Buried
at
Oates
in
Eſsex



Siſte Viator.

Hic juxta ſitus eſt,

JOHANNES LOCKE

Si qualis fuerit rogas, mediocritate ſuâ
contentum ſe vixiſſe reſpondet. Literis
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veritati unice litaret hoc ex ſcriptis
illius diſce; quæ quod de eo reliquum
eſt, majori fide tibi exhibebunt; quam
epitaphii ſuſpecta elogia, virtutes ſi quas
habuit, minores ſane quam quas ſibi
laudi tibi in exemplum proponeret Vitia
una ſepeliantur. Morum exemplum ſi
quæras, in Evangelio habes, vitiorum
utinam nuſquam, mortalitatis certe
(quod proſit) hic et ubiqꝫ.

Natum Anno Dom. 1632. Aug. 29º.
Mortuum Anno Dom. 1704. Oct. 28º.
memorat hæc tabula brevi et
ipſa interitura.

Author of the Eſsay on the Human Understanding.



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THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, Eſq;

In THREE VOLUMES.

The SIXTH EDITION.

To which is added,
The LIFE of the AUTHOR;
AND
A COLLECTION of ſeveral of his PIECES publiſhed
by Mr. DESMAIZEAUX.

VOL. II.

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and M. COOPER.

M.DCC.LIX.

SOME
CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE
CONSEQUENCES
OF THE
LOWERING of INTEREST,
AND
RAISING the VALUE
OF
MONEY.

In a Letter ſent to a Member of Parliament,
1691.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE Lowering of Intereſt AND RAISING the VALUE OF MONEY.

SIR,

THESE notions concerning coinage having, for the main, as you know, been put into writing, above twelve months ſince; as thoſe other, concerning intereſt, a great deal above ſo many years; I put them now again into your hands, with a liberty (ſince you will have it ſo) to communicate them farther, as you pleaſe. If, upon a review, you continue your favourable opinion of them, and nothing leſs than publiſhing will ſatiſfy you, I muſt deſire you to remember, that you muſt be anſwerable to the world for the ſtile, which is ſuch as a man writes careleſly to his friend, when he ſeeks truth, not ornament; and ſtudies only to be in the right, and to be underſtood. I have, ſince you ſaw them laſt year, met with ſome new objections in print, which I have endeavoured to remove; and particularly I have taken into conſideration a printed ſheet, entitled, " Remarks upon a paper given in to the " lords, &c." becauſe one may naturally ſuppoſe, that he, that was ſo much a patron of that cauſe, would omit nothing, that could be ſaid in favour of it. To this I muſt here add, That I am juſt now told from Holland, " That the States, " finding themſelves abuſed, by coining a vaſt quantity of their baſe [Schillings] " money, made of their own Ducatoons, and other finer ſilver, melted down, have " put a ſtop to the minting of any but fine ſilver coin, till they ſhould ſettle their " mint upon a new foot."

I know the ſincere love and concern, you have for your country, puts you conſtantly upon caſting about, on all hands, for any means to ſerve it; and will not ſuffer you to over look any thing, you conceive, may be of any the leaſt uſe, though offer'd you from the meaneſt capacities: you could not elſe have put me upon looking out my old papers, concerning the reducing of intereſt to 4 per cent. which have ſo long lain by, and forgotten. Upon this new ſurvey of them, I find not my thoughts now to differ from thoſe I had near twenty years ſince: they have to me ſtill the appearance of truth; nor ſhould I otherwiſe venture them, ſo much as to your ſight. If my notions are wrong, my intention, I am ſure is right; and whatever I have failed in, I ſhall at leaſt let you ſee with what obedience I am,

SIR,

Nov. 7, 1691.

Your moſt humble ſervant.

SIR,

I Have ſo little concern in paying or receiving of "intereſt," that were I in no more danger to be miſled by inability and ignorance, than I am to be biaſſed by intereſt and inclination, I might hope to give you a very perfect and clear account, of the conſequences of a law to reduce intereſt to 4 per cent. But, ſince you are pleaſed to aſk my opinion, I ſhall endeavour fairly to ſtate this matter of uſe, with the beſt of my ſkill.

The firſt thing to be conſidered is, "Whether the price of the hire of money "can be regulated by law?" And to that I think, generally ſpeaking, one may ſay, "'tis manifeſt it cannot." For ſince it's impoſſible to make a law, that ſhall hinder a man from giving away his money, or eſtate to whom he pleaſes, it will be impoſſible, by any contrivance of law, to hinder men, ſkilled in the power they have, over their own goods, and the ways of conveying them to others, to purchaſe money to be lent them, at what rate ſoever their occaſions ſhall make it neceſſary for them to have it. For it is to be remembered, that no man borrows money, or pays uſe, out of mere pleaſure: 'tis the want of money drives men to that trouble and charge of borrowing; and proportionably to this want, ſo will every one have it, whatever price it coſt him. Wherein the ſkilful, I ſay, will always ſo manage it, as to avoid the prohibition of your law, and keep out of its penalty, do what you can. What then will be the unavoidable conſequences of ſuch a law?

1. It will make the difficulty of borrowing; and lending much greater; whereby trade (the foundation of riches) will be obſtructed.

2. It will be a prejudice to none, but thoſe who moſt need aſſiſtance and help; I mean widows and orphans, and others uninſtructed in the arts and management of more ſkilful men; whoſe eſtates lying in money, they will be ſure, eſpecially orphans, to have no more profit of their money, than what "intereſt" the law barely allows.

3. It will mightily increaſe the advantage of bankers and ſcriveners, and other ſuch expert brokers; who ſkill'd in the arts of putting out money, according to the true and natural value, which the preſent ſtate of trade and money and debts ſhall always raiſe intereſt to, they will infallibly get what the true value of intereſt ſhall be above the legal. For, men finding the convenience of lodging their money in hands, where they can be ſure of it, at ſhort warning, the ignorant and lazy will be forwardeſt to put it into theſe men's hands, who are known willingly to receive it, and where they can readily have the whole, or a part, upon any ſudden occaſion, that may call for it.

4 I fear, I may reckon it as one of the probable conſequences of ſuch a law, that it is likely to cauſe great perjury in the nation; a crime, than which nothing is more carefully to be prevented by lawmakers, not only by penalties, that ſhall attend apparent and proved perjury, but by avoiding and leſſening, as much as may be, the temptations to it. For where thoſe are ſtrong, (as they are, where men ſhall ſwear for their own advantage) there the fear of penalties to follow, will have little reſtraint, eſpecially if the crime be hard to be proved. All which, I ſuppoſe, will happen in this caſe, where ways will be found out to receive money upon other pretences than for uſe, to evade the rule and rigor of the law: and there will be ſecret truſt and colluſions amongſt men, that though they may be ſuſpected, can never be proved, without their own confeſſion. I have heard very ſober and obſerving perſons complain of the danger men's lives and properties are in, by the frequency and faſhionableneſs of perjury amongſt us. Faith and truth, eſpecially in all occaſions of atteſting it, upon the ſolemn appeal to heaven by an oath, is the great bond of ſociety: this it becomes the wiſdom of magiſtrates carefully to ſupport, and render as ſacred and awful, in the minds of the people, as they can. But, if ever frequency of oaths ſhall make them be looked on, as formalities of law, or the cuſtom of ſtraining of truth, (which men's ſwearing in their own caſes is apt to lead them to) has

once dipp'd men in perjury, and the guilt, with the temptation, has ſpread itſelf very wide, and made it almoſt faſhionable in ſome caſes, it will be impoſſible for the ſociety (theſe bonds being diſſolved) to ſubſiſt. All muſt break in pieces, and run to confuſion. That ſwearing in their own caſes is apt by degrees to lead men into as little regard of ſuch oaths, as they have of their ordinary talk, I think there is reaſon to ſuſpect, from what has been obſerved, in ſomething of that kind. Maſters of ſhips are a ſort of men generally induſtrious and ſober, and I ſuppoſe may be thought, for their number and rank, to be equally honeſt to any other ſort of men; and yet, by the diſcourſe I have had with merchants in other countries, I find that they think, in thoſe parts, they take a great liberty in their cuſtom-houſe oaths, to that degree, that I remember I was once told, in a trading town beyond ſea, of a maſter of a veſſel, there eſteemed a ſober and fair man, who yet could not hold ſaying, "God forbid that a cuſtom-houſe oath ſhould be a ſin." I ſay not this to make any reflection upon a ſort of men, that I think as uncorrupt as any other; and who, I am ſure, ought in England to be cheriſhed and eſteemed, as the moſt induſtrious and moſt beneficial of any of its ſubjects: but I could not forbear to give this here, as an inſtance, how dangerous a temptation it is, to bring men cuſtomarily to ſwear, where they have any concernment of their own. And it will always be worthy the care and conſideration of law-makers, to keep up the opinion of an oath, high and ſacred, as it ought to be, in the minds of the people: which can never be done, where frequency of oaths, biaſſed by intereſt, has eſtabliſhed a neglect of them; and faſhion (which it ſeldom fails to do) has given countenance to what profit rewards.

But that law cannot keep men from taking more uſe, than you ſet (the want of money being that alone which regulates its price) will perhaps appear, if we conſider how hard it is to ſet a price upon wine, or ſilks, or other unneceſſary commodities; but how impoſſible it is to ſet a rate upon victuals, in a time of famine. For, money being an univerſal commodity, and as neceſſary to trade as food is to life, every body muſt have it, at what rate they can get it; and unavoidably pay dear, when it is ſcarce; and debts, no leſs than trade, have made borrowing in faſhion. The bankers are a clear inſtance of this: for ſome years ſince, the ſcarcity of money having made it in England worth really more than ſix per cent. moſt of thoſe that had not the ſkill to let it for more than ſix per cent. and ſecure themſelves from the penalty of the law, put it in the bankers hands, where it was ready at their call, when they had an opportunity of greater improvement. So that the rate you ſet, profits not the lenders, and very few of the borrowers, who are fain to pay the price for money, that commodity would bear, were it left free; and the gain is only to the banker. And ſhould you leſſen the uſe to four per cent. the merchant or tradeſman that borrows, would not have it one jot cheaper than he has now; but probably theſe two ill effects would follow: Firſt, That he would pay dearer; and, Secondly, That there would be leſs money left in the country, to drive the trade. For the bankers, paying at moſt but four per cent. and receiving from ſix to ten per cent. or more, at that low rate could be content to have more money lie dead by them, than now, when it is higher: by which means there would be leſs money ſtirring in trade, and a greater ſcarcity; which would raiſe it upon the borrower, by this monopoly. And what a part of our treaſure their ſkill and management, joined with others lazineſs, or want of ſkill, is apt to draw into their hands, is to be known by thoſe vaſt ſums of money, they were found to owe, at the ſhutting up of the Exchequer: and though it be very true, yet it is almoſt beyond belief, that one private goldſmith of London ſhould have credit, upon his ſingle ſecurity, (being uſually nothing but a note, under one of his ſervant's hands) for above eleven hundred thouſand pounds at once. The ſame reaſons, I ſuppoſe, will ſtill keep on the ſame trade; and, when you have taken it down by law, to that rate, no body will think of having more than four per cent. of the banker; though thoſe, who have need of money, to employ it in trade, will not then, any more than now, get it under five or ſix, or, as ſome pay, ſeven or eight. And if they had then, when the law permitted men to make

make more profit of their money, ſo large a proportion of the caſh of the nation in their hands, who can think, but that, by this law, it ſhould be more driven into Lombard-ſtreet now? there being many now, who lend them at four or five per cent. who would not lend to others at ſix. It would therefore, perhaps, bring down the rate of money to the borrower, and certainly diſtribute it better to the advantage of trade in the country, if the legal uſe were kept pretty near to the natural; (by natural uſe, I mean that rate of money, which the preſent ſcarcity of it makes it naturally at, upon an equal diſtribution of it) for then men, being licenſed by the law to take near the full natural uſe, will not be forward to carry it to London, to put it into the banker's hands; but will lend it to their neighbours in the country, where it is convenient for trade it ſhould be. But, if you leſſen the rate of uſe, the lender, whoſe intereſt it is to keep up the rate of money, will rather lend it to the banker, at the legal intereſt, than to the tradeſman, or gentleman, who, when the law is broken, ſhall be ſure to pay the full natural intereſt, or more; becauſe of the ingroſſing by the banker, as well as the riſque in tranſgreſſing the law: whereas, were the natural uſe, ſuppoſe ſeven per cent. and the legal ſix; firſt, the owner would not venture the penalty of the law, for the gaining one in ſeven, that being the utmoſt his money would yield: nor would the banker venture to borrow, where his gains would be but one per cent. nor the money'd man lend him, what he could make better profit of legally, at home. All the danger lies in this, That your trade ſhould ſuffer, if your being behind-hand has made the natural uſe ſo high, that your tradeſman cannot live upon his labour, but that your rich neighbours will ſo underſell you, that the return you make, will not amount to pay the uſe, and afford a livelihood. There is no way to recover from this, but by a general frugality and induſtry; or by being maſters of the trade of ſome commodity, which the world muſt have from you at your rate, becauſe it cannot be otherwhere ſupplied.

Now, I think, the natural intereſt of money is raiſed two ways: firſt, When the money of a country is but little, in proportion to the debts of the inhabitants, one amongſt other. For, ſuppoſe ten thouſand pounds were ſufficient to manage the trade of Bermudas, and that the ten firſt planters carried over twenty thouſand pounds, which they lent to the ſeveral tradeſmen and inhabitants of the country, who living above their gains, had ſpent ten thouſand pounds of this money, and it were gone out of the iſland: 'tis evident, that, ſhould all the creditors at once call in their money, there would be a great ſcarcity of money, when that, employed in trade, muſt be taken out of the tradeſmens hands to pay debts; or elſe the debtors want money, and be expoſed to their creditors, and ſo intereſt will be high. But this ſeldom happening, that all, or the greateſt part, of the creditors do at once call for their money, unleſs it be in ſome great and general danger, is leſs and ſeldomer felt than the following, unleſs where the debts of the people are grown to a greater proportion; for that, conſtantly cauſing more borrowers than there can be lenders, will make money ſcarce, and conſequently intereſt high. Secondly, That, which conſtantly raiſes the natural intereſt of money, is, when money is little, in proportion to the trade of a country. For in trade every body calls for money, according as he wants it, and this diſproportion is always felt. For, if Engliſhmen owed in all but one million, and there were a million of money in England, the money would be well enough proportioned to the debts: but, if two millions were neceſſary to carry on the trade, there would be a million wanting, and the price of money would be raiſed, as it is of any other commodity in a market, where the merchandize will not ſerve half the cuſtomers, and there are two buyers for one ſeller.

'Tis in vain, therefore, to go about effectually to reduce the price of intereſt by a law; and you may as rationally hope to ſet a fixed rate upon the hire of houſes, or ſhips, as of money. He that wants a veſſel, rather than loſe his market, will not ſtick to have it at the market-rate, and find ways to do it with ſecurity to the owner, though the rate were limited by law: and, he that wants money, rather than loſe his voyage, or his trade, will pay the natural intereſt for it; and ſubmit to ſuch ways of conveyance, as ſhall keep the lender out of the reach of the law. So that your act, at beſt, will ſerve only to increaſe the arts of lending, but not at all leſſen the charge of the borrower: he, 'tis likely, ſhall, with more trouble, and going farther about, pay alſo the more for his money; unleſs you intend to break in, only upon mortgages and contracts already made, and (which is not to be ſuppoſed) by a law, poſt factum, void bargains lawfully made, and give to Richard what is Peter's due, for no other reaſon, but becauſe one was borrower, and the other lender.

But, ſuppoſing the law reach'd the intention of the promoters of it; and that this act be ſo contrived, that it fixed the natural price of money, and hinder'd its being, by any body, lent at a higher uſe than four per cent. which is plain it cannot: let us, in the next place, ſee what will be the conſequences of it.

1. It will be a loſs to widows, orphans, and all thoſe, who have their eſtates in money, one third of their eſtates; which will be a very hard caſe upon a great number of people; and it is warily to be conſidered, by the wiſdom of the nation, whether they will thus, at one blow, fine and impoveriſh a great and innocent part of the people, who having their eſtates in money, have as much right to make as much of the money as it is worth, (for more they cannot) as the landlord has to let his land for as much as it will yield. To fine men one third of their eſtates, without any crime, or offence committed, ſeems very hard.

2. As it will be a conſiderable loſs and injury to the money'd man, ſo it will be no advantage at all to the kingdom. For, ſo trade be not cramp'd, and the exportation of our native commodities and manufactures not hindered, it will be no matter to the kingdom, who amongſt ourſelves gets, or loſes: only common charity teaches, that thoſe ſhould be moſt taken care of, by the law, who are leaſt capable of taking care for themſelves.

3. It will be a gain to the borrowing merchant. For if he borrow at four per cent. and his returns be twelve per cent. he will have eight per cent. and the lender four: whereas now they divide the profit equally at ſix per cent. But this neither gets, nor loſes, to the kingdom, in your trade, ſuppoſing the merchant and lender to be both Engliſhmen: only it will, as I have ſaid, transfer a third part of the money'd man's eſtate, who had nothing elſe to live on, into the merchant's pocket; and that without any merit in the one, or tranſgreſſion in the other. Private mens intereſts ought not thus to be neglected, nor ſacrificed to any thing, but the manifeſt advantage of the publick. But, in this caſe, it will be quite the contrary. This loſs to the money'd men will be a prejudice to trade: ſince it will diſcourage lending at ſuch a diſproportion of profit, to riſque; as we ſhall ſee more by and by, when we come to conſider of what conſequence it is to encourage lending, that ſo none of the money of the nation may lie dead, and thereby prejudice trade.

4. It will hinder trade. For, there being a certain proportion of money, neceſſary for driving ſuch a proportion of trade, ſo much money of this, as lies ſtill, leſſens ſo much of the trade. Now it cannot be rationally expected, but that, where the venture is great, and the gains ſmall, (as it is in lending in England, upon low intereſt) many will chuſe rather to hoard up their money, than venture it abroad, on ſuch terms. This will be a loſs to the kingdom, and ſuch a loſs as, here in England, ought chiefly to be look'd after: for, we having no mines, nor any other way of getting, or keeping of riches amongſt us, but by trade, ſo much of our trade as is loſt, ſo much of our riches muſt neceſſarily go with it; and the over-balancing of trade, between us and our neighbours, muſt inevitably carry away our money, and quickly leave us poor, and expoſed. Gold and ſilver, though they ſerve for few, yet they command all the conveniencies of life, and therefore in a plenty of them conſiſts riches.

Every one knows that mines alone furniſh theſe: but withal 'tis obſervable, that moſt countries, ſtored with them by nature, are poor. The digging and refining of theſe metals taking up the labour, and waſting the number of the people. For which reaſon the wiſe policy of the Chineſe will not ſuffer the mines, they have, to be wrought. Nor indeed, things rightly conſidered, do gold and ſilver, drawn out of the mine, equally enrich, with what is got by trade. He that would make the lighter ſcale preponderate to the oppoſite, will not ſo ſoon do it, by adding increaſe of new weight to the emptier, as if he took out of the heavier what he adds to the lighter, for then half ſo much will do it. Riches do not conſiſt in having more gold and ſilver, but in having more in proportion than the reſt of the world, or than our neighbours, whereby we are enabled to procure to ourſelves a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life, than comes within the reach of neighbouring kingdoms and ſtates, who, ſharing the gold and ſilver of the world in a leſs proportion, want the means of plenty and power, and ſo are poorer. Nor would they be one jot the richer, if, by the diſcovery of new mines, the quantity of gold and ſilver in the world becoming twice as much as it is, their ſhares of them ſhould be doubled. By gold and ſilver in the world, I muſt be underſtood to mean, not what lies hid in the earth; but what is already out of the mine, in the hands and poſſeſſions of men. This, if well conſidered, would be no ſmall encouragement to trade, which is a ſurer and ſhorter way to riches, than any other, where it is managed with ſkill and induſtry.

In a country not furniſhed with mines, there are but two ways of growing rich, either conqueſt, or commerce. By the firſt the Romans made themſelves maſters of the riches of the world; but I think that, in our preſent circumſtances, no body is vain enough to entertain a thought of our reaping the profits of the world with our ſwords, and making the ſpoil and tribute of vanquiſhed nations, the fund for the ſupply of the charges of the government, with an overplus for the wants, and equally craving luxury, and faſhionable vanity of the people.

Commerce, therefore, is the only way left to us, either for riches, or ſubſiſtence: for this the advantages of our ſituation, as well as the induſtry and inclination of our people, bold and ſkilful at ſea, do naturally fit us: by this the nation of England has been hitherto ſupported, and trade left almoſt to itſelf, and aſſiſted only by the natural advantages above-mentioned, brought us in plenty and riches, and always ſet this kingdom in a rank equal, if not ſuperior to any of its neighbours; and would, no doubt, without any difficulty have continued it ſo, if the more enlarged, and better underſtood intereſt of trade, ſince the improvement of navigation, had not raiſed us many rivals; and the amazing politicks of ſome late reigns, let in other competitors with us for the ſea, who will be ſure to ſeize to themſelves whatever parts of trade, our miſmanagement, or want of money, ſhall let ſlip out of our hands: and when it is once loſt, 'twill be too late to hope, by a miſ-tim'd care, eaſily to retrieve it again. For the currents of trade, like thoſe of waters, make themſelves channels, out of which they are afterwards as hard to be diverted, as rivers that have worn themſelves deep within their banks.

Trade, then, is neceſſary to the producing of riches, and money neceſſary to the carrying on of trade. This is principally to be looked after, and taken care of. For if this be neglected, we ſhall in vain by contrivance amongſt ourſelves, and ſhuffling the little money we have, from one another's hands, endeavour to prevent our wants: decay of trade will quickly waſte all the remainder; and then the landed-man, who thinks, perhaps, by the fall of intereſt to raiſe the value of his land, will find himſelf cruelly miſtaken, when the money being gone, (as it will be, if our trade be not kept up) he can get neither farmer to rent, nor purchaſer to buy his land. Whatſoever, therefore, hinders the lending of money, injures trade: and ſo the reducing of money to four per cent. which will diſcourage men from lending, will be a loſs to the kingdom, in ſtopping ſo much of the current money, which turns the wheels of trade. But all this upon a ſuppoſition, that the lender and borrower are both Engliſhmen.

If the lender be a foreigner, by leſſening intereſt from ſix to four, you get to the kingdom one third part of the intereſt we pay yearly to foreigners: which let any one, if he pleaſe, think conſiderable. But then, upon leſſening intereſt to four per cent. it is likely one of theſe things will happen: that either you fall the price of your native commodities, or leſſen your trade, or elſe prevent not the high uſe, as you intended. For, at the time of leſſening your intereſt, you want money for your trade, or you do not. If you do not, there is no need to prevent borrowing at a high rate of your neighbours. For no country borrows of its neighbours, but where there is need of money for trade: no body will borrow more of a foreigner to let it lie ſtill. And, if you do want money, neceſſity will ſtill make you borrow where you can, and at the rates your neceſſity, not your laws, ſhall ſet: or elſe, if there be ſcarcity of money, it muſt hinder the merchant's buying and exportation, and the artiſan's manufacture. Now the kingdom gets, or loſes by this (for no queſtion the merchant, by low intereſt, gets all the while) only proportionably (allowing the conſumption of foreign commodities to be ſtill the ſame) as the paying of uſe to foreigners carries away more, or leſs, of our money, than want of money, and ſtopping our trade keeps us from bringing in, by hindring our gains, which can be only eſtimated by thoſe, who know how much money we borrow of foreigners, and at what rate; and too, what profit in trade we make of that money.

Borrowing of foreigners upon intereſt, it's true, carries away ſome of our gain: but yet, upon examination it will be found, that our growing rich, or poor, depends not at all upon our borrowing upon intereſt, or not; but only, which is greater or leſs, our importation, or exportation of conſumable commodities. For, ſuppoſing two millions of money will drive the trade of England, and that we have money enough of our own to do it; if we conſume of our own product and manufacture, and what we purchaſe by it of foreign commodities, one million, but of the other million conſume nothing, but make a return of ten per cent. per annum, we muſt then every year be one hundred thouſand pounds richer, and our ſtock be ſo much increaſed: but, if we import more conſumable commodities, than we export, our money muſt go out to pay for them, and we grow poorer. Suppoſe, therefore, ill huſbandry had brought us to one million ſtock, and we borrow the other million (as we muſt, or loſe half our trade) at ſix per cent. If we conſume one moiety, and make ſtill ten per cent. per ann. return of the other million, the kingdom gets forty thouſand pounds per ann. though it pay ſixty thouſand pounds per ann. uſe. So that, if the merchant's return be more than his uſe, (which 'tis certain it is, or elſe he will not trade) and all that is ſo traded for, on borrowed money, be but the over-balance of our exportation to our importation, the kingdom gets, by this borrowing, ſo much as the merchant's gain is above his uſe. But, if we borrow only for our own expences, we grow doubly poor, by paying money for the commodity we conſume, and uſe for that money; though the merchant gets all this while, by making returns greater than his uſe. And therefore, borrowing of foreigners, in itſelf, makes not the kingdom rich, or poor; for it may do either: but ſpending more than our fruit, or manufactures, will pay for, brings in poverty, and poverty borrowing.

For money as neceſſary to trade, may be doubly conſidered. Firſt, as in his hands that pays the labourer and landholder, (for here its motion terminates, and through whoſe hands ſoever it paſſes between theſe, he is but a broker) and if this man want money, (as for example, the clothier) the manufacture is not made; and ſo the trade ſtops, and is loſt. Or, ſecondly, money may be conſidered as in the hand of the conſumer, under which name I here reckon the merchant who buys the commodity, when made, to export: and, if he want money, the value of the commodity, when made, is leſſened, and ſo the kingdom loſes in the price. If therefore, uſe be leſſened, and you cannot tie foreigners to your terms, then the ill effects will fall upon your landholders and artiſans: if foreigners can be forced, by your law, to lend you money, only at your own rate, or not lend at all, is it not more likely they will rather take it home, and think it ſafer in their own country at four per cent. than abroad, in a decaying country? Nor can their overplus of money bring them to lend to you, on your terms: for, when your merchants want of money ſhall have ſunk the price of your market, a Dutchman will find it more gains, to buy your commodity himſelf, than lend his money at four per cent. to an Engliſh merchant to trade with. Nor will the act of navigation hinder their coming, by making them come empty, ſince even already there are thoſe who think, that many, who go for Engliſh merchants, are but Dutch factors, and trade for others in their own names. The kingdom, therefore, will loſe by this lowering of intereſt, if it makes foreigners withdraw any of their money, as well as if it hinders any of your people from lending theirs, where trade has need of it.

In a treatiſe, writ on purpoſe for the bringing down of intereſt, I find this argument, of foreigners calling away their money, to the prejudice of our trade, thus anſwered, "That the money of foreigners, is not brought into the land by "ready coin, or bullion, but by goods, or bills of exchange, and, when it is "paid, muſt be returned by goods, or bills of exchange; and there will not "be the leſs money in the land." I could not but wonder to ſee a man, who undertook to write of money and intereſt, talk ſo directly beſides the matter, in the buſineſs of trade. "Foreigner's money, he ſays, is not brought into the "land by ready coin, or bullion, but by goods, or bills of exchange." How then do we come by bullion, or money? For gold grows not, that I know, in our country, and ſilver ſo little, that one hundred thouſandth part of the ſilver we have now in England, was not drawn out of any mines in this iſland. If he means that the monied man in Holland, who puts out his money at intereſt here, did not ſend it over in bullion, or ſpecie hither: that may be true, or falſe; but either way helps not that author's purpoſe. For, if he paid his money to a merchant, his neighbour, and took his bills for it here in England, he did the ſame thing, as if he had ſent over that money, ſince he does but make that merchant leave in England the money, which he has due to him there, and otherwiſe would carry away. "No, ſays our author, he cannot carry it away; "for, ſays he, when it is paid, it muſt be returned by goods, or bills of ex"change." It muſt not be paid and exported in ready money, ſo ſays our law indeed, but that is a law to hedge in the cuckoo, and ſerves to no purpoſe. For, if we export not goods, for which our merchants have money due to them in Holland, How can it be paid by bills of exchange? And for goods, one hundred pounds worth of goods can no where pay two hundred pounds in money. This being that which I find many men deceive themſelves with, in trade, it may be worth while to make it a little plainer.

Let us ſuppoſe England peopled, as it is now; and its woollen manufacture in the ſame ſtate and perfection, that it is at preſent; and that we, having no money at all, trade with this our woollen manufacture, for the value of two hundred thouſand pounds yearly to Spain where there actually is a million in money: farther, let us ſuppoſe that we bring back from Spain yearly in oil, wine, and fruit, to the value of one hundred thouſand pounds, and continue to do this ten years together: 'tis plain that we have had for our two millions value in woollen manufacture, carried thither, one million returned in wine, oil, and fruit: but what is become of t'other million? Will the merchants be content to loſe it? That you may be ſure they would not, nor have traded on, if they had not, every year, returns made, anſwering their exportation. How then were the returns made? In money it is evident. For the Spaniards having, in ſuch a trade, no debts, nor the poſſibility of any debts in England, cannot pay one farthing of that other million, by bills of exchange: and having no commodities, that we will take off, above the value of one hundred thouſand pounds per ann. they cannot pay us in commodities. From whence it neceſſarily follows, that the hundred thouſand pounds per ann. wherein we over-balance them in trade, muſt be paid us in money; and ſo, at the ten years end, their million of money, (though their law make it death to export it) will be all brought into England; as, in truth by this over-balance of trade, the greateſt part of our money hath been brought into England, out of Spain.

Let us ſuppoſe ourſelves now poſſeſſed of this million of money; and exporting yearly out of England, to the ſeveral parts of the world, conſumable commodities, to the value of a million, but importing yearly in commodities, which we conſume amongſt us, to the value of eleven hundred thouſand pounds. If ſuch a trade as this be managed amongſt us, and continue ten years, it is evident, that our million of money will, at the end of the ten years, be inevitably all gone from us to them, by the ſame way that it came to us; that is, by their over-balance of trade; for we, importing every year one hundred thouſand pounds

worth

worth of commodities, more than we export, and there being no foreigners, that will give us one hundred thouſand pounds every year for nothing, it is unavoidable, that one hundred thouſand pounds of our money muſt go out every year, to pay for that over-plus, which our commodities do not pay for. 'Tis ridiculous to ſay, that bills of exchange ſhall pay our debts abroad: that cannot be, till ſcrips of paper can be made current coin. The Engliſh merchant who has no money owing him abroad, cannot expect to have his bills paid there. Or, if he has credit enough with his correſpondent, to have his bills anſwered; this pays none of the debt of England, but only changes the creditor. And if, upon the general balance of trade, Engliſh merchants owe to foreigners one hundred thouſand pounds, or a million, if commodities do not, our money muſt go out to pay it, or elſe our credit be loſt, and our trade ſtop, and be loſt too.

A KINGDOM grows rich, or poor, juſt as a farmer doth, and no otherwiſe. Let us ſuppoſe the whole iſle of Portland one farm; and that the owner beſides what ſerves his family, carries to market to Weymouth and Dorcheſter, &c. cattle, corn, butter, cheeſe, wool or cloth, lead and tin, all commodities, produced and wrought within his farm of Portland, to the value of a thouſand pounds yearly; and for this brings home in ſalt, wine, oil, ſpice, linnen, and ſilks, to the value of nine hundred pounds, and the remaining hundred pounds in money. 'Tis evident he grows every year a hundred pounds richer, and ſo at the end of ten years will have clearly got a thouſand pounds. If the owner be a better huſband, and contenting himſelf with his native commodities, buy leſs wine, ſpice, and ſilk, at market, and ſo bring home five hundred pounds in money yearly, inſtead of a thouſand pounds, at the end of ten years, he will have five thouſand pounds by him, and be ſo much richer. He dies, and his ſon ſucceeds, a faſhionable young gentleman, that cannot dine without Champagne and Burgundy, nor ſleep but in a damaſk bed; whoſe wife muſt ſpread a long train of brocard, and his children be always in the neweſt French cut and ſtuff. He, being come to the eſtate, keeps on a very buſy family; the markets are weekly frequented, and the commodities of his farm carried out, and ſold, as formerly, but the returns are made ſomething different; the faſhionable way of eating, drinking, furniture, and clothing, for himſelf and family, requires more ſugar and ſpice, wine and fruit, ſilk and ribbons, than in his father's time; ſo that inſtead of nine hundred pounds per annum, he now brings home of conſumable commodities, to the value of eleven hundred pounds yearly. What comes of this? He lives in ſplendor, 'tis true, but this unavoidably carries away the money his father got, and he is every year an hundred pounds poorer. To his expences, beyond his income, add debauchery, idleneſs, and quarrels amongſt his ſervants, whereby his manufacturers are diſturbed, and his buſineſs neglected, and a general diſorder and confuſion through his whole family and farm: this will tumble him down the hill the faſter, and the ſtock, which the induſtry, frugality, and good order of his father had laid up, will be quickly brought to an end, and he faſt in priſon. A farm and a kingdom in this reſpect differ no more, than as greater and leſs. We may trade, and be buſy, and grow poor by it, unleſs we regulate our expences; if to this we are idle, negligent, diſhoneſt, malicious, and diſturb the ſober and induſtrious in their buſineſs, let it be upon what pretence it will, we ſhall ruin the faſter.

So that, whatever, this author, or any one elſe may ſay, money is brought into England, by nothing but ſpending here leſs of foreign commodities, than what we carry to market,, can pay for; nor can debts, we owe to foreigners, be paid by bills of exchange, till our commodities exported, and ſold beyond ſea, have produced money, or debts, due there to ſome of our merchants. For nothing will pay debts, but money, or money's worth, which three or four lines writ in paper, cannot be. If ſuch bills have an intrinſick value, and can ſerve inſtead of money, why do we not ſend them to market, inſtead of our cloth, lead and tin, and at an eaſier rate purchaſe the commodities we want? All, that a bill of exchange can do, is to direct to whom money due, or taken up upon credit, in a foreign country, ſhall be paid: and if we trace it, we ſhall find, that what is owing already, became ſo for commodities, or money carried from hence: and, if it be taken up upon credit, it muſt (let the debt be ſhifted from one creditor to another, as often as you will) at laſt be paid by money, or goods, carried from hence, or elſe the merchant here muſt turn bankrupt.

We have ſeen how riches and money are got, kept, or loſt, in any country; and that is by conſuming leſs of foreign commodities, than what by commodities, or labour, is paid for. This is in the ordinary courſe of things: but where great armies and alliances are to be maintained abroad, by ſupplies ſent out of any country, there often, by a ſhorter and more ſenſible way, the treaſure is diminiſhed. But this, ſince the holy war, or at leaſt ſince the improvement of navigation and trade, ſeldom happening to England, whoſe princes have found the enlarging their power by ſea, and the ſecuring our navigation and trade, more the intereſt of this kingdom than wars, or conqueſts, on the continent: expences in arms beyond ſea have had little influence on our riches or poverty. The next thing to be conſidered, is, how money is neceſſary to trade.

The neceſſity of a certain proportion of money to trade (I conceive) lies in this, That money, in its circulation, driving the ſeveral wheels of trade, whilſt it keeps in that channel (for ſome of it will unavoidably be dreined in to ſtanding pools) is all ſhared between the landholder, whoſe land affords the materials; the labourer, who works them; the broker, *i. e.* the merchant and ſhopkeeper, who diſtributes them to thoſe that want them; and the conſumer, who ſpends them. Now money is neceſſary to all theſe ſorts of men, as ſerving both for counters and for pledges, and ſo carrying with it even reckoning, and ſecurity, that he, that receives it, ſhall have the ſame value for it again, of other things that he wants, whenever he pleaſes. The one of theſe it does by its ſtamp and denomination; the other by its intrinſick value, which is its quantity.

For mankind, having conſented to put an imaginary value upon gold and ſilver, by reaſon of their durableneſs, ſcarcity, and not being very liable to be counterfeited, have made them, by general conſent, the common pledges, whereby men are aſſured, in exchange for them, to receive equally valuable things, to thoſe they parted with, for any quantity of theſe metals. By which means it comes to paſs, that the intrinſick value, regarded in theſe metals, made the common barter, is nothing but the quantity, which men give, or receive of them. For they having, as money, no other value, but as pledges to procure what one wants, or deſires; and they procuring what we want, or deſire, only by their quantity, 'tis evident, that the intrinſick value of ſilver, and gold, uſed in commerce, is nothing but their quantity.

The neceſſity, therefore, of a proportion of money to trade, depends on money, not as counters, for the reckoning may be kept, or transferred by writing; but on money as a pledge, which writing cannot ſupply the place of: ſince the bill, bond, or other note of debt, I receive from one man, will not be accepted as ſecurity by another, he not knowing that the bill, or bond, is true or legal, or that the man, bound to me is honeſt, or reſponſible; and ſo is not valuable enough to become a current pledge, nor can by publick authority, be well made ſo, as in the caſe of aſſigning of bills. Becauſe a law cannot give to bills that intrinſick value, which the univerſal conſent of mankind has annexed to ſilver and gold. And hence foreigners can never be brought to take your bills or writings, for any part of payment, though perhaps, they might paſs as valuable conſiderations among your own people, did not this very much hinder it, *viz.* That they are liable to unavoidable doubt, diſpute, and counterfeiting, and require other proofs, to aſſure us that they are true and good ſecurity, than our eyes, or a touchſtone. And at beſt, this courſe, if practicable, will not hinder us from being poor; but may be ſuſpected to help to make us ſo, by keeping us from feeling our poverty, which, in diſtreſs, will be ſure to find us with greater diſadvantage. Though it be certain it is better than letting any part of our trade fall for want of current pledges; and better too than borrowing money of our neighbours upon uſe, if this way of aſſigning bills can be made ſo eaſy, ſafe, and univerſal at home, as to hinder it.

To return to the buſineſs in hand, and ſhew the neceſſity of a proportion of money to trade. Every man muſt have at leaſt ſo much money, or ſo timely recruits, as may in hand, or in a ſhort diſtance of time, ſatisfy his creditor who ſupplies him with the neceſſaries of life, or of his trade. For nobody has any longer theſe neceſſary ſupplies, than he has money, or credit, which is nothing elſe but an aſſurance of money, in ſome ſhort time. So that it is requiſite to trade, that there ſhould be ſo much money, as to keep up the landholder's, labourer's, and broker's credit: and therefore ready money muſt be conſtantly exchang'd for wares and labour, or follow within a ſhort time after.

This ſhews the neceſſity of ſome proportion of money to trade: but what proportion that is, is hard to determine; becauſe it depends not barely on the quantity of money, but the quickneſs of its circulation. The very ſame ſhilling may, at one time, pay twenty men in twenty days: at another, reſt in the ſame hands one hundred days together. This makes it impoſſible exactly to eſtimate the quantity of money needful in trade; but to make ſome probable gueſs, we are to conſider, how much money it is neceſſary to ſuppoſe muſt reſt conſtantly in each man's hands, as requiſite to the carrying on of trade.

First, therefore, the labourers, living generally but from hand to mouth, and, indeed, conſidered as labourers in order to trade, may well enough carry on their part, if they have but money enough to buy victuals, cloaths, and tools: all which may very well be provided, without any great ſum of money, lying ſtill in their hands. The labourers, therefore, being uſually paid once a week, (if the times of payment be ſeldomer, there muſt be more money for the carrying on this part of trade) we may ſuppoſe there is conſtantly amongſt them, one with another, or thoſe who are to pay them, always one week's wages in ready money. For it cannot be thought, that all, or moſt of the labourers pay away all their wages conſtantly, as ſoon as they receive it, and live upon truſt till next pay-day. This the farmer and tradeſman could not well bear, were it every labourer's caſe, and every one to be truſted: and, therefore, they muſt of neceſſity keep ſome money in their hands, to go to market for victuals, and to other tradeſmen as poor as themſelves, for tools; and lay up money too to buy cloaths, or pay for thoſe they bought upon credit. Which money, thus neceſſarily reſting in their hands, we cannot imagine to be, one with another, much leſs than a week's wages, that muſt be in their pockets, or ready in the farmer's hands. For he, who employs a labourer at a ſhilling per day, and pays him on Saturday nights, cannot be ſuppoſed conſtantly to receive that ſix ſhillings, juſt the ſame Saturday: it muſt ordinarily be in his hands one time with another, if not a whole week, yet ſeveral days before.

This was the ordinary courſe, whilſt we had money running, in the ſeveral channels of commerce: but that now very much failing, and the farmer, not having money to pay the labourer, ſupplies him with corn, which, in this great plenty, the labourer will have at his own rate, or elſe not take it off his hands for wages. And as for the workmen, who are employed in our manufactures, eſpecially the woollen one, theſe the clothier, not having ready money to pay, furniſhes with the neceſſaries of life, and ſo trucks commodities for work, which, ſuch as they are, good, or bad, the workman muſt take at his maſter's rate, or ſit ſtill and ſtarve: whilſt by this means, this new ſort of ingroſſers, or foreſtallers, having the feeding and ſupplying this numerous body of workmen out of their warehouſes, (for they have now magazines of all ſorts of wares) ſet the price upon the poor landholder. So that the markets, now being deſtroyed, and the farmer not finding vent there for his butter, cheeſe, bacon, and corn, &c. for which he was wont to bring home ready money, muſt ſell it to theſe ingroſſers, on their own terms of time and rate; and allow it to their own day-labourers, under the true market-price. What kind of influence this is like to have upon land, and how this way rents are like to be paid at quarter-day, is eaſy to apprehend: and 'tis no wonder to hear every day, of farmers breaking and running away. For, if they cannot receive money for their goods at market, 'twill be impoſſible for them, to pay their landlord's rent. If any one doubt whether this be ſo, I deſire him to enquire how many farmers in the weſt are broke, and gone, ſince Michaelmas laſt. Want of money, being to this degree, works both ways upon the landholder. For, firſt, the ingroſſing foreſtaller lets not the money come to market; but ſupplying the workman, who is employed by him in manufacture, with neceſſaries, impoſes his price, and forbearance on the farmer, who cannot ſell to the others. And the labourer who is employed by the landholder in huſbandry, impoſes alſo his rate on him, for the commodities he takes. For there being a want of day-labourers in the country, they muſt be humoured, or elſe they will neither work for you, nor take your commodities for their labour.

Secondly, As for the landholder, ſince his tenants cannot coin their rent juſt at quarter-day, but muſt gather it up by degrees, and lodge it with them 'till pay-day; or borrow it of thoſe, who have it lying by them, or do gather it up by degrees, which is the ſame thing, and muſt be neceſſarily ſo much money for ſome time lying ſtill. For all that is paid in great ſums, muſt ſomewhere be gathered up by the retail incomes of a trade, or elſe lie ſtill too in great ſums, which is the ſame ſtop of money, or a greater. Add to this, That to pay the creditor, that lent him his rent, he muſt gather up money by degrees, as the ſale of his commodities ſhall bring it in, and ſo makes a greater ſtop, and greater want of money: ſince the borrowed money, that paid the landholder the 25th of March, muſt be ſuppoſed to lie ſtill ſome time, in the creditor's hand, before he lent it the tenant; and the money that pays the creditor three months after, muſt lie ſtill ſome time in the tenant's. Nor does the landlord pay away his rent uſually, as ſoon as he receives it, but by degrees, as his occaſions call for it. All this conſidered, we cannot but ſuppoſe, that, between the landlord and tenant, there muſt neceſſarily be at leaſt a quarter of the yearly revenue of the land, conſtantly in their hands. Indeed conſidering, that moſt part of the rents of England are paid at our Lady-day and Michaelmas, and that the ſame money, which pays me my rent from my tenant the 25th of March, or thereabouts, cannot pay my next neighbour his rent from his tenant at the ſame time, much leſs one more remote in another country, it might ſeem requiſite to ſuppoſe half the yearly revenue of the land to be neceſſarily employed in paying of rent. For to ſay that ſome tenants break, and pay not their rent at all, and others pay not till two, three, four, five, ſix, &c. months after quarter-day, and ſo the rent is not all paid at one time, is no more than to ſay, that there is money wanting to the trade. For, if the tenant fail the landlord, he muſt fail his creditor, and he his, and ſo on, till ſome body break, and ſo trade decay, for want of money. But ſince a conſiderable part of the land of England is in the owner's hands, who neither pay nor receive great ſums for it at a certain day; becauſe too, (which is the chief reaſon) we are not to conſider here, how much money is in any one man's, or any one ſort of men's hands, at one time; for that at other times may be diſtributed into other hands, and ſerve other parts of trade; but how much money is neceſſary to be in each man's hands all the year round, taking one time with another, i. e. having three hundred pounds in his hand one month, is to be reckoned as one hundred pounds in his hand three months, (and ſo proportionably) I think we may well ſuppoſe a quarter of the yearly revenue to be conſtantly in the landlord's, or tenant's hands.

Here, by the by, we may obſerve, that it were better for trade, and conſequently for every body, (for more money would be ſtirring, and leſs would do the buſineſs) if rents were paid by ſhorter intervals than ſix months. For, ſuppoſing I let a farm at fifty two pounds per ann. if my rent be paid half yearly, there is required twenty ſix pounds to be employed in the payment of it in one entire ſum, (if it be paid well, and if it be not paid well, for want of ſo much money to be ſpared to that purpoſe, there is ſo much want of money, and trade is ſtill endamaged by it) a great part whereof muſt neceſſarily lie ſtill, before it comes out of my tenant's cheſt to my hands, if it be paid once a quarter, thirteen pounds alone will do it, and leſs money is laid up for it, and ſtopp'd a leſs while in its courſe: but, ſhould it be paid every week, one ſingle twenty ſhillings will pay the rent of fifty two pounds per ann. whence would follow this double benefit. Firſt, That a great deal leſs money would ſerve for the trade of a country. And, ſecondly, That leſs of the money would lie ſtill; the contrary whereof muſt needs happen, where growing debts are to be paid at larger diſtances, and in greater ſums.

Thirdly, As for the brokers, ſince they too muſt lay up the money, coming in by retail, either to go to market, and buy wares, or to pay at the day appointed, which is often ſix months, for thoſe wares which they have already, we cannot ſuppoſe them to have leſs by them, one with another, than one twentieth part of their yearly returns. Whether the money be their own, or they be indebted ſo much, or more, it matters not, if it be neceſſary they ſhould have conſtantly by them, comparing one time with another, at leaſt one twentieth part of their yearly return.

Indeed, in ſome great towns, where the bankers are ready at hand to buy bills, or any other way to lend money, for ſhort time at great intereſt, there perhaps the merchant is not forced to keep ſo much money by him, as in other places, where they have not ſuch a ſupply: but if you conſider what money to do this muſt neceſſarily be conſtantly lodged in the banker's hands, the caſe will be much the ſame.

To theſe ſums, if you add, what part of the money of a country, ſcholars of all ſorts, women, gameſters, and great men's menial ſervants, and all ſuch, that do not contribute at all to trade, either as landholders, labourers, or brokers, will unavoidably have conſtantly in their hands, it cannot well be thought, that leſs than one fiftieth part of the labourer's wages, one fourth part of the landholder's yearly revenue, and one twentieth part of the broker's yearly returns in ready money, will be enough to drive the trade of any country. At leaſt to put it beyond exception low enough, it cannot be imagined that leſs than one moiety of this, i. e. leſs than one hundredth part of the labourer's yearly wages, one eighth part of the landholder's yearly revenue, and one fortieth part of the broker's yearly returns, in ready money, can be enough to move the ſeveral wheels of trade, and keep up commerce, in that life and thriving poſture it ſhould be; and how much the ready caſh of any country is ſhort of this proportion, ſo much muſt the trade be impaired and hindered for want of money.

But however theſe meaſures may be miſtaken, this is evident, that the multiplying of brokers hinders the trade of any country, by making the circuit, which the money goes, larger, and in that circuit more ſtops, ſo that the returns muſt neceſſarily be lower and ſcantier, to the prejudice of trade: beſides that, they eat up too great a ſhare of the gains of trade: by that means ſtarving the labourer, and impoveriſhing the landholder, whoſe intereſt is chiefly to be taken care of, it being a ſettled, unmoveable concernment in the commonwealth.

If this be ſo, it is paſt queſtion, that all encouragement ſhould be given to artificers; and things ſo ordered, as much as might be, that thoſe, who make, ſhould alſo vend and retail out of their own commodities, and they be hindred, as much as poſſible, from paſſing here at home, through divers hands to the laſt buyer. Lazy and unworking ſhopkeepers in this being worſe than gameſters, that they do not only keep ſo much of the money of a country conſtantly in their hands, but alſo make the publick pay them for the keeping of it. Though gaming too, upon the account of trade (as well as other reaſons) may well deſerve to be reſtrained: ſince gameſters, in order to their play, keep great ſums of money by them, which there lies dead. For, though gameſter's money ſhift maſters oftener than any, and is tumbled up and down, with every caſt of a die, yet, as to the public, it lies perfectly ſtill, and no more of it comes into trade, than they ſpend in eating, or wearing.

Here too we may obſerve, how much manufacture deſerves to be encouraged: ſince that part of trade, though the moſt conſiderable, is driven with the leaſt money, eſpecially if the workmanſhip be more worth than the materials. For to the trade, that is driven by labour and handicraftſmen, one two and fiftieth part of the yearly money paid them will be ſufficient: but to a trade of commodities, of our bare, native growth, much greater proportion of money is required.

Perhaps it will be wondered, why, having given ſome eſtimate (how wide I know not) of the money, neceſſary in the hands of the landholder, labourer, and broker, to carry on trade, I have ſaid nothing of the conſumer, whom I had mentioned before. To this I anſwer, There are ſo few conſumers, who are not either labourers, brokers, or landholders, that they make a very inconſiderable part in the account. For thoſe, who immediately depend on the landholder, as his children and ſervants, come in under that title, being maintain'd by the rent of his lands; and ſo of the reſt.

By what has been ſaid, we may ſee what injury the lowering of intereſt is like to do us, by hindring trade, when it ſhall either make the foreigner call home his money, or your own people backward to lend, the reward not being judg'd proportionable to the riſque.

There is another ſeeming conſequence, of the reducing of money to a low price, which at firſt ſight has ſuch an appearance of truth in it, that I have known it to impoſe upon very able men, and I gueſs it has no ſmall influence, at this time, in the promoting this alteration, and that is, that the lowering of intereſt will raiſe the value of all other things in proportion. For money being the counter-balance to all other things purchaſeable by it, and lying, as it were, in the oppoſite ſcale of commerce, it looks like a natural conſequence, that as much as you take off from the value of money, ſo much you add to the price of other things which are exchanged for it; the raiſing of the price of any thing being no more but the addition to its value in reſpect of money, or, which is all one, leſſening the value of money. For example: ſhould the value of gold be brought down to that of ſilver, one hundred guineas would purchaſe little more corn, wooll or land, than one hundred ſhillings; and ſo, the value of money being brought lower, ſay they, the price of other things will riſe, and the falling of intereſt from ſix pounds to four pounds per cent. is taking away ſo much of the price of money, and ſo conſequently the leſſening its value.

The miſtake of this plauſible way of reaſoning will be eaſily diſcovered, when we conſider, that the meaſure of the value of money, in proportion to any thing purchaſeable by it, is the quantity of ready money we have in compariſon with the quantity of that thing, and its vent; or, which amounts to the ſame thing, the price of any commodity riſes or falls, by the proportion of the numbers of buyers and ſellers; this rule holds univerſally in all things that are to be bought and ſold, bating now and then an extravagant fancy of ſome particular perſon, which never amounts to ſo conſiderable a part of trade, as to make any thing in the account, worthy to be thought an objection to this rule.

The vent of any thing depends upon its neceſſity or uſefulneſs, as convenience, or opinion, guided by fancy, or faſhion, ſhall determine.

The vent of any commodity comes to be increaſed, or decreaſed, as a greater part of the running caſh of the nation is deſign'd to be laid out, by ſeveral people at the ſame time, rather in that, than another, as we ſee in the change of faſhions.

I shall begin firſt with the neceſſaries, or conveniencies of life, and the conſumable commodities ſubſervient thereunto; and ſhew, that the value of money, in reſpect of thoſe, depends only on the plenty, or ſcarcity of money, in proportion to the plenty or ſcarcity of thoſe things, and not on what intereſt ſhall, by neceſſity, law, or contract, be at that time laid on the borrowing of money: and then afterwards I ſhall ſhew that the ſame holds in land.

There is nothing more confirmed, by daily experience, than that men give any portion of money, for whatſoever is abſolutely neceſſary, rather than go without it. And in ſuch things, the ſcarcity of them alone makes their prices. As for example: let us ſuppoſe half an ounce of ſilver, or half a crown now in England, is worth a buſhel of wheat: but ſhould there be next year a great ſcarcity of wheat in England, and a proportionable want of all other food, five ounces of ſilver would, perhaps, in exchange purchaſe but one buſhel of wheat: ſo that money would be then nine tenths leſs worth in reſpect of food, though at the ſame value it was before, in reſpect of other things, that kept their former proportion, in their quantity and conſumption.

By the like proportions, of increaſe and decreaſe, does the value of things, more or leſs convenient, riſe and fall, in reſpect of money; only with this difference, that things abſolutely neceſſary for life muſt be had at any rate; but things convenient will be had only as they ſtand in preference with other conveniencies: and therefore in any one of theſe commodities, the value riſes only as its quantity is leſs, and vent greater, which depends upon its being preferr'd to other things, in its conſumption. For ſuppoſing that, at the ſame time that there is a great ſcarcity of wheat, and other grain, there were a conſiderable quantity of oats, men, no queſtion, would give far more for wheat than oats, as being the healthier, pleaſanter, and more convenient food: but, ſince oats would ſerve to ſupply that abſolute neceſſity of ſuſtaining life, men would not rob themſelves of all other conveniences of life, by paying all their money for wheat, when oats, that are cheaper, though with ſome inconvenience, would ſupply that defect. It may then ſo happen at the ſame time, that half an ounce of ſilver, that the year before would buy one buſhel of wheat, will this year buy but one tenth of a buſhel: half an ounce of ſilver, that the year before would have bought three buſhels of oats, will this year ſtill buy one buſhel: and at the ſame time half an ounce of ſilver, that would the year before have bought fifteen pounds of lead, will ſtill buy the ſame quantity. So that at the ſame time ſilver, in reſpect of wheat, is nine tenths leſs worth than it was, in reſpect of oats two thirds leſs worth, and in reſpect of lead as much worth as before.

The fall, therefore, or riſe of intereſt, making immediately, by its change, neither more, nor leſs land, money, or any ſort of commodity in England, than there was before, alters not at all the value of money, in reference to commodities. Becauſe the meaſure of that is only the quantity and vent, which are not immediately chang'd by the change of intereſt. So far as the change of intereſt conduces, in trade, to the bringing in, or carrying out money, or commodities, and ſo in time to the varying their proportions here in England, from what it was before; ſo far the change of intereſt, as all other things that promote, or hinder trade, may alter the value of money, in reference to commodities. But that is not in this place to be conſidered.

This is perfectly the value of money, in reſpect of conſumable commodities: but the better to underſtand it, in its full latitude, in reſpect both of conſumable commodities, and land too, we muſt conſider, firſt, That the value of land conſiſts in this, that, by its conſtant production of ſaleable commodities, it brings in a certain yearly income. Secondly, The value of commodities conſiſts in this, that as portable and uſeful things, they, by their exchange or conſumption, ſupply the neceſſaries, or conveniences of life. Thirdly, In money there is a double value, anſwering to both of theſe, firſt, as it is capable, by its intereſt, to yield us ſuch a yearly income: and in this it has the nature of land, (the income of one being called rent, of the other uſe) only with this difference, that the land, in its ſoil being different, as ſome fertile, ſome barren, and the products of it very various, both in their ſorts, goodneſs, and vent, is not capable of any fixed eſtimate by its quantity: but money being conſtantly the ſame, and by its intereſt giving the ſame ſort of product, through the whole country, is capable of having a fixed yearly rate ſet upon it by the magiſtrate; but land is not. But though, in the uniformity of its legal worth, one hundred pounds of lawful money being all through England equal in its current value, to any other one hundred pounds of lawful money, (becauſe by virtue of the law it will every where paſs for as much ware, or debt, as any other hundred pounds) is capable to have its yearly hire valued better than land: yet in reſpect of the varying need, and neceſſity of money, (which changes with the increaſe, or decay of money, or trade, in a country) it is as little capable to have its yearly hire fixed by law, as land itſelf. For were all the land in Rumney-marſh, acre for acre, equally good, that is, did conſtantly produce the ſame quantity of equally good hay, or graſs, one as another, the rent of it, under that conſideration, of every acre being of an equal worth, would be capable of being regulated by law; and one might as well enact, that no acre of land in Rumney-marſh ſhall be lett for above forty ſhillings per annum, as that no hundred pounds ſhall be lett for above four pounds per annum. But no body can think it fit (ſince by reaſon of the equal value of that land it can) that therefore the rent of the land in Rumney-marſh ſhould be regulated by law. For ſuppoſing all the land in Rumney-marſh, or in England, were all of ſo equal a worth, that any one acre, compared at the ſame time to any one other, were equally good, in reſpect of its product; yet the ſame acre, compar'd with its ſelf in different times, would not, in reſpect of rent, be of equal value. And therefore, it would have been an unreaſonable thing, if in the time of Henry 7. the rent of land in Rumney-marſh had been ſettled by a law, according to the judg'd value of it at that time, and the ſame law, limiting the rent perhaps to 5s. per acre, have continued ſtill. The abſurdity and impracticableneſs of this every one ſees, at the firſt propoſal, and readily concludes within himſelf, that things muſt be left to find their own price; and it is impoſſible, in this their conſtant mutability, for human foreſight to ſet rules and bounds to their conſtantly varying proportion and uſe, which will always regulate their value.

They, who conſider things beyond their names, will find, that money, as well as all other commodities, is liable to the ſame changes and inequalities: nay, in this reſpect of the variety of its value, brought in by time, in the ſucceſſion of affairs, the rate of money is leſs capable of being regulated by a law, in any country, than the rent of land. Becauſe, to the quick changes, that happen in trade, this too muſt be added, that money may be brought in, or carried out of the kingdom, which land cannot; and ſo that be truly worth ſix or eight per cent. this year, which would yield but four the laſt.

2. Money has a value, as it is capable, by exchange, to procure us the neceſſaries, or conveniencies of life, and in this it has the nature of a commodity; only with this difference, that it ſerves us commonly by its exchange, never almoſt by its conſumption. But though the uſe men make of money be not in its conſumption, yet it has not at all a more ſtanding, ſettled value, in exchange with any other thing, than any other commodity has, but a more known one, and better fixed by name, number, and weight, to enable us to reckon what the proportion of ſcarcity and vent of one commodity is to another. For ſuppoſing, as before, that half an ounce of ſilver would laſt year exchange for one buſhel of wheat, or for 15lb. weight of lead; if this year wheat be ten times ſcarcer, and lead in the ſame quantity to its vent, as it was, is it not evident, that half an ounce of ſilver will ſtill exchange for 15lb. of lead, though it will exchange but for one tenth of a buſhel of wheat; and he that has uſe of lead will as ſoon take 15lb. weight of lead, as half an ounce of ſilver, for one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, and no more. So that if you ſay, that money now is nine tenths leſs worth than it was the former year, you muſt ſay ſo of lead too, and all other things, that keep the ſame proportion to money which they had before. The variation, indeed, is firſt and moſt taken notice of in money: becauſe that is the univerſal meaſure, by which people reckon, and uſed by every body in the valuing of all things. For calling that half ounce of ſilver half a crown, they ſpeak properly, and are readily underſtood, when they ſay, half a crown, or two ſhillings and ſix pence, will now buy one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, but do not ſay, that 15lb. of lead will now buy one tenth of a buſhel of wheat, becauſe it is not generally uſed to this ſort of reckoning: nor do they ſay, lead is leſs worth than it was, though, in reſpect of wheat, lead, as well as ſilver, be nine tenths worſe than it was; only by the tale of ſhillings, we are better enabled to judge of it: becauſe theſe are meaſures, whoſe ideas by conſtant uſe are ſettled in every Engliſhman's mind.

This, I ſuppoſe, is the true value of money, when it paſſes from one to another, in buying and ſelling; where it runs the ſame changes of higher, or lower, as any other commodity doth: for one equal quantity whereof, you ſhall receive in exchange more, or leſs of another commodity, at one time, than you do at another. For a farmer that carries a buſhel of wheat to market, and a labourer that carries half a crown, ſhall find that the money of one, as well as corn of the other, ſhall at ſome times purchaſe him more or leſs leather, or ſalt, according as they are in greater plenty, and ſcarcity, one to another. So that in exchanging coined ſilver for any other commodity, (which is buying and ſelling) the ſame meaſure governs the proportion you receive, as if you exchanged lead, or wheat, or any other commodity. That which regulates the price, i. e. the quantity given for money (which is called buying and ſelling) for another commodity, (which is called bartering) is nothing elſe but their quantity in proportion to their vent. If then lowering of uſe makes not your ſilver more in ſpecie, or your wheat, or other commodities leſs, it will not have any influence at all to make it exchange for leſs of wheat, or any other commodity, than it will have on lead, to make it exchange for leſs of wheat, or any other commodity.

Money therefore, in buying and ſelling, being perfectly in the ſame condition with other commodities, and ſubject to all the ſame laws of value, let us next ſee how it comes to be of the ſame nature with land, by yielding a certain yearly income, which we call uſe, or intereſt. For land produces naturally ſomething new and profitable, and of value to mankind; but money is a barren thing, and produces nothing, but by compact transfers that profit, that was the reward of one man's labour, into another man's pocket. That which occaſions this, is the unequal diſtribution of money; which inequality has the ſame effect too upon land, that it has upon money. For my having more money in my hand than I can, or am diſpoſed to uſe in buying, or ſelling, makes me able to lend: and another's want of ſo much money as he could employ in trade, makes him willing to borrow. But why then, and for what conſideration doth he pay uſe? For the ſame reaſon, and upon as good conſideration, as the tenant pays rent for your land. For as the unequal diſtribution of land, (you having more than you can, or will manure, and another leſs) brings you a tenant for your land; and the ſame unequal diſtribution of money, (I having more than I can, or will employ, and another leſs) brings me a tenant for my money: ſo my money is apt in trade, by the induſtry of the borrower, to produce more than ſix per cent. to the borrower, as well as your land, by the labour of the tenant, is apt to produce more fruits, than his rent comes to; and therefore deſerves to be paid for, as well as land by a yearly rent. For though the uſurer's money would bring him in no yearly profit, if he did not lend it, (ſuppoſing he employs it not himſelf) and ſo his ſix per cent. may ſeem to be the fruit of another man's labour, yet he ſhares not near ſo much of the profit of another man's labour, as he that lets land to a tenant. For, without the tenant's induſtry, (ſuppoſing as before, the owner would not manage it himſelf) his land would yield him little, or no profit. So that the rent he receives is a greater portion of the fruit of his tenant's labour, than the uſe is at ſix per cent. For generally, he that borrows one thouſand pounds at ſix per cent. and ſo pays ſixty pounds per annum uſe, gets more above his uſe in one year, by his induſtry, than he that rents a farm of ſixty pounds per annum gets in two, above his rent, though his labour be harder.

It being evident therefore, that he that has ſkill in traffick, but has not money enough to exerciſe it, has not only reaſon to borrow money, to drive his trade and get a livelihood; but as much reaſon to pay uſe for that money, as he, who having ſkill in huſbandry, but no land of his own to employ it in, has not only reaſon to rent land, but to pay money for the uſe of it: it follows, that borrowing money upon uſe is not only, by the neceſſity of affairs, and the conſtitution of human ſociety, unavoidable to ſome men; but that alſo to receive profit for the loan of money, is as equitable and lawful, as receiving rent for land, and more tolerable to the borrower, notwithſtanding the opinion of ſome over ſcrupulous men.

This being ſo, one would expect, that the rate of intereſt ſhould be the meaſure of the value of land in number of years purchaſe, for which the fee is ſold; for 100 l. per annum being equal to 100 l. per annum, and ſo to perpetuity; and 100 l. per annum being the product of 1000 l. when intereſt is at 10 per cent. of 1250 l. when intereſt is at 8 per cent. of 1666 l. or thereabouts, when intereſt is at 6 per cent. of 2000 l. when money is at 5 per cent. of 2500 l. when money is at 4 per cent. One would conclude, I ſay, that land ſhould ſell in proportion to uſe, according to theſe following rates, viz.

When

$$\text{When Money is at}\left\{\begin{matrix}10\\8\\6\\5\\4\end{matrix}\right\}\text{per cent. for}\left\{\begin{matrix}10\\12\frac{1}{2}\\16\frac{2}{3}\\20\\25\end{matrix}\right\}\text{years purchaſe.}$$

But experience tells us, that neither in queen Elizabeth, nor king James the firſt reigns, when intereſt was at ten per cent. was land ſold for ten: or when it was at eight per cent. for twelve and a half year's purchaſe, or any thing near the low rate, that high uſe required (if it were true, that the rate of intereſt governed the price of land) any more than land now yields twenty-five years purchaſe, becauſe a great part of the monied men will now lett their money upon good ſecurity, at four per cent. Thus we ſee in fact how little this rule has held at home: and he, that will look into Holland, will find, that the purchaſe of land was not raiſed there, when their intereſt fell. This is certain, and paſt doubt, that the legal intereſt can never regulate the price of land, ſince it is plain, that the price of land has never changed with it, in the ſeveral changes have been made, in the rate of intereſt by law: nor now that the rate of intereſt is by law the ſame through all England, is the price of land every where the ſame, it being in ſome parts conſtantly ſold for four, or five years purchaſe, more than in others. Whether you, or I, can tell the reaſon of this, it matters not to the queſtion in hand: but it being really ſo, this is plain demonſtration againſt thoſe, who pretend to advance and regulate the price of land by a law, concerning the intereſt of money.

But yet I will give you ſome of my gueſſes, why the price of land is not regulated (as at firſt ſight, it ſeems it ſhould be) by the intereſt of money. Why it is not regulated by the legal uſe is manifeſt, becauſe the rate of money does not follow the ſtandard of the law, but the price of the market; and men, not obſerving the legal and forced, but the natural and current intereſt of money, regulate their affairs by that. But why the rate of land does not follow the current intereſt of money, requires a farther conſideration.

All things, that are bought and ſold, raiſe and fall their price in proportion, as there are more buyers or ſellers. Where there are a great many ſellers to a few buyers, there uſe what art you will, the thing to be ſold will be cheap. On the other ſide, turn the tables, and raiſe up a great many buyers for a few ſellers, and the ſame thing will immediately grow dear. The rule holds in land, as well as all other commodities, and is the reaſon, why in England, at the ſame time, that land in ſome places is at ſeventeen or eighteen years purchaſe, it is about others, where there are profitable manufactures, at two or three and twenty years purchaſe: becauſe there (men thriving and getting money, by their induſtry, and willing to leave their eſtates to their children in land, as the ſureſt, and moſt laſting proviſion, and not ſo liable to caſualties as money in untrading, or unſkilful hands) are many buyers ready always to purchaſe, but few ſellers. For, the land thereabout being already poſſeſſed by that ſort of induſtrious and thriving men, they have neither need, nor will, to ſell. In ſuch places of manufacture, the riches of the one not ariſing from the ſquandering and waſte of another, (as it doth in other places, where men live lazily upon the product of the land) the induſtry of the people, bringing in increaſe of wealth from remote parts, makes plenty of money there, without the impoveriſhing of their neighbours. And, when the thriving tradeſman has got more than he can well employ in trade, his next thoughts are to look out for a purchaſe; but it muſt be a purchaſe in the neighbourhood, where the eſtate may be under his eye, and within convenient diſtance, that the care and pleaſure of his farm may not take him off from the engagements of his calling, nor remove his children too far from him, or the trade he breeds them up in. This ſeems to me the reaſon, why in places, wherein thriving manufactures have erected themſelves, land has been obſerved to ſell quicker, and for more years purchaſe than in other places, as about Halifax in the north, Taunton and Exeter in the weſt.

This is that then, which makes land, as well as other things, dear: plenty of buyers, and but few ſellers: and ſo, by the rule of contraries, plenty of ſellers and few buyers makes land cheap.

He, that will juſtly eſtimate the value of any thing, muſt conſider its quantity in proportion to its vent, for this alone regulates the price. The value of any thing, compared with itſelf, or with a ſtanding meaſure, is greater, as its quantity is leſs in proportion to its vent: but, in comparing it, or exchanging it with any other thing, the quantity and vent of that thing too muſt be allowed for, in the computation of their value. But, becauſe the deſire of money is conſtantly almoſt every where the ſame, its vent varies very little: but as its greater ſcarcity enhances the price, and increaſes the ſcramble, there being nothing elſe that does eaſily ſupply the want of it: the leſſening its quantity, therefore, always increaſes its price, and makes an equal portion of it exchange for a greater of any other thing. Thus it comes to paſs, that there is no manner of ſettled proportion between the value of an ounce of ſilver, and any other commodity: for, either varying its quantity in that country, or the commodity changing its quantity in proportion to its vent, their reſpective values change, i. e. leſs of one will barter for more of the other: though, in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, 'tis only ſaid, that the price of the commodity, not of the money, is changed. For example; half an ounce of ſilver in England, will exchange ſometimes for a whole buſhel of wheat, ſometimes for half, ſometimes but a quarter, and this it does equally, whether by uſe it be apt to bring in to the owner ſix in the hundred of its own weight per annum, or nothing at all: it being only the change of the quantity of wheat to its vent, ſuppoſing we have ſtill the ſame ſum of money in the kingdom; or elſe the change of the quantity of our money in the kingdom, ſuppoſing the quantity of wheat, in reſpect to its vent be the ſame too, that makes the change in the price of wheat. For if you alter the quantity, or vent, on either ſide, you preſently alter the price, but no other way in the world.

For it is not the being, adding, increaſing, or diminiſhing of any good quality in any commodity, that makes its price greater, or leſs, but only as it makes its quantity, or vent, greater, or leſs, in proportion one to another. This will eaſily appear by two or three inſtances.

1. The being of any good, and uſeful quantity in any thing, neither increaſes its price, nor indeed makes it have any price at all, but only as it leſſens it quantity, or increaſes its vent, each of theſe in proportion to one another. What more uſeful, or neceſſary things are there to the being, or well-being of men, than air and water; and yet theſe have generally no price at all, nor yield any money: becauſe their quantity is immenſly greater than their vent, in moſt places of the world. But, as ſoon as ever water (for air ſtill offers itſelf every where, without reſtraint, or incloſure, and therefore is no where of any price) comes any where to be reduced into any proportion to its conſumption, it begins preſently to have a price, and is ſometimes ſold dearer than wine. Hence it is, that the beſt, and moſt uſeful things are commonly the cheapeſt; becauſe, though their conſumption be great, yet the bounty of providence has made their production large, and ſuitable to it.

2. Nor does the adding an excellency to any commodity, raiſe its price, unleſs it increaſes its conſumption. For, ſuppoſe there ſhould be taught a way (which ſhould be publiſhed to the knowledge of every one) to make a medicine of wheat alone, that ſhould infallibly cure the ſtone: 'tis certain the diſcovery of this quality in that grain, would give it an excellency very conſiderable: And yet this would not increaſe the price of it one farthing in twenty buſhels, becauſe its quantity, or vent, would not hereby, to any ſenſible degree, be altered.

3. Neither does the increaſing of any good quality, in any ſort of things, make it yield more. For though teaſels be much better this year than they were laſt, they are not one jot dearer, unleſs they be fewer too, or the conſumption of them greater.

4. Nor does the leſſening the good qualities of any ſort of commodity leſſen its price; which is evident in hops, that are uſually deareſt thoſe years they are worſt. But, if it happen to be a ſpecies of commodity, whoſe defects may be ſupplied by ſome other, the making of it worſe does leſſen its price; becauſe it hinders its vent. For, if rye ſhould any year prove generally ſmutty, or grown, no queſtion it would yield leſs money than otherwiſe, becauſe the deficiency of that might be, in ſome meaſure, made up by wheat, and other grain. But, if it be a ſort of commodity, whoſe uſe no other known thing can ſupply, 'tis not its being better, or worſe, but its quantity, and vent, is that alone which regulates, and determines its value.

To apply this now to money, as capable of different rates of intereſt. To money, conſidered in its proper uſe as a commodity paſſing in exchange from one to another, all that is done by intereſt, is but the adding to it by agreement, or publick authority, a faculty, which it naturally has not, of increaſing every year ſix per cent. Now, if publick authority ſink uſe to four per cent. 'tis certain it diminiſhes this good quality in money one third. But yet this making the money of England not one farthing more than it was, it alters not the meaſures, upon which all changeable commodities increaſe, or ſink their price, and ſo makes not money exchange for leſs of any commodity, than it would without this alteration of its intereſt. If leſſening uſe to four per cent. ſhould at all alter the quantity of money, and make it leſs, it would make money, as it has the nature of a commodity, dearer, i. e. a leſs quantity of money would exchange for a greater quantity of another commodity, than it would before. This perhaps will appear a little plainer by theſe following particulars.

1. That the intrinſick, natural worth of any thing, conſiſts in its fitneſs to ſupply the neceſſities, or ſerve the conveniencies of human life; and the more neceſſary it is to our being, or the more it contributes to our well-being, the greater is its worth: But yet,

2. That there is no ſuch intrinſick, natural ſettled value in any thing, as to make any aſſigned quantity of it conſtantly worth any aſſigned quantity of another.

3 The marketable value of any aſſigned quantities of two, or more commodities, are (pro hic & nunc) equal, when they will exchange one for another. As, ſuppoſing one buſhel of wheat, two buſhels of barley, thirty pounds of lead, and one ounce of ſilver, will now in the market be taken one for another, they are then of equal worth: and, our coin being that which Engliſhmen reckon by, an Engliſhman would ſay, that now one buſhel of wheat, two buſhels of barley, thirty pounds of lead, and one ounce of ſilver, were equally worth five ſhillings.

4. The change of the marketable value of any commodity, in reſpect of another commodity, or in reſpect of a ſtanding, common meaſure, is not the altering of any intrinſick value, or quality, in the commodity; (for muſty and ſmutty corn will ſell dearer at one time, than the clean and ſweet at another) but the alteration of ſome proportion, which that commodity bears to ſomething elſe.

5. This proportion in all commodities, whereof money is one, is the proportion of their quantity to the vent. The vent is nothing elſe, but the paſſing of commodities from one owner to another, in exchange; and is then called quicker, when a greater quantity of any ſpecies of commodity, is taken off from the owners of it, in an equal ſpace of time.

6. This vent is regulated, i. e. made quicker or ſlower, as greater or leſs quantities of any ſaleable commodity are removed out of the way and courſe of trade; ſeparated from publick commerce; and no longer lie within the reach of exchange. For, though any commodity ſhould ſhift hands never ſo faſt, and be exchanged from one man to another; yet, if they were not thereby exempted from trade and ſale, and did not ceaſe to be any longer traffick, this would not at all make, or quicken their vent. But this, ſeldom or never happening, makes very little or no alteration.

7. Things are removed out of the market, or hands of commerce, and ſo their vent altered three ways; 1. By conſumption, when the commodity in its

uſe is deſtroy'd, as, meat, drink, and cloaths, &c. all that is ſo conſumed is quite gone out of the trade of the world. 2. By exportation; and all that is ſo carried away, is gone out of the trade of England, and concerns Engliſhmen no more in the price of their commodities among themſelves for their own uſe, than if it were out of the world. 3. By buying and laying up for a man's private uſe. For what is by any of theſe ways ſhut out of the market, and no longer moveable, by the hand of commerce, makes no longer any part of merchantable ware, and ſo, in reſpect of trade, and the quantity of any commodity, is not more conſiderable than if it were not in being. All theſe three terminating at laſt in conſumption of all commodities, (excepting only jewels and plate, and ſome few others, which wear out but inſenſibly) may properly enough paſs under that name. Ingroſſing too has ſome influence on the preſent vent: but this incloſing ſome conſiderable part of any commodity, (for if the ingroſſing be of all the commodity, and it be of general uſe, the price is at the will of the ingroſſer) out of the free common of trade, only for ſome time, and afterwards returning again to ſale, makes not uſually ſo ſenſible and general an alteration in the vent, as the others do: but yet influences the price, and the vent more, according as it extends itſelf to a larger portion of the commodity, and hoards it up longer.

8. Most other portable commodities (excepting jewels, plate, &c.) decaying quickly in their uſe, but money being leſs conſumed, or increaſed, i. e. by ſlower degrees removed from, or brought into the free commerce of any country, than the greateſt part of other merchandize; and ſo the proportion between its quantity and vent, altering ſlower than in moſt other commodities; it is commonly look'd on as a ſtanding meaſure, to judge of the value of all things, eſpecially being adapted to it by its weight and denomination in coinage.

9. Money, whilſt the ſame quantity of it is paſſing up and down the kingdom in trade, is really a ſtanding meaſure of the falling and riſing value of other things, in reference to one another: and the alteration of price is truly in them only. But if you increaſe, or leſſen, the quantity of money, current in traffick, in any place, then the alteration of value is in the money: and, if at the ſame time wheat keep its proportion of vent to quantity, money, to ſpeak truly, alters its worth, and wheat does not, though it ſell for a greater, or leſs price, than it did before. For money, being look'd upon as the ſtanding meaſure of other commodities, men conſider and ſpeak of it ſtill, as if it were a ſtanding meaſure, though when it has varied its quantity, 'tis plain it is not.

10. But the value, or price of all commodities, amongſt which money paſſing in trade is truly one, conſiſting in proportion, you alter this, as you do all other proportions, whether you increaſe one, or leſſen the other.

11. In all other commodities, the owners, when they deſign them for traffick, endeavour, as much as they can, to have them vented and gone, i. e. removed out of the reach of commerce, by conſumption, exportation, for laying up: but money, never lying upon people's hands, or wanting vent, (or any one may part with it in exchange, when he pleaſes:) the provident publick, and private care, is to keep it from venting, or conſuming, i. e. from exportation, which is its proper conſumption; and from hoarding up by others, which is a ſort of ingroſſing. Hence it is that other commodities have ſometimes a quicker, ſometimes a ſlower vent: for no body lays out his money in them, but according to the uſe he has of them, and that has bounds. But, every body being ready to receive money without bounds, and keep it by him, becauſe it anſwers all things: therefore the vent of money is always ſufficient, or more than enough. This being ſo, its quantity alone is enough to regulate and determine its value, without conſidering any proportion between its quantity and vent, as in other commodities.

12. Therefore the leſſening of uſe, not bringing one penny of money more into the trade, or exchange of any country, but rather drawing it away from trade, and ſo making it leſs, does not at all ſink its value, and make it buy leſs of any commodity, but rather more.

13. THAT, which raiſes the natural intereſt of money, is the ſame that raiſes the rent of land, i. e. its aptneſs to bring in yearly to him that manages it, a greater overplus of income above his rent, as a reward to his labour. That which cauſes this in land, is the greater quantity of its product, in proportion to the ſame vent to that particular fruit, or the ſame quantity of product, in proportion to a greater vent of that ſingle commodity; but that which cauſes increaſe of profit to the borrower of money, is the leſs quantity of money, in proportion to trade, or to the vent of all commodities, taken together, & vice verſa.

14. THE natural value of money, as it is apt to yield ſuch a yearly income by intereſt, depends on the whole quantity of the then paſſing money of the kingdom, in proportion to the whole trade of the kingdom, i. e. the general vent of all the commodities. But the natural value of money, in exchanging for any one commodity, is the quantity of the trading-money of the kingdom, deſign'd for that commodity, in proportion to that ſingle commodity and its vent. For though any ſingle man's neceſſity and want, either of money, or any ſpecies of commodity, being known, may make him pay dearer for money, or that commodity; yet this is but a particular caſe, that does not at the ſame time alter this conſtant and general rule.

15. THAT ſuppoſing wheat a ſtanding meaſure, that is, that there is conſtantly the ſame quantity of it, in proportion to its vent, we ſhall find money to run the ſame variety of changes in its value, as all other commodities do. Now that wheat in England does come neareſt to a ſtanding meaſure, is evident by comparing wheat with other commodities, money, and the yearly income of land, in Henry the Seventh's time, and now. For ſuppoſing that primo Hen. 7. N. lett 100 acres of land to A. for 6 d. per annum per acre, rack-rent, and to B. another 100 acres of land, of the ſame ſoil and yearly worth with the former, for a buſhel of wheat per acre, rack-rent, (a buſhel of wheat about that time being probably ſold for about 6 d.) it was then an equal rent. If, therefore, theſe leaſes were for years yet to come, 'tis certain that he, that paid but 6 d. per acre, would pay now 50 s. per annum, and he that paid a buſhel of wheat per acre, would now pay about 25 l. per annum, which would be near about the yearly value of the land, were it to be lett now. The reaſon whereof is this, That there being ten times as much ſilver now in the world, (the diſcovery of the Weſt-Indies having made the plenty) as there was then, it is nine tenths leſs worth now, than it was at that time; that is, it will exchange for nine tenths leſs of any commodity now, which bears the ſame proportion to its vent, as it did 200 years ſince; which of all other commodities, wheat is likelieſt to do. For in England, and this part of the world, wheat being the conſtant and moſt general food, not altering with the faſhion, not growing by chance; but as the farmers ſow more, or leſs of it, which they endeavour to proportion, as near as can be gueſs'd, to the conſumption, abſtracting the overplus of the precedent year, in their proviſion for the next; and vice verſa; it muſt needs fall out, that it keeps the neareſt proportion to its conſumption, (which is more ſtudied and deſign'd in this, than other commodities) of any thing, if you take it for ſeven or twenty years together: though perhaps the plenty, or ſcarcity of one year, cauſed by the accidents of the ſeaſon, may very much vary it from the immediately precedent, or following. Wheat, therefore, in this part of the world, (and that grain, which is the conſtant general food of any other country) is the fitteſt meaſure to judge of the alter'd value of things, in any long tract of time: and therefore, wheat here, rice in Turky, &c. is the fitteſt thing to reſerve a rent in, which is deſigned to be conſtantly the ſame for all future ages. But money is the beſt meaſure of the altered value of things in a few years: becauſe its vent is the ſame, and its quantity alters ſlowly. But wheat, or any other grain, cannot ſerve inſtead of money; becauſe of its bulkineſs, and too quick change of its quantity. For had I a bond, to pay me 100 buſhels of wheat next year, it might be a fourth part loſs, or gain to me; too great an inequality and uncertainty to be ventur'd in trade: beſides the different goodneſs of ſeveral parcels of wheat in the ſame year.

16. That, ſuppoſing any iſland ſeparate from the commerce of the reſt of mankind; if gold and ſilver, or whatever elſe (ſo it be laſting) be their money, if they have but a certain quantity of it, and can get no more, that will be a ſteady, ſtanding meaſure of the value of all other things.

17. That, if in any country they uſe for money any laſting material, whereof there is not any more to be got, and ſo cannot be increaſed; or being of no other uſe, the reſt of the world does not value it, and ſo it is not like to be diminiſhed; this alſo would be a ſteady, ſtanding meaſure of the value of other commodities.

18. That, in a country, where they had ſuch a ſtanding meaſure, any quantity of that money (if it were but ſo much, that every body might have ſome) would ſerve to drive any proportion of trade, whether more, or leſs, there being counters enough to reckon by, and the value of the pledges being ſtill ſufficient, as conſtantly increaſing with the plenty of the commodity. But theſe three laſt, being built on ſuppoſitions, that are not like to be found in the practice of mankind, ſince navigation and commerce have brought all parts acquainted with one another, and introduced the uſe of gold and ſilver money, into all trading parts of the world, they ſerve rather to give us ſome light into the nature of money, than to teach here a new meaſure of traffick. Though it be certain, that that part of the world, which bred moſt of our gold and ſilver, uſed leaſt of it in exchange, and uſed it not for money at all.

19. That therefore, in any country, that hath commerce with the reſt of the world, it is almoſt impoſſible now to be without the uſe of ſilver coin; and having money of that, and accounts kept in ſuch money, it is impoſſible to have any ſtanding, unalterable meaſure of the value of things. For, whilſt the mines ſupply to mankind more than waſtes and conſumes in its uſe, the quantity of it will daily grow greater, in reſpect of other commodities, and its value leſs.

20. That in a country, that hath open commerce with the reſt of the world, and uſes money, made of the ſame materials with their neighbours, any quantity of that money will not ſerve to drive any quantity of trade; but there muſt be a certain proportion between their money and trade. The reaſon whereof is this, becauſe, to keep your trade going without loſs, your commodities amongſt you muſt keep an equal, or, at leaſt, near the price of the ſame ſpecies of commodities in the neighbouring countries: which they cannot do, if your money be far leſs than in other countries: for then, either your commodities muſt be ſold very cheap, or a great part of your trade muſt ſtand ſtill, there not being money enough in the country to pay for them (in their ſhifting of hands) at that high price, which the plenty, and conſequently low value of money makes them at in another country. For the value of money, in general, is the quantity of all the money in the world, in proportion to all the trade: but the value of money in any one country, is the preſent quantity of the current money in that country, in proportion to the preſent trade. Suppoſing then, that we had now in England but half as much money, as we had ſeven years ago, and yet had ſtill as much yearly product of commodities, as many hands to work them, and as many brokers to diſperſe them, as before; and that the reſt of the world we trade with, had as much money as they had before, (for 'tis likely they would have more by our moiety ſhared amongſt them) 'tis certain, that either half our rents ſhould not be paid, half our commodities not vented, and half our labourers not employed, and ſo half the trade be clearly loſt; or elſe, that every one of theſe muſt receive but half the money for their commodities and labour, they did before, and but half ſo much as our neighbours do receive, for the ſame labour, and the ſame natural product, at the ſame time. Such a ſtate of poverty as this, though it will make no ſcarcity of our native commodities amongſt us, yet it will have theſe ill conſequences.

1. It will make our native commodities vent very cheap.

2. It will make all foreign commodities very dear, both which will keep us poor. For the merchant, making ſilver and gold his meaſure, and conſidering what the foreign commodity coſts him (i. e. how many ounces of ſilver) in the country where money is more plenty, i. e. cheaper; and conſidering too, how

many ounces of ſilver it will yield him in another country, will not part with it here, but for the ſame quantity of ſilver, or as much as that ſilver will buy here of our commodity, which will be a great deal more than in another place. So that, in all our exchange of native or foreign commodities, we ſhall pay double the value that any other country does, where money is in greater plenty. This, indeed, will make a dearneſs, and, in time, a ſcarcity of foreign commodities; which is not the worſt inconveniency, that it brings upon us, ſuppoſing them not abſolutely neceſſary. But,

3. It endangers the drawing away our people, both handicrafts, mariners, and ſoldiers, who are apt to go, where their pay is beſt, which will always be where there is greateſt plenty of money, and in time of war muſt needs bring great diſtreſs.

21. Upon this meaſure too it is, that the variation of exchange of money, between ſeveral countries, does ſomewhat depend. For it is certain, that one ounce of ſilver is always of equal value to another ounce of ſilver, conſidered in its intrinſick worth, or in reference to the univerſal trade of the world: but 'tis not of the ſame value, at the ſame time, in ſeveral parts of the world, but is of the moſt worth in that country, where there is the leaſt money, in proportion to its trade: and therefore, men may afford to give twenty ounces of ſilver in one place, to receive eighteen or nineteen ounces of ſilver in another. But this is not all: to this then, (to find out the alteration of the exchange) the over-balance of the trade muſt be taken into conſideration. Theſe two together regulate the exchange, in all the commerce of the world, and, in both, the higher rate of exchange depends upon one and the ſame thing, viz. the greater plenty of money in one country than in the other; only with this difference, that where the over-balance of trade raiſes the exchange above the par, there it is the plenty of money, which private merchants have in one country, which they deſire to remove into another: but, where the riches of the country raiſes the exchange above the par, there it is the plenty of the money in the whole country. In one, the merchant has more money (or debts, which is all one) in a foreign country, than his trade there will employ, and ſo is willing to allow upon exchange to him abroad, that ſhall pay him ready money at home, 1, 2, 3, &c. per cent. more or leſs, proportionably as his, or his countrymen's plenty of ready money abroad, the danger of leaving it there, or the difficulty of bringing it home in ſpecie, and his preſent need of money at home, is greater or leſs: in the other, the whole country has more money, than can well be employed in the trade thereof, or at leaſt, the proportion of the money to the trade is greater than in the neighbouring country, where the exchange is below the par.

For, ſuppoſing the balance of trade to be equal between England and Holland, but that there is in Holland a greater plenty of money than in England, (which will appear by the lowneſs of the natural uſe in Holland, and the height of the natural uſe in England; and alſo by the dearneſs of food and labour in general in Holland, and the cheapneſs of it in England.) If N. has 10,000 l. in Holland, which the greater advantage he could make of it in England, either by uſe or purchaſe, tempts him to transfer into England, 'tis probable he will give as much to a merchant in England, to pay him 10,000 l. in England, as the inſurance at that time between Holland and England is worth. If this happens to be in a country, where the exportation of bullion is prohibited, he muſt pay the more; becauſe his venture, if he carry it in ſpecie, will be greater. And upon this ground, perhaps, the prohibiting the exportation of money out of England, under penalties, may be of ſome uſe, by making the rate of the exchange greater to thoſe countries, which import upon us more than they export in commodities; and ſo retain ſome part of the money, which their over-balance of trade would carry away from us, though, after all, if we are over-balanced in trade, it muſt go.

But, ſince the Holland merchant cannot receive N's 10,000 l. in money in Holland, and pay him 10,000 l. in England, unleſs his over-balance of trade make Engliſhmen indebted to him 10,000 l. in money, which he is not like to take in commodities; I think the over-balance of trade is that, which chiefly raiſes the exchange in any country, and that plenty of money, in any country, does it only for ſo much of the money as is transferred, either to be let out to uſe, or to be ſpent there. And, though, lending to foreigners, upon uſe, doth not at all alter the balance of trade between thoſe countries, yet it does alter the exchange between thoſe countries, for ſo much as is lent upon uſe, by not calling away the money, that ſhould follow the over-balance of trade, but letting it reſt there, as if it were accounted for; all one as if the balance of trade were for ſo much altered. But this being not much, in compariſon of the general traffick between two nations, or at leaſt varying ſlower, the merchant too regulating the exchange, and not the uſurer; I ſuppoſe it is the preſent balance of trade, on which the exchange immediately and chiefly depends, unleſs ſome accident ſhall make a great deal of money be remitted at the ſame time from one place to another, which will for that time raiſe the exchange all one as an over-balance of trade; and indeed, when examined, is generally very little different from it.

To be able to eſtimate the par, with the riſe and fall of the exchange, it is neceſſary to know the intrinſic value, i. e. how much ſilver is in the coins of the two countries, by which you reckon and charge the bill of exchange.

Sir, " If I have been led a little too far from one thing to another, in the " conſideration of money, I beg your pardon, hoping that theſe particulars will " afford ſome light to our preſent ſubject."

To return to the price of land. 'Tis evident by what has been above ſaid, that the years purchaſe of land does not increaſe with the fall of intereſt; and the abating that good quality in money, or yielding yearly ſix per cent. to four, does not preſently ſo ſink its value, in reſpect of land, that one third more is required in exchange: falling of intereſt from ſix to four, will not raiſe land from twenty to thirty years purchaſe; the riſing and falling of the price of land, as of other things, depends much on the quantity of land ſet to ſale, compared with the quantity of money deſigned for that traffic, or, which amounts to the ſame thing, upon the number of buyers and ſellers. For, where there are many ſellers and few purchaſers, though intereſt be leſſened, land will be cheap, as I have already ſhewed. At leaſt, this is certain, That making a law to reduce intereſt will not raiſe the price of land; it will only, by driving it more into the banker's hands, leave the country barer of money, whereby, if the price of land about London ſhould be accidentally raiſed, that of remoter countries would thereby have fewer purchaſers, and at lower rates.

This being ſo, that the low rate of land depends much on the great number of ſellers in proportion to purchaſers, the next thing to be enquired into, is, What makes plenty of ſellers? And to that the anſwer is obvious, general ill huſbandry, and the conſequence of it, debts. If a neglect of government and religion, ill examples, and depraved education, have introduced debauchery; and art, or chance, has made it faſhionable for men to live beyond their eſtates, debts will increaſe and multiply, and draw with them a neceſſity on men, firſt of encumbring, and then ſelling their eſtates. This is generally the cauſe why men part with their land: and I think there is ſcarce one in an hundred that thinks of ſelling his patrimony, till mortgages have pretty well eat into the freehold; and the weight of growing debts force a man, whether he will or no, out of his poſſeſſions. When almoſt is there ever a clear and unencumbered eſtate ſet to ſale? 'Tis ſeldom a thriving man turns his land into money, to make the greater advantage: the examples of it are ſo rare, that they are ſcarce of any conſideration in the number of ſellers.

This, I think, may be the reaſon, why in queen Elizabeth's days (when ſobriety, frugality, and induſtry, brought in daily increaſe to the growing wealth of the kingdom) land kept up its price, and ſold for more years purchaſe, than correſponded to the intereſt of money, then buſily employed in a thriving trade, which made the natural intereſt much higher than it is now, as well as the parliament then ſet it higher by law.

On the contrary ſide, What makes ſcarcity of purchaſers?

1. The ſame reaſon, ill huſbandry. When the tradeſman lives up to the height of his income, and the vanity of expences either drains the merchants coffers, or keeps them from overflowing, he ſeldom thinks of purchaſing. Buying of land is the reſult of a full and ſatiated gain: and men in trade ſeldom think of laying out their money upon land, till their profit has brought them in more than their trade can well employ; and their idle bags, cumbring their counting-houſes, put them upon emptying them on a purchaſe.

2. Another thing that makes a ſcarcity of buyers of land, are doubtful and ill titles: where theſe are frequent and fatal, one can no more expect that men, who have money, ſhould be forward to purchaſe, than ſhips, richly laden, to venture themſelves amongſt rocks and quickſands. 'Tis no wonder ſuch ſeas ſhould not be much frequented, where the examples, and remains of daily wrecks, ſhew the folly and hazard of the venture, in the number of thoſe who have miſcarried.

3. A general decay of trade diſcourages men from purchaſing: for this threatens an univerſal poverty, which is ſure to fall firſt and heavieſt upon land. The merchant, who furniſhes the improvident landholder, will not fail to have money for his wares with gain, whether the kingdom get by his trade, or no; and he will keep his money rather employed in trade, which brings him in profit, (for the merchant may get by a trade, that makes the kingdom poor) than lay it out in land, whoſe rents he ſees ſinking, and foreſees by the courſe of trade, is likely to continue to do ſo. When a nation is running to decay and ruin, the merchant and monied man, do what you can, will be ſure to ſtarve laſt: obſerve it where you will, the decays that come upon, and bring to ruin any country, do conſtantly firſt fall upon the land: and though the country gentleman, (who uſually ſecurely relies upon ſo much a year as was given in at his marriage ſettlement, and thinks his land an unmoveable fund for ſuch an income) be not very forward to think ſo; yet this nevertheleſs is an undoubted truth, that he is more concerned in trade, and ought to take a greater care, that it be well managed, and preſerved, than even the merchant himſelf. For he will certainly find, when a decay of trade has carried away one part of our money out of the kingdom, and the other is kept in the merchant and tradeſman's hands, that no laws he can make, nor any little arts of ſhifting property amongſt ourſelves, will bring it back to him again; but his rents will fall, and his income every day leſſen, 'till general induſtry and frugality, joined to a well-order'd trade, ſhall reſtore to the kingdom the riches and wealth it had formerly.

This by the way, if well conſidered, might let us ſee, that taxes, however contrived, and out of whoſe hand ſoever immediately taken, do, in a country, where their great fund is in land, for the moſt part terminate upon land. Whatſoever the people is chiefly maintained by, that the government ſupports itſelf on: nay, perhaps it will be found, that thoſe taxes, which ſeem leaſt to affect land, will moſt ſurely of all other fall the rents. This would deſerve to be well conſidered, in the raiſing of taxes, leſt the neglect of it bring upon the country gentleman an evil, which he will be ſure quickly to feel, but not be able very quickly to remedy. For rents once fallen are not eaſily raiſed again. A tax laid upon land ſeems hard to the landholder, becauſe it is ſo much money going viſibly out of his pocket: and therefore, as an eaſe to himſelf, the landholder is always forward to lay it upon commodities. But, if he will throughly conſider it, and examine the effects, he will find he buys this ſeeming eaſe at a very dear rate: and, though he pays not this tax immediately out of his own purſe, yet his purſe will find it by a greater want of money there, at the end of the year, than that comes to, with the leſſening of his rents to boot: which is a ſettled and laſting evil, that will ſtick upon him beyond the preſent payment.

To make this clear, let us ſuppoſe in the preſent ſtate of affairs in England, that the rents of England are twelve millions, and that the charge and neceſſities of the government require a ſupply of three millions from the parliament, which is laid on land. Here is one fourth part of his yearly income goes immediately out of the landlord's and landholder's pocket. This is a burthen very apt to be felt. The country gentleman, who actually pays the money out of his pocket, or finds it deducted out of his rent at quarter-day for taxes, ſees and very ſenſibly obſerves what goes thus out of his eſtate. But though this be a quarter of his yearly income, and out of an eſtate of four hundred pounds a year, the publick tax now openly takes away one hundred; yet this influences not at all the yearly rent of the land, which the rack-renter, or under-tenant, pays: it being the ſame thing to him, whether he pays all his rent to the king, or his landlord; or half, or a quarter, or none at all to the king; the caſe is all one to him, what hand receives his rent, when due: ſo trade flouriſhes, and his commodities go off well, he will be able to pay his rent on. This leſſens not any more the value of his farm, than an high or a low chief rent does, paid out of it to the lord of the fee: the tenant's bargain and profit is the ſame, whether the land be charged, or not charged, with an annuity payable to another man. We ſee this in college leaſes, where tho' the college tenant pays for it to the college in ſome years five times as much as he does others, upon the varying rate of corn; yet the under-tenant feels not this alteration in the leaſt, nor finds a reaſon to have his rent abated, becauſe a greater part of it is diverted from his landlord. All this is but changing the hand that receives the rent, without any influence at all upon the yearly value of the eſtate; which will not be let for one penny more, or leſs, to the renter, however, or amongſt whomſoever, the rent he pays be divided. From hence it is evident, that taxes laid on land do not in the leaſt make rents fall.

But ſuppoſe, to ſhift off the burthen from the land, ſome country gentleman ſhould think fit to raiſe theſe three millions upon commodities, to let the land go free. Firſt, it is to be conſidered, That ſince the publick wants require three millions, (for that we ſuppoſed for argument's ſake; let it be three millions, or one million, that's all one;) and ſo much muſt go into the king's coffers, or elſe the neceſſities of the government will not be ſupplied: that for raiſing theſe three millions on commodities, and bringing ſo much into the Exchequer, there muſt go a great deal more than three millions out of the ſubjects pockets. For a tax of that nature cannot be levied by officers, to watch every little rivulet of trade, without a great charge, eſpecially at firſt trial. But ſuppoſing no more charge in raiſing it, than of a land tax, and that there are only three millions to be paid, 'tis evident that to do this out of commodities, they muſt, to the conſumer, be raiſed a quarter in their price; ſo that every thing, to him that uſes it, muſt be a quarter dearer. Let us ſee now who, at long run, muſt pay this quarter, and where it will light. 'Tis plain, the merchant and broker, neither will, nor can; for if he pays a quarter more for commodities than he did, he will ſell them at a price proportionably raiſed. The poor labourer and handicraftſman cannot: for he juſt lives from hand to mouth already, and all his food, clothing and utenſils, coſting a quarter more than they did before, either his wages muſt riſe with the price of things, to make him live; or elſe, not being able to maintain himſelf and family by his labour, he comes to the pariſh; and then the land bears the burthen a heavier way. If the labourer's wages be raiſed in proportion to the increaſed rates of things, the farmer who pays a quarter more for wages, as well as all other things, whilſt he ſells his corn and wool, either at the ſame rate, or lower, at the market (ſince the tax laid upon it makes people leſs forward to buy) muſt either have his rent abated, or elſe break and run away in his landlord's debt: and ſo the yearly value of the land is brought down. And who then pays the tax at the year's end, but the landlord? when the tenant, not able to raiſe his rent by his commodities, either runs away in his landlord's debt, or cannot be continued in the farm, without abatement of rent; for, when the yearly charge in his farm is greater by the increaſe of the labourer's wages, and yet his product ſells cheaper by reaſon of the tax laid on his commodities; how will the farmer be able to make up his rent at quarter-day? For this may be worth our notice, that any tax laid on foreign commodities in England, raiſes its price, and makes the importer get more for his commodity: but, on the contrary, a tax laid on your native product, and home-made commodities, leſſens their price, and makes them yield leſs to the firſt ſeller.

The reaſon whereof is plain. For the merchant importing no commodity, but what the neceſſity, or faſhionable wantonneſs, of your people gives him vent for, will not only proportion his gain to the coſt and riſque, which he has been at before landing; but will expect profit of his money paid here, for any tax laid on it; and take advantage from thence to raiſe his price, above what his tax comes to; and if he cannot do that, he will trade no more in that commodity. For it being not the product of his farm, he is not tied to bring it to market, if he finds its price not anſwer his expectation there, but turns himſelf to other wares, which he finds your markets take off better. A merchant will never continue to trade in wares, which the change of faſhion, or humour amongſt your people, has made leſs vendible, though he may be ſometimes caught by a ſudden alteration. But that ſeldom happens in the courſe of trade, ſo as to influence the great bulk of it. For things of neceſſity muſt ſtill be had, and things of faſhion will be had, as long as men have money, or credit, whatever rates they coſt, and the rather becauſe they are dear. For, it being vanity, not uſe, that makes the expenſive faſhion of your people, the emulation, who ſhall have the fineſt, that is, the deareſt things, not the moſt convenient, or uſeful. How many things do we value, or buy, becauſe they come at dear rates from Japan and China, which if they were our own manufacture, or product, common to be had, and for a little money, would be contemned and neglected? Have not ſeveral of our own commodities, offered to ſale at reaſonable rates, been deſpiſed, and the very ſame eagerly bought and bragg'd off, when ſold for French, at a double price? You muſt not think, therefore, that the raiſing their price will leſſen the vent of faſhionable, foreign commodities amongſt you, as long as men have any way to purchaſe them, but rather increaſe it. French wine is become a modiſh drink amongſt us, and a man is aſhamed to entertain his friend, or almoſt to dine himſelf without it. The price is in the memory of man raiſed from 6d. to 2s. and does this hinder the drinking of it? No, the quite contrary: a man's way of living is commended, becauſe he will give any rate for it: and a man will give any rate rather than paſs for a poor wretch, or a penurious curmudgeon, that is not able, or knows not how to live well, nor uſe his friends civilly. Faſhion is, for the moſt part, nothing but the oſtentation of riches, and therefore the high price of what ſerves to that, rather increaſes than leſſens its vent. The conteſt and glory is in the expence, not the uſefulneſs of it; and people are then thought and ſaid to live well, when they can make a ſhew of rare and foreign things, and ſuch as their neighbours cannot go to the price of.

Thus we ſee how foreign commodities fall not in their price, by taxes laid on them, becauſe the merchant is not neceſſitated to bring to your market any but faſhionable commodities, and thoſe go off the better for their high rate. But, on the contrary, your landholder being forced to bring his commodities to market, ſuch as his land and induſtry affords him, common and known things, he muſt ſell them there at ſuch price as he can get. This the buyer knows; and theſe home-bred commodities being ſeldom the favourites of your people, or any farther acceptable, than as great conveniency recommends them to the vulgar, or downright neceſſity to all; as ſoon as a tax is laid on them, every one makes as ſparing a uſe of them as he can, that he may ſave his money for other neceſſary, or creditable expences. Thus the price, which our native commodities yield the firſt ſeller, is mightily abated, and ſo the yearly value of the land, which produces them, leſſened too.

If, therefore, the laying of taxes upon commodities does, as it is evident, affect the land that is out at rack-rent, it is plain it does equally affect all the other land in England too, and the gentry will, but the worſt way, increaſe their own charges, that is, by leſſening the yearly value of their eſtates, if they hope to eaſe their land, by charging commodities. It is in vain, in a country whoſe great fund is land, to hope to lay the publick charge of the government on any thing elſe; there at laſt it will terminate. The merchant (do what you can) will not bear it, the labourer cannot, and therefore the landholder muſt: and whether he were beſt do it, by laying it directly where it will at laſt ſettle, or by letting it come to him by the ſinking of his rents, which when they are once fallen, every one knows are not eaſily raiſed again, let him conſider.

HOLLAND is brought as an inſtance of laying the charge of the publick upon trade, and 'tis poſſible (excepting ſome few ſmall free towns) the only place in the world that could be brought to favour this way. But yet, when examined, will be found to ſhew the quite contrary, and be a clear proof, that lay the taxes how you will, land every where, in proportion, bears the greater ſhare of the burthen. The publick charge of the government, 'tis ſaid, is, in the United Provinces, laid on trade. I grant it is, the greateſt part of it; but is the land excuſed, or eaſed by it? By no means; but, on the contrary, ſo loaded, that in many places half, in others a quarter, in others one eighth of the yearly value does not come into the owner's pocket: and if I have not been miſinformed, the land in ſome places will not pay the taxes: ſo that we may ſay, that the charge of the government came not upon commodities, 'till the land could not bear it. The burthen unavoidably ſettles upon the land firſt, and when it has preſſed it ſo, that it can yield no more, trade muſt be brought in aid, to help to ſupport the government rather than let all ſink: but the firſt ſtreſs is always upon land, and as far as that will reach, it is unavoidably carried, lay your taxes how you will. 'Tis known what a ſhare of the publick charges of the government is ſupported by the trade of Amſterdam alone; as I remember that one town pays thirty-ſix in the hundred of all the publick taxes raiſed in the United Provinces. But are the lands of Guelderland eaſed by it? Let any one ſee, in that country of land more than trade, what they make clear of their revenues, and whether the country gentlemen there grow rich on their land, whilſt the merchant, having the taxes laid on his commerce, is impoveriſhed? On the contrary, Guelderland is ſo low and out of caſh, that Amſterdam has been fain, for many years, to lay down the taxes for them; which is, in effect, to pay the taxes of Guelderland too.

STRUGGLE and contrive as you will, lay your taxes as you pleaſe, the traders will ſhift it off from their own gain; the merchants will bear the leaſt part of it, and grow poor laſt. In Holland itſelf, where trade is ſo loaded, who, I pray, grows richeſt, the landholder, or the trader? Which of them is pinch'd, and wants money moſt? A country may thrive, the country gentleman grow rich, and his rents increaſe (for ſo it has been here) whilſt the land is taxed: but I challenge any one to ſhew me a country, wherein there is any conſiderable publick charge raiſed, where the land does not moſt ſenſibly feel it, and, in proportion, bear much the greater part of it.

WE muſt not, therefore, impute the falling of the rents, or of the price of land, to high intereſt; nor, if ill huſbandry has waſted our riches, hope by ſuch kind of laws to raiſe them to their former value. I humbly conceive we ſhall in vain endeavour it, by the fall of intereſt. The number of buyers muſt be increaſed, and ſellers leſſened, which muſt be done by other ways, than regulating of intereſt, or elſe the landed-man will neither find chapmen for his land, nor for the corn that grows on it, at the rate he deſires.

BUT, could an act of parliament bring down intereſt to four per cent. and the lowering of that immediately raiſe the purchaſer's fine from 20 to 25 years purchaſe; yet it may be doubted, whether this be fit to be made into a law, becauſe it would be of no advantage to the kingdom. For what profit would it be to the nation to make a law, that he who ſells land ſhould inſtead of four have five hundred pounds of the purchaſer? This, indeed, a little alters the diſtribution of the money we have amongſt us Engliſhmen here at home, but neither helps to continue what we have, nor brings in more from abroad: which, being the only concernment of the kingdom, in reference to its wealth, is apt to be ſuppoſed by us without doors to be the only care of a parliament. For it matters not, ſo it be here amongſt us, whether the money be in Thomas, or Richard's hands, provided it be ſo order'd, that whoever has it may be encouraged to let it go into the current of trade, for the improvement of the general ſtock and wealth of the nation.

As this increaſe of the fine, in the purchaſe of land, is not an advantage to the kingdom; ſo neither is it to the landholder, who is the perſon, that bearing the greateſt part of the burthens of the kingdom, ought, I think, to have the greateſt care taken of him, and enjoy as many privileges, and as much wealth, as the favour of the law can (with regard to the publick-weal) conſer upon him. But pray conſider: the raiſing the price of land in ſale, by increaſing the number of years purchaſe to be paid for it, gives the advantage, not to the landholder, but to him that ceaſes to be ſo. He that has no longer the land, has the more money: and he, who has the land, is poorer. The true advantage of the landholder is, that his corn, fleſh, and wool, ſell better, and yield a greater price; this, indeed, is a profit that benefits the owner of the land, and goes along with it: it is this alone raiſes the rent, and makes the poſſeſſor richer: and this can only be done by increaſing our wealth, and drawing more money into England. which the falling of intereſt, and thereby (if it could effect it) raiſing the purchaſe of land, is ſo far from doing, that it does viſibly and directly one way hinder our increaſe of wealth, that is, by hindering foreigners to come here, and buy land, and ſettle amongſt us. Whereby we have this double loſs; firſt, we loſe their perſons, increaſe of people being the increaſe both of ſtrength and riches. Secondly, we loſe ſo much money; for, tho' whatever an Engliſhman gives to another for land, tho' raiſed to forty years purchaſe, be not one farthing advantage to the kingdom; yet whatever a foreigner, who purchaſes land here, gives for it, is ſo much every farthing clear gain to the nation: for that money comes clear in, without carrying out any thing for it, and is every farthing of it as perfect gain to the nation, as if it dropp'd down from the clouds.

But farther, if conſideration be to be had only of ſellers of land, the lowering of intereſt to four per cent. will not be in their favour, unleſs by it you can raiſe land to thirty years purchaſe, which is not at all likely: and I think nobody, by falling of intereſt to four per cent. hopes to get chapmen for their land at that rate. Whatſoever they have leſs, if law can regulate intereſt, they loſe of their value of land, money being thus abaſed. So that the landed-man will ſcarce find his account neither, by this law, when it comes to trial. And at laſt, I imagine, this will be the reſult of all ſuch attempts, that experience will ſhew that the price of things will not be regulated by laws, tho' the endeavours after it will be ſure to prejudice and inconvenience trade, and put your affairs out of order.

If this be ſo, that intereſt cannot be regulated by law, or that if it could, yet the reducing of it to four per cent. would do more harm than good: what then ſhould there (you will ſay) be no law at all to regulate intereſt? I ſay not ſo. For,

1. It is neceſſary that there ſhould be a ſtated rate of intereſt, and in debts and forbearances, where contract has not ſettled it between the parties, the law might give a rule, and courts of judicature might know what damages to allow. This may, and therefore ſhould, be regulated.

2. That in the preſent current of running caſh, which now takes its courſe almoſt all to London, and is ingroſſed by a very few hands in compariſon, young men, and thoſe in want, might not too eaſily be expoſed to extortion and oppreſſion; and the dextrous and combining money-jobbers not have too great and unbounded a power, to prey upon the ignorance, or neceſſity of borrowers. There would not be much danger of this, if money were more equally diſtributed into the ſeveral quarters of England, and into a greater number of hands, according to the exigencies of trade.

If money were to be hired, as land is; or to be had as corn, or wool, from the owner himſelf, and known, good ſecurity be given for it, it might then probably be had at the market (which is the true) rate, and that rate of intereſt would be a conſtant gauge of your trade and wealth. But, when a kind of monopoly, by conſent, has put this general commodity into a few hands, it may need regulation, though what the ſtated rate of intereſt ſhould be, in the conſtant change of affairs, and flux of money, is hard to determine. Poſſibly it may be allowed, as a reaſonable propoſal, that it ſhould be within ſuch bounds, as ſhould not, on the one ſide, quite eat up the merchant's and tradeſmen's profit, and diſcourage their induſtry; nor, on the other hand, ſo low, as ſhould hinder men from riſquing their money in other mens hands, and ſo rather chuſe to keep it out of trade, than venture it upon ſo ſmall profit. When it is too high, it ſo hinders the merchant's gain, that he will not borrow; when too low, it ſo hinders the monied man's profit, that he will not lend; and both theſe ways it is an hindrance to trade.

BUT this being, perhaps, too general and looſe a rule, let me add, that if one would conſider money and land alone, in relation one to another, perhaps it is now at ſix per cent. in as good a proportion as is poſſible, ſix per cent. being a little higher than land at twenty years purchaſe, which is the rate pretty near, that land has generally carried in England, it never being much over, nor under. For ſuppoſing 100 l. in money, and land of 5 l. per ann. be of equal value, which is land at twenty years purchaſe; 'tis neceſſary for the making their value truly equal, that they ſhould produce an equal income, which the 100 l. at 5 l. per cent. intereſt is not likely to do.

1. BECAUSE of the many, and ſometimes long intervals of barrenneſs, which happen to money, more than land. Money at uſe, when returned into the hands of the owner, uſually lies dead there, 'till he gets a new tenant for it, and can put it out again; and all this time it produces nothing. But this happens not to land, the growing product whereof turns to account to the owner, even when it is in his hands, or is allowed for by the tenant, antecedently to his entering upon the farm. For though a man, that borrows money at Midſummer, never begins to pay his intereſt from our Lady-day, or one moment backwards; yet he, who rents a farm at Midſummer, may have as much reaſon to begin his rent from our Lady-day, as if he had then entered upon it.

2. BESIDES the dead intervals of ceaſing profit, which happen to money more than land, there is another reaſon why the profit and income of money let out, ſhould be a little higher than that of land; and that is, becauſe money out at intereſt runs a greater riſque, than land does. The borrower may break, and run away with the money, and then not only the intereſt due, but all the future profit, with the principal, is loſt for ever. But in land a man can loſe but the rent due, for which uſually too the ſtock upon the land is ſufficient ſecurity: and, if a tenant run away in arrear of ſome rent, the land remains; that cannot be carried away, or loſt. Should a man purchaſe good land in Middleſex of 5 l. per ann. at twenty years purchaſe, and other land in Rumney-marſh, or elſewhere, of the ſame yearly value, but ſo ſituated, that it were in danger to be ſwallowed of the ſea, and be utterly loſt, it would not be unreaſonable, that he ſhould expect to have it under twenty years purchaſe; ſuppoſe ſixteen and an half: this is to bring it to juſt the caſe of land at twenty years purchaſe; and money at ſix per cent. where the uncertainty of ſecuring one's money may well be allowed that advantage of greater profit; and therefore, perhaps, the legal intereſt now in England at ſix per cent, is as reaſonable and convenient a rate as can well be ſet by a ſtanding rule, eſpecially if we conſider that the law requires not a man to pay ſix per cent. but ties up the lender from taking more. So that if ever it falls of itſelf, the monied-man is ſure to find it, and his intereſt will be brought down to it.

HIGH intereſt is thought by ſome a prejudice to trade: but if we look back, we ſhall find, that England never throve ſo well, nor was there ever brought into England ſo great an increaſe of wealth ſince, as in queen Elizabeth's and king James I. and king Charles I. time, when money was at ten and eight per cent. I will not ſay high intereſt was the cauſe of it. For I rather think that our thriving trade was the cauſe of high intereſt, every one craving money to employ in a profitable commerce. But this, I think, I may reaſonably infer from it, That lowering of intereſt is not a ſure way to improve either our trade, or wealth.

TO this I hear ſome ſay, That the Dutch, ſkilful in all arts of promoting trade, to out-do us in this, as well as all other advancements of it, have obſerved this rule, viz, That when we fell intereſt in England from ten to eight, they preſently ſunk intereſt in Holland to four per cent. And again, when we lower'd it to ſix, they ſell it to three per cent. thereby to keep the advantage, which the lowneſs of intereſt gives to trade. From whence theſe men readily conclude, That the falling of intereſt will advance trade in England. To which I anſwer,

1. That this looks like an argument rather made for the preſent occaſion, to miſlead thoſe who are credulous enough to ſwallow it, than ariſing from true reaſon, and matter of fact. For, if lowering of intereſt were ſo advantageous to trade, why did the Dutch ſo conſtantly take their meaſures only by us, and not as well by ſome other of their neighbours, with whom they have as great, or greater commerce than with us? This is enough, at firſt ſight, to make one ſuſpect this to be duſt, only raiſed to throw in people's eyes, and a ſuggeſtion made to ſerve a purpoſe. For,

2. It will not be found true, That, when we abated intereſt here in England to eight, the Dutch ſunk it in Holland to four per cent. by law; or that there was any law made in Holland to limit the rate of intereſt to three per cent. when we reduced it in England to ſix. It is true, John de Witt, when he managed the affairs of Holland, ſetting himſelf to leſſen the publick debts, and having actually paid ſome, and getting money in a readineſs to pay others, ſent notice to all the creditors, That thoſe, who would not take four per cent. ſhould come and receive their money. The creditors finding him in earneſt, and knowing not how otherwiſe to employ their money, accepted his terms, and changed their obligations into four per cent. whereas before they were at five, and ſo (the great loans of the country being to the ſtate) it might be ſaid in this ſenſe, That the rate of intereſt was reduced lower at that time: but that it was done by a law, forbidding to take higher intereſt than four per cent. that I deny, and require any one to ſhew. Indeed, upon good ſecurity, one might lately have borrowed money in Holland at three, and three and an half per cent. but not by virtue of any law, but the natural rate of intereſt. And I appeal to the men, learned in the law of Holland, whether laſt year (and I doubt not but it is ſo ſtill) a man might not lawfully lend his money for what intereſt he could get, and whether in the courts he ſhould not recover the intereſt he contracted for, if it were ten per cent. So that, if money be to be borrowed by honeſt and reſponſible men, at three, or three and an half per cent. it is not by the force of ſtatutes and edicts, but by the natural courſe of things; which will always bring intereſt upon good ſecurity low, where there is a great deal of money to be lent, and little good ſecurity, in proportion, to be had. Holland is a country, where the land makes a very little part of the ſtock of the country. Trade is their great fund; and their eſtates lie generally in money: ſo that all, who are not traders, generally ſpeaking, are lenders: of which there are ſo many, whoſe income depends upon intereſt, that if the States were not mightily in debt, but paid every one their principal, inſtead of the four per cent. uſe, which they give, there would be ſo much more money than could be uſed, or would be ventured in trade, that money there would be at two per cent, or under, unleſs they found a way to put it out in foreign countries.

Interest, I grant theſe men, is low in Holland: but it is ſo, not as an effect of law, or the politick contrivance of the government, to promote trade; but as the conſequence of great plenty of ready money, when their intereſt firſt fell. I ſay, when it firſt fell: for being once brought low, and the publick having borrowed a great part of private mens money, and continuing in debt, it muſt continue ſo, though the plenty of money, which firſt brought intereſt low, were very much decay'd, and a great part of their wealth were really gone. For the debt of the ſtate affording to the creditors a conſtant yearly income, that is look'd on as a ſafe revenue, and accounted as valuable as if it were in land; and accordingly they buy it one of another: and whether there be any money in the publick coffers or no, he, who has to the value of ten thouſand pounds owing him from the States, may ſell it every day in the week, and have ready money for it: this credit is ſo great an advantage to private men, who know not elſe what to do with their ſtocks, that, were the States now in a condition to begin to pay their debts, the creditors, rather than take their money out, to lie dead by them, would let it ſtay in, at lower intereſt, as they did ſome years ſince, when they were called on to come and receive their money. This is the ſtate of intereſt in Holland: their plenty of money, and paying their public debts, ſome time ſince lowered their intereſt. But it was not done by the command and limitation of a law, nor in conſequence of our reducing it here by law to ſix per cent. For I deny, that there is any law there yet, to forbid lending of money for above three, or ſix, or ten per cent. Whatever ſome here ſuggeſt, every one there may hire out his money, as freely as he does any thing elſe, for what rate he can get; and the bargain being made, the law will enforce the borrower to pay it.

I GRANT low intereſt, where all men conſent to it, is an advantage to trade, if merchants will regulate their gains accordingly, and men be perſuaded to lend to them: but can it be expected, when the publick gives ſeven or eight, or ten per cent. that private men, whoſe ſecurity is certainly no better, ſhall have for four? And can there be any thing ſtranger, than that the ſame men, who look on, and therefore allow high uſe as an encouragement to lending to the Chequer, ſhould think low uſe ſhould bring money into trade? The States of Holland, ſome few years ſince, paid but four per cent. for the money they owed: if you propoſe them for an example, and intereſt be to be regulated by a law, try whether you can do ſo here, and bring men to lend it to the publick at that rate. This would be a benefit to the kingdom, and abate a great part of our publick charge. If you cannot do that, confeſs, that 'tis not the law in Holland has brought the intereſt there ſo low, but ſomething elſe, and that which will make the States, or any body elſe, pay dearer now, if either their credit be leſs, or money there ſcarcer.

AN infallible ſign of your decay of wealth is the falling of rents, and the raiſing of them would be worth the nation's care: for in that, and not in the falling of intereſt, lies the true advantage of the landed-man, and with him of the publick. It may be therefore, not beſides our preſent buſineſs, to enquire into the cauſe of the falling of rents in England.

1. EITHER the land is grown barrener, and ſo the product is leſs, and conſequently the money to be received for that product is leſs. For it is evident, that he whoſe land was wont to produce 100 buſhels of wheat, communibus annis, if by long tillage and huſbandry it will now produce but 50 buſhels, the rent will be abated half. But this cannot be ſuppoſed general.

2. OR the rent of that land is leſſened. 1. Becauſe the uſe of the commodity ceaſes: as the rents muſt fall in Virginia, were taking of tobacco forbid in England. 2. Or becauſe ſomething elſe ſupplies the room of that product: as the rate of coppice lands will fall upon the diſcovery of coal mines. 3. Or, becauſe the markets are ſupplied with the ſame commodity cheaper from another place: as the breeding counties of England muſt needs fall their rents, by the importation of Iriſh cattle. 4. Or, becauſe a tax laid on your native commodities, makes what the farmer ſells cheaper; and labour, and what he buys, dearer.

3. OR, the money in the country is leſs. For the exigencies and uſes of money not leſſening with its quantity, and it being in the ſame proportion to be employed and diſtributed ſtill, in all the parts of its circulation, ſo much as its quantity is leſſened, ſo much muſt the ſhare of every one that has a right to this money be the leſs; whether he be landholder, for his goods; or labourer, for his hire; or merchant, for his brokerage. Though the landholder uſually finds it firſt. Becauſe money failing, and falling ſhort, people have not ſo much money as formerly to lay out, and ſo leſs money is brought to market, by which the price of things muſt neceſſarily fall. The labourer feels it next. For, when the landholder's rent falls, he muſt either bate the labourer's wages, or not employ, or not pay him; which either way makes him feel the want of money. The merchant feels it laſt. For though he ſells leſs, and at a lower rate, he buys alſo our native commodities, which he exports at a lower rate too: and will be ſure to leave our native commodities unbought, upon the hands of the farmer, or manufacturer, rather than export them to a market, which will not afford him returns with profit.

IF one third of the money employed in trade, were locked up, or gone out of England, muſt not the landholders neceſſarily receive one third leſs for their goods, and conſequently rents fall; a leſs quantity of money by one third being to be diſtributed amongſt an equal number of receivers? Indeed, people not perceiving the money to be gone, are apt to be jealous one of another; and each ſuſpecting another's inequality of gain to rob him of his ſhare, every one will be employing his ſkill, and power, the beſt he can, to retrieve it again, and to bring money into his pocket, in the ſame plenty as formerly. But this is but ſcrambling among ourſelves, and helps no more againſt our want, than the pulling off a ſhort coverlet will, amongſt children, that lie together, preſerve them all from the cold. Some will ſtarve, unleſs the father of the family provide better, and enlarge the ſcanty covering. This pulling and conteſt is uſually between the landed-man and the merchant. For the labourer's ſhare, being ſeldom more than a bare ſubſiſtance, never allows that body of men, time, or opportunity to raiſe their thoughts above that, or ſtruggle with the richer for theirs, (as one common intereſt) unleſs when ſome common and great diſtreſs, uniting them in one univerſal ferment, makes them forget reſpect, and emboldens them to carve to their wants with armed force: and then ſometimes they break in upon the rich, and ſweep all like a deluge. But this rarely happens but in the male-adminiſtration of neglected, or miſmanaged government.

THE uſual ſtruggle and conteſt, as I ſaid before, in the decays of wealth and riches, is between the landed-man, and the merchant, with whom I may here join the monied man. The landed-man finds himſelf aggrieved, by the falling of his rents, and the ſtreightning of his fortune, whilſt the monied man keeps up his gain, and the merchant thrives and grows rich by trade. Theſe, he thinks, ſteal his income into their pockets, build their fortunes upon his ruin, and ingroſs more of the riches of the nation than comes to their ſhare. He, therefore, endeavours, by laws, to keep up the value of lands which he ſuſpects leſſened by the other's exceſs of profit: but all in vain. The cauſe is miſtaken, and the remedy too. 'Tis not the merchant's nor monied-man's gains that makes land fall: but the want of money and leſſening of our treaſure, waſted by extravagant expences, and a miſmanaged trade, which the land always firſt feels. If the landed-gentleman will have, and by his example make it faſhionable to have, more claret, ſpice, ſilk, and other foreign, conſumable wares, than our exportation of commodities does exchange for; money muſt unavoidably follow to balance the account, and pay the debt. And therefore, I fear that another propoſal I hear talked of, to hinder the exportation of money and bullion, will ſhew more our need of care to keep our money from going from us, than a way and method how to preſerve it here.

'TIS death in Spain to export money: and yet they, who furniſh all the world with gold and ſilver, have leaſt of it amongſt themſelves. Trade fetches it away from that lazy and indigent people, notwithſtanding all their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there. It follows trade, againſt the rigour of their laws; and their want of foreign commodities makes it openly be carried out at noonday. Nature has beſtowed mines on ſeveral parts of the world: but their riches are only for the induſtrious and frugal. Whomſoever elſe they viſit, 'tis with the diligent and ſober only they ſtay. And if the virtue and provident way of living of our anceſtors (content with our native conveniencies of life, without the coſtly itch after the materials of pride and luxury from abroad) were brought in faſhion and countenance again amongſt us; this alone would do more to keep and increaſe our wealth, and enrich our land, than all our paper-helps, about intereſt, money, bullion, &c. which however eagerly we may catch at, will not, I fear, without better huſbandry, keep us from ſinking, whatever contrivances we may have recourſe to. 'Tis with a kingdom as with a family. Spending leſs than our own commodities will pay for, is the ſure and only way for the nation to grow rich. And, when that begins once ſeriouſly to be conſidered, and our faces and ſteps are in earneſt turned that way, we may hope to have our rents riſe, and the publick ſtock thrive again. 'Till then, we in vain, I fear, endeavour with noiſe, and weapons of law, to drive the wolf from our own to one another's doors: the breed ought to be extirpated out of the iſland. For want, brought in by ill management, and nurſed up by expenſive vanity, will make the nation poor, and ſpare no body.

If three millions were neceſſary for the carrying on the trade of England, whereof one million were for the landholder, to maintain him; another were for the payment of the labourer and handicraftſman; and the third were the ſhare of the brokers, coming to them for their care and pains in diſtributing; if one million of this money were gone out of the kingdom, muſt there not be one third leſs to be ſhared amongſt them for the product of their land, their labour and their diſtribution? I do not ſay they will feel it at the ſame time. But the landholder having nothing, but what the product of his land will yield; and the buyer, according to the plenty, or ſcarcity of money he has, always ſetting the price upon what is offered to ſale; the landholder muſt be content to take the market-rate, for what he brings thither; which always following the ſcarcity, or plenty of money, if any part of our money be gone, he is ſure firſt to find it in the price of his commodities. For the broker and merchant, though he ſell cheaper, yet he buys cheaper too: and he will be ſure to get by his returns, or let alone a commodity, which will not produce him gain: and whatſoever is ſo alone, and left upon hands, always turns to the landholder's loſs.

Supposing that of our woollen manufacture, foreign markets took off one half, and the other half were conſumed amongſt ourſelves: if a ſenſible part (as one third) of our coin were gone, and ſo men had equally one third leſs money than they had, (for, 'tis certain, it muſt be tantamount, and what I 'ſcape of one third leſs, another muſt make up) it would follow, that they would have leſs to lay out in cloaths, as well as other things, and ſo would wear them longer, or pay leſs for them. If a clothier finds a want of vent, he muſt either ſell cheaper, or not at all; if he ſell cheaper, he muſt alſo pay leſs, both for wool and labour; and if the labourer hath leſs wages, he muſt alſo pay leſs for corn, butter, cheeſe, fleſh, or elſe forbear ſome of theſe quite. In all which caſes, the price of wool, corn, fleſh, and the other products of land are brought down, and the land bears the greateſt part of the loſs. For where-ever the conſumption, or vent of any commodity is ſtopt, there the ſtop continues on, till it comes to the landholder. And, where-ever the price of any commodity begins to fall, how many hands ſoever there be between that and the landholder, they all take repriſals one upon another, till at laſt it comes to the landholder; and there the abatement of price, of any of his commodities, leſſens his income, and is a clear loſs. The owner of land, which produces the commodity, and the laſt buyer who conſumes it, are the two extremes in commerce. And though the falling of any ſort of commodity in the landholder's hand does not prove ſo to the laſt conſumer, the arts of intervening brokers and ingroſſers keeping up the price to their own advantage, yet, whenever want of money, or want of deſire in the conſumer, make the price low, that immediately reaches the firſt producer: nobody between having any intereſt to keep it up.

Now as to the two firſt cauſes of falling of rents, falling of intereſt has no influence at all. In the latter it has a great part, becauſe it makes the money of England leſs, by making both Engliſhmen and foreigners withdraw, or withhold their money. For that which is not let looſe into trade, is all one whilſt hoarded up, as if it were not in being.

I have heard it brought for a reaſon, why intereſt ſhould be reduced to four per cent. "That thereby the landholder, who bears the burden of the publick "charge, may be in ſome degree eaſed by falling of intereſt."

This argument will be put right, if you ſay it will eaſe the borrower, and lay the loſs on the lender: but it concerns not the land in general, unleſs you will ſuppoſe all landholders in debt. But I hope we may yet think that men in England, who have land, have money too; and that landed men, as well as others, by their providence and good huſbandry, accommodating their expences to their income, keep themſelves from going backwards in the world.

That which is urged, as moſt deſerving conſideration and remedy in the caſe, is, "That it is hard and unreaſonable, that one, who has mortgaged half "his land, ſhould yet pay taxes for the whole, whilſt the mortgagee goes away "with the clear profit of an high intereſt." To this I anſwer:

1. That, if any man has run himſelf in debt for the ſervice of his country, 'tis fit the publick ſhould reimburſe him, and ſet him free. This is a care that becomes the publick juſtice, That men, if they receive no rewards, ſhould at leaſt be kept from ſuffering, in having ſerved their country. But I do not remember the polity of any nation, who altered their conſtitution in favour of thoſe, whoſe miſmanagement had brought them behind-hand; poſſibly, as thinking the publick little beholden to thoſe, who had miſemployed the ſtock of their country in the exceſs of their private expences, and, by their example, ſpread a faſhion, that carries ruin with it. Men's paying taxes of mortgaged lands, is a puniſhment for ill huſbandry, which ought to be diſcouraged: but it concerns very little the frugal and the thrifty.

2. Another thing to be ſaid in reply to this, is, That it is with gentlemen in the country, as with tradeſmen in the city. If they will own titles to greater eſtates than really they have, it is their own faults, and there is no way left to help them from paying for them. The remedy is in their own hands, to diſcharge themſelves when they pleaſe. And when they have once ſold their land, and paid their debts, they will no longer pay taxes for what they own, without being really theirs. There is another way alſo, whereby they may be relieved, as well as a great many other inconveniencies remedied; and that is by a regiſtry: for if mortgages were regiſtered, land-taxes might reach them, and order the lender to pay his proportion.

I have met with patrons of four per cent, who (amongſt many other fine things they tell us of) affirm, "That if intereſt were reduced to four per cent. "then ſome men would borrow money at this low rate, and pay their debts; "others would borrow more than they now do, and improve their land; others "would borrow more, and employ it in trade and manufacture." Gilded words indeed, were there any thing ſubſtantial in them! Theſe men talk, as if they meant to ſhew us, not only the wiſdom, but riches of Solomon, and would make gold and ſilver as common as ſtones in the ſtreet: but at laſt, I fear, 'twill be but wit without money, and I wiſh it amount to that. 'Tis without queſtion, that could the countryman and the tradeſman take up money cheaper than now they do, every man would be forward to borrow, and deſire that he might have other men's money to employ to his advantage. I confeſs, thoſe who contend for four per cent. have found out a way to ſet men's mouths a watering for money at that rate, and to increaſe the number of the borrowers in England; if any body can imagine it would be an advantage to increaſe them. But to anſwer all their fine projects, I have but this one ſhort queſtion to aſk them: Will four per cent. increaſe the number of lenders? If it will not, as any man at the very firſt hearing will ſhrewdly ſuſpect it will not, then all the plenty of money, theſe conjurers beſtow upon us, for improvement of land, paying of debts, and advancement of trade, is but like the gold and ſilver, which old women believe other conjurers beſtow ſometimes, by whole lapfuls, on poor credulous girls, which, when they bring to the light, is found to be nothing but wither'd leaves; and the poſſeſſors of it are ſtill as much in want of money as ever.

Indeed, I grant it would be well for England, and I wiſh it were ſo, that the plenty of money were ſo great amongſt us, that every man could borrow, as much as he could uſe in trade, for four per cent. nay, that men could borrow as much as they could employ for ſix per cent. But even at that rate, the borrowers already are far more than the lenders. Why elſe doth the merchant upon occaſion, pay ſix per cent. and often above that rate for brokage? And why doth the country gentleman of 1000 l. per ann. find it ſo difficult, with all the ſecurity he can bring, to take up 1000l. All which proceeds from the ſcarcity of money, and bad ſecurity; two cauſes which will not be leſs powerful, to hinder borrowing, after the lowering of intereſt; and I do not ſee how any one can imagine that reducing uſe to four per cent. ſhould abate their force, or how leſſening the reward of the lender, without diminiſhing his riſque, ſhould make him more forward and ready to lend. So that theſe men, whilſt they talk, that at four per cent. men would take up and employ more money to the publick advantage, do but pretend to multiply the number of borrowers among us, of which it is certain we have too many already. While they thus ſet men a longing for the golden days of four per cent. methinks they uſe the poor, indigent debtor, and needy tradeſman, as I have ſeen prating jackdaws do ſometimes their young, who kawing and fluttering about the neſt, ſet all their young ones a gaping; but, having nothing in their empty mouths but noiſe and air, leave them as hungry as before.

'Tis true, theſe men have found out by a cunning project, how, by the reſtraint of a law, to make the price of money one third cheaper, and then they tell John a Nokes that he ſhall have 10,00 l. of it to employ in merchandiſe, or cloathing; and John a Stiles ſhall have 20,000 l. more to pay his debts; and ſo diſtribute this money as freely as Diego did his legacies, which they are to have, even where they can get it. But till theſe men can inſtruct the forward borrowers, where they ſhall be furniſhed, they have perhaps done ſomething to increaſe men's deſire, but not made money one jot eaſier to come by. And, till they do that, all this ſweet jingling of money, in their diſcourſes, goes juſt to the tune of, "If all the world were oatmeal." Methink theſe undertakers, whilſt they have put men in hopes of borrowing more plentifully, at eaſier rates, for the ſupply of their wants and trades, had done better to have bethought themſelves of a way how men need not borrow upon uſe at all: for this would be much more advantageous, and altogether as feaſible. It is as eaſy to diſtribute twenty pair of ſhoes amongſt thirty men, if they pay nothing for them at all, as if they paid 4 s. a pair; ten of them (notwithſtanding the ſtatute-rate ſhould be be reduced from 6 s. to 4 s. a pair) will be neceſſitated to ſit ſtill barefoot, as much as if they were to pay nothing for ſhoes at all. Juſt ſo it is in a country, that wants money in proportion to trade. It is as eaſy to contrive how every man ſhall be ſupplied with what money he needs (i. e. can employ in improvement of land, paying his debts, and returns of his trade) for nothing, as for four per cent. Either we have already more money than the owners will lend, or we have not. If part of the money, which is now in England, will not be lent at the rate intereſt is at preſent at, will men be more ready to lend, and borrowers be furniſhed for all thoſe brave purpoſes, more plentifully, when money is brought to four per cent? If people do already lend all the money they have, above their own occaſions, whence are thoſe, who will borrow more at four per cent. to be ſupplied? Or is there ſuch plenty of money, and ſcarcity of borrowers, that there needs the reducing of intereſt to four per cent. to bring men to take it?

All the imaginable ways of increaſing money in any country, are theſe two: either to dig it in the mines of our own, or get it from our neighbours. That four per cent. is not of the nature of the deuſing-rod, or virgula divina, able to diſcover mines of gold and ſilver, I believe will eaſily be granted me. The way of getting from foreigners, is either by force, borrowing, or trade. And whatever ways, beſides theſe, men may fancy, or propoſe, for increaſing of money, (except they intend to ſet up for the philoſopher's ſtone) would be much the ſame with a diſtracted man's device, that I knew, who, in the beginning of his diſtemper, firſt diſcovered himſelf to be out of his wits, by getting together and boiling a great number of groats, with a deſign, as he ſaid, to make them plim, i. e. grow thicker. That four per cent. will raiſe armies, diſcipline ſoldiers, and make men valiant, and fitter to conquer countries, and enrich themſelves with the ſpoils, I think was never pretended. And that it will not bring in more of our neighbour's money upon loan, than we have at preſent among us, is ſo viſible in itſelf, that it will not need any proof; the contenders for four per cent. looking upon it as an undeniable truth, and making uſe of it as an argument, to ſhew the advantage it will be to the nation, by leſſening the uſe paid to foreigners, who upon falling of uſe will take home their money. And, for the laſt way of increaſing our money, by promoting of trade, how much lowering of intereſt is the way to that, I have, I ſuppoſe, ſhewed you already.

HAVING lately met with a little tract, entituled, "A Letter to "a friend concerning uſury," printed this preſent Year, 1690; which gives in ſhort, the arguments of ſome treatiſes, printed many years ſince, for the lowering of intereſt; it may not be amiſs briefly to conſider them.

"1 AN high intereſt decays trade. The advantage from intereſt is greater "than the profit from trade, which makes the rich merchants give "over, and put out their Stock to intereſt, and the leſſer merchants break."

Anſw. THIS was printed in 1621, when intereſt was at ten per cent. And whether England had ever a more flouriſhing trade than at that time, muſt be left to the judgment of thoſe, who have conſider'd the growing ſtrength and riches of this kingdom in queen Elizabeth's and king James I's reigns. Not that I impute it to high intereſt, but to other cauſes, I have mention'd, wherein uſury had nothing to do. But if this be thought an argument now in 1690, when the legal intereſt is ſix per cent. I deſire thoſe, who think fit to make uſe of it, to name thoſe rich merchants, who have given over, and put out their ſtocks to intereſt.

2. "INTEREST being at ten per cent. and in Holland at ſix, our neighbour "merchants underſell us."

Anſw. THE legal intereſt being here now at ſix per cent. and in Holland not limited by law, our neighbour merchants underſell us, becauſe they live more frugally, and are content with leſs profit.

3. "INTEREST being lower in Holland than in England, their contributions "to war, works of piety, and all charges of the ſtate, are cheaper to them than "to us."

Anſw. THIS needs a little explication. Contributions, greater or leſs, I underſtand: but contributions cheaper or dearer, I confeſs I do not. If they manage their wars and charges cheaper than we, the blame is not to be laid on high, or low intereſt.

4, "INTEREST being ſo high, prevents the building of ſhipping, which is "the ſtrength and ſafety of our iſland, moſt merchant-ſhips being built in "Holland."

Anſw. THOUGH this argument be now gone, ſuch ſhips being prohibited by a law, I will help the author to one as good. The Dutch buy our Rape-ſeed, make it into oil, bring it back to us, and ſell it with advantage. This may be as well ſaid to be from high intereſt here, and low there. But the truth is, the induſtry and frugality of that people, makes them content to work cheaper, and ſell at leſs profit than their neighbours, and ſo get the trade from them.

5. "The high rate of uſury makes land ſell ſo cheap, being not worth more "than fourteen, or fifteen years purchaſe; whereas in Holland, where intereſt "is at ſix, it is worth above twenty-five. So that a low intereſt raiſes the price "of land. Where money is dear, land is cheap."

Anſw. THIS argument plainly confeſſes, That there is ſomething elſe regulates the price of land, beſides the rate of intereſt; elſe, when money was at ten per cent. here, land ſhould have been at ten years purchaſe, whereas he confeſſes it then to have been at fourteen or fifteen. One may ſuppoſe, to favour his hypotheſis, he was not forward to ſpeak the moſt of it. And intereſt, as he ſays, being at ſix per cent. in Holland, land there ſhould have ſold, by that rule, for ſixteen and an half years purchaſe; whereas he ſays, it was worth about twenty-five. And Mr. Manly ſays, p. 33. "That money in France being at "ſeven per cent. noble land ſells for thirty-four and thirty-five years purchaſe, "and ordinary land for twenty-five." So that the true concluſion from hence is, not what our author makes, but this; That 'tis not the legal intereſt, but ſomething elſe, that governs the rate of land. I grant his poſition, That where money is dear, land is cheap, and vice verſa. But it muſt be ſo by the natural, not legal intereſt. For, where money will be lent on good ſecurity, at four or five per cent. 'tis a demonſtration that there is more than will be ventured on ordinary credit in trade. And when this plenty becomes general, 'tis a ſign there is more money than can be employed in trade; which cannot but put many upon ſeeking purchaſes, to lay it out in land, and ſo raiſe the price of land, by making more buyers than ſellers.

6. "'Tis not probable lenders will call in their money, when they cannot "make greater intereſt any where. Beſides, their ſecurity upon land will be "better."

Anſw. SOME unſkilful and timorous men will call in their money; others put it into the banker's hands. But the bankers and ſkilful will keep it up, and not lend it, but at the natural uſe, as we have ſhewn. But how ſecurities will be mended, by lowering of intereſt, is, I confeſs, beyond my comprehenſion.

Of raiſing our COIN.

BEING now upon the conſideration of intereſt and money, give me leave to ſay one word more on this occaſion, which may not be wholly unſeaſonable at this time. I hear a talk up and down of raiſing our money, as a means to retain our wealth, and keep our money from being carried away. I I wiſh thoſe, that uſe the phraſe of raiſing our money, had ſome clear notion annexed to it; and that then they would examine, "Whether, that being true, it would at all ſerve to thoſe ends, for which it is propoſed?"

THE raiſing of money, then, ſignifies one of theſe two things; either raiſing the value of our money, or raiſing the denomination of our coin.

THE raiſing the value of money, or any thing elſe, is nothing, but the making a leſs quantity of it exchange for any other thing, than would have been taken for it before, v. g. If 5s. will exchange for, or, (as we call it) buy a buſhel of wheat; if you can make 4 s. buy another buſhel of the ſame wheat, it is plain the value of your money is raiſed, in reſpect of wheat, one fifth. But thus nothing can raiſe, or fall the value of your money, but the proportion of its plenty, or ſcarcity, in proportion to the plenty, ſcarcity, or vent of any other commodity, with which you compare it, or for which you would exchange it. And thus ſilver, which makes the intrinſick value of money, compared with itſelf, under any ſtamp, or denomination of the ſame, or different countries, cannot be raiſed. For an ounce of ſilver, whether in pence, groats, or crown-pieces, ſtivers, or ducatoons, or in bullion, is and always eternally will be of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver, under what ſtamp, or denomination ſoever; unleſs it can be ſhewn that any ſtamp can add any new or better qualities to one parcel of ſilver, which another parcel of ſilver wants.

SILVER, therefore, being always of equal value to ſilver, the value of coin, compared with coin, is greater, leſs, or equal, only as it has more, leſs, or equal ſilver in it: and in this reſpect, you can by no manner of way raiſe, or fall your money. Indeed moſt of the ſilver of the world, both in money and veſſels, being alloy'd, (i. e. mixed with ſome baſer metals) fine ſilver, (i. e. ſilver ſeparated from all alloy) is uſually dearer than ſo much ſilver alloy'd, or mix'd with baſer metals. Becauſe, beſides the weight of the ſilver, thoſe who have need of fine (i. e. unmix'd ſilver; as gilders, wire-drawers, &c.) muſt, according to their need, beſides an equal weight of ſilver, mix'd with other metals, give an overplus to reward the refiner's ſkill and pains. And in this caſe, fine ſilver, and alloy'd, or mixed ſilver, are conſidered as two diſtinct commodities. But no money being coined here, or almoſt any where, of pure, fine ſilver, this concerns not the value of money at all; wherein an equal quantity of ſilver is always of the ſame value with an equal quantity of ſilver, let the ſtamp, or denomination be what it will.

ALL then, that can be done in this great myſtery of raiſing money, is only to alter the denomination, and call that a crown now, which before, by the law, was but a part of a crown. For example: ſuppoſing, according to the ſtandard of our law, 5 s. or a crown, were to weigh an ounce, (as it does now, wanting about 16 grains) whereof one twelfth were copper, and eleven twelfths ſilver, (for there-abouts it is) 'tis plain here 'tis the quantity of ſilver gives the value to it. For let another piece be coin'd of the ſame weight, wherein half the ſilver is taken out, and copper, or other alloy, put into the place, every one knows it will be worth but half as much. For the value of the alloy is ſo inconſiderable as not to be reckoned. This crown now muſt be raiſed, and from henceforth our crown-pieces, coin'd one twentieth lighter; which is nothing but changing the denomination, calling that a crown now, which yeſterday was but a part, viz. nineteen twentieths of a crown; whereby you have only raiſed 19 parts to the denomination formerly given to 20. For I think no body can be ſo ſenſeleſs as to imagine, that 19 grains, or ounces of ſilver can be raiſed to the value of 20; or that 19 grains, or ounces of ſilver ſhall at the ſame time exchange for, or buy as much corn, oil, or wine, as 20; which is to raiſe it to the value of 20. For if 19 ounces of ſilver can be worth 20 ounces of ſilver, or pay for as much of any other commodity, then 18, 10, or one ounce may do the ſame. For, if the abating one twentieth of the quantity of the ſilver of any coin, does not leſſen its value, the abating the nineteen twentieths of the quantity of the ſilver of any coin, will not abate its value. And ſo a ſingle three-pence, or a ſingle penny, being called a crown, will buy as much ſpice, or ſilk, or any other commodity, as a crown-piece, which contains 20 or 60 times as much ſilver; which is an abſurdity ſo great, that I think no body will want eyes to ſee, and ſenſe to diſown.

Now this raiſing your money, or giving a leſs quantity of ſilver the ſtamp and denomination of a greater, may be done two ways.

1. By raiſing one ſpecies of your money.

2. By raiſing all your ſilver coin, at once, proportionably; which is the thing, I ſuppoſe, now propoſed.

1. The raiſing of one ſpecies of your coin, beyond its intrinſick value, is done by coining any one ſpecies, (which in account bears ſuch a proportion to the other ſpecies of your coin) with leſs ſilver in it, than is required by that value it bears in your money.

For example: a crown with us goes for 60 pence, a ſhilling for 12 pence, a teſter for 6 pence, and a groat for 4 pence: and accordingly, the proportion of ſilver in each of them, ought to be at 60, 12, 6, and 4. Now, if in the mint there ſhould be coin'd groats, or teſters, that being of the ſame alloy with our other money, had but two thirds of the weight, that thoſe ſpecies are coin'd at now; or elſe, being of the ſame weight, were ſo alloy'd, as to have one third of the ſilver, required by the preſent ſtandard, changed into copper, and ſhould thus, by law, be made current; (the reſt of your ſilver money being kept to the preſent ſtandard in weight and fineneſs) 'tis plain, thoſe ſpecies would be raiſed one third part; that paſſing for 6 d. which had but the ſilver of 4 d. in it; and would be all one, as if a groat ſhould by law be made current for 6 d. and every 6 d. in payment paſs for 9 d. This is truly raiſing theſe ſpecies: but is no more in effect, than if the mint ſhould coin clipp'd money. And has, beſides the cheat that is put by ſuch baſe, or light money, on every particular man that receives it, that he wants one third of that real value, which the publick ought to ſecure him, in the money it obliges him to receive, as lawful and current; it has, I ſay, this great and unavoidable inconvenience to the publick; That, beſides the opportunity it gives to domeſtick coiners to cheat you with lawful money, it puts it into the hands of foreigners to fetch away your money, without any commodities for it. For if they find that two-penny weight of ſilver, mark'd with a certain impreſſion, ſhall here in England be equivalent to 3 d. weight mark'd with another impreſſion, they will not fail to ſtamp pieces of that faſhion; and ſo importing that baſe and low coin, will, here in England, receive 3 d. for 2 d. and quickly carry away your ſilver in exchange for copper, or barely the charge of coinage.

This is unavoidable in all countries, where any one ſpecies of their money is diſproportionate in its intrinſick value, (i. e. in its due proportion of ſilver to the reſt of the money of that country) an inconvenience ſo certainly attending the allowance of any baſe ſpecies of money to be current, that the king of France could not avoid it, with all his watchfulneſs. For though, by edict, he made his 4 ſols pieces, (whereof 15 were to paſs for a French crown, though 20 of them had not ſo much ſilver in them, as was in a French crown-piece) paſs in the inland parts of his kingdom, 15 for a crown in all payments; yet he durſt not make them current in the ſea-port towns, for fear that ſhould give an opportunity to their importation. But yet this caution ſerved not the turn: they were ſtill imported; and by this means, a great loſs and damage brought upon his country. So that he was forced to cry them down, and ſink them to near their intrinſic value. Whereby a great many particular men, who had quantities of that ſpecies in their hands, loſt a great part of their eſtates; and every one, that had any, loſt proportionably by it.

If we had groats, or ſix-pences, current by law amongſt us, that wanted one third of the ſilver, which they now have by the ſtandard, to make them of equal value to our other ſpecies of money; who can imagine, that our neighbours would not preſently pour in quantities of ſuch money upon us, to the great loſs and prejudice of the kingdom? The quantity of ſilver, that is in each piece, or ſpecies of coin, being that, which makes its real and intrinſick value, the due proportions of ſilver ought to be kept in each ſpecies, according to the reſpective rate, ſet on each of them by law. And, when this is ever varied from, it is but a trick to ſerve ſome preſent occaſion; but is always with loſs to the country, where the trick is play'd.

2. The other way of raiſing money is by raiſing all your ſilver coin at once, the proportion of a crown, a ſhilling, and a penny, in reference to one another, being ſtill kept, (viz. That a ſhilling ſhall weigh one fifth of a crown piece, and a penny weight one twelfth of a ſhilling, in ſtandard ſilver) but out of every one of theſe, you abate one twentieth of the ſilver, they were wont to have in them.

If all the ſpecies of money be, as 'tis call'd, raiſed, by making each of them to have one twentieth leſs of ſilver in them than formerly; and ſo your whole money be lighter than it was: theſe following will be ſome of the conſequences of it.

1. It will rob all creditors of one twentieth (or 5 per cent.) of their debts, and all landlords one twentieth of their quit-rents for ever; and in all other rents, as far as their former contracts reach, (of 5 per cent.) of their yearly income; and this without any advantage to the debtor, or farmer. For he, receiving no more pounds ſterling for his land, or commodities, in this new lighter coin, than he ſhould have done of your old and weightier money, gets nothing by it. If you ſay, Yes, he will receive more crown, half-crown, and ſhilling pieces, for what he now ſells for new money, than he ſhould have done, if the money of the old ſtandard had continued; you confeſs your money is not raiſed in value, but in denomination: ſince what your new pieces want in weight, muſt now be made up in their number. But, which way ſoever this falls, 'tis certain, the publick (which moſt men think ought to be the only reaſon of changing a ſettled law, and diſturbing the common, current courſe of things) receives not the leaſt profit by it. Nay, as we ſhall ſee by and by, it will be a great charge and loſs to the kingdom. But this, at firſt ſight, is viſible; That in all payments to be received upon precedent contracts, if your money be in effect raiſed, the receiver will loſe 5 per cent. For money having been lent, and leaſes and other bargains made, when money was of the ſame weight and fineneſs, that it is now, upon confidence that under the ſame names of pounds, ſhillings, and pence, they ſhould receive the ſame value, i. e. the ſame quantity of ſilver, by giving the denomination now to leſs quantities of ſilver by one twentieth, you take from them 5 per cent. of their due.

When men go to market, to buy any other commodities with their new, but lighter money, they will find 20 s. of their new money will buy no more of any commodity than 19 would before. For it not being the denomination, but the quantity of ſilver, that gives the value to any coin, 19 grains, or parts, of ſilver, however denominated, or marked, will no more be worth, or paſs for, or buy ſo much of any other commodity, as 20 grains of ſilver will, than 19 s. will paſs for 20 s. If any one thinks a ſhilling, or a crown in name, has its value from the denomination, and not from the quantity of ſilver in it, let it be tried; and hereafter let a penny be called a ſhilling, or a ſhilling be called a crown. I believe no body would be content to receive his debts, or rents in ſuch money: which, though the law ſhould raiſe thus, yet he foreſees he ſhould loſe eleven twelfths by the one, and by the other four fifths of the value he received; and would find his new ſhilling, which had no more ſilver in it than one twelfth of what a ſhilling had before, would buy him of corn, cloth, or wine, but one twelfth of what an old ſhilling would. This is as plainly ſo in the raiſing, as you call it, your crown to 5 s. and 3 d. or (which is the ſame thing) making your crown one twentieth lighter in ſilver. The only difference is, that the loſs is ſo great, (it being eleven twelfths) that every body ſees, and abhors it at firſt propoſal; but, in the other (it being but one twentieth, and covered with the deceitful name of raiſing our money) people do not ſo readily obſerve it, If it be good to raiſe the crown-piece this way, one twentieth this week, I ſuppoſe it will be as good and profitable to raiſe it as much again the next week. For there is no reaſon, why it will not be as good to raiſe it again, another one twentieth, the next week, and ſo on; wherein, if you proceed but ten weeks ſucceſſively, you will, by new-year's day next have every half-crown raiſed to a crown, to the loſs of one half of people's debts and rents, and the king's revenue, beſides the confuſion of all your affairs: and, if you pleaſe to go on in this beneficial way of raiſing your money, you may, by the ſame art, bring a penny-weight of ſilver to be a crown.

Silver, i. e. the quantity of pure ſilver, ſeparable from the alloy, makes the real value of money. If it does not, coin copper with the ſame ſtamp and denomination, and ſee whether it will be of the ſame value. I ſuſpect your ſtamp will make it of no more worth, than the copper-money of Ireland is, which is its weight in copper, and no more. That money loſt ſo much to Ireland, as it paſſed for, above the rate of copper. But yet I think no body ſuffered ſo much by it, as he, by whoſe authority it was made current.

If ſilver give the value, you will ſay, What need is there then of the charge of coinage? May not men exchange ſilver by weight, for other things; make their bargains, and keep their accounts in ſilver by weight? This might be done, but it has theſe inconveniencies:

1. The weighing of ſilver to every one we had occaſion to pay it to, would be very troubleſome, for every one muſt carry about ſcales in his pocket.

2. Scales would not do the buſineſs. For, in the next place, every one cannot diſtinguiſh between fine and mixed ſilver: ſo that though he receive the full weight, he was not ſure he received the full weight of ſilver, ſince there might be a mixture of ſome of the baſer metals, which he was not able to diſcern. Thoſe, who have had the care and government of politick ſocieties, introduced coinage, as a remedy to thoſe two inconveniencies. The ſtamp was a warranty of the publick, that, under ſuch a denomination, they ſhould receive a piece of ſuch a weight, and ſuch a fineneſs; that is, they ſhould receive ſo much ſilver. And this is the reaſon, why the counterfeiting the ſtamp is made the higheſt crime, and has the weight of treaſon laid upon it: becauſe the ſtamp is the publick voucher of the intrinſick value. The royal authority gives the ſtamp; the law allows and confirms the denomination: and both together give, as it were, the publick faith, as a ſecurity, that ſums of money, contracted for, under ſuch denominations, ſhall be of ſuch a value, that is, ſhall have in them ſo much ſilver. For 'tis ſilver, and not names, that pays debts, and purchaſes commodities. If therefore, I have contracted for twenty crowns, and the law then has required, that each of thoſe crowns ſhould have an ounce of ſilver; 'tis certain my bargain is not made good, I am defrauded (and whether the publick faith be not broken with me, I leave to be conſidered) if, paying me twenty crowns, the law allows them to be ſuch as have but nineteen twentieths of the ſilver, they ought to have, and really had in them, when I made my contract.

2. It diminiſhes all the king's revenue 5 per cent. For though the ſame number of pounds, ſhillings, and pence are paid into the exchequer, as were wont, yet theſe names being given to coin that have each of them one twentieth leſs of ſilver in them; and that being not a ſecret concealed from ſtrangers, no more than from his own ſubjects, they will ſell the king no more pitch, tar, or hemp, for 20 ſhillings, after the raiſing your money, than they would before for 19: or, to ſpeak in the ordinary phraſe, they will raiſe their commodities 5 per cent. as you have raiſed your money 5 per cent. And 'tis well if they ſtop there. For uſually in ſuch changes, an outcry being made of your leſſening your coin, thoſe, who have to deal with you, taking the advantage of the alarm, to ſecure themſelves from any loſs by your new trick, raiſe their price even beyond the par of your leſſening your coin.

I hear of two inconveniencies complained of, which 'tis propoſed by this project to remedy.

The one is, The melting down of our coin: the other, The carrying away of our bullion. Theſe are both inconveniencies which, I fear, we lie under: but neither of them will be in the leaſt removed, or prevented, by the propoſed alteration of our money.

1. It is paſt doubt that our money is melted down. The reaſon whereof is evidently the cheapneſs of coinage. For a tax on wine paying the coinage, the particular owners pay nothing for it. So that 100 ounces of ſilver coin'd, comes to the owner at the ſame rate, as 100 ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion. For delivering into the mint his ſilver in bars, he has the ſame quantity of ſilver delivered out to him again in coin, without any charges to him. Whereby if at any time he has occaſion for bullion, 'tis the ſame thing to melt down our milled money, as to buy bullion from abroad, or take it in exchange for other commodities. Thus our mint, to the only advantage of our officers, but at the publick coſt, labours in vain, as will be found. But yet this makes you not have one jot leſs money in England, than you would have otherwiſe; but only makes you coin, that which otherwiſe would not have been coin'd, nor perhaps been brought hither: And being not brought hither by an over-balance of your exportation, cannot ſtay when it is here. It is not any ſort of coinage does, or can keep your money here: that wholly and only depends upon the balance of your trade. And had all the money in king Charles the II. and king James the II's time, been minted, according to this new propoſal, this rais'd money would have been gone, as well as the other, and the remainder been no more, nor no leſs than it is now. Though I doubt not but the mint would have coin'd as much of it, as it has of our preſent mill'd money. The ſhort is this: an over-balance of trade with Spain brings you in bullion; cheap coinage, when it is here, carries it into the mint, and money is made of it; but, if your exportation will not balance your importation in other parts of your trade, away muſt your ſilver go again, whether monied, or not monied. For where goods do not, ſilver muſt pay for the commodities you ſpend.

That this is ſo, will appear by the books of the mint, where may be ſeen how much mill'd money has been coin'd in the two laſt reigns. And in a paper I have now in my hands, (ſuppoſed written by a man not wholly ignorant in the mint) 'tis confeſſed, That whereas one third of the current payments were ſome time ſince of mill'd money, there is not now one twentieth. Gone then it is: But let not any one miſtake and think it gone, becauſe in our preſent coinage an ounce wanting about 16 grains, is denominated a crown: or that (as is now propoſed) an ounce wanting about 40 grains, being coined in one piece, and denominated a crown, would have ſtopp'd it, or will (if our money be ſo altered) for the future fix it here. Coin what quantity of ſilver you pleaſe, in one piece, and give it the denomination of a crown; when your money is to go, to pay your foreign debts, (or elſe it will not go out at all) your heavy money (i. e. that which is weight according to its denomination, by the ſtandard of the mint) will be that which will be melted down, or carried away in coin by the exporter, whether the pieces of each ſpecies be by the law bigger, or leſs. For, whilſt coinage is wholly paid for by a tax, whatever your ſize of money be, he that has need of bullion to ſend beyond ſea, or of ſilver to make plate, need but take mill'd money and melt it down, and he has it as cheap as if it were in pieces of eight, or other ſilver coming from abroad; the ſtamp, which ſo well ſecures the weight and fineneſs of the mill'd money, coſting nothing at all.

To this perhaps will be ſaid, That if this be the effect of mill'd money, that it is ſo apt to be melted down, it were better to return to the old way of coining by the hammer. To which I anſwer, By no means. For,

1. COINAGE by the hammer leſs ſecures you from having a great part of your money melted down. For in that way there being a greater inequality in the weight of the pieces, ſome being too heavy, and ſome too light; thoſe, who know how to make their advantage of it, cull out the heavy pieces, melt them down, and make a benefit of the over-weight.

2. COINAGE by the hammer expoſes you much more to the danger of falſe coin. Becauſe the tools are eaſily made and concealed, and the work carried on with fewer hands, and leſs noiſe than a mill; whereby falſe coiners are leſs liable to diſcovery.

3. THE pieces not being ſo round, even, and fairly ſtamp'd, nor marked on the edges, are expoſed to clipping, which mill'd money is not.

MILL'D money is, therefore, certainly beſt for the publick. But, whatever be the cauſe of melting down for mill'd money, I do not ſee how raiſing our money (as they call it) will at all hinder its being melted down. For if our crown-pieces ſhould be coin'd one twentieth lighter, Why ſhould that hinder them from being melted down, more than now? The intrinſick value of the ſilver is not alter'd, as we have ſhewn already: therefore that temptation to melt them down remains the ſame as before.

"BUT they are lighter by one twentieth." That cannot hinder them from being melted down. For half-crowns are lighter by half, and yet that preſerves them not.

"BUT they are of leſs weight under the ſame denomination, and therefore, "they will not be melted down." That is true, if any of theſe preſent crowns, that are one twentieth heavier, are current for crowns at the ſame time. For then they will no more melt down the new light crowns, than they will the old clipp'd ones, which are more worth in coin and tale, than in weight and bullion. But it cannot be ſuppos'd, that men will part with their old and heavier money, at the ſame rate that the lighter, new coin goes at, and pay away their old crowns for 5 s. in tale, when at the mint they will yield them 5 s. 3 d. And then if an old mill'd crown goes for 5s. 3d. and a new mill'd crown (being ſo much lighter) goes for a crown, What, I pray, will be the odds of melting down the one, or the other? The one has one-twentieth leſs ſilver in it, and goes for one-twentieth leſs; and ſo being weight, they are melted down upon equal terms. If it be a convenience to melt one, it will be as much a convenience to melt the other: juſt as it is the ſame convenience to melt mill'd half-crowns as mill'd crowns, the one having, with half the quantity of ſilver, half the value. When the money is all brought to the new rate, i. e. to be one twentieth lighter, and commodities raiſed as they will proportionably, What ſhall hinder the melting down of your money, then more than now, I would fain know? It it be coin'd then, as it is now, gratis, a crown-piece, (let it be of what weight ſoever) will be as it is now, juſt worth its own weight in bullion of the ſame fineneſs; for the coinage which is the manufactury about it, and makes all the difference, coſting nothing, what can make the difference of value? And therefore, whoever wants bullion, will as cheaply melt down theſe new crowns, as buy bullion with them. The raiſing of your money cannot then (the act for free coinage ſtanding) hinder its being melted down.

NOR, in the next place, much leſs can it, as it is pretended, hinder the exportation of our bullion. Any denomination, or ſtamp, we ſhall give to ſilver here, will neither give ſilver a higher value in England, nor make it leſs prized abroad. So much ſilver will always be worth (as we have already ſhew'd) ſo much ſilver given in exchange one for another. Nor will it, when in your mint a leſs quantity of it is rais'd to a higher denomination (as when nineteen twentieths of an ounce has the ſame denomination of a crown, which formerly belong'd only to the whole 20) be one jot rais'd, in reſpect of any other commodity.

You have rais'd the denomination of your ſtamp'd ſilver one twentieth, or, which is all one, 5 per cent. And men will preſently raiſe their commodities 5 per cent. So that if yeſterday 20 crowns would exchange for twenty buſhels of wheat, or 20 yards of a certain ſort of cloth, if you will to day coin current crowns one twentieth lighter, and make them the ſtandard, you will find 20 crowns will exchange for but 19 buſhels of wheat, or 19 yards of that cloth, which will be juſt as much ſilver for a buſhel, as yeſterday. So that, ſilver being of no more real value, by your giving the ſame denomination to a leſs quantity of it; this will no more bring in, or keep your bullion here, than if you had done nothing. If this were otherwiſe, you would be beholden (as ſome people fooliſhly imagine) to the clippers for keeping your money. For if keeping the old denomination to a leſs quantity of ſilver, be raiſing your money (as in effect it is all that is, or can be done in it, by this project of making your coin lighter) the clippers have ſufficiently done that: and, if their trade go on a little while longer, at the rate it has of late, and your mill'd money be melted down and carried away, and no more coin'd; your money will, without the charge of new coinage, be, by that ſort of artificers, raiſed above five per cent. when all your current money ſhall be clipped, and made above one twentieth lighter than the ſtandard, preſerving ſtill its former denomination.

It will poſſibly be here objected to me, That we ſee 100 l. of clipp'd money, above 5 per cent. lighter than the ſtandard, will buy as much corn, cloth, or wine, as 100 l. in mill'd money, which is above one twentieth heavier: whereby it is evident that my rule fails, and that it is not the quantity of ſilver that gives the value to money, but its ſtamp and denomination. To which I anſwer, That men make their eſtimate and contracts according to the ſtandard, upon ſuppoſition they ſhall receive good and lawful money, which is that of full weight: and ſo in effect they do, whilſt they receive the current money of the country. For ſince 100 l. of clipp'd money will pay a debt of 100 l. as well as the weightieſt mill'd money, and a new crown out of the mint will pay for no more fleſh, fruit, or cloth, than five clipp'd ſhillings; 'tis evident that they are equivalent as to the purchaſe of any thing here at home, whilſt no body ſcruples to take five clipp'd ſhillings, in exchange for a weighty mill'd crown. But this will be quite otherwiſe as ſoon as you change your coin, and (to raiſe it as you call it) make your money one twentieth lighter in the mint; for then nobody will any more give an old crown of the former ſtandard for one of the new, than he will now give you 5 s. and 3 d. for a crown: for ſo much then his old crown will yield him at the mint.

Clipp'd and unclipp'd money will always buy an equal quantity of any thing elſe, as long as they will without ſcruple change one for another. And this makes, that the foreign merchant, who comes to ſell his goods to you, always counts upon the value of your money, by the ſilver that is in it, and eſtimates the quantity of ſilver by the ſtandard of your mint; though perhaps by reaſon of clipp'd, or worn money amongſt it, any ſum that is ordinarily received is much lighter than the ſtandard, and ſo has leſs ſilver in it than what is in a like ſum, new coin'd in the mint. But whilſt clipp'd and weighty money will equally change one for another, it is all one to him, whether he receive his money in clipp'd money, or no, ſo it be but current. For if he buy other commodities here with his money, whatever he contracts for, clipp'd as well as weighty money equally pays for it. If he would carry away the price of his commodity in ready caſh, 'tis eaſily changed into weighty money: and then, he has not only the ſum in tale that he contracted for, but the quantity of ſilver he expected, for his commodities, according to the ſtandard of our mint. If the quantity of your clipp'd money be once grown ſo great, that the foreign merchant cannot (if he has a mind to it) eaſily get weighty money for it, but having ſold his merchandiſe, and received clipp'd money, finds a difficulty to procure what is weight for it; he will in ſelling his goods, either contract to be paid in weighty money, or elſe raiſe the price of his commodities, according to the diminiſh'd quantity of ſilver, in your current coin.

In Holland (ducatoons being the beſt money of the country, as well as the largeſt coin) men in payments received and paid thoſe indifferently with the other money of the country, 'till of late the coining of other ſpecies of money, of baſer alloy, and in greater quantities, having made the ducatoons, either by melting down, or exportation, ſcarcer than formerly, it became difficult to change the baſer money into ducatoons; and ſince that, no body will pay a debt in ducatoons, unleſs he be allowed half per cent. or more, above the value they were coined for.

To underſtand this, we muſt take notice, That guilders is the denomination, that in Holland they uſually compute by, and make their contracts in. A ducatoon formerly paſſed at three guilders and three ſtuyvers, or ſixty-three ſtuyvers. There were then (ſome years ſince) began to be coined another piece, which was called a three guilders piece, and was ordered to paſs for three guilders, or ſixty ſtuyvers. But 21 three guilders pieces, which were to paſs for 63 guilders, not having ſo much ſilver in them as 20 ducatoons, which paſſed for the ſame ſum of 63 guilders, the ducatoons were either melted down in their mints (for the making of theſe three guilders pieces, or yet baſer money, with profit) or were carried away by foreign merchants; who, when they carried back the product of their ſale in money, would be ſure to receive their payment of the number of guilders they contracted for, in ducatoons, or change the money they received, into ducatoons: whereby they carried home more ſilver, than if they had taken their payment in three guilders pieces, or any other ſpecies. Thus ducatoons became ſcarce. So that now, he, that will be paid in ducatoons, muſt allow half per cent. for them. And therefore the merchants, when they ſell any thing now, either make their bargain to be paid in ducatoons; or if they contract for guilders in general, (which will be ſure to be paid them in the baſer money of the country) they raiſe the price of their commodities accordingly.

By this example, in a neighbour country, we may ſee how our new mill'd money goes away. When foreign trade imports more than our commodities will pay for, 'tis certain we muſt contract debts beyond ſea, and thoſe muſt be paid with money, when either we cannot furniſh, or they will not take our goods to diſcharge them. To have money beyond ſea to pay our debts, when our commodities do not raiſe it, there is no other way but to ſend it thither. And ſince a weighty crown coſts no more here than a light one, and our coin beyond ſea is valued no otherwiſe, than according to the quantity of ſilver it has in it, whether we ſend it in ſpecie, or whether we melt it down here to ſend it in bullion, (which is the ſafeſt way, as not being prohibited) the weightieſt is ſure to go. But when ſo great a quantity of your money is clipp'd, or ſo great a part of your weighty money is carried away, that the foreign merchant, or his factor here, cannot have the price paid in weighty money, or ſuch as will eaſily be changed into it, then every one will ſee "(when men will no longer take five clipp'd ſhillings for a mill'd, or weighty crown)" that it is the quantity of ſilver that buys commodities and pays debts, and not the ſtamp and denomination which is put upon it. And then it will be ſeen what a robbery is committed on the publick by clipping, that every grain diminiſhed from the juſt weight of our money, is ſo much loſs to the nation, "which will one time or other be ſenſibly felt;" and which, if be not taken care of, and ſpeedily ſtopp'd, will in that enormous courſe it is now in, quickly, I fear, break out into open ill effects, and at one blow deprive us of a great part (perhaps near one fourth) of our money. For that will be really the caſe, when the increaſe of clipp'd money makes it hard to get weighty: when men begin to put a difference of value between that which is weighty, and light money; and will not ſell their commodities, but for money that is weight, and will make their bargains accordingly.

Let the country gentleman, when it comes to that paſs, conſider, What the decay of his eſtate will be? When, receiving his rent in the tale of clipp'd ſhillings, according to his bargain, he cannot get them to paſs at market for more than their weight. And he that ſells him ſalt, or ſilk, will bargain for 5s. ſuch a quantity, if he pays him in fair, weighty coin, but in clipp'd money he will not take under 5s. 3d. Here you ſee you have your money, without this new trick of coinage, raiſed 5 per cent. But whether to any advantage of the kingdom, I leave every one to judge.

Hitherto we have only conſidered the raiſing of ſilver coin, and that has been, only by coining it, with leſs ſilver in it, under the ſame denomination. There is another way yet of raiſing money, which has ſomething more of reality, though as little good in it as the former. This too, now that we are upon the chapter of raiſing money, it may not be unſeaſonable to open a little. The raiſing I mean, is, when either of the two richer metals, (which money is uſually made of) is by law raiſed above its natural value, in reſpect of the other. Gold and ſilver have, in almoſt all ages and parts of the world (where money was uſed) generally been thought the fitteſt materials to make it of. But there being a great diſproportion in the plenty of theſe metals in the world, one has always been valued much higher than the other; ſo that one ounce of gold has exchanged for ſeveral ounces of ſilver: as at preſent, our guinea paſſing for 21s. 6d. in ſilver, gold is now about fifteen and an half times more worth than ſilver; there being about fifteen and an half times more ſilver in 21s. 6d. than there is gold in a guinea. This being now the market rate of gold to ſilver; if by an eſtabliſhed law the rate of guineas ſhould be ſet higher, (as to 22s. 6d.) they would be raiſed indeed, but to the loſs of the kingdom. For by this law, gold being raiſed 5 per cent. above its natural true value, foreigners would find it worth while to ſend their gold hither, and ſo fetch away our ſilver at five per cent. profit, and ſo much loſs to us. For when ſo much gold, as would purchaſe but 100 ounces of ſilver any where elſe, will in England purchaſe the merchant 105 ounces, what ſhall hinder him from bringing his gold to ſo good a market; and either ſelling it at the mint, where it will yield ſo much, or having it coin'd into guineas? And then (going to market with his guineas) he may buy our commodities at the advantage of 5 per cent, in the very ſort of his money; or change them into ſilver, and carry that away with him?

On the other ſide, if by a law you would raiſe your ſilver money, and make four crowns, or 20s. in ſilver, equal to a guinea, at which rate I ſuppoſe it was firſt coin'd, ſo that by your law a guinea ſhould paſs but for 20s. the ſame inconveniency would follow. For then ſtrangers would bring in ſilver and carry away your gold, which was to be had here at a lower rate than any where elſe.

If you ſay, that this inconvenience is not to be feared; for that as ſoon as people found, that gold began to grow ſcarce, or that it was more worth than the law ſet upon it, they would then part with it at the ſtatute-rate, as we ſee the broad pieces that were coined in king James the firſt's time for 20s. no body will now part with under 23s. or more, according to the market value. This I grant is true, and it does plainly confeſs the fooliſhneſs of making a law, which cannot produce the effect it is made for: as indeed it will not, when you would raiſe the price of ſilver, in reſpect of gold, above its natural market value: for then, as we ſee in our gold, the price of it will raiſe itſelf. But on the other ſide, if you ſhould by a law, ſet the value of gold above its par; then people would be bound to receive it at that high rate, and ſo part with their ſilver at an under value. But ſuppoſing, that having a mind to raiſe your ſilver in reſpect of gold, you make a law to do it, what comes of that? If your law prevail, only this; that, as much as you raiſe ſilver, you debaſe gold, (for they are in the condition of two things, put in oppoſite ſcales, as much as the one riſes the other falls) and then your gold will be carried away with ſo much clear loſs to the kingdom, as you raiſe ſilver and debaſe gold by your law, below their natural value. If you raiſe gold in proportion to ſilver, the ſame effect follows.

I say, "raiſe ſilver in reſpect of gold, and gold in proportion to ſilver." For, when you would raiſe the value of money, fancy what you will, 'tis but in reſpect of ſomething you would change it for, and is done only when you can make a leſs quantity of the metal, which your money is made of, change for a greater quantity of that thing which you would raiſe it to.

The effect indeed, and ill conſequence of raiſing either of theſe two metals, in reſpect of the other, is more eaſily obſerved, and ſooner found in raiſing gold than ſilver coin: becauſe your accounts being kept, and your reckonings all made in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, which are denominations of ſilver coins, or numbers of them; if gold be made current at a rate above the free and market value of thoſe two metals, every one will eaſily perceive the inconvenience. But there being a law for it, you cannot refuſe the gold in payment for ſo much. And all the money, or bullion, people will carry beyond ſea from you, will be in ſilver; and the money, or bullion, brought in, will be in gold. And juſt the ſame will happen, when your ſilver is raiſed and gold debaſed, in reſpect of one another, beyond their true and natural proportion: (natural proportion or value, I call that reſpective rate they find, any where, without the preſcription of law.) For then ſilver will be that which is brought in, and gold will be carried out; and that ſtill with loſs to the kingdom, anſwerable to the overvalue ſet by the law. Only as ſoon as the miſchief is felt, people will (do what you can) raiſe the gold to its natural value. For your accounts and bargains being made in the denomination of ſilver money; if, when gold is raiſed above its proportion, by the law, you cannot refuſe it in payment (as if the law ſhould make a guinea current at 22s. and 6d.) you are bound to take it at that rate in payment. But if the law ſhould make guineas current at 20s. he that has them, is not bound to pay them away at that rate, but may keep them, if he pleaſes, or get more for them if he can: yet, from ſuch a law, one of theſe three things will follow. Either 1ſt, The law forces them to go at 20s. and then being found paſſing at that rate, foreigners make their advantage of it: Or, 2dly, people keep them up, and will not part with them at the legal rate, underſtanding them really to be worth more, and then all your gold lies dead, and is of no more uſe to trade, than if it were all gone out of the kingdom: Or, 3dly, It paſſes for more than the law allows, and then your law ſignifies nothing, and had been better let alone. Which way ſoever it ſucceeds, it proves either prejudicial, or ineffectual. If the deſign of your law takes place, the kingdom loſes by it: if the inconvenience be felt and avoided, your law is eluded.

Money is the meaſure of commerce, and of the rate of every thing, and, therefore, "ought to be kept (as all other meaſures) as ſteady and invariable as may be." But this cannot be, if your money be made of two metals, whoſe proportion, and, conſequently, whoſe price, conſtantly varies in repect to one another. Silver, for many reaſons, is the fitteſt of all metals to be this meaſure; and therefore, generally made uſe of for money. But then it is very unfit and inconvenient that gold, or any other metal, ſhould be made current, legal money, at a ſtanding, ſettled rate. This is to ſet a rate upon the varying value of things by law, which juſtly cannot be done; and is, as I have ſhewed, as far as it prevails, a conſtant damage and prejudice to the country, where it is practiſed. Suppoſe fifteen to one, be now the exact par between gold and ſilver, what law can make it laſting; and eſtabliſh it ſo, that next year, or twenty years hence, this ſhall be the juſt value of gold to ſilver; and that one ounce of gold ſhall be juſt worth fifteen ounces of ſilver, neither more or leſs? 'Tis poſſible, the Eaſt-India trade ſweeping away great ſums of gold, may make it ſcarcer in Europe. Perhaps the Guinea trade, and mines of Peru, affording it in greater abundance, may make it more plentiful; and ſo its value in reſpect of ſilver, come on the one ſide to be as ſixteen, or, on the other, as fourteen to one. And can any law you ſhall make, alter this proportion here, when it is ſo every where elſe, round about you? If your law ſet it at fifteen, when it is at the free market rate, in the neighbouring countries, as ſixteen to one; will they not ſend hither their ſilver to fetch away your gold, at one ſixteen loſs to you? Or if you will keep its rate to ſilver as fifteen to one, when in Holland, France, and Spain its market value is but fourteen; will they not ſend hither their gold, and fetch away your ſilver, at one fifteen loſs to you? This is unavoidable, if you will make money of both gold and ſilver, at the ſame time, and ſet rates upon them by law, in reſpect of one another.

What then! (Will you be ready to ſay) Would you have gold kept out of England? Or, being here, would you have it uſeleſs to trade; and muſt there be no money made of it? I anſwer, quite the contrary. 'Tis fit the kingdom ſhould make uſe of the treaſure it has. 'Tis neceſſary your gold ſhould be coin'd, and have the king's ſtamp upon it, to ſecure men in receiving it, that there is ſo much gold in each piece. But 'tis not neceſſary that it ſhould have a fixed value ſet on it, by publick authority: 'tis not convenient that it ſhould, in its varying proportion, have a ſettled price. Let gold, as other commodities, find its own rate. And when, by the king's image and inſcription, it carries with it a publick aſſurance of its weight and fineneſs; the gold money, ſo coin'd, will never fail to paſs at the known market rates, as readily as any other ſpecies of your money. Twenty guineas, tho' deſigned at firſt for 20 l. go now as current for 21 l. 10 s. as any other money, and ſometimes for more, as the rate varies. The value, or price, of any thing, being only the reſpective eſtimate it bears to ſome other, which it comes in competition with, can only be known by the quantity of the one, which will exchange for a certain quantity of the other. There being no two things in nature, whoſe proportion and uſe does not vary, 'tis impoſſible to ſet a ſtanding, regular price between them. The growing plenty, or ſcarcity, of either in the market, (whereby I mean the ordinary place, where they are to be had in traffick) or the real uſe, or changing faſhion of the place, bringing either of them more into demand than formerly, preſently varies the reſpective value of any two things. You will as fruitleſly endeavour to keep two different things ſteadily at the ſame price one with another, as to keep two things in an æquilibrium, where their varying weights depend on different cauſes. Put a piece of ſpunge in one ſcale, and an exact counterpoiſe of ſilver in the other; you will be mightily miſtaken if you imagine, that becauſe they are to-day equal, they ſhall always remain ſo. The weight of the ſpunge varying with every change of moiſture in the air, the ſilver, in the oppoſite ſcale, will ſometimes riſe and ſometimes fall. This is juſt the ſtate of ſilver and gold, in regard of their mutual value. Their proportion, or uſe, may, nay, conſtantly does vary, and with it their price. For, being eſtimated one, in reference to the other, they are, as it were, put in oppoſite ſcales; and as the one riſes the other falls, and ſo on the contrary.

Farthings, made of a baſer metal, may on this account too deſerve your conſideration. For whatſoever coin you make current, above the intrinſick value, will always be damage to the publick, whoever get by it. But of this I ſhall not, at preſent, enter into a more particular enquiry; only this I will confidently affirm, "That it is the intereſt of every country, that all the current "money of it ſhould be of one and the ſame metal; That the ſeveral ſpecies "ſhould be all of the ſame alloy, and none of a baſer mixture: And that the "ſtandard once thus ſettled, would be inviolably and immutably kept to perpe"tuity." For, whenever that is alter'd, upon what pretence ſoever, the publick will loſe by it.

Since then it will neither bring us in more money, bullion, or trade; nor keep that we have here, nor hinder our weighty money, of what denomination ſoever, from being melted; To what purpoſe ſhould the kingdom be at the charge of coining all our money anew? For I do not ſuppoſe any body can propoſe, that we ſhould have two ſorts of money, at the ſame time, one heavier, and the other lighter, as it comes from the mint; that is very abſurd to imagine. So that if all your old money muſt be coined over again; it will indeed be ſome advantage, and that a very conſiderable one, to the officers of the mint. For they being allowed 3 s. 6 d. (it ſhould be ſixteen pence half-penny), for the coinage of every pound troy, which is very near five and an half per cent. if our money be ſix millions, and muſt be coined all over again, it will coſt the nation to the mint three hundred thirty thouſand pounds. One hundred thirty thouſand pounds, if the clipp'd money muſt eſcape, becauſe it is already as light as your new ſtandard; Do you not own that this deſign of new coinage is juſt of the nature of clipping?

This buſineſs of money and coinage is by ſome men, and amongſt them ſome very ingenious perſons, thought a great myſtery, and very hard to be underſtood. Not that truly in itſelf it is ſo, but becauſe intereſted people, that treat of it, wrap up the ſecret, they make advantage of, in a myſtical, obſcure, and unintelligible way of talking; which men, from a pre-conceived opinion of the difficulty of the ſubject, taking for ſenſe, in a matter not eaſy to be penetrated, but by the men of art, let paſs for current, without examination. Whereas, would they look into thoſe diſcourſes, and enquire what meaning their words have, they would find, for the moſt part, either their poſitions to be falſe, their deductions to be wrong, or (which often happens) their words to have no diſtinct meaning at all. Where none of theſe be, there their plain, true, honeſt ſenſe, would prove very eaſy and intelligible, if expreſſed in ordinary and direct language.

That this is ſo, I ſhall ſhew, by examining a printed ſheet on this ſubject; entituled, "Remarks on a paper given in to the Lords, &c."

Rem. "'Tis certain, That what place ſoever will give moſt for ſilver by "weight, it will thither be carried and ſold: and if of the money which now "paſſes in England, there can be 5 s. 5 d. the ounce given for ſtandard ſilver at the "mint, when but 5 s. 4 d. of the very ſame money can be given elſewhere for "it, it will certainly be brought to the mint; and when coined, cannot be ſold "(having one penny over value ſet upon it by the ounce) for the ſame that "other plate may be bought for, ſo will be left unmelted; at leaſt, 'twill be "the intereſt of any exporter, to buy plate to ſend out, before money; whereas "now it is his intereſt to buy money, to ſend out before plate."

Anſw. The author would do well to make it intelligible, how, "of the "money that now paſſes in England, at the mint can be given 5 s. 5 d. the "ounce for ſtandard ſilver, when but 5 s. 4 d. of the ſame money can be given "elſewhere for it." Next, "How it has one penny over value ſet upon it by the "ounce, ſo that, when coin'd, it cannot be ſold." This, to an ordinary reader, looks very myſterious; and, I fear, is ſo, as either ſignifying nothing at all, or nothing that will hold. For

1. I ask, Who is it at the mint, that "can give 5 s. 5 d. the ounce for "ſtandard ſilver, when nobody elſe can give above 5 s. 4 d.?" Is it the king, or is it the maſter-worker, or any of the officers? For to give 5 s. 5 d. for what will yield but 5 s. 4 d. to any body elſe, is to give one ſixty fifth part more than it is worth. For ſo much every thing is worth, as it will yield. And I do not ſee how this can turn to account to the king, or be borne by any body elſe.

2. I ask, How a penny over value can be ſet upon it by the ounce, ſo "that it cannot be ſold?" This is ſo myſterious, that I think it near impoſſible. For an equal quantity of ſtandard ſilver, will always be juſt worth an equal quantity of ſtandard ſilver. And it is utterly impoſſible to make ſixty-four parts of ſtandard ſilver equal to, or worth, ſixty-five parts of the ſame ſtandard ſilver; which is meant by "ſetting a penny over-value upon it by the ounce," if that has any meaning at all. Indeed, by the workmanſhip of it, ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver may be made not only worth ſixty-five ounces, but ſeventy or eighty. But the coinage, which is all the workmanſhip here, being paid for by a tax, I do not ſee how that can be reckoned at all: or if it be, it muſt raiſe every 5 s. 4 d. coined, to above 5 s. 5 d. If I carry ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion to the mint to be coin'd, ſhall I not have juſt 64 ounces back again for it in coin? And if ſo, can theſe ſixty-four ounces of coin'd, ſtandard ſilver, be poſſibly made worth ſixty-five ounces of the ſame ſtandard ſilver uncoin'd, when they coſt me no more; and I can, for barely going to the mint, have ſixty-four ounces of ſtandard ſilver in bullion turn'd into coin? Cheapneſs of coinage in England, where it coſts nothing, will indeed make money be ſooner brought to the mint, than any where elſe; becauſe there I have the convenience of having it made into money for nothing. But this will no more keep it in England than if it were perfect bullion. Nor will it hinder it from being melted down, becauſe it coſt no more in coin than in bullion: and thus equally, whether your pieces of the ſame denomination be lighter, heavier, or juſt as they were before. This being explained, 'twill be eaſy to ſee, whether the other things ſaid in the ſame paragraph be true or falſe, and particularly, whether "'twill be the intereſt of every exporter, to buy plate to ſend out before money."

Rem. "'Tis only barely aſſerted, That if ſilver be raiſed at the mint, that "'twill riſe elſewhere above it; but can never be known 'till it be tried."

Anſw. THE author tells us, in the laſt paragraph, that ſilver, that is worth “ but 5s. 2d. per ounce at the mint, is worth 5s. 4d. elſewhere.” This, how true, or what inconvenience it hath, I will not here examine. But, be the inconvenience of it what it will, this raiſing the money he propoſes as a remedy: and to thoſe who ſay, upon raiſing our money, ſilver will riſe too, he makes this anſwer, that “ it can never be known whether it will or no, 'till it be tried.” To which I reply, That it may be known as certainly without trial, as it can, that two pieces of ſilver that weighed equally yeſterday, will weigh equally again to-morrow in the ſame ſcales.

“ THERE is ſilver, (ſays our author) whereof an ounce (i. e. 480 grains) “ will change for 5s. 4d.” (i. e. 496 grains) of our ſtandard ſilver coined. To-morrow you coin your money lighter; ſo that then 5s. 4d. will have but 472 grains of coin'd ſtandard ſilver in in it. Can it not then be known, without trial, whether that ounce of ſilver, which to-day will change for 496 grains of ſtandard ſilver coin'd, will change to-morrow but for 472 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver coin'd? Or can any one imagine that 480 grains of the ſame ſilver, which to-day are worth 496 grains of our coin'd ſilver, will to-morrow be worth but 472 grains of the ſame ſilver, a little differently coin'd? He that can have a doubt about this, 'till it be tried, may as well demand a trial to be made, to prove, that the ſame thing is æquiponderant, or equivalent to itſelf. For I think it is as clear, That 472 grains of ſilver are æquiponderant to 496 grains of ſilver, as that an ounce of ſilver, that is to day worth 496 grains of ſtandard ſilver, ſhould to-morrow be worth but 472 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver, all circumſtances remaining the ſame, but the different weight of the pieces ſtamp'd: which is that our author aſſerts, when he ſays, That 'tis only barely aſſerted, &c. What has been ſaid to this, may ſerve alſo for an anſwer to the next paragraph. Only I deſire it may be taken notice of, that the author ſeems to inſinuate, that ſilver goes not in England, as in foreign parts, by weight: which is a very dangerous, as well as falſe poſition; and which, if allowed, may let into our mint what corruption and debaſing of our money one pleaſes.

Rem. “ THAT our trade hath heretofore furniſhed us with an overplus, “ brought home in gold and ſilver, is true: but that we bring home from any “ place more goods than we now export to it, I do not conceive to be ſo. And “ more goods might be ſent to thoſe parts; but by reaſon of the great value of “ ſilver in this part of the world, more money is to be got by exporting ſilver, “ than by any other thing that can be ſent; and that is the reaſon of it And “ for its being melted down, and ſent out, becauſe it is ſo heavy, is not by their “ paper denied.”

Anſw. “ THAT we bring home from any place more goods than we now “export, (the author tells us) he doth not conceive.”

WOULD he had told us a reaſon for his conceit. But ſince the money of any country is not preſently to be changed, upon any private man's groundleſs conceit, I ſuppoſe this argument will not be of much weight with many men. I make bold to call it a groundleſs conceit: for if the author pleaſe to remember the great ſums of money are carried every year to the Eaſt-Indies, for which we bring home conſumable commodities; (though I muſt own that it pays us again with advantage) or if he will examine, how much only two commodities, wholly conſumed here, coſt us yearly in money, (I mean Canary wine and currants) more than we pay for, with goods exported to the Canaries and Zant; beſides the over-balance of trade upon us in ſeveral other places, he will have little reaſon to ſay, “ he doth not conceive we bring home from any place more goods “ than we now export to it.”

“ As to what he ſays, concerning the melting down and exporting our money, “ becauſe it is heavy:” if by heavy, he means, becauſe our crown-pieces (and the reſt of our ſpecies of money in proportion) are 23 or 24 grains heavier than he would have them coin'd: this, whoever grants it, I deny upon grounds, which, I ſuppoſe, when examined, will be found clear and evident.

INDEED, when your debts beyond ſea, to anſwer the over-balance of foreign importations, call for your money, 'tis certain the heavy money, which has the full ſtandard weight, will be melted down and carried away; becauſe foreigners value not the ſtamp, or denomination, but your ſilver.

He would do well to tell us what he means by "the great value of ſilver in "this part of the world." For he ſpeaks of it as a cauſe that draws away our money more now than formerly, or elſe it might as well have been omitted as mentioned in this place: and if he mean, by this part of the world, England; 'tis ſcarce ſenſe to ſay, that the great value of ſilver in England ſhould draw ſilver out of England. If he means the neighbouring countries to England, he ſhould have ſaid it, and not doubtfully this part of the world. But let him, by this part of the world, mean what he will, I dare ſay every one will agree, That ſilver is not more valued in this, than any other part of the world; nor in this age, more than in our grandfathers days.

I am ſorry, if it be true, what he tells us, That "more money is to be got "by exportation of ſilver, than by any other thing that can be ſent." This is an evidence, that "we bring home more goods than we export." For, 'till that happens, and has brought us in debt beyond ſea, ſilver will not be exported; but the overplus of people's gain, being generally laid up in ſilver, it will be brought home in ſilver; and ſo our people will value it as much as any other, in this part of the world.

The truth of the caſe in ſhort is this. Whenever we, by a loſing trade, contract debts with our neighbours, they will put "a great value on our ſilver, and "more money will be got by tranſporting ſilver than any thing can be ſent:" Which comes about thus. Suppoſe that by an over-balance of their trade (whether by a ſale of pepper, ſpices, and other Eaſt-India commodities, it matters not) we have received great quantities of goods, within theſe two or three months, from Holland, and ſent but little thither; ſo that the accounts balanced, between the inhabitants of England and the United Provinces, we of England were a million in their debt; What would follow from hence? This; That theſe Dutch creditors, deſiring to have what is due to them, give order to their factors and correſpondents here, to return it to them. For enquiring as we do, what are the effects of an over-balance of trade, we muſt not ſuppoſe, they inveſt their debts in commodities, and return their effects that way. A million then being to be returned from England to Holland in money, every one ſeeks bills of exchange; but Engliſhmen not having debts in Holland to anſwer this million, or any the leaſt part of it, bills are not to be got. This preſently makes the exchange very high: upon which the bankers, &c. who have the command of great quantities of money and bullion, ſend that away to Holland in ſpecie, and ſo take money here to pay it again there, upon their bills, at ſuch a rate of exchange, as gives them five, ten, fifteen, &c. per cent. profit: and thus ſometimes a 5 s. piece of our mill'd money may truly be ſaid to be worth 5 s. 3 d. 4 d. 6 d. 9 d. in Holland. And if this be "the great value of ſilver in this part of the world," I eaſily grant it him. But this great value is to be remedied, not by the alteration of our mint, but by the regulation and balance of our trade. For be your coin what it will, our neighbours, if they over-balance us in trade, will not only have a great value for our ſilver, but get it too; and there will be "more to be got, by exporting ſilver to them, than by any other thing "can be ſent."

Rem. "The alteration of the coins in Spain and Portugal are no way at all "like this. For there they altered in denomination near half, to deceive thoſe "they paid, with paying thoſe, to whom they owed one ounce of ſilver, but "half an ounce for it. But, in the alteration here deſigned, to whoever an "ounce of ſilver was owing, an ounce will be paid in this money; it being "here only deſigned, that an ounce of money ſhould equal an ounce of ſilver "in value, at home, as well as abroad, which now it does not."

Anſw. In this paragraph the author confeſſes the alteration of the coin in Spain and Portugal was a cheat; but the "alteration here deſigned, he ſays, is "not:" but the reaſon he gives for it is admirable: viz. "Becauſe they there "altered in denomination near half," and here the denomination is alter'd but five per cent. for ſo in truth it is, whatever he deſigned. As if fifty per cent.

were a cheat, but five per cent. were not; becauſe perhaps leſs perceivable. For the two things, that are pretended to be done here by this new coinage, I fear will both fail, viz. 1. That "to whomſoever an ounce of ſilver is owing, an " ounce of ſilver ſhall be paid in this money." For when an ounce of ſilver is coin'd, as is propoſed, into 5s. 5d. (which is to make our money five per cent. lighter than it is now) I that am to receive 100l. per ann. fee-farm rent; ſhall I in this new money receive 105l. or barely 100l.? The firſt I think will not be ſaid. For if by law you have made it 100l. 'tis certain the tenant will pay me no more. If you do not mean that 400 crowns, or 2000 ſhillings of your new coin ſhall be 100l. but there muſt be five per cent. in tale, added to every 100, you are at the charge of new coinage to no other purpoſe but to breed confuſion. If I muſt receive 100l. by tale, of this new money for my fee-farm rent, 'tis demonſtration that I loſe five ounces per cent. of the ſilver was due to me. This a little lower he confeſſes in theſe words, "That where a man has a " rent-SEC, that can never be more, this may ſomewhat affect it, but ſo very " little, that it will ſcarce ever at all be perceiv'd, This very little is five per cent. and if a man be cheated of that, ſo he perceives it not, it goes for nothing. But this loſs will not affect only ſuch rents as can never be more, but all payments whatſoever, that are contracted for, before this alteration of our money.

2. IF it be true, what he affims, "That an ounce of money doth equal an " ounce of ſilver in value, abroad, but not at home;" then this part of the undertaking will alſo fail. For I deny that the ſtamp on our money does any more debaſe it here at home, than abroad, or make the ſilver in our money not equal in value to the ſame weight of ſilver every-where. The author would have done well to have made it out, and not left ſo great a paradox only to the credit of a ſingle aſſertion.

Rem. "AND for what is ſaid in this bill to prevent exportation, relates only " to the keeping in our own coin and bullion, and leaves all foreign to be ex- " ported ſtill."

Anſw. WHAT the author means by our own and foreign bullion, will need ſome explication.

Rem. "THERE is now no ſuch thing as payments made in weighty and " mill'd money."

Anſw. I BELIEVE there are very few in town, who do not very often receive a mill'd crown for 5s. and a mill'd half crown for 2s. 6d. But he means, I ſuppoſe, in great and entire ſums of mill'd money. But I aſk, if all the clipp'd money were called in, whether then all the payments would not be in weighty money; and that not being called in, whether if it be lighter than your new mill'd money, the new mill'd money will not be melted down as much as the old? Which I think the author there confeſſes, or elſe I underſtand him not.

Rem. "NOR will this any way interrupt trade; for trade will find its own " courſe; the denomination of money in any country no way concerning that".

Anſw. THE denomination to a certain weight of money, in all countries, concerns trade; and the alteration of that neceſſarily brings diſturbance to it.

Rem. "FOR if ſo be it occaſions the coining more money."

Anſw, HE talks as if it would be "the occaſion of coining more money." Out of what? Out of money already coin'd, or out of bullion? For I would be glad to know where it is.

Rem. "IT may be ſome gain to thoſe that will venture to melt down the " coin, but very ſmall loſs (if any) to thoſe that ſhall be paid in the new: 'tis " not to be denied, but that where any man has a rent-SEC, that can never be " more, this may ſomewhat affect it; but ſo very little, 'twill ſcarce ever at all " be perceived."

Anſw. As much as it will be gain to melt down their coin, ſo much loſs will it be to thoſe who are paid in the new, viz. 5 per cent, which, I ſuppoſe, is more than the author would be willing to loſe, unleſs he get by it another way.

Rem. "AND if the alteration deſired ſhould have the effect of making our " native commodities any ways dearer."

Anſw. HERE our author confeſſes, that proportionably as your money is raiſed, the price of other things will be raiſed too. But to make amends, he ſays,

Rem. "IT does at the ſame time make the land which produces them, of " more than ſo much more in value."

Anſw. THIS "more than ſo much more in value," is more than our author, or any body elſe for him, will ever be able to make out.

THE price of things will always be eſtimated by the quantity of ſilver is given in exchange for them. And if you make your money leſs in weight, it muſt be made up in tale. This is all this great myſtery of raiſing money, and raiſing land. For example: the manor of Blackacre would yeſterday have yielded one hundred thouſand crowns, which crown-pieces, let us ſuppoſe numero rotundo, to weigh each of them an ounce of ſtandard ſilver. To-day your new coin comes in play, which is 5 per cent lighter. There's your money raiſed: the land now at ſale, yields one hundred and five thouſand crowns, which is juſt the ſame one hundred thouſand ounces of ſtandard ſilver. There's the land raiſed. And is not this an admirable invention, for which the publick ought to be at above one hundred thouſand pounds charge for new coinage, and all your commerce put in diſorder? And then to recommend this invention, you are told, as a great ſecret, That, "had not money from time to time, been raiſed in its de- " nomination, lands had not ſo riſen too:" which is to ſay, Had not your money been made lighter, fewer pieces of it would have bought as much land as a greater number does now.

Rem. "THE loſs of payments, there ſpoken of, will, in no ſort, be ſo great, " as if the parties, to whom theſe debts are owing, were now bound to receive " them in the money now paſſes, and then to melt the ſame down; ſo at this " they will have no cauſe to complain."

Anſw. A VERY good argument! the clippers have robb'd the publick of a good part of their money (which men will, ſome time or other, find in the payments they receive) and 'tis deſired the mint may have a liberty to be beforehand with thoſe, to whom debts are owing. They are told, they will have no reaſon to complain of it, who ſuffer this loſs; becauſe it is not ſo great as the other. The damage is already done to the publick, by clipping. Where at laſt it will light, I cannot tell. But men, who receive clipp'd money, not being forced to melt it down, do not yet receive any loſs by it. When clipp'd money will no longer change for weighty, then thoſe, who have clipp'd money in their hands, will find the loſs of it.

Rem. "'TWILL make the cuſtoms better paid, becauſe there will be more " money."

Anſw. THAT there will be more money in tale, 'tis poſſible: that there will be more money in weight and worth, the author ought to ſhew. And then, weatever becomes of the cuſtoms, (which I do not hear are unpaid now) the king will loſe in the exciſe above thirty thouſand pounds per annum. For in all taxes where ſo many pounds, ſhillings, or pence are determined by the law to be paid, there the king will loſe 5 per cent. The author here, as in other places, gives a good reaſon for it: for, "his majeſty being to pay away this money by " tale, as he received it, it will be to him no loſs at all."

As if my receiving my rents in full tale, but in money of undervalue five per cent. were not ſo much loſs to me, becauſe I was to pay it away again by tale. Try it at 50 per cent. the odds only is, That one being greater than the other, would make more noiſe. But the author's great refuge in this is, That it will not be perceived.

Rem. "IF all foreign commodities were to be purchaſed with this new ſpecies " of money ſent out; we agree, That with 100l. of it, there could not be " ſo much ſilver, or other commodities bought, as with 100l. in crown-pieces " as now coined; becauſe they would be heavier; and all coin in any kingdom, " but where 'tis coined, only goes by weight; and for the ſame weight of ſilver, " the ſame every-where ſtill will be bought; and ſo there will, with the ſame " quantity of goods. And if thoſe goods ſhould coſt 5 per cent. more here in " England than heretofore, and yield but the ſame money (we mean by the

" ounce abroad) the ſame money brought home and coin'd, will yield the importer 5 per cent. more at the mint than it heretofore could do, and ſo no damage to the trader at all."

Anſw. HERE truth forces from the author a confeſſion of two things, which demonſtrate the vanity and uſefulneſs of the project. 1. That upon this change of your coin, foreign goods will be rais'd. Your own goods will coſt more, five per cent. So that goods of all kinds being thereupon rais'd; wherein conſiſts the raiſing of your money, when an ounce of ſtandard ſilver, however minced, ſtamped, or denominated, will buy no more commodities than it did before? This confeſſion alſo ſhews the falſhood of that dangerous ſuppoſition, That money, "in the kingdom where it is coin'd, goes not by weight," i.e. is not valued by its weight.

Rem. "'TIS true, the owners of ſilver will find a good market for it, and no others will be damaged; but, on the contrary, the making plenty of money will be an advantage to all."

Anſw. I GRANT it true, That if your money were really raiſed five per cent. the owners of ſilver would get ſo much by it, by bringing it to the mint to be coin'd. But ſince, as is confeſſed, commodities will (upon this raiſing your money) be raiſed to five per cent. this alteration will be an advantage to no body, but the officers of the mint, and hoarders of money.

Rem. "WHEN ſtandard ſilver was laſt raiſed at the mint, (which it was from 5s. to 5s. and 2d. the ounce, in the 43d of Eliz.) and, for above forty years after, ſilver uncoin'd was not worth above 4s. 10d. the ounce, which occaſion'd much coining; and of money, none in thoſe days was exported: whereas ſilver now is worth but the very ſame 5s. 2d. the ounce ſtill at the mint, and is worth 5s. 4d. elſewhere. So that if this bill now with the Lords does not happen to paſs, there can never any ſilver be ever more coin'd at the mint; and all the mill'd money will, in a very little time more, be deſtroy'd."

Anſw. THE reaſon of ſo much money coin'd in queen Elizabeth's time, and afterwards, was not the leſſening of your crown-pieces from 480 to 462 grains, and ſo proportionably all the reſt of your money, (which is that the author calls raiſing ſtandard ſilver from 5s. to 5s. 2d. the ounce) but from the over-balance of your trade, bringing them in plenty of bullion, and keeping it here.

How ſtandard ſilver (for if the author ſpeaks of other ſilver, it is a fallacy) ſhould be worth its own weight in ſtandard ſilver at the mint, (i. e. 5s. 2d. the ounce) and be worth more than its own weight in ſtandard ſilver, (i. e. 5s. 4d. the ounce) in Lombard-ſtreet, is a paradox that no body, I think will be able to comprehend, till it be better explain'd. It it time to give off coining, if the value of ſtandard ſilver be leſſened by it; as really it is, if an ounce of coin'd ſtandard ſilver, will not exchange for an ounce of uncoin'd ſtandard ſilver, unleſs you add 15 or 16 grains overplus to it: which is what the author would have taken upon his word, when he ſays, "Silver is worth five ſhillings four pence elſewhere."

FIVE ſhillings four pence of money coin'd at the mint, the author muſt allow to be at leaſt 495 grains. An ounce is but 480 grains. How then an ounce of uncoin'd ſtandard ſilver, can be worth five ſhillings four pence, (i. e. how 480 grains of uncoin'd ſtandard ſilver, can be worth 495 grains of the ſame ſtandard ſilver, coin'd into money) is unintelligible; unleſs the coinage of our mint leſſens the value of ſtandard ſilver.

" SIR,

" COIN and intereſt are two things of ſo great moment to the publick, and of ſo great concernment in trade, that they ought very accurately to be examin'd into, and very nicely weighed, upon any propoſal of alteration to be made in them. I pretend not to have treated of them here, as they deſerve. That muſt be the work of an abler hand, I have ſaid ſomething on theſe ſubjects, becauſe you required it. And, I hope, the readineſs of my obedience will excuſe to you, the faults I have committed, and aſſure you that I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

SHORT

OBSERVATIONS

On a Printed Paper, entituled,

For encouraging the coining ſilver money in England, and after for keeping it here.

THE Author ſays, “ Silver yielding the propoſed 2 d. or 3 d. more by the “ ounce, than it will do by being coined into money, there will be none “ coin'd into money; and matter of fact ſhews there is none.”

'Twou'd be hard to know what he means, when he ſays, “ ſilver yields 2 d. “ or 3 d. more by the ounce, than it will do by being coined into money:” but that he tells us in plain words at the bottom of the leaf, t,,hat an ounce of ſilver “ uncoined, is of 2d. more value, than after it is coined it will be;” which I take the liberty to ſay, is ſo far from being true, that I affirm it is impoſſible to be ſo. For which I ſhall only give this ſhort reaſon, viz. Becauſe the ſtampt neither does, nor can take away any of the intrinſick value of the ſilver; and, therefore, an ounce of uncoined, ſtandard ſilver, muſt neceſſarily be of equal value to an ounce of uncoined, ſtandard ſilver. For example; ſuppoſe a goldſmith has a round plate of ſtandard ſilver, juſt of the ſhape, ſize and weight of a coin'd crown-piece, which, for brevity's ſake, we will ſuppoſe to be an ounce; this ounce of ſtandard ſilver is certainly of equal value to any other ounce of unwrought, ſtandard ſilver in his ſhop; away he goes with his round piece of ſilver to the Tower, and has there the ſtamp ſet upon it, when he brings this numerical piece back again to his ſhop coin'd, can any one imagine, that it is now 2d. leſs worth than it was, when he carried it out ſmooth, a quarter of an hour before; or, that it is not ſtill of equal value to any other ounce of unwrought ſtandard ſilver in his ſhop? He that can ſay 'tis 2d. leſs worth, than it was before it had the king's image and inſcription on it, may as well ſay, that 60 grains of ſilver, brought from the Tower, are worth but 58 grains of ſilver in Lombard-ſtreet.

But the author very warily limits this ill effect of coinage only to England; why it is ſo in England, and not every where, would deſerve a reaſon.

But let us grant it to be true, as our author affirms, that coin'd ſilver in England is one thirtieth worſe, or of leſs value, than uncoin'd; the natural conſequence from this, if it be true, is, that it is very unfit that the mint ſhould be employ'd in England, where it debaſes the ſilver one thirtieth; for, if the ſtamp leſſens the value of our ſilver this year, it will alſo do ſo the next, and ſo on to the end of the world, it always working the ſame way. Nor will the altering the denomination, as is propoſed, at all help it.

But yet he thinks he has ſome proof for his propoſition, becauſe it is matter of fact that there is no money coin'd at the mint. This is the great grievance, and is one indeed, but for a different reaſon from what ſeems to inſpire that paper.

The matter in ſhort is this; England ſending more conſumable commodities to Spain than it receives from thence, the merchants, who manage their trade, bring back the overplus in bullion, which, at their return, they ſell as as a commodity. The chapmen, that give higheſt for this, are, as in all caſes of buying and ſelling, thoſe who can make moſt profit by it; and thoſe are the returners of our money, by exchange, into thoſe countries, where our debts, any way contracted, make a need of it; for they getting 6, 8, 10, &c. per cent. according to the want and demand of money from England there, and according to the riſque of the ſea, buy up this bullion, as ſoon as it comes in, to ſend it to their correſpondents in thoſe parts, to make good their credit for the bills they have drawn on them, and ſo can give more for it than the mint-rate, i. e. more than an equal weight of mill'd money for an equal weight of ſtandard bullion, they being able to make more profit of it by returns.

Suppose the balance of our trade with Holland were in all other commodities equal, but that in the laſt Eaſt-India ſale we bought of them of Eaſt-India commodities to the value of a million, to be paid in a month; within a month a million muſt be returned into Holland, this preſently raiſes the exchange, and the traders in exchange ſell their bills at high rates; but the balance of trade being (as is ſuppoſed in the caſe) equal in all other commodities, this million can no way be repaid to their correſpondents, on whom thoſe bills were drawn, but by ſending them money, or bullion, to reimburſe them.

This is the true reaſon why the bullion, brought from Spain, is not carried to the mint to be coin'd, but bought by traders in foreign exchange, and exported by them, to ſupply the overplus of our expences there, which are not paid for by our commodities. Nor will the propoſed raiſing of our money, as it is called, whether we coin our money for the future one thirtieth, or one twentieth, or one half lighter than now it is, bring one ounce more to the mint than now, whilſt our affairs in this reſpect remain in the ſame poſture. And I challenge the author to ſhew that it will; for ſaying is but ſaying. Bullion can never come to the mint to be coin'd, whilſt the over-balance of trade and foreign expences are ſo great, that to ſatisfy them, not only the bullion, your trade in ſome parts now yearly brings in, but alſo ſome of your formerly coin'd money is requiſite, and muſt be ſent out; but when a change in that brings in and lodges bullion here, (for now it ſeems it only paſſes through England) the increaſe of ſilver and gold ſtaying in England will again bring it to the mint to be coin'd.

This makes it eaſily intelligible, how it comes to paſs, that, when now at the mint they can give but 5s. 2d. per ounce for ſilver, they can give 5s. 4d. the ounce in Lombard-ſtreet, (which is what our author means when he ſays, "ſilver "is now worth but 5s. 2d. the ounce at the mint, and is worth 5s. 4d. elſe-"where.") The reaſon whereof is plain, viz. Becauſe the mint, giving weighty money for bullion, can give ſo much and no more for ſilver, than it is coin'd at, which is 5s. 2d. the ounce, the publick paying all the odds, that is between the coin'd and uncoin'd ſilver, which is the manufacture of coinage: but the banker, or returner of money, having uſe of ſilver beyond ſea, where he can make his profit of it, by anſwering bills of exchange, which he ſells dear, muſt either ſend our money in ſpecie, or melt down our coin to tranſport, or elſe with it buy bullion.

The ſending our money in ſpecie, or melting it down, has ſome hazard, and therefore, if he could have bullion for 5s. 2d. per ounce, or a little dearer, 'tis like he would always rather chuſe to exchange coin for bullion, with ſome little loſs, rather than run the riſque of melting it down, or exportation.

But this would ſcarce make him pay 2d. in the crown, which is almoſt three and an half per cent. if there were not ſomething more in it, than barely the riſque of melting, or exportation; and that is the lightneſs of the greateſt part of our current coin. For example, N. has given bills for thirty thouſand pounds ſterling in Flanders, and ſo has need of ten thouſand weight of ſilver to be tranſported thither; he has thirty thouſand pounds ſterling by him in ready money, whereof five thouſand pounds is weighty mill'd money; what ſhall hinder him then from throwing that into his melting-pot, and ſo reducing it to bullion, to be tranſported? But what ſhall he do for the other twenty-five thouſand pounds, which, though he has by him, is yet clipp'd and light money, that is at leaſt twenty per cent. lighter than the ſtandard? If he tranſports or melts down this, there is ſo much clear loſs to him; it is therefore, more advantage to him to buy bullion at 5s. 4d. the ounce with that light money, than to tranſport, or melt it down; wherein, though the ſeller of the bullion has leſs weight in ſilver than he parts with, yet he finds his account, as much as if he received it in weighty coin, whilſt a clipp'd crown-piece, or ſhilling, paſſes as well in payment for any commodity here in England as a mill'd one. Thus our mint is kept from coining.

But this paper, For encouraging the coining, &c. would fain have the mill at work, though there be no griſt to be had, unleſs you will grind over again what is ground already, and pay toll for it a ſecond time; a propoſition fit only for the miller himſelf to make; for the meaneſt houſewife in the country would laugh at it, as ſoon as propoſed. However, the author pleaſes himſelf, and thinks he has a good argument to make it paſs, viz. becauſe the toll to be paid for it will not amount to three hundred and thirty thouſand pounds, as is ſaid in a late treatiſe about raiſing the value of money, p. 70. for, ſays he, that writer is miſtaken, in ſaying that "3 s. and 6 d. is allowed at the mint for the coinage of every pound "troy," whereas there is but ſixteen pence halfpenny there allowed for the ſame; which ſixteen pence halfpenny being above one third of 3 s. and 6 d. it follows by his own computation, that the new coining our money will coſt the nation above one hundred and ten thouſand pounds; a ſmall ſum, in this our plenty of riches, to be laid out for the purchaſing theſe following inconveniencies, without any the leaſt advantage.

1. A LOSS to the king of one thirtieth (if you coin your money 2 d. per crown, one twentieth, if you coin your money 3 d. per crown lighter) of all his ſtanding revenue.

2. A LIKE loſs of one twentieth, or one thirtieth, in all rents that are ſettled; for theſe have, during the term, the nature of rent-ſec: but five per cent. loſs in a man's income he thinks ſo little, it will not be perceived.

3. TROUBLE to merchants in their trade. Theſe inconveniencies he is forced to allow. He might have ſaid diſorder to all people in their trade, though he ſays it will be but a little trouble to merchants, and without any real damage to trade. The author would have done well to have made out this, and a great many other aſſertions in that paper; but ſaying is much eaſier, if that may paſs for proof.

INDEED he has, by a ſhort way, anſwered the book above-mentioned, in the concluſion of his paper, in theſe words: "And he that ſo groſly miſtakes "in ſo material points of what he would aſſert, 'tis plain is not free from miſ"takes." It does not appear that he, who publiſhed that book, ever thought himſelf free from miſtakes; but he, that miſtakes in two material points, may be in the right in two others, and thoſe will ſtill need an anſwer. But one of theſe material points will, I think, by what is already ſaid, appear not to be a miſtake; and for any thing the author of the paper hath ſaid, or can ſay, it will always be true, that an ounce of ſilver coin'd, or not coin'd, is, and eternally will be, of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver. As to any other miſtake, concerning the rate of coinage, 'tis like he had his information from ſome diſintereſted perſon, whom he thought worthy of credit. And whether it be 3 s. 6 d. as he was told, or only ſixteen pence halfpenny per pound troy, as the paper ſays, whether the reader will believe the one, or the other, or think it worth his more exact inquiry, this is certain, the kingdom ought not to be at that, or any other charge, where there is no advantage, as there will be none in this propoſed coinage, but quite the contrary.

IN his anſwer to

Object. 1. HE ſays from Edw. III. "Silver has from time to time (as it grew "in eſteem) been by degrees raiſed in all mints." If an ounce of ſilver now not exchanging, or paying for what one tenth of an ounce would have purchaſed in Edw. IIId's time, and ſo being ten times leſs worth now, than it was then, be growing in eſteem, this author is in the right, elſe ſilver has not ſince Edw. IIId's reign, from time to time grown in eſteem. Be that as it will, he aſſigns a wrong cauſe of raiſing of ſilver, as he calls it, in our mint. For if growing thus in requeſt, i. e. by leſſening its value, had been the reaſon of altering our money, this change of coin, or raiſing the denomination of ſilver in ours, and other mints, ought to have been greater by much, ſince Henry VII's time, than it was between that and Edward III's; becauſe the great change of the value of ſilver has been made, by the plenty of it poured into this part of the world from the Weſt-Indies, not diſcovered till Henry VII's reign. So that I think I may ſay, that the value of ſilver from Edward III. to Henry VII. changed not one tenth, but from Henry VII. till now it changed above ſeven tenths; and yet, money having been raiſed in our mint two thirds ſince Edward IIId's time, the far greater part of the raiſing of it was before Henry VII's time, and a very ſmall part of it ſince; ſo that the cauſe, inſinuated by our author, 'tis evident, was not the cauſe of leſſening our coin ſo often, whatever was it: and 'tis poſſible there wanted not men of projects in thoſe days, who for private ends, by wrong ſuggeſtions, and falſe reaſonings, covered with myſterious terms, led thoſe into miſtakes, who had not the time and will nicely to examine; though a crown-piece three times as big as one of ours now, might, for its ſize alone, deſerve to be reformed.

To Object. 2. he ſays, "The raiſing the denomination of money in Spain "and Portugal, was making it go for more when coin'd, than its true value."

THIS, I ſay, is impoſſible, and deſire the author to prove it. It did in Spain and Portugal, juſt what it will do here and every-where; it made not the ſilver coin'd go for more than its value, in all things to be bought, but juſt ſo much as the denomination was raiſed, juſt ſo much leſs of commodity had the buyer in exchange for it: as it would be here, if you ſhould coin ſix-pences into ſhillings; if any one went to market with this new money, he would find that, whereas he had a buſhel of wheat laſt week for eight ſhillings of the former coin, he would have now but half a buſhel for eight of the new ſhillings, when the ſame denomination had but half the quantity of ſilver. Indeed thoſe, who were to receive money upon former contracts, would be defrauded of half their due, receiving in their full tale of any denomination contracted for, but half the ſilver they ſhould have; the cheat whereof they would find, when they went to market with their new money. For this I have above proved, that one ounce of ſilver is, and eternally will be, equal in value to another ounce of ſilver; and all that can poſſibly put a difference between them, is only the different value of the workmanſhip, beſtowed on one more than another, which in coinage our author tells us in this paper is but ſixteen pence halfpenny per pound troy. I demand therefore, of our author, to ſhew that any ſort of coinage, or, as he calls it, raiſing of money, can raiſe the value of coin'd ſilver, or make it go for more than uncoin'd, bating the charge of coinage, unleſs it be to thoſe who, being to receive money upon former contracts, will, by receiving the tale agreed for, receive leſs than they ſhould of ſilver; and ſo be defrauded of what they really contracted for.

WHAT effect ſuch a raiſing of their money had in one particular, I will tell our author. In Portugal they count their money by reys, a very ſmall, or rather imaginary coin, juſt as if we here ſhould count all our ſums by farthings. It pleaſed the government, poſſibly being told that it would raiſe the value of their money, to raiſe in denomination the ſeveral ſpecies, and make them go for a greater (let us ſuppoſe double the) number of reys than formerly. What was the conſequence? It not only confounded the property of the ſubject, and diſturbed affairs to no purpoſe; but treaties of commerce having ſettled the rates of the cuſtoms at ſo many reys on the ſeveral commodities, the king immediately loſt in the value half his cuſtoms. The ſame that in proportion will happen in the ſettled revenue of the crown here, upon the propoſed change.

FOR though our author in theſe words, "Whereas all now deſired by this "act is, to keep ſilver, when coin'd, of the ſame value it was before," would inſinuate, that this raiſing the denomination, or leſſening our coin, as is propoſed, will do no ſuch thing; yet 'tis demonſtration, that when our coin is leſſened 3d. in 5s. the king will receive five per cent. leſs in value in his cuſtoms, exciſe, and all his ſettled revenue, and ſo proportionably, as the quantity of ſilver, in every ſpecies of our coin, ſhall be made leſs than now it is coin'd, in thoſe of the ſame denomination.

BUT, whatever our author means by "making money go for more when "coin'd than its true value, or by keeping ſilver, when coin'd, of the ſame va-"lue it was before;" this is evident, that raiſing their money thus, by coining it with leſs ſilver in it than it had before, had not the effect in Portugal and Spain, which our author propoſes from it here: for it has not brought one penny more to the mint there, nor kept their money, or ſilver, from exportation ſince, though forfeiture and death be the penalties joined in aid to this trick of raiſing to keep it in.

BUT our author tells us in anſwer to Object. 4. This "will ſcarce ever at all "be perceived." If of 100 guineas a man has in his pocket, 5 ſhould be picked out, ſo as he ſhould not perceive it, the fraud and the loſs would not be one jot the leſs; and though he perceived it not when, or how it was done, yet he will find it in his accounts, and the going ſo much back in his eſtate at the end of the year.

To Object. 3. he ſays, The "raiſing your coin (it may be) may raiſe the "price of bullion here in England. An ounce of ſilver will always be equal in value to an ounce of ſilver every-where, bating the workmanſhip. I ſay it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe, and require our author to ſhew it poſſible in England, or any-where, or elſe hereafter to ſpare his may be's. To avoid fallacies, I deſire to be underſtood, when I uſe the word ſilver alone, to mean nothing but ſilver, and do lay aſide the conſideration of baſer metals that may be mixed with it: for I do not ſay that an ounce of ſtandard ſilver, that has almoſt one twelfth of copper in it, is of equal value with an ounce of fine ſilver that has no alloy at all; but that any two ounces of equally alloy'd ſilver, will always be of equal value; the ſilver being the meaſure of commerce, 'tis the quantity of ſilver that is in every piece he receives, and not the denomination of it, which the merchant looks after, and values it by.

BUT this raiſing of the denomination our author would have paſs, becauſe 'twill be "better for the poſſeſſors of bullion," as he ſays, Anſ. 3. But who are they who now in England are poſſeſſed of ſo much bullion? or what private men are there in England of that conſideration, that for their advantage, all our money ſhould be new coin'd, and of a leſs weight, with ſo great a charge to the nation, and loſs to his majeſty's revenue?

HE farther adds, Anſ. 3. It doth not thence inevitably follow, it will raiſe "the price of bullion beyond ſea."

IT will as inevitably follow, as that nineteen ounces of ſilver will never be equal in weight, or worth, to twenty ounces of ſilver: ſo much as you leſſen your coin, ſo much more muſt you pay in tale, as will make the quantity of ſilver the merchant expects, for his commodity, under what denomination ſoever he receives it.

THE clothier, thus buying his Spaniſh wool, oil, and labour, at five per cent. more in denomination, ſells his woollen manufacture proportionably dearer to the Engliſh merchant, who exporting it to Spain, where their money is not changed, ſells it at the uſual market-rate, and ſo brings home the ſame quantity of bullion for it, which he was wont; which, therefore, he muſt ſell to you at the ſame raiſed value your money is at: and what then is gained by all this? The denomination is only changed, to the prejudice of the publick, but as to all the great matters of your trade, the ſame quantity of ſilver is paid for commodities as before, and they ſold in their ſeveral foreign markets for the ſame quantity of ſilver. But whatever happens in the rate of foreign bullion, the raiſing of the denomination of our money, will bring none of it to our mint to be coined; that depends on the balance of our trade, and not on leſſening our coin under the ſame denomination: for whether the pieces we call crowns be coin'd 16, 24, or 100 grains lighter, it will be all one as to the value of bullion, or the bringing more, or leſs of it into England, or to our mint.

WHAT he ſays in his anſwer to Object 4. beſides what we have already taken notice of, is partly againſt his bill, and partly miſtake.

1. HE ſays, "It may be ſome (as it is now) gain to thoſe, that will venture "to melt down the mill'd and heavy money now coin'd." That men do venture to melt down the mill'd and heavy money, is evident, from the ſmall part of mill'd money is now to be found of that great quantity of it that has been coin'd; and a farther evidence is this, that mill'd money will now yield four, or five more per cent. than the other, which muſt be to melt down, and uſe as bullion, and not as money in ordinary payments. The reaſon whereof is, the ſhameful and horrible debaſing (or, as our author would have it, raiſing) our unmill'd money by clipping.

FOR the odds betwixt mill'd and unmill'd money being now, modeſtly ſpeaking, above 20 per cent. and bullion, for reaſons elſewhere given, being not to be had, refiners, and ſuch as have need of ſilver, find it the cheapeſt way to buy mill'd money for clipp'd, at four, five, or more per cent. loſs.

I ASK, therefore, this gentleman, What ſhall become of all our preſent mill'd and heavy money, upon the paſſing of this act? To which his paper almoſt confeſſes, what I ſhall venture to anſwer for him, viz. That, as ſoon as ſuch a law is paſſed, the mill'd and heavy money will all be melted down; for it being five per cent heavier, i. e. more worth than what is to be coined in the mint, no body will carry it thither to receive five per cent. leſs for it, but ſell it to ſuch as will give four, or four and a half per cent. more for it, and at that rate melt it down with advantage: for Lombard-ſtreet is too quick-ſighted, to give ſixty ounces of ſilver for fifty ſeven ounces of ſilver, when bare throwing it into the melting-pot will make it change for its equal weight; ſo that by this law five per cent. gain on all our mill'd money, will be given to be ſhared between the poſſeſſor and the melter of our mill'd money, out of the honeſt creditor and landlord's pocket, who had the guaranty of the law, that, under ſuch a tale of pieces, of ſuch a denomination as he let his land for, he ſhould have to ſuch a value, i. e. ſuch a weight in ſilver. Now I aſk, Whether it be not a direct and unanſwerable reaſon againſt this bill, that he confeſſes, that it will be, "a gain "to thoſe, who will melt down the mill'd and heavy money," with ſo much loſs to the publick, and not, as he ſays, "with very ſmall loſs to thoſe, that "ſhall be paid in the new," unleſs he calls five per cent. very ſmall loſs; for juſt ſo much is it to receive but fifty ſeven grains, or ounces of ſilver, for ſixty, which is the proportion in making your crowns 3d. lighter. This is certain, no body will pay away mill'd, or weighty crowns for debts, or commodities, when it will yield him four, or five per cent. more; ſo that which is now left of weighty money, being ſcattered up and down the kingdom, into private hands, which cannot tell how to melt it down, will be kept up and laſt to our trade. And, as to your clipp'd and light money, will you make a new act for coinage, without taking any care for that? The making a new ſtandard for your money, cannot do leſs than make all money, which is lighter than that ſtandard, unpaſſable; and thus the mill'd and heavy money not coming into payment, and the light and clipp'd not being lawful money, according to the new ſtandard, there muſt needs be a ſudden ſtop of trade, and 'tis to be fear'd, a general confuſion of affairs; though our author ſays, "it will not any ways inter"rupt trade."

2. THE latter part of this ſection, about raiſing the value of land, I take the liberty to ſay is a miſtake; which, though a ſufficient reply to an aſſertion without proof, yet I ſhall not ſo far imitate this author, as barely to ſay things: and therefore, I ſhall add this reaſon for what I ſay, viz. Becauſe nothing can truly raiſe the value, i. e. the rent of land, but the increaſe of your money: but becauſe raiſing the value of land is a phraſe which, by its uncertain ſenſe, may deceive others, we may reckon up theſe ſeveral meanings of it,

1. THE value of land is raiſed, when its intrinſick worth is increaſed, i. e. when it is fitted to bring forth a greater quantity of any valuable product. And thus the value of land is raiſed only by good huſbandry.

2. THE value of land is raiſed, when remaining of the ſame fertility, it comes to yield more rent, and thus its value is raiſed only by a greater plenty of money and treaſure.

3. OR it may be raiſed in our author's way, which is, by raiſing the rent in tale of pieces, but not in the quantity of ſilver received for it; which in truth, is no raiſing of it at all, no more than it could be accounted the raiſing of a man's rent, if he lett his land this year for forty ſixpences, which laſt year he let for twenty ſhillings. Nor would it alter the caſe, if he ſhould call thoſe forty ſixpences forty ſhillings; for having but half the ſilver of forty ſhillings in them, they would be but of half the value, however their denomination were changed.

IN his anſwer to the fifth objection, there is this dangerous inſinuation, That coin, in any country where it is coin'd, goes not by weight, i. e. has its value from the ſtamp and denomination, and not the quantity of ſilver in it. Indeed in contracts already made, if your ſpecies be by law coin'd a fifth part lighter, under the ſame denomination, the creditor muſt take a hundred ſuch light ſhillings,

lings, or twenty ſuch light crown-pieces for 5l. if the law calls them ſo, but he loſes one fifth, in the intrinſick value of his debt. But, in bargains to be made, and things to be purchaſed, money has, and will always have its value from the quantity of ſilver in it, and not from the ſtamp and denomination, as has been already proved, and will ſome time, or other, be evidenced with a witneſs, in the clipp'd money. And if it were not ſo, that the value of money were not according to the quantity of ſilver in it, i. e. that it goes by weight, I ſee no reaſon why clipping ſhould be ſo ſeverely puniſhed.

As to foreigners, he is forced to confeſs, That 'tis all one what our money is, greater or leſs, who regard only the quantity of ſilver, they ſell their goods for; how then can the leſſening our money bring in more plenty of bullion into England, or to the mint?

But he ſays, "The owners and importers of ſilver will find a good market "at the mint. &c." But always a better in Lombard-ſtreet, and not a grain of it will come to the mint, as long as by an under-balance of trade, or other foreign expences, we contract debts beyond ſea, which require the remitting of greater ſums thither, than are imported in bullion. "If for above forty years "after ſilver was raiſed, in the forty third year of queen Elizabeth, from 5s. to "5s. 2d. the ounce, uncoin'd ſilver was not worth above 4s. 10d. per ounce;" the cauſe was not that raiſing of ſilver in the mint, but an over-balance of trade, which bringing in an increaſe of ſilver yearly, for which men having no occaſion abroad, brought it to the mint to be coin'd, rather than let it lie dead by them in bullion; and whenever that is the caſe again in England, it will occaſion coining again, and not till then. "No money was in thoſe days exported," ſays he; no, nor bullion neither, ſay I; why ſhould, or how could it, when our exported merchandiſe paid for all the commodities we brought home, with an over-plus of ſilver and gold, which ſtaying here, ſet the mint on work. But the paſſing this bill, will not hinder the exportation of one ounce either of bullion or money, which muſt go, if you contract debts beyond ſea; and how its having been once melted in England, which is another thing propoſed in this bill, ſhall hinder its exportation, is hard to conceive, when even coining has not been able to do it, as is demonſtrable, if it be examin'd what vaſt ſums of mill'd money have been coin'd, in the two laſt reigns, and how little of it is now left. Beſides, if the exportation of bullion ſhould be brought under any greater difficulty than of any other commodity, it is to be conſidered whether the management of that trade, which is in ſkilful hands, will not thereupon be ſo ordered, as to divert it from coming to England for the future, and cauſe it to be ſent from Spain, directly to thoſe places, where they know Engliſh debts will make it turn to beſt account, to anſwer bills of exchange ſent thither.

FURTHER

CONSIDERATIONS

CONCERNING

Raiſing the Value

OF

MONEY.

WHEREIN

Mr. LOWNDES's arguments for it, in his late report concerning “ An eſſay for the amendment of the “ of the ſilver coins,” are particularly examined.

To the Right Honourable

Sir JOHN SOMERS, Kt.

Lord Keeper of the great ſeal of England, and one of his Majeſty's moſt honourable privy-council.

My Lord,

THE papers I here preſent your lordſhip, are in ſubſtance the ſame with one which I delivered to you, in obedience to the commands I received, by your lordſhip, from their excellencies, the lords Juſtices; and with another, which I writ in anſwer to ſome queſtions your lordſhip was pleaſed to propoſe to me, concerning our coin. The approbation your lordſhip was pleaſed to give them then, has been an encouragement to me to reviſe them now, and put them in an order, fitter to comply with their deſires, who will needs have me print ſomething at this time on this ſubject: and could any thing of this nature be received with indifferency in this age, the allowance they have had from your lordſhip, whoſe great and clear judgment is, with general conſent and applauſe, acknowledged to be the juſt meaſure of right and wrong amongſt us, might make me hope that they might paſs in the world without any great diſlike.

However, ſince your lordſhip thought they might be of uſe to clear ſome difficulties, and rectify ſome wrong notions, that are taken up about money, I have ventured them into the world, deſiring no mercy to any erroneous poſitions, or wrong reaſonings, which ſhall be found in them. I ſhall never knowingly be of any, but truth's and my country's ſide; the former I ſhall always gladly embrace and own, whoever ſhews it me: and in theſe papers, I am ſure, I have no other aim, but to do what little I can for the ſervice of my country. Your lordſhip's ſo evidently preferring that to all other conſiderations, does, in the eyes of all men, ſit ſo well upon you, that my ambition will not be blamed, if I in this propoſe to myſelf ſo great an example, and in my little ſphere am moved by the ſame principle.

I have a long time foreſeen the miſchief and ruin coming upon us by clipp'd money, if it were not timely ſtopped: and had concern enough for the publick, to make me print ſome thoughts touching our coin, ſome years ſince. The principles I there went on, I ſee no reaſon to alter: they have, if I miſtake not, their foundation in nature, and will ſtand: they have their foundation in nature, and are clear; and will be ſo, in all the train of their conſequences, throughout this whole (as it is thought) myſterious buſineſs of money, to all thoſe, who will but be at the eaſy trouble of ſtripping this ſubject of hard, obſcure, and doubtful words, wherewith men are often miſled, and miſlead others. And now the diſorder is come to extremity, and can no longer be play'd with, I wiſh it may find a ſudden and effectual cure, not a remedy in ſound and appearance, which may flatter us on to ruin, in the continuation of a growing miſchief, that calls for preſent help.

I wish too, that the remedy may be as eaſy as poſſible; and that the cure of this evil be not ordered ſo, as to lay a great part of the burden unequally on thoſe, who have had no particular hand in it. Weſtminſter-hall is ſo great a witneſs of your lordſhip's unbiaſſed juſtice, and ſteady care to preſerve to every one their right, that the world will not wonder you ſhould not be for ſuch a leſſening our coin, as will, without any reaſon, deprive great numbers of blameleſs men of a fifth part of their eſtates, beyond the relief of Chancery. I hope this age will eſcape ſo great a blemiſh. I doubt not but there are many, who, for the ſervice of their country, and for the ſupport of the government, would gladly part with, not only one fifth, but a much larger portion of their eſtates.

But, when it ſhall be taken from them, only to be beſtowed on men, in their and the common opinion, no better deſerving of their country than themſelves, unleſs growing exceedingly rich by the publick neceſſities, whilſt every body elſe finds his fortune ſtreighten'd by them, be a publick merit, that deſerves a publick and ſignal reward, this loſs of one fifth of their debts and income will ſit heavy on them, who ſhall feel it, without the alleviation of any profit, or credit, that will thereby accrue to the nation, by ſuch a leſſening of our coin.

If any one aſk, How I, a retir'd, private man, come at this time to meddle with money and trade, for they are inſeparable? I reply, that your lordſhip, and the other great men, that put me upon it, are anſwerable for it: whether what I ſay be to the purpoſe, or no, that I myſelf am anſwerable for. This I can anſwer to all the world, that I have not ſaid any thing here, without a full perſuaſion of its truth; nor with any other motive, or purpoſe, than the clearing of this artificially perplex'd, rather than in itſelf myſterious, ſubject, as far as my poor talent reaches. That which, perhaps, I ſhall not be ſo well able to anſwer to your lordſhip and myſelf, is the liberty I have taken, in ſuch an addreſs as this, to profeſs that I am,

My Lord,

Your lordſhip's moſt humble,

and moſt obedient ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

The

The PREFACE.

THOUGH Mr. Lowndes and I differ in the way, yet, I aſſure myſelf, our end is the ſame; and that we both propoſe to ourſelves the ſervice of our country. He is a man known ſo able in the poſt he is in, to which the buſineſs of money peculiarly belongs; and has ſhewed himſelf ſo learned in the records, and matters of the mint, and ſo exact in calculations and combinations of numbers relating to our coin, either already in uſe, or deſigned by him, that I think I ſhould have troubled the publick no more on this ſubject, had not he himſelf engaged me in it; and brought it to that paſs, that either I muſt be thought to renounce my own opinion, or muſt publickly oppoſe his.

WHILST his treatiſe was yet a manuſcript, and before it was laid before thoſe great perſons, to whom it was afterwards ſubmitted, he did me the favour to ſhew it to me; and made me the compliment, to aſk me my opinion of it. Tho' we had ſome ſhort diſcouſe on the ſubject, yet the multiplicity of his buſineſs, whilſt I ſtaid in town, and my health, which ſoon after forced me out of it, allowed us not an occaſion to debate any one point thoroughly, and bring it to an iſſue. Before I returned to town, his book was in the preſs, and finiſhed, before I had an opportunity to ſee Mr. Lowndes again. And here he laid a new obligation on me, not only in giving me one of them, but telling me, when I received it from his hands, that it was the firſt he had parted with to any body. I then went it over a ſecond time, and having more leiſure to conſider it, I found there were a great many particulars in it drawn out of antient records, not commonly known, wherewith he had obliged the world. Theſe, which very pleaſingly entertained me, though they prevail'd not on me to be of his opinion every where, yet joined with the great civilities he had ſhewn me, left me in a diſpoſition ſo little inclined to oppoſe any thing in it, that I ſhould rather have choſen to acknowledge myſelf in print, to be his convert, if his arguments had convinced me, than to have troubled the world with the reaſons why I diſſent from him.

IN this diſpoſition, my pen reſted from meddling any further with this ſubject, whilſt I was in town; ſoon after, my own health, and the death of a friend, forced me into the country; and the buſineſs occaſion'd thereby, and my own private affairs, took up all my time at my firſt coming thither; and had continued to do ſo, had not ſeveral repeated intimations and inſtances from London, not without ſome reproaches of my backwardneſs, made me ſee, that the world concern'd me particularly in Mr. Lowndes's poſtſcript, and expected ſomething from me on that occaſion.

THOUGH poſſibly I was not wholly out of his mind when Mr. Lowndes writ that invitation, yet I ſhall not make myſelf the compliment, to think I alone am concern'd in it. The great importance of the matter, made him deſire every one to contribute what he could to the clearing of it, and ſetting it in a true light. And I muſt do him this right, to think, that he prefers the publick good to his private opinion; and therefore is willing his propoſals and arguments ſhould with freedom be examin'd to the bottom, that, if there be any miſtake in them, no body may be miſled by his reputation and authority, to the prejudice of his country. Thus I underſtand his poſtcript, and thus I ſhall endeavour to comply with it. I ſhall to the beſt of my ſkill, examine his arguments with all reſpect to him, and fidelity to truth, as far as I can diſcover it. The frankneſs of his proceeding in particular with me, aſſures me he is ſo great a lover of truth and right, that he will not think himſelf injured, when that is defended; and will be glad, when it is made plain, by whoſe hand ſoever it be.

THIS is what has made me publiſh theſe papers, without any derogation to Mr. Lowndes, or ſo much as a ſuſpicion that he will take it amiſs. I judge of him by myſelf. For I ſhall think myſelf obliged to any one, who ſhall ſhew me or the publick, any material miſtake in any thing I have here ſaid, whereon any part of the queſtion turns.

FURTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
CONCERNING
RAISING the VALUE
OF
MONEY.

SILVER is the inſtrument and meaſure of commerce in all the civilized and trading parts of the world.

IT is the inſtrument of commerce by its intrinſick value.

THE intrinſick value of ſilver, conſider'd as money, is that eſtimate which common conſent has placed on it, whereby it is made equivalent to all other things, and conſequently is the univerſal barter, or exchange, which men give and receive for other things, they would purchaſe or part with, for a valuable conſideration: and thus, as the wiſe man tells us, money anſwers all things.

SILVER is the meaſure of commerce by its quantity, which is the meaſure alſo of its intrinſick value. If one grain of ſilver has an intrinſick value in it, two grains of ſilver has double that intrinſick value, and three grains treble, and ſo on proportionably. This we have daily experience of, in common buying and ſelling. For if one ounce of ſilver will buy, i. e. is of equal value to one buſhel of wheat, two ounces of ſilver will buy two buſhels of the ſame wheat, i. e. has double the value.

HENCE it is evident, that an equal quantity of ſilver is always of equal value to an equal quantity of ſilver.

THIS, common ſenſe, as well as the market, teaches us. For, ſilver being all of the ſame nature and goodneſs, having all the ſame qualities, 'tis impoſſible but it ſhould in the ſame quantity have the ſame value. For, if a leſs quantity of any commodity be allow'd to be equal in value to a greater quantity of the ſame ſort of commodity, it muſt be for ſome good quality it has, which the other wants. But ſilver to ſilver has no ſuch difference.

HERE it will be aſked, is not ſome ſilver finer than other?

I ANSWER, one maſs of mixed metal not diſcerned by the eye to be any thing but ſilver, and therefore called ſilver, may have a leſs mixture of baſer metal in it than another, and ſo in common ſpeech is ſaid to be finer ſilver. So ducatoons, having a leſs mixture of copper in them than our Engliſh coin has, are ſaid to be finer ſilver. But the truth is, the ſilver that is in each is equally fine, as will appear when the baſer metal is ſeparate from it. And 'tis of this pure, or fine ſilver, I muſt be underſtood, when I mention ſilver; not regarding the copper, or lead, which may chance to be mixed with it. For example: Take an ounce of ſilver, and one fourth of an ounce of copper, and melt them together, one may ſay of the whole maſs, that it is not fine ſilver; but it is true, there is an ounce of fine ſilver in it; and though this maſs, weighing one ounce and a quarter, be not of equal value to one ounce and a quarter of fine ſilver, yet the ounce of fine ſilver in it, is, when ſeparate from the copper, of equal value to any other ounce of ſilver.

BY this meaſure of commerce, viz. the quantity of ſilver, men meaſure the value of all other things. Thus to meaſure what the value of lead is to wheat, and of either of them to a certain ſort of linnen cloth, the quantity of ſilver, that each is valued at, or ſells for, needs only be known. For, if a yard of cloth be ſold for half an ounce of ſilver, a buſhel of wheat for one ounce, and a hundred weight of lead for two ounces; any one preſently ſees, and ſays, that a buſhel of wheat is double the value of a yard of that cloth, and but half the value of an hundred weight of lead.

Some are of opinion, that this meaſure of commerce, like all other meaſures, is arbitrary, and may at pleaſure be varied, by putting more, or fewer grains of ſilver, in pieces of a known denomination, v. g. by making a penny, or a ſhilling lighter, or heavier in ſilver, in a country where theſe are known denominations of pieces of ſilver money. But they will be of another mind, when they conſider, that ſilver is a meaſure of a nature quite different from all other. The yard, or quart men meaſure by, may reſt indifferently in the buyers or ſellers, or a third perſon's hands, it matters not whoſe it is. But it is not ſo in ſilver: it is the thing bargained for, as well as the meaſure of the bargain; and in commerce paſſes from the buyer to the ſeller, as being in ſuch a quantity equivalent to the thing ſold: and ſo it not only meaſures the value of the commodity it is apply'd to, but is given in exchange for it, as of equal value. But this it does, (as is viſible) only by its quantity, and nothing elſe. For it muſt be remembered, that ſilver is the inſtrument, as well as meaſure, of commerce, and is given in exchange for the things traded for: and, every one deſiring to get as much as he can of it, for any commodity he ſells, 'tis by the quantity of ſilver, he gets for it in exchange, and by nothing elſe, that he meaſures the value of the commodity he ſells.

The coining of ſilver, or making money of it, is the aſcertaining of its quantity by a publick mark, the better to fit it for commerce.

In coin'd ſilver, or money, there are theſe three things, which are wanting in other ſilver. 1. Pieces of exactly the ſame weight and fineneſs. 2. A ſtamp, ſet on thoſe pieces by the publick authority of that country. 3. A known denomination given to theſe pieces by the ſame authority.

The ſtamp is a mark, and as it were a publick voucher, that a piece of ſuch denomination is of ſuch a weight, and of ſuch a fineneſs, i. e. has ſo much ſilver in it.

That preciſe weight and fineneſs, by law appropriated to the pieces of each denomination, is called the ſtandard.

Fine ſilver is ſilver without the mixture of any baſer metal.

Alloy is baſer metal mixed with it.

The fineneſs of any metal appearing to be ſilver, and ſo called, is the proportion of ſilver is in it, compared with what there is in it of baſer metals.

The fineneſs of ſtandard ſilver in England, is eleven parts ſilver and one part copper, near: or to ſpeak more exactly, the proportion of ſilver to copper, is as 111 to 9. Whatever piece, or maſs, has in it of baſer metal, above the proportion of 9 to 111, is worſe, or coarſer than ſtandard. Whatever maſs of metal has a leſs proportion than 9 to 111, of baſer metal in it, is better, or finer than ſtandard.

Since ſilver is the thing ſought for, and would better ſerve for the meaſure of commerce, if it were unmix'd, it will poſſibly be aſked, "Why any mixture "of baſer metal is allow'd in money, and what uſe there is of ſuch alloy, which "ſerves to make the quantity of ſilver leſs known, in the ſeveral coins of different countries?"

Perhaps it would have been better for commerce in general, and more convenient for all their ſubjects, if the princes every where, or at leaſt in this part of the world, would at firſt have agreed on the fineneſs of the ſtandard to have been juſt one twelfth alloy, in round numbers; without thoſe minuter fractions which are to be found in the alloy of moſt of the coin of the ſeveral diſtinct dominions of this part of the world. Which broken proportion of baſer metal to ſilver, in the ſtandard of the ſeveral mints, ſeems to have been introduced by the ſkill of men employed in coining, to keep that art, (as all trades are called) a myſtery; rather than for any uſe, or neceſſity there was of ſuch broken numbers. But, be that as it will, the ſtandard in our mint being now ſettled by authority, and eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, known at home and abroad, and the rules and methods of eſſaying ſuited to it; and all the wrought plate, as well as coin of England, being made by that meaſure; it is of greater concernment that it ſhould remain unvariable.

But to the queſtion; "What need is there of any mixture of baſer metal "with ſilver in money or plate?" I anſwer, there is great reaſon for it. For,

1. Copper mix'd with ſilver makes it harder, and ſo wears and waſtes leſs in uſe, than if it were fine ſilver. 2. It melts eaſier. 3. Silver, as it is drawn and melted from the mine, being ſeldom perfectly fine, it would be a great charge by refining, to ſeparate all the baſer metals from it, and reduce it to perfectly unmix'd ſilver.

The uſe of coin'd ſilver, or money, is, that every man in the country, where it is current by publick authority, may, without the trouble of refining, eſſaying, or weighing, be aſſured what quantity of ſilver he gives, receives, or contracts for, under ſuch denominations.

If this ſecurity goes not along with the publick ſtamp, coining is labour to no purpoſe, and puts no difference between coin'd money, and uncoin'd bullion. This is ſo obvious, that I think no government, where money is coin'd, ever overlooks it. And therefore, the laws every where, when the quantity of ſilver has been leſſen'd in any piece carrying the publick ſtamp, by clipping, waſhing, rounding, &c. have taken off the authority of the publick ſtamp, and declared it not to be lawful money. This is known to be ſo in England, and every one may not only refuſe any money bearing the publick ſtamp, if it be clipp'd, or any ways robb'd of the due weight of its ſilver; but he that offers it in payment is liable to indictment, fine and impriſonment. From whence we may ſee, that the uſe and end of the publick ſtamp is only to be a guard and voucher of the quantity of ſilver, which men contract for. And the injury done to the publick faith, in this point, is that which in clipping and falſe coining heightens the robbery into treaſon.

Men in their bargains contract for denominations, or ſounds, but for the intrinſick value; which is the quantity of ſilver, by publick authority warranted to be in pieces of ſuch denominations. And 'tis by having a greater quantity of ſilver, that men thrive and grow richer, and not by having a greater number of denominations; which, when they come to have need of their money, will prove but empty ſounds, if they do not carry with them the real quantity of ſilver is expected.

The ſtandard once ſettled by publick authority, the quantity of ſilver eſtabliſhed under the ſeveral denominations (I humbly conceive) ſhould not be alter'd, 'till there were an abſolute neceſſity ſhewn of ſuch a change, which I think can never be.

The reaſon why it ſhould not be chang'd, is this; Becauſe the publick authority is guarantee for the performance of all legal contracts. But men are abſolved from the performance of their legal contracts, if the quantity of ſilver under ſettled and legal denominations be altered: as is evident, if borrowing 100l. or 400 ounces of ſilver, to repay the ſame quantity of ſilver (for that is underſtood by the ſame ſum, and ſo the law warrants it) or taking a leaſe of lands for years to come, at the like rent of 100l. they ſhall pay, both the one and the other, in money coin'd under the ſame denominations, with one fifth leſs ſilver in it, than at the time of the bargain; the landlord here and creditor are each defrauded of twenty per cent. of what they contracted for, and is their due. And I aſk, How much juſter it would be thus to diſſolve the contracts they had made, than to make a law, that from henceforth all landlords and creditors ſhould be paid their paſt debts, and the rents for leaſes already made, in clipp'd money, twenty per cent. lighter than it ſhould be? Both ways they loſe twenty per cent. of their due, and with equal juſtice.

The caſe would be the ſame, and legal contracts be avoided, if the ſtandard ſhould be altered, on the other ſide, and each ſpecies of our coin be made one fifth heavier. For then, he that had borrow'd, or contracted for any ſum, could not be diſcharged, by paying the quantity he agreed for, but be liable to be forced to pay twenty per cent. more than he bargained for, that is, more than he ought.

On the other ſide; Whether the creditor be forced to receive leſs, or the borrower be forced to pay more, than his contract, the damage and injury is the ſame, whenever a man is defrauded of his due. And whether this will not be a publick failure of juſtice, thus arbitrarily to give one man's right and poſſeſſion to another, without any fault on the ſuffering man's ſide, and without any the leaſt advantage to the publick, I ſhall leave to be conſidered.

Raising of coin is but a ſpecious word to deceive the unwary. It only gives the uſual denomination of a greater quantity of ſilver to a leſs, (v. g. calling four grains of ſilver a penny to-day, when five grains of ſilver made a penny yeſterday) but adds no worth, or real value to the ſilver coin, to make amends for its want of ſilver. That is impoſſible to be done. For it is only the quantity of ſilver in it that is, and eternally will be, the meaſure of its value. And to convince any one of this, I aſk, Whether he, that is forced to receive but 320 ounces of ſilver under the denomination of 100l. (for 400 ounces of ſilver which he lent under the like denomination of 100 l.) will think theſe 320 ounces of ſilver, however denominated, worth thoſe 400 ounces he lent? If any one can be ſuppoſed ſo ſilly, he need but go to the next market, or ſhop, to be convinced, that men value not money by the denomination, but by the quantity of ſilver there is in it. One may as rationally hope to lengthen a foot, by dividing it into fifteen parts, inſtead of twelve, and calling them inches; as to increaſe the value of the ſilver, that is in a ſhilling, by dividing it into fifteen parts inſtead of twelve, and calling them pence. This is all that is done, when a ſhilling is raiſed from twelve to fifteen pence.

Clipping of money is raiſing it without publick authority; the ſame denomination remaining to the piece, that hath now leſs ſilver in it than it had before.

Altering the ſtandard, by coining pieces under the ſame denomination with leſs ſilver in them than they formerly had, is doing the ſame thing by publick authority. The only odds is, that by clipping, the loſs is not forced on any one, (for no body is obliged to receive clipp'd money;) by altering the ſtandard, it is.

Altering the ſtandard, by raiſing the money, will not get to the publick, or bring to the mint to be coin'd, one ounce of ſilver: but will defraud the king, the church, the univerſities and hoſpitals, &c. of ſo much of their ſettled revenue, as the money is raiſed, v. g. twenty per cent. if the money (as is propos'd) be raiſed one fifth. It will weaken, if not totally deſtroy the publick faith, when all that have truſted the publick, and aſſiſted our preſent neceſſities, upon acts of parliament, in the million lottery, bank act, and other loans, ſhall be defrauded of twenty per cent. of what thoſe acts of parliament were ſecurity for. And to conclude, this raiſing our money will defraud all private men of twenty per cent. in all their debts and ſettled revenues.

Clipping, by Engliſhmen, is robbing the honeſt man who receives clipp'd money, and transferring the ſilver, i. e. the value is pared off from it, into the clipper's pocket. Clipping by foreigners is robbing England itſelf. And thus the Spaniards lately robb'd Portugal of a great part of its treaſure, or commodities (which is the ſame thing) by importing upon them clipp'd money of the Portugal ſtamp.

Clipping, and clipp'd money, have, beſides this robbery of the publick, other great inconveniencies: as the diſordering our trade, raiſing foreign exchange, and a general diſturbance, which every one feels thereby in his private affairs.

Clipping is ſo gainful, and ſo ſecret a robbery, that penalties cannot reſtrain it, as we ſee by experience.

Nothing, I humbly conceive, can put a ſtop to clipping, now it is grown ſo univerſal, and men become ſo ſkilful in it, but making it unprofitable.

Nothing can make clipping unprofitable, but making all light money go only for its weight. This ſtops clipping in a moment, brings out all the mill'd and weighty money, deprives us not of of any part of our clipp'd money for the uſe of trade, and brings it orderly, and by degrees, and without force, into the mint to be recoin'd.

IF clipp'd money be call'd in all at once, and ſtopp'd from paſſing by weight, I fear it will ſtop trade, put our affairs all at a ſtand, and introduce confuſion. Whereas, if it be permitted to paſs by its weight, till it can by degrees be coin'd, (the ſtamp ſecuring its fineneſs, as well then as now, and the ſcales determining its weight) it will ſerve for paying of great ſums, as commodiouſly almoſt as weighty money, and the weighty money, being then brought out, will ſerve for the market trade, and leſs payments, and alſo to weigh the clipp'd money by.

ON the other ſide; If clipp'd money be allow'd to paſs current by tale, till it be all recoin'd, one of theſe two effects will apparently follow: either that we ſhall want money for trade, as the clipp'd money decreaſes, by being coin'd into weighty; (for very few, if any body, who get weighty money into their hands, will part with it, whilſt clipp'd money, not of half the value is current) or if they do the coiners and clippers will pick it up, and new coin and clip it; whereby clipp'd money will be increaſed. So that, by this way, either money will be wanting to trade, or clipp'd money continued. If clipp'd money be ſtopp'd all at once, there is immediately a ſtop of trade. If it be permitted to paſs in tale, as if it were lawful, weighty money, whilſt it is recoining, and till all be recoin'd, that way alſo there will be an end of trade, or no end of clipp'd money. But, if it be made to paſs for its weight, till it be all recoin'd, both theſe evils are avoided, and the weighty money, which we want, will be brought out to boot.

MONEY is neceſſary to the carrying on of trade. For where money fails, men cannot buy, and trade ſtops.

CREDIT will ſupply the defect of it to ſome ſmall degree, for a little while. But, credit being nothing but the expectation of money within ſome limited time, money muſt be had, or credit will fail.

MONEY alſo is neceſſary to us, in a certain proportion to the plenty of it amongſt our neighbours. For, if any of our neighbours have it in a much greater abundance than we, we are many ways obnoxious to them. 1. They can maintain a greater force. 2. They can tempt away our people, by greater wages, to ſerve them by land, or ſea, or in any labour. 3. They can command the markets, and thereby break our trade, and make us poor. 4. They can on any occaſion ingroſs naval and warlike ſtores, and thereby endanger us.

IN countries where domeſtick mines do not ſupply it, nothing can bring in ſilver but tribute, or trade. Tribute is the effect of conqueſt: trade, of ſkill and induſtry.

BY commerce ſilver is brought in, only by an over-balance of trade.

AN over-balance of trade, is when the quantity of commodities, which we ſend to any country, do more than pay for thoſe we bring from thence: for then the over-plus is brought home in bullion.

BULLION is ſilver, whoſe workmanſhip has no value. And thus foreign coin hath no value here for its ſtamp, and our coin is bullion in foreign dominions.

'TIS uſeleſs and labour in vain, to coin ſilver, imported into any country, where it is not to ſtay.

SILVER imported cannot ſtay in any country in which, by an over-balance of their whole trade, it is not made theirs, and doth not become a real increaſe of their wealth.

IF, by a general balance of its trade, England yearly ſends out commodities to the value of four hundred thouſand ounces of ſilver, more than the commodities we bring home from abroad coſt us; there is one hundred thouſand poud every year clear again: which will come home in money, by a real increaſe of our wealth, and will ſtay here.

ON the other ſide, if, upon a general balance of our whole trade, we yearly import commodities from other parts, to the value of an hundred thouſand pound more than our commodities exported pay for, we every year grow an hundred thouſand pound poorer. And if, beſides that, we ſhould alſo import a million in bullion from Spain every year, yet it is not ours; it is no increaſe to our wealth, nor can it ſtay here; but muſt be exported again, every grain of it, with an hundred thouſand pound of our own money to boot.

I HAVE heard it propoſed, as a way to keep our money here, that we ſhould pay our debts beyond ſeas, by bills of exchange.

THE idleneſs of ſuch a propoſition will appear, when the nature of exchange is a little conſidered.

FOREIGN exchange is the paying of money in one country, to receive it in another.

THE exchange is high, when a man pays for bills of exchange above the par. It is low, when he pays leſs than the par.

THE par is a certain number of pieces of the coin of one country, containing in them an equal quantity of ſilver to that in another number of pieces, of the coin of another country: v. g. ſuppoſing 36 ſkillings of Holland to have juſt as much ſilver in them as 20 Engliſh ſhillings. Bills of exchange drawn from England to Holland at the rate of 36 ſkillings Dutch for each pound ſterling, is according to the par. He that pays the money here, and receives it there, neither gets nor loſes by the exchange; but receives juſt the ſame quantity of ſilver in the one place, that he parts with in the other. But, if he pays one pound ſterling to receive but 30 ſkillings in Holland, he pays one ſixth more than the par, and ſo pays one ſixth more ſilver for the exchange, let the ſum be what it will.

THE reaſon of high exchange, is the buying much commodities in any foreign country, beyond the value of what that country takes of ours. This makes Engliſhmen have need of great ſums there, and this raiſes the exchange, or price of bills. For what grows more into demand, increaſes preſently in price.

RETURNING money by exchange, into foreign parts, keeps not one farthing from going out: it only prevents the more troubleſome and hazardous way of ſending money in ſpecie, forwards and backwards. Bills of exchange more commodiouſly, by ſcrips of paper, even the accounts between particular debtors and creditors, in different countries, as far as the commerce between thoſe two places is equivalent: but where the over-balance, on either ſide, demands payment, there bills of exchange can do nothing; but bullion, or money in ſpecie muſt be ſent. For in a country where we owe money, and have no debts owing to us, bills will not find credit, but for a ſhort time, till money can be ſent to reimburſe thoſe that paid them; unleſs we can think men beyond ſea will part with their money for nothing. If the traders of England owe their correſpondents of Holland a hundred thouſand pound, their accounts with all the reſt of the world ſtanding equal, and remaining ſo, one farthing of this hundred thouſand pound cannot be paid by bills of exchange. For example, I owe a thouſand pound of it; and to pay that, buy a bill of N. here, drawn on John de Wit of Amſterdam, to pay P. Van Lore, my correſpendent there. The money is paid accordingly, and thereby I am out of Van Lore's debt; but one farthing of the debt of England to Holland is not thereby paid; for N. of whom I bought the bill of exchange, is now as much indebted to John de Wit, as I was before to P. Van Lore. Particular debtors and creditors are only changed by bills of exchange; but the debt, owing from one country to the other, cannot be paid without real effects ſent thither to that value, either in commodities, or money. Where the balance of trade barely pays for commodities with commodities, there money muſt be ſent, or elſe the debts cannot be paid.

I HAVE ſpoke of ſilver coin alone, becauſe that makes the money of account, and meaſure of trade, all through the world. For all contracts are, I think, every where made, and accounts kept in ſilver coin. I am ſure they are ſo in England, and the neighbouring countries.

SILVER therefore, and ſilver alone, is the meaſure of commerce. Two metals, as gold and ſilver, cannot be the meaſure of commerce both together, in any country: becauſe the meaſure of commerce muſt be perpetually the ſame, invariable, and keeping the ſame proportion of value in all its parts. But ſo only one metal does, or can do to itſelf: ſo ſilver is to ſilver, and gold to gold. And an ounce of ſilver is always of equal value to an ounce of ſilver, and an ounce of gold to an ounce of gold; and two ounces of the one, or the other, of double the value to an ounce of the ſame. But gold and ſilver change their value one to another: for ſuppoſing them to be in value as ſixteen to one now; perhaps the next month they may be as fifteen and three quarters, or fifteen and ſeven eighths to one. And one may as well make a meaſure, v. g. a yard, whoſe parts lengthen and ſhrink, as a meaſure of trade of materials that have not always a ſettled, unvariable value to one another.

ONE metal, therefore, alone can be the money of account and contract, and the meaſure of commerce in any country. The fitteſt for this uſe, of all other, is ſilver, for many reaſons, which need not here be mentioned. It is enough that the world has agreed in it, and made it their common money; and as the Indians rightly call it, meaſure. All other metals, gold, as well as lead, are but commodities.

COMMODITIES are moveables, valuable by money, the common meaſure.

GOLD, tho' not the money of the world, and the meaſure of commerce, nor fit to be ſo, yet may, and ought to be coined, to aſcertain its weight and fineneſs; and ſuch coin may ſafely have a price, as well as a ſtamp ſet upon it, by publick authority; ſo the value ſet be under the market-price. For then ſuch pieces coined, will be a commodity as paſſable as ſilver money, very little varying in their price; as guineas, which were coined at the value of 20s. but paſſed uſually for between 21 or 22s. according to the current rate; but not having ſo high a value put upon them by the law, no body could be forced to take them to their loſs at 21s. 6d. if the price of gold ſhould happen at any time to be cheaper.

FROM what has been ſaid, I think it appears,

1. THAT ſilver is that which mankind have agreed on, to take and give in exchange for all other commodities, as an equivalent.

2. THAT 'tis by the quantity of ſilver they give, or take, or contract for, that they eſtimate the value of other things, and ſatisfy for them; and thus, by its quantity, ſilver becomes the meaſure of commerce.

3. HENCE it neceſſarily follows, that a greater quantity of ſilver has a greater value; a leſs quantity of ſilver has a leſs value; and an equal quantity an equal value.

4. THAT money differs from uncoin'd ſilver only in this, that the quantity of ſilver in each piece of money, is aſcertained by the ſtamp it bears; which is ſet there to be a publick voucher of its weight and fineneſs.

5. THAT gold is treaſure, as well as ſilver, becauſe it decays not in keeping, and never ſinks much in its value.

6. THAT gold is fit to be coined, as well as ſilver; to aſcertain its quantity to thoſe who have a mind to traffick in it; but not fit to be joined with ſilver, as a meaſure of commerce.

7. THAT jewels too are treaſure, becauſe they keep without decay; and have conſtantly a great value, in proportion to their bulk: but cannot be uſed for money, becauſe their value is not meaſured by their quantity, nor can they, as gold and ſilver, be divided, and keep their value.

8. THE other metals are not treaſure, becauſe they decay in keeping, and becauſe of their plenty; which makes their value little in a great bulk; and ſo unfit for money, commerce and carriage.

9. THAT the only way to bring treaſure into England, is the well ordering our trade.

10. THAT the only way to bring ſilver and gold to the mint, for the increaſe of our ſtock of money and treaſure, which ſhall ſtay here, is an overbalance of our whole trade. All other ways, to increaſe our money and riches, are but projects that will fail us.

THESE things premiſed, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew wherein I differ from Mr. Lowndes, and upon what grounds I do ſo.

MR. Lowndes propoſes, that our money ſhould be raiſed (as it is called) one fifth: that is, That all our preſent denominations of money, as penny, ſhilling,

ling, half-crown, crown, &c. ſhould each have one fifth leſs ſilver in it, or be anſwer'd with coin of one fifth leſs value. How he propoſes to have it done, I ſhall conſider hereafter. I ſhall at preſent only examine the reaſons he gives for it.

His firſt reaſon, p. 68. he gives us in theſe words, "The value of the ſilver "in the coin ought to be raiſed to the foot of ſix ſhillings three pence in every "crown; becauſe the price of ſtandard ſilver in bullion is riſen to ſix ſhillings "five pence an ounce."

This reaſon ſeems to me to labour under ſeveral great miſtakes; as

1. That ſtandard ſilver can riſe in reſpect of itſelf.

2. That ſtandard bullion is now, or ever was worth, or ſold to the traders in it for 6s. 3d. the ounce, of lawful money of England. For if that matter of fact holds not to be ſo, that an ounce of ſterling bullion is worth 6s. 5d. of our mill'd, weighty money, this reaſon ceaſes: and our weighty crown-pieces ought not to be raiſed to 6s. 3d. becauſe our light, clipp'd money will not purchaſe an ounce of ſtandard bullion, under the rate of 6s. 5d. of that light money. And let me add here, nor for that rate neither. If therefore, the author means here, that an ounce of ſtandard ſilver is riſen to 6s. 5d. of our clipp'd money, I grant it him, and higher too. But then, that has nothing to do with the raiſing our lawful coin, which remains unclipp'd; unleſs he will ſay too, that ſtandard bullion is ſo riſen, as to be worth, and actually to ſell for, 6s. 5d. the ounce, of our weighty, mill'd money. This I not only deny, but farther add, that it is impoſſible to be ſo. For 6s. 5d. of mill'd money, weighs an ounce and a quarter near. Can it therefore be poſſible, that one ounce of any commodity, ſhould be worth an ounce and a quarter of the ſelf ſame commodity, and of exactly the ſame goodneſs? for ſo is ſtandard ſilver to ſtandard ſilver. Indeed one has a mark upon it, which the other has not: but it is a mark that makes it rather more, than leſs valuable: or if the mark, by hindering its exportation, makes it leſs valuable for that purpoſe, the melting-pot can eaſily take it off.

The complaint made of melting down our weighty money, anſwers this reaſon evidently. For can it be ſuppos'd, that a goldſmith will give one ounce and a quarter of coined ſilver, for one ounce of bullion; when by putting it into his melting-pot, he can, for leſs than a penny charge, make it bullion? (For 'tis always to be remember'd, what I think is made clear, that the value of ſilver, conſidered as it is money, and the meaſure of commerce, is nothing but its quantity.) And thus a mill'd ſhilling, which has double the weight of ſilver in it to a current ſhilling, whereof half the ſilver is clipp'd away, has double the value. And to ſhew that this is ſo, I will undertake, that any merchant, who has bullion to ſell, ſhall ſell it for a great deal leſs number of ſhillings in tale, to any one who will contract to pay him in mill'd money, than if he be paid in the current, clipp'd money.

Those who ſay bullion is riſen, I deſire to tell me, what they mean by riſen? Any commodity, I think, is properly ſaid to be riſen, when the ſame quantity will exchange for a greater quantity of another thing; but more particularly of that thing, which is the meaſure of commerce in the country. And thus corn is ſaid to be riſen among the Engliſh in Virginia, when a buſhel of it will ſell, or exchange for more pounds of tobacco; amongſt the Indians, when it will ſell for more yards of Wampompeak, which is their money; and amongſt the Engliſh here, when it will exchange for a greater quantity of ſilver than it would before. Riſing and falling of commodities, is always between ſeveral commodities of diſtinct worths. But nobody can ſay, that tobacco (of the ſame goodneſs) is riſen in reſpect of itſelf. One pound of the ſame goodneſs will never exchange for a pound and a quarter of the ſame goodneſs. And ſo it is in ſilver: an ounce of ſilver, will always be of equal value to an ounce of ſilver: nor can it ever riſe, or fall, in reſpect of itſelf: an ounce of ſtandard ſilver can never be worth an ounce and quarter of ſtandard ſilver; nor one ounce of uncoin'd ſilver, exchange for an ounce and a quarter of coin'd ſilver: the ſtamp cannot ſo much debaſe its value. Indeed the ſtamp, hindering its free exportation, may make the goldſmith (who profits by the return of money) give one hundred and twentieth, or one ſixtieth, or perhaps, ſometimes, one thirtieth more, that is 5s. 2d. ½ 5s. 3d. or 5s. 4d. the ounce of coin'd ſilver for uncoin'd, when there is need of ſending ſilver beyond ſeas; as there always is, when the balance of trade will not ſupply our wants, and pay our debts there. But much beyond this, the goldſmith will never give for bullion; ſince he can make it out of coin'd money at a cheaper rate.

'Tis ſaid, bullion is riſen to 6s. 5d. the ounce, i. e. that an ounce of uncoin'd ſilver will exchange for an ounce and a quarter of coin'd ſilver. If any one can believe this, I will put this ſhort caſe to him. He has of bullion, or ſtandard, uncoin'd ſilver, two round plates, each of an exact ſize and weight of a crown-piece: he has beſides, of the ſame bullion, a round plate of the weight and ſize of a ſhilling, and another yet leſs, of an exact weight and ſize of a threepence. The two great plates being of equal weight and fineneſs, I ſuppoſe he will allow to be of equal value, and that the two leſs, join'd to either of them, make it one fifth more worth than the other is by itſelf, they having all three together one fifth more ſilver in them. Let us ſuppoſe then, one of the greater, and the two leſs plates to have received the next moment, (by miracle, or by the mill, it matters not how) the mark, or ſtamp, of our crown, our ſhilling, and our threepence: can any body ſay, that now they have got the ſtamp of our mint upon them, they are ſo fallen in value, or the other unſtamp'd piece ſo riſen, that that unſtamp'd piece, which a moment before was worth only one of the other pieces, is now worth them all three? Which is to ſay, that an ounce of uncoin'd ſilver, is worth an ounce and a quarter of coin'd. This is what men would perſuade us, when they ſay, that bullion is raiſed to 6s. 5d. [of lawful money] the ounce, which I ſay is utterly impoſſible. Let us conſider this a little further, in another inſtance. The preſent milled crown-piece, ſay they, will not exchange for an ounce of bullion, without the addition of a ſhilling and a three-pence of weighty coin added to it. Coin but that crown-piece into 6s. 3d. and then they ſay it will buy an ounce of bullion, or elſe they give up their reaſon and meaſure of raiſing the money. Do that which is allow'd to be equivalent to coining of a preſent mill'd crown-piece into 6s. 3d. viz call it 75 pence, and then alſo it muſt by this rule of raiſing buy an ounce of bullion. If this be ſo, the ſelf-ſame mill'd crown-piece will, and will not exchange for an ounce of bullion. Call it 60 pence and it will not: the very next moment call it 75 pence, and it will. I am afraid no body can think, change of denomination has ſuch power.

Mr. Lowndes ſupports this his firſt reaſon with theſe words, p. 68. "This "reaſon, which I humbly conceive will appear irrefragable, is grounded upon a "truth ſo apparent, that it may well be compared to an axiom, even in mathe-"matical reaſoning; to wit, that whenſoever the intrinſick value of ſilver in the "coin hath been, or ſhall be, leſs than the price of ſilver in bullion, the coin "hath, and will be melted down."

This I think, though it be allowed Mr. Lowndes for as apparent a truth, and as certain a maxim as he could wiſh, yet ſerves not at all to his purpoſe of leſſening the coin. For when the coin is, as it ſhould be, according to the ſtandard (let the ſtandard be what it will) weighty and unclipp'd, it is impoſſible that the value of coin'd ſilver ſhould be leſs than the value, or price of uncoin'd; becauſe, as I have ſhewn, the value and quantity of ſilver are the ſame: and where the quantities are equal, the values are equal, excepting only the odds that may be between bullion that may be freely exported, and coin'd ſilver that may not; the odds whereof ſcarce ever amounts to above 2d. per ounce, and rarely to above a penny, or an half-penny. And this odds (whatever it be) will equally belong to his raiſed, milled money, which cannot be exported, as it will to our preſent mill'd money, which cannot be exported, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew more particularly hereafter. All this diſorder, and a thouſand others, comes from light and unlawful money being current. For then it is no wonder that bullion ſhould be kept up to the value of your clipp'd money; that is, that bullion ſhould not be ſold by the ounce for leſs than 6s. 5d. when that 6s. 5d. clipp'd money, paid for it, does not weigh above an ounce. This inſtance therefore, of the preſent price of bullion, proves nothing but that the quantity of ſilver in money governs the value of it, and not the denomination; as appears, when clipp'd money is brought to buy bullion. This is a fair trial: ſilver is ſet againſt ſilver, and by that is ſeen, whether clipp'd money be of the ſame value with weighty of the ſame denomination, or whether it be not the quantity of ſilver in it that regulates its value.

I CANNOT but wonder that Mr. Lowndes, a man ſo well ſkill'd in the law, eſpecially of the mint, the exchequer, and of our money, ſhould all along in this argument ſpeak of clipp'd money, as if it were the lawful money of England; and ſhould propoſe by that (which is in effect by the clipper's ſheers) to regulate a new ſort of coin to be introduced into England. And if he will ſtand to that meaſure, and leſſen the new coin to the rate of bullion ſold in exchange for preſent, current, clipp'd money, to prevent its being melted down; he muſt make it yet much lighter than he propoſes; ſo that raiſing it, or to give it its due name, that leſſening of it one fifth will not ſerve the turn: for I will be bold to ſay, that bullion now in England, is no where to be bought by the ounce for 6s. 5d. of our preſent, current, clipp'd money. So that if his rule be true, and nothing can ſave the weighty coin from melting down, but reducing it to the weight that clipp'd money is brought to, he muſt leſſen the money in his new coin much more than one fifth; for an ounce of ſtandard bullion will always be worth an ounce of clipp'd money, whether that in tale amount to 6s. 5d. 6s. 6d. 10s. or any other number of ſhillings, or pence, of the nick-nam'd clipp'd money. For a piece of ſilver, that was coined for a ſhilling, but has half the ſilver clipp'd off, in the law, and in propriety of ſpeech, is no more a ſhilling than a piece of wood, which was once a ſealed yard, is ſtill a yard, when one half of it broke off.

LET us conſider this maxim a little farther; which out of the language of the mint, in plain Engliſh, I think amounts to thus much, viz. That "when an "ounce of ſtandard bullion coſts a greater number of pence in tale, than an ounce "of that bullion can be coined into, by the ſtandard of the mint, the coin will "be melted down." I grant it, if bullion ſhould riſe to 15 pence the ounce above 5 s. 2 d. as is now pretended; which is to ſay, that an ounce of bullion cannot be bought for leſs than an ounce and a quarter of the like ſilver coin'd. But that, as I have ſhewed, is impoſſible to be: and every one would be convinced of the contrary, if we had none now but lawful money current. But 'tis no wonder, if the price and value of things be confounded and uncertain, when the meaſure itſelf is loſt. For we have no lawful ſilver money current amongſt us; and therefore cannot talk, nor judge right, by our preſent, uncertain, clipped money, of the value and price of things, in reference to our lawful, regular coin, adjuſted and kept to the unvarying ſtandard of the mint. The price of ſilver in bullion above the value of ſilver in coin, when clipping has not defaced our current caſh (for then the odds is very rarely above a penny, or two pence the ounce) is ſo far from being a cauſe of melting down our coin, that this price, which is given above the value of the ſilver in our coin, is given only to preſerve our coin from being melted down: for nobody buys bullion at above 5s. 2d. the ounce, (which is juſt the value) for any other reaſon, but to avoid the crime and hazard of melting down our coin.

I THINK it will be agreed on all hands, that nobody will melt down our money, but for profit. Now profit can be made by melting down our money but only in two caſes.

Firſt, WHEN the current pieces of the ſame denomination are unequal, and of different weights, ſome heavier, ſome lighter: for then the traders in money cull out the heavier, and melt them down with profit. This is the ordinary fault of coining by the hammer, wherein it uſually ſufficed, That a bar of ſilver was cut into as many half-crowns, or ſhillings, as anſwered its whole weight; without being very exact in making each particular piece of its due weight, whereby ſome pieces came to be heavier, and ſome lighter, than by the ſtandard they ſhould. And then the heavier pieces were cull'd out, and there was profit to be made (as one eaſily perceives) in melting them down. But this cauſe of melting down our money is eaſily prevented, by the exacter way of coining by the mill, in which each ſingle piece is brought to its juſt weight. This inequality of pieces of the ſame denomination, is to be found in our money, more than ever, ſince clipping has been in faſhion: and therefore, 'tis no wonder, that in this irregular ſtate of our money, one complaint is, that the heavy money is melted down. But this alſo the making clipp'd money go at preſent for its weight, (which is a ſudden reducing of it to the ſtandard) and then, by degrees, recoining it into mill'd money (which is the ultimate and more complete reducing it to the ſtandard) perfectly cures.

THE other caſe, wherein our money comes to be melted down, is a loſing trade; or, which is the ſame thing in other words, an over-great conſumption of foreign commodities. Whenever the over-balance of foreign trade makes it difficult for our merchants to get bills of exchange, the exchange preſently riſes, and the returns of money raiſe them in proportion to the want of money Engliſhmen have in any parts beyond ſeas. They, who thus furniſh them with bills, not being able to ſatisfy their correſpondents, on whom thoſe bills are drawn, with the product of our commodities there, muſt ſend ſilver from hence to reimburſe them, and repay the money they have drawn out of their hands. Whilſt bullion may be had for a ſmall price more than the weight of our current caſh, theſe exchangers generally chuſe rather to buy bullion, than run the riſque of melting down our coin, which is criminal by the law. And thus the matter for the moſt part went, whilſt mill'd and clipp'd money paſſed promiſcuouſly in payment: for ſo long a clipp'd half-crown was as good here as a mill'd one, ſince one paſſed, and could be had as freely as the other. But as ſoon as there began to be a diſtinction between clipp'd and unclipp'd money, and weighty money could no longer be had for the light, bullion (as was natural) aroſe; and it would fall agein to-morrow to the price it was at before, if there were none but weighty money to pay for it. In ſhort, whenever the whole of our foreign trade and conſumption exceeds our exportation of commodities, our money muſt go to pay our debts ſo contracted whether melted or not melted down. If the law makes the exportation of our coin penal, it will be melted down; if it leaves the exportation of our coin free, as in Holland, it will be carried out in ſpecie. One way, or other, go it muſt, as we ſee in Spain; but whether melted down, or not melted down, it matters little: our coin and treaſure will be both ways equally diminiſhed, and can be reſtored, only by an over-balance of our whole exportation, to our whole importation of conſumable commodities. Laws, made againſt exportation of money, or bullion, will be all in vain. Reſtraint, or liberty in that matter, makes no country rich or poor: as we ſee in Holland, which had plenty of money under the free liberty of its exportation, and Spain, in great want of money under the ſevereſt penalties againſt carrying of it out. But the coining, or not coining our money, on the ſame foot it was before, or in bigger, or leſs pieces, and under whatſoever denominations you pleaſe, contributes nothing to, or againſt its melting down, or exportation, ſo our money be all kept, each ſpecies in its full weight of ſilver, according to the ſtandard: for if ſome be heavier, and ſome lighter, allowed to be current; ſo under the ſame denomination the heavier will be melted down, where the temptation of profit is conſiderable, which in well regulated coin kept to the ſtandard, cannot be. But this melting down carries not away one grain of our treaſure out of England. The coming and going of that depends wholly upon the balance of our trade; and therefore it is a wrong concluſion which we find, p. 71. "That continuing either old, or new coins on the preſent foot. will be "nothing elſe but furniſhing a ſpecies to melt down at an extravagant profit, and "will encourage a violent exportation of our ſilver, for ſake of the gain only, "'till we ſhall have little, or none left." For example: Let us ſuppoſe all our light money new coined, upon the foot that this gentleman would have it, and all our old mill'd crowns going for 75 pence as he propoſes, and the reſt of the old mill'd money proportionably; I deſire it to be ſhewed how this would hinder the exportation of one ounce of ſilver, whilſt our affairs are in the preſent poſture. Again, on the other ſide, ſuppoſing all our money were now mill'd coin upon the preſent foot, and our balance of trade changing, our exportation of commodities were a million more than our importation, and like to continue ſo yearly; whereof one half was to Holland, and the other to Flanders, there being an equal balance between England and all other parts of the world we trade to; I aſk, What poſſible gain could any Engliſhman make, by melting down and carrying out our money to Holland and Flanders, when a million was to come thence hither, and Engliſhmen had more there already than they knew how to uſe there, and could not get home without paying dear there for bills of exchange? If that were the caſe of our trade, the exchange would preſently fall here, and riſe there beyond the par, of their money to ours, i. e. an Engliſh merchant muſt give in Holland more ſilver, for the bills he bought there, than he ſhould receive upon thoſe bills here, if the two ſums were weighed one againſt the other: or run the riſque of bringing it home in ſpecie. And what then could any Engliſhman get by exporting of our money, or ſilver thither?

THESE are the only two caſes wherein our coin can be melted down with profit; and I challenge any one living to ſhew me any other. The one of them is removed only by a regular juſt coin, kept equal to the ſtandard; be that what it will, it matters not, as to the point of melting down of the money. The other is to be removed only by the balance of our trade kept from running us behind-hand, and contracting debts in foreign countries by an over-conſumption of their commodities.

To thoſe who ſay, that the exportation of our money, whether melted down, or not melted down, depends wholly upon our conſumption of foreign commodities, and not at all upon the ſizes of the ſeveral ſpecies of our money, which will be equally exported or not exported, whether coin'd upon the old, or the propoſed new foot: Mr. Lowndes replies:

1. THAT "the neceſſity of foreign expence, and exportation to anſwer the "balance of trade, may be diminiſhed, but cannot in any ſenſe be augmented, "by raiſing the value of our money."

I BEG his pardon, if I cannot aſſent to this. Becauſe the neceſſity of our exportation of money, depending wholly upon the debts which we contract in foreign parts, beyond what our commodities exported can pay; the coining our money in bigger, or leſs pieces, under the ſame, or different denominations, or on the preſent, or propoſed foot, in itſelf neither increaſing thoſe debts, nor the expences that make them, can neither augment, nor diminiſh the exportation of our money.

2. HE replies, p. 72. That melters of the coin "will have leſs profit by "fourteen pence halfpenny in the crown," when the money is coined upon the new foot.

To this I take liberty to ſay, that there will not be a farthing more profit in melting down the money, if it were all new mill'd money, upon the preſent foot, than if it were all new coin'd, as is propoſed, one fifth lighter. For whence ſhould the profit ariſe more in the one, than the other? But Mr. Lowndes goes upon this ſuppoſition; That ſtandard bullion is now worth ſix ſhillings and five pence an ounce of mill'd money, and would continue to ſell for ſix ſhillings five pence the ounce, if our money were all weighty mill'd money: both which I take to be miſtakes, and think I have proved them to be ſo.

3. HE ſays, "'Tis hoped that the exchange to Holland may be kept at a "ſtand, or at leaſt from falling much lower." I hope ſo too. But how that concerns this argument, or the coining of the money upon a new foot, I do not ſee.

4. HE ſays, p. 73. "There is a great difference, with regard to the ſervice "or diſſervice of the publick, between carrying out bullion, or coin, for ne"ceſſary uſes, or for prohibited commodities." The gain to the exporters, which is that which makes them melt it down and export it, is the ſame in both caſes. And the neceſſity of exporting it is the ſame. For 'tis to pay debts, which there is an equal neceſſity of paying, when once contracted, though for uſeleſs things. They are the goldſmiths and dealers in ſilver, that uſually export what ſilver is ſent beyond ſea, to pay the debts they have contracted by their bills of exchange. But thoſe dealers in exchange ſeldom know, or conſider, how they, to whom they give their bills, have, or will employ the money, they re-

ceive upon thoſe bills. Prohibited commodities, 'tis true, ſhould be kept out, and uſeleſs ones impoveriſh us by being brought in. But this is the fault of our importation: and there the miſchief ſhould be cured, by laws, and our way of living. For the exportation of our treaſure is not the cauſe of their importation, but the conſequence. Vanity and luxury ſpends them: and gives them vent here: that vent cauſes their importation: and when our merchants have brought them, if our commodities will not be enough, our money muſt go to pay for them. But what this paragraph has in it againſt continuing our coin upon the preſent foot, or for making our coin lighter, I confeſs here again, I do not ſee.

'TIS true what Mr. Lowndes obſerves here, the importation of gold, and the going of guineas at 30s. has been a great prejudice and loſs to the kingdom. But that has been wholly owing to our clipp'd money, and not at all to our money being coin'd at five ſhillings two pence the ounce; nor is the coining our money lighter, the cure of it. The only remedy for that miſchief, as well as a great many others, is the putting an end to the paſſing of clipp'd money by tale, as if it were lawful coin.

5. HIS fifth head, p. 74. is to anſwer thoſe, who hold, that by the leſſening our money one fifth, all people, who are to receive money upon contracts already made, will be defrauded of twenty per cent. of their due: and thus all men will loſe one fifth of their ſettled revenues, and all men, that have lent money, one fifth of their principal and uſe. To remove this objection, Mr. Lowndes ſays, that ſilver in England is grown ſcarce, and conſequently dearer, and ſo is of higher price. Let us grant for the preſent, it is of higher price (which how he makes out, I ſhall examine by and by.) This, if it were ſo, ought not to annul any man's bargain, nor make him receive leſs in quantity than he lent. He was to receive again the ſame ſum, and the publick authority was guarantee, that the ſame ſum ſhould have the ſame quantity of ſilver, under the ſame denomination. And the reaſon is plain, why in juſtice he ought to have the ſame quantity of ſilver again, notwithſtanding any pretended riſe of its value. For if ſilver had grown more plentiful, and by conſequence (by our author's rule) cheaper, his debtor would not have been compelled, by the publick authority, to have paid him, in conſideration of its cheapneſs, a greater quantity of ſilver than they contracted for. Cacao-nuts were the money of a part of America, when we firſt came thither. Suppoſe then you had lent me laſt year 300, or fifteen ſcore Cacao-nuts, to be repaid this year, Would you be ſatisfied and think yourſelf paid your due, if I ſhould tell you, Cacao-nuts were ſcarce this year, and that fourſcore were of as much value this year as an hundred the laſt; and that therefore, you were well and fully paid, if I reſtored to you only 240 for the 300 I borrowed? Would you not think yourſelf defrauded of two thirds of your right, by ſuch a payment? Nor would it make any amends for this to juſtice, or reparation to you, that the publick had (after your contract, which was made for fifteen ſcore) altered the denomination of ſcore, and applied it to ſixteen inſtead of twenty. Examine it, and you will find this juſt the caſe, and the loſs proportionable in them both: that is a real loſs of twenty per cent. As to Mr. Lowndes's Proofs, that ſilver is now one fifth more value than it was, and therefore a man has a right done him, if he receive one fifth leſs than his contract, I fear none of them will reach Mr. Lowndes's point. He ſaith, p. 77. "By daily experience nineteen penny weight, and three tenths of a penny weight "of ſterling ſilver, which is juſt the weight of a crown piece, will purchaſe "more coin'd money than five unclipp'd ſhillings." I wiſh he had told us where this daily experience he ſpeaks of, is to be found: for I dare ſay no body hath ſeen a ſum of unclipp'd ſhillings paid for bullion any where theſe twelve months, to go no further back.

IN the next place, I wiſh he had told us how much more than five lawful mill'd ſhillings, bullion of the weight of a crown-piece will purchaſe. If he had ſaid it would purchaſe ſix ſhillings and three-pence weighty money, he had proved the matter in queſtion. And whoever has the weight of a crown in ſilver paid him in Mr. Lowndes's new coin, inſtead of ſix ſhillings and three-pence of our preſent money, has no injury done him, if it will certainly purchaſe him ſix ſhillings and three-pence all unclipp'd, of our preſent money. But every one at firſt ſight perceives this to be impoſſible, as I have already proved it. And I have in this the concurrence of Mr. Lowndes's new ſcheme, to prove it to be ſo. For, p. 62. he propoſes that his ſilver unite having the weight and fineneſs of a preſent, unclipp'd crown-piece; ſhould go for 75 pence; and that the preſent ſhilling ſhould go for 15 pence; by which eſtabliſhment there will be 75 pence in his unite, and 93 pence three farthings in ſix ſhillings three-pence, weighty money of the preſent coin; which is an undeniable confeſſion, that it is as impoſſible for his ſilver unite, (having no more ſilver in it than a preſent unclipp'd crown) to be worth, and ſo to purchaſe ſix unclipp'd ſhillings and three-pence of our preſent money, as it is for 75 pence to be worth 93 of the ſame pence, or 75 to be equal to 93.

If he means by more, that his ſterling ſilver of the weight of a crown-piece will purchaſe a penny, or two-pence more than five unclipp'd ſhillings, which is the moſt, and which is but accidental too; What is this riſe of its value to 15 pence? And what amends will one ſixtieth (a little more or leſs) riſe in value, make for one fifth diminiſhed in weight, and loſt in quantity? which is all one as to ſay, that a penny, or thereabouts, ſhall make amends for fifteen pence taken away.

Another way to recommend his new coin, to thoſe who ſhall receive it, inſtead of the preſent, weightier coin, he tells them, p. 77. it will pay as much debt, and purchaſe as much commodities as our preſent money which is one fifth heavier: what he ſays of debts is true. But yet I would have it well conſidered by our Engliſh gentlemen, that though creditors will loſe one fifth of their principal and uſe, and landlords will loſe one fifth of their income, yet the debtors and tenants will not get it. It will be aſked, Who then will get it? Thoſe, I ſay, and thoſe only, who have great ſums of weighty money (whereof one ſees not a piece now in payments) hoarded up by them, will get by it. To thoſe, by the propoſed change of our money, will be an increaſe of one fifth, added to their riches, paid out of the pockets of the reſt of the nation. For what theſe men received for four ſhillings, they will pay again for five. This weighty money hoarded up, Mr. Lowndes, p. 105. computes at one million and ſix hundred thouſand pounds. So that be raiſing our money one fifth, there will three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds be given to thoſe, who have hoarded up our weighty money, which hoarding up of money is thought by many to have no other merit in it, than the prejudicing our trade and publick affairs, and increaſing our neceſſities, by keeping ſo great a part of our money from coming abroad, at a time when there was ſo great need of it. If the ſum of unclipp'd money in the nation be, as ſome ſuppoſe, much greater; then there will, by this contrivance of the raiſing our coin, be given to theſe rich hoarders, much above the aforeſaid ſum of three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds of our preſent money. No body elſe, but theſe hoarders, can get a farthing by this propoſed change of our coin; unleſs men in debt have plate by them, which they will coin to pay their debts. Thoſe too, I muſt confeſs, will get one fifth by all the plate of their own, which they ſhall coin and pay debts with, valuing their plate at bullion; but if they ſhall conſider the faſhion of their plate, what that coſt when they bought it, and the faſhion that new plate will coſt them, if they intend ever to have plate again, they will find this one fifth ſeeming preſent profit, in coining their plate to pay their debts, amount to little, or nothing at all. No body then but the hoarders will get by this twenty per cent. And I challenge any one to ſhew, how any body elſe (but that little in the caſe of plate coin'd to pay debts) ſhall get a farthing by it. It ſeems to promiſe faireſt to the debtors: but to them too it will amount to nothing. For he, that takes up money to pay his debts, will receive this new money, and pay it again at the ſame rate he received it, juſt as he does now our preſent coin, without any profit at all. And though commodities (as is natural) ſhall be raiſed, in proportion to the leſſening of the money, no body will get by that, any more than they do now, when all things are grown dearer. Only he that is bound up by contract to receive any ſum, under ſuch a denomination of pounds, ſhillings and pence, will find his loſs ſenſibly, when he goes to buy commodities, and make new bargains. The markets and the ſhops will ſoon convince him, that his money, which is one fifth lighter, is alſo one fifth worſe; when he muſt pay twenty per cent. more for all the commodities he buys, with the money of the new foot, than if he bought it with the preſent coin.

THIS Mr. Lowndes himſelf will not deny, when he calls to mind what he himſelf, ſpeaking of the inconveniencies we ſuffer by our clipp'd money, ſays, p. 115. "Perſons before they conclude in any bargains, are neceſſitated firſt to "ſettle the price, or value of the very money, they are to receive for their goods; "and if it be in clipp'd, or bad money, they ſet the price of their goods ac- "cordingly: which I think has been one great cauſe of raiſing the price, "not only of merchandize, but even of edibles, and other neceſſaries for the "ſuſtenance of the common people, to their great grievance." That every one, who receives money, after the raiſing our money, on contracts made before the change, muſt loſe twenty per cent. in all he ſhall buy, is demonſtration, by Mr. Lowndes's own ſcheme. Mr. Lowndes propoſes that there ſhould be ſhillings coin'd upon the new foot, one fifth lighter than our preſent ſhillings, which ſhould go for twelve pence a-piece; and that the unclipp'd ſhillings of the preſent coin ſhould go for fifteen pence a-piece; and the crown for ſeventy-five pence. A man, who has a debt of a hundred pounds owing him, upon bond, or leaſe, receives it in theſe new ſhillings, inſtead of lawful money of the preſent ſtandard; he goes to market with twenty ſhillings in one pocket of this new money, which are valued at 240 pence; and in the other pocket with four mill'd crown pieces, (or twenty mill'd ſhillings of the preſent coin) which are valued at three hundred pence, which is one fifth more: 'tis demonſtration then, that he loſes one fifth, or twenty per cent. in all that he buys, by the receipt of this new money, for the preſent coin, which was his due; unleſs thoſe he deals with, will take four for five pence, or four ſhillings for five ſhillings. He buys for example, a quart of oil for fifteen pence: if he pay for it with the old money in one pocket, one ſhilling will do it: if with the new money in the other, he muſt add three-pence to it, or a quarter of another ſhilling; and ſo of all the reſt that he pays for, with either the old money, which he ſhould have received his debts in, or with the new, which he was forced to receive for it. Thus far, 'tis demonſtration, he loſes twenty per cent. by receiving his debt in a new money thus raiſed, when he uſes it to buy any thing. But to make him amends, Mr. Lowndes tells him, ſilver is now dearer, and all things conſequently will be bought cheaper twenty per cent. And yet at the ſame time he tells him, in the paſſage above cited, out of p. 115. that all other things are grown dearer. I am ſure there is no demonſtration, that they will be ſold twenty per cent. cheaper. And, if I may credit houſe-keepers and ſubſtantial tradeſmen, all ſorts of proviſions and commodities, are lately riſen exceſſively; and, notwithſtanding the ſcarcity of ſilver, begin to come up to the true value of our clipp'd money, every one ſelling their commodities ſo as to make themſelves amends, in the number of light pieces for what they want in weight. A creditor ought to think the new light money equivalent to the preſent heavier, becauſe it will buy as much commodities. But what if it ſhould fail, as 'tis ten to one but it will, what ſecurity has he for it? He is told ſo, and he muſt be ſatisfied. That ſalt, wine, oil, ſilk, naval ſtores, and all foreign commodities, will none of them be ſold us by foreigners, for a leſs quantity of ſilver than before, becauſe we have given the name of more pence to it, is, I think demonſtration. All our names (if they are any more to us) are to them but bare ſounds; and our coin, as theirs to us, but meer bullion, valued only by its weight. And a Swede will no more ſell you his hemp and pitch, or a Spaniard his oil, for leſs ſilver, becauſe you tell him, ſilver is ſcarcer now in England, and therefore riſen in value one fifth; than a tradeſman of London will ſell his commodity, cheaper to the Iſle of Man, becauſe they are grown poorer, and money is ſcarce there.

ALL foreign commodities muſt be ſhut out of the number of thoſe that will fall, to comply with our raiſing our money. Corn alſo, 'tis evident, does not riſe, or fall, by the differences of more, or leſs plenty of money, but by the plenty and ſcarcity that God gives. For our money, in appearance, remaining the ſame, the price of corn is double one year, to what it was the precedent: and therefore, we muſt certainly make account, that ſince the money is one fifth lighter, it will buy one fifth leſs corn communibus annis. And this being the great expence of the poor, that takes up almoſt all their earnings, if corn be, communibus annis, ſold for one fifth more money in tale, than before the change of our money, they too muſt have one fifth more in tale, of the new money, for their wages than they have now; and the day-labourer muſt have, not only twelve, but fifteen-pence of the new money a day, which is the preſent ſhilling that he has now, or elſe he cannot live. So that all foreign commodities, with corn and labour, keeping up their value to the quantity of ſilver they ſell for now, and not complying, in the fall of their real price, with the nominal raiſing of our money; there is not much left, wherein landlords and creditors are to expect the recompence of twenty per cent. abatement of price in commodities, to make up their loſs in the lightneſs of our money, they are paid their rents and debts in. 'Twould be eaſy to ſhew the ſame thing, concerning our other native commodities, and make it clear, that we have no reaſon to expect they ſhould abate of their preſent price, any more than corn and labour: but this is enough, and any one who has a mind to it, may trace the reſt at his leiſure.

And thus I fear the hopes of cheaper penny-worths, which might beguile ſome men into a belief that landlords and creditors would receive no leſs by the propoſed new money, is quite vaniſhed. But if the promiſe of better pennyworths, and a fall of all commodities twenty per cent. ſhould hold true, this would not all relieve creditors and landlords, and ſet them on equal terms with their neighbours: becauſe the cheap pennyworths will not be for them alone, but every body elſe, as well as they, will ſhare in that advantage; ſo that their ſilver being diminiſhed one fifth in their rents and debts, which are paid them, they would ſtill be twenty per cent. greater loſers than their unhoarding neighbours, and forty per cent. greater loſers than the hoarders of money; who will certainly get twenty per cent. in the money, whatever happens in the price of things; and twenty per cent more in the cheapneſs of commodities, if that promiſed recompenſe be made good to creditors and landlords. For the hoarders of money (if the price of things falls) will buy as cheap as they. So that whatever is ſaid of the cheapneſs of commodities, 'tis demonſtration, (whether that proves true, or no) that creditors, and landlords, and all thoſe, who are to receive money, upon bargains made before the propoſed change of our coin, will unavoidably loſe twenty per cent.

One thing Mr. Lowndes ſays in this paragraph very remarkable, which I think decides the queſtion. His words, p. 78, are theſe, "That if the value of "the ſilver in the coins (by an extrinſick denomination) be raiſed above the value, "or market-price, of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion, the ſubjects would be "proportionably injured or defrauded, as they were formerly in the caſe of baſe "monies, coin'd by publick authority." It remains therefore, only to ſhew, that the market-price of ſtandard bullion is not one fifth above our coin that is to be raiſed, and then we have Mr. Lowndes of our ſide too againſt its raiſing. I think it is abundantly proved already, that ſtandard bullion neither is, nor can be, worth one fifth more than our lawful weighty money: and if it be not, by Mr. Lowndes's confeſſion, there is no need of raiſing our preſent, legal, mill'd money to that degree; and 'tis only our clipp'd money that wants amendment: and when that is recoin'd and reduced all to mill'd and lawful money, that, then too will have no need of raiſing. This I ſhall now prove out of Mr. Lowndes's own words here.

Mr. Lowndes, in the forecited words, compares the value of ſilver in our coin, to the value of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion; which he ſuppoſing to be as four or five, makes that the meaſure of the raiſing our money. If this be the difference of value between ſilver in bullion, and ſilver in coin; and if it be true, that four ounces of ſtandard bullion be worth five ounces of the ſame ſilver coined; or, which is ſame thing, that bullion, will ſell by the ounce for ſix ſhillings and five pence unclipp'd money; I will take the boldneſs to adviſe his majeſty to buy, or to borrow any where ſo much bullion, or, rather than be without it, melt down ſo much plate, as is equal in weight to twelve hundred pounds ſterling of our preſent mill'd money. This let him ſell for mill'd money. And, according to our author's rule, it will yield fifteen hundred pounds. Let that fifteen hundred pounds be reduced into bullion, and ſold again, and it will produce eighteen hundred and ſixty pounds; which eighteen hundred and ſixty pounds of weighty money being reduced to bullion, will ſtill produce one fifth more in weight of ſilver, being ſold for weighty money. And thus his majeſty may get at leaſt three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds by ſelling of bullion for weighty money, and melting that down into bullion, as faſt as he receives it; 'till he has brought into his hands the million and ſix hundred thouſand pounds, which Mr. Lowndes computes there is of weighty money left in England.

I DOUBT not but every one, who reads it, will think this a very ridiculous propoſition. But he muſt think it ridiculous for no other reaſon, but becauſe he ſees 'tis impoſſible that bullion ſhould ſell for one fifth above its weight of the ſame ſilver coin'd, that is, that an ounce of ſtandard ſilver ſhould ſell for ſix ſhillings five-pence of our preſent, weighty money. For if it will, 'tis no ridiculous thing that the king ſhould melt down, and make that profit of his money.

IF our author's rule (p. 78, where he ſays, "That the only juſt and reaſonable foot, upon which the coins ſhould be current, is the very price of the ſilver thereof, in caſe it be molten in the ſame place, where coins are made current.") be to be obſerved; our money is to be raiſed but an halfpenny, or at moſt a penny in five ſhillings: for that was the ordinary odds in the price between bullion and coin'd ſilver, before clipping had deprived us, in commerce, of all our mill'd and weighty money. And ſilver in ſtandard bullion would not be in value one jot above the ſame ſilver in coin, if clipp'd money were not current by tale, and coin'd ſilver (as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, p. 73.) as well as bullion, had the liberty of exportation. For when we have no clipp'd money, but all our current coin is weight, according to the ſtandard, all the odds of value that ſilver in bullion has to ſilver in coin, is only owing to its prohibition of its exportation in money; and never riſes, nor can riſe, above what the goldſmith ſhall eſtimate the riſque and trouble of melting it down; which is ſo little, that the importers of ſilver could never raiſe it to above a penny an ounce, but at ſuch times as the Eaſt-India company, or ſome foreign ſale, calling for a great quantity of ſilver at a time, made the goldſmiths ſcramble for it; and ſo the importers of bullion raiſe its price upon them, according to the preſent need of great quantities of ſilver which every goldſmith (eager to engroſs to himſelf as much as he could) was content to pay high for, rather than go without: his preſent gains from thoſe whom he furniſhed, and whom otherwiſe he could not furniſh, making him amends.

THE natural value, then, between ſilver in bullion, and in coin, is (I ſay) every where equal; bating the charge of coinage, which gives the advantage to the ſide of the coin. The ordinary odds here in England, between ſilver in bullion, and the ſame in our coin, is, by reaſon that the ſtamp hinders its free exportation, about a penny in the crown. The accidental difference, by reaſon of ſudden occaſions, is ſometimes (but rarely) two-pence in five ſhillings, or ſomewhat more in great urgencies. And ſince the ordinary rate of things is to be taken as the meaſure of their price, and Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 78, "That if the value of the ſilver in their coins, ſhould be raiſed above the value, or market price, of the ſame ſilver reduced to bullion, the ſubject would be proportionably injured and defrauded;" I leave him to make the inference, what will be the conſequence in England, if our coin be raiſed here one fifth, or twenty per cent.

MR. Lowndes ſays farther, p. 80, That ſilver has a price. I anſwer; ſilver to ſilver can have no other price, but quantity for quantity. If there be any other difference in value, it is, or can be nothing, but one of theſe two: firſt, either the value of the labour employed about one parcel of ſilver more than another, makes a difference in their price; and thus faſhioned plate ſells for more than its weight of the ſame ſilver; and in countries where the owners pay for the coinage, ſilver in coin is more worth than its weight in bullion; but here, where the publick pays the coinage, they are of very near equal value, when there is no need of exportation: for then there is no more odds than the trouble of carrying the bullion to the mint, and fetching again, is worth; or the charge of refining ſo much of it, as will bring it to ſtandard, if it be worſe than ſtandard.

Or ſecondly, ſome privilege belonging to one parcel of ſilver, which is denied to another, viz. here in England a liberty of exportation allowed to ſilver in bullion, denied to ſilver ſtamp'd. This when there is need of exportation of ſilver, gives ſome ſmall advantage of value to uncoin'd ſilver here, above coin'd; but that is ordinarily very inconſiderable; and can never reach to one fifth, nor half one fifth, as has been already ſhewn. And this I think will anſwer all that is ſaid about the price of ſilver in that place.

'Tis true what Mr. Lowndes ſays, in the next words, p. 81, "That five "ſhillings coin'd upon the foot propoſed, will actually contain more real and "intrinſick value of ſilver by a great deal, than is in the current money, now "commonly applied to the payment of the ſaid rents, revenues and debts." But will he hence conclude, becauſe there is now loſt in thoſe rents, revenues and debts, a great deal more than twenty per cent, under the preſent irregularity of our coin, and the robbery in clipp'd money, without any the leaſt neglect, or miſcarriage in the owner, that entitled him to that loſs, that therefore, it is juſt that the loſs of twenty per cent. be eſtabliſh'd on him by law for the future, in the reforming of our coin?

Mr. Lowndes's ſecond reaſon for leſſening of our coin, we have, p. 82, in theſe words, "The value of the ſilver in the coin ought to be raiſed, to encou- "rage the bringing of bullion to the mint to be coin'd." This raiſing of money is in effect, as has been ſeen, nothing but giving a denomination of more pence to the ſame quantity of ſilver, viz. That the ſame quantity of ſilver ſhall hereafter be called ſeventy-five pence, which is now called ſixty-pence. For that is all is done: as is manifeſt, when a crown-piece, which now goes but for ſixty pence, ſhall be made to go for ſeventy-five pence; for 'tis plain, it contains nothing of ſilver, or worth in it, more than it did before. Let us ſuppoſe, that all our ſilver coin now in England were ſix-pences, ſhillings, half-crowns and crowns, all mill'd money, full weight, according to the preſent ſtandard; and that it ſhould be ordered, that for the future, the crown-piece, inſtead of going for ſixty pence, ſhould go for ſeventy-five pence, and ſo proportionably, of all the other pieces; I aſk then, how ſuch a change of denomination ſhall bring bullion to the mint to be coin'd, and from whence? I ſuppoſe this change of names, or aſcribing to it more imaginary parts of any denomination, has no charms in it to bring bullion to the mint to be coin'd: for whether you call the piece coin'd twelve pence, or fifteen pence, or ſixty, or ſeventy-five, a crown or a ſceptre, it will buy no more ſilk, ſalt, or bread than it would before. That therefore cannot tempt people to bring it to the mint. And if it will pay more debts, that is perfect defrauding, and ought not to be permitted. Next, I aſk, from whence ſhall this raiſing fetch it? For bullion cannot be brought hither to ſtay here, whilſt the balance of our trade requires all the bullion we bring in, to be exported again, and more ſilver out of our former ſtock with it, to anſwer our exigencies beyond ſeas. And whilſt it is ſo the goldſmiths and returners of money will give more for bullion to export, than the mint can give for it to coin; and ſo none of that will come to the mint.

But ſays our author, p. 83, "An half-penny an ounce profit, which will be "in the propoſed coin, above the preſent price of ſterling bullion, will be an en- "couragement to thoſe who have Engliſh plate, to bring it in to be coin'd." I doubt whether there will be any ſuch profit; for I imagine, that ſtandard bullion cannot now be bought per ounce, for ſix ſhillings and five pence of our clipp'd, running caſh, which is the meaſure, whereby Mr. Lowndes determines of the price of ſterling ſilver. But, taking this half-penny an ounce profit for granted, it will not bring to the mint any plate, whoſe faſhion is valued by the owner at above an half-penny per ounce; and how much then it is like to bring to the mint, is eaſy to gueſs.

The true and only good reaſon, that brings bullion to the mint to be coin'd, is the ſame that brings it to England to ſtay there, viz. The gain we make by an over-balance of trade. When our merchants carry commodities abroad, to a greater value than thoſe they bring home, the overplus comes to them in foreign coin, or bullion, which will ſtay here, when we gain by the balance of our whole trade. For then we can have no debts beyond ſea to be paid with it. In this thriving poſture of our trade, thoſe to whoſe ſhare this bullion falls, not having any uſe of it, whilſt it is in bullion, chuſe to carry it to the mint to have it coin'd there, whereby it is of more uſe to them for all the buſineſs of ſilver in trade, or purchaſing land; the mint having aſcertain'd the weight and fineneſs of it: ſo that on any occaſion every one is ready to take it at its known value, without any ſcruple; a convenience that is wanting in bullion. But when our trade runs on the other ſide, and our exported commodities will not pay for thoſe foreign ones we conſume, our treaſure muſt go; and then it is vain to beſtow the labour of coining on bullion, that muſt be exported again. To what purpoſe is it, to make it paſs through our mint, when it will away? The leſs pains and charge it coſts us, the better.

His third reaſon, p. 83, is, that this raiſing of our coin, by making it "more "in tale, will make it more commenſurate to the general need thereof," and thereby hinder the increaſe of hazardous paper-credit, and the inconveniency of bartering.

Just as the boy cut his leather into five quarters (as he called them) to cover his ball, when cut into four quarters it fell ſhort: but after all his pains, as much of his ball lay bare as before: if the quantity of coin'd ſilver, employ'd in England, fall ſhort, the arbitrary denomination of a greater number of pence given to it, or, which is all one, to the ſeveral coin'd pieces of it, will not make it commenſurate to the ſize of our trade, or the greatneſs of our occaſions. This is as certain, as that if the quantity of a board, which is to ſtop a leak of a ſhip fifteen inches ſquare, be but twelves inches ſquare, it will not be made to do it, by being meaſured by a foot, that is divided into fifteen inches, inſtead of twelve, and ſo having a larger tale, or number of inches in denomination given to it.

This, indeed, would be a convincing reaſon, if ſounds would give weight to ſilver, and the noiſe of a greater number of pence (leſs in quantity proportionably as they are more in number) were a larger ſupply of money, which our author, p. 84, ſays our occaſions require, and which he by an increaſe of the tale of pence hopes to provide. But that miſtake is very viſible, and ſhall be farther ſhewn in the buſineſs of bartering.

The neceſſity of truſt and bartering is one of the many inconveniencies ſpringing from the want of money. This inconvenience, the multiplying arbitrary denominations will no more ſupply, nor any ways make our ſcarcity of coin commenſurate to the need there is of it, than if the cloth which was provided for cloathing the army, falling ſhort, one ſhould hope to make it commenſurate to the need there is of it, by meaſuring it by a yard one fifth ſhorter than the ſtandard, or changing the ſtandard of the yard, and ſo getting the full denomination of yards, neceſſary according to the preſent meaſure. For this is all will be done by raiſing our coin, as is propoſed. All it amounts to is no more but this, viz. That each piece, and conſequently our whole ſtock of money, ſhould be meaſured and denominated by a penny, one fifth leſs than the ſtandard.

Where there is not coin'd ſilver, in proportion to the value of the commodities, that daily change owners in trade, there is a neceſſity of truſt, or bartering, i. e. changing commodities for commodities, without the intervention of money. For example; let us ſuppoſe in Bermudas but an hundred pounds in ready money, but that there is every day there, a transferring of commodities from one owner to another, to the value of double as much. When the money is all got into hands, that have already bought all that they have need of, for that day, whoever has need of any thing elſe that day, muſt either go on tick, or barter for it, i. e. give the commodities he can beſt ſpare for the commodities he wants, v. g. ſugar for bread, &c. Now 'tis evident here, that changing the denomination of the coin, they already have in Bermudas, or coining it over again under new denominations, will not contribute in the leaſt towards the removing this neceſſity of truſt, or bartering. For the whole ſilver, they have in coin, being but four hundred ounces; and the exchange of the commodities made in a diſtance of time, wherein this money is paid, not above once, being to the value of eight hundred ounces of ſilver; 'tis plain, that one half of the commodities, that ſhift hands, muſt of neceſſity be taken upon credit, or exchanged by barter; thoſe who want them, having no money to pay for them. Nor can any alteration of the coin, or denomination of theſe four hundred ounces of ſilver, help this; becauſe the value of the ſilver, in reſpect of other commodities, will not thereby be at all increaſed; and the commodities changed, being (as in the caſe) double in value to the four hundred ounces of coin'd ſilver to be laid out in them, nothing can ſupply this want but a doubly quantity, i. e. eight hundred ounces of coin'd ſilver; how denominated, it matters not, ſo there be a fit proportion of ſmall pieces to ſupply ſmall payments.

Suppose the commodities paſſing every day in England, in markets and fairs, between ſtrangers, or ſuch as truſt not one another, were to the value of a million of ounces of ſilver; and there was but half a million of ounces of coin'd ſilver in the hands of thoſe, who wanted thoſe commodities; 'tis demonſtration they muſt truck for them, or go without them. If then the coin'd ſilver of England be not ſufficient to anſwer the value of commodities moving in trade amongſt us, credit, or barter muſt do it. Where the credit and money fail, barter alone muſt do it: which being introduced by the want of a greater plenty of coin'd ſilver, nothing but a greater plenty of coin'd ſilver can remove it. The increaſe of denomination does, or can do nothing in the caſe; for 'tis ſilver by its quantity, and not denomination, that is the price of things, and meaſure of commerce; and 'tis the weight of ſilver in it, and not the name of the piece, that men eſtimate commodities by, and exchange them for.

If this be not ſo, when the neceſſity of our affairs abroad, or ill huſbandry at home, has carried away half our treaſure, and a moiety of our money is gone out of England; 'tis but to iſſue a proclamation, That a penny ſhall go for twopence, ſix-pence for a ſhilling, half a crown for a crown, &c. and immediately, without any more ado, we are as rich as before. And when half the remainder is gone, 'tis but doing the ſame thing again, and raiſing the denomination anew, and we are where we were, and ſo on: where by ſuppoſing the denomination raiſed $\frac{15}{16}$, every man will be as rich with an ounce of ſilver in his purſe, as he was before, when he had ſixteen ounces there; and in as great plenty of money, able to carry on his trade, without bartering; his ſilver by this ſhort way of raiſing, being changed into the value of gold: for when ſilver will buy ſixteen times as much wine, oil and bread, &c. to day, as it would yeſterday, (all other things remaining the ſame, but the denomination) it hath the real worth of gold.

This, I gueſs, every body ſees cannot be ſo. And yet this muſt be ſo, if it be true that raiſing the denomination one fifth can ſupply the want, or one jot raiſe the value of ſilver in reſpect of other commodities, i. e. make a leſs quantity of it to day, buy a greater quantity of corn, oil and cloth, and all other commodities, than it would yeſterday, and thereby remove the neceſſity of bartering. For, if raiſing the denomination can thus raiſe the value of coin, in exchange for other commodities, one fifth, by the ſame reaſon it can raiſe it two fifths, and afterwards three fifths, and again, if need be, four fifths, and as much farther as you pleaſe. So that, by this admirable contrivance of raiſing our coin, we ſhall be as rich, and as well able to ſupport the charge of the government, and carry on our trade without bartering, or any other inconvenience, for want of money, with ſixty thouſand ounces of coin'd ſilver in England, as if we had ſix, or ſixty millions. If this be not ſo, I deſire any one to ſhew me, why the ſame way of raiſing our denomination, which can raiſe the value of money in reſpect of other commodities, one fifth, cannot, when you pleaſe, raiſe it another fifth, and ſo on? I beg to be told where it muſt ſtop, and why at ſuch a degree, without being able to go farther.

It muſt be taken notice of, that the raiſing I ſpeak of here, is the raiſing of the value of our coin in reſpect of other commodities (as I call it all along) in contradiſtinction to raiſing the denomination. The confounding of theſe in diſcourſes concerning money, is one great cauſe, I ſuſpect, that this matter is ſo little underſtood, and ſo often talk'd of with ſo little information of the hearers.

A penny is a denomination no more belonging to eight than to eighty, or to one ſingle grain of ſilver: and ſo it is not neceſſary that there ſhould be ſixty ſuch pence, no more, nor leſs, in an ounce of ſilver, i. e. twelve in a piece call-ed a ſhilling, and ſixty in a piece called a crown; ſuch like diviſions being only extrinſical denominations, are every where perfectly arbitrary. For here in England there might as well have been twelve ſhillings in a penny, as twelve pence, in a ſhilling, i. e. the denomination of the leſs piece might have been a ſhilling, and of the bigger a penny. Again, the ſhilling might have been coin'd ten times as big as the penny, and the crown ten times as big as the ſhilling; whereby the ſhilling would have but ten pence in it, and the crown an hundred. But this, however order'd, alters not one jot the value of the ounce of ſilver, in reſpect of other things, any more than it does its weight. This raiſing being but giving of names at pleaſure to aliquot parts of any piece, viz. that now the ſixtieth part of an ounce of ſilver ſhall be call'd a penny, and to-morrow that the ſeventy fifth part of an ounce of ſilver ſhall be called a penny, may be done with what increaſe you pleaſe. And thus it may be order'd by a proclamation, that a ſhilling ſhall go for twenty-four pence, an half-crown for ſixty inſtead of thirty-pence, and ſo of the reſt. But that an half-crown ſhould be worth, or contain, ſixty ſuch pence, as the pence were, before this change of denomination was made, that no power on earth can do. Nor can any power (but that which can make the plenty, or ſcarcity of commodities) raiſe the value of our money thus double, in reſpect of other commodities, and make that the ſame piece, or quantity of ſilver, under a double denomination, ſhall purchaſe double the quantity of pepper, wine or lead, an inſtant after ſuch proclamation, to what it would do an inſtant before. If this could be, we might, as every one ſees, raiſe ſilver to the value of gold, and make ourſelves as rich as we pleaſed. But 'tis but going to market with an ounce of ſilver of one hundred and twenty pence, to be convinced that it will purchaſe no more than an ounce of ſilver of ſixty pence. And the ringing of the piece will as ſoon purchaſe more commodities, as its change of denomination, and the multiplied name of pence, when it is called ſix ſcore inſtead of ſixty.

'Tis propos'd, that the twelve pence ſhould be raiſed to fifteen pence, and the crown to ſeventy-five pence, and ſo proportionably of the reſt: But yet that the pound ſterling ſhould not be raiſed. If there be any advantage in raiſing, Why ſhould not that be raiſed too? And, as the crown-piece is raiſed from ſixty to ſeventy-five pence, why ſhould not the pound ſterling be raiſed in the ſame proportion, from two hundred and forty pence, to three hundred pence?

Further, If this raiſing our coin can ſo ſtretch our money, and enlarge our pared remainder of it, as "to make it more commenſurate to the general need "thereof, for carrying on the common traffick and commerce of the nation, and "to anſwer occaſions requiring a larger ſupply of money," as Mr. Lowndes tells us in his third reaſon, p. 83. why are we ſo niggardly to ourſelves in this time of occaſion, as to ſtop at one fifth? Why do we not raiſe it one full moiety, and thereby double our money? If Mr. Lowndes's rule, p. 78. "That if the value "of the ſilver in the coin, ſhould be raiſed above the market-price of the ſame "ſilver, reduced to bullion; the ſubject would be proportionably injured and "defrauded," muſt keep us from theſe advantages, and the publick care of juſtice ſtop the raiſing of the money at one fifth; becauſe, if our money be raiſed beyond the market-price of bullion, it will be ſo much defrauding of the ſubject: I then ſay, it muſt not be raiſed one fifth, nor half one fifth, that is, it muſt not be raiſed fifteen pence in the crown; no, nor five pence. For I deny that the market-price of ſtandard bullion ever was, or ever can be five ſhillings ſeven pence, of lawful, weighty money, the ounce: ſo that if our preſent mill'd money be raiſed one fifth, the ſubjects will, by Mr. Lowndes's rule, be defrauded ſixteen per cent. nay, above eighteen per cent. For the market price of ſtandard bullion being ordinarily under five ſhillings four pence the ounce, when ſold for weighty money (which is but one thirtieth) whatever our preſent, mill'd money is raiſed above one thirtieth, it is by Mr. Lowndes's rule ſo much defrauding the ſubject. For the market-price of any thing, and ſo of bullion, is to be taken from its ordinary rate, all the year round; and not from the extraordinary riſe of two or three market-days in a year. And that the market price of ſtandard ſilver was not found, nor pretended to be above five ſhillings and four pence the ounce, before clipping had left none but light, running caſh to pay for bullion, or any thing elſe, is evident from a paper then publiſhed, which I took the liberty to examine in my "conſiderations of the conſequences of raiſing the value of money," &c. printed 1692. The author of that paper, 'tis manifeſt, was not ignorant of the price of ſilver, nor had a deſign to leſſen its rate, but ſet down the higheſt price it then bore.

If then Mr. Lowndes's rule of juſtice, and care of the ſubject, be to regulate the riſe of our mill'd money, it muſt not be raiſed above one thirtieth part. If the advantages he promiſes, of making our money, by raiſing it one fifth, "more "commenſurate to the general need thereof," be to be laid hold on, 'tis reaſonable to raiſe it higher, "to make it yet more commenſurate to the general need there "is of it." Which ever of the two Mr. Lowndes will prefer, either reaſon of ſtate, or rule of juſtice, one fifth muſt not be his meaſure of raiſing our preſent mill'd money. If the advantage of making our money more proportionate to our trade and other neceſſities, be to govern its propoſed raiſing, every one will cry out Mr. Lowndes, If your way will do what you ſay, the raiſing it one half will be much better than one fifth, and therefore pray let an half-crown be raiſed to a crown, and ſixpence to a ſhilling. If equity and the conſideration of the ſubjects property ought to govern in the caſe, you muſt not raiſe our mill'd crown to above five ſhillings and four pence.

If it be here ſaid to me, that I do then allow that our money may be raiſed one thirtieth, i. e. that the crown-piece ſhould be raiſed to five ſhillings and two pence, and ſo proportionably of the other ſpecies of our coin; I anſwer, he that infers ſo, makes his inference a little too quick.

But let us for once allow the ordinary price of ſtandard ſilver to be five ſhillings four pence the ounce, to be paid for in weighty coin (for that muſt always be remembered, when we talk of the rate of bullion) and that the rate of bullion is the juſt meaſure of raiſing our money. This I ſay is no reaſon for the raiſing our mill'd crown now, to five ſhillings four pence, and recoining all our clipp'd money upon that foot; unleſs we intend, as ſoon as that is done, to new raiſe, and coin it again. For, whilſt our trade and affairs abroad require the exportation of ſilver, and the exportation of our coin'd ſilver is prohibited, and made penal by our law, ſtandard bullion will always be ſold here for a little more than its weight of coin'd ſilver. So that, if we ſhall endeavour to equal our weighty coin'd ſilver to ſtandard bullion, by raiſing it, whilſt there is a neceſſity of the exportation of ſilver, we ſhall do no otherwiſe than a child, who runs to overtake and get up to the top of his ſhadow, which ſtill advances at the ſame rate that he does. The privilege that bullion has, to be exported freely, will give it a little advance in price above our coin, let the denomination of that be raiſed, or fallen as you pleaſe, whilſt there is need of its exportation, and the exportation of our coin is prohibited by law. But this advance will be but little, and will always keep within the bounds, which the riſque and trouble of melting down our coin ſhall ſet to it, in the eſtimate of the exporter. He that will rather venture to throw an hundred pound into his melting-pot, when no body ſees him, and reduce it to bullion, than give an hundred and five pounds, for the ſame weight of the like bullion, will never give five ſhillings and five pence of mill'd money for an ounce of ſtandard bullion; nor buy at that price, what he can have near five per cent. cheaper, without any riſque, if he will not accuſe himſelf. And I think it may be concluded, that very few, who have furnaces, and other conveniencies ready for melting ſilver, will give one per cent. for ſtandard bullion, which is under five ſhillings and three pence per ounce, who can only for the trouble of melting it, reduce our coin to as good bullion.

The odds of the price in bullion to coin on this account (which is the only one, where the coin is kept to the ſtandard) can never be a reaſon for raiſing our coin to preſerve it from melting down: becauſe this price above its weight is given for bullion, only to avoid melting down our coin; and ſo this difference of price between ſtandard bullion and our coin, can be no cauſe of its melting down.

These three reaſons which I have examined, contain the great advantages, which our author ſuppoſes the propoſed raiſing of our coin will produce. And therefore I have dwelt longer upon them. His remaining ſix reaſons being of leſs moment, and offering moſt of them but ſome circumſtantial conveniencies, as to the computation of our money, &c. I ſhall more briefly paſs over. Only before I proceed to them, I ſhall here ſet down the different value of our money, collected from our author's hiſtory of the ſeveral changes of our coin, ſince Edward the firſt's reign, quite down to this preſent time. A curious hiſtory indeed, for which I think myſelf, and the world, indebted to Mr. Lowndes's great learning in this ſort of knowledge, and his great exactneſs in relating the particulars.

I shall remark only the quantity of ſilver was in a ſhilling, in each of thoſe changes; that ſo the reader may at firſt ſight, without farther trouble, compare the leſſening, or increaſe of the quantity of ſilver upon every change. For in propriety of ſpeech, the adding to the quantity of ſilver in our coin, is the true raiſing of its value; and the diminiſhing the quantity of ſilver in it, is the ſinking of its value; however they come to be tranſpoſed, and uſed in the quite contrary ſenſe.

If my calculations, from the weight and fineneſs I find ſet down in Mr. Lowndes's extract out of the indentures of the mint, have not miſled me, the quantity of ſilver to a grain, which was in a ſhilling in every change of our money, is ſet down in the following table.

One ſhilling contain'd of fine ſilver.

			Grains.
28	Edw.	1	264
18	Edw.	3	236
27	Edw.	3	213
9	Hen.	5	176
1	Hen.	6	142
4	Hen.	6	176
49	Hen.	6	142
1	Hen.	8	118
34	Hen.	8	100
36	Hen.	8	60
37	Hen.	8	40
3	Edw.	6	40
5	Edw.	6	20
6	Edw.	6	88
2	Eliz.		89
43	Eliz.		86

And ſo it has remained from the 43d year of queen Elizabeth to this day.

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Mr. Lowndes having given us the fineneſs of the ſtandard ſilver in every reign, and the number of pieces a pound troy was coin'd into, cloſes this hiſtory with words to this purpoſe, p. 56. “ By this deduction it doth evidently appear, “ that it hath been a policy, conſtantly practiſed in the mints of England, to “ raiſe the value of the coin, in its extrinſick denomination, from time to time,

" as any exigence, or occaſion required, and more eſpecially to encourage the " bringing of bullion into the realm to be coin'd." This indeed, is roundly to conclude for his hypotheſis. But I could wiſh, that from the hiſtories of thoſe times, wherein the ſeveral changes were made, he had ſhewed us the exigencies and occaſions, that produced the raiſing of the coin, and what effects it had.

If I miſtake not, Henry the VIIIth's ſeveral raiſings of our coin, brought little increaſe of ſilver into England. As the ſeveral ſpecies of our coin leſſened in their reſpective quantities of ſilver, ſo the treaſure of the realm decreaſed too: and he, that found the kingdom rich, did not, as I remember, by all his raiſing our coin, leave it ſo.

Another thing, that (from this hiſtory) makes me ſuſpect, that the raiſing the denomination was never found effectively to draw ſilver into England, is the lowering the denomination, or adding more ſilver to the ſeveral ſpecies of our coin; as in Hen. VI's time, the ſhilling was increaſed from one hundred forty two grains of ſilver, to one hundred ſeventy ſix: and in the ſixth of Edw. VI. in whoſe time raiſing the denomination ſeems to have been tried to the utmoſt, when a ſhilling was brought to twenty grains of ſilver. And the great alteration, that was then quickly made on the other hand, from twenty to eighty grains at one leap, ſeems to ſhew that this leſſening the ſilver in our coin, had proved highly prejudicial: for this is a greater change in ſinking of the denomination in proportion, than ever was made at once in raiſing it; a ſhilling being made four times weightier in ſilver, the ſixth, than it was in the fifth year of Edw. VI's reign.

Kingdoms are ſeldom found weary of the riches they have, or averſe to the increaſe of their treaſure. If therefore, the raiſing the denomination did in reality bring ſilver into the realm, it cannot be thought that they would at any time ſink the denomination, which, by the rule of contraries, ſhould be at leaſt ſuſpected to drive, or keep it out.

Since, therefore, we are not from matter of fact informed, what were the true motives, that cauſed thoſe ſeveral changes in the coin; may we not with reaſon ſuſpect, that they were owing to that policy of the mint, ſet down by our author, p. 83. in theſe words, That the " propoſed advance is agreeable to the " policy, that in paſt ages hath been practiſed, not only in our mint, but in the " mints of all politick governments; namely, to raiſe the value of ſilver in the " coin, to promote the work of the mint?" As I remember, ſuitable to this policy of the mint, there was, ſome two years ſince, a complaint of a worthy gentleman, not ignorant of it, that the mill in the mint ſtood ſtill; and therefore, there was a propoſal offered for bringing griſt to the mill.

The buſineſs of money, as in all times, even in this our quick-ſighted age, hath been thought a myſtery: thoſe employed in the mint muſt, by their places, be ſuppoſed to penetrate deepeſt into it. 'Tis no impoſſible thing, then, to imagine, that it was not hard, in the ignorance of paſt ages, when money was little, and ſkill in the turns of trade leſs, for thoſe verſed in the buſineſs and policy of the mint, to perſuade a prince, eſpecially if money were ſcarce, that the fault was in the ſtandard of the mint, and that the way to increaſe the plenty of money, was to raiſe (a well-ſounding word) the value of the coin. This could not but be willingly enough hearkened to; when, beſides the hopes of drawing an increaſe of ſilver into the realm, it brought preſent gain, by the part which the king got of the money, which was hereupon all coin'd anew, and the mint officers loſt nothing, ſince it promoted the work of the mint.

This opinion Mr. Lowndes himſelf gives ſufficient grounds for in his book, particularly p. 29. were we read theſe words, " Although the former debaſe- " ments of the coins, by publick authority, eſpecially thoſe in the reigns of king " Henry VIII. and king Edward VI. might be projected for the profit of the " crown, and the projectors might meaſure that profit by the exceſſive quanti- " ties of alloy, that were mixed with the ſilver and the gold (and let me add, or by the quantity of ſilver leſſened in each ſpecies, which is the ſame thing.) " And " though this was enterprized by a prince, who could ſtretch his prerogative ve- " ry far upon his people; and was done in times, when the nation had very little "commerce, inland or foreign, to be injured and prejudiced thereby; yet experience preſently ſhewed, that the projectors were miſtaken, and that it was "abſolutely neceſſary to have the baſe money reformed." This, at leaſt, they were not miſtaken in, that they brought work to the mint, and a part of the money coined to the crown for ſeigniorage: in both which there was profit. Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 44. "That Henry VIII. had to the value of fifty ſhillings "for every pound weight of gold coined." I have met with it ſomewhere, that formerly the king might take what he pleaſed for coinage. I know not too, but the flattering name of raiſing money might prevail then, as it does now; and impoſe ſo far on them, as to make them think, the raiſing, i. e. diminiſhing the ſilver in their coin, would bring it into the realm, or ſtay it here, when they found it going out. For if we may gueſs at the other, by Henry VIII's raiſing, it was probably when, by reaſon of expence in foreign wars, or ill managed trade, they found money begin to grow ſcarce.

THE having the ſpecies of our coin one fifth bigger, or one fifth leſs, than they are at preſent, would be neither good, nor harm to England, if they had always been ſo. Our ſtandard has continued in weight and fineneſs, juſt as it is now, for very near this hundred years laſt paſt: and thoſe, who think the denomination and ſize of our money have any influence on the ſtate of our wealth, have no reaſon to change the preſent ſtandard of our coin; ſince under that we have had a greater increaſe, and longer continuance of plenty of money, than perhaps any other country can ſhew: I ſee no reaſon to think, that a little bigger, or leſs ſize of the pieces coin'd, is of any moment, one way or t'other. The ſpecies of money in any country, of whatſoever ſizes, fit for coining, if their proportions to one another be ſuited to arithmetick and calculations, in whole numbers, and the ways of accounts in that country; if they are adapted to ſmall payments, and carefully kept to their juſt weight and fineneſs, can have no harm in them. The harm comes by the change, which unreaſonably and unjuſtly gives away and transfers men's properties, diſorders trade, puzzles accounts, and needs a new arithmetic to caſt up reckonings, and keep accounts in; beſides a thouſand other inconveniencies; not to mention the charge of recoining the money. For this may be depended on, that, if our money be raiſed as is propoſed, it will enforce the recoining of all our money, both old and new, (except the new ſhillings) to avoid the terrible difficulty and confuſion there will be in keeping accounts in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, (as they muſt be) when the ſpecies of our money are ſo ordered, as not to anſwer thoſe denominations in round numbers.

THIS conſideration leads me to Mr. Lowndes's fifth and ſixth reaſons, p. 85. wherein he recommends the raiſing our money in the proportion propoſed, for its convenience, to our accounting by pounds, ſhillings, and pence. And for obviating perplexity among the common people, he propoſes the preſent weighty crown to go at ſix ſhillings three pence; and the new ſcepter, or unite, to be coin'd of the ſame weight, to go at the ſame rate; and half-crowns, half-ſcepters, or half-unites, of the weight of the preſent half-crown, to go for two ſhillings ſeven pence half-penny: by no number of which pieces can there be made an even pound ſterling, or any number of even ſhillings under a pound; but they always fall into fractions of pounds and ſhillings, as may be ſeen by this following table.

	l.	s.	d.
1 Half-crown, half-ſcepter, or half-unite piece		3	1½
1 Crown, ſcepter, or unite piece		6	3
3 Half-crown pieces		9	4½
2 Crown pieces		12	6
5 Half-crown pieces		15	7½
3 Crown pieces		18	9
7 Half-crown pieces	1	1	10½
4 Crown pieces	1	5	

The preſent ſhilling, and new teſtoon, going for fifteen pence, no number of them make any number of even ſhillings; but five ſhillings, ten ſhillings, fifteen ſhillings, and twenty ſhillings; but in all the reſt, they always fall into fractions.

The like may be ſaid of the preſent ſixpences, and future half teſtoons, going for ſeven pence half-penny; the quarter teſtoons, which are to go for three pence three farthings; and the groſs and groats, which are to go for five pence; the half groſs, or groat, which is to go for two pence half-penny, and the prime, which is to go for a penny farthing: out of any tale of each of which ſpecies there can no juſt number of ſhillings be made, as I think, but five ſhillings, ten ſhilling, fifteen ſhillings, and twenty ſhillings; but they always fall into fractions. This new intended ſhilling alone ſeems to be ſuited to our accounting in pounds, ſhillings and pence. The great pieces, as ſcepters, and half-ſcepters, which are made to ſerve for the payment of greater ſums, and are for diſpatch in tale, will not in tale fall into even pounds. And I fear it will puzzle a better arithmetician than moſt countrymen are, to tell, without pen and ink, how many of the leſſer pieces (except the ſhillings) however combined, will make juſt ſixteen or ſeventeen ſhillings. And I imagine there is not one countryman of three, but may have it for his pains, if he can tell an hundred pounds made up of a promiſcuous mixture of the ſpecies of this new raiſed money (excluding the ſhillings) in a day's time. And that, which will help to confound him; and every body elſe, will be the old crowns, half-crowns, ſhillings, and ſixpences current for new numbers of pence. So that I take it for granted, that if our coin be raiſed as is propoſed, not only all our clipp'd, but all our weighty and mill'd money, muſt of neceſſity be recoin'd too; if you would not have trade diſturbed, and people more diſeaſed with new money, which they cannot tell, nor keep accounts in, than with light and clipp'd money, which they are cheated with. And what a charge the new coining of all our money will be to the nation, I have computed in another place.* That I think is of ſome conſideration in our preſent circumſtances, though the confuſion that this new raiſed money, I fear, is like to introduce, and the want of money, and ſtop of trade, when the clipp'd is called in, and the weighty is to be recoin'd, be of much greater.

His fourth, eighth, and ninth reaſons, p. 84, and 86. are taken from the ſaving our preſent mill'd money from being cut and recoin'd. The end I confeſs to be good: 'tis very reaſonable, that ſo much excellent coin, as good as ever was in the world, ſhould not be deſtroyed. But there is, I think, a ſurer and eaſier way to preſerve it, than what Mr. Lowndes propoſes. 'Tis paſt doubt, it will be in no danger of recoining, if our money be kept upon the preſent foot: but if it be raiſed, as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, all the preſent mill'd money will be in danger, and the difficulty of counting it, upon the new propoſed foot, will enforce it to be recoin'd into new pieces of crowns, half-crowns, ſhillings, and ſixpences, that may paſs for the ſame number of pence the preſent do, viz. 60. 30, 12, and 6. as I have above ſhewn. He ſays in his fourth reaſon, that "if "pieces having the ſame bigneſs ſhould have different values, it might be difficult for the common people (eſpecially thoſe not ſkilled in arithmetick) to "compute how many of one kind will be equal to the ſum of another." Such difficulties and confuſion in counting money, I agree with him, ought carefully to be avoided. And therefore, ſince if pieces having the ſame bigneſs and ſtamp, which the people are acquainted with, ſhall have new values different from thoſe which people are accuſtomed to; and theſe new values ſhall in numbers of pence not anſwer our way of accounting by pounds and ſhillings, "it will be "difficult for the common people (eſpecially thoſe not ſkill'd in arithmetick) "to compute how many of any one kind will make any ſum they are to pay, "or receive;" eſpecially when the numbers of any one kind of pieces will be brought into ſo few even ſums of pounds and ſhillings. And thus Mr. Lowndes's argument here turns upon himſelf, and is againſt raiſing our coin to the value propoſed by him, from the confuſion it will produce.

His 8th reaſon, p. 86. we have in theſe words: "It is difficult to conceive "how any deſign of amending the clipp'd money can be compaſſed, without "raiſing

* Vid. Short obſervations on a paper, entituled, For encouraging coining, &c. p. 56. of this IId Vol.

" raiſing the value of the ſilver remaining in them, becauſe of the great deficiency of the ſilver clipp'd away, which (upon recoining) muſt neceſſarily " be defray'd and borne, one way or other."

'Tis no difficulty to conceive, that clipp'd money, being not lawful money, ſhould be prohibited to paſs for more than its weight. Next, it is no difficulty to conceive, that clipp'd money, paſſing for no more than its weight, and ſo being in the ſtate of ſtandard bullion, which cannot be exported, ſhould be brought to the mint, and there exchanged for weighty money. But this way, " it is no difficulty to conceive how the amending the clipp'd money may be " compaſſed, becauſe this way the deficiency of the ſilver, clipp'd away, will " certainly be defray'd and borne, one way or other."

And thus I have gone over all Mr. Lowndes's reaſons for raiſing our coin; wherein, though I ſeem to differ from him, yet I flatter myſelf, it is not altogether ſo much as at firſt ſight may appear; ſince by what I find in another part of his book, I have reaſon to judge he is a great deal of my mind. For he has five very good arguments for continuing the preſent ſtandard of fineneſs, each of which is as ſtrong for continuing alſo the preſent ſtandard of weight, i. e. continuing a penny of the ſame weight of ſtandard ſilver, which at preſent it has. He, that has a mind to be ſatisfied of this, may read Mr. Lowndes's firſt five reaſons, for continuing the preſent ſtandard of fineneſs, which he will find in his 29, 30, 31, 32 pages of his report. And when Mr. Lowndes himſelf has again conſidered, what there is of weight in them, and how far it reaches, he will at leaſt not think it ſtrange, if they appear to me and others, good arguments againſt putting leſs ſilver into our coin of the ſame denominations, let that diminution be made what way it will.

What Mr. Lowndes ſays about gold coins, p. 88, &c. appears to me highly rational, and I perfectly agree with him; excepting only that I do not think gold is in regard of ſilver riſen one third in England; which I think may be thus made out. A guinea weighing five penny-weight and nine grains, or one hundred and twenty nine grains; and a pound ſterling weighing one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty grains; a guinea at twenty ſhillings, is as one hundred and twenty nine, to one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty; that is, as one to fourteen and an half.

A guinea at two and twenty ſhillings, is as one hundred and twenty nine, at two thouſand forty two, i. e. as one to ſixteen.

A guinea, at thirty ſhillings, is as one hundred twenty nine, to two thouſand ſeven hundred eighty four, i. e. as one to twenty one and an half, near.

He therefore, that receives twenty ſhillings mill'd money for a guinea, receives one thouſand eight hundred and ſixty grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty nine grains of ſtandard gold, i. e. fourteen and an half for one.

He, who receives two and twenty ſhillings mill'd money for a guinea, has two thouſand forty two grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty nine grains ſtandard gold, i. e. ſixteen for one.

He, who receives thirty ſhillings mill'd money for a guinea, has two thouſand ſeven hundred eighty four grains ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty nine grains of gold, i. e. twenty one and an half for one.

But the current caſh being (upon trials made about midſummer laſt) computed by Mr. Lowndes, p. 108. to want half its ſtandard weight, and not being mended ſince, it is evident, he, who receives thirty ſhillings of our preſent clipp'd money, for a guinea, has but one thouſand three hundred ninety two grains of ſtandard ſilver, for one hundred twenty nine grains of gold, i. e. has but ten and three quarters of ſilver for one of gold.

I have left out the utmoſt preciſions of fractions in theſe computations, as not neceſſary in the preſent caſe, theſe whole numbers ſhewing well enough the difference of the value of guineas at thoſe ſeveral rates.

If it be true, what I here aſſert, viz. that he who receives thirty ſhillings in our current, clipp'd money, for a guinea, receives not eleven grains of ſilver for one of gold; whereas the value of gold to ſilver in all our neighbouring countries is about fifteen to one, which is about a third part more; it will probably be demanded, how it comes to paſs that foreigners, or others, import gold, when they do not receive as much ſilver for it here, as they may have in all other countries? The reaſon whereof is viſibly this, that they exchange it not here for ſilver, but for our commodities: and our bargains for commodities as well as all other contracts being made in pounds, ſhillings, and pence, our clipp'd money retains amongſt the people (who know not how to count but by current money) a part of its legal value, whilſt it paſſes for the ſattisfaction of legal contracts, as if were lawful money. As long as the king receives it for his taxes, and the landlord for his rent, 'tis no wonder the farmer and tenant ſhould receive it for his commodities. And this, perhaps, would do well enough, if our money and trade were to circulate only amongſt ourſelves, and we had no commerce with the reſt of the world, and needed it not. But here lies the loſs, when foreigners ſhall bring over gold hither, and with that pay for our commodities at the rate of thirty ſhillings the guinea, when the ſame quantity of gold, that is in a guinea, is not beyond ſea worth more ſilver than is in twenty, or one and twenty and ſixpence of our mill'd and lawful money: by which way of paying for our commodities, England loſes near one third of the value of all the commodities it thus ſells. And 'tis all one as if foreigners paid for them in money coin'd and clipp'd beyond ſea, wherein was one third leſs ſilver than there ought to be. And thus we loſe near one third in all our exportation, whilſt foreign gold imported is received in payment for thirty ſhillings a guinea. To make this appear, we need but trace this way of commerce a little, and there can be no doubt of the loſs we ſuffer by it.

Let us ſuppoſe, for example, a bale of Holland linnen, worth there one hundred and eighty ounces of our ſtandard ſilver; and a bale of ſerge here, worth alſo the ſame weight of one hundred and eighty ounces of the ſame ſtandard ſilver; 'tis evident theſe two bales are exactly of the ſame value. Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 88. "That at this time the gold, that is in a guinea (if it were carried to Spain, Italy, Barbary, and ſome other places,) would not purchaſe ſo much ſilver there, as is equal to the ſtandard of twenty of our ſhillings," i. e. would be in value there to ſilver, ſcarce as one to fourteen and an half: and I think I may ſay, that gold in Holland is, or lately was, as one to fifteen, or not much above. Taking then, ſtandard gold in Holland to be in proportion to ſtandard ſilver, as one to about fifteen, or a little more; twelve ounces of our ſtandard gold, or as much gold as is in forty-four guineas and an half, muſt be given for that bale of Holland linnen, if any one will pay for it there in gold: but if he buys that bale of ſerge here for one hundred and eighty ounces of ſilver, which is forty-eight pounds ſterling, if he pays for it in gold at thirty ſhillings the guinea, two and thirty guineas will pay for it. So that in all the goods, that we ſell beyond ſeas for gold imported, and coined into guineas, unleſs the owners raiſe them one third above what they would ſell them for in mill'd money, we loſe twelve in forty-four and an half, which is very near one third.

This loſs is wholly owing to the permitting clipp'd money in payment. And this loſs we muſt unavoidably ſuffer, whilſt clipp'd money is current amongſt us. And this robbing of England of near one third of the value of the commodities we ſend out, will continue, whilſt people had rather receive guineas at thirty ſhillings, than ſilver coin (no other being to be had) that is not worth half what they take it for. And yet this clipp'd money, as bad as it is, and however unwilling people are to be charged with it, will always have credit enough to paſs, whilſt the goldſmiths and bankers receive it; and they will always receive it, whilſt they can paſs it over again to the king with advantage, and can have hopes to prevail, that at laſt when it can be borne no longer, but muſt be called in, no part of the loſs of light money, which ſhall be found in their hands ſhall fall upon them, though they have for many years dealt in it, and by reaſon of its being clipp'd, have had all the running caſh of the kingdom in their hands, and made profit of it. I ſay, clipp'd money, however bad it be, will always paſs whilſt the king's receivers, the bankers of any kind, and at laſt the exchequer takes it. For who will not receive clipp'd money, rather than have none for his neceſſary occaſions, whilſt he ſees the great receipt of the exchequer admits it, and the bank and goldſmiths will take it of him, and give him credit for it, ſo that he needs keep no more of it by him than he pleaſes? In this ſtate, whilſt the exchequer receives clipp'd money, I do not ſee how it can be ſtopp'd from paſſing. A clipp'd half-crown, that goes at the exchequer, will not be refuſed by any one, who has hopes by his own, or other's hands to convey it thither, and who, unleſs he take it, cannot trade, or ſhall not be paid. Whilſt therefore, the exchequer is open to clipp'd money, it will paſs, and whilſt clipp'd money paſſes, clippers will certainly be at work; and what a gap this leaves to foreigners, if they will make uſe of it to pour in clipp'd money upon us (as its neighbours did into Portugal) as long as we have either goods, or weighty money, left to be carried away at fifty per cent. or greater profit, it's eaſy to ſee.

I WILL ſuppoſe the king receives clipp'd money in the exchequer, and at half, or three quarters loſs, coins it into mill'd money. For if he receives all, how much ſoever clipp'd, I ſuppoſe the clipper's ſheers are not ſo ſqueamiſh as not to pare away above half. 'Twill be a wonderful conſcientiouſneſs in them, no where that I know to be parallell'd, if they will content themſelves with leſs profit than they can make, and will leave ſeven pennyworth of ſilver in an half-crown, if ſix pennyworth and the ſtamp be enough to make it paſs for half a crown. When his majeſty hath coin'd this into mill'd money of ſtandard weight, and paid it out again to the bankers, goldſmiths or others, what ſhall then become of it? Either they will lay it up to get rid of their clipp'd money, for no body will part with heavy money, whilſt he has any light; nor will any heavy money come abroad, whilſt there is light left; for whoever has clipp'd money by him, will ſell good bargains, or borrow at any rate of thoſe, who are willing to part with any weighty, to keep that by him, rather than the clipp'd money he has in his hands. So that, as far as this reaches, no mill'd money, how much ſoever be coin'd, will appear abroad; or if it does, will it long eſcape the coiners and clippers hands, who will be at work preſently upon it, to furniſh the exchequer with more clipp'd money at fifty, ſixty, ſeventy, or I know not what advantage? Tho' this be enough to cut off the hopes of mill'd money appearing in payments, whilſt any clipp'd is current; yet to this we may add, that gold, imported at an over-value, will ſweep it away, as faſt as it is coin'd, whilſt clipp'd money keeps up the rate of guineas above their former value. This will be the circulation of our money, whilſt clipp'd is permitted any way to be current. And if ſtore enough of clipp'd money at home, or from abroad, can be but provided (as 'tis more than probable it may now, the trade is ſo univerſal, and has been ſo long practiſed with great advantage, and no great danger, as appears by the few have ſuffered, in regard to the great numbers 'tis evident are engaged in the trade, and the vent of it here in England is ſo known and ſure) I do not ſee how in a little while we ſhall have any money, or goods at all left in England, if clipping be not immediately ſtopp'd. And how clipping can be ſtopp'd, but by an immediate, poſitive prohibition, whereby all clipp'd money ſhall be forbid to paſs, in any payment whatſoever, or to paſs for more than its weight, I would be glad to learn. Clipping is the great leak, which for ſome time paſt has contributed more to ſink us, than all the forces of our enemies could do. 'Tis like a breach in the ſea-bank, which widens every moment till it be ſtopp'd. And my timorous temper muſt be pardoned, if I am frighted with the thoughts of clipp'd money being current, one moment longer, at any other value but of warranted, ſtandard bullion. And therefore, there can be nothing more true and reaſonable, nor that deſerves better to be conſidered, than what Mr. Lowndes ſays in his corollary, p. 90.

WHOEVER deſires to know the different ways of coining money, by the hammer and by the mill, may inform himſelf in the exact account Mr. Lowndes has given of both, under his ſecond general head; where he may alſo ſee the probableſt gueſs that has been made of the quantity of our clipp'd money, and the ſilver deficient in it; and an account of what ſilver money was coin'd in the reigns of Q. Elizabeth, K. James Iſt. and Charles Iſt. more exact than is to be had any where elſe. There is only one thing which I ſhall mention, ſince

Mr. Lowndes does it here again under this head, p. 100, and that is, melting down our coin; concerning which I ſhall venture humbly to propoſe theſe following queſtions.

1. WHETHER bullion be any thing but ſilver, whoſe workmanſhip has no value?

2. WHETHER that workmanſhip, which can be had for nothing, has, or can have any value?

3. WHETHER, whilſt the money in our mint is coin'd for the owners, without any coſt to them, our coin can ever have any value above ſtandard bullion?

4. WHETHER, whilſt our coin is not of value above ſtandard bullion, goldſmiths and others, who have need of ſtandard ſilver, will not take what is by the free labour of the mint ready aſſay'd and adjuſted to their uſe, and melt that down, than be at the trouble of melting, mixing and aſſaying of ſilver for the uſes they have?

5. WHETHER the only cure for this wanton, though criminal melting down our coin, be not, that the owners ſhould pay one moiety of the ſixteen-pence half-penny which is paid per pound troy for coinage of ſilver, which the king now pays all?

6. WHETHER, by this means ſtandard ſilver in coin will not be more worth than ſtandard ſilver in bullion, and ſo be preſerved from this wanton melting down, as ſoon as an over-balance of our trade ſhall bring us ſilver to ſtay here? For till then, it is in vain to think of preſerving our coin from melting down, and therefore to no purpoſe till then to change that law.

7. WHETHER any laws, or any penalties, can keep our coin from being carried out, when debts contracted beyond ſea call for it?

8. WHETHER it be any odds to England, whether it be carried out, melted down into bullion, or in ſpecie?

9. WHETHER, whilſt the exigencies of our occaſions and trade call for it abroad, it will not always be melted down for the conveniency of exportation, ſo long as the laws prohibit its exportation in ſpecie?

10. WHETHER ſtandard ſilver in coin and in bullion, will not immediately be of the ſame value, as ſoon as the prohibition of carrying our money in ſpecie is taken off?

11. WHETHER an ounce of ſilver the more would be carried out in a year, if that prohibition were taken off?

12. WHETHER ſilver in our coin, will not always, during the prohibition of its exportation, be a little leſs worth than ſilver in bullion, whilſt the conſumption of foreign commodities beyond what ours pay for, makes the exportation of ſilver neceſſary? And ſo, during ſuch a ſtate, raiſe your money as much, and as you will, "ſilver in the coin will never fetch as much as the ſilver in bullion," as Mr. Lowndes expreſſes it, p. 110.

AS to the inconveniencies and damages we ſuſtain, by clipp'd money paſſing by tale, as if it were lawful; nothing can be more true, more judicious, nor more weighty, than what Mr. Lowndes ſays, under his third general head; wherein I perfectly agree with him, excepting only, where he builds any thing upon the propoſed raiſing our coin one fifth. And to what he ſays, p. 114, concerning our being "deprived of the uſe of our heavy money, by men's hoarding it, in proſpect that the ſilver, contain'd in thoſe weighty pieces, will turn more to their profit, than lending it at intereſt, purchaſing, or trading therewith;" I crave leave to add, That thoſe hoarders of money, a great many of them, drive no leſs, but rather a greater trade, by hoarding the weighty money, than if they let it go abroad. For, by that means all the current caſh being light, clipp'd, and hazardous money, 'tis all tumbled into their hands, which gives credit to their bills, and furniſhes them to trade for as much as they pleaſe, whilſt every body elſe ſcarce trades at all, (but juſt as neceſſity forces) and is ready to ſtand ſtill.

WHERE he ſays, p. 114, "'Tis not likely the weighty monies will ſoon appear abroad, without raiſing their value, and recoining the clipp'd monies:" I ſhould agree with him, if it ran thus: without recoining the clipp'd, and in the mean time making it go for its weight. For that will, I humbly conceive, bring out the heavy money, without raiſing its value, as effectually and ſooner; for it will do it immediately: his will take up ſome time. And I fear, if clipp'd money be not ſtopp'd, all at once and preſently, from paſſing any way in tale, the damage it will bring will be irreparable.

" Mr. Lowndes's fourth general head is, to propoſe the means, that muſt be " obſerved, and the proper methods to be uſed in, and for the re-eſtabliſhment " of the ſilver coins."

The firſt is, " That the work ſhould be finiſhed in as little time as may be; " not only to obviate a farther damage by clipping in the interim, but alſo that " the needful advantages of the new money may be the ſooner obtain'd for the " ſervice of the nation."

These, I agree with him, are very good and neceſſary ends; but they are both to be attain'd, I conceive, much ſooner by making clipp'd money go for its weight, than by the method Mr. Lowndes propoſes. For this immediately puts an end to clipping, and " obviates all farther damage thereby." Next, it immediately brings out all the hoarded, weighty money, and ſo that advantage will be ſooner obtain'd for the ſervice of the nation, than it can any other way beſides. Next, it preſerves the uſe of clipp'd money " for the ſervice of the " nation, in the interim," 'till it can be recoin'd all at the Tower.

His ſecond propoſition is, " That the loſs, or the greateſt part of it, ought to " be borne by the publick, and not by particulars, who being very numerous " will be prejudiced againſt a reformation for the publick benefit, if it be to be " effected at the coſt of particular men."

A tax given to make good the defect of ſilver in clipp'd money, will be paid by particulars; and ſo the loſs will be borne by particular men: and whether theſe particulars be not more numerous, or at leaſt a great number of innocent men of them more ſenſibly burden'd that way, than if it takes its chance in the hands of thoſe men, who have profited by the having it in their hand, will be worth conſidering. And I wiſh it were well weigh'd, which of the two ways, the greater number of men would be moſt dangerouſly prejudiced againſt this reformation. But as Mr. Lowndes orders the matter, every body will, I fear, be prejudiced againſt this reformation, when (as he divides it, p. 133, 134,) the owner will bear near one half of the loſs, in the price of his clipp'd money, and every body elſe his part of the remainder, in a tax levied on them for it. I wiſh a remedy could be found without any body's loſs. Moſt of thoſe ways I have heard propoſed, to make reparation to every particular man, for the clipp'd money ſhall be found in his hands, do ſo delay the remedy, if not entail clipping upon us, that I fear ſuch a care of particulars endangers the whole. And if that ſuffer, it will go but ill with particulars. I am not for hindering thoſe who have clipp'd money, from any recompence which can be provided and made them. The queſtion here, is not whether the honeſt countryman ſhall bear the loſs of his clipp'd money, without any more ado, or pay a tax to recompenſe himſelf. That, which I humbly conceive, the nation is moſt concerned in, is that clipping ſhould be finally ſtopp'd, and that the money, which remains, ſhould go according to its true value, for the carrying on of commerce, and the preſent ſupply of people's exigencies, 'till that part of it, which is defaced, can by the mint be brought to its legal and due form. And therefore I think it will be the rational deſire of all particulars, that the ſhorteſt and ſureſt way, not interfering with law, or equity, ſhould be taken to put an effectual end to an evil, which every moment it continues, works powerfully towards a general ruin.

His fourth propoſition is, " That no room muſt be left for jealouſy," I acknowledge to be a good one, if there can be a way found to attain it.

I cannot but wonder to find theſe words, p. 124. " That no perſon what- " ſoever ſhall hereafter be obliged to accept, in legal payments, any money " whatſoever, that is already clipp'd, or may hereafter be clipp'd, or diminiſh'd; " and that no perſon ſhall tender, or receive, any ſuch money in payment, under " ſome ſmall penalty to be made eaſily recoverable, &c."

As if any man now were obliged to receive clipped money in legal payment, and there were not already a law, with ſevere penalties, againſt thoſe who tendered clipped money in payment?

'Tis a doubt to me, whether the warden, maſter-worker, &c. of the mint at the Tower, could find fit and ſkillful perſons enough to ſet nine other mints at work, in other parts of England, in a quarter of a year, as Mr. Lowndes propoſes, p. 127. Beſides, Mr. Lowndes tells us, p. 96. that the engines, which "put the letters upon the edges of the larger ſilver pieces, and mark the edges "of the reſt with a graining, are wrought ſecretly." And indeed, this is ſo great a guard againſt counterfeiting, as well as clipping our money, that it deſerves well to be kept a ſecret, as it has been hitherto. But how that can be, if money be to be coined in nine other mints, ſet up in ſeveral parts, is hard to conceive. And laſtly, perhaps, ſome may apprehend it may be of ill conſequence to have ſo many men inſtructed and employed in the art of coining, only for a ſhort job, and then turned looſe again to ſhift for themſelves, by their own ſkill and induſtry, as they can.

The proviſion made in his fourth rule, p. 136, to prevent the gain of "ſubtle "dealers by culling out the heavieſt of the clipp'd pieces," though it be the product of great ſagacity and foreſight, exactly calculated, and as well contrived, as in that caſe it can be; yet I fear is too ſubtle for the apprehenſion and practice of countrymen, who many of them, with their little quickneſs in ſuch matters, have alſo but ſmall ſums of money by them, and ſo neither having arithmetick, nor choice of clipp'd money, to adjuſt it to the weight there required, will be hardly made to underſtand it. But I think the clippers have, or will take care that there ſhall not be any great need of it.

To conclude; I confeſs myſelf not to ſee the leaſt reaſon, why our preſent mill'd money ſhould be at all alter'd in fineneſs, weight, or value. I look upon it to be the beſt and ſafeſt from counterfeiting, adulterating, or any ways being fraudulently diminiſhed, of any that ever was coined. It is adjuſted to our legal payments, reckonings and accounts, to which our money muſt be reduced: the raiſing its denomination will neither add to its worth, nor make the ſtock we have, more proportionate to our occaſions, nor bring one grain of ſilver the more into England, nor one farthing advantage to the publick: it will only ſerve to defraud the king, and a great number of his ſubjects, and perplex all, and put the kingdom to a needleſs charge of recoining all, both milled as well as clipped money.

If I might take upon me to offer any thing new, I would humbly propoſe, that ſince market and retail trade requires leſs diviſions than ſix-pences, a ſufficient quantity of four-penny, four-penny half-penny, and five-penny pieces ſhould be coined. Theſe in change will anſwer all the fractions between ſix-pence and a farthing, and thereby ſupply the want of ſmall monies, whereof I believe no body ever ſaw enough common to anſwer the neceſſity of ſmall payments; whether, either becauſe there was never a ſufficient quantity of ſuch pieces coined, or whether becauſe of their ſmallneſs they are apter to be loſt out of any hands, or becauſe they oftner falling into children's hands, they loſe them, or lay them up; ſo it is, there is always a viſible want of them; to ſupply which, without the inconveniencies attending very ſmall coin, the propoſed pieces, I humbly conceive, will ſerve.

If it be thought fit for this end to have four-pence, four-pence half-penny, and five-penny pieces, coin'd, it will, I ſuppoſe, be convenient that they ſhould be diſtinguiſhed from ſix-pences, and from one another, by a deep and very large plain difference in the ſtamp on both ſides, to prevent miſtakes, and loſs of time in telling of money. The four-pence half-penny has already the harp for a known diſtinction, which may be fit to be continued: the five-pence may have the feathers, and the four-pence this mark IV. of four on the reverſe, and on the other ſide they may each have the king's head with a crown on it, to ſhew on that ſide too, that the piece ſo coined, is one of thoſe under a ſix-pence; and with that they may each, on that ſide alſo, have ſome marks of diſtinction one from another, as the five-pence this mark of V. the four-pence half-penny a little harp, and the four-pence nothing.

These, or any other better diſtinctions, which his majeſty ſhall order, will in tale readily diſcover them, if by chance any of them fall into larger payments, for which they are not deſigned.

And thus I have, with as much brevity and clearneſs as I could, complied with what Mr. Lowndes profeſſes to be the end of printing his report in theſe words, viz. "That any perſons, who have conſider'd an affair of this nature, "may (if they pleaſe) communicate their thoughts for rendering the deſign here "aimed at more perfect, or more agreeable to the publick ſervice." It muſt be confeſſed, that my conſiderations have led me to thoughts, in ſome parts of this affair, quite oppoſite to Mr. Lowndes's: But how far this has been from any deſire to oppoſe him, or to have a diſpute with a man, no otherwiſe known to me but by his civilities, and whom I have a very great eſteem for, will appear by what I printed about raiſing the value of money, about three years ſince. All that I have ſaid here, in anſwer to him, being nothing but the applying the principles I then went on, particularly now, to Mr. Lowndes's arguments, as they came in my way; that ſo thereby others may judge what will, or will not, be the conſequences of ſuch a change of our coin, as he propoſes; the only way, I think, of rendering his deſign more agreeable to the publick ſervices.

One ſhilling contained of fine ſilver.

	Gr.
28 Edw. 1	264
18 Edw. 3	236
27 Edw. 3	213
9 Hen. 5	176
1 Hen. 6	142
4 Hen. 6	176
49 Hen. 6	142
1 Hen. 8	118
34 Hen. 8	100
36 Hen. 8	60
37 Hen. 8	40

The fineneſs increaſed, but the weight leſſen'd.

	Gr.
3 Edw. 6	40
5 Edw. 6	20
6 Edw. 6	88
2 Eliz.—	89
43 Eliz.—	86

i. e. $7\frac{1}{3}$ gr. in a penny.

William III.

1 l. troy of ſterling ſilver is coin'd in 62s. the remedy over or under is $2\frac{1}{12}$ pwt. or 6d. $\frac{1}{4}$ which is the 124 part fere v. pl. 8. Aug. 99.

Species.	oz.	pwt.	gr.	Juſt ſt^d.	oz.	pwt.	ſh.	pen.
Mexico real	—	17	12	better	—	—	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Ducatoon of Flanders	1	—	22	—	—	$4\frac{1}{2}$	5	4
Sevil real	—	17	12	worſe	—	1	4	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Holland dollar	—	18	5	—	—	10	4	4
Lyon dollar	—	17	$18\frac{1}{2}$	—	2	3	3	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Rix dollar of the Empire	—	18	15	—	—	$7\frac{1}{2}$	4	$5\frac{3}{4}$
Old cardecu	—	6	$3\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	1	1	$6\frac{1}{4}$
French lewis	—	17	11	—	—	—$\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Double milrez of Portugal	—	14	4	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	3	$6\frac{1}{4}$
Single milrez of Portugal	—	7	2	—	—	1	1	9
St. Mark of Venice	—	10	4	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	2	6
Double Dutch ſtyver	—	1	—	—	4	6	—	$1\frac{3}{4}$
Croſs Dollar	—	18	—	—	—	12	4	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Zealand dollar	—	13	—	—	2	—	2	3
Old Philip dollar	1	2	—	—	1	—	5	—
Ferdinando dollar 1623	—	18	6	—	—	$12\frac{1}{2}$	4	3
Prince of Orange dollar 1624	—	18	6	—	—	$10\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$
Leopoldus dollar 1624	—	18	2	—	—	$9\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{1}{4}$
Rodolphus dollar 1607	—	18	7	—	—	10	4	4
Maximilian dollar 1616	—	18	2	—	—	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{3}{4}$
Daniſh dollar 1620	—	13	—	—	—	13	2	$11\frac{1}{4}$
Portugal teſtoon	—	5	—	—	—	1	1	$2\frac{3}{4}$
The quarter of a new French lewis	—	4	9	—	—	—$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1

A pound weight of troy ſtandard gold is cut into guineas $44\frac{1}{2}$ one guinea weighs gr. $129\frac{2}{7}$, i. e. 5 pw. 9 gr. $\frac{2}{7}$.

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

In the former,

The falſe PRINCIPLES and FOUNDATION of

Sir ROBERT FILMER, and his Followers,

Are DETECTED and OVERTHROWN.

The Latter, is an

ESSAY

CONCERNING

The TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, and END of

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

READER,

THOU haſt here the beginning and end of a diſcourſe, concerning government; what fate has otherwiſe diſpoſed of the papers, that ſhould have fill'd up the middle, and were more than all the reſt, 'tis not worth while to tell thee. Theſe which remain, I hope, are ſufficient to eſtabliſh the throne of our great reſtorer, our preſent king William; to make good his title, in the conſent of the people; which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Chriſtendom; and to juſtify, to the world, the people of England, whoſe love of their juſt and natural rights, with their reſolution to preſerve them, ſaved the nation, when it was on the very brink of ſlavery and ruin. If theſe papers have that evidence, I flatter myſelf, is to be found in them, there will be no great miſs of thoſe which are loſt, and my reader may be ſatisfied without them. For I imagine, I ſhall have neither the time, nor inclination, to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my anſwer, by tracing Sir Robert again, thro' all the windings and obſcurities, which are to be met with, in the ſeveral branches of his wonderful ſyſtem. The king, and body of the nation, have ſince ſo thoroughly confuted his hypotheſis, that I ſuppoſe, nobody hereafter will have either the confidence to appear, againſt our common ſafety, and be again an advocate for ſlavery; or the weakneſs to be deceiv'd with contradictions, dreſs'd up in a popular ſtile, and well turn'd periods. For if any one will be at the pains himſelf, in thoſe parts, which are here untouched, to ſtrip Sir Robert's diſcourſes of the flouriſh of doubtful expreſſions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, poſitive, intelligible propoſitions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be ſatisfied there was never ſo much glib nonſenſe put together, in well ſounding Engliſh. If he think it not worth while to examine his works, all thro', let him make an experiment, in that part, where he threats of uſurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his ſkill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and conſiſtent with himſelf, or common ſenſe. I ſhould not ſpeak ſo plainly of a gentleman, long ſince paſt anſwering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publickly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the times. 'Tis neceſſary thoſe men, who taking on them to be teachers, have ſo dangerouſly miſled others, ſhould be openly ſhewed, of what authority this their patriarch is, whom they have ſo blindly follow'd, that ſo they may either retract, what, upon ſo ill grounds, they have vented, and cannot be maintain'd; or elſe juſtify thoſe principles, which they have preach'd up for goſpel, tho' they had no better an author, that an Engliſh courtier. For I ſhould not have writ againſt Sir Robert, or taken the pains to ſhew his miſtakes, inconſiſtencies, and want of (what he ſo muſt boaſts of, and pretends wholly to build on) ſcripture-proofs, were there not men amongſt us, who, by crying up his books, and eſpouſing his doctrine, ſave me from the reproach of writing againſt a dead adverſary. They have been ſo zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they ſhould ſpare me. I wiſh, where they have done the truth and the publick wrong, to redreſs it: and allow its juſt weight to this reflection, "That there cannot be done a greater miſchief "to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government, that ſo, at laſt, all times might not have reaſon to complain of the "drum eccleſiaſtick." If any one, concern'd really for truth, undertake the confutation of my hypotheſis, I promiſe him either to recant my miſtake, upon fair conviction; or to anſwer his difficulties. But he muſt remember two things,

Firſt, THAT cavilling here and there, at ſome expreſſion, or little incident of my diſcourſe, is not an anſwer to my book.

Secondly, THAT I ſhall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of theſe worth my notice: tho' I ſhall always look on myſelf, as bound to give ſatisfaction to any one, who ſhall appear to be conſcientiouſly ſcrupulous in the point, and ſhall ſhew any juſt grounds for his ſcruples.

I HAVE nothing more, but to advertiſe the reader, that A. ſtands for our author, O. for his obſervations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. And that a bare quotation of pages, always means pages of his Patriarcha, edit. 1680.

OF GOVERNMENT:

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

§. 1. SLAVERY is ſo vile and miſerable an eſtate of man, and ſo directly oppoſite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that 'tis hardly to be conceiv'd, that an Engliſhman, much leſs a gentleman, ſhould plead for it. And truly, I ſhould have taken Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, as any other treatiſe, which would perſuade all men, that they are ſlaves, and ought to be ſo, for ſuch another exerciſe of wit, as was his, who writ the encomium of Nero; rather than for a ſerious diſcourſe, meant in earneſt; had not the gravity of the title and epiſtle, the picture in the front of the book, and the applauſe that followed it, required me to believe, that the author and publiſher were both in earneſt. I, therefore, took it into my hands, with all the expectation, and read it through, with all the attention, due to a treatiſe, that made ſuch a noiſe, at its coming abroad; and cannot but confeſs myſelf mightily ſurprized, that in a book, which was to provide chains for all mankind, I ſhould find nothing but a rope of ſand; uſeful perhaps to ſuch, whoſe ſkill and buſineſs it is to raiſe a duſt, and would blind the people, the better to miſlead them; but in truth, not of any force, to draw thoſe into bondage, who have their eyes open, and ſo much ſenſe about them, as to conſider, that chains are but an ill wearings how much care ſoever hath been taken to file and poliſh them.

2. IF any one think I take too much liberty, in ſpeaking ſo freely of a man, who is the great champion of abſolute power, and the idol of thoſe, who worſhip it; I beſeech him to make this ſmall allowance for once, to one, who, even after the reading of Sir Robert's book, cannot but think himſelf, as the law allows him, a freeman: and I know no fault it is, to do ſo, unleſs any one, better ſkill'd in the fate of it, than I, ſhould have it revealed to him, that this treatiſe, which has lain dormant ſo long, was, when it appear'd in the world, to carry by ſtrength of its arguments, all liberty out of it; and that, from thenceforth, our author's ſhort model was be the pattern in the mount, and the perfect ſtandard of politicks for the future. His ſyſtem lies in a little compaſs; 'tis no more but this,

"That all government is abſolute monarchy."

AND the ground he builds on, is this,

"That no man is born free."

3. IN this laſt age, a generation of men has ſprung up amongſt us, that would flatter princes with an opinion, that they have a divine right to abſolute power, let the laws, by which they are conſtituted, and are to govern, and the conditions, under which they enter upon their authority, be what they will, and their engagements, to obſerve them, never ſo well ratified, by ſolemn oaths and promiſes. To make way for this doctrine, they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom; whereby they have not only, as much as in them lies, expoſed all ſubjects to the utmoſt miſery of tyranny and oppreſſion, but have alſo unſettled the titles, and ſhaken the thrones of princes: (for they

too, by theſe men's ſyſtem, except only one, are all born ſlaves, and by divine right are ſubjects to Adam's right heir; as if they had deſign'd to make war upon all government, and ſubvert the very foundations of human ſociety, to ſerve their preſent turn.

4. However, we muſt believe them, upon their own bare words, when they tell us, "We are all born ſlaves, and muſt continue ſo;" there is no remedy for it; life and thraldom we entered into together, and can never be quit of the one, till we part with the other. Scripture, or reaſon, I am ſure, do not any where ſay ſo, notwithſtanding the noiſe of divine right, as if divine authority hath ſubjected us to the unlimited will of another. An admirable ſtate of mankind, and that which they have not had wit enough to find out till this latter age! for however Sir Robert Filmer ſeems to condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion, Patr. p. 3. yet I believe it will be hard for him to find any other age, or country, of the world, but this, which has aſſerted monarchy to be jure divino. And he confeſſes, Patr. p. 4. That "Heyward, Blackwood, "Barclay, and others, that have bravely vindicated the right of kings, in moſt "points, never thought of this; but, with one conſent, admitted the natural "liberty and equality of mankind."

5. By whom this doctrine came, at firſt, to be broached, and brought in faſhion among us, and what ſad effects it gave riſe to, I leave to hiſtorians to relate, or to the memory of thoſe, who were contemporaries with Sibthorp and Manwaring to recollect. My buſineſs at preſent is, only to conſider, what Sir Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this argument fartheſt, and is ſuppoſed to have brought it to perfection, has ſaid in it: for from him every one, who would be as faſhionable as French was at court, has learned, and runs away with this ſhort ſyſtem of politicks, viz. "Men are not born free, and there"fore could never have the liberty to chuſe either governors, or forms of go"vernment." Princes have their power abſolute, and by divine right: for ſlaves could never have a right to compact, or conſent. Adam was an abſolute monarch, and ſo are all princes ever ſince.

CHAP. II.

Of paternal and regal power.

6. SIR Robert Filmer's great poſition is, that "men are not naturally free." This is the foundation, on which his abſolute monarchy ſtands, and from which it erects itſelf to an height, that its power is above every power: "caput "inter nubila," ſo high above all earthly and human things, that thought can ſcarce reach it; that promiſes and oaths, which tie the infinite Deity, cannot confine it. But if this foundation fails, all his fabric falls with it, and governments muſt be left, again, to the old way, of being made by contrivance, and the conſent of men (Ανθρωπίνη κτίσις) making uſe of their reaſon to unite together into ſociety. To prove this grand poſition of his, he tells us, p. 12. "Men "are born in ſubjection to their parents," and therefore cannot be free. And this authority of parents, he calls, "royal authority, p. 12, 14. fatherly autho"rity, right of fatherhood," p. 12, 20. One would have thought he would, in the beginning of ſuch a work as this, on which was to depend the authority of princes, and the obedience of ſubjects, have told us expreſsly, what that fatherly authority is, have defined it, though not limited it, becauſe in ſome other treatiſes of his, he tells us, 'tis unlimited, and * unlimitable; he ſhould, at leaſt, have given us ſuch an account of it, that we might have had an entire notion of this fatherhood, or fatherly authority, whenever it came in our way, in his writings: this I expected to have round in the firſt chapter of his Patriar-

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* In grants and gifts that have their original from God, or nature, as the power of the father hath, no inferior power of man can limit, nor make any law of preſcription againſt them. O. 158.

The ſcripture teaches, that ſupreme power was originally in the father, without any limitation, O. 245.

cha. But inſtead thereof, having, 1. En paſſant, made his obeiſance to the arcana imperii, p. 5. 2. Made his compliment to the "rights and liberties of this, "or any other nation," p. 6. which he is going preſently to null and deſtroy; and 3. Made his leg to thoſe learned men, who did not ſee ſo far into the matter as himſelf, p. 7. He comes to fall on Bellarmine, p. 8. and by a victory over him, eſtabliſhes his fatherly authority, beyond any queſtion. Bellarmine being routed by his own confeſſion, p. 11. the day is clear got, and there is no more need of any forces: for, having done that, I obſerve not that he ſtates the queſtion, or rallies up any arguments, to make good his opinion, but rather tells us the ſtory, as he thinks fit, of this ſtrange kind of domineering phantom, called the fatherhood, which whoever could catch, preſently got empire, and unlimited, abſolute power. He aſſures us, how this fatherhood began in Adam, continued its courſe, and kept the world in order, all the time of the patriarchs, till the flood, got out of the ark with Noah and his ſons, made and ſupported all the kings of the earth, 'till the captivity of the Iſraelites in Egypt; and then the poor fatherhood was under hatches, 'till "God, by giving the Iſraelites "kings, re-eſtabliſhed the ancient and prime right of the lineal ſucceſſion, in "paternal government." This is his buſineſs from p. 12, to 19. And then, obviating an objection, and clearing a difficulty, or two, with one half reaſon, p. 23. "to confirm the natural right of regal power," he ends the firſt chapter. I hope 'tis no injury to call an half quotation, an half reaſon; for God ſays, "Honour thy father and mother;" but our author contents himſelf with half, leaves out "thy mother" quite, as little ſerviceable to his purpoſe. But of that more in another place.

7. I do not think our author ſo little ſkill'd, in the way of writing diſcourſes of this nature, nor ſo careleſs of the point in hand, that he, by overſight, commits the fault that he himſelf, in his "anarchy of a mix'd monarchy, p. 239." objects to Mr. Hunton, in theſe words: "Where firſt I charge the A. that he "hath not given us any definition, or deſcription of monarchy, in general; "for, by the rules of method, he ſhould have firſt defined." And by the like rule of method, Sir Robert ſhould have told us, what his fatherhood, or fatherly authority, is, before he had told us, in whom it was to be found, and talked ſo much of it. But, perhaps, Sir Robert found, that this fatherly authority, this power of fathers, and of kings, for he makes them both the ſame, p. 24. would make a very odd and frightful figure, and very diſagreeing with what, either children imagine of their parents, or ſubjects of their kings, if he ſhould have given us the whole draught together, in that gigantic form, he had painted it in his own fancy; and therefore, like a wary phyſician, when he would have his patient ſwallow ſome harſh, or corroſive, liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that, which may dilute it; that the ſcattered parts may go down with leſs feeling, and cauſe leſs averſion.

8. Let us, then, endeavour to find, what account he gives us of this fatherly authority, as it lies ſcattered in the ſeveral parts of his writings. And firſt, as it was veſted in Adam, he ſays, "Not only Adam, but the ſucceeding patriarchs, had by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children, p. 12. "This lordſhip, which Adam, by command, had over the whole world, and by "right, deſcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample, "as the abſolute dominion of any monarch, which hath been ſince the creation, "p. 13. Dominion of life and death, making war, and concluding peace, p. 13. "Adam and the patriarchs had abſolute power of life and death, p. 35. Kings, "in the right of parents, ſucceed to the exerciſe of ſupreme juriſdiction, p. 19. "As kingly power is by the law of God, ſo it hath no inferior law, to limit "it, Adam was Lord of all, p. 40. The father of a family governs by no other law, than by his own will, p. 78. The ſuperiority of princes is above "laws, p. 79. The unlimited juriſdiction of kings is ſo amply deſcribed by "Samuel. p. 80. Kings are above the laws, p. 93. And to this purpoſe ſee a great deal more, which our A. delivers, in Bodin's words: "It is certain, "that all laws, privileges, and grants of princes, have no force, but during "their life; if they be not ratified, by the expreſs conſent, or by ſufferance of

" the prince following, eſpecially privileges, O. p. 279. The reaſon, why " laws have been alſo made by kings, was this; when kings were either buſied " with wars, or diſtracted with publick cares, ſo that every private man could " not have acceſs to their perſons, to learn their wills and pleaſure, then were " laws of neceſſity invented, that ſo every particular ſubject might find his prin" cipal pleaſure, deciphered unto him, in the tables of his laws, p. 92. In a " monarchy, the king muſt by neceſſity be above the laws, p. 100. A perfect " kingdom is that, wherein the king rules all things, according to his own will, " p. 100. Neither common, nor ſtatute laws, are, or can be, any diminution " of that general power, which kings have, over their people, by right of fa" therhood, p. 115. Adam was the father, king, and lord over his family; a " ſon, a ſubject, and a ſervant, or ſlave, were one and the ſame thing, at firſt. " The father had power to diſpoſe, or ſell, his children, or ſervants; whence " we find, that the firſt reckoning up of goods, in ſcripture, the man-ſervant " and the maid-ſervant, are numbered, among the poſſeſſions and ſubſtance of " the owner, as other goods were, O. pref. God alſo hath given to the father " a right, or liberty, to alien his power over his children, to any other; whence " we find the ſale, and gift, of children to have been much in uſe in the begin" ning of the world, when men had their ſervants for a poſſeſſion and an inhe" ritance, as well as other goods; whereupon we find the power of caſtrating " and making eunuchs, much in uſe, in old times, O. p. 155. Law is nothing " elſe, but the will of him, that hath the power of the ſupreme father, O. p. 223. " It was God's ordinance, that the ſupremacy ſhould be unlimited in Adam, and " as large as all the acts of his will; and as in him, ſo in all others, that have " ſupreme power, O. p. 245."

9. I HAVE been fain to trouble my reader with theſe ſeveral quotations, in our A.'s own words, that in them might be ſeen his own deſcription of his fatherly authority, as it lies ſcattered up and down, in his writings, which he ſuppoſes, was firſt veſted in Adam, and by right belongs to all princes ever ſince. This fatherly authority then, or right of fatherhood, in our A.'s ſenſe, is a divine unalterable right of ſovereignty, whereby a father, or a prince, hath an abſolute, arbitrary, unlimited, and unlimitable power, over the lives, liberties, and eſtates of his children and ſubjects; ſo that he may take, or alienate their eſtates, ſell, caſtrate, or uſe their perſons as he pleaſes, they being all his ſlaves, and he lord, or proprietor, of every thing, and his unbounded will their law.

10. OUR A. having placed ſuch a mighty power in Adam, and, upon that ſuppoſition, founded all government, and all power of princes, it is reaſonable to expect, that he ſhould have proved this, with arguments, clear and evident, ſuitable to the weightineſs of the cauſe. That, ſince men had nothing elſe left them, they might, in ſlavery, have ſuch undeniable proofs of its neceſſity, that their conſciences might be convinced, and oblige them to ſubmit peaceably to that abſolute dominion which their governors had a right to exerciſe over them. Without this, what good could our A. do, or pretend to do, by erecting ſuch an unlimited power, but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men, too apt of itſelf to grow and increaſe, with the poſſeſſion of any power? And by perſuading thoſe, who, by the conſent of their fellow-men, are advanced to great, but limited degrees of it, that, by that part which is given them, they have a right to all that was not ſo; and, therefore, may do what they pleaſe, becauſe they have authority to do more than others, and ſo tempt them to do what is neither for their own, nor the good of thoſe, under their care; whereby great miſchiefs cannot but follow.

THE ſovereignty of Adam, being that, on which, as a ſure baſis, our A. builds his mighty, abſolute monarchy, I expected, that, in his Patriarcha, this his main ſuppoſition would have been proved, and eſtabliſhed with all that evidence of arguments, that ſuch a fundamental tenet required; and that this, on which the great ſtreſs of the buſineſs depends, would have been made out, with reaſons ſufficient, to juſtify the confidence, with which it was aſſumed. But, in all that treatiſe, I could find very little tending that way: the thing is there ſo taken for granted, without proof, that I could ſcarce believe myſelf, when, upon on attentive reading that treatiſe, I found there ſo mighty a ſtructure raiſed, upon the bare ſuppoſition of this foundation. For it is ſcarce credible, that, in a diſcourſe where he pretends to confute the erroneous principle of man's natural freedom, he ſhould do it by a bare ſuppoſition of Adam's authority, without offering any proof for that authority. Indeed he confidently ſays, that Adam had "royal authority, p. 12, and 13. Abſolute lordſhip and dominion of life and "death, p. 13. An univerſal monarchy, p. 33. Abſolute power of life and "death, p. 35." He is very frequent in ſuch aſſertions; but, what is ſtrange, in all his whole Patriarcha, I find not one pretence of a reaſon, to eſtabliſh this his great foundation of government; not any thing, that looks like an argument, but theſe words: "To confirm this natural right, of regal power, we find in "the decalogue, that the law, which enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered "in the terms, Honour thy father; as if all power were originally in the fa- "ther." And why may I not add as well, That in the decalogue, the law that enjoins obedience to queens, is delivered in the terms of "Honour thy mother," as, if all power were originally in the mother? The argument, as Sir Robert puts it, will hold, as well for one as t'other: but of this, more in its due place.

12. All that I take notice of here, is, that this is all our A. ſays, in this firſt, or any of the following chapters, to prove the abſolute power of Adam, which is his great principle; and yet, as if he had there ſettled it, upon ſure demonſtration, he begins his ſecond chapter with theſe words, "By conferring "theſe proofs and reaſons, drawn from the authority of the ſcripture." Where thoſe proofs and reaſons, for Adam's ſovereignty, are, bating that of, Honour thy father, above-mentioned, I confeſs, I cannot find; unleſs what he ſays, p. 11. "In theſe words, we have an evident confeſſion, viz. of Bellarmine, that "creation made man, prince of his poſterity," muſt be taken for proofs and reaſons, drawn from ſcripture, or for any ſort of proof at all: tho' from thence, by a new way of inference, in the words immediately following, he concludes the royal authority of Adam, ſufficiently ſettled in him.

13. If he has, in that chapter, or any where, in the whole treatiſe, given any other proofs of Adam's royal authority, other than by often repeating it, which, among ſome men, goes for argument; I deſire any body for him, to ſhew me the place and page, that I may be convinced of my miſtake, and acknowledge my overſight. If no ſuch arguments are to be found, I beſeech thoſe men, who have ſo much cried up this book, to conſider, whether they do not give the world cauſe to ſuſpect, that 'tis not the force of reaſon and argument, that makes them for abſolute monarchy, but ſome other bye-intereſt, and therefore are reſolved to applaud any author, that writes in favour of this doctrine, whether he ſupport it with reaſon or no. But I hope they do not expect, that rational and indifferent men ſhould be brought over to their opinion, becauſe this their great doctor of it, in a diſcourſe, made on purpoſe to ſet up the abſolute monarchical power of Adam, in oppoſition to the natural freedom of mankind, has ſaid ſo little to prove it, from whence it is rather naturally to be concluded, that there is little to be ſaid.

14. But, that I might omit no care to inform myſelf in our A's full ſenſe, I conſulted his "obſervations on Ariſtotle, Hobbs, &c." to ſee, whether, in diſputing with others, he made uſe of any arguments, for this his darling tenet of Adam's ſovereignty; ſince, in his treatiſe of the "natural power of kings," he hath been ſo ſparing of them. In his obſervations on Mr. Hobbs's Leviathan, I think he has put, in ſhort, all thoſe arguments for it together, which in his writings I find him, any where, to make uſe of, ; his words are theſe: "If God "created only Adam, and of a piece of him made the woman, and if by gene- "ration from them two, as parts of them, all mankind be propagated: if alſo "God gave to Adam, not only the dominion over the woman, and the chil- "dren that ſhould iſſue from them, but alſo over the whole earth to ſubdue it, "and over all the creatures on it, ſo that, as long as Adam lived, no man could "claim, or enjoy, any thing but by donation, aſſignation, or permiſſion from "him, I wonder, &c. O. 165." Here we have the ſum of all his arguments, for Adam's ſovereignty, and againſt natural freedom, which I find up and down

in his other treatiſes: and they are theſe following; "God's creation of Adam, " the dominion he gave him over Eve, and the dominion he had, as father, over " his children:" all which, I ſhall particularly conſider.

CHAP. III.

Of Adam's title to ſovereignty by creation.

15. SIR Robert, in his preface to his obſervations on Ariſtotle's politicks, tells us, "A natural freedom of mankind cannot be ſuppoſed, without the " denial of the creation of Adam:" but how Adam's being created, which was nothing but his receiving a being, immediately from omnipotency, and the hand of God, gave Adam a ſovereignty over any thing, I cannot ſee; nor conſequently underſtand, how a ſuppoſition of natural freedom, is a denial of Adam's creation, and would be glad, any body elſe (ſince our A. did not vouchſafe us the favour) would make it out for him. For I find no difficulty to ſuppoſe the freedom of mankind, though I have always believed the creation of Adam. He was created, or began to exiſt, by God's immediate power, without the intervention of parents, or the pre-exiſtence of any of the ſame ſpecies, to beget him, when it pleaſed God he ſhould; and ſo did the lion, the king of beaſts before him, by the ſame creating power of God: and if bare exiſtence by that power, and in that way, will give dominion, without any more ado, our A. by this argument, will make the lion have as good a title to it, as he, and certainly the ancienter. No! for Adam had his title, " by the appointment of God," ſays our A. in another place. Then, bare creation gave him not dominion, and one might have ſuppoſed mankind free, without the denying the creation of Adam, ſince it was God's appointment made him monarch.

16. BUT let us ſee, how he puts his creation and this appointment together. " By the appointment of God, ſays Sir Robert, as ſoon as Adam was created, " he was monarch of the world, though he had no ſubjects; for though there " could not be actual government till there were ſubjects; yet, by the right of " nature, it was due to Adam, to be governor of his poſterity, though not in " act, yet at leaſt in habit, Adam was a king from his creation." I wiſh he had told us here, what he meant by God's appointment. For whatſoever providence orders, or the law of nature directs, or poſitive revelation declares, may be ſaid to be, by God's appointment: but I ſuppoſe it cannot be meant here, in the firſt ſenſe, i. e. by providence; becauſe that would be to ſay no more, but that, as ſoon as Adam was created, he was de facto monarch, becauſe, by right of nature, it was due to Adam to be governor of his poſterity. But he could not, de facto, be by providence conſtituted the governor of the world, at a time when there was actually no government, no ſubjects to be governed; which our A. here confeſſes. Monarch of the world is alſo differently uſed, by our A. for ſometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world, excluſive of the reſt of mankind, and thus he does, in the ſame page of his preface before cited; " Adam, ſays he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to " ſubdue it, and having dominion given him, over all creatures, was thereby " the monarch of the whole world, none of his poſterity had any right to poſ- " ſeſs any thing, but by his grant, or permiſſion, or by ſucceſſion from him." 2. Let us underſtand, then, by monarch, proprietor of the world, and by appointment, God's actual donation, and revealed, poſitive grant, made to Adam, Gen. i. 28. as we ſee Sir Robert himſelf does, in this parallel place; and then his argument will ſtand thus, " by the poſitive grant of God as ſoon as Adam " was created, he was proprietor of the world, becauſe, by the right of nature, " it was due to Adam, to be governor of his poſterity." In which way of arguing there are two manifeſt falſhoods. Firſt, it is falſe that God made that grant to Adam, as ſoon as he was created, ſince, though it ſtands in the text, immediately after his creation, yet it is plain, it could not be ſpoken to Adam, till after Eve was made, and brought to him; and how then could he be monarch,

narch, by appointment, as ſoon as created, eſpecially ſince he calls, if I miſtake not, that which God ſays to Eve, Gen. iii. 16. the original grant of government, which not being, till after the fall, when Adam was ſomewhat, at leaſt in time, and very much diſtant in condition, from his creation; I cannot ſee, how our A. can ſay in this ſenſe, that, "by God's appointment, as ſoon as Adam was created, he was monarch of the world." Secondly, were it true, that God's actual donation, "appointed Adam monarch of the world, as ſoon as he was created," yet the reaſon, here given for it, would not prove it, but it would always be a falſe inference, that God, by a poſitive donation, "appointed Adam monarch of the world; becauſe, by right of nature, it was due to Adam, to be governor of his poſterity:" for, having given him the right of government, by nature, there was no need of a poſitive donation; at leaſt it will never be a proof of ſuch a donation.

17. On the other ſide, the matter will not be much mended, if we underſtand by God's appointment, the law of nature, (though it be a pretty harſh expreſſion for it, in this place) and, by monarch of the world, ſovereign ruler of mankind: for then the ſentence under conſideration muſt run thus: "By the law of nature, as ſoon as Adam was created, he was governor of mankind; for, by right of nature, it was due to Adam, to be governor of his poſterity;" which amounts to this, he was governor, by right of nature, becauſe he was governor by right of nature. But ſuppoſing we ſhould grant, that a man is by nature governor of his children, Adam could not hereby be monarch, as ſoon as created: for this right of nature, being founded in his being their father, how Adam could have a natural right to be governor, before he was a father, when, by being a father only, he had that right, is, methinks, hard to conceive, unleſs he would have him to be a father, before he was a father, and have a title before he had it.

18. To this foreſeen objection our A. anſwers very logically, "He was governor in habit and not in act:" a very pretty way of being a governor, without government, a father without children, and a king without ſubjects. And thus, Sir Robert was an author, before he writ his book, not in act, 'tis true, but in habit, for when he had once publiſhed it, it was due to him, by the right of nature, to be an author, as much as it was to Adam, to be governor of his children, when he had begot them; And, if to be ſuch a monarch of the world, an abſolute monarch in habit, but not in act, will ſerve the turn, I ſhould not much envy it, to any of Sir Robert's friends, that he thought fit graciouſly to beſtow it upon; though even this of act and habit, if it ſignified any thing, but our A.'s ſkill in diſtinctions, be not to his purpoſe in this place. For the queſtion is not here, about Adam's actual exerciſe of government, but actually having a title to be governor: government, ſays our A. was "due to Adam, by the right of nature:" What is this right of nature? A right fathers have over their children, by begetting them; "Generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos," ſays our A. out of Grotius, O. 223. The right, then, follows the begetting, as ariſing from it; ſo that according to this way of reaſoning, or diſtinguiſhing of our A. Adam, as ſoon as he was created, had a title only in habit, and not in act, which in plain Engliſh is, he had actually no title at all.

19. To ſpeak leſs learnedly, and more intelligibly, one may ſay of Adam, he was in a poſſibility of being governor, ſince it was poſſible, he might beget children, and thereby acquire the right of nature, be it what it will, to govern them, that accrues from thence: but what connection has this, with Adam's creation, to make him ſay, that "as ſoon as he was created, he was monarch of the world?" For, it may as well be ſaid of Noah, that as ſoon as he was born, he was monarch of the world, ſince he was in poſſibility (which in our A.'s ſenſe is enough to make a monarch, "a monarch in habit") to outlive all mankind, but his own poſterity. What ſuch neceſſary connection there is, betwixt Adam's creation, and his right to government, ſo that a "natural freedom of mankind cannot be ſuppoſed without the denial of the creation of Adam," I confeſs, for my part, I do not ſee; nor how thoſe words, "by the appointment, &c." O. 254. however explained, can be put together, to make any

tolerable ſenſe, at leaſt to eſtabliſh this poſition, with which they end, viz. "Adam was a king from his creation;" a king, ſays our A. "not in act, but "in habit," i. e. actually no king at all.

20. I fear I have tired my reader's patience, by dwelling longer on this paſſage, than the weightineſs of any argument in it, ſeems to require: but I have unavoidably been engaged in it, by our A.'s way of writing, who huddling ſeveral ſuppoſitions together, and that, in doubtful and general terms, makes ſuch a medley and confuſion, that it is impoſſible to ſhew his miſtakes, without examining the ſeveral ſenſes, wherein his words may be taken, and without ſeeing how, in any of theſe various meanings, they will conſiſt together, and have any truth in them: for, in this preſent paſſage before us, how can any one argue againſt this poſition of his, "that Adam was a king from his creation," unleſs one examine, whether the words, "from his creation," be to be taken as they may, for the time of the commencement of his government, as the foregoing words import, "as ſoon as he was created, he was monarch;" or, for the cauſe of it, as he ſays, p. 11. "Creation made man prince of his poſterity?" how farther can one judge of the truth of his being thus king, till one has examined, whether, king be to be taken, as the words, in the beginning of this paſſage, would perſuade, on ſuppoſition of his private dominion, which was by God's poſitive grant, "monarch of the world by appointment;" or king, on ſuppoſition of his fatherly power over his offſpring, which was by nature, "due by the right of nature: whether, I ſay, king be to be taken in both, or one only of theſe two ſenſes, or in neither of them, but only this, that creation made him prince, in a way different from both the other? For though this aſſertion, that "Adam was king from his creation," be true in no ſenſe, yet it ſtands here, as an evident concluſion, drawn from the preceding words, though in truth it be but a bare aſſertion, join'd to other aſſertions of the ſame kind, which, confidently put together, in words of undetermined and dubious meaning, look like a ſort of arguing, when there is, indeed, neither proof nor connection: a way, very familiar with our A. of which having given the reader a taſte here, I ſhall, as much as the argument will permit me, avoid touching on hereafter; and ſhould not have done it here, were it not to let the world ſee, how incoherencies in matter, and ſuppoſitions without proofs, put handſomely together, in good words and a plauſible ſtile, are apt to paſs for ſtrong reaſon and good ſenſe, 'till they come to be look'd into, with attention.

CHAP. IV.

Of Adam's title to ſovereignty, by donation, Gen. i. 28.

21. HAVING at laſt got through the foregoing paſſage, where we have been ſo long detain'd, not by the force of arguments and oppoſition, but the intricacy of the words, and the doubtfulneſs of the meaning, let us go on to his next argument, for Adam's ſovereignty. Our A. tells us, in the words of Mr. Selden, that "Adam, by donation from God, Gen. i. 28. was made "the general Lord of all things, not without ſuch a private dominion to him-"ſelf, as without his grant, did exclude his children. This determination of "Mr. Selden, ſays our A. is conſonant to the hiſtory of the Bible, and natural "reaſon, O. 201." And, in his pref. to his obſ. on Ariſt. he ſays thus: "The "firſt government in the world, was monarchical, in the father of all fleſh. "Adam being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to ſubdue it, "and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch "of the whole world; none of his poſterity had any right to poſſeſs any thing, "but by his grant, or permiſſion, or by ſucceſſion from him: the earth, ſaith "the Pſalmiſt, hath he given to the children of men; which ſhews the title "comes from fatherhood."

22. Before I examine this argument, and the text, on which it is founded, it is neceſſary to deſire the reader to obſerve, that our A. according to his uſual method, begins in one ſenſe, and concludes in another; he begins here with Adam's propriety, or private dominion, by donation; and his concluſion is, " which ſhews the title comes from fatherhood."

23. But let us ſee the argument. The words of the text are theſe, " And " God bleſſed them, and God ſaid unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and " repleniſh the earth and ſubdue it, and have dominion over the fiſh of the ſea, " and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon " the earth, Gen. i. 28." from whence our A. concludes, " that Adam, having " here dominion given him, over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the " whole world:" whereby muſt be meant, that either this grant of God gave Adam property, or as our A. calls it, " private dominion" over the earth, and all inferior, or irrational creatures, and ſo conſequently, that he was thereby monarch; or 2dly, that it gave him rule and dominion over all earthly creatures, whatſoever, and thereby over his children, and ſo he was monarch; for, as Mr. Selden has properly worded it, Adam " was made general Lord of all things," one may very clearly underſtand him, that he means nothing to be granted to Adam here, but property; and therefore, he ſays not one word of Adam's monarchy. But our A. ſays " Adam was hereby monarch of the world," which, properly ſpeaking, ſignifies ſovereign ruler of all the men in the world; and ſo Adam, by this grant, muſt be conſtituted ſuch a ruler. If our A. means otherwiſe, he might with much clearneſs have ſaid, that " Adam was hereby " proprietor of the whole world." But he begs your pardon, in that point; clear, diſtinct ſpeaking not ſerving every where to his purpoſe, you muſt not expect it in him, as Mr. Selden, or other ſuch writers.

24. In oppoſition, therefore, to our A.'s doctrine, that " Adam was monarch " of the whole world," founded on this place, I ſhall ſhew,

1. That by this grant, Gen. i. 28. God gave no immediate power to Adam, over men, over his children, over thoſe of his own ſpecies; and ſo he was not made ruler, or monarch, by this charter.

2. That, by this grant, God gave him not private dominion over the inferior creatures, but right in common with all mankind, ſo neither was he monarch upon the account of the property here given him.

25. 1. That this donation, Gen. i. 28. gave Adam no power over men, will appear, if we conſider the words of it. For, ſince all poſitive grants convey no more, than the expreſs words, they are made in, will carry, let us ſee, which of them, here, will comprehend mankind, or Adam's poſterity; and thoſe, I imagine, if any, muſt be theſe, " every living thing that moveth," the words in Hebrew are, חיה הרמשת i. e. " beſtiam reptantem," of which words the ſcripture itſelf is the beſt interpreter: God having created the fiſhes and fowls, the fifth day, the beginning of the ſixth he creates the irrational inhabitants of the dry land, which, ver. 24. are deſcribed in theſe words, " Let the earth bring " forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping things, and beaſts " of the earth, after his kind; and ver. 25. and God made the beaſts of the " earth, after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth " on the earth, after his kind:" Here, in the creation of the brute inhabitants of the earth, he firſt ſpeaks of them all, under one general name, of living creatures; and then, afterwards, divides them into three ranks, 1. Cattle, or ſuch creatures as were, or might be tame, and ſo be the private poſſeſſion of particular men: 2. חיה, which ver. 24 and 25, in our Bible, is tranſlated beaſts, and by the Septuagint ϑηρια, wild beaſts, and is the ſame word, that here in our text, ver. 28, where we have this great charter to Adam, is tranſlated living thing, and is alſo the ſame word uſed Gen. ix. 2. where this grant is renewed to Noah, and there likewiſe tranſlated beaſt. 3. The third rank were the creeping animals, which ver. 24 and 25, are compriſed under the word, הרמשת, the ſame, that is uſed here ver. 28, and is tranſlated moving, but in the former verſes creeping, and by the Septuagint, in all theſe places, ἑρπετὰ, or reptils; from whence it appears, that the words, which we tranſlate here, in God's donation,

ver. 28. "living creatures moving," are the ſame, which, in the hiſtory of the creation, ver. 24, 25. ſignify two ranks of terreſtrial creatures, viz. wild beaſts and reptils, and are ſo underſtood by the Septuagint.

26. WHEN God had made the irrational animals of the world, divided into three kinds, from the places of their habitation, viz. fiſhes of the ſea, fowls of the air, and living creatures of the earth, and theſe again into cattle, wild beaſts, and reptils, he conſiders of making man, and the dominion he ſhould have, over the terreſtrial world, ver. 26. and then he reckons up the inhabitants of theſe three kingdoms: but in the terreſtrial, leaves out the ſecond rank חיה, or wild beaſts: but here, ver. 28. where he actually executes this deſign, and gives him this dominion, the text mentions the fiſhes of the ſea, and fowls of the air, and the terreſtrial creatures, in the words that ſignify the wild beaſts and reptils, though tranſlated, living thing, that moveth, leaving out cattle. In both which places, though the word, that ſignifies wild beaſts, be omitted in one, and that which ſignifies cattle in the other, yet, ſince God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he deſigned in the other, we cannot but underſtand the ſame, in both places; and have here only an account, how the terreſtrial, irrational animals, which were already created and reckoned up, at their creation, in three diſtinct ranks of cattle, wild beaſts, and reptils, were here, ver. 28. actually put under the dominion of man, as they were deſigned, ver. 26. nor do theſe words contain in them the leaſt appearance of any thing, that can be wreſted, to ſignify God's giving, to one man, dominion over another, to Adam over his poſterity.

27. AND this further appears from Gen. ix. 2. where God renewing this charter to Noah and his ſons, he gives them dominion over the fowls of the air, and the fiſhes of the ſea, and the terreſtrial creatures, expreſſed by חיה and הרמש wild beaſts and reptils, the ſame words that, in the text before us, Gen. i. 28. are tranſlated, "every moving thing, that moveth on the earth," which by no means can comprehend man, the grant being made to Noah and his ſons, all the men, then living, and not to one part of men over another: which is yet more evident, from the very next words, ver. 3. where God gives every רמש, "every moving thing," the very words uſed, ch. i. 28. to them for food. By all which it is plain, that God's donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. and his deſignation, v. 26. and his grant again to Noah and his ſons, refer to, and contain in them, neither more nor leſs, than the works of the creation of the fifth day, and the beginning of the ſixth, as they are ſet down from the 20th, to 26th ver. incuſively of the 1ſt ch. and ſo comprehend all the ſpecies of irrational animals, of the terraqueous globe; though all the words, whereby they are expreſſed, in the hiſtory of their creation, are no where uſed, in any of the following grants, but ſome of them omitted in one, and ſome in another. From whence I think, it is paſt all doubt, that man cannot be comprehended in this grant, nor any dominion, over thoſe of his own ſpecies, be conveyed to Adam. All the terreſtrial, irrational creatures are enumerated, at their creation, ver. 25. under the names "beaſts of the earth, cattle, and creeping things;" but man, being not then created, was not contained, under any of thoſe names; and therefore, whether we underſtand the Hebrew words right, or no, they cannot be ſuppoſed to comprehend man, in the very ſame hiſtory, and the very next verſes following; eſpecially ſince that Hebrew word רמש which, if any, in this donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. muſt comprehend man, is ſo plainly uſed in contradiſtinction to him, as Gen. vi. 20. vii. 14, 21, 23. Gen. viii. 17, 19. And, if God made all mankind ſlaves to Adam and his heirs, by giving Adam dominion, over "every living thing, that moveth on the earth," ch. i. 28. as our A. would have it, methinks Sir Robert ſhould have carried his monarchical power one ſtep higher, and ſatisfied the world, that princes might eat their ſubjects too, ſince God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs, ch. ix. 2. to eat "every "living thing, that moveth," as he did to Adam, to have dominion over them; the Hebrew words, in both places, being the ſame.

28. DAVID, who might be ſuppoſed to underſtand the donation of God in this text, and the right of kings too, at well as our A. in his comment on this

place, as the learned and judicious Ainſworth calls it, in the 8th Pſalm, finds here no ſuch charter of monarchical power; his words are, "Thou haſt made "him, i. e. man, the ſon of man, a little lower then the angels, thou madeſt "him to have dominion over the works of thy hands, thou haſt put all things "under his feet, all ſheep and oxen, and the beaſts of the field, and the fowls "of the air, and fiſh of the ſea, and whatſoever paſſeth through the paths of the "ſea," In which words, if any one can find out, that there is meant any monarchical power of one man over another, but only the dominion of the whole ſpecies of mankind over the inferior ſpecies of creatures, he may, for aught I know, deſerve to be one of Sir Rob.'s monarchs in habit, for the rareneſs of the diſcovery. And by this time, I hope 'tis evident, that he that gave "dominion "over every living thing, that moveth on the earth," gave Adam no monarchical power, over thoſe of his own ſpecies; which will yet appear more fully, in the next thing I am to ſhew.

29. 2. Whatever God gave, by the words of this grant, Gen. i. 28. it was not to Adam in particular, excluſive of all other men: whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not a private dominion, but a dominion, in common with the reſt of mankind. That this donation was not made, in particular to Adam, appears evidently from the words of the text, it being made to more than one, for it was ſpoken in the plural number, God bleſſed them, and ſaid unto them, have dominion. God ſays unto Adam and Eve, have dominion, "thereby, ſays our "A. Adam was monarch of the world:" but the grant being to them, i. e. ſpoke to Eve alſo, as many interpreters think, with reaſon, that theſe words were not ſpoken, 'till Adam had his wife, muſt not ſhe thereby be lady, as well as he lord, of the world? If it be ſaid, that Eve was ſubjected to Adam, it ſeems ſhe was not ſo ſubjected to him, as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or property in them; for ſhall we ſay, that God ever made a joint grant to two, and one only was to have the benefit of it?

30. But, perhaps, 'twill be ſaid, "Eve was not made till afterward:" grant it ſo, what advantage will our A. get by it? The text will be only more directly againſt him, and ſhew that God, in his donation, gave the world to mankind, in common; and not to Adam, in particular. The word them, in the text, muſt include the ſpecies of man, for 'tis certain them, can by no means ſignify Adam alone. In the 26th verſe, where God declares his intention to give this dominion, it is plain he meant, that he would make a ſpecies of creatures, that ſhould have dominion over the other ſpecies of this terreſtrial globe: the words are, "And God ſaid, let us make man in our image, after our likeneſs, and let them "have dominion over the fiſh, &c." They, then, were to have dominion. Who? even thoſe, who were to have the image of God, the individuals of that ſpecies of man, that he was going to make; for that them, ſhould ſignify Adam ſingly, excluſive of the reſt, that ſhould be in the world with him, is againſt both ſcripture and all reaſon: and it cannot poſſibly, be made ſenſe, if man, in the former part of the verſe, do not ſignify the ſame with them, in the latter; only man there, as is uſual, is taken for the ſpecies, and them the individuals of that ſpecies; and we have a reaſon, in the very text. God makes him "in "his own image, after his own likeneſs," makes him an intellectual creature, and ſo capable of dominion: for wherein ſoever elſe the image of God conſiſted, the intellectual nature was certainly a part of it, and belonged to the whole ſpecies, and enabled them to have dominion over the inferior creatures; and therefore David ſaith in the 8th Pſalm above cited, "Thou haſt made him little "lower than the angels, thou haſt made him to have dominion." 'Tis not of Adam, king David ſpeaks here, for verſe 4. 'tis plain, 'tis of man, and the ſon of man, of the ſpecies of mankind.

31. And that this grant, ſpoken to Adam, was made to him, and the whole ſpecies of man, is clear from our A.'s own proof, out of the Pſalmiſt. "The "earth, ſaith the Pſalmiſt, hath he given to the children of men; which ſhews "the title comes from fatherhood." Theſe are Sir Robert's words, in the preface before cited, and a ſtrange inference it is he makes; "God hath given the "earth to the children of men; ergo, the title comes from fatherhood" 'Tis

pity, the propriety of the Hebrew tongue had not uſed fathers of men, inſtead of children of men, to expreſs mankind; then indeed our A. might have had the countenance of the ſound of the words, to have placed the title in the fatherhood. But to conclude, that the fatherhood had the right to the earth, becauſe God gave it to the children of men, is a way of arguing, contrary to our A. and a man muſt have a great mind to go contrary to the ſound, as well as ſenſe of the words, before he could light on it. But the ſenſe is yet harder, and more remote from our A.'s purpoſe: for as it ſtands in his preface, it is to prove Adam's being monarch; and his reaſoning is thus, "God gave the earth to the children "of men; ergo, Adam was monarch of the world." I defy any man to make a more pleaſant concluſion than this; which cannot be excuſed from the moſt obvious abſurdity, 'till it can be ſhewn, that by children of men, he who had no father, Adam alone is ſignified; but whatever our A. does, the ſcripture ſpeaks not nonſenſe.

32. To maintain this property and private dominion of Adam, our A. labours, in the following page, to deſtroy the community, granted to Noah and his ſons, in that parallel place, Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3. and he endeavours to do it two ways.

1. SIR ROBERT would perſuade us, againſt the expreſs words of the ſcripture, that what was here granted to Noah, was not granted to his ſons, in common with him. His words are; "As for the general community between Noah "and his ſons, which Mr. Selden will have to be granted to them, Gen. ix. 2. "the text doth not warrant it." What warrant our A. would have, when the plain, expreſs words of ſcripture, not capable of another meaning, will not ſatisfy him, who pretends to build wholly on ſcripture, is not eaſy to imagine. The text ſays, "God bleſſed Noah and his ſons, and ſaid unto them, i. e. as our A. "would have it, unto him: for, ſaith he, although the ſons are there mentioned "with Noah, in the bleſſing, yet it may be beſt underſtood, with a ſubordina"tion, or benediction in ſucceſſion," O. 211. That, indeed, is beſt for our A. to be underſtood, which beſt ſerves to his purpoſe; but that truly may beſt be underſtood, by any body elſe, which beſt agrees with the plain conſtruction of the words, and ariſes from the obvious meaning of the place; and then, with ſubordination and in ſucceſſion, will not be beſt underſtood, in a grant of God, where he himſelf put them not, nor mentions any ſuch limitation. But yet, our A. has reaſons, why it may beſt be underſtood ſo. "The bleſſing, ſays he in "the following words, might truly be fulfilled, of the ſons, either under, or after "their father enjoy'd a private dominion," O. 211. which is to ſay, that a grant, whoſe expreſs words give a joint title, in preſent (for the text ſays, into your hands they are deliver'd) may beſt be underſtood, with a ſubordination, or in ſucceſſion: becauſe 'tis poſſible, that in ſubordination, or in ſucceſſion, it may be enjoyed. Which is all one as to ſay, that a grant of any thing, in preſent poſſeſſion, may beſt be underſtood of reverſion: becauſe 'tis poſſible one may live to enjoy it in reverſion. If the grant be, indeed, to a father, and to his ſons after him, who is ſo kind as to let his children enjoy it preſently, in common with him, one may truly ſay, as to the event, one will be as good as the other; but it can never be true, that what the expreſs words grant in poſſeſſion, and in common, may beſt be underſtood to be in reverſion. The ſum of all his reaſoning amounts to this: God did not give to the ſons of Noah, the world, in common with their father, becauſe 'twas poſſible they might enjoy it under, or after him. A very good ſort of argument, againſt an expreſs text of ſcripture: but God muſt not be believed, though he ſpeaks it himſelf, when he ſays, or does, any thing, which will not conſiſt with Sir Robert's hypotheſis.

33. FOR 'tis plain, however he would exclude them, That part of this benediction, as he would have it, in ſucceſſion, muſt needs be meant to the ſons, not to Noah himſelf at all: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and repleniſh the earth," ſays God in this bleſſing. This part of the benediction, as appears by the ſequel, concern'd not Noah himſelf at all; for we read not of any children he had, after the flood; and in the following chapter, where his poſterity is reckon'd up, there is no mention of any, and ſo this benediction in ſucceſſion, was not to take place, 'till 350 years after; and to ſave our A.'s imaginary monarchy, the peopling of

the world muſt be deferr'd 350 years; for this part of the benediction cannot be underſtood with ſubordination, unleſs our A. will ſay, that they muſt aſk leave for their father Noah, to lie with their wives. But in this one point, our A. is conſtant to himſelf in all his diſcourſes, he takes great care there ſhould be monarchs in the world, but very little that there ſhould be people; and, indeed, his way of government is not the way to people the world. For how much abſolute monarchy helps to fulfil this great and primary bleſſing of God Almighty, "Be "fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the earth," which contains in it the improvement, too, of arts and ſciences, and the conveniences of life, may be ſeen in thoſe large and rich countries, which are happy under the Turkiſh government, where are not now to be found $\frac{1}{3}$, nay in many, if not moſt parts of them $\frac{1}{30}$, perhaps I might ſay not $\frac{1}{000}$ of the people, that were formerly; as will eaſily appear to any one, who will compare the acccounts we have of it, at this time, with antient hiſtory. But this, by the by.

34. The other parts of this benediction, or grant, are ſo expreſſed, that they muſt needs be underſtood, to belong equally to them all; as much to Noah's ſons, as to Noah himſelf, and not to his ſons, with a ſubordination, or in ſucceſſion. "The fear of you, and the dread of you, ſays God, ſhall be upon every beaſt," &c. Will any body but our A. ſay, that the creatures feared and ſtood in awe of Noah only, and not of his Sons, without his leave, or 'till after his death? And the following words, "into your hands they are deliver'd," are they to be underſtood, as our A. ſays, if your father pleaſe, or they ſhall be deliver'd into your hands, hereafter? If this be to argue from ſcripture, I know not what may not be prov'd by it; and I can ſcarce ſee, how much this differs from that fiction and fancy, or how much a ſurer foundation it will prove, than the opinions of philoſophers and poets, which our A. ſo much condemns in his preface.

35. But our A. goes on to prove, that "it may beſt be underſtood, with a "ſubordination, or a benediction in ſucceſſion; for, ſays he, it is not probable, "that the private dominion, which God gave to Adam, and by his donation, "aſſignation, or ceſſion, to his children, was abrogated, and a community of "all things inſtituted, between Noah and his ſons.——Noah was left the ſole "heir of the world; why ſhould it be thought, that God would diſinherit him "of his birth-right, and make him, of all men in the world, the only tenant, "in common with his children?" O. 211.

36. The prejudices of our own ill-grounded opinions, however by us called probable, cannot authorize us to underſtand ſcripture, contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the words. I grant, 'tis not probable, that Adam's private dominion was here abrogated: becauſe it is more than improbable, (for it will never be proved) that ever Adam had any ſuch private dominion: and ſince parallel places of ſcripture are moſt probable, to make us know, how they may be beſt underſtood, there needs but the comparing this bleſſing here, to Noah and his ſons, after the flood, with that to Adam after the creation, Gen. i. 28. to aſſure any one, that God gave Adam no ſuch private dominion. 'Tis probable, I confeſs, that Noah ſhould have the ſame title, the ſame property and dominion, after the flood, that Adam had before it: but, ſince private dominion cannot conſiſt with the bleſſing and grant, God gave to him and his ſons in common, 'tis a ſufficient reaſon to conclude, that Adam had none, eſpecially ſince in the donation made to him, there are no words that expreſs it, or do in the leaſt favour it; and then let my reader judge, whether it may beſt be underſtood, when in the one place there is not one word for it, not to ſay what has been above proved, that the text in itſelf proves the contrary; and in the other, the words and ſenſe are directly againſt it.

37. But our A. ſays, "Noah was the ſole heir of the world, why ſhould it "be thought, that God would diſinherit him of his birth-right?" Heir, indeed in England, ſignifies the eldeſt ſon, who is, by the law of England, to have all his father's land, but where God ever appointed any ſuch heir of the world, our A. would have done well to have ſhew'd us; and how God diſinherited him of his birth-right, or what harm was done him, if God gave his ſons a right, to make uſe of a part of the earth, for the ſupport of themſelves and families, when

the whole was not only more than Noah himſelf, but infinitely more, than they all could make uſe of; and the poſſeſſions of one could not at all prejudice, or, as to any uſe, ſtreighten that of the other.

38. Our A. probably foreſeeing he might not be very ſucceſsful in perſuading people out of their ſenſes, and ſay what he could, men would be apt to believe the plain words of ſcripture, and think, as they ſaw, that the grant was ſpoken to Noah and his ſons jointly; he endeavours to inſinuate, as if this grant to Noah, conveyed no property, no dominion; becauſe, "ſubduing the earth, "and dominion over the creatures, are therein omitted, nor the earth once na-"med." And therefore, ſays he, "there is a conſiderable difference between "theſe two texts; the firſt bleſſing gave Adam a dominion, over the earth and "all creatures, the latter allows Noah liberty, to uſe the living creatures for food; "here is no alteration, or diminiſhing of his title, to a property of all things, but "an enlargement only of his commons," O. 211. So that in our A's ſenſe, all, that was ſaid here to Noah and his ſons, gave them no dominion, no property, but only enlarged the commons; their commons, I ſhould ſay, ſince God ſays, "to you "are they given," though our A. ſays his, for as for Noah's ſons, they, it ſeems, by Sir Robert's appointment, during their father's life-time, were to keep faſting days.

39. Any one, but our A. would be mightily ſuſpected to be blinded with prejudice, that, in all this bleſſing to Noah and his ſons, could ſee nothing, but only an enlargement of commons. For, as to dominion, which our A. thinks omitted, "the fear of you, and the dread of you, ſays God, ſhall be upon every beaſt," which I ſuppoſe, expreſſes the dominion, or ſuperiority, was deſigned man over the living creatures, as fully as may be; for, in that fear and dread, ſeems chiefly to conſiſt, what was given to Adam, over the inferior animals; who, as abſolute a monarch as he was, could not make bold with a lark, or rabbit, to ſatisfy his hunger, and had the herbs, but in common with the beaſts, as is plain from Gen. i. 2, 9, and 30. In the next place 'tis manifeſt that, in this bleſſing to Noah and his ſons, property is not only given in clear words, but in a larger extent, than it was to Adam. "Into your hands they are given," ſays God to Noah and his ſons; which words, if they give not property, nay, property in poſſeſſion, 'twill be hard to find words that can; ſince there is not a way, to expreſs a man's being poſſeſſed of any thing, more natural, nor more certain, than to ſay, it is delivered into his hands. And, ver. 3. to ſhew, that they had then given them the utmoſt property man is capable of, which is to have a right to deſtroy any thing by uſing it, "Every moving thing that liveth, ſaith God, ſhall "be meat for you;" which was not allowed to Adam, in his charter. This our A. calls, "a liberty of uſing them for food, and only an enlargement of com-"mons, but no alteration of property," O. 211. What other property man can have, in the creatures, but the "liberty of uſing them," is hard to be underſtood: ſo that, if the firſt bleſſing, as our A. ſays, gave Adam "dominion over "the creatures," and the bleſſing to Noah and his ſons gave them "ſuch a li-"berty to uſe them," as Adam had not; it muſt needs give them ſomething, that Adam, with his ſovereignty, wanted, ſomething that one would be apt to take for a greater property; for certainly, he has no abſolute dominion over, even the brutal part of the creatures, and the property, he has in them, is very narrow and ſcanty, who cannot make that uſe of them, which is permitted to another. Should any one, who is abſolute lord of a country, have bidden our A. ſubdue the earth, and given him dominion over the creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have taken a kid, or a lamb, out of the flock, to ſatisfy his hunger; I gueſs, he would ſcarce have thought himſelf lord, or proprietor, of that land, or the cattle on it; but would have found the difference, between "having domi-"nion," which a ſhepherd may have, and having full property, as an owner. So that, had it been his own caſe, Sir Robert, I believe, would have thought, here was an alteration, nay, an enlarging of property; and that Noah and his children had, by this grant, not only property given them, but ſuch a property given them, in the creatures, as Adam had not: for however, in reſpect of one another, men may be allowed to have propriety, in their diſtinct portions of the

creatures; yet, in reſpect of God, the maker of heaven and earth, who is ſole lord and proprietor of the whole world, man's propriety in the creatures is nothing, but that "liberty to uſe them," which God has permitted; and ſo man's property may be altered and enlarged, as we ſee it was here, after the flood, when other uſes of them are allowed, which before were not. From all which, I ſuppoſe, it is clear, that neither Adam nor Noah had any "private dominion," any property in the creatures, excluſive of his poſterity, as they ſhould ſucceſſively grow up, into need of them, and come to be able to make uſe of them.

40. Thus we have examined our A.'s argument for Adam's monarchy, founded on the bleſſing pronounced, Gen. i. 28. Wherein I think 'tis impoſſible for any ſober reader, to find any other, but the ſetting of mankind, above the other kinds of creatures, in this habitable earth of ours. 'Tis nothing, but the giving to man, the whole ſpecies of man, as the chief inhabitant, who is the image of his Maker, the dominion over the other creatures. This lies ſo obvious in the plain words, that any one, But our A. would have thought it neceſſary to have ſhewn, how theſe words, that ſeem'd to ſay the quite contrary, gave "Adam monarchical, abſolute power," over other men, or the ſole property in all the creatures; and methinks, in a buſineſs of this moment, and that whereon he builds all that follows, he ſhould have done ſomething more, than barely cite words, which apparently make againſt him; for I confeſs, I cannot ſee any thing in them, tending to Adam's monarchy, or private dominion, but quite the contrary. And I the leſs deplore the dulneſs of my apprehenſion herein, ſince I find the apoſtle ſeems to have as little notion of any ſuch "private dominion "of Adam," as I, when he ſays, "God gives us all things richly to enjoy," which he could not do, if it were all given away already, to monarch Adam, and the monarchs, his heirs and ſucceſſors. To conclude; this text is ſo far from proving Adam, ſole proprietor, that on the contrary, it is a confirmation of the original community of all things, amongſt the ſons of men; which appearing, from this donation of God, as well as other places of ſcripture, the ſovereignty of Adam, built upon his "private dominion," muſt fall, not having any foundation to ſupport it.

41. But yet if, after all, any one will needs have it ſo, that, by this donation of God, Adam was made ſole proprietor of the whole earth, what will this be to his ſovereignty? and how will it appear, that propriety in land gives a man power over the life of another? or how will the poſſeſſion, even of the whole earth, give any one a ſovereign, arbitrary authority, over the perſons of men? The moſt ſpecious thing to be ſaid, is, that he that is proprietor of the whole world, may deny all the reſt of mankind food, and ſo at his pleaſure ſtarve them, if they will not acknowledge his ſovereignty, and obey his will. If this were true, it would be a good argument to prove, that there was never any ſuch property, that God never gave any ſuch private dominion; ſince it is more reaſonable to think, that God, who bid mankind increaſe and multiply, ſhould rather himſelf give them all a right, to make uſe of the food and raiment, and other conveniencies of life, the materials whereof he had ſo plentifully provided for them, than to make them depend upon the will of a man for their ſubſiſtence, who ſhould have power to deſtroy them all, when he pleaſed, and who, being no better than other men, was in ſucceſſion likelier by want, and the dependance of a ſcanty fortune, to tie them to hard ſervice, than by liberal allowance of the conveniencies of life, promote the great deſign of God, "increaſe and multiply." He that doubts this, let him look into the abſolute monarchies of the world, and ſee what becomes of the conveniencies of life, and the multitudes of people.

42. But we know, God hath not left one man ſo to the mercy of another, that he may ſtarve him, if he pleaſe: God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children ſuch a property, in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right, in the ſurpluſage of his goods, ſo that it cannot juſtly be denied him, when his preſſing wants call for it. And, therefore, no man could ever have a juſt power over the life of another, by right of property in land, or poſſeſſions, ſince 'twould always

be a ſin, in any man of eſtate, to let his brother periſh, for want of affording him relief, out of his plenty. As juſtice gives every man a title to the product of his honeſt induſtry, and the fair acquiſitions of his anceſtors deſcended to him: ſo charity gives every man a title, to ſo much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to ſubſiſt otherwiſe: and a man can no more juſtly make uſe of another's neceſſity, to force him to become his vaſſal, by with-holding that relief, God requires him to afford, to the wants of his brother, than he, that has more ſtrength, can ſeize upon a weaker, maſter him to his obedience, and, with a dagger at his throat, offer him death, or ſlavery.

43. Should any one make ſo perverſe an uſe of God's bleſſings, poured on him with a liberal hand; ſhould any one be cruel and uncharitable to that extremity, yet all this would not prove that propriety in land, even in this caſe, gave any authority over the perſons of men, but only that compact might; ſince the authority of the rich proprietor, and the ſubjection of the needy beggar, began not from the poſſeſſion of the lord, but the conſent of the poor man, who preferr'd being his ſubject to ſtarving. And the man, he thus ſubmits to, can pretend to no more power over him, than he has conſented to, upon compact. Upon this ground, a man's having his ſtores filled in a time of ſcarcity, having money in his pocket, being in a veſſel at ſea, being able to ſwim, &c. may as well be the foundation of rule and dominion, as being poſſeſſor of all the land in the world; any of theſe being ſufficient to enable me to ſave a man's life, who would periſh, if ſuch aſſiſtance were denied him, and any thing, by this rule, that may be an occaſion of working upon another's neceſſity, to ſave his life, or any thing dear to him, at the rate of his freedom, may be made a foundation of ſovereignty, as well as property. From all which it is clear, that tho' God ſhould have given Adam private dominion, yet that private dominion could give him no ſovereignty: but we have already ſufficiently proved, that God gave him no "private dominion."

CHAP. V.

Of Adam's title to ſovereignty, by the ſubjection of Eve.

44. THE next place of ſcripture, we find our A. builds his monarchy of Adam on, is Gen. iii. 16. "And thy deſire ſhall be to thy huſband, "and he ſhall rule over thee. Here we have (ſays he) the original grant of government;" from whence he concludes, in the following part of the page, O. 244. "That the ſupreme power is ſettled in the fatherhood, and limited to "one kind of government, that is, to monarchy:" For, let his premiſes be what they will, this is always the concluſion; let rule in any text, be but once named, and preſently abſolute monarchy is, by divine right, eſtabliſhed. If any one will but carefully read our A.'s own reaſoning from theſe words, O. 244. and conſider among other things, "the line and poſterity of Adam," as he there brings them in, he will find ſome difficulty to make ſenſe of what he ſays; but we will allow this at preſent, to his peculiar way of writing, and conſider the force of the text in hand. The words are, the curſe of God upon the woman, for having been the firſt and forwardeſt in the diſobedience; and if we will conſider the occaſion, of what God ſays here to our firſt parents, that he was denouncing judgment, and declaring his wrath againſt them both, for their diſobedience; we cannot ſuppoſe, that this was the time, wherein God was granting Adam prerogatives and privileges, inveſting him with dignity and authority, elevating him to dominion and monarchy: for, though as a helper in the temptation, Eve was laid below him, and ſo he had, accidentally, a ſuperiority over her, for her greater puniſhment; yet he too, had his ſhare in the fall, as well as the ſin, and was laid lower, as may be ſeen in the following

verſes; and 'twould be hard to imagine, that God, in the ſame breath, ſhould make him univerſal monarch over all mankind, and a day-labourer for his life; turn him out of "paradiſe, to till the ground," ver. 23. and, at the ſame time, advance him to a throne, and all the privileges and eaſe of abſolute power.

45. This was not a time, when Adam could expect any favours, any grant of privileges, from his offended maker. If this be "the original grant of government," as our A. tells us, and Adam was now made monarch, whatever Sir Robert would have him, 'tis plain, God made him but a very poor monarch, ſuch an one, as our A. himſelf would have counted it no great privilege to be. God ſets him to work for his living, and ſeems rather to give him a ſpade into his hand, to ſubdue the earth, than a ſceptre to rule over its inhabitants. "In the ſweat of thy face thou ſhalt eat thy bread," ſays God to him, ver. 19. This was unavoidable, may it perhaps be anſwered, becauſe he was yet without ſubjects, and had no body to work for him; but afterwards living as he did above 900 years, he might have people enough, whom he might command to work for him; no, ſays God, not only whilſt thou art without other help, ſave thy wife, but as long as thou liveſt, ſhalt thou live by thy labour. "In the ſweat of thy face, ſhalt thou eat thy bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it waſt thou taken, for duſt thou art, and unto duſt ſhalt thou return," ver. 19. It will perhaps be anſwered again, in favour of our A. that theſe words are not ſpoken perſonally to Adam, but in him, as their repreſentative, to all mankind, this being a curſe upon mankind, becauſe of the fall.

46. God, I believe, ſpeaks differently from men, becauſe he ſpeaks with more truth, more certainty: but, when he vouchſafes to ſpeak to men, I do not think, he ſpeaks differently from them, in croſſing the rules of language, in uſe amongſt them: this would not be to condeſcend to their capacities, when he humbles himſelf to ſpeak to them, but to loſe his deſign in ſpeaking, what, thus ſpoken, they could not underſtand. And yet thus muſt we think of God, if the interpretations of ſcripture, neceſſary to maintain our A.'s doctrine, muſt be received for good. For, by the ordinary rules of language, it will be very hard to underſtand what God ſays, if what he ſpeaks here, in the ſingular number to Adam, muſt be underſtood to be ſpoken to all mankind, and what he ſays in the plural number, Gen. i. 26, and 28. muſt be underſtood of Adam alone, excluſive of all others, and what he ſays to Noah and his ſons, jointly, muſt be underſtood to be meant to Noah alone, Gen. ix.

47. Farther, it is to be noted, that theſe words here of Gen. iii. 16. which our A. calls "the original grant of government," were not ſpoken to Adam; neither, indeed, was there any grant in them, made to Adam, but a puniſhment laid upon Eve. And, if we will take them, as they were directed, in particular to her, or in her, as their repreſentative, to all other women, they will at moſt concern the female ſex only, and import no more, but that ſubjection, they ſhould ordinarily be in, to their huſbands: but there is here, no more law, to oblige a woman to ſuch a ſubjection, if the circumſtances either of her condition, or contract with her huſband ſhould exempt her from it, than there is, that ſhe ſhould bring forth her children in ſorrow and pain, if there could be found a remedy for it, which is alſo a part of the ſame curſe upon her: for the whole verſe runs thus, "Unto the woman he ſaid, I will greatly multiply thy ſorrow and thy conception; in ſorrow thou ſhalt bring forth children, and thy deſire ſhall be to thy huſband, and he ſhall rule over thee." 'Twould, I think, have been a hard matter for any body, but our A. to have found out a grant of "monarchical government to Adam," in theſe words, which were neither ſpoke to, nor of him: neither will any one, I ſuppoſe, by theſe words, think the weaker ſex, as by a law, ſo ſubjected to the curſe contained in them, that 'tis their duty, not to endeavour to avoid it. And will any one ſay, that Eve, or any other woman, ſinned, if ſhe were brought to bed, without thoſe multiplied pains, God threatens her here with? Or that either of our queens, Mary or Elizabeth, had they married any of their ſubjects, had been by this text put into a political ſubjection to him? Or that he, thereby, ſhould have had monarchical rule over her? God, in this text, gives not, that I ſee, any au-

thority to Adam over Eve, or to men over their wives, but only foretels what ſhould be the woman's lot, how, by his providence, he would order it ſo, that ſhe ſhould be ſubject to her huſband, as we ſee that generally the laws of mankind, and cuſtoms of nations, have ordered it ſo; and there is, I grant, a foundation in nature for it.

48. Thus when God ſays of Jacob and Eſau, “That the elder ſhould ſerve “the younger,” Gen. xxv. 23. no body ſuppoſes, that God hereby made Jacob, Eſau's ſovereign, but foretold what ſhould, de facto, come to paſs.

But if theſe words, here ſpoken to Eve, muſt needs be underſtood, as a law, to bind her and all other women to ſubjection, t can be no other ſubjection than what every wife owes her huſband; and then, if this be the “original grant of “government, and the foundation of monarchical power,” there will be as many monarchs as there are huſbands. If, therefore, theſe words give any power to Adam, it can be only a conjugal power, not political; the power, that every huſband hath, to order the things of private concernment in his family, as proprietor of the goods and land there, and to have his will take place, before that of his wife, in all things of their common concernment; but not a political power, of life and death, over her, much leſs over any body elſe.

49. This I am ſure: if our A. will have this text to be a “grant, the original “grant of government,” political government, he ought to have proved it, by ſome better arguments, than by barely ſaying, that, “thy deſire ſhall be unto “thy huſband,” was a law, whereby Eve, and “all that ſhould come of her,” were ſubjected to the abſolute, monarchical power of Adam, and his heirs. “Thy deſire ſhall be to thy huſband,” is too doubtful an expreſſion, of whoſe ſignification, interpreters are not agreed, to build ſo confidently on, and in a matter of ſuch moment, and ſo great and general concernment. But our A. according to his way of writing, having once named the text, concludes preſently, without any more ado, that the meaning is, as he would have it. Let the words rule, and ſubject, be but found in the text, or margin, and it immediately ſignifies the duty of a ſubject to his prince; the relation is changed, and though God ſays huſband, Sir Robert will have it king; Adam has preſently abſolute, monarchical power over Eve, and not only over Eve, but “all that ſhould come of her” though the ſcripture ſays not a word of it, nor our A. a word to prove it. But Adam muſt, for all that, be an abſolute monarch, and ſo down to the end of the chapter. And here, I leave my reader to conſider, whether my bare ſaying, without offering any reaſons to evince it, that this text gave not Adam that abſolute, monarchical power, our A. ſuppoſes, be not as ſufficient to deſtroy that power, as his bare aſſertion is, to eſtabliſh it; ſince the text mentions neither prince, nor people, ſpeaks nothing of abſolute, or monarchical power, but the ſubjection of Eve to Adam, a wife to her huſband. And he, that would trace our A. ſo, all through, would make a ſhort and ſufficient anſwer, to the greateſt part of the grounds, he proceeds on, and abundantly confute them, by barely denying: it being a ſufficient anſwer to aſſertions without proof, to deny them without giving a reaſon. And, therefore, ſhould I have ſaid nothing, but barely deny'd, that, by this text, “the ſupreme power was ſettled and founded, by God himſelf, in the “fatherhood, limited to monarchy, and that to Adam's perſon and heirs,” all which our A. notably concludes, from theſe words, as may be ſeen in the ſame page, O. 244. it had been a ſufficient anſwer. Should I have deſired any ſober man, only to have read the text, and conſidered to whom, and on what occaſion it was ſpoken, he would, no doubt, have wondered, how our A. found out monarchical, abſolute power in it, had he not had an exceeding good faculty, to find it himſelf, where he could not ſhew it others. And thus, we have examined the two places of ſcripture, all that I remember, our A. brings to prove Adam's ſovereignty, that ſupremacy, which he ſays, “it was God's ordi-“nance, ſhould be unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will,” O. 254. viz. Gen. i. 28. and Gen. iii. 16. one whereof ſignifies only the ſubjection of the inferior ranks of creatures to mankind, and the other, the ſubjection that is due, from a wife to her huſband; both far enough, from that, which ſubjects owe the governors of political ſocieties.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Adam's title to ſovereignty, by fatherhood.

50. THERE is one thing more, and then I think I have given you all, that our A. brings for proof, of Adam's ſovereignty, and that it is a ſuppoſition of a natural right of dominion, over his children, by being their father. And this title of fatherhood, he is ſo pleaſed with, that you will find it brought in almoſt in every page; particularly he ſays, "Not only Adam, but the ſucceeding patriarchs, had by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children," p. 12. And in the ſame page, "This ſubjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority, &c." This being, as one would think, by his ſo frequent mentioning it, the main baſis of all his frame, we may well expect clear and evident reaſon for it, ſince he lays it down as a poſition, neceſſary to his purpoſe, That "every man, that is born, is ſo far from being free, that, by his very birth, he becomes a ſubject of him that begets him," O. 156. So that Adam, being the only man created, and all ever ſince being begotten, no body has been born free. If we aſk, how Adam comes by this power over his children; he tells us here, 'tis by begetting them: and ſo again, O. 223 "This natural dominion of Adam, ſays he, may be proved out of Grotius himſelf, who teacheth, that, generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos." And, indeed, the act of begetting, being that, which makes a man a father, his right of a father over his children can naturally ariſe from nothing elſe.

51. GROTIUS tells us not here, how far this jus in liberos, this power of parents over their children extends; but our A. always very clear in the point, aſſures us, 'tis ſupreme power, and, like that of abſolute monarchs over their ſlaves, abſolute power of life and death. He, that ſhould demand of him, how, or for what reaſon it is, that begetting a child gives the father ſuch an abſolute power over him, will find him anſwer nothing: we are to take his word for this, as well as ſeveral other things, and by that the laws of nature, and the conſtitutions of government muſt ſtand or fall: had he been an abſolute monarch, this way of talking might have ſuited well enough; pro ratione voluntas, might have been of force in his mouth; but in the way of proof, or argument, is very unbecoming, and will little advantage his plea for abſolute monarchy. "Sir Robert has too much leſſened a ſubject's authority, to leave himſelf the hopes of eſtabliſhing any thing, by his bare ſaying it;" one ſlave's opinion, without proof, is not of weight enough, to diſpoſe of the liberty and fortunes of all mankind. If all men are not, as I think they are, naturally equal, I'm ſure all ſlaves are; and then I may, without preſumption, oppoſe my ſingle opinion to his; and be confident that my ſaying, "That begetting of children makes them not ſlaves to their fathers," as certainly ſets all mankind free, as his affirming the contrary, makes them all ſlaves. But that this poſition, which is the foundation of all their doctrine, who would have monarchy to be jure divino, may have all fair play, let us hear what reaſons others give for it, ſince our A. offers none.

52. THE argument, I have heard others make uſe of, to prove that fathers, by begetting them, come by an abſolute power over their children, is this: That "Fathers have a power over the lives of their children, becauſe they give them life and being," which is the only proof it is capable of: ſince there can be no reaſon, why naturally one man ſhould have any claim, or pretence of right, over that in another, which was never his, which he beſtowed not, but was received from the bounty of another. 1. I anſwer, That every one who gives another any thing, has not always thereby a right to take it away again. But, 2. They, who ſay the father gives life to his children, are ſo dazzled with the thoughts of monarchy, that they do not, as they ought, remember God, who is "the author and giver of life: 'tis in him alone we live, move, and have our being." How can he be thought to give life to another, that knows not,

wherein his own life conſiſts? Philoſophers are at a loſs about it, after their moſt diligent enquiries; and anatomiſts, after their whole lives and ſtudies ſpent in diſſections, and diligent examining the bodies of men, confeſs their ignorance, in the ſtructure and uſe of many parts of man's body; and in that operation, wherein life conſiſts in the whole. And doth the rude plowman, or the more ignorant voluptuary, frame and faſhion ſuch an admirable engine as this is, and then put life and ſenſe into it? Can any man ſay, he formed the parts, that are neceſſary to the life of his child? Or can he ſuppoſe himſelf to give the life, and yet not know what ſubject is fit to receive it, nor what actions, or organs, are neceſſary for its reception, or preſervation?

53. To give life to that, which has yet no being, is to frame and make a living creature, faſhion the parts, and mould and ſuit them to their uſes, and, having proportioned and fitted them together, to put into them a living ſoul. He, that could do this, might, indeed, have ſome pretence to deſtroy his own workmanſhip. But is there any one ſo bold, that dares thus far arrogate to himſelf the incomprehenſible works of the Almighty? Who alone did at firſt, and continues ſtill to make a living ſoul, he alone can breathe in the breath of life. If any one thinks himſelf an artiſt at this, let him number up the parts of his child's body, which he hath made, tell me their uſes and operations, and when the living and rational ſoul began to inhabit this curious ſtructure, when ſenſe began, and how this engine, which he has framed, thinks and reaſons: if he made it, let him, when it is out of order mend it, at leaſt tell wherein the defects lie. “Shall he that made the eye not ſee?” ſays the Pſalmiſt, pſalm xciv. 9. See theſe men's vanities? The ſtructure of that one part is ſufficient to convince us of an all-wiſe contriver, and he has ſo viſible a claim to us, as his workmanſhip, that one of the ordinary appellations of God in ſcripture, is, “God our maker,” and “the Lord our maker.” And, therefore, though our A. for the magnifying of his fatherhood, be pleaſed to ſay, O. 159. “That even the power, which “God himſelf exerciſeth over mankind, is by right of fatherhood,” yet this fatherhood is ſuch an one, as utterly excludes all pretence of title, in earthly parents; for he is king, becauſe he is, indeed, maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be, of their children.

54. But, had men ſkill and power to make their children, 'tis not ſo ſlight a piece of workmanſhip, that it can be imagined they could make them without deſigning it. What father of a thouſand, when he begets a child, thinks farther than to ſatisfy his preſent appetite. God, in his infinite wiſdom, has put ſtrong deſires of copulation, into the conſtitution of men, thereby to continue the race of mankind, which he doth moſt commonly, without the intention, and often againſt the conſent and will of the begetter. And, indeed, thoſe who deſire and deſign children, are but the occaſions of their being, and, when they deſign and wiſh to beget them, do little more towards their making, than Deucalion and his wife, in the fable, did towards the making of mankind, by throwing pebbles over their heads.

55. But grant that the parents made their children, gave them life and being, and that hence there followed an abſolute power. This would give the father but a joint dominion with the mother, over them. For no body can deny, but that the woman had an equal ſhare, if not the greater, as nouriſhing the child a long time in her own body, out of her own ſubſtance; there it is faſhioned, and from her it receives the materials and principles of its conſtitution: and it is ſo hard to imagine the rational ſoul ſhould preſently inhabit the yet unformed embrio, as ſoon as the father has done his part, in the act of generation, that, if it muſt be ſuppoſed to derive any thing from the parents, it muſt certainly owe moſt to the mother. But be that as it will, the mother cannot be denied an equal ſhare in begetting of the child, and ſo the abſolute authority of the father will not ariſe from hence. Our A. indeed is of another mind; for he ſays, “For “we know that God, at the creation, gave the ſovereignty to man, over the “woman as being the nobler and principal agent in generation,” O. 172. I remember not this in my bible, and when the place is brought, where God, at the creation, gave the ſovereignty to man over the woman, and that for this rea-

ſon, becauſe "he is the nobler and principle agent in generation," it will be time enough to conſider, and anſwer it. But it is no new thing for our A. to tell us his own fancies, for certain and divine truths, though there be often a great deal of difference between his and divine revelations; for God in the ſcripture ſays, "his father and his mother that begat him."

56. THEY, who alledge the practice of mankind, for expoſing or ſelling their children, as a proof of their power over them, are, with Sir Robert, happy arguers; and cannot but recommend their opinion, by founding it on the moſt ſhameful action, and moſt unnatural murder, human nature is capable of. The dens of lions and nurſeries of wolves know no ſuch cruelty as this: theſe ſavage inhabitants of the deſart obey God and nature, in being tender and careful of their off-ſpring; they will hunt, watch, fight, and almoſt ſtarve, for the preſervation of their young; never part with them, never forſake them, till they are able to ſhift for themſelves. And is it the privilege of man alone, to act more contrary to nature, than the wild and moſt untamed part of the creation? Doth God forbid us, under the ſevereſt penalty, that of death, to take away the life of any man, a ſtranger, and upon provocation? And does he permit us to deſtroy thoſe, he has given us the charge and care of; and, by the dictates of nature and reaſon, as well as his revealed command, requires us to preſerve? He has, in all the parts of the creation, taken a peculiar care to propagate and continue the ſeveral ſpecies of creatures, and makes the individuals act ſo ſtrongly to this end, that they ſometimes neglect their own private good for it; that ſeem to forget that general rule, which nature teaches all things, of ſelf-preſervation; and the preſervation of their young, as the ſtrongeſt principle in them, over-rules the conſtitution of their particular natures. Thus we ſee, when their young ſtand in need of it, the timorous become valiant, the fierce and ſavage kind, and the ravenous tender and liberal.

57. BUT if the example, of what hath been done, be the rule of what ought to be, hiſtory would have furniſhed our A. with inſtances of this abſolute, fatherly power, in its height and perfection, and he might have ſhewed us in Peru, people that begot children, on purpoſe to fatten and eat them. The ſtory is ſo remarkable, that I cannot but ſet it down in the A.'s words. "In ſome provinces, ſays he, they were ſo liquoriſh after man's fleſh, that they would not "have the patience to ſtay, till the breath was out of the body, but would "ſuck the blood, as it ran from the wounds of the dying man; they had publick ſhambles of man's fleſh, and their madneſs herein was to that degree, that "they ſpared not their own children, which they had begot on ſtrangers, taken "in war. For they made their captives their miſtreſſes, and choicely nouriſhed "the children they had by them; till about thirteen years old, they butchered and eat them; and they ſerved the mothers, after the ſame faſhion, when "they grew paſt child-bearing, and ceaſed to bring them any more roaſters." Gracilaſſo de la Vega hiſt. des Yncas de Peru, L. 1. c. 12.

58. THUS far can the buſy mind of man carry him to a brutality, below the level of beaſts, when he quits his reaſon, which places him almoſt equal to angels. Nor can it be otherwiſe, in a creature whoſe thoughts are more than the ſands, and wider than the ocean, where fancy and paſſion muſt needs run him into ſtrange courſes, if reaſon, which is the only ſtar and compaſs, be not that he ſteers by. The imagination is always reſtleſs, and ſuggeſts variety of thoughts, and the will, reaſon being laid aſide, is ready for every extravagant project, and in this ſtate, he that goes fartheſt out of the way, is thought fitteſt to lead, and is ſure of moſt followers: and, when faſhion has once eſtabliſhed what folly or craft began, cuſtom makes it ſacred, and 'twill be thought impudence, or madneſs, to contradict or queſtion it. He that will impartially ſurvey the nations of the world, will find ſo much of their religions, governments and manners, brought in and continued amongſt them, by theſe means, that he will have but little reverence for the practices, which are in uſe and credit amongſt men; and will have reaſon to think, that the woods and foreſts, where the irrational, untaught inhabitants keep right, by following nature, are fitter to give us rules, than cities and places, where thoſe, that call themſelves civil and rational,

go out of their way, by the authority of example. If precedents are ſufficient to eſtabliſh a rule in this caſe, our A. might have found, in holy writ, children ſacrificed by their parents, and this amongſt the people of God themſelves. The pſalmiſt tells us, Pſal. cvi, 38. "They ſhed innocent blood, even the blood of "their ſons and their daughters, whom they ſacrificed unto the idols of Canaan." But God judged not of this by our A's rule, nor allow'd of the authority of practice, againſt his righteous law; but, as it follows there, "The land was pol- "luted with blood, therefore was the wrath of the Lord kindled againſt his peo- "ple, inſomuch that he abhorred his own inheritance." The killing of their children, though it were faſhionable, was charged on them as innocent blood, and ſo had, in the account of God, the guilt of murther, as the offering them to idols had the guilt of idolatry.

59. Be it then, as Sir Robert ſays, that antiently it was uſually for men "to "ſell and caſtrate their children," O. 155. Let it be, that they expoſed them; add to it, if you pleaſe, for this is ſtill greater power, that they begat them for their table, to fat and eat them: if this proves a right to do ſo, we may, by the ſame argument, juſtify adultery, inceſt and ſodomy; for there are examples of theſe too, both antient and modern: ſins, which, I ſuppoſe, have their principal aggravation from this, that they croſs the main intention of nature, which willeth the increaſe of mankind, and the continuation of the ſpecies, in the higheſt perfection, and the diſtinction of families, with the ſecurity of the marriage-bed, as neceſſary thereunto.

60. In confirmation of this natural authority of the father, our A. brings a lame proof, from the poſitive command of God in ſcripture: his words are, "To confirm the natural right of regal power, we find, in the decalogue, that "the law which enjoins obedience to kings, is deliver'd in the terms, Honour, "thy father, p. 23. Whereas many confeſs, that government, only in the ab- "ſtract, is the ordinance of God, they are not able to prove any ſuch ordinance "in the ſcripture, but only in the fatherly power; and, therefore, we find the "commandment, that enjoins obedience to ſuperiors, given in the terms, Ho- "nour thy father; ſo that not only the power and right of government, but "the form of the power governing, and the perſon, having the power, are all "the ordinances of God. The firſt father had not only ſimply power, but "power monarchical, as he was father, immediately from God," O. 254. To the ſame purpoſe, the ſame law is cited by our A. in ſeveral other places, and juſt after the ſame faſhion, that is, "and mother," as apocryphal words, are always left out; a great argument of our A's ingenuity, and the goodneſs of his cauſe, which requir'd in its defender, zeal, to a degree of warmth, able to warp the ſacred rule of the word of God, to make it comply with his preſent occaſion; a way of proceeding, not unuſual to thoſe, who embrace not truths, becauſe reaſon and revelation offer them; but eſpouſe tenets and parties, for ends different from truth, and then reſolve at any rate to defend them; and ſo do with the words and ſenſe of the authors they would fit to their purpoſe, juſt as Procruſtes did with his gueſts, lop, or ſtretch them, as may beſt fit them to the ſize of their notions: and they always prove, like thoſe ſo ſerved, deform'd, lame, and uſeleſs.

61. For had our A. ſet down this command, without garbling, as God gave it, and join'd mother to father, every reader would have ſeen, that it had made directly againſt him; and that it was ſo far from eſtabliſhing the "monarchical "power of the father," that it ſet up the mother equal with him, and enjoin'd nothing but what was due in common, to both father and mother: for that is the conſtant tenor of the ſcripture, "Honour thy father and mother, Exod. xx. "He that ſmiteth his father, or mother, ſhall ſurely be put to death, xxi. 15. "He that curſeth his father, or mother, ſhall ſurely be put to death, ver. 17. "repeated Lev. xx. 9. and by our ſaviour, Matt. xv. 4. Ye ſhall fear every man "his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. If any man have a rebellious ſon, which "will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother; then ſhall "his father and his mother lay hold on him, and ſay, This our ſon is ſtubborn "and rebellious, he will not obey our voice, Deut xxi. 18, 19, 20, 21. Curſed be "he that ſetteth light by his father, or mother, xxviii. 16. My ſon, hear the

"inſtruction of thy father, and forſake not the law of thy mother," are the words of Solomon a king, who was not ignorant of what belonged to him, as a father, or a king, and yet he joins father and mother together, in all the inſtructions he gives children, quite through his book of Proverbs. "Woe unto him, "that ſaith unto his father, What begetteſt thou? or to the woman, What "haſt thou brought forth? Iſa. xi. 10. In thee have they ſet light by father, "or mother, Ezek. xxviii. 2. And it ſhall come to paſs, that when any ſhall "yet propheſy, then his father and mother that begat him, ſhall ſay unto "him, Thou ſhalt not live, and his father and mother that begat him, ſhall "thruſt him through, when he propheſieth, Zech. xiii. 3." Here, not the father only, but the father and mother jointly, had power, in this caſe of life and death. Thus ran the law of the old teſtament, and in the new they are likewiſe joined, in the obedience of their children, Eph. vi. 1. The rule is, "Children obey your parents;" and I do not remember, that I any where read, "Children obey your father;" and no more: the ſcripture joins mother too, in that homage which is due from children; and had there been any text, where the honour of obedience of children had been directed to the father alone, 'tis not likely that our A. who pretends to build all upon ſcripture, would have omitted it: nay, the ſcripture makes the authority of father and mother, in reſpect of thoſe they have begot, ſo equal, that, in ſome places, it neglects even the priority of order, which is thought due to the father, and the mother is put firſt, as Lev. xix. 3. From which, ſo conſtantly joining father and mother together, as is found quite through the ſcripture, we may conclude, that the honour, they have a title to, from their children, is one common right belonging ſo equally to them both, that neither can claim it wholly, neither can be excluded.

62. One would wonder then, how our A. infers from the fifth commandment, that all "power was originally in the father." How he finds monarchical "power of government, ſettled and fixed by the commandment, Honour thy "father and thy mother." If all the honour, due by the commandment, be it what it will, be the only right of the father, becauſe he, as our A. ſays, "has "the ſovereignty over the woman, as being the nobler and principaller agent in "generation," Why did God afterwards, all along, join the mother with him, to ſhare in his honour? Can the father, by this ſovereignty of his, diſcharge the child from paying this honour to his mother? The ſcripture gave no ſuch licence to the Jews, and yet there were often breaches wide enough, betwixt huſband and wife, even to divorce and ſeparation: and, I think, no body will ſay, a child may with-hold honour from his mother, or, as the ſcripture terms it, "ſet light "by her," though his father ſhould command him to do ſo; no more than the mother could diſpenſe with him, for neglecting to honour his father: whereby 'tis plain, that this command of God, gives the father no ſovereignty, no ſupremacy.

63. I agree with our A. that the title to this honour is veſted in the parents by nature, and is a right which accrues to them, by their having begotten their children, and God, by many poſitive declarations, has confirmed it to them: I alſo allow our A.'s rule, "that, in grants and gifts, that have their original from "God and nature, as the power of the father," (let me add, "and mother," for whom God hath joined together, let no man put aſunder) "no inferior "power of men can limit, nor make any law of preſcription againſt them," O. 158. ſo that the mother having, by this law of God, a right to honour from her children, which is not ſubject to the will of her huſband, we ſee this "abſolute, monarchical power of the father," can neither be founded on it, nor conſiſt with it: and he has a power, very far from monarchical, very far from that abſoluteneſs our A. contends for, when another has, over his ſubjects, the ſame power he hath, and by the ſame title: and, therefore, he cannot forbear ſaying himſelf, that "he cannot ſee how any man's children can be free from ſubjection to their parents," p. 12. which, in common ſpeech, I think, ſignifies mother, as well as father, or if parents here ſignifies only father, 'tis the firſt time I ever yet knew it to do ſo, and, by ſuch an uſe of words, one may ſay any thing.

64. By our A.'s doctrine, the father having abſolute juriſdiction over his children, has alſo the ſame over their iſſue, and the conſequence is good, were it true, that the father had ſuch a power: and yet I aſk our A. Whether the grandfather, by his ſovereignty, could diſcharge the grandchild, from paying to his father the honour due to him by the fifth commandment. If the grandfather hath, by “right of fatherhood,” ſole ſovereign power in him, and that obedience, which is due to the ſupreme magiſtrate, be commanded in theſe words, “Honour thy father,” 'tis certain the grandfather might diſpenſe with the grandſon's honouring his father; which ſince 'tis evident, in common ſenſe, he cannot, it follows from hence, that “honour thy father and mother,” cannot mean an abſolute ſubjection to a ſovereign power, but ſomething elſe. The right therefore, which parents have by nature, and which is confirmed to them by the fifth commandment, cannot be that political dominion which our A. would derive from it: for that being in every civil ſociety ſupreme ſomewhere, can diſcharge any ſubject from any political obedience to any one of his fellow-ſubjects. But what law of the magiſtrate can give a child liberty, not to “honour his father and mother?” 'Tis an eternal law, annex'd purely to the relation of parents and children, and ſo contains nothing of the magiſtrate's power in it, nor is ſubjected to it.

65. Our A. ſays, God hath given to a father, a right, or liberty to alien “this power over his children to any other,” O. 155. I doubt whether he can alien wholly the right of honour, that is due from them: but, be that as it will, this I am ſure, he cannot alien, and retain the ſame power. If, therefore, the magiſtrate's ſovereignty be, as our A. would have it, “nothing but the authority of a ſupreme father,” p. 23. 'tis unavoidable, that if the magiſtrate hath all this paternal right, as he muſt have, if fatherhood be the fountain of all authority, then the ſubjects, tho' fathers, can have no power over their children, no right to honour from them: for it cannot be all in another's hands, and a part remain with the parents. So that, according to our A.'s own doctrine, “Honour thy father and mother,” cannot poſſibly be underſtood of political ſubjection and obedience: ſince the laws, both in the old and new teſtament, that commanded children to “honour and obey their parents,” were given to ſuch, whoſe fathers were under civil government, and fellow-ſubjects with them, in political ſocieties; and to have bid them, “Honour and obey their parents,” in our A.'s ſenſe, had been to bid them be ſubjects to thoſe, who had no title to it; the right to obedience, from ſubjects, being all veſted in another; and, inſtead of teaching obedience, this had been to foment ſedition, by ſetting up powers that were not. If therefore, this command, “Honour thy father and mother,” concern political dominion, it directly overthrows our A.'s monarchy; ſince it being to be paid by every child to his father, even in ſociety, every father muſt neceſſarily have political dominion, and there will be as many ſovereigns as there are fathers: beſides that, the mother too hath her title, which deſtroys the ſovereignty of one ſupreme monarch. But if, “honour thy father and mother,” mean ſomething diſtinct from political power, as neceſſarily it muſt; it is beſides our A.'s buſineſs, and ſerves nothing to his purpoſe.

66. “The law that enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered, ſays our A. in the terms, Honour thy father, as if all power were originally in the father,” O. 254. And that law is alſo delivered, ſay I, in the terms, “Honour thy mother,” as if all power were originally in the mother. I appeal, whether the argument be not as good on one ſide as the other, father and mother being joined all along, in the old and new teſtament, where-ever honour or obedience is enjoined children. Again our A. tells us, O. 254. “That this command, Honour thy father, gives the right to govern, and makes the form of government monarchical.” To which I anſwer, that if by “honour thy father,” be meant obedience to the political power of the magiſtrate, it concerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers, who are ſubjects; becauſe they, by our A.'s doctrine, are diveſted of all that power, it being placed wholly in the prince; and ſo being equally ſubjects and ſlaves with their children, can have no right by that title, to any ſuch honour, or obedience, as contains in it

political ſubjection: if " honour thy father and mother," ſignifies the duty we owe our natural parents, as by our ſaviour's interpretation, Matth. xv. 4. and al the other mentioned places, 'tis plain it does; then it cannot concern politica obedience, but a duty that is owing to perſons who have no title to ſovereignty nor any political authority, as magiſtrates, over ſubjects. For the perſon of a private father, and a title to obedience due to the ſupreme magiſtrate, are things inconſiſtent; and therefore this command, which muſt neceſſarily comprehend the perſons of our natural fathers, muſt mean a duty we owe them, diſtinct from our obedience to the magiſtrate, and from which the moſt abſolute power of princes cannot abſolve us. What this duty is, we ſhall in its due place examine.

67. And thus we have at laſt got through all, that in our A. looks like an argument, for that abſolute, unlimited ſovereignty, deſcribed, ſect. 8. which he ſuppoſes in Adam; ſo that mankind, ever ſince, have been all born ſlaves, without any title to freedom. But if creation, which gave nothing but a being, made not Adam prince of his poſterity: if Adam, Gen. i. 28. was not conſtituted lord of mankind, nor had a private dominion given him, excluſive of his children, but only a right and power over the earth, and inferior creatures, in common with the children of men: if alſo, Gen. iii. 16. God gave not any political power to Adam, over his wife and children, but only ſubjected Eve to Adam, as a puniſhment, or foretold the ſubjection of the weaker ſex, in the ordering the common concernments of their families, but gave not thereby to Adam, as to the huſband, power of life and death, which neceſſarily belongs to the magiſtrate: if fathers, by begetting their children, acquire no ſuch power over them: and if the command, " Honour thy father and mother," give it not, but only enjoins a duty, owing to parents equally, whether ſubjects or not, and to the mother as well as the father: if all this be ſo, as I think, by what has been ſaid, is very evident, then man has a natural freedom, notwithſtanding all our A. confidently ſays to the contrary; ſince all, that ſhare in the ſame common nature, faculties and powers, are in nature equal, and ought to partake in the ſame common rights and privileges, 'till the manifeſt appointment of God, who is " Lord over all, bleſſed for ever," can be produced to ſhew any particular perſon's ſupremacy, or a man's own conſent ſubjects him to a ſuperior. This is ſo plain, that our A. confeſſes, that Sir John Hayward, Blackwood and Barclay, " the great vindicators of the right of kings," could not deny it, " but admit, with one conſent, the natural liberty and equality of mankind," for a truth unqueſtionable. And our A. hath been ſo far from producing any thing, that may make good his great poſition, " That Adam was abſolute monarch," and ſo " men are not naturally free," that even his own proofs make againſt him; ſo that to uſe his own way of arguing, " This firſt erroneous " principle failing, the whole fabrick of this vaſt engine of abſolute power and " tyranny, drops down of itſelf," and there needs no more to be ſaid, in anſwer to all that he builds upon ſo falſe and frail a foundation.

68. But to ſave others the pains, were there any need, he is not ſparing himſelf to ſhew, by his own contradictions, the weakneſs of his own doctrine. Adam's abſolute and ſole dominion is that, which he is every where full of, and all along builds on, and yet he tells us, p. 12. " That as Adam was lord of " his own children; ſo his children, under him, had a command and power over " their own children." The unlimited and undivided ſovereignty of Adam's fatherhood, by our A.'s computation, ſtood but a little while, only during the firſt generation; but as ſoon as he had grandchildren, Sir Robert could give but a very ill account of it. " Adam, as father of his children, ſaith he, hath an " abſolute, unlimited royal power over them, and, by virtue thereof, over thoſe " that they begot, and ſo to all generations;" and yet his children, viz. Cain and Seth, have a paternal power over their children, at the ſame time; ſo that they are, at the ſame time, abſolute lords, and yet vaſſals and ſlaves; Adam has all the authority, as " grandfather of the people," and they have a part of it, as fathers of a part of them: he is abſolute over them and their poſterity, by having begotten them, and yet they are abſolute over their children by the ſame

title. "No, ſays our A. Adam's children under him, had power over their own "children, but ſtill with ſubordination to the firſt parent." A good diſtinction, that ſounds well, and 'tis pity it ſignifies nothing, nor can be reconciled with our A.'s words. I readily grant, that ſuppoſing Adam's abſolute power over his poſterity, any of his children might have from him, a delegated, and ſo a ſubordinate power over a part, or all the reſt: but that cannot be the power, our A. ſpeaks of here; it is not a power, by grant and commiſſion, but the natural paternal power he ſuppoſes a father to have, over his children. For 1. he ſays, "As Adam was lord of his children, ſo his children, under him, had a power "over their own children:" they were then lords over their own children, after the ſame manner, and by the ſame title, that Adam was, i. e. by right of generation, by right of fatherhood. 2. 'Tis plain he means the natural power of fathers, becauſe he limits it to be only "over their own children;" a delegated power has no ſuch limitation, as only over their own children, it might be over others, as well as their own children. 3. If it were a delegated power, it muſt appear in ſcripture; but there is no ground in ſcripture to affirm, that Adam's children had any other power over theirs, than what they naturally had as fathers.

69. BUT that he means here, paternal power, and no other, is paſt doubt, from the inference he makes, in theſe words immediately following; "I ſee "not then how the children of Adam, or of any man elſe, can be free from "ſubjection to their parents." Whereby it appears, that the power on one ſide, and the ſubjection on the other, our A. here ſpeaks of, is that natural power and ſubjection between parents and children. For that, which every man's children owed, could be no other; and that our A. always affirms to be abſolute and unlimited. This natural power of parents over their children, Adam had over his poſterity, ſays our A. and this power of parents over their children, his children had over theirs, in his life-time, ſays our A. alſo; ſo that Adam, by a natural right of father, had an abſolute, unlimited power over all his poſterity, and at the ſame time his children had, by the ſame right, abſolute, unlimited power over theirs. Here then are two abſolute, unlimited powers, exiſting together, which I would have any body reconcile one to another, or to common ſenſe. For the ſalvo he has put in, of ſubordination, makes it more abſurd: to have one abſolute, unlimited, nay unlimitable power, in ſubordination to another, is ſo manifeſt a contradiction, that nothing can be more. "Adam is abſolute "prince, with the unlimited authority of fatherhood, over all his poſterity;" all his poſterity are, then, abſolutely his ſubjects, and, as our A. ſays, his ſlaves; children and grandchildren are equally in this ſtate of ſubjection and ſlavery; and yet, ſays our A. "the children of Adam have paternal, i. e. abſolute, unli- "mited power, over their own children:" which, in plain Engliſh, is, they are ſlaves and abſolute princes at the ſame time, and in the ſame government: and one part of the ſubjects have an abſolute, unlimited power over the other, by the natural right of parentage.

70. IF any one will ſuppoſe, in favour of our A. that he here meant, that parents, who are in ſubjection themſelves to the abſolute authority of their father, have yet ſome power over their children; I confeſs he is ſomething nearer the truth: but he will not at all hereby help our A.: for he no where ſpeaking of the paternal power, but as an abſolute, unlimited authority, cannot be ſuppos'd to underſtand any thing elſe here, unleſs he himſelf had limited it, and ſhewed how far it reached. And that he means here, paternal authority, in that large extent, is plain, from the immediate following words; "This ſubjection of "children being, ſays he, the foundation of all regal authority," p. 12. The ſubjection then, that in the former line, he ſays, "every man is in to his pa- "rents," and conſequently what Adam's grandchildren were in to their parents, was that, which was the foundation of all regal authority, i. e. according to our A. abſolute, unlimitable authority. And thus Adam's children had regal authority over their children, whilſt they themſelves were ſubjects to their father, and fellow-ſubjects with their children. But let him mean as he pleaſes, 'tis plain he allows "Adam's children to have paternal power," p. 12. as alſo all other fa-

thers to have "paternal power over their children," O. 156. From whence one of theſe two things will neceſſarily follow, that either Adam's children, even in his life-time, had, and ſo all other fathers have, as he phraſes it, p. 12. "by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children," or elſe, that Adam, "by right of fatherhood, had not royal authority." For it cannot be, but that paternal power does, or does not give royal authority, to them that have it: if it does not, then Adam could not be ſovereign, by this title, nor any body elſe, and then there is an end of all our A.'s politicks at once: if it does give royal authority, then every one, that has paternal power, has royal authority, and then by our A.'s patriarchal government, there will be as many kings, as there are fathers.

71. And thus, what a monarchy he hath ſet up, let him and his diſciples conſider. Princes certainly will have great reaſon to thank him, for theſe new politicks, which ſet up as many abſolute kings, in every country, as there are fathers of children. And yet, who can blame our A. for it, it lying unavoidably in the way of our diſcourſing upon our A.'s principles? For, having placed an "abſolute power in fathers by right of begetting," he could not eaſily reſolve how much of this power belonged to a ſon, over the children he had begotten; and ſo it fell out to be a very hard matter to give all the power, as he does, to Adam, and yet allow a part in his life-time, to his children, when they were parents, and which he knew not well how to deny them. This makes him ſo doubtful in his expreſſions, and ſo uncertain where to place this abſolute, natural power, which he calls fatherhood; ſometimes Adam alone has it all, as p. 13. O. 244, 245, and pref.

Sometimes parents have it, which word ſcarce ſignifies the father alone, p. 12, 19.

Sometimes children, during their father's life-time, as p. 12.

Sometimes fathers of families, as p. 78, and 79.

Sometimes fathers indefinitely, O. 155.

Sometimes the heir to Adam, O. 253.

Sometimes the poſterity of Adam, 244, 246.

Sometimes prime fathers, all ſons, or grandchildren of Noah, O. 244.

Sometimes the eldeſt parents, p. 12.

Sometimes all kings, p. 19.

Sometimes all, that have ſupreme power, O. 245.

Sometimes, heirs to thoſe firſt progenitors, who were, at the firſt, natural parents of the whole people, p. 19.

Sometimes an elective king, p. 23.

Sometimes thoſe, whether a few, or a multitude, that govern the commonwealth, p. 23.

Sometimes, he that can catch it, an uſurper, p. 23. O. 155.

72. Thus this new nothing, that is to carry with it all power, authority, and government; this fatherhood, which is to deſign the perſon, and eſtabliſh the throne of monarchs, whom the people are to obey, may, according to Sir Robert, come into any hands, any how, and ſo by his politicks, give to democracy, royal authority, and make an uſurper, a lawful prince. And if it will do all theſe fine feats, much good do our author and all his followers, with their omnipotent fatherhood, which can ſerve for nothing, but to unſettle and deſtroy all the lawful governments in the world, and to eſtabliſh, in their room, diſorder, tyranny, and uſurpation.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of fatherhood and property, conſidered together, as fountains of ſovereignty.

73. IN the foregoing chapters we have ſeen, what Adam's monarchy was, in our A.'s opinion, and upon what titles he founded it. The foundations which he lays the chief ſtreſs on, as thoſe from which he thinks he may beſt derive monarchical power to future princes, are two, viz. fatherhood and property; and therefore, the way he propoſes, to "remove the abſurdities and in-" conveniencies of the doctrine of natural freedom, is, to maintain the natural " and private dominion of Adam," O. 222. Conformable hereunto, he tells us, the "grounds and principles of government neceſſarily depend upon the original " of property, O. 108. The ſubjection of children to their parents is the foun-" tain of all regal authority, p. 12. And all power on earth is either derived, " or uſurped, from the fatherly power, there being no other original to be " found, of any power whatſoever," O 158. I will not ſtand here to examine, how it can be ſaid, without a contradiction, that the "firſt grounds and " principles of government neceſſarily depend upon the original of property," and yet, "that there is no other original of any power whatſoever, but that of " the father:" It being hard to underſtand, how there can be "no other ori-" ginal but fatherhood," and yet that the "grounds and principles of govern-" ment depend upon the original of property;" property and fatherhood being as far different, as lord of a manor and father of children. Nor do I ſee, how they will, either of them, agree with what our A. ſays, O. 244. of God's ſentence againſt Eve, Gen. iii. 16. "That it is the original grant of government;" ſo that, if that were the original, government had not its original, by our A.'s own confeſſion, either from property, or fatherhood; and this text, which he brings as a proof of Adam's power over Eve, neceſſarily contradicts what he ſays of the fatherhood, that it is the "ſole fountain of all power." For if Adam had any ſuch regal power over Eve, as our A. contends for, it muſt be by ſome other title, than that of begetting.

74. But I leave him to reconcile theſe contradictions, as well as many others, which may plentifully be found in him, by any one, who will but read him with a little attention; and ſhall come now to conſider, how theſe two originals of government, "Adam's natural and private dominion," will conſiſt, and ſerve to make out and eſtabliſh the titles of ſucceeding monarchs, who as our A. obliges them, muſt all derive their power from theſe fountains. Let us, then, ſuppoſe Adam made, "by God's donation," lord and ſole proprietor of the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner as Sir Robert could wiſh, let us ſuppoſe him alſo, "by right of fatherhood," abſolute ruler over his children, with an unlimited ſupremacy; I aſk then, upon Adam's death what becomes of both his natural and private dominion? And I doubt not 'twill be anſwered, that they deſcended to his next heir, as our A. tells us in ſeveral places. But this way, 'tis plain, cannot poſſibly convey both his natural and private dominion, to the ſame perſon. For, ſhould we allow that all the property, all the eſtate of the father, ought to deſcend to the eldeſt ſon, (which will need ſome proof to eſtabliſh it) and ſo he has, by that title, all the private dominion, of the father, yet the father's natural dominion, the paternal power, cannot deſcend unto him by inheritance. For it being a right, that accrues to a man only by begetting, no man can have this natural dominion over any one, he does not beget; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that a man can have a right to any thing, without doing that upon which that right is ſolely founded. For if a father, by begetting, and no other title, has natural dominion over his children, he that does not beget them, cannot have this natural dominion over them; and therefore, be it true or falſe, that our A. ſays, O. 156. that every man that is born, by his

"very birth becomes a ſubject to him that begets him," this neceſſarily fol-"lows, viz. That a man by his birth, cannot become a ſubject to his brother, who did not beget him; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that a man, by the very ſame title, can come to be under the "natural and abſolute dominion," of two different men at once; or it be ſenſe to ſay, that a man, by birth, is under the natural dominion of his father, only becauſe he begat him, and a man, by birth, alſo is under the natural dominion of his eldeſt brother, though he did not beget him.

75. If then the private dominion of Adam, i. e. his property, in the creatures, deſcended at his death, all entirely to his eldeſt ſon, his heir; (for if it did not, there is preſently an end of all Sir Robert's monarchy) and his natural dominion, the dominion a father has over his children, by begetting them, belonged immediately, upon Adam's deceaſe, equally to all his ſons who had children, by the ſame title their father had it, the ſovereignty founded upon property, and the ſovereignty founded upon fatherhood, come to be divided; ſince Cain, as heir, had that of property alone, Seth and the other ſons that of fatherhood, equally with him. This is the beſt can be made of our A.'s doctrine, and of the two titles of ſovereignty, he ſets up in Adam, one of them will either ſignify nothing; or, if they both muſt ſtand, they can ſerve only to confound the rights of princes, and diſorder government in his poſterity. For, by building upon two titles to dominion, which cannot deſcend together, and which he allows may be ſeparated, (for he yields, that "Adam's children had their "diſtinct territories, by right of private dominion," O. 210. p. 40.) he makes it perpetually a doubt, upon his principles, where the ſovereignty is, or to whom we owe our obedience, ſince fatherhood and property are diſtinct titles, and began preſently upon Adam's death, to be in diſtinct perſons. And which then was to give way to the other?

76. Let us take the account of it, as he himſelf gives it us. He tells us, out of Grotius, that "Adam's children by donation, aſſignation, or ſome kind of "ceſſion, before he was dead, had their diſtinct territories, by right of private "dominion; Abel had his flocks, and paſtures for them; Cain had his fields "for corn, and the land of Nod, where he built him a city," O. 210. Here 'tis obvious to demand, which of theſe two, after Adam's death, was ſovereign? Cain, ſays our A, p. 19. By what title? "As heir; for heirs to progenitors, "who were natural parents of the people, are not only lords of their own "children, but alſo of their brethren," ſays our A. p. 19. What was Cain heir to? Not the entire poſſeſſions, not all that which Adam had private dominion in; for our A. allows that Abel, by a title derived from his father. "had "his diſtinct territory for paſture, by right of private dominion." What then, Abel had, by private dominion, was exempt from Cain's dominion. For he could not have private dominion over that, which was under the private dominion of another; and therefore, his ſovereignty over his brother is gone, with this private dominion, and ſo there are preſently two ſovereigns, and his imaginary title of fatherhood is out of doors, and Cain is no prince over his brother. Or elſe, if Cain retain his ſovereignty over Abel, notwithſtanding his private dominion, it will follow, that the "firſt grounds and principles of government" have nothing to do with property, whatever our A. ſays to the contrary. 'Tis true, Abel did not out-live his father Adam; but that makes nothing to the argument, which will hold good againſt Sir Robert, in Abel's iſſue, or in Seth, or any of the poſterity of Adam, not deſcended from Cain.

77. The ſame inconvenience he runs into, about the three ſons of Noah, who, as he ſays, p. 13. "had the whole world, divided amongſt them, by their fa-"ther." I aſk then, in which of the three ſhall we find "the eſtabliſhment "of regal power," after Noah's death? If in all three, as our A. there ſeems to ſay; then it will follow, that regal power is founded in property of land, and follows private dominion, and not in paternal power, or natural dominion, and ſo there is an end of paternal power, as the fountain of regal authority, and the ſo much magnified fatherhood quite vaniſhes. If the regal power deſcended to Shem, as eldeſt, and heir to his father, then "Noah's diviſion of the world, by

" lot, to his ſons, or his ten years ſailing about the Mediterranean, to appoint " each ſon his part," which our A. tells of, p. 15. was labour loſt, his diviſion of the world to them, was to ill, or to no purpoſe. For his grant to Cham and Japhet was little worth, if Shem, notwithſtanding this grant, as ſoon as Noah was dead, was to be lord over them. Or, if this grant of private dominion to them, over their aſſigned territories, were good, here were ſet up two diſtinct ſorts of power, not ſubordinate one to the other, with all thoſe inconveniencies, which he muſters up, againſt the " power of the people," O. 158. which I ſhall ſet down in his own words, only changing property for people. " All power on earth is either derived, or uſurped, from the fatherly power, " there being no other original to be found, of any power whatſoever: for if " there ſhould be granted two ſorts of power, without any ſubordination of one " to the other, they would be in perpetual ſtrife, which ſhould be ſupreme, for " two ſupremes cannot agree: if the fatherly power be ſupreme, then the power " grounded on private dominion muſt be ſubordinate, and depend on it; and " if the power, grounded on property, be ſupreme, then the fatherly power " muſt ſubmit to it, and cannot be exerciſed, without the licenſe of the pro" prietors, which muſt quite deſtroy the frame and courſe of nature." This is his own arguing, againſt two diſtinct, independent powers, which I have ſet down in his own words, only putting power, riſing from property, for power of the people; and when he has anſwered what he himſelf has urged, here, againſt two diſtinct powers, we ſhall be better able to ſee how, with any tolerable ſenſe, he can derive all regal authority " from the natural and private dominion " of Adam," from fatherhood and property together, which are diſtinct titles, that do not always meet in the ſame perſon; and 'tis plain, by his own confeſſion, preſently ſeparated, as ſoon as both Adam's and Noah's death made way for ſucceſſion: though our A. frequently in his writings, jumbles them together, and omits not to make uſe of either, where he thinks it will ſound beſt to his purpoſe. But the abſurdities of this will more fully appear, in the next chapter, where we ſhall examine the ways of conveyance of the ſovereignty of Adam, to princes, that were to reign after him.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the conveyance of Adam's ſovereign monarchical power.

78. SIR Robert, having not been very happy in any proof he brings, for the ſovereignty of Adam, is not much more fortunate, in conveying it to future princes, who, if his politicks be true, muſt all derive their titles from that firſt monarch. The ways he has aſſigned, as they lie ſcattered up and down in his writings, I will ſet down in his own words: in his preface he tells us, that, " Adam being monarch of the whole world, none of his poſterity had any " right to poſſeſs any thing, but by his grant, or permiſſion, or by ſucceſſion " from him." Here he makes two ways of conveyance, of any thing Adam ſtood poſſeſſed of, and thoſe are grants, or ſucceſſion. Again, he ſays, All " kings either are, or are to be reputed, the next heirs to thoſe firſt progenitors, " who were at firſt the natural parents of the whole people," p. 19. There " cannot be any multitude of men whatſoever, but that in it, conſidered by it" ſelf, there is one man amongſt them, that, in nature, hath a right to be the " king of all the reſt, as being the next heir to Adam," O. 253. Here in theſe places, inheritance is the only way he allows, of conveying monarchical power to princes. In other places he tells us, O. 155. " All power on earth is ei" ther derived, or uſurped, from the fatherly power," O. 158. " All kings " that now are, or ever were, were either fathers of their people, or heirs of " ſuch fathers, or uſurpers of the right of ſuch fathers," O. 253. And here he makes inheritance, or uſurpation, the only ways, whereby kings come by this original power: but yet, he tells us, " This fatherly empire, as it was of it

ſelf hereditary, ſo it was alienable by patent, and ſeizable by an uſurper," O. 190. So then here inheritance, grant, or uſurpation, will convey it. And laſt of all, which is moſt admirable, he tells us, p. 100. "It ſkills not which way kings "come by their power, whether by election, donation, ſucceſſion, or by any "other means; for it is ſtill the manner of the government, by ſupreme power, "that makes them properly kings, and not the means of obtaining their crowns." Which, I think, is a full anſwer to all his whole hypotheſis and diſcourſe, about Adam's royal authority, as the fountain, from which all princes were to derive theirs; and he might have ſpared the trouble of ſpeaking ſo much as he does, up and down, of heirs and inheritance, if to make any one properly a king, needs no more but "governing by ſupreme power, and it matters not by what "means he came by it."

79. By this notable way, our A. may make Oliver as properly king, as any one elſe, he could think of: and had he had the happineſs to live under Maſſanello's government, he could not, by this his own rule, have forborn to have done homage to him, with "O king live for ever," ſince the manner of his government, by ſupreme power, made him properly king, who was, but the day before, properly a fiſherman, And if Don Quixote had taught his 'Squire to govern with ſupreme authority, our A. no doubt, could have made a moſt loyal ſubject in Sancho Pancha's iſland; and he muſt needs have deſerved ſome preferment in ſuch governments, ſince I think he is the firſt politician, who pretending to ſettle government upon its true baſis, and to eſtabliſh the thrones of lawful princes, ever told the world, that he was "properly a king, whoſe man- "ner of government was by ſupreme power, by what means ſoever he obtain'd "it;" which, in plain Engliſh, is to ſay, that regal and ſupreme power is properly and truly his, who can by any means ſeize upon it; and if this be to be "properly a king," I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find an uſurper.

80. This is ſo ſtrange a doctrine, that the ſurprize of it hath made me paſs by, without their due reflection, the contradictions he runs into, by making ſometimes inheritance alone, ſometimes only grant, or inheritance, ſometimes only inheritance, or uſurpation, ſometimes all theſe three, and at laſt election, or any other means, added to them, the ways, whereby Adam's royal authority, that is, his right to ſupreme rule, could be conveyed down to future kings and governors, ſo as to give them a title to the obedience and ſubjection of the people. But theſe contradictions lie ſo open, that the very reading of our A.'s own words will diſcover them to any ordinary underſtanding; and though what I have quoted out of him (with abundance more of the ſame ſtrain and coherence, which might be found in him) might well excuſe me from any farther trouble in this argument, yet, having propoſed to myſelf to examine the main parts of his doctrine, I ſhall a little more particularly conſider how inheritance, grant, uſurpation, or election, can any way make out government in the world, upon his principles; or derive to any one a right of empire, from this regal authority of Adam, had it been never ſo well proved, that he had been abſolute monarch and lord of the whole world.

CHAP. IX.

Of Monarchy, by inheritance from Adam.

81. THO' it be never ſo plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, ſhould all men be of our A.'s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet ſince men cannot obey any thing that cannot command, and ideas of government in the fancy, though never ſo perfect, though never ſo right, cannot give laws, nor preſcribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof, for the ſettling of order, and eſtabliſhment of government, in its exerciſe and uſe amongſt men, unleſs there were a way alſo taught, how to know the perſon, to whom it belonged to have this, power,

power; and exerciſe this dominion over others. 'Tis in vain, then, to talk of ſubjection and obedience, without telling us whom we are to obey. For were I never ſo fully perſuaded, that there ought to be magiſtracy and rule in the world; yet I am nevertheleſs at liberty ſtill, 'till it appears, who is the perſon, that hath right to my obedience; ſince, if there be no marks to know him by, and diſtinguiſh him, that hath right to rule, from other men, it may be myſelf, as well as any other. And, therefore, though ſubmiſſion to government be every one's duty, yet ſince that ſignifies nothing, but ſubmitting to the direction and laws of ſuch men, as have authority to command; 'tis not enough to make a man a ſubject, to convince him, that there is regal power in the world; but there muſt be ways of deſigning, and knowing the perſon, to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be oblig'd, in conſcience, to ſubmit to any power, unleſs he can be ſatisfied, who is the perſon who has a right to exerciſe that power over him. If this were not ſo, there would be no diſtinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is, without any more ado, to be obey'd, and crowns and ſcepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their phyſicians, if the perſon cannot be known, who has a right to direct me, and whoſe preſcriptions I am bound to follow. To ſettle, therefore, men's conſciences under an obligation to obedience, 'tis neceſſary, that they know not only, that there is a power ſomewhere in the world, but the perſon, who by right is veſted with this power over them.

82. How ſucceſsful our A. has been in his attempts, to ſet up a monarchical, abſolute power in Adam, the reader may judge, by what has been already ſaid; but were that abſolute monarchy, as clear as our A. would deſire it, as I preſume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no uſe to the government of mankind, now in the world, unleſs he alſo make out theſe two things:

Firſt, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was, upon his deceaſe, convey'd entire to ſome other perſon, and ſo on to poſterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth, are poſſeſs'd of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived to them.

83. If the firſt of theſe fail, the power of Adam, were it never ſo great, never ſo certain, will ſignify nothing to the preſent government and ſocieties in the world, but we muſt ſeek out ſome other original of power for the government of polities, than this of Adam, or elſe there will be none at all in the world. If the latter fail, it will deſtroy the authority of the preſent governors, and abſolve the people from ſubjection to them, ſince they having no better a claim, than others, to that power, which is alone the fountain of all authority, can have no title to rule over them.

84. Our A. having fanſied an abſolute ſovereignty in Adam, mentions ſeveral ways of its conveyance to princes, that were to be his ſucceſſors; but that, which he chiefly inſiſts on, is that of inheritance, which occurs ſo often, in his ſeveral diſcourſes, and I having in the foregoing chapter quoted ſeveral of theſe paſſages, I ſhall not need here again to repeat them. This ſovereignty he erects, as has been ſaid, upon a double foundation, viz. that of property, and that of fatherhood, One was the right, he was ſuppoſed to have in all creatures, a right to poſſeſs the earth with the beaſts, and other inferior ranks of things in it, for his private uſe, excluſive of all other men. The other was the right, he was ſuppoſed to have, to rule and govern men, all the reſt of mankind.

85. In both theſe rights, there being ſuppoſed an excluſion of all other men, it muſt be upon ſome reaſon peculiar to Adam, that they muſt both be founded.

That of his property our A. ſuppoſes to ariſe from God's immediate donation, Gen. i. 28. and that of fatherhood from the act of begetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir ſucceed not to the reaſon, upon which his father's right was founded, he cannot ſucced to the right, which followeth from it. For example, Adam had a right of property in the creatures, upon the donation and grant of God almighty, who was Lord and proprietor of them all; let this be ſo, as our A. tells us, yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no ſuch right of property in them, unleſs the ſame reaſon, viz. God's donation, veſted a right in the heir too. For, if Adam could have had no property in, nor uſe of the creatures, without this poſitive donation from God, and this donation were only perſonally to Adam, his heir could have no right by it, but, upon his death, it muſt revert to God, the lord and owner, again; for poſitive grants give no title farther, than the expreſs words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if, as our A. himſelf contends, that donation, Gen. i. 28. were made only to Adam perſonally, his heir could not ſucceed to his property in the creatures; and if it were a donation to any but Adam, let it be ſhewn, that it was to his heir, in our A.'s ſenſe, i. e. to one of his children excluſive of all the reſt.

86. But not to follow our A. too far out of the way, the plain of the caſe is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in all other animals, a ſtrong deſire of ſelf-preſervation, and furniſh'd the world with things fit for food and raiment, and other neceſſaries of life, ſubſervient to his deſign, that man ſhould live and abide, for ſome time, upon the face of the earth, and not that ſo curious and wonderful a piece of workmanſhip, by its own negligence, or want of neceſſaries, ſhould periſh again, preſently after a few moment's continuance; God, I ſay, having made man and the world thus, ſpoke to him, that is, directed him, by his ſenſes and reaſon, (as he did the inferior animals, by their ſenſe and inſtinct, which he had placed in them for that purpoſe) to the uſe of thoſe things, which were ſerviceable for his ſubſiſtence, and given him as the means of his preſervation. And therefore I doubt not, but before theſe words were pronounced, Gen. i. 28, 29. (if they muſt be underſtood literally, to have been ſpoken) and without any ſuch verbal donation, man had a right to an uſe of the creatures, by the will and grant of God. For the deſire, ſtrong deſire, of preſerving his life and being, having been planted in him, as a principle of action, by God himſelf; reaſon, "which was the voice of God in him," could not but teach him and aſſure him, that purſuing that natural inclination he had to preſerve his being, he follow'd the will of his maker; and, therefore, had a right to make uſe of thoſe creatures, which by his reaſon, or ſenſes, he could diſcover would be ſerviceable thereunto. And thus man's property in the creatures, was founded upon the right he had to make uſe of thoſe things that were neceſſary, or uſeful, to his being.

87. This being the reaſon and foundation of Adam's property, gave the ſame title, on the ſame ground, to all his children, not only after his death, but in his life-time: ſo that here was no privilege of his heir, above his other children, which could exclude them from an equal right to the uſe of the inferior creatures, for the comfortable preſervation of their beings, which is all the property man hath in them; and ſo Adam's ſovereignty, built on property, or as our A. calls it, "private dominion," comes to nothing. Every man had a right to the creatures, by the ſame title Adam had, viz. by the right every one had to take care of and provide for their ſubſiſtence: and thus men had a right in common, Adam's children in common with him. But if any one had began, and made himſelf a property, in any particular thing (which how he, or any one elſe could do, ſhall be ſhewn in another place) that thing, that poſſeſſion, if he diſpoſed not otherwiſe of it, by his poſitive grant, deſcended naturally to his children, and they had a right to ſucceed to it, and poſſeſs it.

88. It might reaſonably be aſked here, "How come children by this right "of poſſeſſing, before any other, the properties of their parents upon their de"ceaſe?" For it being perſonally the parents, when they die, without actually transferring their right to another, Why does it not return again to the common ſtock of mankind? 'Twill perhaps be anſwered, that common conſent hath diſpoſed of it to their children. Common practice, we ſee, indeed, does ſo diſpoſe of it, but we cannot ſay, that it is the common conſent of mankind; for that hath never been aſked, nor actually given; and if common, tacit conſent hath eſtabliſhed it, it would make but a poſitive, and not a natural right of children, to inherit the goods of their parents: but where the practice is univerſal, 'tis reaſonable to think the cauſe is natural. The ground, then, I think to be this: the firſt and ſtrongeſt deſire God planted in men, and wrought into the very prin-

ciples of their nature, being that of ſelf-preſervation, that is the foundation of a right to the creatures, for the particular ſupport and uſe of each individual perſon himſelf. But next to this, God planted in men a ſtrong deſire alſo of propagating their kind, and continuing themſelves in their poſterity; and this gives children a title, to ſhare in the property of their parents, and a right to inherit their poſſeſſions. Men are not proprietors of what they have, merely for themſelves, their children have a title to part of it, and have their kind of right, join'd with their parents, in the poſſeſſion, which comes to be wholly theirs, when death, having put an end to their parents uſe of it, hath taken them from their poſſeſſions; and this we call inheritance: men being, by a like obligation, bound to preſerve what they have begotten, as to preſerve themſelves, their iſſue come to have a right in the goods, they are poſſeſſed of. That children have ſuch a right, is plain from the laws of God; and that men are convinced, that children have ſuch a right, is evident from the law of the land, both which laws require parents to provide for their children.

89. For, children being by the courſe of nature born weak, and unable to provide for themſelves, they have, by the appointment of God himſelf, who hath thus ordered the courſe of nature, a right to be nouriſh'd and maintain'd by their parents; nay, a right not only to a bare ſubſiſtence, but to the conveniencies and comforts of life, as far as the conditions of their parents can afford it. Hence it comes, that when their parents leave the world, and ſo the care due to their children ceaſes, the effects of it are to extend, as far as poſſibly they can, and the proviſions they have made in their life-time, are underſtood to be intended, as nature requires they ſhould, for their children, whom, after themſelves, they are bound to provide for, tho' the dying parents, by expreſs words, declare nothing about them: nature appoints the deſcent of their property to their children, who thus come to have a title, and natural right of inheritance to their father's goods, which the reſt of mankind cannot pretend to.

90. Were it not for this right, of being nouriſh'd and maintain'd by their parents, which God and nature has given to children, and obliged parents to, as a duty, it would be reaſonable, that the father ſhould inherit the eſtate of his ſon, and be preferr'd in the inheritance before his grandchild. For to the grandfather, there is due a long ſcore of care and expences, laid out upon the breeding and education of his ſon, which one would think in juſtice ought to be paid. But, that having been done in obedience to the ſame law, whereby he received nouriſhment and education from his own parents; this ſcore of education, receiv'd from a man's father, is paid by taking care, and providing for his own children, is paid, I ſay, as much as is requir'd of payment, by alteration of property, unleſs preſent neceſſity of the parents require a return of goods, for their neceſſary ſupport and ſubſiſtence. For we are not now ſpeaking of that reverence, acknowledgment, reſpect and honour, that is always due from children to their parents; but of poſſeſſions and commodities of life, valuable by money. But, tho' it be incumbent on parents to bring up and provide for their children, yet this debt to their children does not quite cancel the ſcore, due to their parents; but only is made by nature preferable to it. For the debt, a man owes his father, takes place, and gives the father a right to inherit the ſon's goods, where for want of iſſue, the right of children doth not exclude that title. And, therefore, a man having a right to be maintain'd by his children, where he needs it; and to enjoy alſo the comforts of life from them, when the neceſſary proviſion, due to them and their children, will afford it; if his ſon die without iſſue, the father, has a right, in nature, to poſſeſs his goods, and inherit his eſtate (whatever the municipal laws of ſome countries, may abſurdly direct otherwiſe,) and ſo again his children and their iſſue from him; or for want of ſuch, his father and his iſſue. But, where no ſuch are to be found, i. e. no kindred, there we ſee the poſſeſſions of a private man revert to the community, and ſo, in politick ſocieties, come into the hands of the publick magiſtrate: but, in the ſtate of nature, become again perfectly common, no body having a right to inherit them: nor can any one have a property in them, otherwiſe than in other things, common by nature, of which I ſhall ſpeak in its due place.

91. I have been the larger, in ſhewing upon what ground children have a right to ſucceed to the poſſeſſion of their father's properties, not only becauſe by it, it will appear, that if Adam had a property (a titular, inſignificant, uſeleſs property; for it could be no better, for he was bound to nouriſh and maintain his children and poſterity out of it) in the whole earth and its product, yet all his children coming to have, by the law of nature, and right of inheritance, a joint-title and right of property in it, after his death, it could convey no right of ſovereignty to any one of his poſterity over the reſt: ſince, every one having a right of inheritance to his portion, they might enjoy their inheritance, or any part of it in common, or ſhare it, or ſome parts of it, by diviſion, as it beſt liked them. But no one could pretend to the whole inheritance, or any ſovereignty, ſuppoſed to accompany it; ſince a right of inheritance gave every one of the reſt, as well as any one, a title to ſhare in the goods of his father. Not only upon this account, I ſay, have I been ſo particular in examining the reaſon of children's inheriting the property of their fathers, but alſo, becauſe it will give us farther light in the inheritance of rule and power, which in countries, where their particular, municipal laws give the whole poſſeſſion of land, entirely to the firſt-born, and deſcent of power has gone ſo to men, by this cuſtom, ſome have been apt to be deceived into an opinion, that there was a natural, or divine right of primogeniture, to both eſtate and power; and that the inheritance of both rule over men, and property in things, ſprang from the ſame original, and were to deſcend by the ſame rules.

92. Property, whoſe original is from the right a man has, to uſe any of the inferior creatures, for the ſubſiſtence and comfort of his life, is for the benefit and ſole advantage of the proprietor, ſo that he may even deſtroy the thing that he has property in, by his uſe of it, where need requires: but government, being for the preſervation of every man's right and property, by preſerving him from the violence or injury of others, is for the good of the governed. For, the magiſtrate's ſword being for a "terror to evil doers," and by that terror to enforce men to obſerve the poſitive laws of the ſociety, made conformable to the laws of nature, for the publick good, i. e. the good of every particular member of that ſociety, as far as by common rule it can be provided for, the ſword is not given the magiſtrate, for his own good alone.

93. Children therefore, as has been ſhew'd, by the dependance they have on their parents for ſubſiſtence, have a right of inheritance to their father's property, as that, which belongs to them, for their proper good and behoof, and therefore are fitly termed goods, wherein the firſt-born has not a ſole, or peculiar right, by any law of God and nature, the younger children having an equal title with him, founded on that right, they all have to maintenance, ſupport, and comfort from their parents, and on nothing elſe. But government, being for the benefit of the governed, and not the ſole advantage of the governors (but only for theirs with the reſt, as they make a part of that politick body, each of whoſe parts and members are taken care of, and directed in its peculiar functions for the good of the whole, by the laws of the ſociety) cannot be inherited by the ſame title that children have to the goods of their father. The right a ſon has, to be maintained and provided with the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, out of his father's ſtock, gives him a right to ſucceed to his father's property, for his own good; but this can give him no right to ſucceed, alſo, to the rule, which his father had over other men. All that a child has right to claim from his father, is nouriſhment and education, and the things nature furniſhes for the ſupport of life: but he has no right to demand rule, or dominion from him: he can ſubſiſt and receive from him the portion of good things, and advantages of education naturally due to him, without empire and dominion. That (if his father hath any) was veſted in him, for the good and behoof of others; and, therefore the ſon cannot claim, or inherit it by a title, which is founded wholly on his own private good and advantage.

94. We muſt know, how the firſt ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know, who has a right to ſucceed him in it, and inherit it from

him: if the agreement and conſent of men firſt gave a ſcepter into any one's hand, or put a crown on his head, that alſo muſt direct its deſcent and conveyance. For the ſame authority, that made the firſt a lawful ruler, muſt make the ſecond too, and ſo give right of ſucceſſion: in this caſe, inheritance, or primogeniture, can in itſelf have no right, no pretence to it, any farther than that conſent, which eſtabliſhed the form of the government, hath ſo ſettled the ſucceſſion. And thus we ſee the ſucceſſion of crowns, in ſeveral countries, places it on different heads, and he comes, by right of ſucceſſion, to be a prince in one place, who would be a ſubject in another.

95. IF God, by his poſitive grant and revealed declaration, firſt gave rule and dominion to any man, he that will claim by that title, muſt have the ſame poſitive grant of God, for his ſucceſſion. For, if that has not directed the courſe of its deſcent and conveyance, down to others, no body can ſucceed to this title of the firſt ruler. Children have no right of inheritance to this; and primogeniture can lay no claim to it, unleſs God, the author of this conſtitution, hath ſo ordain'd it. Thus we ſee the pretenſions of Saul's family, who received his crown from the immediate appointment of God, ended with his reign; and David, by the ſame title, that Saul reigned, viz. God's appointment, ſucceeded in his throne, to the excluſion of Jonathan, and all pretenſions of paternal inheritance: and if Solomon had a right to ſucceed his father, it muſt be by ſome other title than that of primogeniture. A cadet, or ſiſter's ſon, muſt have the preference in ſucceſſion, if he has the ſame title the firſt lawful prince had; and in dominion, that has its foundation only in the poſitive appointment of God himſelf, Benjamin the youngeſt, muſt have the inheritance of the crown, if God ſo direct, as well as one of that tribe had the firſt poſſeſſion.

96. IF paternal right, the act of begetting, give a man rule and dominion, inheritance, or primogeniture, can give no title. For he that cannot ſucceed to his father's title, which was begetting, cannot ſucceed to that power over his brethren, which his father had, by paternal right, over them. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more in another place. This is plain, in the mean time, that any government, whether ſuppoſed to be at firſt founded in paternal right, conſent of the people, or the poſitive appointment of God himſelf, which can ſuperſede either of the other, and ſo begin a new government upon a new foundation, I ſay, any government began upon either of theſe, can, by right of ſucceſſion, come to thoſe only, who have the title of him they ſucceed to. Power founded on contract, can deſcend only to him who has right by that contract: power founded on begetting, he only can have that begets: and power founded on the poſitive grant, or donation of God, he only can have, by right of ſucceſſion, to whom that grant directs it.

97. FROM what I have ſaid, I think this is clear, that a right to the uſe of the creatures, being founded originally in the right a man has, to ſubſiſt and enjoy the conveniencies of life; and the natural right children have to inherit the goods of their parents, being founded in the right they have, to the ſame ſubſiſtence and commodities of life, out of the ſtock of their parents, who are therefore taught, by natural love and tenderneſs, to provide for them, as a part of themſelves; and, all this being only for the good of the proprietor; or heir; it can be no reaſon for children's inheriting of rule and dominion, which has another original, and a different end. Nor can primogeniture have any pretence to a right of ſolely inheriting either property, or power, as we ſhall, in its due place, ſee more fully. 'Tis enough to have ſhewed here, that Adam's property, or private dominion, could not convey any ſovereignty, or rule, to his heir, who not having a right to inherit all his father's poſſeſſions, could not thereby come to have any ſovereignty over his brethren: and therefore, if any ſovereignty on account of his property, had been veſted in Adam, which in truth there was not, yet it would have died with him.

98. As Adam's ſovereignty, if, by virtue of being proprietor of the whole world, he had any authority over men, could not have been inherited, by any of his children, over the reſt, becauſe they had the ſame title to divide the inheritance, and every one had a right to a portion of his father's poſſeſſions: ſo nei-

ther could Adam's ſovereignty, by right of fatherhood, if any ſuch he had, deſcend to any one of his children. For it being in our A.'s account, a right, acquired by begetting, to rule over thoſe he had begotten, it was not a power poſſible to be inherited, becauſe the right, being conſequent to, and built on, an act perfectly perſonal, made that power ſo too, and impoſſible to be inherited. For paternal power, being a natural right, riſing only from the relation of a father and ſon, is as impoſſible to be inherited, as the relation itſelf; and a man may pretend as well to inherit the conjugal power, the huſband, whoſe heir he is, had over his wife, as he can to inherit the paternal power, of a father over his children. For, the power of the huſband being founded on contract, and the power of the father on begetting, he may as well inherit the power, obtained by the conjugal contract, which was only perſonal, as he may the power, obtained by begetting, which could reach no farther than the perſon of the begetter, unleſs begetting can be a title to power, in him that does not beget.

99. Which makes it a reaſonable queſtion to aſk, Whether Adam, dying before Eve, his heir, (ſuppoſe Cain or Seth) ſhould have, by right of inheriting Adam's fatherhood, ſovereign power over Eve, his mother. For Adam's fatherhood being nothing, but a right he had to govern his children, becauſe he begot them; he that inherits Adam's fatherhood, inherits nothing, even in our A.'s ſenſe, but the right Adam had to govern his children, becauſe he begot them: ſo that the monarchy of the heir would not have taken in Eve, or if it did, it being nothing, but the fatherhood of Adam, deſcended by inheritance, the heir muſt have right to govern Eve, becauſe Adam begot her; for fatherhood is nothing elſe.

100. Perhaps it will be ſaid, with our A. that a man can alien his power over his child; and what may be transferred by compact, may be poſſeſſed by inheritance. I anſwer, A father cannot alien the power he has over his child, he may perhaps to ſome degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it; and if any other man acquire it, 'tis not by the father's grant, but by ſome act of his own. For example: a father, unnaturally careleſs of his child, ſells, or gives him to another man; and he again expoſes him; a third man finding him, breeds up, cheriſhes and provides for him, as his own: I think in this caſe, no body will doubt, but that the greateſt part of filial duty and ſubjection was here owing, and to be paid to his foſter-father; and if any thing could be demanded from the child, by either of the other, it could be only due to his natural father: who, perhaps, might have forfeited his right, to much of that duty, comprehended in the command, "Honour your parents," but could transfer none of it to another. He, that purchaſed and neglected the child, got, by his purchaſe and grant of the father, no title to duty, or honour from the child; but only he acquired it, who by his own authority, performing the office and care of a father, to the forlorn and periſhing infant, made himſelf, by paternal care, a title to proportionable degrees of paternal power. This will be more eaſily admitted, upon conſideration of the nature of paternal power, for which I refer my reader to the ſecond book.

101. To return to the argument in hand: this is evident, That paternal power, ariſing only from begetting, for in that our A. places it alone, can neither be transferred, nor inherited: and he, that does not beget, can no more have paternal power, which ariſes from thence, than he can have a right to any thing, who performs not the condition, to which only it is annexed. If one ſhould aſk, "By what law has a father power over his children?" It will be anſwered, no doubt, by the law of nature, which gives ſuch a power over them to him that begets them. If one ſhould aſk likewiſe, "By what law does our A.'s "heir come by a right to inherit?" I think it would be anſwered, By the law of nature too. For I find not, that our A. brings one word of ſcripture to prove the right of ſuch an heir he ſpeaks of. Why then the law of nature gives fathers paternal power over their children, becauſe they did beget them; and the ſame law of nature gives the ſame paternal power to the heir, over his brethren, who did not beget them; whence it follows, that either the father has not his paternal power, by begetting, or elſe that the heir has it not at all: for 'tis hard to underſtand, how the law of nature, which is the law of reaſon, can

give the paternal power to the father, over his children, for the only reaſon of begetting; and to the firſt-born, over his brethren, without this only reaſon, i. e. for no reaſon at all: and if the eldeſt, by the law of nature, can inherit this paternal power, without the only reaſon, that gives a title to it, ſo may the youngeſt, as well as he, and a ſtranger, as well as either; for where there is no reaſon for any one, as there is not, but for him that begets, all have an equal title. I am ſure our A. offers no reaſon, and when any body does, we ſhall ſee whether it will hold or no.

102. In the mean time, 'tis as good ſenſe to ſay, that by the law of nature a man has a right to inherit the property of another, becauſe he is of kin to him, and is known to be of his blood, and therefore, by the ſame law of nature, an utter ſtranger to his blood, has right to inherit his eſtate: as to ſay that, by the law of nature, he that begets them, has paternal power over his children, and therefore by the law of nature, the heir, that begets them not, has this paternal power over them; or, ſuppoſing the law of the land gave abſolute power over their children, to ſuch only who nurſed them, and fed their children themſelves, could any body pretend, that this law gave any one, who did no ſuch thing, abſolute power over thoſe, who were not his children.

103. When therefore, it can be ſhewed, that conjugal power can belong to him, that is not an huſband; it will alſo, I believe, be proved, that our A.'s paternal power, acquired by begetting, may be inherited by a ſon; and that a brother, as heir to his father's power, may have paternal power over his brethren, and, by the ſame rule, conjugal power too: but till then, I think we may reſt ſatisfied, that the paternal power of Adam, this ſovereign authority of fatherhood, were there any ſuch, could not deſcend to, nor be inherited by his next heir. Fatherly power I eaſily grant our A. if it will do him any good, can never be loſt, becauſe it will be as long in the world, as there are fathers: but none of them will have Adam's paternal power, or derive theirs from him: but every one will have his own, by the ſame title Adam had his, viz. by begetting; but not by inheritance, or ſucceſſion, no more than huſbands have their conjugal power, by inheritance from Adam. And thus we ſee, as Adam had no ſuch property, no ſuch paternal power, as gave him ſovereign juriſdiction over mankind; ſo likewiſe his ſovereignty, built upon either of theſe titles, if he had any ſuch, could not have deſcended to his heir, but muſt have ended with him. Adam therefore, as has been proved, being neither monarch, nor his imaginary monarchy hereditable, the power, which is now in the world, is not that which was Adam's, ſince all that Adam could have, upon our A.'s grounds, either of property, or fatherhood, neceſſarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to poſterity by inheritance. In the next place, we will conſider, whether Adam had any ſuch heir, to inherit his power, as our A. talks of.

CHAP. X.

Of the heir to Adam's monarchical power.

104. OUR A. tells us, O. 253. "That it is a truth undeniable, that there "cannot be any multitude of men whatſoever, either great or ſmall, "though gathered together from the ſeveral corners and remoteſt regions of the "world, but that, in the ſame multitude, conſidered by itſelf, there is one man "amongſt them, that, in nature, hath a right to be king of all the reſt, as being "the next heir to Adam, and all the other ſubjects to him; every man by nature is a king, or a ſubject." And again. p. 20. "If Adam himſelf were ſtill "living, and now ready to die, it is certain that there is one man, and but one, in "the world, who is next heir." Let this multitude of men be, if our A. pleaſes, all the princes upon the earth, there will then be, by our A.'s rule, "one amongſt "them, that in nature, hath a right to be king of all the reſt, as being the right "heir to Adam;" an excellent way to eſtabliſh the thrones of princes, and ſettle the obedience of their ſubjects, by ſetting up an hundred, or perhaps a thouſand

ſand titles (if there be ſo many princes in the world) againſt any king, now reigning, each as good upon our A.'s grounds, as his, who wears the crown. If this right of heir carry any weight with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as our A. ſeems to tell us, O. 244, muſt not all be ſubject to it, from the higheſt to the loweſt? Can thoſe, who wear the name of princes, without having the right of being heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their ſubjects, by this title, and not be bound to pay it, by the ſame law? Either governments in the world are not to be claimed, and held, by this title of Adam's heir, and then the ſtarting of it is to no purpoſe, the being or not being Adam's heir ſignifies nothing, as to the title of dominion: or, if it really be, as our A. ſays, the true title to government and ſovereignty, the firſt thing to be done is to find out this true heir of Adam, ſeat him in his throne, and then all the kings and princes of the world ought to come and reſign up their crowns and ſcepters to him, as things that belong no more to them, than to any of their ſubjects.

105. For either this right in nature, of Adam's heir to be king over all the race of men, (for all together they make one multitude) is a right not neceſſary to the making of a lawful king, and ſo there may be lawful kings without it, and then kings titles and power depend not on it; or elſe all the kings in the world, but one, are not lawful kings, and ſo have no right to obedience: either this title of heir to Adam is that, whereby kings hold their crowns, and have a right to ſubjection from their ſubjects, and then one only can have it, and the reſt, being ſubjects, can require no obedience from other men, who are but their fellow-ſubjects; or elſe, it is not the title whereby kings rule, and have a right to obedience from their ſubjects; and then kings are kings without it, and this dream, of the natural ſovereignty of Adam's heir, is of no uſe to obedience and government. For if kings have a right to dominion, and the obedience of their ſubjects, who are not, nor can poſſibly be heirs to Adam, What uſe is there of ſuch a title, when we are obliged to obey without it? If kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no right to ſovereignty, we are all free, 'till our A. or any body for him, will ſhew us Adam's right heir. If there be but one heir of Adam, there can be but one lawful king in the world, and no body in conſcience can be obliged to obedience, 'till it be reſolved who that is; for it may be any one, who is not known to be of a younger houſe, and all others have equal titles. If there be more than one heir of Adam, every one is his heir, and ſo every one has regal power. For if two ſons can be heirs together, then all the ſons are equally heirs, and ſo all are heirs, being all ſons, or ſons ſons of Adam. Betwixt theſe two the right of heir cannot ſtand; for by it, either but one only man, or all men are kings. Take which you pleaſe, it diſſolves the bonds of government and obedience; ſince, if all men are heirs, they can owe obedience to no body; if only one, no body can be obliged to pay obedience to him, 'till he be known, and his title made out.

CHAP. XI.

Who heir?

106. THE great queſtion, which, in all ages, has diſturbed mankind, and brought on them the greateſt part of thoſe miſchiefs, which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and diſordered the peace of the world, has been, not, Whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came? but, Who ſhould have it? The ſettling of this point being of no ſmaller moment than the ſecurity of princes, and the peace and welfare of their eſtates and kingdoms, a reformer of politicks, one would think, ſhould lay this ſure, and be very clear in it; for, if this remain diſputable, all the reſt will be to very little purpoſe; and the ſkill uſed in dreſſing up power, with all the ſplendor and temptation abſoluteneſs can add to it, without ſhewing, who has a right to have it, will ſerve only to give a greater edge to man's natural ambition, which of itſelf is but too keen. What can this do, but ſet men on the more eagerly to ſcramble, and to

lay a ſure and laſting foundation of endleſs contention and diſorder, inſtead of that peace and tranquility, which is the buſineſs of government, and the end of human ſociety?

107. THIS deſignation of the perſon our A. is more than ordinary obliged to take care of, becauſe he, affirming that "the aſſignment of civil power is by divine inſtitution," hath made the conveyance, as well as the power itſelf, ſacred: ſo that no conſideration, no act or art of man can divert it from that perſon, to whom, by this divine right, it is aſſigned; no neceſſity or contrivance can ſubſtitute another perſon in his room. For if the aſſignment of civil power be by "divine inſtitution," and Adam's heir be he, to whom it is thus aſſigned, as in the foregoing chapter our A. tells us, it would be as much ſacrilege for any one to be king, who was not Adam's heir, as it would have been amongſt the Jews, for any one to have been prieſt, who had not been of Aaron's poſterity: for not only the prieſthood, "in general, being by divine inſtitution, but the aſſignment of it" to the ſole line and poſterity of Aaron, made it impoſſible to be enjoy'd or exerciſed by any one, but thoſe perſons who are of the off-ſpring of Aaron: whoſe ſucceſſion, therefore, was carefully obſerved; and, by that, the perſons who had a right to the prieſthood certainly known.

108. LET us ſee, then, what care our A. has taken, to make us know, who is "this heir, who by divine inſtitution has a right to be king over all men." The firſt account of him we meet with is p. 12. in theſe words: "This ſubjection of children, being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himſelf; it follows, that civil power, not only in general, is by divine inſtitution, but even the aſſignment of it ſpecifically to the eldeſt parents." Matters of ſuch conſequence as this is, ſhould be in plain words, as little liable as might be to doubt, or equivocation; and I think, if language be capable of expreſſing any thing diſtinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and the ſeveral degrees of nearneſs of blood, is one. It were, therefore, to be wiſhed, that our A. had uſed a little more intelligible expreſſions here, that we might have better known who it is, to whom the aſſignment of civil power is made, by divine inſtitution; or (at leaſt) would have told us what he meant by eldeſt parents. For, I believe, if land had been aſſign'd, or granted to him, and the eldeſt parents of his family, he would have thought it had needed an interpreter; and it would ſcarce have been known to whom next it belonged.

109. IN propriety of ſpeech, (and certainly propriety of ſpeech is neceſſary, in a diſcourſe of this nature) eldeſt parents ſignifies either the eldeſt men and women, that have had children, or thoſe, who have longeſt had iſſue; and then our A.'s aſſertion will be, That thoſe fathers and mothers, who have been longeſt in the world, or longeſt fruitful, have, by divine inſtitution, a right to civil power. If there be any abſurdity in this, our A. muſt anſwer for it: and if his meaning be different from my explication, he is to be blamed that he would not ſpeak it plainly. This I am ſure, parents cannot ſignify heirs male, nor eldeſt parents an infant child; who yet may ſometime be the true heir, if there can be but one. And we are hereby ſtill as much at a loſs, who civil power belongs to, notwithſtanding this "aſſignment by divine inſtitution," as if there had been no ſuch aſſignment at all, or our A. had ſaid nothing of it. This, of eldeſt parents, leaving us more in the dark, who by divine inſtitution has a right to civil power, than thoſe, who never heard any thing at all of heir, or deſcent, of which our A. is ſo full. And tho' the chief matter of his writings be to teach obedience to thoſe who have a right to it, which he tells us is conveyed by deſcent, yet who thoſe are, to whom this right by deſcent belongs, he leaves like the philoſopher's ſtone in politicks, out of the reach of any one to diſcover from his writings.

110. THIS obſcurity cannot be imputed to want of language, in ſo great a maſter of ſtyle as Sir Robert is, when he is reſolved with himſelf, what he would ſay: and therefore, I fear, finding how hard it would be to ſettle rules of deſcent by divine inſtitution, and how little it would be to his purpoſe, or conduce to the clearing and eſtabliſhing the titles of prince, if ſuch rules of deſcent were ſettled, he choſe rather to content himſelf with doubtful and general terms, which might make no ill ſound in men's ears, who were willing to be pleaſed with them,

rather than offer any clear rules of deſcent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which mens conſciences might be ſatisfied, to whom it deſcended, and know the perſons, who had a right to regal power, and with it to their obedience.

111. How elſe is it poſſible, that laying ſo much ſtreſs as he does upon deſcent, and Adam's heir, next heir, true heir, he ſhould never tell us what heir means, nor the way to know, who the next, or true heir is? This, I do not remember he does any where expreſsly handle; but where it comes in his way, very warily and doubtfully touches; though it be ſo neceſſary, that without it all diſcourſes of government and obedience, upon his principles, would be to no purpoſe, and fatherly power, never ſo well made out, will be of no uſe to any body. Hence he tells us, O. 244. "That not only the conſtitution of power in general, " but the limitation of it to one kind, i. e. monarchy, and the determination of " it to the individual perſon and line of Adam, are all three ordinances of God; " neither Eve, nor her children, could either limit Adam's power, or join others " with him; and what was given unto Adam, was given, in his perſon, to his " poſterity." Here, again, our A. informs us, that the divine ordinance hath limited the deſcent of Adam's monarchical power. To whom? "To Adam's " line and poſterity," ſays our A. A notable limitation, a limitation to all mankind. For if our A. can find any one amongſt mankind, that is not of the line and poſterity of Adam, he may, perhaps, tell him, who this next heir of Adam's is: but for us, I deſpair how this limitation of Adam's empire to his line and poſterity will help us to find out one heir. This limitation, indeed, of our A. will ſave thoſe the labour, who would look for him amongſt the race of brutes, if any ſuch there were; but will very little contribute to the diſcovery of one next heir amongſt men; though it make a ſhort and eaſy determination of the queſtion, about the deſcent of Adam's regal power, by telling us, that the line and poſterity of Adam is to have it, that is, in plain Engliſh, any one may have it, ſince there is no perſon living, that hath not the title of being of the line and poſterity of Adam; and, while it keeps there, it keeps within our A.'s limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed, p. 19. he tells us, that ſuch heirs are not only " lords of their own children, but of their brethren," whereby, and by the words following, which we ſhall conſider anon, he ſeems to inſinuate, that the eldeſt ſon is heir; but he no where, that I know, ſays it in direct words; but by the inſtances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow, we may allow this to be ſo far his opinion concerning heirs, that where there are divers children, the eldeſt ſon has the right to be heir. That primogeniture cannot give any title to paternal power, we have already ſhewed. That a father may have a natural right to ſome kind of power over his children, is eaſily granted; but that an elder brother has ſo over his brethren, remains to be proved: God, or nature, has not any where, that I know, placed any ſuch juriſdiction in the firſt-born; nor can reaſon find any ſuch natural ſuperiority amongſt brethren. The law of Moſes gave a double portion of the goods and poſſeſſions to the eldeſt, but we find not any where, that naturally, or by God's inſtitution, ſuperiority or dominion belonged to him; and the inſtances there brought by our A. are but ſlender proofs of a right to civil power and dominion in the firſt-born, and do rather ſhew the contrary.

112. His words are, in the fore-cited place, "And therefore, we find God " told Cain of his brother Abel, his deſire ſhall be ſubject unto thee, and thou " ſhalt rule over him." To which I anſwer,

1. These words of God to Cain, are, by many interpreters, with great reaſon, underſtood in a quite different ſenſe, than what our A. uſes them in.

2. Whatever was meant by them, it could not be, that Cain, as elder, had a natural dominion over Abel; for the words are conditional: "If thou " doſt well," and ſo perſonal to Cain, and whatever was ſignified by them, did depend on his carriage, and not follow his birth-right: and therefore, could by no means be an eſtabliſhment of dominion in the firſt-born, in general: for, before this, Abel had his "diſtinct territories by right of private dominion," as our A. himſelf confeſſes, O. 210. which he could not have had, to the prejudice of the heir's title; "if, by divine inſtitution," Cain, as heir, was to inherit all his father's dominion.

3. If this was intended by God, as the charter of primogeniture, and the grant of dominion, to elder brothers in general as ſuch, by right of inheritance, we might expect, it ſhould have included all his brethren. For we may well ſuppoſe, Adam, from whom the world was to be peopled, had by this time, that theſe were grown up to be men, more ſons than theſe two: whereas Abel himſelf is not ſo much as named; and the words in the original can ſcarce, with any good conſtruction, be applied to him.

4. It is too much to build a doctrine of ſo mighty conſequence upon ſo doubtful and obſcure a place of ſcripture, which may be well, nay better, underſtood in a quite different ſenſe, and ſo can be but an ill proof, being as doubtful as the thing to be proved by it; eſpecially, when there is nothing elſe in ſcripture, or reaſon, to be found, that favours, or ſupports it.

113. It follows, p. 19. "Accordingly, when Jacob bought his brother's "birth-right, Iſaac bleſſed him thus; Be lord over thy brethren, and let the "ſons of thy mother bow before thee." Another inſtance, I take it, brought by our A. to evince dominion due to birth-right, and an admirable one it is. For it muſt be no ordinary way of reaſoning, in a man that is pleading for the natural power of kings, and againſt all compact, to bring for proof of it, an example, where his own account of it founds all the right upon compact, and ſettles empire in the younger brother; unleſs buying and ſelling be no compact; for he tells us, "when Jacob bought his brother's birth-right." But, paſſing by that, let us conſider the hiſtory itſelf, with what uſe our A. makes of it, and we ſhall find theſe following miſtakes about it.

1. That our A. reports this, as if Iſaac had given Jacob this bleſſing, immediately upon his purchaſing the birth-right; for he ſays, "when Jacob "bought, Iſaac bleſſed him," which is plainly otherwiſe in the ſcripture. For it appears, there was a diſtance of time between, and if we will take the ſtory in the order it lies, it muſt be no ſmall diſtance; all Iſaac's ſojourning in Gerar, and tranſactions with Abimelech, Gen. xxvi. coming between; Rebecca being then beautiful, and conſequently young, but Iſaac when he bleſſed Jacob, was old and decrepit: and Eſau alſo complains of Jacob, Gen. xxvii. 36. that two times he had ſupplanted him, "he took away my birth-right, ſays he, and be-"hold now he hath taken away my bleſſing;" words, that, I think, ſignify diſtance of time, and difference of action.

2. Another miſtake of our A.'s is, that he ſuppoſes Iſaac gave Jacob the bleſſing, and bid him be "lord over his brethren," becauſe he had the birth-right; for our A. brings this example to prove, that he that has the birth-right, has thereby a right to "be lord over his brethren." But it is alſo manifeſt, by the text, that Iſaac had no conſideration of Jacob's having bought the birth-right; for when he bleſſed him, he conſidered him not as Jacob, but took him for Eſau. Nor did Eſau underſtand any ſuch connection between birth-right and the bleſſing, for he ſays, "He hath ſupplanted me theſe two times, he took "away my birth-right, and behold now he hath taken away my bleſſing:" whereas had the bleſſing, which was to be "lord over his brethren," belong'd to the birth-right, Eſau could not have complained of this ſecond, as a cheat, Jacob having got nothing, but what Eſau had ſold him, when he ſold him his birth-right; ſo that it is plain, dominion, if theſe words ſignify it, was not underſtood to belong to birth-right.

114. And that in thoſe days of the patriarchs, dominion was not underſtood to be the right of the heir, but only a greater portion of goods, is plain from Gen. xxi. 10. for Sarah taking Iſaac to be heir, ſays, "Caſt out this bond-"woman and her ſon, for the ſon of this bondwoman ſhall not be heir with "my ſon:" whereby could be meant nothing, but that he ſhould not have a pretence to an equal ſhare of his father's eſtate, after his death, but ſhould have his portion preſently, and be gone. Accordingly we read, Gen. xxv. 5, 6. "That "Abraham gave all that he had unto Iſaac, but unto the ſons of the concubines, "which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and ſent them away from Iſaac "his ſon, while he yet lived." That is, Abraham having given portions to all his other ſons, and ſent them away, that which he had reſerved, being the

greateſt part of his ſubſtance, Iſaac as heir poſſeſſed after his death; but, by being heir, he had no right to be "lord over his brethren;" for if he had, why ſhould Sarah endeavour to rob him of one of his ſubjects, or leſſen the number of his ſlaves, by deſiring to have Iſhmael ſent away.

115. Thus, as under the law, the privilege of birth-right was nothing but a double portion, ſo we ſee that before Moſes, in the patriarchs time, from whence our A. pretends to take his model, there was no knowledge, no thought, that birth-right gave rule, or empire, paternal or kingly authority, to any one over his brethren. If this be not plain enough in the ſtory of Iſaac and Iſhmael, he that will look into 1 Chron. v. 1, 2. may there read theſe words, "Reuben "was the firſt-born, but, foraſmuch as he defiled his father's bed, his birth-"right was given unto the ſons of Joſeph the ſon of Iſrael, and the genealogy is "not to be reckoned after the birth-right; for Judah prevailed above his bre-"thren, and of him came the chief ruler, but the birth-right was Joſeph's." What this birth-right was, Jacob bleſſing Joſeph, Gen. xlviii. 22. telleth us in theſe words, "Moreover I have given thee one portion above thy brethren, "which I took out of the hand of the Amorite, with my ſword and with my "bow." Whereby it is not only plain, that the birth-right was nothing but a double portion, but the text in Chron. is expreſs againſt our A.'s doctrine, and ſhews that dominion was no part of the birth-right. For it tells us, that Joſeph had the birth-right, but Judah the dominion. One would think our A. were very fond of the very name of birth-right, when he brings this inſtance of Jacob and Eſau, to prove that dominion belongs to the heir over his brethren.

116. 1. Because it will be but an ill example to prove, that dominion, by God's ordination, belonged to the eldeſt ſon, becauſe Jacob the youngeſt here had it, let him come by it how he would. For, if it prove any thing, it can only prove, againſt our A. that the "aſſignment of dominion to the eldeſt "is not by divine inſtitution," which would then be unalterable. For if, by the law of God, or nature, abſolute power and empire belongs to the eldeſt ſon and his heirs, ſo that they are ſupreme monarchs, and all the reſt of their brethren ſlaves, our A. gives us reaſon to doubt, whether the eldeſt ſon has a power to part with it, to the prejudice of his poſterity, ſince he tells us, O. 158. "That in grants and gifts, that have their original from God, or nature, no "inferior power of man can limit, or make any law of preſcription againſt them."

117. 2. Because this place, Gen. xxvii. 29. brought by our A. concerns not at all the dominion of one brother over the other, nor the ſubjection of Eſau to Jacob. For 'tis plain in the hiſtory, that Eſau was never ſubject to Jacob, but lived apart in mount Seir, where he founded a diſtinct people and government, and was himſelf prince over them, as much as Jacob was in his own family. This text, if conſidered, can never be underſtood of Eſau himſelf, or the perſonal dominion of Jacob over him: for the words brethren, and ſons of thy mother, could not be uſed literally by Iſaac, who knew Jacob had only one brother; and theſe words are ſo far from being true in a literal ſenſe, or eſtabliſhing any dominion in Jacob over Eſau, that in the ſtory, we find the quite contrary, for Gen. xxxii. Jacob ſeveral times calls Eſau lord, and himſelf his ſervant; and Gen. xxxiii. "he bowed himſelf ſeven times to the ground to "Eſau." Whether Eſau, then, were a ſubject and vaſſal (nay, as our A. tells us, all ſubjects are ſlaves) to Jacob, and Jacob his ſovereign prince by birth-right, I leave the reader to judge; and to believe, if he can, that theſe words of Iſaac, "be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother's ſons bow down to "thee," confirmed Jacob in a ſovereignty over Eſau, upon the account of the birth-right, he had got from him.

118. He, that reads the ſtory of Jacob and Eſau, will find there was never any juriſdiction, or authority, that either of them had over the other, after their father's death; they lived with the friendſhip and equality of brethren, neither lord, neither ſlave to his brother; but independent of each other, were both heads of their diſtinct families, where they received no laws from one another, but lived ſeparately, and were the roots, out of which ſprang two diſtinct people, under two diſtinct governments. This bleſſing, then, of Iſaac, whereon our A.

would build the dominion of the elder brother, ſignifies no more, but what Rebecca had been told from God, Gen. xxv. 23. "Two nations are in thy womb, "and two manner of people ſhall be ſeparated from thy bowels, and the one "people ſhall be ſtronger than the other people, and the elder ſhall ſerve the "younger;" and ſo Jacob bleſſed Judah, Gen. xlix. and gave him the ſcepter and dominion; from whence our A. might have argued as well, that juriſdiction and dominion belongs to the third ſon over his brethren, as well as from this bleſſing of Iſaac, that it belonged to Jacob: both theſe places contain only predictions of what ſhould long after happen to their poſterities, and not any declaration of the right of inheritance to dominion in either. And thus we have our A.'s two great and only arguments to prove, that "heirs are lords over their "brethren."

1. Because God tells Cain, Gen. iv. That, however ſin might ſet upon him, he ought, or might be maſter of it: for the moſt learned interpreters underſtood the words of ſin, and not of Abel, and give ſo ſtrong reaſons for it, that nothing can convincingly be inferred from ſo doubtful a text, to our A.'s purpoſe.

2. Because in this of Gen. xxvii. Iſaac foretels that the Iſraelites, the poſterity of Jacob, ſhould have dominion over the Edomites, the poſterity of Eſau; therefore ſays our A. "heirs are lords of their brethren:" I leave any one to judge of the concluſion.

119. And now we ſee, how our A. has provided for the deſcending, and conveyance down of Adam's monarchical power, or paternal dominion to poſterity, by the inheritance of his heir, ſucceeding to all his father's authority, and becoming upon his death as much lord as his father was, "not only over his "own children, but over his brethren," and all deſcended from his father, and ſo in infinitum. But yet who this heir is, he does not once tell us; and all the light we have from him in this ſo fundamental a point, is only, that in his inſtance of Jacob, by uſing the word birth-right, as that which paſſed from Eſau to Jacob, he leaves us to gueſs, that by heir, he means the eldeſt ſon; though I do not remember he any where mentions expreſsly the title of the firſt-born, but all along keeps himſelf under the ſhelter of the indefinite term heir. But taking it to be his meaning, that the eldeſt ſon is heir, (for if the eldeſt be not, there will be no pretence, why the ſons ſhould not be all heirs alike) and ſo, by right of primogeniture, has dominion over his brethren; this is but one ſtep towards the ſettlement of ſucceſſion, and the difficulties remain ſtill, as much as ever, till he can ſhew us, who is meant by right heir, in all thoſe caſes which may happen, where the preſent poſſeſſor hath no ſon. This he ſilently paſſes over, and perhaps wiſely too: for what can be wiſer, after one has affirmed, that, "the perſon having that power, as well as the power and form "of government, is the ordinance of God, and by divine inſtitution," vid. O. 254, p. 12. than to be careful, not to ſtart any queſtion concerning the perſon, the reſolution whereof will certainly lead him into a confeſſion, that God and nature hath determined nothing about him. And if our A. cannot ſhew, who by right of nature, or a clear poſitive law of God, has the next right to inherit the dominion of this natural monarch, he has been at ſuch pains about, when he died without a ſon, he might have ſpared his pains in all the reſt; it being more neceſſary for the ſettling men's conſciences, and determining their ſubjection and allegiance, to ſhew them who, by original right, ſuperior and antecedent to the will, or any act of men, hath a title to this paternal juriſdiction; than it is to ſhew that by nature there was ſuch a juriſdiction; it being to no purpoſe for me to know there is ſuch a paternal power, which I ought, and am diſpoſed to obey, unleſs, where there are many pretenders, I alſo know the perſon, that is rightfully inveſted and endowed with it.

120. For the main matter in queſtion being concerning the duty of my obedience, and the obligation of conſcience I am under, to pay it to him that is of right my lord and ruler, I muſt know the perſon that this right of paternal power reſides in, and ſo impowers him to claim obedience from me. For let it be true what he ſays, p. 12. "That civil power not only in general is by divine

“ inſtitution, but even the aſſignment of it, eſpecially to the eldeſt parents; and “ O. 254. that not only the power, or right of government, but the form of “ the power of governing, and the perſon having that power, are all the ordi- “ nance of God;” yet unleſs he ſhews us, in all caſes, who is this perſon, ordained by God; who is this eldeſt parent, all his abſtract notions of monarchical power will ſignify juſt nothing, when they are to be reduced to practice, and men are conſcientiouſly to pay their obedience. For paternal juriſdiction being not the thing to be obeyed, becauſe it cannot command, but is only that, which gives one man a right, which another hath not, and if it come by inheritance, another man cannot have, to command and be obeyed; it is ridiculous to ſay, I pay obedience to the paternal power, when I obey him, to whom paternal power gives no right to my obedience: for he can have no divine right to my obedience, who cannot ſhew his divine right to the power of ruling over me, as well as that, by divine right, there is ſuch a power in the world.

121. And hence not being able to make out any prince's title to government, as heir to Adam, which therefore is of no uſe, and had been better let alone, he is fain to reſolve all into preſent poſſeſſion, and makes civil obedience as due to an uſurper, as to a lawful king; and thereby the uſurper's title as good. His words are, O. 253. and they deſerve to be remembered: “ If an “ uſurper diſpoſſeſs the true heir, the ſubjects obedience to the fatherly power “ muſt go along and wait upon God's providence.” But I ſhall leave his title of uſurpers to be examined in its due place, and deſire my ſober reader to conſider, what thanks princes owe ſuch politicks as this, which can ſuppoſe paternal power, i. e. a right to government in the hands of a Cade, or a Cromwell, and ſo all obedience being due to paternal power, the obedience of ſubjects will be due to them, by the ſame right, and upon as good grounds, as it is to lawful princes; and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine as it is, muſt neceſſarily follow, from making all political power to be nothing elſe, but Adam's paternal power, by right and divine inſtitution, deſcending from him, without being able to ſhew, to whom it deſcended, or who is heir to it.

122. To ſettle government in the world, and to lay obligations to obedience, on any man's conſcience, it is as neceſſary (ſuppoſing with our A. that all power be nothing, but the being poſſeſſed of Adam's fatherhood) to ſatisfy him, who has a right to this power, this fatherhood, when the poſſeſſor dies without ſons, to ſucceed immediately to it, as it was to tell him, that, upon the death of the father, the eldeſt ſon had a right to it: for it is ſtill to be remembered, that the great queſtion is, (and that which our A. would be thought to contend for, if he did not ſometimes forget it) what perſons have a right to be obeyed, and not, whether there be a power in the world, which is to be called paternal, without knowing in whom it reſides: for ſo it be a power, i. e. right to govern, it matters not, whether it be termed paternal or regal, natural or acquired: whether you call it ſupreme fatherhood, or ſupreme brotherhood, will be all one, provided we know who has it.

123. I go on, then, to aſk, whether in the inheriting of this paternal power, this ſupreme fatherhood, the grandſon by a daughter, hath a right before a nephew by a brother? whether the grandſon, by the eldeſt ſon, being an infant, before the younger ſon, a man and able? Whether the daughter before the uncle? Any other man deſcended by a male line? Whether a grandſon by a younger daughter, before a grand-daughter by an elder daughter? Whether the elder ſon by a concubine, before a younger ſon by a wife? From whence alſo will ariſe many queſtions of legitimation, and what, in nature, is the difference betwixt a wife and a concubine? For as to the municipal, or poſitive laws of men, they can ſignify nothing here. It may farther be aſked, whether the eldeſt ſon being a fool, ſhall inherit this paternal power, before the younger a wiſe man? And what degree of folly it muſt be, that ſhall exclude him? And who ſhall be judge of it? Whether the ſon of a fool, excluded for his folly, before the ſon of his wiſe brother who reigned? Who has the paternal power, whilſt the widow-queen is with child by the deceaſed king, and no body knows whether it will be a ſon, or a daughter? Which ſhall be heir of the two male-twins,

who, by the diſſection of the mother, were laid open to the world? Whether a ſiſter by the half-blood, before a brother's daughter by the whole blood?

124. THESE, and many more ſuch doubts, might be propoſed about the titles of ſucceſſion, and the right of inheritance; and that not as idle ſpeculations, but ſuch as, in hiſtory, we ſhall find have concerned the inheritance of crowns and kingdoms; and if ours want them, we need not go farther for famous examples of it, than the other kingdom in this very iſland, which having been fully related by the ingenious and learned author of Patriarcha non Monarcha, I need ſay no more of. Till our A. hath reſolved all the doubts, that may ariſe about the next heir, and ſhewed, that they are plainly determined by the law of nature, or the revealed law of God, all his ſuppoſitions of a monarchical, abſolute, ſupreme, paternal power in Adam, and the deſcent of that power to his heirs, would not be of the leaſt uſe to eſtabliſh the authority, or make out the title of any one prince, now on earth; but would rather unſettle and bring all into queſtion: for, let our A. tell us, as long as he pleaſes, and let all men believe it too, that Adam had a paternal and thereby a monarchical power; that this (the only power in the world) deſcended to his heirs; and that there is no other power in the world but this: let this be all as clear demonſtration, as it is manifeſt error, yet if it be not paſt doubt, to whom this paternal power deſcends, and whoſe now it is, no body can be under any obligation of obedience, unleſs any one will ſay, that I am bound to pay obedience to paternal power in a man, who has no more paternal power than I myſelf; which is all one as to ſay, I obey a man, becauſe he has a right to govern, and if I be aſked, how I know he has a right to govern, I ſhould anſwer, it cannot be known, that he has any at all. For that cannot be a reaſon of my obedience which I know not to be ſo: much leſs can that be a reaſon of my obedience, which no body at all can know to be ſo.

125. AND therefore, all this ado about Adam's fatherhood, the greatneſs of its power, and the neceſſity of its ſuppoſal, helps nothing to eſtabliſh the power of thoſe that govern, or to determine the obedience of ſubjects, who are to obey if they cannot tell, whom they are to obey, or it cannot be known, who are to govern, and who to obey. In the ſtate, the world now is irrecoverably ignorant, who is Adam's heir. This fatherhood, this monarchical power of Adam deſcending to his heirs, would be of no more uſe to the government of mankind, than it would be, to the quieting of men's conſciencies, or ſecuring their healths, If our A. had aſſured them, that Adam had a power to forgive ſins, or cure diſeaſes, which by divine inſtitution, deſcended to his heir, whilſt this heir is impoſſible to be known. And ſhould he not do as rationally, who upon this aſſurance of our A. went and confeſſed his ſins, and expected a good abſolution, or took phyſick, with expectation of health, from any one, who had taken on himſelf the name of prieſt, or phyſician, or thruſt himſelf into thoſe employments, ſaying, "I acquieſce in the abſolving power, deſcending "from Adam; or I ſhall be cured by the medicinal power deſcending from Adam;" as he who ſays, "I ſubmit to and obey the paternal power deſcending "from Adam," when 'tis confeſſed all theſe powers deſcend only to his ſingle heir, and that heir is unknown?

127. 'Tis true, the civil lawyers have pretended to determine ſome of theſe caſes, concerning the ſucceſſion of princes; but, by our A.'s principles, they have meddled in a matter, that belongs not to them: For if all political power be derived only from Adam, and be to deſcend only to his ſucceſſive heirs, by the ordinance of God and divine inſtitution, this is a right antecedent, and paramount to all government; and therefore, the poſitive laws of men cannot determine that which is itſelf the foundation of all law and government, and is to receive its rule only from the law of God and Nature. And, that being ſilent in the caſe, I am apt to think there is no ſuch right to be conveyed this way: I am ſure it would be to no purpoſe, if there were; and men would be more at a loſs, concerning government and obedience to governors, than if there were no ſuch right; ſince, by poſitive laws and compact, which divine inſtitution (if there be any) ſhuts out, all theſe endleſs, inextricable doubts can be ſafely provided againſt; but it can never be underſtood, how a divine natural right, and

that of ſuch moment, as is all order and peace in the world, ſhould be conveyed down to poſterity, without any plain, natural, or divine rule concerning it. And there would be an end of civil government, if the aſſignment of civil power were by divine inſtitution, to the heir, and yet by that divine inſtitution, the perſon of the heir could not be known. This paternal regal power, being by divine right only his, it leaves no room for human prudence, or conſent, to place it any where elſe; for if only one man hath a divine right to the obedience of mankind, no body can claim that obedience, but he that can ſhew that right; nor can mens conſciences, by any other pretence, be obliged to it. And thus, this doctrine cuts up all government by the roots.

127. Thus we ſee how our A. laying it for a ſure foundation, that the very perſon, that is to rule, is the ordinance of God, and by divine inſtitution, tells us at large only, that this perſon is the heir, but who this heir is, he leaves us to gueſs; and ſo this divine inſtitution, which aſſigns it to a perſon, whom we have no rule to know, is juſt as good as an aſſignment to no body at all. But, whatever our A. does, divine inſtitution makes no ſuch ridiculous aſſignments: Nor can God be ſuppoſed to make it a ſacred law, that one certain perſon ſhould have a right to ſomething, and yet not give rules to mark out and know that perſon by; or give an heir a divine right to power, and yet not point out who that heir is. 'Tis rather to be thought, that an heir had no ſuch right, by divine inſtitution, than that God ſhould give ſuch a right to the heir, but yet leave it doubtful and undeterminable who ſuch heir is.

128. If God had given the land of Canaan, to Abraham, and in general terms to ſomebody after him, without naming his ſeed, whereby it might be known, who that ſomebody was, it would have been as good and uſeful an aſſignment, to determine the right to the land of Canaan, as it would be the determining the right of crowns, to give empire to Adam and his ſucceſſive heirs after him, without telling who his heir is: for the word heir, without a rule to know who it is, ſignifies no more than ſomebody, I know not whom. God making it a divine inſtitution, that men ſhould not marry thoſe who are near of kin, thinks it not enough to ſay, "none of you ſhall approach to any that is near of kin "to him, to uncover their nakedneſs," but moreover, gives rules to know who are thoſe near of kin, forbidden by divine inſtitution, or elſe that law would have been of no uſe; it being to no purpoſe lay reſtraints, or give privileges to men in ſuch general terms, as the particular perſon concerned cannot be known by. But God not having any where ſaid, the next heir ſhall inherit all his father's eſtate, or dominion, we are not to wonder that he hath no where appointed, who that heir ſhould be; for never having intended any ſuch thing, never deſigned any heir in that ſenſe, we cannot expect he ſhould any where nominate, or appoint any perſon to it, as we might had it been otherwiſe. And therefore, in ſcripture, though the word heir occur, yet there is no ſuch thing as heir in our A.'s ſenſe, one that was by right of nature, to inherit all that his father had, excluſive of his brethren. Hence Sarah ſuppoſes, that if Iſhmael ſtaid in the houſe, to ſhare in Abraham's eſtate after his death, this ſon of a bond-woman might be heir with Iſaac; and therefore ſays ſhe, "caſt out "this bond-woman and her ſon; for the ſon of this bond-woman ſhall not be "heir with my ſon;" butt his cannot excuſe our A. who telling us there is, in every number of men, one who is right and next heir to Adam, ought to have told us, what the laws of deſcent are. But he having been ſo ſparing to inſtruct us by rules, how to know who is heir, let us ſee in the next place, what his hiſtory, out of ſcripture, on which he pretends wholly to build his government, gives us in this neceſſary and fundament point.

129. Our A. to make good the title of his book, p. 13. begins his hiſtory of the deſcent of Adam's regal power, p. 13. in theſe words, "This lordſhip, "which Adam by command, had over the whole world, and by right de-"ſcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy, was a large," &c. How does he prove, that the patriarchs, by deſcent, did enjoy it? For "dominion of life and "death, ſays he, we find Judah, the father, pronounced ſentence of death a-"gainſt Thamar, his daughter-in-law, for playing the harlot," p. 13. How

does this prove, that Judah had abſolute and ſovereign authority? He pro-"nounced ſentence of death." The pronouncing of ſentence of death, is not a certain mark of ſovereignty, but uſually the office of inferior magiſtrates. The power of making laws of life and death, is indeed a mark of ſovereignty, but pronouncing the ſentence, according to thoſe laws, may be done by others, and therefore this will but ill prove, that he had ſovereign authority: as if one ſhould ſay, judge Jefferies pronounced ſentence of death, in the late times, therefore judge Jefferies had ſovereign authority. But it will be ſaid, Judah did it not by commiſſion from another, and therefore, did it in his own right. Who knows, whether he had any at all? Heat of paſſion might carry him to do that, which he had no authority to do. "Judah had dominion of life and death;" how does that appear? he exerciſed it, he "pronounced ſentence of death a-"gainſt Thamar;" our A. thinks it is very good proof, that becauſe he did it, therefore he had a right to do it: he lay with her alſo: by the ſame way of proof, he had a right to do that too; if the conſequence be good from doing, to a right of doing. Abſalom too may be reckoned amongſt our A.'s ſovereigns; for he pronounced ſuch a ſentence of death againſt his brother Amnon, and much upon a like occaſion, and had it executed too; if that be ſufficient to prove a dominion of life and death.

But, allowing this all to be clear demonſtration of ſovereign power, who was it, that had all this "lordſhip by right deſcending to him from Adam, as large "and ample as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch?" Judah, ſays our A. Judah, a younger ſon of Jacob, his father and elder brethren living: ſo that, if our A.'s own proof be to be taken, a younger brother may, in the life of his father and elder brothers, by right of deſcent, enjoy Adam's monarchical power; and if one ſo qualified may be monarch, by deſcent, why may not every man? If Judah, his father and elder brothers living, were one of Adam's heirs, I know not who can be excluded from this inheritance; all men by inheritance may be monarchs, as well as Judah.

130. "Touching war, we ſee that Abraham commanded an army of 318 "ſoldiers of his own family, and Eſau met his brother Jacob with 400 men at "arms. For matter of peace; Abraham made a league with Abimelech," &c. p. 13. Is it not poſſible for a man to have 318 men in his family, without being heir to Adam? A planter in the Weſt-Indies has more, and might, if he pleaſed (who doubts) muſter them up, and lead them out againſt the Indians, to ſeek reparation upon any injury received from them, and all this, without the "abſolute dominion of a monarch, deſcending to him from Adam." Would it not be an admirable argument to prove, that all power by God's inſtitution, deſcended from Adam by inheritance, and that the very perſon, and power, of this planter were the ordinance of God, becauſe he had power in his family over ſervants, born in his houſe, and bought with his money? For this was juſt Abraham's caſe; thoſe who were rich, in the patriarch's days, as in the Weſt-Indies now, bought men and maid ſervants, and by their increaſe, as well as purchaſing of new, came to have large and numerous families, which though they made uſe of in war, or peace, can it be thought the power, they had over them, was an inheritance deſcended from Adam, when 'twas the purchaſe of their money? A man's riding in an expedition againſt an enemy, upon his horſe bought in a fair, would be as good a proof that the owner "enjoyed the "lordſhip, which Adam, by command, had over the whole world, by right "deſcending to him," as Abraham's leading out the ſervants of his family is, that the patriarch enjoyed this lordſhip, by deſcent from Adam: ſince the title to the power the maſter had in both caſes, whether over ſlaves or horſes, was only from his purchaſe; and the getting a dominion over any thing by bargain and money is a new way of proving one had it by deſcent and inheritance.

131. "But making war and peace are marks of ſovereignty." Let it be ſo in politick ſocieties; may not, therefore, a man in the Weſt-Indies, who hath with him ſons of his own, friends or companions, ſoldiers under pay, or ſlaves bought with money, or perhaps a band made up of all theſe, make war and

peace, if there ſhould be occaſion, and "ratify the articles too with an oath," without being a ſovereign, an abſolute king over thoſe who went with him? He that ſays he cannot, muſt then allow many maſters of ſhips, many private planters, to be abſolute monarchs, for as much as this they have done. War and peace cannot be made for politick ſocieties, but by the ſupreme power of ſuch ſocieties; becauſe war and peace, giving a different motion to the force of ſuch a politick body, none can make war or peace, but that which has the direction of the force of the whole body, and that in politick ſocieties is only the ſupreme power. In voluntary ſocieties for the time, he that has ſuch a power by conſent, may make war and peace, and ſo may a ſingle man for himſelf; the ſtate of war not conſiſting in the number of partiſans, but the enmity of the parties, where they have no ſuperior to appeal to.

132. The actual making of war and peace, is no proof of any other power, but only of diſpoſing thoſe to exerciſe, or ceaſe, acts of enmity, for whom he makes it, and this power, in many caſes, any one may have, without any politick ſupremacy: and, therefore, the making of war, or peace, will not prove that every one, that does ſo, is a politick ruler, much leſs a king; for then commonwealths muſt be kings too, for they do as certainly make war and peace as monarchical government.

133. But granting this a "mark of ſovereignty in Abraham," is it a proof of the deſcent to him of Adam's ſovereignty over the whole world? If it be, it will ſurely be as good a proof of the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip to others too. And then commonwealths, as well as Abraham, will be heirs of Adam, for they make war and peace as well as he. If you ſay, that the "lordſhip of Adam" doth not by right deſcend to commonwealths, though they make war and peace; the ſame ſay I of Abraham, and then there is an end of your argument; if you ſtand to your argument, and ſay thoſe, that do make war and peace, as commonwealths do without doubt, "do inherit Adam's lordſhip," there is an end of your monarchy; unleſs you will ſay, that commonwealths "by deſcent enjoying Adam's lordſhip" are monarchies; and that, indeed, would be a new way of making all the governments in the world monarchical.

134. To give our A. the honour of this new invention, for I confeſs it is not I have firſt found it out, by tracing his principles, and ſo charged it on him, 'tis fit my readers know, that (as abſurd as it may ſeem) he teaches it himſelf, p. 23. where he ingenuouſly ſays, "in all kingdoms and commonwealths in the "world, whether the prince be the ſupreme father of the people, or but the "true heir to ſuch a father, or come to the crown by uſurpation, or election, "or whether ſome few, or a multitude, govern the commonwealth; yet ſtill "the authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all theſe, is the only "right and natural authority of a ſupreme father;" which right of fatherhood he often tells us, is "regal and royal authority;" as particularly, p. 12. the page immediately preceding this inſtance of Abraham. This regal authority, he ſays, thoſe that govern commonwealths have; and if it be true, that regal and royal authority be in thoſe that govern commonwealths, it is as true that commonwealths are governed by kings; for, if regal authority be in him that governs, he that governs muſt needs be a king, and ſo all commonwealths are nothing but downright monarchies, and then what need any more ado about the matter? The governments of the world are, as they ſhould be, there is nothing but monarchy in it. This without doubt, was the ſureſt way our A. could have found, to turn all other governments, but monarchical, out of the world.

135. But all this ſcarce proves Abraham to have been a king, as heir to Adam. If by inheritance he had been king, Lot, who was of the ſame family, muſt needs have been his ſubject, by that title, before the ſervants in his family; but we ſee they lived as friends and equals, and when their herdſmen could not agree, there was no pretence of juriſdiction or ſuperiority, between them, but they parted by conſent, Gen. xiii. hence he is called both by Abraham, and by the text, Abraham's brother, the name of friendſhip and equality, and not of juriſdiction and authority, though he were really but his nephew. And if our A. knows that Abraham was Adam's heir, and a king, 'twas more, it ſeems, than

than Abraham himſelf knew, or his ſervant, whom he ſent a wooing for his ſon; for when he ſets out the advantages of the match, Gen. xxiv. 35. thereby to prevail with the young woman and her friends; he ſays, "I am Abraham's "ſervant, and the Lord hath bleſſed my maſter greatly, and he is become great, "and he hath given him flocks and herds, and ſilver and gold, and men-ſer-"vants and maid-ſervants, and camels and aſſes, and Sarah, my maſter's wife, "bare a ſon to my maſter, when ſhe was old, and unto him hath he given "all he hath." Can one think that a diſcreet ſervant, that was thus particular to ſet out his maſter's greatneſs, would have omitted the crown Iſaac was to have, if he had known of any ſuch? Can it be imagined, he ſhould have neglected to have told them, on ſuch an occaſion as this, that Abraham was a king, a name well known at that time, for he had nine of them his neighbours, if he, or his maſter, had thought any ſuch thing, the likelieſt matter of all the reſt, to make his errand ſucceſsful?

136. But this diſcovery, it ſeems, was reſerved for our A. to make 2 or 3000 years after; and let him enjoy the credit of it, only he ſhould have taken care that ſome of Adam's land ſhould have deſcended to this his heir, as well as all Adam's lordſhip. For though this lordſhip, which Abraham, (if we may believe our A.) as well as the other patriarchs, by right "deſcending to him, "did enjoy, was as large and ample as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch, "which hath been ſince the creation; yet his eſtate, his territories, his dominions were very narrow and ſcanty; for he had not the poſſeſſion of a foot of land, till he bought a field and a cave of the ſons of Heth, to bury Sarah in.

137. The inſtance of Eſau joined with this of Abraham, to prove that the "lordſhip, which Adam had, over the whole world, by right deſcending from "him, the patriarchs did enjoy," is yet more pleaſant than the former. "Eſau "met his brother Jacob with 400 men at arms;" he, therefore, was a king, by right of heir to Adam; 400 armed men then, however got together, are enough to prove him that leads them, to be a king and Adam's heir. There have been tories in Ireland, (whatever there are in other countries) who would have thanked our A. for ſo honourable an opinion of them, eſpecially if there had been no body near, with a better title of 500 armed men, to queſtion their royal authority of 400. 'Tis a ſhame for men to trifle ſo, to ſay no worſe of it, in ſo ſerious an argument. Here Eſau is brought as a proof that Adam's lordſhip, "Adam's abſolute dominion, as large as that of any monarch, deſcended by "right to the patriarchs;" and in this very chap. p. 19. Jacob is brought as an inſtance of one that by "birth-right was lord over his brethren." So we have here two brothers, abſolute monarchs, by the ſame title, and at the ſame time heirs to Adam; the eldeſt heir to Adam, becauſe he met his brother with 400 men; and the youngeſt heir to Adam by birth-right: "Eſau enjoyed the "lordſhip, which Adam had over the whole world, by right deſcending to "him, in as large and ample manner, as the abſoluteſt dominion of any mo-"narch; and, at the ſame time, Jacob lord over him, by the right, heirs have "to be lords over their brethren." Riſum teneatis? I never, I confeſs, met with any man of parts ſo dextrous as Sir Robert at this way of arguing: but 'twas his misfortune to light upon an hypotheſis, that could not be accommodated to the nature of things, and human affairs; his principles could not be made to agree with that conſtitution and order which God had ſettled in the world, and therefore muſt needs often claſh with common ſenſe and experience.

138. In the next ſection he tells us, "That patriarchal power continued, "not only till the flood, but after it, as the name patriarch doth in part prove." The word patriarch doth more than in part prove, that patriarchal power continued in the world, as long as there were patriarchs; for 'tis neceſſary that patriarchal power ſhould be, whilſt there are patriarchs; as 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be paternal or conjugal power, while there are fathers or huſbands; but this is but playing with names. That which he would fallaciouſly inſinuate, is the thing in queſtion to be proved, viz. That the "lordſhip which Adam had

“ over the world,” the ſuppoſed, abſolute, univerſal dominion of “ Adam by “ right deſcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy.” If he affirms ſuch an abſolute monarchy continued to the flood, in the world, I would be glad to know what records he has it from; for I confeſs I cannot find a word of it in my bible: if, by patriarchal power, he means any thing elſe, it is nothing to the matter in hand. And how the name patriarch in ſome part proves, that thoſe, who are called by that name, had abſolute, monarchical power, I confeſs I do not ſee; and therefore, I think, needs no anſwer, 'till the argument from it be made out a little clearer.

139. “ The three ſons of Noah had the world, ſays our A. divided amongſt “ them, by their father, for of them was the whole world overſpread,” p. 14. The world might be overſpread by the offspring of Noah's ſons, tho' he never divided the world amongſt them; for the earth might be repleniſhed, without being divided; ſo that all our A.'s argument here, proves no ſuch diviſion. However, I allow it to him, and then aſk, the world being divided amongſt them, which of the three was Adam's heir? If Adam's lordſhip, Adam's monarchy, by right deſcended only to the eldeſt, then the other two could be but his ſubjects, his ſlaves; if by right it deſcended to all the three brothers, by the ſame right it will deſcend to all mankind, and then it will be impoſſible what he ſays, p. 19. that “ heirs are lords of their brethren,” ſhould be true; but all brothers, and conſequently all men will be equal and independent, all heirs to Adam's monarchy, and conſequently all monarchs too, one as much as another. But 'twill be ſaid, Noah their father divided the world amongſt them; ſo that our A. will allow more to Noah, than he will to God almighty; for O. 211. he thought it hard, that God himſelf ſhould give the world to Noah and his ſons, to the prejudice of Noah's birth-right; his words are, “ Noah “ was left ſole heir to the world, why ſhould it be thought, that God would “ diſinherit him of his birth-right, and make him, of all men in the world, “ the only tenant in common with his children?” And yet here, he thinks it fit that Noah ſhould diſinherit Shem of his birth-right, and divide the world betwixt him and his brethren; ſo that this birth-right, when our A. pleaſes, muſt, and when he pleaſes muſt not, be ſacred and inviolable.

140. If Noah did divide the world between his ſons, and his aſſignment of dominions to them were good, there is an end of divine inſtitution; all our A.'s diſcourſe of Adam's heir, with whatſoever he builds on it, is quite out of doors; and the natural power of kings falls to the ground; and then the form of the “ power of governing, and the perſon having that power, will not be (as he “ ſays they are, O. 254.) the ordinance of God, but they will be ordinances of “ man.” For if the right of the heir be the ordinance of God, a divine right, no man, father or not father, can alter it: if it be not a divine right, it is only human, depending on the will of man: and ſo where human inſtitution gives it not, the firſt-born has no right at all, above his brethren; and men may put government into what hands, and under what form they pleaſe.

141. He goes on, “ moſt of the civileſt nations of the earth, labour to fetch “ their original from ſome of the ſons, or nephews of Noah,” p. 14. How many do moſt of the civileſt nations amount to? And who are they? I fear the Chineſes, a very great and civil people, as well as ſeveral other people of the eaſt, weſt, north, and ſouth, trouble not themſelves much about this matter. All, that believe the bible, which I believe are our A.'s “ moſt of the civileſt na- “ tions,” muſt neceſſarily derive themſelves from Noah; but for the reſt of the world, they think little of his ſons, or nephews. But, if the heralds and antiquaries of all nations, for 'tis theſe men generally, that labour to find out the originals of nations, or all the nations themſelves “ ſhould labour to fetch their “ original from ſome of the ſons, or nephews of Noah,” what would this be to prove, that the “ lordſhip, which Adam had over the whole world, by right, “ deſcended to the patriarchs?” Whoever nations or races of men labour to fetch their original from, may be concluded to be thought by them of renown, famous to poſterity, for the greatneſs of their virtues and actions; but beyond theſe they look not, nor conſider who they were heirs to, but look on them as

ſuch as raiſed themſelves, by their own virtue, to a degree, that would give a luſtre to thoſe, who in future ages could pretend to derive themſelves from them. But if it were Ogyges, Hercules, Brama, Tamerlane, Pharamond; nay, if Jupiter and Saturn were the names, from whence divers races of men, both antient and modern, have laboured to derive their original; will that prove, that thoſe men "enjoyed the lordſhip of Adam, by right deſcending to them?" If not, this is but a flouriſh of our A.'s to miſlead his reader, that in itſelf ſignifies nothing.

142. To as much purpoſe, is what he tells us, p. 15. concerning this diviſion of the world, "That ſome ſay, it was by lot, and others that Noah ſailed "round the Mediterranean in ten years, and divided the world into Aſia, Africk, "and Europe, portions for his three ſons." America then, it ſeems, was left to be his, that could catch it. Why our A, takes ſuch pains to prove the diviſion of the world, by Noah, to his ſons, and will not leave out an imagination, tho' no better than a dream, that he can find any where to favour it, is hard to gueſs, ſince ſuch a diviſion, if it prove any thing, muſt neceſſarily take away the title of Adam's heir; unleſs three brothers can all together be heirs of Adam: and therefore the following words, "howſoever the manner of this diviſion be "uncertain, yet it is moſt certain the diviſion itſelf was by families, from Noah "and his children, over which the parents were heads and princes," p. 15. if allowed him to be true, and of any force to prove, that all the power in the world is nothing, but the lordſhip of Adam's deſcending by right, they will only prove that the fathers of the children are all heirs to this lordſhip of Adam. For if in thoſe days, Cham and Japhet, and other parents, beſides the eldeſt ſon, were heads and princes over their families, and had a right to divide the earth by families, what hinders younger brothers, being fathers of families, from having the ſame right? If Cham and Japhet, were princes by right deſcending to them, notwithſtanding any title of heir in their eldeſt brother, younger brothers, by the ſame right deſcending to them, are princes now, and ſo all our A.'s natural power of kings will reach no farther than their own children, and no kingdom by this natural right can be bigger than a family. For either this lordſhip of Adam over the whole world, by right deſcends only to the eldeſt ſon, and then there can be but one heir, as our A. ſays, p. 19. or elſe, it by right deſcends to all the ſons equally, and then every father of a family will have it, as well as the three ſons of Noah: take which you will, it deſtroys the preſent governments and kingdoms, that are now in the world; ſince whoever has this natural power of a king, by right deſcending to him, muſt have it either, as our A. tells us, Cain had it, and be lord over his brethren, and ſo be alone king of the whole world; or elſe, as he tells us here, Shem, Cham and Japhet had it, three brothers, and ſo be only prince of his own family, and all families independent one of another; all the world muſt be only one empire, by the right of the next heir, or elſe every family be a diſtinct government of itſelf, by the "lordſhip of "Adam's deſcending to parents of families." And to this only tends all the proofs he here gives us of the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip: for continuing his ſtory of this deſcent, he ſays,

143. "In the diſperſion of Babel, we muſt certainly find the eſtabliſhment "of royal power, throughout the kingdoms of the world, p. 14." If you muſt find it, pray do, and you will help us to a new piece of hiſtory: but you muſt ſhew it us, before we ſhall be bound to believe that regal power was eſtabliſh'd in the world upon your principles. For that regal power was eſtabliſh'd "in the "kingdoms of the world," I think nobody will diſpute; but that there ſhould be kingdoms in the world, whoſe ſeveral kings enjoyed their crowns, "by right "deſcending to them from Adam," that we think not only apocryphal, but alſo utterly impoſſible. If our A. has no better foundation for his monarchy, than a ſuppoſition of what was done at the diſperſion of Babel, the monarchy he erects thereon, whoſe top is to reach to heaven, to unite mankind, will ſerve only to divide and ſcatter them, as that tower did; and, inſtead of eſtabliſhing civil government and order in the world, will produce nothing but confuſion.

144. For he tells us, the nations they were divided into, "were diſtinct families, which had fathers for rulers over them; whereby it appears, that, even "in the confuſion, God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority, by diſ"tributing the diverſity of languages, according to the diverſity of families," p. 14. It would have been a hard matter for any one, but our A. to have found out ſo plainly, in the text he here brings, that all the nations, in that diſperſion, were governed by fathers, and that "God was careful to preſerve the fatherly "authority." The words of the text are, "Theſe are the ſons of Shem, after "their families, after their tongues, in their lands, after their nations;" and the ſame thing is ſaid of Cham and Japhet, after an enumeration of their poſterities; in all which there is not one word ſaid of their governors, or forms of government; of fathers, or fatherly authority. But our A. who is very quickſighted to ſpy out fatherhood, where no body elſe could ſee any the leaſt glimpſes of it, tells us poſitively, their "rulers were fathers, and God was careful to "preſerve the fatherly authority;" and why, becauſe thoſe of the ſame family ſpoke the ſame language, and ſo of neceſſity in the diviſion kept together. Juſt as if one ſhould argue thus: Hannibal in his army, conſiſting of divers nations, kept thoſe of the ſame language together, therefore fathers were captains of each band, and Hannibal was careful of the fatherly authority: or, in peopling of Carolina, the Engliſh, French, Scotch, and Welch that are there, planted themſelves together, and by them the country is divided "in their lands after their "tongues, after their families, after their nations;" therefore care was taken of the fatherly authority. Or becauſe, in many parts of America, every little tribe was a diſtinct people, with a different language, one ſhould infer, that therefore "God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority," or that therefore their rulers "enjoyed Adam's lordſhip by right deſcending to them," tho' we know not who were their governors, nor what their form of government, but only that they were divided into little, independent ſocieties, ſpeaking different languages.

145. The ſcripture ſays not a word of their rulers or forms of government, but only gives an account how mankind came to be divided into diſtinct languages and nations: and therefore 'tis not to argue from the authority of ſcripture, to tell us poſitively, fathers were their rulers, when the ſcripture ſays no ſuch thing; but to ſet up fancies of one's own brain, when we confidently aver matter of fact, where records are utterly ſilent. Upon a like ground, i. e. none at all, he ſays, "That they were not confuſed multitudes, without heads "and governors, and at liberty to chuſe what governors, or governments, they "pleaſed."

146. For I demand, when mankind were all yet of one language, all congregated in the plain of Shinar, were they then all under one monarch, "who "enjoyed the lordſhip of Adam by right deſcending to him?" If they were not, there was then no thoughts, 'tis plain, of Adam's heir, no right to government known then, upon that title; no care taken, by God or man, of Adam's fatherly authority. If when mankind were but one people, dwelt all together, and were of one language, and were upon building a city together, and when 'twas plain, they could not but know the right heir, for Shem lived till Iſaac's time, a long while after the diviſion at Babel; if then, I ſay, they were not under the monarchical government of Adam's fatherhood, by right deſcending to the heir, 'tis plain there was no regard had to the fatherhood, no monarchy acknowledged due to Adam's heir, no empire of Shem's in Aſia, and conſequently no ſuch diviſion of the world by Noah, as our A. has talked of. As far as we can conclude any thing from ſcripture in this matter, it ſeems from this place, that, if they had any government, it was rather a commonwealth than an abſolute monarchy: for the ſcripture tells us, "Gen. xi. They ſaid:" 'Twas not a prince commanded the building of this city and tower, 'twas not by the command of one monarch, but by the conſultation of many, a free people; "let us build us a city;" they built it for themſelves as free men, not as ſlaves for their lord and maſter: "that we be not ſcattered abroad:" having a city once built, and fixed habitations to ſettle our abodes and families. This

was the conſultation and deſign of a people, that were at liberty to part aſunder, but deſired to keep in one body; and could not have been either neceſſary, or likely in men tied together, under the government of one monarch; who, if they had been, as our A. tells us, all ſlaves, under the abſolute dominion of a monarch, needed not have taken ſuch care to hinder themſelves from wandering out of the reach of his dominion. I demand whether this be not plainer in ſcripture, than any thing of "Adam's heir, or fatherly authority?

147. But if being as God ſays, Gen. xi. 6. one people, they had one ruler, one king by natural right, abſolute and ſupreme over them, "what care had "God to preſerve the paternal authority of the ſupreme fatherhood," if on a ſudden he ſuffers 72 (for ſo many our A. talks of) diſtinct nations, to be erected out of it, under diſtinct governors, and at once to withdraw themſelves from the obedience of their ſovereign? This is to entitle God's care, how, and to what we pleaſe. Can it be ſenſe to ſay, that God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority in thoſe who had it not? For if theſe were ſubjects under a ſupreme prince, what authority had they? Was it an inſtance of God's care, to preſerve the fatherly authority, when he took away the true ſupreme fatherhood of the natural monarch? Can it be reaſon to ſay, that God for the preſervation of fatherly authority, lets ſeveral new governments, with their governors, ſtart up, who could not all have fatherly authority? And, is it not as much reaſon to ſay, that God is careful to deſtroy fatherly authority, when he ſuffers one, who is in poſſeſſion of it, to have his government torn in pieces, and ſhared by ſeveral of his ſubjects? Would it not be an argument, juſt like this for monarchical government, to ſay, when any monarchy was ſhatter'd to pieces, and divided amongſt revolted ſubjects, that God was careful to preſerve monarchical power, by rending a ſettled empire into a multitude of little governments? If any one will ſay, that what happens in providence to be preſerved, God is careful to preſerve, as a thing, therefore, to be eſteemed by men, as neceſſary or uſeful, 'tis a peculiar propriety of ſpeech, which every one will not think fit to imitate: but this I am ſure is impoſſible to be either proper, or true ſpeaking, that Shem, for example (for he was then alive,) ſhould have fatherly authority, or ſovereignty, by right of fatherhood, over that one people at Babel, and that the next moment, Shem yet living, 72 others ſhould have fatherly authority, or ſovereignty, by right of fatherhood, over the ſame people, divided into ſo many diſtinct governments: either theſe 72 fathers actually were rulers, juſt before the confuſion, and then they were not one people, but that God himſelf ſays, they were; or elſe they were a commonwealth, and then, where was monarchy? or elſe theſe 72 fathers had fatherly authority, but knew it not. Strange! that fatherly authority ſhould be the only original of government amongſt men, and yet all mankind not know it; and ſtranger yet, that the confuſion of tongues ſhould reveal it to them all on a ſudden, that, in an inſtant, theſe 72 ſhould know that they had fatherly power, and all others know that they were to obey it in them, and every one know that particular fatherly authority, to which he was a ſubject. He that can think this arguing from ſcripture, may from thence make out what model of an Eutopia will beſt ſuit with his fancy, or intereſt; and this fatherhood thus diſpoſed of, will juſtify both a prince who claims an univerſal monarchy, and his ſubjects, who, being fathers of families, ſhall quit all ſubjection to him, and canton his empire into leſs governments for themſelves; for it will always remain a doubt in which of theſe the fatherly authority reſided, 'till our A. reſolves us, whether Shem, who was then alive, or theſe 72 new princes, beginning ſo many new empires in his dominions, and over his ſubjects, has right to govern; ſince our A. tells us, that both one, and t'other had fatherly, which is ſupreme authority, and are brought in by him as inſtances of thoſe who did "enjoy the "lordſhips of Adam, by right deſcending to them, which was as large and ample "as the abſoluteſt dominion of any monarch." This at leaſt is unavoidable, that if "God was careful to preſerve the fatherly authority, in the 72 new erect-"ed nations," it neceſſarily follows, that he was as careful to deſtroy all pretences of Adam's heir; ſince he took care, and therefore did preſerve the fatherly authority in ſo many, at leaſt 71, that could not poſſibly be Adam's heirs, when

the right heir (if God had ever ordained any ſuch inheritance) could not but be known, Shem then living, and they being all one people.

148. Nimrod is his next inſtance, of enjoying this patriarchal power, p. 16. but I know not for what reaſon our A. ſeems a little unkind to him, and ſays, that he "againſt right enlarged his empire, by ſeizing violently on the rights of "other lords of families." Theſe lords of families here were called fathers of families, in his account of the diſperſion of Babel; but it matters not how they were called, ſo we know who they are, for this fatherly authority muſt be in them, either as heirs to Adam, and ſo there could not be 72, nor above one at once; or elſe as natural parents over their children, and ſo every father will have paternal authority over his children, by the ſame right, and in as large extent as thoſe 72 had, and ſo be independent princes over their own offſpring. Taking his lords of families in this latter ſenſe (as 'tis had to give thoſe words any other ſenſe in this place) he gives us a very pretty account of the original of monarchy, in theſe following words, p. 16. "And in this ſenſe, he may be ſaid "to be the author and founder of monarchy," viz. As againſt right ſeizing violently on the rights of fathers over their children; which paternal authority, if it be in them, by right of nature, (for elſe how could thoſe 72 come by it?) no body can take from them, without their own conſents; and then I deſire our A. and his friends to conſider, how far this will concern other princes, and whether it will not according to his concluſion of that paragraph, reſolve all regal power of thoſe, whoſe dominions extend beyond their families, either into tyranny and uſurpation, or election and conſent of fathers of families, which will differ very little from conſent of the people.

149. All his inſtances in the next ſection, p. 17. of the 12 dukes of Edom, the 9 kings, in a little corner of Aſia, in Abraham's days, the 31 kings in Canaan deſtroy'd by Joſhua, and the care he takes to prove that theſe were all ſovereign princes, and that every town in thoſe days had a king, are ſo many direct proofs againſt him, that it was not the lordſhip of Adam, by right deſcending to them, that made kings. For, if they had held their royalties by that title, either there muſt have been but one ſovereign over them all, or elſe every father of a family had been as good a prince, and had as good a claim to royalty as theſe. For, if all the ſons of Eſau had each of them, the younger as well as the eldeſt, the right of fatherhood, and ſo were ſovereign princes after their father's death, the ſame right had their ſons after them, and ſo on to all poſterity; which will limit all the natural power of fatherhood, only to be over the iſſue of their own bodies and their deſcendants, which power of fatherhood dies with the head of each family, and makes way for the like power of fatherhood to take place in each of his ſons over their reſpective poſterities; whereby the power of fatherhood will be preſerv'd indeed, and is intelligible, but will not be at all to our A.'s purpoſe. None of the inſtances he brings are proofs of any power they had, as heirs of Adam's paternal authority, by the title of his fatherhood deſcending to them; no, nor of any power they had, by virtue of their own: for Adam's fatherhood being over all mankind, it could deſcend but to one at once, and from him to his right heir only, and ſo there could, by that title, be but one king in the world at a time; and by right of fatherhood, not deſcending from Adam, it muſt be only as they themſelves were fathers, and ſo could be over none but their own poſterity. So that, if thoſe 12 dukes of Edom, if Abraham and the 9 kings his neighbours, if Jacob and Eſau, and the 31 kings in Canaan, the 72 kings mutilated by Adonibezek, the 32 kings that came to Benhadad, the 70 kings of Greece making war at Troy, were, as our A. contends, all of them ſovereign princes, 'tis evident that kings derive their power from ſome other original than fatherhood,, ſince ſome of theſe had power over more than their own poſterity, and 'tis demonſtration, they could not be all heirs to Adam: for I challenge any man to make any pretence to power by right of fatherhood, either intelligible or poſſible in any one, otherwiſe, than either as Adam's heir, or as progenitor over his own deſcendants, naturally ſprung from him. And if our A. could ſhew, that any one of theſe princes, of which he gives us here ſo large a catalogue, had his authority by either of theſe titles, I think I might

yield him the cauſe: though 'tis manifeſt they are all impertinent, and directly contrary to what he brings them to prove, viz. "That the lordſhip, which Adam "had over the world, by right, deſcended to the patriarchs."

150. Having told us, p. 16. That "the patriarchal government continued "in Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, until the Egyptian bondage; p. 17. he tells "us, by manifeſt footſteps, we may trace this paternal government, unto the "Iſraelites coming into Egypt, where the exerciſe of the ſupreme, patriarchal "government was intermitted; becauſe they were in ſubjection to a ſtronger "prince." What theſe footſteps are of paternal government, in our A.'s ſenſe, i. e. of abſolute, monarchical power, deſcending from Adam, and exerciſed by right of fatherhood, we have ſeen, that is, for 2290 years, no footſteps at all: ſince, in all that time, he cannot produce any one example of any perſon, who claimed, or exerciſed, regal authority, by right of fatherhood; or ſhew any one, who, being a king, was Adam's heir: all that his proofs amount to, is only this, that there were fathers, patriarchs and kings, in that age of the world; but that the fathers and patriarchs had any abſolute, arbitrary power, or by what titles thoſe kings had theirs, and of what extent it was, the ſcripture is wholly ſilent; 'tis manifeſt, by right of fatherhood, they neither did, nor could claim any title to dominion and empire.

151. To ſay, "That the exerciſe of ſupreme, patriarchal government was "intermitted, becauſe they were in ſubjection to a ſtronger prince," proves nothing but what I before ſuſpected, viz. "That patriarchal juriſdiction, or go"vernment" is a fallacious expreſſion, and does not in our A. ſignify (what he would yet inſinuate by it) paternal and regal power, ſuch an abſolute ſovereignty as, he ſuppoſes, was in Adam.

152. For how can he ſay that patriarchal juriſdiction was intermitted in Egypt, where there was a king, under whoſe regal government the Iſraelites were, if patriarchal were abſolute, monarchical juriſdiction? And if it were not, but ſomething elſe, why does he make ſuch ado, about a power not in queſtion, and nothing to the purpoſe? The exerciſe of patriarchal juriſdiction, if patriarchal be regal, was not intermitted, whilſt the Iſraelites were in Egypt. 'Tis true, the exerciſe of regal power was not then in the hands of any of the promiſed ſeed of Abraham, nor before neither, that I know; but what is that to the intermiſſion of regal authority, as deſcending from Adam, unleſs our A. will have it, that this choſen line of Abraham, had the right of inheritance to Adam's lordſhip: and then, to what purpoſes are his inſtances of the 72 rulers, in whom the fatherly authority was preſerved in the confuſion at Babel? Why does he bring the 12 princes, ſons of Iſhmael, and the dukes of Edom, and join them with Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob, as examples of the exerciſe of true patriarchal government, if the exerciſe of patriarchal juriſdiction were intermitted in the world, whenever the heirs of Jacob had not ſupreme power? I fear ſupreme, patriarchal juriſdiction was not only intermitted, but from the time of the Egyptian bondage, quite loſt in the world, ſince 'twill be hard to find from that time downwards, any one, who exerciſed it, as an inheritance deſcending to him from the patriarchs Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob. I imagined monarchical government would have ſerved his turn, in the hands of Pharaoh, or any body. But one cannot eaſily diſcover, in all places, what his diſcourſe tends to; as particularly in this place, it is not obvious to gueſs what he drives at, when he ſays, "the exerciſe of ſupreme, patriarchal juriſdiction in Egypt," or how this ſerves to make out the deſcent of Adam's lordſhip, to the patriarchs, or any body elſe.

153. For I thought he had been giving us, out of ſcripture, proofs, and examples of monarchical government, founded on paternal authority, deſcending from Adam, and not an hiſtory of the Jews; amongſt whom yet we find no kings, 'till many years after they were a people: and, when kings were their rulers, there is not the leaſt mention, or room for a pretence, that they were heirs to Adam, or kings by paternal authority. I expected, talking ſo much as he does of ſcripture, that he would have produced thence a ſeries of monarchs, whoſe titles were clear to Adam's fatherhood, and who, as heirs to him, owned

and exerciſed paternal juriſdiction over their ſubjects, and that this was the true patriarchal government; whereas he neither proves that the patriarchs were kings, nor that either kings or patriarchs were heirs to Adam, or ſo much as pretended to it: and one may as well prove, that the patriarchs were all abſolute monarchs; that the power both of patriarchs and kings was only paternal; and that this power deſcended to them from Adam; I ſay all theſe propoſitions may be as well proved by a confuſed account of a multitude of little kings in the Weſt-Indies, out of Ferdinando Soto, or any of our late hiſtories of the Northern America, or by our A.'s 70 kings of Greece, out of Homer, as by any thing he brings out of ſcripture, in that multitude of kings he has reckoned up.

154. And methinks he ſhould have let Homer and his wars of Troy alone, ſince his great zeal to truth, or monarchy, carried him to ſuch a pitch of tranſport againſt philoſophers and poets, that he tells us in his preface, that "there "are too many, in theſe days, who pleaſe themſelves, in running after the "opinion of philoſophers and poets, to find out ſuch an original of government, "as might promiſe them ſome title to liberty, to the great ſcandal of chriſtiani-"ty, and bringing in of atheiſm." And yet theſe heathens, philoſopher Ariſtotle, and poet Homer, are not rejected, by our zealous, chriſtian politician, whenever they offer any thing, that ſeems to ſerve his turn; whether "to the "great ſcandal of chriſtianity, and bringing in of atheiſm," let him look. This I cannot but obſerve, in authors who 'tis viſible write not for truth; how ready zeal for intereſt and party is to entitle chriſtianity to their deſigns, and to charge atheiſm on thoſe, who will not, without examining, ſubmit to their doctrines, and blindly ſwallow their nonſenſe.

But to return to his ſcripture hiſtory, our A. farther tells us, p. 18. that "after the return of the Iſraelites out of bondage, God, out of a ſpecial care of "them, choſe Moſes and Joſhua, ſucceſſively, to govern as princes, in the "place and ſtead of the ſupreme fathers." If it be true, that they returned out of bondage, it muſt be into a ſtate of freedom, and muſt imply, that, both before and after this bondage, they were free, unleſs our A. will ſay, that changing of maſters, is returning out of bondage; or that a ſlave returns out of bondage, when he is removed from one galley to another. If then they returned out of bondage, 'tis plain, that in thoſe days, whatever our A. in his preface ſays to the contrary, there was difference between a ſon, a ſubject, and a ſlave; and that neither the patriarchs before, nor their rulers after this "Egyptian bondage, "numbered their ſons, or ſubjects, amongſt their poſſeſſions," and diſpoſed of them with as abſolute a dominion, as they did their other goods.

155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom Reuben offered his two ſons as pledges, and Judah was at laſt ſurety for Benjamin's ſafe return out of Egypt: which all had been vain, ſuperfluous, and but a ſort of mockery, if Jacob had had the ſame power over every one of his family, as he had over his ox or his aſs, as an owner over his ſubſtance; and the offers that Reuben or Judah made, had been ſuch a ſecurity for returning Benjamin, as if a man ſhould take two lambs out of his lord's flock, and offer one as ſecurity, that he will ſafely reſtore the other.

156. When they were out of this bondage, what then? "God out of a "ſpecial care of them, the Iſraelites." 'Tis well that once in his book, he will allow God to have any care of the people, for in other places he ſpeaks of mankind, as if God had no care of any part of them, but only of their monarchs, and that the reſt of the people, the ſocieties of men, were made as ſo many herds of cattle, only for the ſervice, uſe, and pleaſure of their princes.

157. "Chose Moſes and Joſhua ſucceſſively to govern as princes:" a ſhrewd argument our A. has found out, to prove God's care of the fatherly authority, and Adam's heirs, that here, as an expreſſion of his care of his own people, he chuſes thoſe for princes over them, that had not the leaſt pretence to either. The perſons choſen were Moſes, of the tribe of Levi, and Joſhua, of the tribe of Ephraim, neither of which had any title of fatherhood, But, ſays our A. they were in the place and ſtead of the ſupreme fathers. If God had any where as plainly declared his choice of ſuch fathers to be rulers, as he did of

Moſes and Joſhua, we might believe Moſes and Joſhua were in their places and ſtead: but that being the queſtion in debate, till that be better proved, Moſes being choſen by God, to be ruler of his people, will no more prove that government belonged to Adam's heir, or to the fatherhood, than God's chuſing Aaron of the tribe of Levi to be prieſt, will prove that the prieſthood belonged to Adam's heir, or the prime fathers: ſince God could chuſe Aaron to be prieſt, and Moſes ruled in Iſrael, though neither of thoſe offices, were ſettled on Adam's heir, or the fatherhood.

158. Our A. goes on, "And, after them likewiſe, for a time, he raiſes up "judges, to defend his people, in time of peril," p. 18. This proves fatherly authority to be the original of government, and that it deſcended from Adam to his heirs, juſt as well, as what went before: only here our A. ſeems to confeſs, that theſe judges, who were all the governors they then had, were only men of valour, whom they made their generals, to defend them in time of peril; and cannot God raiſe up ſuch men, unleſs fatherhood have a title to government?

159. But ſays our A. "when God gave the Iſraelites kings, he re-eſtabliſhed the ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government." p. 18.

160. How did God re-eſtabliſh it? By a law, a poſitive command? We find no ſuch thing. Our A. means then, that when God gave them a king, in giving them a king, he re-eſtabliſhed the right, &c. To re-eſtabliſh, de facto, the right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government, is to put a man in poſſeſſion of that government, which his fathers did enjoy, and he by lineal ſucceſſion had a right to. For, firſt, if it were another government, than what his anceſtors had, it was not ſucceeding to an ancient right, but beginning a new one. For, if a prince ſhould give a man, beſides his ancient patrimony, which for ſome ages his family had been diſſeized of, an additional eſtate, never before in the poſſeſſion of his anceſtors; he could not be ſaid to re-eſtabliſh the right of lineal ſucceſſion to any more, than what had been formerly enjoyed by his anceſtors. If therefore, the power the kings of Iſrael had, were any thing more than Iſaac or Jacob had, it was not the re-eſtabliſhing in them the right of ſucceſſion to a power, but giving them a new power, however you pleaſe to call it, paternal or not: and whether Iſaac and Jacob had the ſame power that the kings of Iſrael had, I deſire any one, by what has been ſaid above, to conſider, and I do not think they will find, that either Abraham, Iſaac or Jacob, had any regal power at all.

161. Next, there can be "no re-eſtabliſhment of the prime and ancient "right of lineal ſucceſſion" to any thing, unleſs he that is put in poſſeſſion of it has the right to ſucceed, and be the true and next heir to him he ſucceeds to. Can that be a re-eſtabliſhment, which begins in a new family? Or that the "re-"eſtabliſhment of an ancient right of lineal ſucceſſion," when a crown is given to one, who has no right of ſucceſſion to it, and who, if the lineal ſucceſſion had gone on, had been out of all poſſibility of pretence to it? Saul, the firſt king God gave the Iſraelites, was of the tribe of Benjamin: was the "ancient "and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion re-eſtabliſhed" in him? The next was David, the youngeſt ſon of Jeſſe, of the poſterity of Judah, Jacob's third ſon: was the "ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government "re-eſtabliſhed" in him? Or in Solomon, his younger ſon, and ſucceſſor in the throne? Or in Jeroboam, over the ten tribes? Or in Athaliah, a woman who reigned ſix years, an utter ſtranger to the royal blood? "if the ancient and "prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government, were re-eſtabliſhed in any of theſe or their poſterity, "the ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government" belongs to the younger brothers, as well as elder, and may be re-eſtabliſhed in any man living; for, whatever younger brothers, "by ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion" may have, as well as the elder, that every man living may have a right to, by lineal ſucceſſion, and Sir Robert, as well as any other. And ſo, what a brave right of lineal ſucceſſion, to his paternal, or regal government, our A. has re-eſtabliſhed, for the ſecuring

curing the rights and inheritance of crowns, where every one may have it, let the world conſider.

162. BUT ſays our A. however, p. 19. “whenſoever God made choice of any ſpecial perſon to be king, he intended that the iſſue alſo ſhould have benefit thereof, as being comprehended ſufficiently, in the perſon of the father; although the father was only named in the grant.” This yet will not help out ſucceſſion; for if as our A. ſays, the benefit of the grant be intended to the iſſue of the grantee, this will not direct the ſucceſſion; ſince, if God give any thing to a man and his iſſue in general, the claim cannot be to any one of that iſſue, in particular; every one, that is of his race, will have an equal right. If it be ſaid, our A. meant heir, I believe our A. was as willing as any body to have uſed that word, if it would have ſerved his turn; but Solomon who ſucceeded David in his throne, being no more his heir, than Jeroboam, who ſucceeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his iſſue, our A. had reaſon to avoid ſaying, that God intended it to the heirs, when that would not hold in a ſucceſſion, which our A. could not except againſt, and ſo he has left his ſucceſſion as undetermined, as if he had ſaid nothing about it. For, if the regal power be given by God to a man and his iſſue, as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his ſeed, muſt they not all have a title to it, all ſhare in it? And one may as well ſay, that by God's grant to Abraham and his ſeed, the land of Canaan was to belong only to one of his ſeed, excluſive of all others, as by God's grant of dominion to a man and his iſſue, this dominion was to belong in peculiar to one of his iſſue, excluſive of all others.

163. BUT, how will our A. prove, that whenſoever God made choice of any ſpecial perſon to be a king, he intended that “the (I ſuppoſe he means his) iſſue alſo ſhould have benefit thereof?” Has he ſo ſoon forgot Moſes and Joſhua, whom, in this very ſection, he ſays, “God out of a ſpecial care, choſe to govern as princes;” and the judges that God raiſed up? Had not theſe princes, having the authority of the ſupreme fatherhood, the ſame power, that the kings had, and being ſpecially choſen by God himſelf, ſhould not their iſſue have the benefit of that choice, as well as David's, or Solomon's? If theſe had the paternal authority put into their hands immediately by God; why had not their iſſue the benefit of this grant, in a ſucceſſion to this power? Or, if they had it, as Adam's heirs, why did not their heirs enjoy it after them, by right deſcending to them? For they could not be heirs to one another. Was the power the ſame, and from the ſame original in Moſes, Joſhua, and the judges, as it was in David and the kings, and was it inheritable in one, and not in the other? If it was not paternal authority, then God's own people were governed by thoſe, that had not paternal authority, and thoſe governors did well enough without it: If it were paternal authority, and God choſe the perſons, that were to exerciſe it, our A.'s rule fails, that “whenſoever God makes choice of any perſon to be ſupreme ruler” (for I ſuppoſe the name king has no ſpell in it, 'tis not the title, but the power makes the difference) “he intends that the iſſue alſo ſhould have the benefit of it,” ſince from their coming out of Egypt, to David's time, 400 years, the iſſue was never “ſo ſufficiently comprehended in the perſon of the father.” as that any ſon, after the death of his father, ſucceeded to the government, amongſt all thoſe judges that judged Iſrael. If, to avoid this, it be ſaid, God always choſe the perſon of the ſucceſſor, and ſo transferring the fatherly authority to him, excluded his iſſue from ſucceeding to it, that is manifeſtly not ſo in the ſtory of Jephtha, where he articled with the people, and they made him judge over them, as is plain, Judg. xi.

164. 'TIS in vain then to ſay, that “whenſoever God chuſes any ſpecial perſon to have the exerciſe of paternal authority” (for if that be not to be king, I deſire to know the difference between a king, and one having the exerciſe of paternal authority) “he intends the iſſue alſo ſhould have the benefit of it;” ſince we find the authority the judges had, ended with them, and deſcended not to their iſſue; and if the judges had not paternal authority, I fear it will trouble our A. or any of the friends to his principles, to tell, who had then the paternal authority, that is, the government and ſupreme power among the Iſraelites;

and I ſuſpect they muſt confeſs, that the choſen people of God continued a people, ſeveral hundred of years, without any knowledge, or thought, of this paternal authority, or any appearance of monarchical government at all.

165. To be ſatisfied of this, he needs but read the ſtory of the Levite, and the war thereupon with the Benjamites, in the three laſt chap. of Judges, and when he finds that the Levite appeals to the people for juſtice, that it was the tribes and the congregation that debated, reſolved, and directed all that was done on that occaſion; he muſt conclude, either that God was not "careful to "preſerve the fatherly authority," amongſt his own choſen people; or elſe that the fatherly authority may be preſerved, where there is no monarchical government; if the latter, then it will follow, that though fatherly authority be never ſo well proved, yet it will not infer a neceſſity of monarchical government; if the former, it will ſeem very ſtrange and improbable, that God ſhould ordain fatherly authority to be ſo ſacred amongſt the ſons of men, that there could be no power, or government, without it; and yet that, amongſt his own people, even whilſt he is providing a government for them, and therein preſcribes rules, to the ſeveral ſtates and relations of men, this great and fundamental one, this moſt material and neceſſary of all the reſt, ſhould be concealed, and lie neglected for 400 years after.

166. Before I leave this, I muſt aſk, how our A. knows that "whenſoever God makes choice of any ſpecial perſon to be king, he intends that the "iſſue ſhould have the benefit thereof?" Does God, by the law of nature, or revelation, ſay ſo? By the ſame law alſo, he muſt ſay, which of his iſſue muſt enjoy the crown in ſucceſſion, and ſo point out the heir, or elſe leave his iſſue to divide and ſcramble for the government: both alike abſurd, and ſuch as will deſtroy the benefit of ſuch grant to the iſſue. When any ſuch declaration of God's intention is produced, it will be our duty to believe God intends it ſo; but till that be done, our A. muſt ſhew us ſome better warrant, before we ſhall be obliged to receive him as the authentick revealer of God's intentions.

167. "The iſſue, ſays our A. is comprehended ſufficiently in the perſon of "the father; although the father only was named in the grant:" And yet God, when he gave the land of Canaan to Abram, Gen. xiii. 15. thought fit to put his ſeed into the grant too: ſo the prieſthood was given to Aaron and his ſeed; and the crown God gave not only to David, but his ſeed alſo: and however our A. aſſures us that "God intends, that the iſſue ſhould have the benefit "of it, when he chuſes any perſon to be king;" yet we ſee that the kingdom, which he gave to Saul, without mentioning his ſeed after him, never came to any of his iſſue: and why, when God choſe a perſon to be king, he ſhould intend, that his iſſue ſhould have the benefit of it, more than when he choſe one to be judge in Iſrael, I would fain know a reaſon; or why does a grant of fatherly authority to a king more comprehend the iſſue, than when a like grant is made to a judge? Is paternal authority by right to deſcend to the iſſue of one, and not of the other? There will need ſome reaſon to be ſhewn of this difference, more than the name; when the thing given is the ſame fatherly authority, and the manner of giving it, God's choice of the perſon, the ſame too; for I ſuppoſe our A. when he ſays, "God raiſed up judges," will by no means allow they were choſen by the people.

168. But ſince our A. has ſo confidently aſſured us, of the care of God to preſerve the fatherhood, and pretends to build all he ſays, upon the authority of the ſcripture, we may well expect that that people, whoſe law, conſtitution and hiſtory is chiefly contained in the ſcripture, ſhould furniſh him, with the cleareſt inſtances, of God's care of preſerving of the fatherly authority in that people, who it is agreed he had a moſt peculiar care of. Let us ſee, then, what ſtate this paternal authority, or government, was in, amongſt the Jews, from their beginning to be a people. It was omitted, by our A.'s confeſſion, from their coming into Egypt, till their return out of that bondage, above 200 years: from thence, till God gave the Iſraelites a king, about 400 years more, our A. gives but a very ſlender account of it, nor indeed all that time, are there the

leaſt footſteps of paternal, or regal, government amongſt them. But then, ſays our A. "God re-eſtabliſhed the ancient and prime right of lineal ſucceſſion to "paternal government."

169. What a "lineal ſucceſſion to paternal government" was then eſtabliſhed, we have already ſeen. I only now conſider, how long this laſted, and that was to their captivity, above 500 years: from thence to their deſtruction by the Romans, above 650 years after, the "ancient and prime right of lineal "ſucceſſion to paternal government" was again loſt, and they continued a people in the promiſed land without it. So that of 1750 years, that they were God's peculiar people, they had hereditary kingly government amongſt them not one third of the time, and of that time there is not the leaſt footſtep of one moment of "paternal government, nor the re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient and prime "right of lineal ſucceſſion to it," whether we ſuppoſe it to be derived, as from its fountain, from David, Saul, Abraham, or, which upon our A.'s principles is the only true, from Adam.

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OF

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

IT having been ſhewn in the foregoing diſcourſe,

1. THAT Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by poſitive donation from God, any ſuch authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended.

2. THAT if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.

3. THAT, if his heirs had, there being no law of nature, nor poſitive law of God, that determines which is the right heir, in all caſes that may ariſe, the right of ſucceſſion, and conſequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.

4. THAT, if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge, of which is the eldeſt line of Adam's poſterity, being ſo long ſince utterly loſt, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another the leaſt pretence to be the eldeſt houſe, and to have the right of inheritance.

ALL theſe premiſes having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impoſſible that the rulers now on earth, ſhould make any benefit, or derive any the leaſt ſhadow of authority, from that, which is held to be the foundation of all power, "Adam's private dominion and paternal juriſdiction;" ſo that he that will not give juſt occaſion to think, that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules, but that of beaſts, where the ſtrongeſt carries it; and ſo lay a foundation for perpetual diſorder and miſchief, tumult, ſedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypotheſis ſo loudly cry out againſt) muſt of neceſſity find out another riſe of government, another original of political power, and another way of deſigning and knowing the perſons that have it, than what Sir Robert F. hath taught us.

2. TO this purpoſe, I think it may not be amiſs, to ſet down what I take to be political power. That the power of a magiſtrate over a ſubject may be diſtinguiſhed from that of a father over his children, a maſter over his ſervant, a huſband over his wife, and a lord over his ſlave. All which diſtinct powers happening ſometimes together, in the ſame man, if he be conſidered under theſe different relations, it may help us to diſtinguiſh theſe powers one from another, and ſhew the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

3. POLITICAL power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and conſequently all leſs penalties, for the regulating and preſerving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of ſuch laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the publick good.

CHAP. II.

Of the ſtate of nature.

4. TO underſtand political power right, and derive it from its original, we muſt conſider what ſtate all men are naturally in, and that is, a ſtate of perfect freedom to order their actions, and diſpoſe of their poſſeſſions and perſons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without aſking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A STATE alſo of equality, wherein all the power and juriſdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the ſame ſpecies and rank, promiſcuouſly born to all the ſame advantages of nature, and the uſe of the ſame faculties, ſhould alſo be equal one amongſt another, without ſubordination or ſubjection, unleſs the lord and maſter of them all, ſhould, by any manifeſt declaration of his will, ſet one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and ſovereignty.

5. THIS equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon, as ſo evident in itſelf and beyond all queſtion, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongſt men, on which he builds the duties, they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of juſtice and charity. His words are:

"THE like natural inducement hath brought men to know, that it is no leſs
" their duty to love others than themſelves; for ſeeing thoſe things, which are
" equal, muſt needs all have one meaſure; if I cannot but wiſh to receive good,
" even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wiſh unto his own ſoul,
" how ſhould I look to have any part of my deſire herein ſatisfied, unleſs my
" ſelf be careful to ſatisfy the like deſire, which is undoubtedly in other men,
" being of one and the ſame nature; to have any thing offered them repugnant
" to this deſire, muſt needs in all reſpects grieve them, as much as me; ſo that
" if I do harm, I muſt look to ſuffer, there being no reaſon, that others ſhould
" ſhew greater meaſures of love to me, than they have by me ſhewed unto
" them; my deſire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature, as much as
" poſſibly may be, impoſeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward
" fully the like affection; for which relation of equality between ourſelves and
" them that are as ourſelves, what ſeveral rules and canons, natural reaſon
" hath drawn for direction of life, no man is ignorant. Eccl. Pol. lib. 1.

6. BUT though this be a ſtate of liberty, yet it is not a ſtate of licenſe; tho' man, in that ſtate, have an uncontroulable liberty to diſpoſe of his perſon, or poſſeſſions, yet he has not liberty to deſtroy himſelf, or ſo much as any creature in his poſſeſſion, but where ſome nobler uſe, than its bare preſervation, calls for it. The ſtate of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reaſon, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but conſult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or poſſeſſions. For, men being all the workmanſhip of one omnipotent and infinitely wiſe maker; all the ſervants of one ſovereign maſter, ſent into the world by his order, and about his buſineſs, they are his property, whoſe workmanſhip they are, made to laſt during his, not one another's, pleaſure: and being furniſhed with like faculties, ſharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be ſuppoſed any ſuch ſubordination among us, that may authorize us to deſtroy one another, as if we were made for one anothers uſes, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preſerve himſelf, and not to quit his ſtation wilfully; ſo by the like reaſon, when his own preſervation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preſerve the reſt of mankind, and may not, unleſs it be to do juſtice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preſervation of the liberty, health, limbs, or goods of another.

7. And, that all men may be reſtrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be obſerved, which willeth the peace and preſervation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is in that ſtate put into every man's hand, whereby every one has a right to puniſh the tranſgreſſors of that law to ſuch a degree, as may hinder its violation. For the law of nature would, as all other laws, that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were no body that, in the ſtate of nature, had a power to execute that law, and thereby preſerve the innocent and reſtrain offenders. And if any one in the ſtate of nature, may puniſh another, for any evil he has done, every one may do ſo. For in that ſtate of perfect equality, where naturally there is no ſuperiority, or juriſdiction, of one over another, what any may do, in proſecution of that law, every one muſt needs have a right to do.

8. And thus, in the ſtate of nature, "one man comes by a power over another;" but yet no abſolute, or arbitrary power, to uſe a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the paſſionate heats, or boundleſs extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, ſo far as calm reaſon and conſcience dictate, what is proportionate to his tranſgreſſion, which is ſo much as may ſerve for reparation and reſtraint. For theſe two are the only reaſons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call puniſhment. In tranſgreſſing the law of nature, the offender declares himſelf to live by another rule, than that of common reaſon and equity, which is that meaſure God has ſet to the actions of men, for their mutual ſecurity; and ſo he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie, which is to ſecure them from injury and violence, being ſlighted and broken by him. Which being a trepaſs againſt the whole ſpecies, and the peace and ſafety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this ſcore, by the right he hath to preſerve mankind in general, may reſtrain, or where it is neceſſary, deſtroy things noxious to them, and ſo may bring ſuch evil on any one, who hath tranſgreſſed that law, as may make him repent the doing it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others from doing the like miſchief. And in this caſe, and upon this ground, "every man hath a right to puniſh the offender, and be the executioner of the law of nature."

9. I doubt not but this will ſeem a very ſtrange doctrine to ſome men: but, before they condemn it, I deſire them to reſolve me, by what right any prince, or ſtate, can put to death, or puniſh an alien, for any crime he commits in their country? It is certain their laws, by virtue of any ſanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legiſlative, reach not a ſtronger: they ſpeak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them; the legiſlative authority, by which they are in force, over the ſubjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Thoſe, who have the ſupreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the reſt of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature, every man hath not a power to puniſh offences againſt it as he ſoberly judges the caſe to require, I ſee not how the magiſtrates of any community can puniſh an alien of another country; ſince, in reference to him, they can have no more power, than what every man may naturally have over another.

10. Besides the crime, which conſiſts in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reaſon, whereby a man ſo far becomes degenerate, and declares himſelf to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done ſome perſon or other, ſome other man receives damage by his tranſgreſſion; in which caſe he, who hath received any damage, has beſides the right of puniſhment common to him with other men, a particular right to ſeek reparation from him that has done it. And any other perſon, who finds it juſt, may alſo join with him that is injured, and aſſiſt him in recovering from the offender ſo much, as may make ſatisfaction for the harm he has ſuffered.

11. From theſe two diſtinct rights, the one of puniſhing the crime for reſtraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of puniſhing is in every body, the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to paſs, that the magiſtrate, who, by being magiſtrate, hath the common right

of puniſhing put into his hands, can often, where publick good demands not the execution of the law, remit the puniſhment of criminal offences, by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the ſatisfaction due to any private man, for the damage he has received. That he, who has ſuffered the damage, has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified perſon has this power of appropriating to himſelf the goods, or ſervice, of the offender, by right of ſelf-preſervation, as every man has a power to puniſh the crime, to prevent its being committed again, "by the right he has of preſerving all mankind," and doing all reaſonable things he can, in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the ſtate of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compenſate, by the example of the puniſhment, that attends it from every body, and alſo to ſecure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reaſon, the common rule and meaſure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjuſt violence and ſlaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war againſt all mankind, and therefore may be deſtroy'd, as a lion or a tyger, one of thoſe wild, ſavage beaſts, with whom men can have no ſociety, nor ſecurity: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, "Whoſo ſheddeth man's blood, by man "ſhall his blood be ſhed." And Cain was ſo fully convinced, that every one had a right to deſtroy ſuch a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, "Every one that findeth me, ſhall ſlay me;" ſo plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

12. By the ſame reaſon, may a man, in the ſtate of nature, puniſh the leſſer breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, With death? I anſwer, Each tranſgreſſion may be puniſhed to that degree, and with ſo much ſeverity, as will ſuffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cauſe to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the ſtate of nature, may, in the ſtate of nature, be alſo puniſhed equally, and as far forth, as it may in a commonwealth. For though it would be beſides my preſent purpoſe, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its meaſures of puniſhment; yet it is certain, there is ſuch a law, and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a ſtudier of that law, as the poſitive laws of commonwealths; nay, poſſibly plainer; as much as reaſon is eaſier to be underſtood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden intereſts, put into words; for ſo truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only ſo far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

13. To this ſtrange doctrine, viz. that "in the ſtate of nature, every one has "the executive power" of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreaſonable for men to be judges in their own caſes, that ſelf-love will make men partial to themſelves and their friends: and, on the other ſide, that ill nature, paſſion and revenge, will carry them too far in puniſhing others; and hence nothing but confuſion and diſorder will follow; and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to reſtrain the partiality and violence of men. I eaſily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the ſtate of nature, which muſt certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own caſe; ſince 'tis eaſy to be imagined, that he who was ſo unjuſt as to do his brother an injury, will ſcarce be ſo juſt as to condemn himſelf for it: but I ſhall deſire thoſe, who make this objection, to remember, that abſolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of thoſe evils which neceſſarily follow from mens being judges in their own caſes, and the ſtate of nature is, therefore, not to be endured, I deſire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is, than the ſtate of nature, where one man commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own caſe, and may do to all his ſubjects whatever he pleaſes, without the leaſt queſtion, or controul, of thoſe who execute his pleaſure? And, in whatſoever he doth, whether led by reaſon, miſtake or paſſion, muſt be ſubmitted to? Which men, in the ſtate of nature, are not bound to do to one another: and if he that judges, judges amiſs, in his own, or any other caſe, he is anſwerable for it to the reſt of mankind.

14. It is often aſked, as a mighty objection, "Where are, or ever were, "there any men, in ſuch a ſtate of nature?" To which it may ſuffice, as an anſwer at preſent: that ſince all princes, and rulers of independent governments, all thro' the world, are in a ſtate of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that ſtate. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others. For it is not every compact, that puts an end to the ſtate of nature between men, but only this one, of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politick; other promiſes and compacts men may make, one with another, and yet ſtill be in the ſtate of nature. The promiſes and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the deſart iſland, mentioned by Garcilaſſo de la Vega, in his hiſtory of Peru, or between a Swiſs and an Indian in the woods of America, are binding to them, tho' they are perfectly in a ſtate of nature, in reference to one another. For truth, and keeping of faith, belongs to men as men, and not as members of ſociety.

15. To thoſe that ſay, there were never any men in the ſtate of nature, I will not only oppoſe the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. 1. ſect. 10. where he ſays, "the laws, which have been hitherto mentioned," i. e. the laws of nature, "do bind men abſolutely, even as they are men, altho' they have "never any ſettled fellowſhip, never any ſolemn agreement amongſt themſelves "what to do, or not to do: but for as much as we are not, by ourſelves, ſufficient to furniſh ourſelves with competent ſtore of things needful for ſuch a "life, as our nature doth deſire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore, to "ſupply thoſe defects and imperfections which are in us, as living ſingle and "ſolely by ourſelves, we are naturally induced to ſeek communion and fellowſhip with others; this was the cauſe of men's uniting themſelves at firſt in "politick ſocieties:" but I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that ſtate, and remain ſo, 'till by their own conſents, they make themſelves members of ſome politick ſociety; and I doubt not, in the ſequel of this diſcourſe to make it very clear.

CHAP. III.

Of the ſtate of war.

16. THE ſtate of war is a ſtate of enmity and deſtruction: and therefore, declaring by word, or action, not a paſſionate and haſty, but a ſedate, ſettled deſign upon another man's life, puts him in a ſtate of war with him, againſt whom he has declared ſuch an intention, and ſo has expoſed his life to the other's power, to be taken away by him, or any one, that joins with him in his defence, and eſpouſes his quarrel; it being reaſonable and juſt I ſhould have a right to deſtroy that, which threatens me with deſtruction. For, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preſerved, as much as poſſible, when all can't be preſerved, the ſafety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may deſtroy a man, who makes war upon him, or has diſcovered an enmity to his being, for the ſame reaſon, that he may kill a wolf, or a lion; becauſe ſuch men are not under the ties of the common law of reaſon, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and ſo may be treated as beaſts of prey, thoſe dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be ſure to deſtroy him, whenever he falls into their power.

17. And hence it is, that he, who attempts to get another man into his abſolute power, does thereby put himſelf into a ſtate of war with him; it being to be underſtood as a declaration of a deſign upon his life. For I have reaſon to conclude, that he, who would get me into his power without my conſent, would uſe me as he pleaſed, when he had got me there, and deſtroy me too, when he had a fancy to it; for nobody can deſire to have me in his abſolute power, unleſs it be to compel me by force to that, which is againſt the right of my freedom, i. e. make me a ſlave. To be free from ſuch force is the only ſecurity of my

preſervation; and reaſon bids me look on him as an enemy to my preſervation, who would take away that freedom, which is the fence to it; ſo that he, who makes an attempt to enſlave me, thereby puts himſelf into a ſtate of war with me. He that, in the ſtate of nature, would take away the freedom, that belongs to any one in that ſtate, muſt neceſſarily be ſuppoſed to have a deſign to take away every thing elſe, that freedom being the foundation of all the reſt: as he that, in the ſtate of ſociety, would take away the freedom belonging to thoſe of that ſociety, or commonwealth, muſt be ſuppoſed to deſign to take away from them every thing elſe, and ſo be looked on as in a ſtate of war.

18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the leaſt hurt him, nor declared any deſign upon his life, any farther than, by the uſe of force, ſo to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleaſes from him; becauſe uſing force, where he has no right to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reaſon to ſuppoſe, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing elſe. And therefore, it is lawful for me to treat him as one, who has put himſelf into a ſtate of war with me, i. e. kill him, if I can; for to that hazard does he juſtly expoſe himſelf, whoever introduces a ſtate of war, and is aggreſſor in it.

19. And here we have the plain "difference between the ſtate of nature, and "the ſtate of war;" which, however ſome men have confounded, are as far diſtant, as a ſtate of peace, good will, mutual aſſiſtance and preſervation, and a ſtate of enmity, malice, violence and mutual deſtruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reaſon, without a common ſuperior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the ſtate of nature. But force, or a declared deſign of force upon the perſon of another, where there is no common ſuperior on earth, to appeal to for relief, is the ſtate of war; and it is the want of ſuch an appeal gives a man the right of war, even againſt an aggreſſor, tho' he be in ſociety and a fellow-ſubject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having ſtolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he ſets on to rob me but of my horſe, or coat: becauſe the law, which was made for my preſervation, where it cannot interpoſe to ſecure my life from preſent force, which if loſt, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggreſſor, becauſe the aggreſſor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the deciſion of the law, for remedy in a caſe, where the miſchief may be irreparable. "Want of "a common judge with authority, puts all men in a ſtate of nature: force "without right upon a man's perſon, makes a ſtate of war," both where there is, and is not a common judge.

20. But, when the actual force is over, the ſtate of war ceaſes between thoſe that are in ſociety, and are equally, on both ſides, ſubjected to the fair determination of the law; becauſe then, there lies open the remedy of appeal for the paſt injury, and to prevent future harm; but where no ſuch appeal is, as in the ſtate of nature, for want of poſitive laws and judges, with authority to appeal to, the ſtate of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to deſtroy the other whenever he can, until the aggreſſor offers peace, and deſires reconciliation on ſuch terms, as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and ſecure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law and conſtituted judges lies open, but the remedy is denied, by a manifeſt perverting of juſtice, and a barefaced wreſting of the laws, to protect, or indemnify, the violence or injuries of ſome men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a ſtate of war. For wherever violence is uſed, and injury done, tho', by hands appointed to adminiſter juſtice, it is ſtill violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law; the end whereof being to protect and redreſs the innocent, by an unbiaſſed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the ſufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in ſuch caſes, an appeal to heaven.

21. To avoid this ſtate of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the leaſt difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great “ reaſon of men's putting themſelves “ into ſociety,” and quitting the ſtate of nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the ſtate of war is excluded, and the controverſy is decided by that power. Had there been any ſuch court, any ſuperior juriſdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jeptha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a ſtate of war; but we ſee, he was forced to appeal to heaven: “ The “ Lord, the Judge, (ſays he) be judge this day between the children of Iſrael, “ and the children of Ammon,” Judg. xi. 27. and then proſecuting and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle. And therefore in ſuch controverſies, where the queſtion is put, Who ſhall be judge? it cannot be meant who ſhall decide the controverſy; every one knows what Jeptha here tells us, that “ the Lord, the Judge,” ſhall judge: where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That queſtion then cannot mean, who ſhall judge? Whether another hath put himſelf in a ſtate of war with me, and whether I may, as Jeptha did, appeal to heaven in it? Of that I myſelf can only be judge in my own conſcience, as I will anſwer it at the great day, to the ſupreme Judge of all men.

CHAP. IV.

Of ſlavery.

22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any ſuperior power on earth, and not to be under the will, or legiſlative authority, of man; but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in ſociety, is to be under no other legiſlative power, but that eſtabliſhed, by conſent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or reſtraint of any law, but what that legiſlative ſhall enact, according to the truſt put in it. Freedom, then, is not what Sir R. F. tells us, O. A. 55. “ A liberty for every one to do “ what he liſts, to live as he pleaſes, and not to be tied by any laws:” But freedom of men under government, is to have a ſtanding rule to live by, common to every one of that ſociety, and made by the legiſlative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will, in all things, where that rule preſcribes not; and not to be ſubject to the inconſtant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is to be under no other reſtraint but the law of nature.

23. This freedom from abſolute, arbitrary power, is ſo neceſſary to, and cloſely join'd with a man's preſervation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preſervation and life together. For a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot by compact, or his own conſent, enſlave himſelf to any one, nor put himſelf under the abſolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleaſes. Nobody can give more power, than he has himſelf; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed having, by his fault, forfeited his own life, by ſome act that deſerves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make uſe of him to his own ſervice, and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardſhip of his ſlavery outweigh the value of his life, 'tis in his power, by reſiſting the will of his maſter, to draw on himſelf the death he deſires.

24. This is the perfect condition of ſlavery, which is nothing elſe, but “ the “ ſtate of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive.” For if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one ſide, and obedience on the other, the ſtate of war and ſlavery ceaſes, as long as the compact endures. For, as has been ſaid, no man can, by agreement, paſs over to another, that which he hath not in himſelf, a power over his own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did ſell themſelves; but 'tis plain, that this was only to drudgery, not to ſlavery. For it is evident, the perſon ſold was not under an abſolute, arbitrary, deſpotical power. For the maſter could not have power to kill him at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his ſervice; and the maſter of ſuch a ſervant was ſo far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not at pleaſure ſo much as maim him, but the loſs of an eye, or tooth, ſet him free, Exod. xxi.

CHAP. V.

Of property.

25. WHETHER we conſider natural reaſon, which tells us, that men being once born, have a right to their preſervation, and conſequently to meat and drink, and ſuch other things, as nature affords for their ſubſiſtence; or revelation, which gives us an account of thoſe grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his ſons, 'tis very clear, that God, as king David ſays, Pſal. cxv. 16. "has given the earth to the children of men;" given it to mankind in common. But this being ſuppoſed, it ſeems to ſome a very great difficulty, how any one ſhould ever come to have a property in any thing. I will not content myſelf to anſwer, That, if it be difficult to make out property, upon a ſuppoſition that God gave the world to Adam and his poſterity in common; it is impoſſible that any man, but one univerſal monarch ſhould have any property, upon a ſuppoſition, that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in ſucceſſion, excluſive of all the reſt of his poſterity. But I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, how men might come to have a property, in ſeveral parts of that, which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any expreſs compact of all the commoners.

26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath alſo given them reaſon to make uſe of it, to the beſt advantage of life and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the ſupport and comfort of their being. And, though all the fruits, it naturally produces, and beaſts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the ſpontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, excluſive of the reſt of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural ſtate: yet being given for the uſe of men, there muſt of neceſſity be a means to appropriate them, ſome way or other, before they can be of any uſe, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or veniſon, which nouriſhes the wild Indian, who knows no incloſure, and is ſtill a tenant in common, muſt be his, and ſo his, i. e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do any good for the ſupport of his life.

27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own perſon: this no body has any right to, but himſelf. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may ſay, are properly his. Whatſoever, then, he removes out of the ſtate that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it ſomething that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common ſtate nature hath placed it in, it hath, by this labour, ſomething annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unqueſtionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at leaſt where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

28. He that is nouriſhed by the acorns, he picked up under an oak, or the apples, he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himſelf. No body can deny but the nouriſhment is his. I aſk then, When did they begin to be his? When he digeſted? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? And

'tis plain, if the firſt gathering made them not his, nothing elſe could. That labour put a diſtinction between them and common: that added ſomething to them, more than nature, the common mother of all, had done, and ſo they became his private right. And will any one ſay, he had no right to thoſe acorns, or apples, he thus appropriated, becauſe he had not the conſent of all mankind to make them his: Was it a robbery thus to aſſume to himſelf, what belonged to all in common? If ſuch a conſent as that was neceſſary, man had ſtarved, notwithſtanding the plenty God had given him. We ſee in commons, which remain ſo by compact, that 'tis the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the ſtate nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is of no uſe. And the taking of this, or that part does not depend on the expreſs conſent of all the commoners. Thus the graſs my horſe has bit, the turfs my ſervant has cut, and the ore I have digged, in any place, where I have a right to them, in common with others, become my property, without the aſſignation, or conſent, of any body. The labour, that was mine, removing them out of that common ſtate, they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

29. By making an explicit conſent of every commoner neceſſary to any one's appropriating to himſelf any part of what is given in common, children, or ſervants, could not cut the meat which their father, or maſter, had provided for them in common, without aſſigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only, who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himſelf.

30. Thus the law of reaſon makes the deer that Indian's, who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods, who hath beſtowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongſt thoſe who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied poſitive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, ſtill takes place; and, by virtue thereof, what fiſh any one catches in the ocean, that great and ſtill remaining common of mankind; or what ambergreaſe any one takes up here, is by the labour, that removes it out of that common ſtate nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongſt us, the hare, that any one is hunting, is thought his who purſues her, during the chace. For being a beaſt, that is ſtill looked upon as common, and no man's private poſſeſſion, whoever has employed ſo much labour about any of that kind, as to find and purſue her, has thereby removed her from the ſtate of nature, wherein ſhe was common, and hath begun a property.

31. It will perhaps be objected to this, That "if gathering the acorns, or "other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingroſs "as much as he will." To which I anſwer, Not ſo. The ſame law of nature, that does, by this means, give us property, does alſo bound that property too. "God has given us all things richly," 1 Tim. vi. 17. is the voice of reaſon, confirmed by inſpiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make uſe of, to any advantage of life, before it ſpoils, ſo much he may, by his labour, fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his ſhare, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God, for man to ſpoil, or deſtroy. And thus, conſidering the plenty of natural proviſions there was a long time in the world, and the few ſpenders, and to how ſmall a part of that proviſion the induſtry of one man could extend itſelf, and ingroſs it to the prejudice of others; eſpecially keeping within the bounds ſet by reaſon, of what might ſerve for his uſe; there could be then little room for quarrels, or contentions, about property ſo eſtabliſhed.

32. But the chief matter of property being now, not the fruits of the earth, and the beaſts, that ſubſiſt on it, but the earth itſelf; as that, which takes in, and carries with it all the reſt; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired, as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates,

vates, and can uſe the product of, ſo much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were incloſe it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to ſay every body elſe has an equal title to it; and, therefore, he cannot appropriate, he cannot incloſe, without the conſent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man alſo to labour; and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reaſon commanded him to ſubdue the earth, i. e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out ſomething upon it, that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, ſubdued, tilled, and ſowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it ſomething, that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could, without injury, take from him.

33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, ſince there was ſtill enough, and as good left, and more, than the yet unprovided could uſe. So that, in effect, there was never the leſs left for others, becauſe of his incloſure for himſelf. For he that leaves as much, as another can make uſe of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himſelf injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the ſame water left him to quench his thirſt: and the caſe of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the ſame.

34. God gave the world to men in common; but ſince he gave it for their benefit, and the greateſt conveniencies of life, they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be ſuppoſed he meant it ſhould always remain common and uncultivated, He gave it to the uſe of the induſtrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy, or covetouſneſs, of the quarrelſome and contentious. He that has as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, 'tis plain he deſired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground, which God had given him in common with others, to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already poſſeſſed, and more, than he knew what to do with, or his induſtry could reach to.

35. 'Tis true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can incloſe, or appropriate any part, without the conſent of all his fellow-commoners: becauſe this is left common by compact, i. e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common in reſpect of ſome men, it is not ſo to all mankind; but is the joint-property of this country, or this pariſh. Beſides, the remainder, after ſuch incloſure, would not be as good to the reſt of the commoners, as the whole was, when they could all make uſe of the whole; whereas in the beginning, and firſt peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwiſe. The law, man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property, which could not be taken from him, where-ever he had fixed it. And hence ſubduing, or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we ſee, are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to ſubdue, gave authority ſo far to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, neceſſarily introduces private poſſeſſions.

36. Nature has well ſet the meaſure of property, by the extent of men's labour, and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could ſubdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment conſume more than a ſmall part; ſo that it was impoſſible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himſelf a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would ſtill have room for as good and as large a poſſeſſion (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. Meaſure did confine every man's poſſeſſion to a very moderate proportion, and ſuch as he might appropriate to himſelf, without injury to any body, in the firſt ages of the world, when men were

more in danger to be loſt, by wandering from their company, in the then vaſt wilderneſs of the earth, than to be ſtraitened, for want of room to plant in. And the ſame meaſure may be allowed ſtill, without prejudice to any body, as full as the world ſeems. For ſuppoſing a man, or family, in the ſtate they were, at firſt peopling of the world, by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in ſome inland, vacant places of America, we ſhall find that the poſſeſſions, he could make himſelf, upon the meaſures we have given, would not be very large, nor even to this day, prejudice the reſt of mankind, or give them reaſon to complain, or think themſelves injured by this man's encroachment, though the race of men have now ſpread themſelves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the ſmall number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of ſo little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain itſelf, a man may be permitted to plow, ſow, or reap, without being diſturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making uſe of it: but, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themſelves beholden to him, who by his induſtry on neglected, and conſequently waſte land, has increaſed the ſtock of corn which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no ſtreſs on, this I dare boldly affirm, that the ſame rule of propriety, viz. that every man ſhould have as much, as he could make uſe of, would hold ſtill in the world, without ſtraitening any body; ſince there is land enough in the world to ſuffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by conſent) larger poſſeſſions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I ſhall, by and by, ſhew more at large.

37. This is certain, That in the beginning, before the deſire of having more than man needed, had altered the intrinſick value of things which depends only on their uſefulneſs to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without waſting or decay, ſhould be worth a great piece of fleſh, or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each one to himſelf, as much of the things of nature as he could uſe; yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the ſame plenty was ſtill left to thoſe, who would uſe the ſame induſtry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himſelf, by his labour, does not leſſen, but increaſe the common ſtock of mankind. For the proviſions, ſerving to the ſupport of human life, produced by one acre of incloſed and cultivated land, are (to ſpeak much within compaſs) ten times more than thoſe, which are yielded by an acre of land, of an equal richneſs, lying waſte in common. And therefore, he that incloſes land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred, left to nature, may truly be ſaid to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now ſupplies him with proviſions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred, lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one. For I aſk, "Whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waſte of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage, or huſbandry, a thouſand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants, as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonſhire, where they are well cultivated?"

Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught or tamed, as many of the beaſts as he could; he, that ſo employed his pains, about any of the ſpontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the ſtate, which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they periſhed in his poſſeſſion, without their due uſe; if the fruits rotted, or the veniſon putrified, before he could ſpend it, he offended againſt the common law of nature, and was liable to be puniſhed; he invaded his neighbour's ſhare, for he had no right, farther than his uſe called for any of them, and they might ſerve to afford him conveniencies of life.

38. The ſame meaſures governed the poſſeſſion of land too: whatſoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made uſe of, before it ſpoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatſoever he incloſed, and could feed, and make uſe of, the cattle and product was alſo his. But if either the graſs of his incloſure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting periſhed, without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithſtanding his incloſure, was ſtill to be looked on as waſte, and might be the poſſeſſion of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground, as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough for Abel's ſheep, to feed on; a few acres would ſerve for both their poſſeſſions. But as families increaſed, and induſtry enlarged their ſtocks, their poſſeſſions enlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground, they made uſe of, 'till they incorporated, ſettled themſelves together, and built cities, and then, by conſent they came in time to ſet out the bounds of their diſtinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and, by laws within themſelves, ſettled the properties of thoſe of the ſame ſociety. For we ſee, that in that part of the world, which was firſt inhabited, and, therefore, like to be the beſt peopled, even as low down as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks and their herds, which was their ſubſtance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did in a country, where he was a ſtranger. Whence it is plain, that at leaſt a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made uſe of. But when there was not room enough, in the ſame place, for their herds to feed together, they by conſent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5, &c. ſeparated, and enlarged their paſture, where it beſt liked them. And, for the ſame reaſon, Eſau went from his father and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6, &c.

39. And thus, without ſuppoſing any private dominion and property in Adam over all the world, excluſive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but ſuppoſing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we ſee labour could make men diſtinct titles to ſeveral parcels of it, for their privates uſes; wherein there could be no doubt, no room for quarrel.

40. Nor is it ſo ſtrange, as perhaps before conſideration it may appear, that the property of labour ſhould be able to over-balance the community of land. For it is labour, indeed, that puts the difference of value on every thing; and let any one conſider what the difference is between an acre of land, planted with tobacco, or ſugar, ſown with wheat or barley; and an acre of the ſame land lying in common, without any hubandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modeſt computation to ſay, that of the products of the earth, uſeful to the life of man, $\frac{9}{10}$ are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly eſtimate things, as they come to our uſe, and caſt up the ſeveral expences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we ſhall find that in moſt of them $\frac{99}{100}$ are wholly to be put on the account of labour.

41. There cannot be a clearer demonſtration of any thing, than ſeveral nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life, whom nature having furniſhed as liberally, as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i. e. a fruitful ſoil, apt to produce in abundance, what might ſerve for food, raiment and delight; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worſe than a day-labourer in England.

42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace ſome of the ordinary proviſions of life, through their ſeveral progreſſes, before they come to our uſe, and ſee how much they receive of their value from human induſtry. Bread, wine and cloth are things of daily uſe and great plenty; yet notwithſtanding, acorns, water, and leaves or ſkins, muſt be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furniſh us with theſe more uſeful commodities. For whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or ſilk, than leaves,

ſkins or moſs, that is wholly owing to labour and induſtry. The one of theſe being the food and raiment, which unaſſiſted nature furniſhes us with; the other proviſions, which our induſtry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then ſee, how much labour makes the far greateſt part of the value of things we enjoy, in this world: And the ground, that produces the materials, is ſcarce to be reckoned in as any, or at moſt but a very ſmall part of it; ſo little that even amongſt us, land, that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of paſturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waſte; and we ſhall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

This ſhews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeneſs of dominions; and that the increaſe of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government, and that prince, who ſhall be ſo wiſe and godlike, as, by eſtabliſhed laws of liberty, to ſecure protection and encouragement to the honeſt induſtry of mankind, againſt the oppreſſion of power, and narrowneſs of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by.

To return to the argument in hand.

43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty buſhels of wheat, and another in America, which with the ſame huſbandry would do the like, are, without doubt, of the ſame natural, intrinſick value: but yet, the benefit mankind receives from the one, in a year, is worth 5 l. and from the other poſſibly not worth a penny, if all the profit, an Indian received from it, were to be valued and ſold here; at leaſt I may truly ſay, not $\frac{1}{1000}$. It is labour then, which puts the greateſt part of the value upon land, without which it would ſcarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greateſt part of all its uſeful products; for all that the ſtraw, bran, bread of that acre of wheat is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waſte, is all the effect of labour. For it is not barely the ploughman's pains, the reapers and threſher's toil, and the baker's ſweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of thoſe, who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and ſtones, who felled and framed the timber, employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utenſils, which are a vaſt number, requiſite to this corn, from its being ſeed to be ſown, to its being made bread, muſt all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furniſhed only the almoſt worthleſs materials, as in themſelves. It would be a ſtrange "catalogue of things, "that induſtry provided and made uſe of, about every loaf of bread," before it came to our uſe, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, ſtone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, maſts, ropes, and all the materials made uſe of in the ſhip, that brought any of the commodities, made uſe of, by any of the workmen, to any part of the work, all which would be almoſt impoſſible, at leaſt too long to reckon up.

44. From all which it is evident, that, though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being maſter of himſelf, and "proprietor of his own "perſon, and the actions, or labour of it, had ſtill in himſelf the great foun"dation of property;" and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the ſupport, or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

45. Thus labour, in the beginning gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleaſed to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes uſe of. Men at firſt, for the moſt part, contented themſelves with what unaſſiſted nature offered to their neceſſities: and though afterwards, in ſome parts of the world, (where the increaſe of people and ſtock, with the uſe of money, had made land ſcarce, and ſo of ſome value) the ſeveral communities ſettled the bounds of their diſtinct territories; and, by laws within themſelves, regulated the properties of the private men of their ſociety; and ſo, by compact and agreement, ſettled the property, which labour and induſtry began; and the leagues, that have been made between ſeveral ſtates and kingdoms, either expreſly, or

tacitly diſowning all claim and right to the land, in the other's poſſeſſion, have, by common conſent, given up their pretences to their natural, common right, which originally they had to thoſe countries, and ſo have, by poſitive agreement, ſettled a property amongſt themſelves, in diſtinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are ſtill great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof, not having joined with the reſt of mankind, in the conſent of the uſe of their common money) lie waſte, and are more than the people, who dwell on it, do, or can make uſe of, and ſo ſtill lie in common. Though this can ſcarce happen, amongſt that part of mankind, that have conſented to the uſe of money.

46. The greateſt part of things really uſeful to the life of man, and ſuch as the neceſſity of ſubſiſting made the firſt commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of ſhort duration; ſuch as, if they are not conſumed by uſe, will decay and periſh of themſelves: gold, ſilver and diamonds, are things that fancy, or agreement, hath put the value on, more than real uſe, and the neceſſary ſupport of life. Now of thoſe good things, which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been ſaid) to as much as he could uſe, and property in all he could effect with his labour; all that his induſtry could extend to, to alter from the ſtate nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred buſhels of acorns, or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods, as ſoon as gathered. He was only to look, that he uſed them, before they ſpoiled, elſe he took more than his ſhare, and robbed others. And, indeed, it was a fooliſh thing, as well as diſhoneſt, to hoard up more than he could make uſe of. If he gave away a part to any body elſe, ſo that it periſhed not uſeleſly in his poſſeſſion, theſe he alſo made uſe of. And if he alſo bartered away plumbs, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts, that would laſt good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he waſted not the common ſtock; he deſtroyed no part of the portion of goods, that belonged to others, ſo long as nothing periſhed uſeleſly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleaſed with its colour; or exchange his ſheep for ſhells, or wool for a ſparkling pebble, or a diamond, and keep thoſe by him, all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of theſe durable things as he pleaſed; the exceeding of the bounds of his juſt property not lying in the largeneſs of his poſſeſſion, but the periſhing of any thing uſeleſly in it.

47. And thus came in the uſe of money, ſome laſting thing, that men might keep without ſpoiling, and that by mutual conſent men would take, in exchange for the truly uſeful, but periſhable ſupports of life.

48. And as different degrees of induſtry were apt to give men poſſeſſions, in different proportions, ſo this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them. For ſuppoſing an iſland, ſeparate from all poſſible commerce with the reſt of the world, wherein there were but an hundred families, but there were ſheep, horſes and cows, with other uſeful animals, wholſome fruits, and land enough for corn, for an hundred thouſand times as many, but nothing in the iſland, either becauſe of its commonneſs, or periſhableneſs, fit to ſupply the place of money: what reaſon could any one have, there, to enlarge his poſſeſſions, beyond the uſe of his family, and a plentiful ſupply to its conſumption, either in what their own induſtry produced, or they could barter, for like, periſhable, uſeful commodities, with others? Where there is not ſomething both laſting and ſcarce, and ſo valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their poſſeſſions of land, were it never ſo rich, never ſo free for them to take. For I aſk, "What would a man value "ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand acres of excellent land ready cultivated, "and well ſtock'd too with cattle, in the midſt of the inland parts of Ame-"rica, where he had no hopes of commerce, with other parts of the world, "to draw money to him, by the ſale of the product?" It would not be worth the incloſing, and we ſhould ſee him give up again, to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would ſupply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family.

49. Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America, and more ſo than that is now; for no ſuch thing as money was any where known. Find out ſome thing that hath the uſe and value of money amongſt his neighbours, you ſhall ſee the ſame man will begin preſently to enlarge his poſſeſſions.

50. But ſince gold and ſilver being little uſeful to the life of man, in proportion to food, raiment and carriage, has its value only from the conſent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the meaſure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a diſproportionate and unequal poſſeſſion of the earth; they having, by a tacit and voluntary conſent, found out a way, how a man may fairly poſſeſs more land, than he himſelf can uſe the product of, by receiving, in exchange for the overplus, gold and ſilver, which may be hoarded up, without injury to any one; theſe metals not ſpoiling, or decaying in the hands of the poſſeſſor. This partage of things in an equality of private poſſeſſions, men have made practicable, out of the bonds of ſociety, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and ſilver, and tacitly agreeing in the uſe of money. For, in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the poſſeſſion of land is determined by poſitive conſtitutions.

51. And thus, I think, it is very eaſy to conceive, without any difficulty, "how labour could at firſt begin a title of property," in the common things of nature, and how the ſpending it upon our uſes, bound it. So that there could, then, be no reaſon of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeneſs of poſſeſſion it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all, he could employ his labour upon, ſo he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make uſe of. This left no room for controverſy, about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to himſelf was eaſily ſeen, and it was uſeleſs, as well as diſhoneſt, to carve himſelf too much, or take more than he needed.

CHAP. VI.

Of paternal power.

52. It may perhaps be cenſured, as an impertinent criticiſm, in a diſcourſe of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have obtained in the world: and yet, poſſibly it may not be amiſs to offer new ones, when the old are apt to lead men into miſtakes; as this of paternal power, probably has done, which ſeems ſo to place the power of parents over their children, wholly in the father, as if the mother had no ſhare in it; whereas if we conſult reaſon or revelation, we ſhall find ſhe hath an equal title. This may give one reaſon to aſk, "Whether this might not be more properly called parental power? For whatever obligation, nature, and the right of generation lays on children, it muſt certainly bind them equal to both concurrent cauſes of it. And accordingly we ſee the poſitive law of God, every where, joins them together, without diſtinction, when it commands the obedience of children. "Honour "thy father and thy mother," Exod. xx. 12. Whoſoever curſeth his father, or "his mother," Lev. xx. 9. "Ye ſhall fear every man his mother and his fa-"ther," Lev. xix. 3. Children obey your parents." &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the ſtile of the old and new teſtament.

53. Had but this one thing been well conſidered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into thoſe groſs miſtakes, they have made about this power of parents; which however it might, without any great harſhneſs, bear the name of abſolute dominion and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power, it ſeemed appropriated to the father, would yet have ſounded but oddly, and in the very name, ſhewn the abſurdity, if this ſuppoſed abſolute power over children had been called parental, and thereby have diſcovered that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill ſerve the turn of thoſe men, who contend ſo much for the abſolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother

ſhould have any ſhare in it. And it would have but ill ſupported the monarchy, they contended for, when, by the very name, it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a ſingle perſon only, was not placed in one, but two perſons jointly. But to let this of names paſs.

54. Though I have ſaid above, chap. 2. "That all men by nature are equal," I cannot be ſuppoſed to underſtand all ſorts of equality: age, or virtue, may give men a juſt precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may ſubject ſome, and alliance, or benefits, others, to pay an obedience to thoſe, to whom nature, gratitude, or other reſpects may have made it due; and yet all this conſiſts with the equality which all men are in, in reſpect of juriſdiction, or dominion, one over another, which was the equality I here ſpoke of, as proper to the buſineſs in hand, being that equal right that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being ſubjected to the will, or authority of any other man.

55. Children, I confeſs, are not born in this full ſtate of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a ſort of rule and juriſdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for ſome time after, but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this ſubjection are like the ſwaddling-cloaths, they are wrapt up in, and ſupported by, in the weakneſs of their infancy: age and reaſon, as they grow up, looſen them, 'till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free diſpoſal.

56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full poſſeſſion of their ſtrength and reaſon, and ſo was capable, from the firſt inſtant of his being, to provide for his own ſupport and preſervation, and govern his actions, according to the dictates of the law of reaſon, which God had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his deſcendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpleſs, without knowledge, or underſtanding: but to ſupply the defects of this imperfect ſtate, till the improvement of growth and age had removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of nature, "under an obligation to preſerve, nouriſh, and educate the children," they had begotten, not as their own workmanſhip, but the workmanſhip of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.

57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the ſame, that was to govern all his poſterity, the law of reaſon. But, his off-ſpring having another way of entrance of the world, different from him by a natural birth, that produced them ignorant and without the uſe of reaſon, they were not preſently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated, or made known, by reaſon only, he that is not come to the uſe of his reaſon, cannot be ſaid to be under this law; and Adam's children being not preſently, as ſoon as born, under this law of reaſon, were not preſently free. For law, in its true notion, is not ſo much the limitation, as the direction, of a free and intelligent agent, to his proper intereſt, and preſcribes no farther than for the general good of thoſe under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an uſeleſs thing, would of itſelf vaniſh; and that ill deſerves the name of confinement, which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be miſtaken, the end of law is not to aboliſh or reſtrain, but to preſerve and enlarge freedom. For in all the ſtates of created beings capable of laws, "where there is no law, there is no freedom." For liberty is to be free from reſtraint and violence from others, which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, "liberty for every man to do what he liſts:" (for who could be free, when every other man's humour might domineer over him?") but a liberty to diſpoſe and order, as he liſts, his perſon, actions, poſſeſſions, and his whole property, within the allowance of thoſe laws, under which he is, and therein not to be ſubject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.

58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, ariſes from that duty, which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-ſpring, during the imperfect ſtate of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of

their yet ignorant nonage, 'till reaſon ſhall take its place, and eaſe them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to. For God, having given man an underſtanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilſt he is in an eſtate, wherein he has not underſtanding of his own, to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to follow: he that underſtands for him, muſt will for him too; he muſt preſcribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but, when he comes to the eſtate, that made his father a freeman, the ſon is a freeman too.

59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? What gave him a free diſpoſing of his property, according to his own will, within the compaſs of that law? I anſwer, a ſtate of maturity, wherein he might be ſuppoſed capable to know that law, that ſo he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that ſtate, he is preſumed to know, how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make uſe of his freedom, and ſo comes to have it; 'till then, ſomebody elſe muſt guide him, who is preſumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If ſuch a ſtate of reaſon, ſuch an age of diſcretion made him free, the ſame ſhall make his ſon free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to diſpoſe of his actions and poſſeſſions according to his own will, within the permiſſion of that law? A capacity of knowing that law. Which is ſuppoſed by that law, at the age of one and twenty years, and, in ſome caſes, ſooner. If this made the father free, it ſhall make the ſon free too. Till then, we ſee the law allows the ſon to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father, or guardian, who is to underſtand for him. And if the father die, and fail to ſubſtitute a deputy in his truſt, if he hath not provided a tutor to govern his ſon, during his minority, during his want of underſtanding, the law takes care to do it, ſome other muſt govern him, and be a will to him, 'till he hath attained to a ſtate of freedom, and his underſtanding be fit to take the government of his will. But, after that, the father and ſon are equally free, as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally ſubjects of the ſame law together, without any dominion left, in the father, over the life, liberty, or eſtate of his ſon, whether they be only in the ſtate and under the law of nature, or under the poſitive laws of an eſtabliſhed government.

60. But if, through defects, that may happen, out of the ordinary courſe of nature, any one comes not to ſuch a degree of reaſon, wherein he might be ſuppoſed capable of knowing the law, and ſo living within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a freeman, he is never let looſe to the diſpoſure of his own will, (becauſe he knows no bounds to it, has not underſtanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own underſtanding is uncapable of that charge. And ſo lunaticks and ideots are never ſet free from the government of their parents; "Children, who are not "as yet come unto thoſe years, whereat they may have; and innocents, which "are excluded by a natural defect, from ever having; Thirdly, Mad-men, "which, for the preſent, cannot poſſibly have the uſe of right reaſon to guide "themſelves, have, for their guide, the reaſon that guideth other men, which "are tutors over them, to ſeek and procure their good for them," ſays Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. 1, ſect. 7. All which ſeems no more than that duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preſerve their off-ſpring, 'till they can be able to ſhift for themſelves, and will ſcarce amount to an inſtance, or proof, of parents regal authority.

61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exerciſe of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we ſee, how natural freedom and ſubjection to parents may conſiſt together, and are both founded on the ſame principle. A child is free, by his father's title, by his father's underſtanding, which is to govern him, 'till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of diſcretion, and the ſubjection of a child to his parents, whilſt yet ſhort of that age, are ſo conſiſtent, and ſo

diſtinguiſhable, that the moſt blinded contenders for monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miſs this difference; the moſt obſtinate cannot but allow their conſiſtency. For were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and, by that title, ſettled a monarch in his throne, inveſted with all the abſolute, unlimited power Sir R. F. talks of; if he ſhould die, as ſoon as his heir were born, muſt not the child, notwithſtanding he were never ſo free, never ſo much ſovereign, be in ſubjection to his mother and nurſe, to tutors and governors, 'till age and education brought him reaſon and ability to govern himſelf, and others? The neceſſities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this reſtraint and ſubjection were inconſiſtent with, or ſpoiled him of that liberty, or ſovereignty, he had a right to, or gave away his empire to thoſe, who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and ſooner for it. If any body ſhould aſk me, When my ſon is of age to be free? I ſhall anſwer, Juſt when his monarch is of age to govern. "But at what time," ſays the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect, 6. "a man may be ſaid to have "attained ſo far forth the uſe of reaſon, as ſufficeth to make him capable of "thoſe laws, whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great "deal more eaſy for ſenſe to diſcern, than for any one by ſkill and learning to "determine."

62. Commonwealths themſelves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time, when men are to begin to act like freemen; and, therefore, 'till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other publick owning of, or ſubmiſſion to the government of their countries.

63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reaſon, which is able to inſtruct him in that law, he is to govern himſelf by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him looſe to an unreſtrained liberty, before he has reaſon to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thruſt him out amongſt brutes, and abandon him to a ſtate as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as theirs. This is that, which puts the authority into the parents hands, to govern the minority of their children. God hath made it their buſineſs to employ this care on their off-ſpring, and hath placed in them ſuitable inclinations of tenderneſs and concern, to temper this power, to apply it, as his wiſdom deſigned it, to the children's good, as long as they ſhould need to be under it.

64, But what reaſon can hence advance this care of the parents, due to their off-ſpring, into an abſolute, arbitrary dominion of the father, whoſe power reaches no farther, than by ſuch a diſcipline, as he finds moſt effectual, to give ſuch ſtrength and health to their bodies, ſuch vigor and rectitude to their minds, as may beſt fit his children to be moſt uſeful to themſelves and others; and, if it be neceſſary to his condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own ſubſiſtence. But in this power the mother too has her ſhare with the father.

65. Nay, this power ſo little belongs to the father, by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loſes his power over them, which goes along with their nouriſhment and education, to which it is inſeparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foſter-father of an expoſed child, as the natural father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his iſſue, if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath, to the name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power, in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one huſband at a time; or, in thoſe parts of America, where, when the huſband and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and proviſion? If the father die, whilſt the children are young, do they not naturally every-where owe the ſame obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? And will any one ſay, that

the mother hath a legiſlative power over her children? That ſhe can make ſtanding rules, which ſhall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty, all the courſe of their lives? Or can ſhe enforce the obſervation of them with capital puniſhments? For this is the proper power of the magiſtrate, of which the father hath not ſo much as the ſhadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life, or property: It is but an help to the weakneſs and imperfection of their nonage, a diſcipline neceſſary to their education: and though a father may diſpoſe of his own poſſeſſions, as he pleaſes, when his children are out of danger of periſhing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives, or goods, which either their own induſtry, or another's bounty has made theirs; nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchiſement of the years of diſcretion. The father's empire then ceaſes, and he can from thenceforwards no more diſpoſe of the liberty of his ſon, than that of any other man: and it muſt be far from an abſolute, or perpetual juriſdiction, from which a man may withdraw himſelf, having licenſe from divine authority to "leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife."

66. But though there be a time, when a child comes to be as free from ſubjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himſelf is free from ſubjection to the will of any body elſe, and they are each under no other reſtraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their country: yet this freedom exempts not a ſon from that honour, which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made the parents inſtruments in his great deſign, of continuing the race of mankind, and the occaſions of life to their children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nouriſh, preſerve, and bring up their offſpring; ſo he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward eſteem and reverence to be ſhewn by all outward expreſſions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront, diſturb or endanger the happineſs, or life, of thoſe, from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, aſſiſtance and comfort of thoſe, by whoſe means he entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life. From this obligation no ſtate, no freedom can abſolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority to make laws, and diſpoſe, as they pleaſe, of their lives, or liberties. 'Tis one thing to owe honour and reſpect, gratitude and aſſiſtance; another, to require an abſolute obedience and ſubmiſſion. The honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this leſſens not his authority, nor ſubjects him to her government.

67. The ſubjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour due from a child places in the parents a perpetual right to reſpect, reverence, ſupport, and compliance too, more or leſs, as the father's care, coſt, and kindneſs in his education has been more or leſs. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life. The want of diſtinguiſhing theſe two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have cauſed a great part of the miſtakes about this matter. For, to ſpeak properly of them, the firſt of theſe is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nouriſhment and education of their children is a charge ſo incumbent on parents for their children's good, that nothing can abſolve them from taking care of it. And though the power of commanding and chaſtiſing them go along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature, ſuch a tenderneſs for their offspring, that there is little fear, that parents ſhould uſe their power with too much rigour. The exceſs is ſeldom on the ſevere ſide, the ſtrong byaſs of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty, when he would expreſs his gentle dealing with the Iſraelites, he tells them, that though he chaſtened them, "he chaſtened them as a man chaſtens his ſon," Deut. viii. 5. i. e. with tenderneſs and affection, and kept them under no ſeverer

diſcipline, than what was abſolutely beſt for them, and had been leſs kindneſs to have ſlackened. This is that power, to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be increaſed, or ill rewarded.

68. On the other ſide, honour and ſupport, all that which gratitude requires, to return for the benefits, received by and from them, is the indiſpenſible duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the parent's advantage, as the other is for the child's; though education, the parent's duty, ſeem to have moſt power, becauſe the ignorance and infirmities of childhood ſtand in need of reſtraint and correction, which is a viſible exerciſe of rule and a kind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in the word, honour, requires leſs obedience, though the obligation be ſtronger on grown, than younger children. For who can think the command, "Children obey "parents," requires in a man, that has children of his own, the ſame ſubmiſſion to his father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that, by this precept, he were bound to obey all his father's commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he ſhould have the indiſcretion to treat him ſtill as a boy?

69. The firſt part then, of paternal power, or rather duty, which is education, belongs ſo to the father, that it terminates at a certain ſeaſon; when the buſineſs of education is over, it ceaſes of itſelf, and is alſo alienable before. For a man may put the tuition of his ſon in other hands; and he that has made his ſon an apprentice to another, has diſcharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience, both to himſelf and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains nevertheleſs entire to them, nothing can cancel that: it is ſo inſeparable from them both, that the father's authority cannot diſpoſſeſs the mother of her right, nor can any man diſcharge his ſon from honouring her, that bore him. But both theſe are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may reach eſtate, liberty, limbs, and life. The power of commanding ends with nonage; and though after that, honour and reſpect, ſupport and defence, and whatſoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the higheſt benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due, from a ſon to his parents; yet all this puts no ſcepter into the father's hand, no ſovereign power of commanding. He has no dominion over his ſon's property, or actions, nor any right, that his will ſhould preſcribe to his ſon's, in all things; however it may become his ſon in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it.

70. A man may owe honour and reſpect to an ancient, or wiſe man, defence to his child, or friend, relief and ſupport to the diſtreſſed, and gratitude to a benefactor, to ſuch a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannot ſufficiently pay it: but all theſe give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws over him, from whom they are owing. And, 'tis plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father, not only becauſe, as has been ſaid, it is owing to the mother too; but becauſe theſe obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied, by the different care and kindneſs, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child, more than another.

71. This ſhews the reaſon, how it comes to paſs, that parents in ſocieties, where they themſelves are ſubjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their ſubjection, as thoſe, who are in the ſtate of nature. Which could not poſſibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and that, in truth, they were one and the ſame thing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the ſubject could naturally have none of it. But theſe two powers, political and paternal, are ſo perfectly diſtinct and ſeparate, are built upon ſo different foundations, and given to ſo different ends, that every ſubject, that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meaneſt of his ſubjects do to theirs; and can therefore contain not any part, or degree, of that kind of dominion, which a prince, or magiſtrate, has over his ſubject.

72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and ſubmiſſion on the other, which are proper to this relation; yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children; which though it be common to him with other men, yet the occaſions of ſhewing it almoſt conſtantly happening to fathers, in their private families, and the inſtances of it elſewhere being rare, and leſs taken notice of, it paſſes in the world for a part of paternal juriſdiction. And this is the power men generally have to beſtow their eſtates on thoſe, who pleaſe them beſt. The poſſeſſion of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the law and cuſtom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father's power to beſtow it, with a more ſparing, or liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this, or that, child hath ported with his will and humour.

73. This is no ſmall tie on the obedience of children; and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a ſubmiſſion to the government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly ſuppoſed, That a father could oblige his poſterity to that government, of which he himſelf was a ſubject, and that his compact held them; whereas it being only a neceſſary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an eſtate, which is under that government, reaches only thoſe, who will take it on that condition, and ſo is no natural tie, or engagement, but a voluntary ſubmiſſion. For every man's children being, by nature, as free as himſelf, or any of his anceſtors ever were, may, whilſt they are in that freedom, chuſe what ſociety they will join themſelves to, what commonwealth they will put themſelves under. But, if they will enjoy the inheritance of their anceſtors, they muſt take it on the ſame terms their anceſtors had it, and ſubmit to all the conditions annexed to ſuch a poſſeſſion. By this power indeed, fathers oblige their children to obedience to themſelves, even when they are paſt minority, and moſt commonly to ſubject them to this, or that political power: but neither of theſe, by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands, to enforce and recompence ſuch a compliance; and is no more power than what a Frenchman has over an Engliſhman, who by the hopes of an eſtate he will leave him, will certainly have a ſtrong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he muſt certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the poſſeſſion of land, in that country where it lies, whether in France, or England.

74. To conclude then, tho' the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the diſcipline and government of that age; and tho' that honour and reſpect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indiſpenſibly owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all eſtates, with all that ſupport and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, i. e. making laws, and enacting penalties on his children; tho', by all this, he has no dominion over the property, or actions, of his ſon: yet it is obvious to conceive how eaſy it was, in the firſt ages of the world, and in places ſtill, where the thinneſs of people gives families leave to ſeparate into unpoſſeſſed quarters, and they have room to remove, or plant, themſelves in yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of * it, he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children; and ſince without ſome government, it would be hard for them to

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* It is no improbable opinion, therefore, which the arch-philoſopher was of, “ That the chief
“ perſon in every houſhold was always, as it were, a king: ſo when numbers of houſholds joined
“ themſelves in civil ſocieties together, kings were the firſt kind of governors amongſt them; which
“ is alſo as it ſeemeth, the reaſon why the name of fathers continued ſtill in them, who of fa-
“ thers, were made rulers; as alſo the ancient cuſtom of governors to do as Melchizedec, and be-
“ ing kings to exerciſe the office of prieſts, which fathers did at the firſt, grew perhaps by the ſame
“ occaſion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment, that has been received in the world. The
“ inconveniencies of one kind have cauſed ſundry others to be deviſed; ſo that in a word, all pub-
“ lick regiment, of what kind ſoever, ſeemeth evidently to have riſen from the deliberate advice,
“ conſultation and compoſition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no
“ impoſſibility in nature, conſidered by itſelf, but that man might have lived without any publick
“ regiment.” Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. 1. Sect. 10.

live together, it was likelieſt it ſhould, by the expreſs or tacit conſent of the children, when they were grown up, be in the father, where it ſeem'd, without any change, barely to continue; when indeed, nothing more was required to it, than the permitting the father to exerciſe alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of nature, which every freeman naturally hath, and, by that permiſſion, reſigning up to him a monarchical power, whilſt they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but only by the conſent of his children, is evident from hence, that nobody doubts but if a ſtranger, whom chance or buſineſs, had brought to his family, had there killed any of his children or committed any other fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or otherwiſe have puniſhed him, as well as any of his children; which it was impoſſible he ſhould do, by virtue of any paternal authority over one, who was not his child, but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right to: and he alone could puniſh him in his family, where the reſpect of his children had laid by the exerciſe of ſuch a power, to give way to the dignity and authority, they were willing ſhould remain in him, above the reſt of his family.

75. Thus 'twas eaſy, and almoſt natural for children, by a tacit and ſcarce avoidable conſent, to make way for the father's authority and government. They had been accuſtomed, in their childhood, to follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him; and when they were men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and leſs covetouſneſs, ſeldom afforded greater controverſies; and when they ſhould ariſe, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whoſe care they had every one been ſuſtained and brought up, and who had a tenderneſs for them all? 'Tis no wonder that they made no diſtinction betwixt minority and full age, nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age, that might make them the free diſpoſers of themſelves and fortunes, when they could have no deſire to be out of their pupilage, the government they had been under, during it, continued ſtill to be more their protection than reſtraint; and they could no where find a greater ſecurity to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father.

76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an inſenſible change, became the politick monarchs of them too; and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs for ſeveral ſucceſſions, or otherwiſe, ſo they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under ſeveral conſtitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occaſions happen'd to mould them. But if princes have their title in their father's right, and it be a ſufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, becauſe they commonly were thoſe, in whoſe hands we find, de facto, the exerciſe of government: I ſay, if this argument be good, it will as ſtrongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be prieſts, ſince it is as certain, that in the beginning "the father of the family was prieſt, as that he was ruler in his own "houſhold."

CHAP. VII.

Of political or civil ſociety.

77. GOD having made man ſuch a creature, that in his own judgment it wa not good for him to be alone, put him under ſtrong obligations of neceſſity, convenience and inclination, to drive him into ſociety, as well as fitted him with underſtanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The firſt ſociety was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which in time, that between maſter and ſervant came to be added: and tho' all theſe might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the maſter, or miſtreſs, of it had ſome ſort of rule, proper to a family; each of theſe, or all together, came ſhort of political ſociety,

as we ſhall ſee, if we conſider the different ends, ties and bounds of each of theſe.

78. Conjugal ſociety is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho' it conſiſt chiefly in ſuch a communion and right in one another's bodies, as is neceſſary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual ſupport and aſſiſtance, and a communion of intereſts too, as neceſſary, not only to unite their care and affection, but alſo neceſſary to their common offspring, who have a right to be nouriſhed and maintain'd by them, 'till they are able to provide for themſelves.

79. For the end of conjunction between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the ſpecies; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to laſt, even after procreation, ſo long as is neceſſary to the nouriſhment and ſupport of the young ones, who are to be ſuſtained by thoſe that got them, 'till they be able to ſhift and provide for themſelves. This rule, which the infinitely wiſe maker hath ſet to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures ſteadily obey. In thoſe viviparous animals, which feed on graſs, the conjunction between male and female laſts no longer than the very act of copulation; becauſe the teat of the dam being ſufficient to nouriſh the young, until he be able to feed on graſs, the male only begets, but concerns not himſelf for the female, or young, to whoſe ſuſtenance he can contribute nothing. But, in beaſts of prey, the conjunction laſts longer; becauſe the dam not being able well to ſubſiſt herſelf, and nouriſh her numerous offspring, by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on graſs, the aſſiſtance of the male is neceſſary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot ſubſiſt, 'till they are able to prey for themſelves, but by the joint care of male and female. The ſame is to be obſerved in all birds (except ſome domeſtick ones, where plenty of food excuſes the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whoſe young needing food in the neſt, the cock and hen continue mates, 'till the young are able to uſe their wings, and provide for themſelves.

80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reaſon, "why the "male and female, in mankind, are tied to a longer conjunction" than other creatures, viz. Becauſe the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for ſupport on his parent's help, and able to ſhift for himſelf, and has all the aſſiſtance is due to him from his parents; whereby the father, who is bound to take care of thoſe he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal ſociety with the ſame woman, longer than other creatures, whoſe young being able to ſubſiſt of themſelves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond diſſolves of itſelf, and they are at liberty, 'till Hymen, at his uſual, anniverſary ſeaſon, ſummons them again to chuſe new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wiſdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foreſight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to ſupply the preſent neceſſity, hath made it neceſſary, that ſociety of man and wife ſhould be more laſting, than of male and female amongſt other creatures; that ſo their induſtry might be encouraged, and their intereſt better united, to make proviſion and lay up goods for their common iſſue, which uncertain mixture, or eaſy and frequent ſolutions of conjugal ſociety would mightily diſturb.

81. But though theſe are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and laſting in man, than the other ſpecies of animals; yet it would give one reaſon to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are ſecured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by conſent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no neceſſity, in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it ſhould always be for life; I mean, to ſuch as are under no reſtraint of any poſitive law, which ordains all ſuch compacts to be perpetual.

82. But the huſband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different underſtandings, will unavoidably ſometimes have different wills too; it therefore being neceſſary that the laſt determination, i. e. the rule, ſhould be placed ſomewhere, it naturally falls to the man's ſhare, as the abler and the ſtronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common intereſt and property, leaves the wife in the full and free poſſeſſion of what, by contract, is her peculiar right, and gives the huſband no more power over her life, than ſhe has over his. The power of the huſband being ſo far from that of an abſolute monarch, that the wife has in many caſes, a liberty to ſeparate from him, where natural right, or their contract, allows it, whether that contract be made by themſelves, in the ſtate of nature, or by the cuſtoms, or laws, of the country they live in; and the children upon ſuch ſeparation fall to the father, or mother's lot, as ſuch contract does determine.

83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politick government, as well as in the ſtate of nature, the civil magiſtrate doth not abridge the right, or power, of either, naturally neceſſary to thoſe ends, viz. procreation and mutual ſupport and aſſiſtance, whilſt they are together; but only decides any controverſy, that may ariſe between man and wife about them. If it were otherwiſe, and that abſolute ſovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the huſband, and were neceſſary to the ſociety between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of thoſe countries, where the huſband is allowed no ſuch abſolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no ſuch power in the huſband, the condition of conjugal ſociety puts it not in him, it being not at all neceſſary to that ſtate. Conjugal ſociety could ſubſiſt and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual aſſiſtance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal ſociety, might be varied and regulated by that contract, which unites man and wife in that ſociety, as far as may conſiſt with procreation, and the bringing up of children 'till they could ſhift for themſelves; nothing being neceſſary to any ſociety, that is not neceſſary to the ends for which it is made.

84. The ſociety betwixt parents and children, and the diſtinct rights and powers belonging reſpectively to them, I have treated of ſo largely in the foregoing chapter, that I ſhall not here need to ſay any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politick ſociety.

85. Master and ſervant are names as old as hiſtory, but given to thoſe of far different condition; for a freeman makes himſelf a ſervant to another, by ſelling him, for a certain time, the ſervice he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his maſter, and under the ordinary diſcipline thereof; yet it gives the maſter but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between 'em. But there is another ſort of ſervants, which by a peculiar name we call ſlaves, who being captives, taken in a juſt war, are, by the right of nature, ſubjected to the abſolute dominion and arbitrary power of their maſters. The men having, as I ſay, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and loſt their eſtates, and being in the ſtate of ſlavery, not capable of any property, cannot, in that ſtate, be conſidered as any part of civil ſociety; the chief end whereof is the preſervation of property.

86. Let us, therefore, conſider a maſter of a family, with all theſe ſubordinate relations of wife, children, ſervants and ſlaves, united under the domeſtick rule of a family; which, what reſemblance ſoever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet it is very far from it, both in its conſtitution, power and end: or, if it muſt be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the abſolute monarch in it, abſolute monarchy will have but a very ſhatter'd and ſhort power, when 'tis plain, by what has been ſaid before, that the maſter of the family has a very diſtinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over thoſe ſeveral perſons that are in it; for excepting the ſlave, (the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any ſlaves in his family, or no) he has no legiſlative power of life and death over any of them, and none too, but what a miſtreſs of a family

may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no abſolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one, over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other ſociety of men, differ from that which is properly political ſociety, we ſhall beſt ſee, by conſidering wherein political ſociety itſelf conſiſts.

87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men, in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preſerve his property, that is, his life, liberty and eſtate, againſt the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and puniſh the breaches of that law in others, as he is perſuaded the offence deſerves, even with death itſelf, in crimes where the heinouſneſs of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But becauſe no political ſociety can be, nor ſubſiſt, without having in itſelf the power to preſerve the property, and in order thereunto, puniſh the offences of all thoſe of that ſociety; there, and there only is political ſociety, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, reſigned it up into the hands of the community, in all caſes, that exclude him not from appealing, for protection, to the law eſtabliſhed by it. And thus, all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by ſettled, ſtanding rules, indifferent, and the ſame to all parties: and by men, having authority from the community for the execution of thoſe rules, decides all the differences, that may happen, between any members of that ſociety, concerning any matter of right; and puniſhes thoſe offences, which any member hath committed againſt the ſociety, with ſuch penalties as the law has eſtabliſhed; whereby it is eaſy to diſcern who are, and who are not, in political ſociety together. Thoſe, who are united into one body, and have a common eſtabliſhed law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controverſies between them, and puniſh offenders, are in civil ſociety one with another: but thoſe, who have no ſuch common appeal, I mean on earth, are ſtill in the ſtate of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himſelf, and executioner; which is, as I have before ſhewed it, the perfect ſtate of nature.

88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to ſet down what puniſhment ſhall belong to the ſeveral tranſgreſſions, which they think worthy of it, committed amongſt the members of that ſociety, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to puniſh the injury, done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preſervation of the property of all the members of that ſociety, as far as is poſſible. But though every man, who has entered into civil ſociety, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to puniſh offences againſt the law of nature, in proſecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legiſlative in all caſes, where he can appeal to the magiſtrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he ſhall be called to it; which, indeed, are his own judgments, they being made by himſelf, or his repreſentative. And herein we have the original of the legiſlative and executive power of civil ſociety, which is to judge, by ſtanding laws, how far offences are to be puniſhed, when committed within the commonwealth; and alſo to determine, by occaſional judgments, founded on the preſent circumſtances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both theſe to employ all the force of all the members, when there ſhall be need.

89. Where-ever, therefore, any number of men are ſo united into one ſociety, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to reſign it to the publick, there, and there only is a political, or civil ſociety. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the ſtate of nature, enter into ſociety to make one people, one body politick, under one ſupreme government; or elſe when any one joins himſelf to, and incorporates with any government already made. For hereby he authoriſes the ſociety, or, which is all one, the

legiſlative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the ſociety ſhall require; to the execution whereof, his own aſſiſtance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a ſtate of nature, into that of a commonwealth, by ſetting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controverſies, and redreſs the injuries, that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legiſlative, or magiſtrates, appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, howevever aſſociated, that have no ſuch deciſive power to appeal to, there they are ſtill in the ſtate of nature.

90. Hence it is evident, that abſolute monarchy, which, by ſome men, is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconſiſtent with civil ſociety, and ſo can be no form of civil government at all. For the end of civil ſociety, being to avoid and remedy thoſe inconveniencies of the ſtate of nature, which neceſſarily follow from every man's being a judge in his own caſe, by ſetting up a known authority, to which every one of that ſociety may appeal, upon any injury received, or controverſy that may ariſe, and which every one of the † ſociety ought to obey; where-ever any perſons are, who have not ſuch an authority to appeal to, for the deciſion of any difference between them, there thoſe perſons are ſtill in the ſtate of nature. And ſo is every abſolute prince, in reſpect of thoſe, who are under his dominion.

91. For, he being ſuppoſed to have all, both legiſlative and executive power in himſelf alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whoſe deciſion relief and redreſs may be expected, of any injury, or inconveniency, that may be ſuffered from the prince, or by his order: ſo that ſuch a man, however entitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you pleaſe, is as much in the ſtate of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the reſt of mankind. For where-ever any two men are, who have no ſtanding rule, and common judge, to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controverſies of right betwixt them, there they are ſtill in the ſtate of * nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woeful difference to the ſubject, or rather ſlave of an abſolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary ſtate of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the beſt of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as thoſe in ſociety ought to have; but, as if he were degraded from the common ſtate of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right: and ſo is expoſed to all the miſery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who, being in the unreſtrained ſtate of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power,

92. For he that thinks abſolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baſeneſs of human nature, need read but the hiſtory of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been inſolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not, probably, be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion ſhall be found out to juſtify all, that he ſhall do to his ſubjects, and the ſword preſently ſilence all thoſe, that dare queſtion it.

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† "The publick power of all ſociety is above every ſoul contained in the ſame ſociety; and the principal uſe of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws, in ſuch caſes, we muſt obey, unleſs there be reaſon ſhewed, which may neceſſarily enforce, that the law of reaſon, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary." Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 16.

* "To take away all ſuch mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs," i. e. ſuch as attend men in the ſtate of nature; "there was no way, but only by growing into compoſition and agreement amongſt themſelves, by ordaining ſome kind of government publick, and by yielding themſelves ſubject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy eſtate of the reſt might be procured. Men always knew, that, where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themſelves; they knew that, however men might ſeek their commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be ſuffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withſtood. Finally, they knew that no man might, in reaſon, take upon him to determine his own right, and, according to his own determination, proceed in maintenance thereof; inaſmuch as every man is towards himſelf, and them, whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore, that ſtrifes and troubles would be endleſs, except they gave their common conſent, all, to be ordered by ſome, whom they ſhall agree upon, without which conſent, there would be no reaſon, that one man ſhould take upon him to be lord, or judge, over another." Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 10.

For what the protection of abſolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be, and to what a degree of happineſs and ſecurity it carries civil ſociety, where this ſort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may eaſily ſee.

93. In abſolute monarchies, indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the ſubjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controverſies, and reſtrain any violence, that may happen betwixt the ſubjects themſelves, one amongſt another. This every one thinks neceſſary, and believes he deſerves to be thought a declared enemy to ſociety and mankind, who ſhould go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and ſociety, and ſuch a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reaſon to doubt. For this is no more, than what every man who loves his own power, profit, or greatneſs, may and naturally muſt do, keep thoſe animals from hurting, or deſtroying, one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleaſure and advantage; and ſo are taken care of, not out of any love the maſter has for them, but love of himſelf, and the profit they bring him. For if it be aſked, What ſecurity, what fence is there, in ſuch a ſtate, againſt the violence and oppreſſion of this abſolute ruler? The very queſtion can ſcarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deſerves death, only to aſk after ſafety. Betwixt ſubject and ſubject, they will grant there muſt be meaſures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and ſecurity; but as for the ruler, he ought to be abſolute, and is above all ſuch circumſtances; becauſe he has power to do more hurt and wrong, 'tis right when he does it. To aſk, How you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that ſide, where the ſtrongeſt hand is to do it, is preſently the voice of faction and rebellion. As if when men, quitting the ſtate of nature, entered into ſociety, they agreed that all of them but one ſhould be under the reſtraint of laws, but that he ſhould ſtill retain all the liberty of the ſtate of nature, increaſed with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think that men are ſo fooliſh, that they take care to avoid what miſchiefs may be done them by pole-cats or foxes; but are content, nay think it ſafety, to be devoured by lions.

94. But whatever flatterers may talk, to amuſe people's underſtandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive that any man, in what ſtation ſoever, is out of the bounds of the civil ſociety, which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth, againſt any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themſelves in the ſtate of nature, in reſpect of him, whom they find to be ſo; and to take care, as ſoon as they can, to have that ſafety and ſecurity in civil ſociety, for which it was firſt inſtituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at firſt, (as ſhall be ſhewed more at large hereafter, in the following part of this diſcourſe) ſome one good and excellent man, having got a pre-eminency amongſt the reſt, had this deference paid to his goodneſs and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit conſent, devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the aſſurance they had, of his uprightneſs and wiſdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as ſome men would perſuade us) ſacredneſs to cuſtoms, which the negligent and unforeſeeing innocence of the firſt ages began, had brought in ſucceſſors of another ſtamp, the people finding their properties not ſecure, under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preſervation of * property) could never be ſafe, nor at reſt, nor think themſelves in civil ſociety, 'till the legiſlature, was placed in collective bodies of men, call them ſenate, parliament, or what you pleaſe. By which means every ſingle perſon became ſubject equally with other the meaneſt men, to thoſe laws, which he himſelf, as part of the legiſlative

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* "At the firſt, when ſome certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing "was then farther thought upon, for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wiſdom "and diſcretion, which were to rule; 'till by experience they found this, for all parts, very inconvenient, ſo as the thing, which they had deviſed for a remedy, did indeed but increaſe the ſore, "which it ſhould have cured. They ſaw, that to live by one man's will, became the cauſe of all "men's miſery. This conſtrained them to come into laws, wherein all men might ſee their duty "beforehand, and know the penalties of tranſgreſſing them." Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 10.

tive had eſtabliſhed; nor could any one, by his own authority, avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of ſuperiority plead exemption, thereby to licenſe his own, or the miſcarriages of any of his dependants. † "No man in civil ſociety can be exempted from the laws of it." For if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redreſs, or ſecurity, againſt any harm he ſhall do, I aſk, whether he be not perfectly ſtill in the ſtate of nature? and ſo can be no part, or member of that civil ſociety; unleſs any one will ſay, the ſtate of nature and civil ſociety are one and the ſame thing, which I have never yet found any one ſo great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.

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† "Civil law, being the act of the whole body politick, doth therefore over-rule each ſeveral part "of the ſame body." Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 10.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the beginning of political ſocieties.

95. MEN being, as has been ſaid, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of his eſtate, and ſubjected to the political power of another, without his own conſent. The only way, whereby any one diveſts himſelf of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil ſociety, is by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, ſafe, and peaceable living, one amongſt another, in a ſecure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater ſecurity againſt any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, becauſe it injures not the freedom of the reſt; they are left as they were, in the liberty of the ſtate of nature. When any number of men have ſo conſented to make one community, or government, they are thereby preſently incorporated, and make one body politick, wherein the majority have a right to act, and conclude the reſt.

96. FOR when any number of men have, by the conſent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For that which acts any community, being only the conſent of the individuals of it, and it being neceſſary to that, which is one body, to move one way, it is neceſſary the body ſhould move that way, whither the great force carries it, which is the conſent of the majority: or elſe it is impoſſible it ſhould act, or continue, one body, one community, which the conſent of every individual, that united into it, agreed that it ſhould; and ſo every one is bound, by that conſent, to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we ſee, that in aſſemblies, impowered to act by poſitive laws, where no number is ſet by that poſitive law, which impowers them, the act of the majority paſſes for the act of the whole, and of courſe determines, as having, by the law of nature and reaſon, the power of the whole.

97. AND thus every man, by conſenting with others to make one body politick, under one government, puts himſelf under an obligation to every one of that ſociety, to ſubmit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or elſe this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one ſociety, would ſignify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties, than he was in before, in the ſtate of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement, if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the ſociety, than he himſelf thought fit, and did actually conſent to? This would be ſtill as great a liberty, as he himſelf had before his compact, or any one elſe, in the ſtate of nature hath, who may ſubmit himſelf, and conſent to any acts of it, if he thinks fit.

98. FOR, if the conſent of the majority ſhall not, in reaſon, be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the conſent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but ſuch a

conſent is next to impoſſible ever to be had, if we conſider the infirmities of health, and avocations of buſineſs, which, in a number, though much leſs than that of a commonwealth, will neceſſarily keep many away from the publick aſſembly. To which, if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of intereſt, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into ſociety upon ſuch terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a conſtitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a ſhorter duration than the feebleſt creatures, and let it not out-laſt the day it was born in: which cannot be ſuppoſed, 'till we can think, that rational creatures ſhould deſire and conſtitute ſocieties only to be diſſolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the reſt, there they cannot act as one body, and conſequently will be immediately diſſolved again.

99. Whosoever, therefore, out of a ſtate of nature, unite into a community, muſt be underſtood to give up all the power neceſſary to the ends, for which they unite into ſociety, to the majority of the community, unleſs they expreſly agreed in any number leſs than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political ſociety, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus, that which begin and actually conſtitutes any political ſociety, is nothing but the conſent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into ſuch a ſociety. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.

100. To this I find two objections made.

Firſt, " That there are no inſtances to be found in ſtory, of a company of " men independent, and equal one amongſt another, that met together, and in " this way began and ſet up a government."

Secondly, 'Tis impoſſible of right, that men ſhould do ſo, becauſe all men " being born under government, they are to ſubmit to that, and are not at li- " berty to begin a new one."

101. To the firſt there is this to anſwer, That it is not at all to be wondered, that hiſtory gives us but a very little account of men that lived together, in the ſtate of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the love and want of ſociety, no ſooner brought any number of them together, but they preſently united, and incorporated, if they deſigned to continue together. And if we may not ſuppoſe men ever to have been in the ſtate of nature, becauſe we hear not much of them in ſuch a ſtate, we may as well ſuppoſe the armies of Salmanaſſar, or Xerxes, were never children, becauſe we hear little of them 'till they were men and embodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records, and letters ſeldom come in amongſt a people, 'till a long continuation of civil ſociety has, by other more neceſſary arts, provided for their ſafety, eaſe, and plenty. And then they begin to look after the hiſtory of their founders, and ſearch into their original, when they have out-lived the memory of it. For 'tis with commonwealths, as with particular perſons, they are commonly ignorant of their own birth and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records, that others have kept of it. And thoſe that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, excepting that of the Jews, where God himſelf immediately interpoſed, and which favours not all paternal dominion, are all either plain inſtances of ſuch a beginning as I have mentioned, or at leaſt have manifeſt footſteps of it.

102. He muſt have a ſtrange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypotheſis, who will not allow, that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of ſeveral men, free and independent one of another, amongſt whom there was no natural ſuperiority or ſubjection. And if Joſephus Acoſta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America, there was no government at all. " There are great " and apparent conjectures, ſays he, that theſe men, ſpeaking of thoſe of Peru, " for a long time, had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops,

"as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, thoſe of Braſil, and many "other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occaſion is offered, in "peace or war, they chuſe their captains as they pleaſe," l. 1. c. 25. If it be ſaid that every man there was born ſubject to his father, or the head of his family. That the ſubjection due from a child to a father, took not away his freedom of uniting into what political ſociety he thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, theſe men, 'tis evident, were actually free; and whatever ſuperiority ſome politicians now would place in any of them, they themſelves claimed it not; but by conſent were all equal, 'till by the ſame conſent they ſet rulers over themſelves. So that their politick ſocieties all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government.

103. And I hope thoſe that went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Juſtin, l. 3. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen, independent one of another, and to have ſet up a government over themſelves, by their own conſent. Thus I have given ſeveral examples out of hiſtory, of people free, and in the ſtate of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of ſuch inſtances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be ſo begun, I ſuppoſe the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it againſt natural liberty. For if they can give ſo many inſtances, out of hiſtory, of government begun upon paternal right, I think (though at beſt an argument from what has been, to what ſhould of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cauſe. But, if I might adviſe them in the caſe, they would do well not to ſearch too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, leſt they ſhould find out the foundation of moſt of them, ſomething very little favourable to the deſign they promote, and ſuch a power as they contend for.

104. But to conclude, reaſon being plainly, on our ſide, that men are naturally free, and the examples of hiſtory ſhewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the conſent of the people; there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice, of mankind, about the firſt erecting of governments.

105. I will not deny, that if we look back, as far as hiſtory will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we ſhall generally find them under the government and adminiſtration of one man. And I am alſo apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to ſubſiſt by itſelf, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land and few people, the government commonly began in the father. For the father having, by the law of nature, the ſame power with every man elſe, to puniſh, as he thought fit, any offences againſt that law, might thereby puniſh his tranſgreſſing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to ſubmit to his puniſhment, and all join with him againſt the offender in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his ſentence againſt any tranſgreſſion, and ſo in effect make him the lawmaker, and governor over all that remain'd in conjunction with his family. He was fitteſt to be truſted; paternal affection ſecured their property and intereſt under his care, and the cuſtom of obeying him in their childhood, made it eaſier to ſubmit to him, rather than to any other. If, therefore, they muſt have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongſt men that live together; who ſo likely to be the man, as he that was their common father; unleſs negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body, made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir for want of age, wiſdom, courage, or any other qualities, leſs fit for rule; or where ſeveral families met, and conſented to continue together; there it is not to be doubted, but they uſed their natural freedom to ſet up him whom they judged the ableſt, and moſt likely to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto, we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering ſwords, and

ſpreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom; though, cæteris paribus, they commonly prefer the heir of their deceaſed king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they paſs him by, and ſet up the ſtouteſt and braveſt man for their ruler.

106. Thus, though looking back, as far as records give us any account of peopling the world, and the hiſtory of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it deſtroys not that which I affirm, viz. That the beginning of politick ſociety depends upon the conſent of the individuals, to join into, and make one ſociety; who, when they are thus incorporated, might ſet up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occaſion to men to miſtake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not here be amiſs here to conſider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form, which, though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the firſt inſtitution of ſome commonwealths, give a riſe to, and place in the beginning the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reaſon, that continued the form of government in a ſingle perſon, was not any regard, or reſpect, to paternal authority; ſince all petty monarchies, that is, almoſt all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at leaſt upon occaſion elective.

107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of the childhood of thoſe ſprung from him, having accuſtomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that, where it was exerciſed with care and ſkill, with affection and love to thoſe under it, it was ſufficient to procure and preſerve to men all the political happineſs, they ſought for in ſociety; it was no wonder that they ſhould pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which, from their infancy, they had been all accuſtomed to; and which by experience they had found both eaſy and ſafe. To which if we add, that monarchy being ſimple and moſt obvious to men, whom neither experience had inſtructed in forms of government, nor the ambition, nor inſolence, of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniencies of abſolute power, which monarchy in ſucceſſion was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them; it was not at all ſtrange, that they ſhould not much trouble themſelves, to think of methods of reſtraining any exorbitances of thoſe, to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing ſeveral parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppreſſion of tyrannical dominion, nor did the faſhion of the age, nor their poſſeſſions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetouſneſs, or ambition) give them any reaſon to apprehend, or provide againſt it; and therefore it is no wonder, they put themſelves into ſuch a frame of government, as was not only, as I ſaid, moſt obvious and ſimple, but alſo beſt ſuited to their preſent ſtate and condition; which ſtood more in need of defence againſt foreign invaſions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a ſimple, poor way of living, confined their deſires within the narrow bounds of each man's ſmall property, made few controverſies, and ſo no need of any laws to decide them, or variety of officers to ſuperintend the proceſs, or look after the execution of juſtice, where there were but few treſpaſſes, and few offenders. Since, then, thoſe who liked one another ſo well, as to join into ſociety, cannot but be ſuppoſed to have ſome acquaintance and friendſhip together, and ſome truſt one in another; they could not but have greater apprehenſions of others, than of one another: and therefore their firſt care and thought cannot but be ſuppoſed to be, how to ſecure themſelves againſt foreign force. It was natural for them to put themſelves under a frame of government, which might beſt ſerve to that end; and chuſe the wiſeſt and braveſt man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out againſt their enemies, and in this chiefly to be their ruler.

108. Thus we ſee, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is ſtill a pattern of the firſt ages in Aſia and Europe, whilſt the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their poſſeſſions of land, or conteſt for wider extent of ground, are little

more than generals of their armies; and though they command abſolutely in war, yet at home, and in time of peace, they exerciſe very little dominion, and have but a very moderate ſovereignty, the reſolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Though the war itſelf, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's ſole authority.

109. And thus, in Iſrael itſelf, the chief buſineſs of their judges and firſt kings, ſeems to have been to be captains of war, and leaders of their armies; which (beſides what is ſignified by "going out, and in, before the people," which was, to march forth to war, and home again at the head of their forces) appears plainly in the ſtory of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Iſrael, the Gileadites in fear, ſend to Jephtha, a baſtard of their family, whom they had caſt off, and article with him, if he will aſſiſt them againſt the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in theſe words "And the " people made him head and captain over them," Judg. xi. 11. which was, as it ſeems, all one as to be judge. "And he judged Iſrael, Judg. xii. 7. that is, was " their captain general ſix years." So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites, with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them, "he fought for you, and adventured his life for, and deliver'd you " out of the hands of Midian," Judges ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him, but what he did as a general; and indeed, that is all is found in his hiſtory, or in any of the reſt of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at moſt he was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's ſons, the children of Iſrael deſired a king, "like all the nations, to " judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles," 1 Sam. viii. 20. God granting their deſire, ſays to Samuel, "I will ſend thee a man, and " thou ſhalt anoint him to be captain over my people Iſrael, that he may ſave " my people out of the hands of the Philiſtines," chap. ix. 16. As if the only buſineſs of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly, at his inauguration, pouring a viol of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that "the Lord hath anointed him to be captain over his inheritance," chap. x. 1. And therefore thoſe, who after Saul's being ſolemnly choſen, and ſaluted king, by the tribes at Mizpah, were unwilling to have him their king, make no other objection but this, "How ſhall this man ſave us?" ver. 27. as if they ſhould have ſaid, This man is unfit to be our king, not having ſkill and conduct enough in war to be able to defend us. And when God reſolved to transfer the government to David, it is in theſe words, "But now thy kingdom ſhall not " continue: the Lord hath ſought him a man, after his own heart, and the " Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people," chap. xiii. 4. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing elſe, but to be their general: and therefore the tribes, who had ſtuck to Saul's family, and oppoſed David's reign, when they came to Hebron, with terms of ſubmiſſion to him, they tell him, amongſt other arguments they had to ſubmit to him as to their king, That he was in effect their king, in Saul's time, and therefore, they had no reaſon, but to receive him as their king now. "Alſo (ſay they) " in time paſt, when Saul " was king over us, thou waſt he, that leddeſt out and broughteſt in Iſrael, and " the Lord ſaid unto thee, thou ſhalt feed my people Iſrael, and thou ſhalt be a " captain over Iſrael."

110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on, to the elder ſon, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly ſubmitted to it, and the eaſineſs and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquieſced, 'till the time ſeem'd to have confirmed it, and ſettled a right of ſucceſſion by preſcription; or whether ſeveral families, or the deſcendants of ſeveral families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or buſineſs brought together, uniting into ſociety, the need of a general, whoſe conduct might defend them againſt their enemies in war, and the great confidence, the innocence and ſincerity of that poor, but virtuous age, (ſuch as are almoſt all thoſe, which begin governments, that ever come to laſt in the world) gave men one of another, made the firſt beginners of commonwealths generally put the

rule into one man's hand, without any other expreſs limitation, or reſtraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required: which ever of thoſe it was, that at firſt put the rule into the hand of a ſingle perſon, certain it is, no body was intruſted with it, but for the publick good and ſafety; and to thoſe ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, commonly uſed it. And unleſs thoſe who had it, had done ſo, young ſocieties could not have ſubſiſted without ſuch nurſing fathers, tender and careful of the publick weal; all governments would have ſunk under the weakneſs and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and people had ſoon periſhed together.

111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and "amor ſceleratus habendi," evil concupiſcence, had corrupted men's minds, into a miſtake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and conſequently better governors, as well as leſs vicious ſubjects; and there was then no ſtretching prerogative, on the one ſide, to oppreſs the people; nor conſequently, on the other, any diſpute about privilege, to leſſen, or reſtrain the power of the magiſtrate, and ſo no conteſt betwixt rulers and people about governors, or government: yet when ambition and luxury in future ages [*] would retain and increaſe the power, without doing the buſineſs for which it was given, and aided by flattery, taught princes to have diſtinct and ſeparate intereſts from their people; men found it neceſſary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to reſtrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuſes of that power, which they having entruſted in another's hands, only for their own good, they found, was made uſe of to hurt them.

112. Thus we may ſee how probable it is, that people, that were naturally free, and, by their own conſent, either ſubmitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families, to make a government, ſhould generally put the rule into one man's hands, and chuſe to be under the conduct of a ſingle perſon, without ſo much as, by expreſs conditions, limiting, or regulating his power, which they thought ſafe enough in his honeſty and prudence: though they never dreamed of monarchy being jure divino, which we never heard of among mankind, 'till it was revealed to us, by the divinity of this laſt age; nor ever allow'd paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may ſuffice to ſhew, that, as far as we have any light from hiſtory, we have reaſon to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the conſent of the people. I ſay peaceful, becauſe I ſhall have occaſion, in another place, to ſpeak of conqueſt, which ſome eſteem a way of beginning of governments.

"The other objection I find urged againſt the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned is this," viz.

113. "That, all men being born under government, ſome or other, it is impoſſible any of them ſhould ever be free, and at liberty to unite together and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government?"

If this argument be good; I aſk, How came ſo many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body upon this ſuppoſition, can ſhew me any one man, in any age of the world, free to begin a lawful monarchy; I will be bound to ſhew him ten other free men at liberty, at the ſame time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form. It being demonſtration, that if any one born under the dominion of another, may be ſo free as to have a right to command others in a new and diſtinct empire; every one that is born under the dominion of another, may be ſo free too, and may become a ruler, or ſubject of a diſtinct, ſeparate government. And ſo, by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or elſe there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely to ſhew us, which that is: which, when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will eaſily agree to pay obedience to him.

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[*] "At the firſt, when ſome certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon, for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wiſdom and diſcretion, which were to rule; 'till by experience they found this, for all parts, very inconvenient, ſo as the thing, which they had deviſed for a remedy, did indeed but increaſe the ſore, which it ſhould have cured. They ſaw, that to live by one man's will, became the cauſe of all men's miſery. This conſtrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might ſee their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of tranſgreſſing them." Hook. Eccl. Pol. L. 1. Sect. 10.

114. Though it be a ſufficient anſwer to their objection to ſhew, that it involves them in the ſame difficulties, that it doth thoſe, they uſe it againſt; yet I ſhall endeavour to diſcover the weakneſs of this argument a little farther.

"All men, ſay they, are born under government; and therefore they can't "be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a ſubject to his father, "or his prince, and is therefore, under the perpetual tie of ſubjection and alle-"giance." 'Tis plain, mankind never owned nor conſidered any ſuch natural ſubjection, that they were born in, to one, or to the other, that tied them, without their own conſents, to a ſubjection to them and their heirs.

115. For there are no examples ſo frequent in hiſtory, both ſacred and profane, as thoſe of men withdrawing themſelves and their obedience from the juriſdiction they were born under, and the family, or community, they were bred up in, and ſetting up new governments in other places; from whence ſprang all that number of petty commonwealths, in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, 'till the ſtronger, or more fortunate, ſwallowed the weaker; and thoſe great ones again breaking to pieces, diſſolved into leſſer dominions. All which are ſo many teſtimonies againſt paternal ſovereignty, and plainly prove, That it was not the natural right of the father, deſcending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, ſince it was impoſſible, upon that ground, there ſhould have been ſo many little kingdoms; all muſt have been but only one univerſal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to ſeparate themſelves, from their families and the government, be it what it will, that was ſet up in it, and go and make diſtinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit.

116. This has been the practice of the world, from its firſt beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under conſtituted and antient polities, that have eſtabliſhed laws and ſet forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongſt the unconfined inhabitants, that run looſe in them. For thoſe who would perſuade us, that "by being born under any government, we are naturally ſubjects to it," and have no more any title, or pretence, to the freedom of the ſtature of nature, have no other reaſon (bating that of paternal power, which we have already anſwered) to produce for it, but only becauſe our fathers, or progenitors, paſſed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themſelves and their poſterity to a perpetual ſubjection to the government, which they themſelves ſubmitted to. 'Tis true that, whatever engagements, or promiſes, any one has made for himſelf, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatſoever, bind his children, or poſterity. For his ſon, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any "act of the father can no more give away the "liberty of the ſon," than it can of any body elſe: he may, indeed, annex ſuch conditions to the land he enjoyed, as a ſubject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his ſon to be of that community, if he will enjoy thoſe poſſeſſions, which were his father's; becauſe that eſtate being his father's property, he may diſpoſe, or ſettle it as he pleaſes.

117. And this has generally given the occaſion to miſtake in this matter; becauſe commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be diſmember'd, nor to be enjoy'd by any, but thoſe of their community, the ſon cannot ordinarily enjoy the poſſeſſion of his father, but under the ſame terms his father did, by becoming a member of the ſociety; whereby he puts himſelf preſently under the government he finds there eſtabliſhed, as much as any other ſubject of that commonwealth. And thus "the conſent of freemen, born under govern-"ment, which only makes them members of it." being given ſeparately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people taking no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not neceſſary, conclude they are naturally ſubjects as they are men.

118. But 'tis plain, governments themſelves underſtand it otherwiſe: they claim "no power over the ſon, becauſe of that they had over the father;" nor

look on children as being their ſubjects, by their fathers being ſo. If a ſubject of England have a child by an Engliſh woman in France, whoſe ſubject is he? Not the king of England's; for he muſt have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it. Nor the king of France's; For how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleaſes? And who ever was judged as a traitor, or deſerter, if he left, or warred againſt a country, for being barely born in it, of parents, that were aliens there? 'Tis plain then, by the practice of governments themſelves, as well as by the law of right reaſon, that "a child is "born a ſubject of no country or government." He is under his father's tuition and authority, 'till he comes to age of diſcretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himſelf under; what body politick he will unite himſelf to. For if an Engliſhman's ſon, born in France, be at liberty and may do ſo, 'tis evident there is no tie upon him, by his father's being a ſubject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his anceſtors. And why then hath not his ſon, by the ſame reaſon, the ſame liberty, though he be born any where elſe? Since the power, that a father hath naturally over his children, is the ſame, wherever they be born; and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the poſitive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.

119. Every man being, as has been ſhewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into ſubjection to any earthly power, but only his own conſent, it is to be conſidered, what ſhall be underſtood to be a ſufficient declaration of a man's conſent, to make him ſubject to the laws of any government. There is a common diſtinction of an expreſs and a tacit conſent, which will concern our preſent caſe. Nobody doubts but an expreſs conſent of any man, entering into any ſociety, makes him a perfect member of that ſociety, a ſubject to that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon, as a tacit conſent, and how far it binds, i. e. how far any one ſhall be looked on to have conſented, and thereby ſubmitted to any government, where he has made no expreſſions of it at all. And to this I ſay, that every man that hath any poſſeſſions, or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit conſent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during ſuch enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his poſſeſſion be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

120. To underſtand this the better, it is fit to conſider, that every man, when he at firſt incorporates himſelf into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himſelf thereunto, annexes alſo, and ſubmits, to the community thoſe poſſeſſions which he has, or ſhall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government. For it would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into ſociety with others, for the ſecuring and regulating of property, and yet to ſuppoſe his land, whoſe property is to be regulated by the laws of the ſociety, ſhould be exempt from the juriſdiction of that government, to which he himſelf, the proprietor of the land, is a ſubject: by the ſame act therefore, whereby any one unites his perſon, which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the ſame he unites his poſſeſſions, which were before free, to it alſo; and they become, both of them, perſon and poſſeſſion, ſubject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever, therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchaſe, permiſſion, or otherwiſe, enjoys any part of the land, ſo annexed to, and under the government of that commonwealth, muſt take it with the condition it is under; that is, of ſubmitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whoſe juriſdiction it is, as far forth as any ſubject of it.

121. But ſince the government has a direct juriſdiction only over the land, and reaches the poſſeſſor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himſelf in the ſociety) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that: the obligation any one is under, by virtue of ſuch enjoyment, "to ſubmit to the government, begins and "ends with the enjoyment;" ſo that, whenever the owner, who has given nothing

thing, but ſuch a tacit conſent to the government, will, by donation, ſale, or otherwiſe, quit the ſaid poſſeſſion, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himſelf into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others, to begin a new one, "in vacuis locis," in any part of the world they can find free and unpoſſeſſed: whereas he that has once, by actual agreement, and any expreſs declaration, given his conſent to be of any commonweal, is perpetually and indiſpenſibly obliged to be, and remain, unalterably a ſubject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the ſtate of nature; unleſs by any calamity, the government he was under, comes to be diſſolved; or elſe by ſome publick acts cut him off from being any longer a member of it.

122. But ſubmitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that ſociety: this is only a local protection and homage, due to, and from all thoſe, who, not being in the ſtate of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its law extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that ſociety, a perpetual ſubject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a ſubject to another, in whoſe family he found it convenient to abide for ſome time; tho' whilſt he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and ſubmit to the government he found there. And thus we ſee, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, tho' they are bound, even in conſcience, to ſubmit to its adminiſtration, as far forth as any deniſon; yet do not thereby come to be ſubjects, or members, of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man ſo, but his actually entering into it, by poſitive engagement, and expreſs promiſe and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political ſocieties, and that conſent which makes any one a member of the commonwealth.

CHAP. IX.

Of the ends of political ſociety and government.

123. If man, in the ſtate of nature, be ſo free, as has been ſaid; if he be abſolute lord of his own perſon and poſſeſſions, equal to the greateſt, and ſubject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and ſubject himſelf to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to anſwer, that, tho' in the ſtate of nature he hath ſuch a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and conſtantly expoſed to the invaſion of others. For all being kings, as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no ſtrict obſervers of equity and juſtice, the enjoyment of the property he has, in this ſtate, is very unſafe, very unſecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reaſon, that he ſeeks out, and is willing to join in ſociety with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preſervation of their lives, liberties and eſtates, which I call by the general name, property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themſelves under government, is the preſervation of their property. To which, in the ſtate of nature, there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an eſtabliſhed, ſettled, known law, received and allowed by common conſent, to be the ſtandard of right and wrong, and the common meaſure to decide all controverſies between them. For, though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men, being biaſſed by their intereſt, as well as ignorant, for want of ſtudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them, in the application of it to their particular caſes.

125. Secondly, In the ſtate of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences, according to the eſtabliſhed

law. For every one in that ſtate, being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themſelves, paſſion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own caſes; as well as negligence and unconcernedneſs, to make them too remiſs in other men's.

126. Thirdly, in the ſtate of nature there often wants power to back and ſupport the ſentence when right, and to give it due execution. They, who by any injuſtice offend, will ſeldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injuſtice; ſuch reſiſtance many times makes the puniſhment dangerous, and frequently deſtructive to thoſe who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithſtanding all the privileges of the ſtate of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into ſociety. Hence it comes to paſs, that we ſeldom find any number of men live, any time together, in this ſtate. The inconveniencies that they are therein expoſed to, by the irregular, and uncertain exerciſe of the power, every man has of puniſhing the tranſgreſſions of others, make them take ſanctuary under the eſtabliſhed laws of government, and therein ſeek the preſervation of their property. 'Tis this makes them ſo willingly give up every one his ſingle power of puniſhing, to be exerciſed by ſuch alone, as ſhall be appointed to it amongſt them; and by ſuch rules, as the community, or thoſe authorized by them to that purpoſe, ſhall agree on. And in this we have the original right and riſe of both the legiſlative, and executive power, as well as of the governments and ſocieties themſelves.

128. For, in the ſtate of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers:

The firſt is, to do whatſover he thinks fit, for the preſervation of himſelf and others, within the permiſſion of the law of nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the reſt of mankind are of one community, make up one ſociety, diſtinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and viciouſneſs of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no neceſſity, that men ſhould ſeparate from this great and natural community, and by poſitive agreements, combine into ſmaller and divided aſſociations.

The other power a man has, in the ſtate of nature, is the power to puniſh the crimes committed againſt that law. Both theſe he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may ſo call it, or particular, political ſociety, and incorporates into any commonwealth, ſeparate from the reſt of mankind.

129. The firſt power, viz. "of doing whatſoever he thought fit for the preſervation of himſelf," and the reſt of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws, made by the ſociety, ſo far forth as the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of that ſociety ſhall require; which laws of the ſociety, in many things, confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

130. Secondly, The power of puniſhing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ, in the execution of the law of nature, by his own ſingle authority, as he thought fit) to aſſiſt the executive power of the ſociety, as the law thereof ſhall require. For being now in a new ſtate, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, aſſiſtance, and ſociety of others, in the ſame community, as well as protection from its whole ſtrength; he is to part alſo with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himſelf, as the good, proſperity, and ſafety of the ſociety ſhall require; which is not only neceſſary, but juſt; ſince the other members of the ſociety do the like.

131. But though men, when they enter into ſociety, give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had, in the ſtate of nature, into the hands of the ſociety, to be ſo far diſpoſed of, by the legiſlative, as the good of the ſociety ſhall require; yet it being only with an intention, in every one, the better to preſerve himſelf, his liberty and property; (For no rational creature can be ſuppoſed to change his condition, with an intention to be worſe) the power of the ſociety, or legiſlative conſtituted by them, can never be ſuppoſed to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to ſecure every one's property, by providing againſt thoſe three defects above-mentioned, that made the ſtate of

nature ſo unſafe and uneaſy. And ſo, whoever has the legiſlative, or ſupreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by eſtabliſhed, ſtanding laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controverſies by thoſe laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of ſuch laws, or abroad to prevent, or redreſs foreign injuries, and ſecure the community from inroads and invaſion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, ſafety, and the publick good of the people.

CHAP. X.

Of the forms of a commonwealth.

132. THE majority having, as has been ſhewed, upon men's firſt uniting into ſociety, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing thoſe laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or elſe may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few ſelect men, and their heirs or ſucceſſors; and then it is an oligarchy: or elſe into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a ſucceſſor to return to them, an elective monarchy. And ſo accordingly, of theſe, the community may make compounded and mix'd forms of government, as they think good. And if the legiſlative power be at firſt given by the majority, to one or more perſons, only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the ſupreme power to revert to them again; when it is ſo reverted, the community may diſpoſe of it again anew, into what hands they pleaſe, and ſo conſtitute a new form of government. For the form of government depending upon the placing the ſupreme power, which is the legiſlative, it being impoſſible to conceive that an inferior power ſhould preſcribe to a ſuperior, or any, but the ſupreme, make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, ſuch is the form of the commonwealth.

133. By commonwealth, I muſt be underſtood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latins ſignified by the word civitas, to which the word which beſt anſwers in our language is commonwealth, and moſt properly expreſſes ſuch a ſociety of men; which community, or city, in Engliſh does not, for there may be ſubordinate communities in a government; and city amongſt us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and therefore to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to uſe the word commonwealth, in that ſenſe, in which I find it uſed by king James the firſt, and I take it to be its genuine ſignification; which if any body diſlike, I conſent with him to change it for a better.

CHAP. XI.

Of the extent of the legiſlative power.

134. THE great end of men's entring into ſociety, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and ſafety, and the great inſtrument and means of that being the laws eſtabliſhed in that ſociety; the firſt and fundamental poſitive law of all commonwealths, is the eſtabliſhing of the legiſlative power; as the firſt and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legiſlative itſelf, is the preſervation of the ſociety, and (as far as will conſiſt with the publick good) of every perſon in it. This legiſlative is not only the ſupreme power of the commonwealth, but ſacred and unalterable in the hands, where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body elſe, in what form

ſoever conceived, or by what power ſoever back'd, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its ſanction from that legiſlative, which the publick has choſen and appointed. For without this the law could not have that, which is abſolutely neceſſary to its being a law, [*] the conſent of the ſociety, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own conſent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the moſt ſolemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this ſupreme power, and is directed by thoſe laws, which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatſoever, or any domeſtick, ſubordinate power, diſcharge any member of the ſociety from his obedience to the legiſlative, acting purſuant to their truſt; nor oblige him to any obedience, contrary to the laws ſo enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the ſociety, which is not the ſupreme.

135. THO' the legiſlative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, tho' it be the ſupreme power in every commonwealth; yet,

Firſt, IT is not, nor can poſſibly be abſolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of every member of the ſociety given up to that perſon, or aſſembly, which is legiſlator; it can be no more than thoſe perſons had, in a ſtate of nature, before they entered into ſociety, and gave up to the community. For no body can transfer to another, more power than he has in himſelf; and no body has an abſolute arbitrary power over himſelf, or over any other, to deſtroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man as has been proved, cannot ſubject himſelf to the arbitrary power of another; and having, in the ſtate of nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty or poſſeſſion of another, but only ſo much as the law of nature gave him, for the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legiſlative power, ſo that the legiſlative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmoſt bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of the ſociety: it is a power, that hath no other end but preſervation, and therefore can never [†] have a right to deſtroy, enſlave, or deſignedly to impoveriſh the ſubjects, The obligations of the law of nature, ceaſe not in ſociety, but only in many caſes are drawn cloſer, and have, by human laws, known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their obſervation. Thus the law of nature ſtands, as an eternal rule to all men, legiſlators as well as others. The rules that they make, for other men's actions, muſt, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration; and the “fundamental law of nature being the preſervation of “mankind,” no human ſanction can be good, or valid againſt it.

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[*] " The lawful power of making laws, to command whole politick ſocieties of men, belonging " ſo properly unto the ſame entire ſocieties, that for any prince or potentate, of what kind ſoever " upon earth, to exerciſe the ſame of himſelf, and not by expreſs commiſſion, immediately and per- " ſonally received from God, or elſe by authority derived, at firſt, from their conſent, upon whoſe " perſons they impoſe laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not, therefore, " which publick approbation hath not made ſo." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 10. " Of this " point, therefore, we are to note, that ſince men naturally have no full and perfect power to com- " mand whole politick multitudes of men, therefore utterly, without our conſent, we could in ſuch " ſort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded, we do conſent, when that " ſociety, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before conſented, without revoking the ſame " after, by the like univerſal agreement."

" Laws therefore human, of what kind ſoever, are available by conſent." Ibid.

[†] " Two foundations there are, which bear up publick ſocieties, the one a natural inclination, " whereby all men deſire ſociable life and fellowſhip; the other an order, expreſly or ſecretly agreed " upon, touching the manner of their union, in living together; the latter is that, which we call " the law of a commonweal, the very ſoul of a politick body, the parts whereof are by law anima- " ted, held together, and ſet on work in ſuch actions as the common good requireth. Laws poli- " tick, ordained for external order and regiment amongſt men, are never framed, as they ſhould be, " unleſs preſuming the will of man to be inwardly obſtinate, rebellious, and averſe from all obe- " dience to the ſacred laws of his nature: in a word, unleſs preſuming man to be, in regard of his " depraved mind, little better than a wild beaſt, they do accordingly provide, notwithſtanding, ſo " to frame his outward actions, that they may be no hindrance unto the common good, for which " ſocieties are inſtituted. Unleſs they do this, they are not perfect." Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. 1. ſect. 10.

136. Secondly, * The legiſlative or ſupreme authority, cannot aſſume to itſelf a power to rule, by extemporary, arbitrary decrees, but is bound to diſpenſe juſtice, and to decide the rights of the ſubject, by promulgated, ſtanding laws, and known, authorized judges. For the law of nature being unwritten, and ſo no where to be found, but in the minds of men, they who through paſſion, or intereſt, ſhall miſcite, or miſapply it, cannot ſo eaſily be convinced of their miſtake, where there is no eſtabliſhed judge: and ſo it ſerves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of thoſe, that live under it, eſpecially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own caſe: and he that has right on his ſide, having ordinarily but his own ſingle ſtrength, hath not force enough to defend himſelf from injuries, or to puniſh delinquents. To avoid theſe inconveniencies, which diſorder men's properties, in the ſtate of nature, men unite into ſocieties, that they may have the united ſtrength of the whole ſociety, to ſecure and defend their properties, and may have ſtanding rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is, that men give up all their natural power to the ſociety, which they enter into, and the community put the legiſlative power into ſuch hands, as they think fit, with this truſt, that they ſhall be governed by declared laws, or elſe their peace, quiet, and property will ſtill be at the ſame uncertainty, as it was in the ſtate of nature.

137. Absolute, arbitrary power, or governing without ſettled ſtanding laws, can neither of them conſiſt with the ends of ſociety and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the ſtate of nature for, and tie themſelves up under, were it not to preſerve their lives, liberties and fortunes; and by ſtated rules of right and property, to ſecure their peace and quiet. It cannot be ſuppoſed, that they ſhould intend, had they a power ſo to do, to give to any one or more, an abſolute, arbitrary power over their perſons and eſtates, and put a force into the magiſtrate's hand, to execute his unlimited will, arbitrarily, upon them. This were to put themſelves into a worſe condition, than the ſtate of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right againſt the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a ſingle man, or many in combination. Whereas by ſuppoſing they have given up themſelves to the abſolute, arbitrary power, and will, of a legiſlator, they have diſarmed themſelves, and armed him to make a prey of them, when he pleaſes. He being in a much worſe condition, who is expoſed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100000, than he that is expoſed to the arbitrary power of 100000 ſingle men; no body being ſecure that his will, who hath ſuch a command, is better than that of other men, tho' his force be a 100000 times ſtronger. And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined reſolutions. For then mankind will be in a far worſe condition, than in the ſtate of nature, if they ſhall have armed one, or a few men, with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleaſure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their ſudden thoughts, or unreſtrained, and, 'till that moment, unknown wills, without having any meaſures ſet down, which may guide and juſtify their actions, For all the power, the government has, being only for the good of the ſociety, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleaſure, ſo it ought to be exerciſed by eſtabliſhed and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be ſafe and ſecure within the limits of the law; and the rulers, too, kept within their due bounds, and not to be tempted, by the power they have in

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* “Human laws are meaſures in reſpect of men, whoſe actions they muſt direct: howbeit ſuch “meaſures they are, as have alſo their higher rules to be meaſured by; which rules are two, the “law of God, and the law of nature; ſo that laws human muſt be made according to the general “laws of nature, and without contradiction to any poſitive law of ſcripture, otherwiſe they are ill “made. Ibid. l. 3. ſect. 9.

“To conſtrain men to any thing inconvenient, doth ſeem unreaſonable.” Ibid. l. 1. ſect. 10.

their hands, to employ it to ſuch purpoſes, and by ſuch meaſures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

138. Thirdly, The ſupreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property, without his own conſent. For the preſervation of property being the end of government, and that, for which men enter into ſociety, it neceſſarily ſuppoſes and requires, that the people ſhould have property, without which they muſt be ſuppoſed to loſe that, by entering into ſociety, which was the end for which they entered into it; too groſs an abſurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in ſociety, having property, they have ſuch a right to the goods, which, by the law of the community, are theirs, that no body hath a right to take their ſubſtance, or any part of it, from them, without their own conſent; without this they have no property at all: for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleaſes, againſt my conſent. Hence it is a miſtake to think, that the ſupreme, or legiſlative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and diſpoſe of the eſtates of the ſubjects, arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleaſure. This is not much to be feared in governments, where the legiſlative conſiſts wholly, or in part, in aſſemblies, which are variable, whoſe members, upon the diſſolution of the aſſembly, are ſubjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the reſt. But in governments, where the legiſlative is in one laſting aſſembly, always in being, or in one man, as in abſolute monarchies, there is danger ſtill, that they will think themſelves to have a diſtinct intereſt from the reſt of the community; and ſo will be apt to increaſe their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit, from the people. For a man's property is not at all ſecure, though there be good and equitable laws to ſet the bounds of it, between him and his fellow-ſubjects, if he, who commands thoſe ſubjects, have power to take from any private man, what part he pleaſes of his property, and uſe and diſpoſe of it, as he thinks good.

139. But government, into whatſoever hands it is put, being, as I have before ſhewed, intruſted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have, and ſecure their properties, the prince, or ſenate, however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property between the ſubjects one amongſt another, yet can never have a power to take to themſelves the whole, or any part of the ſubjects property, without their own conſent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us ſee, that even abſolute power, where it is neceſſary, is not arbitrary, by being abſolute, but is ſtill limited by that reaſon, and confined to thoſe ends, which required it in ſome caſes to be abſolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial diſcipline. For the preſervation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an abſolute obedience to the command of every ſuperior officer, and it is juſtly death to diſobey, or diſpute the moſt dangerous, or unreaſonable of them; but yet we ſee, that neither the ſerjeant, that could command a ſoldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or ſtand in a breach, where he is almoſt ſure to periſh, can command that ſoldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death, for deſerting his poſt, or for not obeying the moſt deſperate orders, can yet, with all his abſolute power of life and death, diſpoſe of one farthing of that ſoldier's eſtate, or ſeize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the leaſt diſobedience. Becauſe ſuch a blind obedience is neceſſary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preſervation of the reſt; but the diſpoſing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

140. 'Tis true, governments cannot be ſupported without great charge, and 'tis fit every one, who enjoys a ſhare of the protection, ſhould pay, out of his eſtate, his proportion for the maintenance of it. But ſtill it muſt be with his own conſent, i. e. the conſent of the majority, giving it either by themſelves, or their repreſentatives, choſen by them. For if any one ſhall claim a power to lay, and levy, taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without ſuch conſent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and ſubverts

the end of government. For what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleaſes, to himſelf?

141. **Fourthly**, The legiſlative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated power from the people, they, who have it, cannot paſs it over to others. The people alone cannot appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by conſtituting the legiſlative, and appointing in whoſe that ſhall be. And when the people have ſaid, we will ſubmit to rules, and be governed by laws, made by ſuch men, and in ſuch forms, no body elſe can ſay other men ſhall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but ſuch as are enacted by thoſe, whom they have choſen and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legiſlative being derived from the people, by a poſitive, voluntary grant and inſtitution, can be no other, than what that poſitive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legiſlators, the legiſlative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

142. **These** are the bounds, which the truſt, that is put in them, by the ſociety, and the law of God and nature, have ſet to the legiſlative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated, eſtabliſhed laws, not to be varied in particular caſes, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country-man at plough.

Secondly, Theſe laws alſo ought to be deſigned for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.

Thirdly, They muſt not raiſe taxes on the property of the people, without the conſent of the people, given by themſelves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only ſuch governments, where the legiſlative is always in being, or at leaſt where the people have not reſerved any part of the legiſlative to deputies, to be, from time to time, choſen by themſelves.

Fourthly, The legiſlative neither muſt, nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body elſe, or place it any where, but when the people have.

CHAP. XII.

Of the legiſlative, executive, and federative power of the commonwealth.

143. THE legiſlative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common wealth ſhall be employed, for preſerving the community, and the members of it. But becauſe thoſe laws, which are conſtantly to be executed, and whoſe force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legiſlative ſhould be always in being, not having always buſineſs to do. And becauſe it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to graſp at power, for the ſame perſons, who have the power of making laws, to have alſo, in their hands, the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themſelves from obedience to the laws they make, and ſuit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a diſtinct intereſt from the reſt of the community, contrary to the end of ſociety and government: therefore, in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is ſo conſidered, as it ought, the legiſlative power is put into the hands of divers perſons, who, duly aſſembled, have by themſelves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws; which, when they have done, being ſeparated again, they are themſelves ſubject to the laws they have made; which is a new, and near tie upon them to take care, that they make them for the publick good,

144. **But** becauſe the laws that are, at once, and in a ſhort time, made, have a conſtant and laſting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an atten-

dance thereunto: therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be a power always in being, which ſhould ſee to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legiſlative and executive power come often to be ſeparated.

145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, becauſe it is that, which anſwers to the power every man naturally had, before he entered into ſociety, For, though in a commonwealth the members of it are diſtinct perſons ſtill, in reference to one another, and as ſuch are governed by the laws of the ſociety; yet, in reference to the reſt of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, ſtill in the ſtate of nature with the reſt of mankind. Hence it is, that the controverſies, that happen between any man of the ſociety, with thoſe that are out of it, are managed by the publick; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this conſideration, the whole community is one body, in the ſtate of nature, in reſpect of all other ſtates, or perſons out of its community.

146. This, therefore, contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the tranſactions with all the perſons, and communities, without the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleaſes. So the thing be underſtood, I am indifferent as to the name.

147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really diſtinct in themſelves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the ſociety within itſelf, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the ſecurity and intereſt of the publick without, with all thoſe that it may receive benefit, or damage, from; yet they are almoſt always united. And though this federative power in the well, or ill management of it, be of great moment to the commonwealth; yet it is much leſs capable to be directed by antecedent, ſtanding, poſitive laws, than the executive; and ſo muſt neceſſarily be left to the prudence and wiſdom of thoſe, whoſe hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good. For the laws, that concern ſubjects, one amongſt another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions and the variation of deſigns and intereſts, muſt be left, in great part, to the prudence of thoſe, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the beſt of their ſkill, for the advantage of the commonwealth.

148. Though, as I ſaid, the executive and federative power of every community be really diſtinct in themſelves, yet they are hardly to be ſeparated, and placed, at the ſame time, in the hands of diſtinct perſons. For both of them requiring the force of the ſociety for their exerciſe, it is almoſt impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in diſtinct, and not ſubordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power ſhould be placed in perſons that might act ſeparately, whereby the force of the publick would be under different commands, which would be apt, ſome time or other, to cauſe diſorder and ruin.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the ſubordination of the powers of the commonwealth.

149. THOUGH in a conſtituted commonwealth, ſtanding upon its own baſis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preſervation of the community, there can be but one ſupreme power, which is the legiſlative, to which all the reſt are, and muſt be ſubordinate, yet the legiſlative being only a fiduciary power, to act for certain ends, there remains ſtill, "in the people, a ſupreme power to remove, or alter, the legiſlative," when they find the legiſlative act contrary to the truſt repoſed in them. For all power given, with truſt for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever

that end is manifeſtly neglected, or oppoſed, the truſt muſt neceſſarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into thoſe hands of the that gave it, who may place it a-new, where they ſhall think beſt, for their ſafety and ſecurity. And thus the community perpetually retains a ſupreme power, of ſaving themſelves from the attempts and deſigns of any body, even of their legiſlators, whenever they ſhall be ſo fooliſh, or ſo wicked, as to lay, and carry on, deſigns againſt the liberties and properties of the ſubject. For no man, or ſociety of men having a power to deliver up their preſervation, nor conſequently the means of it, to the abſolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; whenever any one ſhall go about to bring them into ſuch a ſlaviſh condition, they will always have a right to preſerve what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themſelves of thoſe who invade this fundamental, ſacred, and unalterable law of ſelf-preſervation, for which they entered into ſociety. And thus the community may be ſaid in this reſpect to be always the ſupreme power, but not as conſidered under any form of government, becauſe this power of the people can never take place 'till the government be diſſolved.

150. In all caſes, whilſt the government ſubſiſts, the legiſlative is the ſupreme power. For what can give laws to another, muſt needs be ſuperior to him; and ſince the legiſlative is no otherwiſe legiſlative of the ſociety, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the ſociety, preſcribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are tranſgreſſed, the legiſlative muſt needs be the ſupreme, and all other powers in any members, or parts, of the ſociety, derived from, and ſubordinate to it.

151. In ſome commonwealths, where the legiſlative is not always in being, and the executive is veſted in a ſingle perſon, who has alſo a ſhare in the legiſlative; there that ſingle perſon, in a very tolerable ſenſe, may alſo be called ſupreme; not that he has in himſelf all the ſupreme power, which is that of law-making, but becauſe he has in him the ſupreme execution, from whom all inferior magiſtrates derive all their ſeveral, ſubordinate powers, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them; having alſo no legiſlative ſuperior to him, there being no law to be made without his conſent, which cannot be expected ſhould ever ſubject him to the other part of his legiſlative, he is properly enough in this ſenſe ſupreme. But yet it is to be obſerved, that though oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as ſupreme legiſlator, but as ſupreme executor, of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwiſe, than as the publick perſon, veſted with the power of the law, and ſo is to be conſidered as the image, phantom, or repreſentative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of the ſociety, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this repreſentation, this publick will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himſelf, and is but a ſingle private perſon, without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no obedience, but to the publick will of the ſociety.

152. The executive power placed any where, but in a perſon, that has alſo a ſhare in the legiſlative, is viſibly ſubordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleaſure changed and diſplaced; ſo that it is not the ſupreme executive power, that is exempt from ſubordination, but the ſupreme executive power, veſted in one, who having a ſhare in the legiſlative, has no diſtinct, ſuperior legiſlative, to be ſubordinate and accountable to, farther than he himſelf ſhall join and conſent; ſo that he is no more ſubordinate, than he himſelf ſhall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other miniſterial and ſubordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not ſpeak, they being ſo multiplied with infinite variety, in the different cuſtoms and conſtitutions of diſtinct commonwealths, that it is impoſſible to give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe, we may take notice of, concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is, by poſitive grant and commiſſion, delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to ſome other power in the commonwealth.

153. It is not neceſſary, nor ſo much as convenient, that the legiſlative ſhould be always in being. But abſolutely neceſſary that the executive power ſhould, becauſe there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the legiſlative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, they have a power ſtill to reſume it out of thoſe hands, when they find cauſe, and to puniſh for any maleadminiſtration againſt the laws. The ſame holds alſo, in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both miniſterial and ſubordinate to the legiſlative, which, as has been ſhewed, in a conſtituted commonwealth, is the ſupreme. The legiſlative alſo, in this caſe, being ſuppoſed to conſiſt of ſeveral perſons, (for if it be a ſingle perſon, it cannot but be always in being, and ſo will, as ſupreme, naturally have the ſupreme, executive power, together with the legiſlative) may aſſemble and exerciſe their legiſlature, at the times, that either their original conſtitution, or their own adjournment appoints; or when they pleaſe, if neither of theſe have appointed any time, or there be no other way preſcribed, to convoke them. For the ſupreme power being placed in them, by the people, it is always in them, and they may exerciſe it, when they pleaſe, unleſs by their original conſtitution, they are limited to certain ſeaſons; or, by an act of their ſupreme power, they have adjourned to a certain time; and, when that time comes, they have a right to aſſemble and act again.

154. If the legiſlative, or any part of it, be made up of repreſentatives, choſen for that time, by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary ſtate of ſubjects, and have no ſhare in the legiſlature, but upon a new choice, this power of chuſing muſt alſo be exerciſed by the people, either at certain appointed ſeaſons, or elſe when they are ſummoned to it; and, in this latter caſe, the power of convoking the legiſlative, is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of theſe two limitations, in reſpect of time: that either the original conſtitution requires their aſſembling and acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but miniſterially iſſue directions for their electing and aſſembling, according to due forms: or elſe it is left to his prudence to call them, by new elections, when the occaſions, or exigencies, of the publick require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or the redreſs, or prevention, of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.

155. It may be demanded here, what if the executive power, being poſſeſſed of the force of the commonwealth, ſhall make uſe of that force, to hinder the meeting and acting of the legiſlative, when the original conſtitution, or the publick exigencies require it? I ſay uſing force upon the people, without authority, and contrary to the truſt, put in him that does ſo, is a ſtate of war with the people, who have a right to reinſtate their legiſlative, in the exerciſe of their power. For having erected a legiſlative, with an intent they ſhould exerciſe the power of making laws, either at certain ſet times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force, from what is ſo neceſſary to the ſociety, and wherein the ſafety and preſervation of the people conſiſts, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all ſtates and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppoſe force to it. The uſe of force without authority always puts him, that uſes it, into a ſtate of war, as the aggreſſor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.

156. The power of aſſembling and diſmiſſing the legiſlative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a ſuperiority over it, but is a fiduciary truſt placed in him, for the ſafety of the people, in a caſe, where the uncertainty and variableneſs of human affairs could not bear a ſteady, fixed rule. For it not being poſſible, that the firſt frames of the government ſhould, by any foreſight, be ſo much maſters of future events, as to be able to prefix ſo juſt periods of return and duration to the aſſemblies of the legiſlative, in all times to come, that might exactly anſwer all the exigencies of the commonwealth; the beſt remedy could be found for this defect, was to truſt this to the prudence of one, who was always to be preſent, and whoſe buſineſs it was to watch over the publick good. Conſtant, frequent meetings of the legiſlative, and long continuations of their aſſemblies, without neceſſary occaſion, could not but be burthenſome to the

people, and muſt neceſſarily, in time, produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be ſometimes ſuch, as to need their preſent help: any delay of their convening might endanger the publick; and ſometimes too their buſineſs might be ſo great, that the limited time of their ſitting might be too ſhort for their work, and rob the publick of that benefit, which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What, then, could be done in this caſe, to prevent the community from being expoſed, ſome time or other, to eminent hazard, on one ſide or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, ſet to the meeting and acting of the legiſlative, but to entruſt it to the prudence of ſome, who, being preſent and acquainted with the ſtate of publick affairs, might make uſe of this prerogative for the publick good? and where elſe could this be ſo well placed, as in his hands, who was intruſted with the execution of the laws, for the ſame end? Thus, ſuppoſing the regulation of times for the aſſembling and ſitting of the legiſlative, not ſettled by the original conſtitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power, depending on his good pleaſure, but with this truſt, always to have it exerciſed only for the publick weal, as the occurrences of times, and change of affairs, might require. Whether ſettled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legiſlative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the leaſt inconvenience attending it, it is not my buſineſs here to enquire; but only to ſhew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking, and diſſolving, ſuch conventions of the legiſlative, yet it is not thereby ſuperior to it.

157. THINGS of this world are in ſo conſtant a flux, that nothing remains long in the ſame ſtate. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their ſtations, flouriſhing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected deſolate corners, whilſt other unfrequented places grow into populous countries, fill'd with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing equally, and private intereſt often keeping up cuſtoms and privileges, when the reaſons of them are ceaſed, it often comes to paſs, that in governments, where part of the legiſlative conſiſts of repreſentatives, choſen by the people, that in tract of time this repreſentation becomes very unequal and diſproportionate to the reaſons it was at firſt eſtabliſhed upon. To what groſs abſurdities the following of cuſtom, when reaſon has left it, may lead, we may be ſatisfied, when we ſee the bare name of a town, of which there remains not ſo much as the ruins, where ſcarce ſo much houſing, as a ſheepcoat, or more inhabitants than a ſhepherd is to be found, ſends as many repreſentatives to the grand aſſembly of law-makers, as a whole county, numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This ſtrangers ſtand amazed at, and every one muſt confeſs needs a remedy; though moſt think it hard to find one, becauſe the conſtitution of the legiſlative being the original and ſupreme act of the ſociety, antecedent to all poſitive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And therefore the people, when the legiſlative is once conſtituted, having, in ſuch a government as we have been ſpeaking of, no power to act, as long as the government ſtands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of remedy.

158. "SALUS populi ſuprema lex," is certainly ſo juſt and fundamental a rule, that he, who ſincerely follows it, cannot dangerouſly err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the legiſlative, obſerving rather the true proportion, than faſhion, of repreſentation, regulates, not by old cuſtom, but true reaſon, the number of members in all places, that have a right to be diſtinctly repreſented, which no part of the people, however incorporated, can pretend to, but in proportion to the aſſiſtance, which it affords to the publick; it cannot be judged to have ſet up a new legiſlative, but to have reſtored the old and true one, and to have rectified the diſorders, which ſucceſſion of time had inſenſibly, as well as inevitably, introduced. For it being the intereſt, as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equal repreſentative; whoever brings it neareſt to that, is an undoubted friend to, and eſtabliſher of the government, and cannot miſs the conſent and approbation of the community. Prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the prince, to provide for the publick good in ſuch caſes, which depending upon unforeſeen and uncertain occurrences, cer-

tain and unalterable laws could not ſafely direct; whatſoever ſhall be done manifeſtly for the good of the people, and the eſtabliſhing the government upon its true foundations, is, and always will be juſt prerogative. The power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new repreſentatives, carries with it a ſuppoſition, that in time the meaſures of repreſentation might vary, and thoſe places have a juſt right to be repreſented, which before had none; and, by the ſame reaſon, thoſe ceaſe to have a right, and be too inconſiderable for ſuch a privilege, which before had it. It is not a change from the preſent ſtate, which perhaps corruption, or decay, has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of it to injure, or oppreſs the people, and to ſet up one part, or party, with a diſtinction from, and an unequal ſubjection of the reſt. Whatſoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the ſociety and people in general, upon juſt and laſting meaſures, will always, when done, juſtify itſelf; and whenever the people ſhall chuſe their repreſentatives, upon juſt and undeniably equal meaſures, ſuitable to the original frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the ſociety, whoever permitted, or cauſed them ſo to do.

CHAP. XIV.

Of prerogative.

159. WHERE the legiſlative and executive power are in diſtinct hands, (as they are, in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the good of the ſociety requires, that ſeveral things ſhould be left to the diſcretion of him, that has the executive power. For, the legiſlators not being able to foreſee and provide by laws, for all that may be uſeful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature, a right to make uſe of it for the publick good of the ſociety, in many caſes, where the municipal law has given no direction, 'till the legiſlative can conveniently be aſſembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for, and thoſe muſt neceſſarily be left to the diſcretion of him, that has the executive power in his hands, to be order'd by him, as the publick good and advantage ſhall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themſelves ſhould in ſome caſes give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. that as much as may be, all the members of the ſociety are to be preſerved. For ſince many accidents may happen, wherein a ſtrict and rigid obſervation of the laws may do harm, (as not to pull down an innocent man's houſe to ſtop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and a man may come ſometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no diſtinction of perſons, by an action that may deſerve reward and pardon; it is fit the ruler ſhould have a power in many caſes, to mitigate the ſeverity of the law, and pardon ſome offenders: For, the end of government being the preſervation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be ſpared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.

160. This power to act according to diſcretion, for the publick good, without the preſcription of the law, and ſometimes even againſt it, is that which is called prerogative. For ſince, in ſome governments, the law-making power is not always in being, and is uſually too numerous, and ſo too ſlow for the diſpatch requiſite to execution: and becauſe it is alſo impoſſible to foreſee, and ſo by laws to provide for all accidents, and neceſſities, that may concern the publick; or to make ſuch laws, as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigor, on all occaſions, and upon all perſons, that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice, which the laws do not preſcribe.

161. This power, whilſt employ'd for the benefit of the community, and ſuitably to the truſt and ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is queſtioned. For the people are very ſeldom, or never, ſcrupulous or

nice in the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilſt it is in any tolerable degree employ'd for the uſe it was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifeſtly againſt it. But if there comes to be a queſtion between the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exerciſe of ſuch prerogative to the good, or hurt, of the people, will eaſily decide that queſtion.

162. It is eaſy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when commonwealths differed little from families, in number of people, they differed from them too but little in number of laws; and the governors, being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almoſt all prerogative. A few eſtabliſhed laws ſerved the turn, and the diſcretion and care of the ruler ſupplied the reſt. But when miſtake, or flattery, prevailed with weak princes, to make uſe of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the publick good, the people were fain, by expreſs laws, to get prerogative determined, in thoſe points, wherein they found diſadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of prerogative, were by the people found neceſſary, in caſes which they, and their anceſtors, had left, in the utmoſt latitude, to the wiſdom of thoſe princes, who made no other but a right uſe of it, that is, for the good of their people.

163. And therefore, they have a very wrong notion of government, who ſay that the people have incroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by poſitive laws. For, in ſo doing, they have not pulled from the prince any thing, that of right belonged to him, but only declared that that power, which they indefinitely left in his, or his anceſtors hands, to be exerciſed for their good, was not a thing, which they intended him, when he uſed it otherwiſe. For, the end of government being the good of the community, whatſoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an incroachment upon any body, ſince no body in government can have a right tending to any other end. And thoſe only are incroachments, which prejudice, or hinder the publick good. Thoſe, who ſay otherwiſe, ſpeak as if the prince had a diſtinct and ſeparate intereſt from the good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and ſource from which ſpring almoſt all thoſe evils and diſorders, which happen in kingly governments. And, indeed, if that be ſo, the people under his government are not a ſociety of rational creatures, entered into a community, for their mutual good; they are not ſuch as have ſet rulers over themſelves, to guard and promote that good; but are to be look'd upon as a herd of inferior creatures, under the dominion of a maſter, who keeps them, and works them for his own pleaſure, or profit. If men were ſo void of reaſon and brutiſh, as to enter into ſociety on ſuch terms, prerogative might, indeed, be what ſome men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people.

164. But ſince a rational creature cannot be ſuppoſed, when free, to put himſelf into ſubjection to another for his own harm: (though where he finds a good and wiſe ruler, he may not perhaps think it either neceſſary, or uſeful, to ſet preciſe bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing, but the people's permitting their rulers to do ſeveral things, of their own free choice, where the law was ſilent, and ſometimes too againſt the direct letter of the law, for the publick good; and their acquieſcing in it, when ſo done. For as a good prince, who is mindful of the truſt put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do good: ſo a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power, which his predeceſſors exerciſed, without the direction of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him, by right of his office, which he may exerciſe at his pleaſure, to make, or promote, an intereſt, diſtinct from that of the public, gives the people an occaſion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilſt it was exerciſed for their good, they were content ſhould be tacitly allowed.

165. And therefore he, that will look into the hiſtory of England, will find, that prerogative was always largeſt in the hands of our wiſeſt and beſt princes; becauſe the people, obſerving the whole tendency of their actions to

be the publick good, conteſted not what was done, without law, to that end; or if any human frailty, or miſtake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared in ſome declinations from that end; yet 'twas viſible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the publick. The people, therefore, finding reaſon to be ſatisfied with theſe princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquieſced in what they did, and without the leaſt complaint, let them enlarge their prerogative, as they pleaſed; judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, ſince they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, the publick good.

166. Such god-like princes, indeed, had ſome title to arbitrary power, by that argument, that would prove abſolute monarchy the beſt government, as that which God himſelf governs the univerſe by; becauſe ſuch kings partook of his wiſdom and goodneſs. Upon this is founded that ſaying, "That the reigns "of good princes have always been moſt dangerous to the liberties of their "people." For when their ſucceſſors, managing the government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of thoſe good rulers into precedent, and make them the ſtandard of their prerogative, as if what had been done, only for the good of the people, was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they ſo pleaſed; it has often occaſioned conteſt, and ſometimes publick diſorders, before the people could recover their original right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never ſo: ſince 'tis impoſſible that any body, in the ſociety, ſhould ever have a right to do the people harm; tho' it be very poſſible and reaſonable, that the people ſhould not go about to ſet any bounds to the prerogatives of thoſe kings, or rulers, who themſelves tranſgreſſed not the bounds of the publick good. For "prerogative is nothing but "the power of doing publick good, without a rule."

167. The power of calling parliaments in England as to preciſe time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but ſtill with this truſt, that it ſhall be made uſe of, for the good of the nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occaſions ſhall require. For it being impoſſible to foreſee, which ſhould be always the fitteſt place for them to aſſemble in, and what the beſt ſeaſon; the choice of theſe was left with the executive power, as might be moſt ſubſervient to the publick good, and beſt ſuit the ends of parliaments.

168. The old queſtion will be aſked in this matter of prerogative, "But "who ſhall be judge, when this power is made a right uſe of?" I anſwer: Between an executive power in being, with ſuch a prerogative, and a legiſlative, that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth: as there can be none between the legiſlative and the people, ſhould either the executive or the legiſlative, when they have got the power in their hands, deſign, or go about to enſlave, or deſtroy them. The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other caſes, where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven. For the rulers, in ſuch attempts, exerciſing a power, the people never put into their hands, (who can never be ſuppoſed to conſent, that any body ſhould rule over them for their harm) do that, which they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any ſingle man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exerciſe of a power, without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cauſe of ſufficient moment. And therefore, though the people cannot be judge, ſo as to have, by the conſtitution of that ſociety, any ſuperior power, to determine and give effective ſentence in the caſe; yet they have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all poſitive laws of men, reſerved that ultimate determination to themſelves, which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have juſt cauſe to make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of man's power ſo to ſubmit himſelf to another, as to give him a liberty to deſtroy him; God and nature never allowing a man ſo to abandon himſelf, as to neglect his own preſervation: and ſince he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation

tion for diſorder; for this operates not, 'till the inconvenience is ſo great that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a neceſſity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wiſe princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing of all others, they have moſt need to avoid, as of all others the moſt perilous.

CHAP. XV.

Of paternal, political and deſpotical power, conſidered together.

169. THOUGH I have had occaſion to ſpeak of theſe ſeparately before, yet the great miſtakes of late about government, having, as I ſuppoſe, ariſen from confounding theſe diſtinct powers, one with another, it may not perhaps be amiſs to conſider them here together.

170. FIRST then, paternal, or parental power is nothing, but that which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's good, 'till they come to the uſe of reaſon, or a ſtate of knowledge, wherein they may be ſuppoſed capable to underſtand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themſelves by: capable I ſay, to know it, as well as ſeveral others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderneſs, which God hath planted in the breaſts of parents, towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a ſevere, arbitrary government, but only for the help, inſtruction and preſervation of their offspring. But happen as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reaſon, why it ſhould be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body elſe; neither can there be any pretence, why this parental power ſhould keep the child, when grown to a man, in ſubjection to the will of his parents, any farther than the having receiv'd life, and education from his parents, obliges him to reſpect, honour, gratitude, aſſiſtance, and ſupport, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, it is true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itſelf to the ends and juriſdiction of that which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own diſpoſing.

171. SECONDLY, political power is that power, which, every man having in the ſtate of nature, has given up into the hands of the ſociety, and therein to the governors, whom the ſociety hath ſet over itſelf, with this expreſs, or tacit, truſt, that it ſhall be employ'd for their good, and the preſervation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the ſtate of nature, and which he parts with, to the ſociety, in all ſuch caſes, where the ſociety can ſecure him, is to uſe ſuch means for the preſerving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to puniſh the breach of the law of nature in others ſo as (according to the beſt of his reaſon) may moſt conduce to the preſervation of himſelf, and the reſt of mankind. So that the end and meaſure of this power, when in every man's hands, in the ſtate of nature, being the preſervation of all of this ſociety, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end, or meaſure, when in the hands of the magiſtrates, but to preſerve the members of that ſociety, in their lives, liberties, and poſſeſſions; and ſo cannot be an abſolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as poſſible to be preſerved; but a power to make laws, and annex ſuch penalties to them, as may tend to the preſervation of the whole, by cutting off thoſe parts, and thoſe only, which are ſo corrupt, that they threaten the ſound and healthy, without which no ſeverity is lawful. And this power has its original, only from compact and agreement, and the mutual conſent of thoſe, who make up the community.

172. THIRDLY, deſpotical power is an abſolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleaſes. This is a power,

which neither nature gives, for it has made no ſuch diſtinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey, for man, not having ſuch an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man ſuch a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggreſſor makes of his own life, when he puts himſelf into the ſtate of war with another. For, having quitted reaſon, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond, whereby human kind is united into one fellowſhip and ſociety; and having renounced the way of peace, which that teaches, and made uſe of the force of war, to compaſs his unjuſt ends upon another, where he has no right; and ſo revolting from his own kind, to that of beaſts, by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right, he renders himſelf liable to be deſtroy'd by the injured perſon, and the reſt of mankind, that will join with him, in the execution of juſtice, as any other wild beaſt, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither ſociety, nor ſecurity. And thus captives, taken in a juſt and lawful war, and ſuch only, are ſubject to a deſpotical power; which, as it ariſes not from compact, ſo neither is it capable of any, but is the ſtate of war continued. For what compact can be made with a man, that is not maſter of his own life? What condition can he perform? And if he be once allowed to be maſter of his own life, the deſpotical, arbitrary power of his maſter ceaſes. He that is maſter of himſelf, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preſerving it: ſo that, as ſoon as compact enters, ſlavery ceaſes, and he ſo far quits his abſolute power, and puts an end to the ſtate of war, who enters into conditions with his captive.

173. Nature gives the firſt of theſe, viz. paternal power to parents, for the benefit of their children, during their minority, to ſupply their want of ability and underſtanding how to manage their property. (By property I muſt be underſtood here, as in other places, to mean that property, which men have in their perſons, as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the ſecond, viz. political power to governors, for the benefit of their ſubjects, to ſecure them in the poſſeſſion and uſe of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third, deſpotical power to lords, for their own benefit, over thoſe who are ſtripped of all property.

174. He, that ſhall conſider the diſtinct riſe and extent, and the different ends of theſe ſeveral powers, will plainly ſee, that paternal power comes as far ſhort of that of the magiſtrate, as deſpotical exceeds it; and that abſolute dominion, however placed, is ſo far from being one kind of civil ſociety, that it is as inconſiſtent with it, as ſlavery is with property. Paternal power is only, where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have property in their own diſpoſal; and deſpotical, over ſuch as have no property at all.

CHAP. XVI.

Of conqueſt.

175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other riſe, than that before-mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing, but the conſent of the people; yet ſuch have been the diſorders ambition has filled the world with, that, in the noiſe of war, which makes ſo great a part of the hiſtory of mankind, this conſent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have miſtaken the force of arms, for the conſent of the people; and reckon conqueſt, as one of the originals of government. But conqueſt is as far, from ſetting up any government, as demoliſhing an houſe is, from building a new one in the place. Indeed it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by deſtroying the former; but, without the conſent of the people, can never erect a new one.

176. That the aggreſſor, who puts himſelf into the ſtate of war with another, and unjuſtly invades another man's right, can, by ſuch an unjuſt war,

never come to have a right over the conquered, wil be eaſily agreed by all men, who will not think that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire, over whomſoever they have force enough to maſter; or that men are bound by promiſes, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my houſe, and with a dagger at my throat, make me ſeal deeds to convey my eſtate to him, would this give him any title? Juſt ſuch a title by his ſword, has an unjuſt conqueror, who forces me into ſubmiſſion. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or ſome petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, unleſs it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers puniſh little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs; becauſe they are too big for the weak hands of juſtice in this world, and have the power, in their own poſſeſſion, which ſhould puniſh offenders. What is my remedy againſt a robber, that ſo broke into my houſe? Appeal to the law for juſtice. But perhaps juſtice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot ſtir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of ſeeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my ſon, when able, may ſeek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he, or his ſon, may renew his appeal, 'till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal, 'till they recovered the native right of their anceſtors; which was to have ſuch a legiſlative over them, as the majority ſhould approve, and freely acquieſce in. If it be objected, this would cauſe endleſs trouble; I anſwer, no more than juſtice does, where ſhe lies open to all that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cauſe, is puniſhed for it, by the juſtice of the court he appeals to. And he that appeals to heaven, muſt be ſure he has right on his ſide: and a right too, that is worth the trouble and coſt of his appeal, as he will anſwer at a tribunal, that cannot be deceived, and will be ſure to retribute to every one, according to the miſchiefs he hath created to his fellow-ſubjects, that is, any part of mankind. From whence 'tis plain that he, that “ conquers in an “ unjuſt war, can thereby have no title to the ſubjection and obedience of the “ conquered.”

177. BUT ſuppoſing victory favours the right ſide, let us conſider the conqueror in a lawful war, and ſee what power he gets, and over whom.

Firſt, 'TIS plain he “ gets no power, by his conqueſt, over thoſe that con“ quer'd with him”. They that fought, on his ſide, cannot ſuffer by the conqueſt, but muſt at leaſt be as much freemen, as they were before. And moſt commonly they ſerve upon terms, and on condition to ſhare with their leader, and enjoy a part of the ſpoil, and other advantages, that attend the conquering ſword: or at leaſt have a part of the ſubdued country beſtowed upon them. And “ the conquering people are not, I hope to be ſlaves by conqueſt,” and wear their laurels only to ſhew, they are ſacrifices to their leader's triumph. They, that found abſolute monarchy upon the title of the ſword, make their heroes, who are the founders of ſuch monarchies, arrant draw-can-ſirs, and forget they had any officers and ſoldiers, that fought on their ſide, in the battles they won, or aſſiſted them in the ſubduing, or ſhared in poſſeſſing the countries they maſtered. We are told by ſome, that the Engliſh monarchy is founded in the Norman conqueſt, and that our princes have thereby a title to abſolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by hiſtory it appears otherwiſe) and that William had a right to make war on this iſland; yet his dominion by conqueſt could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all deſcended from them, are freemen, and no ſubjects by conqueſt; let that give what dominion it will. And if I, or any body elſe, ſhall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and 'ts plain, the law, that has made no diſtinction between the one and the other, intends not there ſhould be any difference in their freedom, or privileges.

178. BUT ſuppoſing, which ſeldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the ſame laws and freedom: let us ſee next "what power a lawful conqueror has over the ſubdued:" and that, I ſay, is purely deſpotical. He has an abſolute power over the lives of thoſe, who, by an unjuſt war, have forfeited them; but not over the lives, or fortunes of thoſe, who engaged not in the war, nor over the poſſeſſions even of thoſe, who were actually engaged in it.

179. Secondly, I SAY then, the conqueror gets no power, but only over thoſe who have actually aſſiſted, concurred, or conſented to that unjuſt force, that is uſed againſt him. For the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjuſt thing, ſuch as is to make an unjuſt war, (for they never had ſuch a power in themſelves;) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and injuſtice, that is committed in an unjuſt war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more, than they are to be thought guilty of any violence, or oppreſſion, their governors ſhould uſe upon the people themſelves, or any part of their fellow-ſubjects; they have impowered them no more to one, than to the other. Conquerors, 'tis true, ſeldom trouble themſelves to make the diſtinction, but they willingly permit the confuſion of war to ſweep all together; but yet this alters not the right: for the conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered, being only, becauſe they have uſed force to do, or maintain, an injuſtice, he can have that power only over thoſe, who have concurred in that force, all the reſt are innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and ſo have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who without any injuries, or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

180, Thirdly, THE power a conqueror gets, over thoſe he overcomes in a juſt war, is perfectly deſpotical; he has an abſolute power over the lives of thoſe, who, by putting themſelves in a ſtate of war have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right, and title, to their poſſeſſions. This, I doubt not, but at firſt ſight will ſeem a ſtrange doctrine, it being ſo quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar, in ſpeaking of the dominion of countries, than to ſay ſuch an one conquered it. As if conqueſt, without any more ado, conveyed a right of poſſeſſion. But, when we conſider, that the practice of the ſtrong and powerful, how univerſal ſoever it may be, is ſeldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the ſubjection of the conquered, not to argue againſt the conditions, cut out to them, by the conquering ſword.

181. THOUGH in all war there be uſually a complication of force and damage, and the aggreſſor ſeldom fails to harm the eſtate, when he uſes force againſt the perſons of thoſe he makes war upon; yet 'tis the uſe of force only, that puts a man into the ſtate of war. For whether, by force, he begins the injury, or elſe, having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuſes to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the ſame thing, as at firſt to have done it by force) 'tis the unjuſt uſe of force, that makes the war. For he that breaks open my houſe, and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the ſame thing; ſuppoſing we are in ſuch a ſtate, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to ſubmit: for of ſuch I am now ſpeaking. 'Tis the "unjuſt uſe of force, then, that puts a man into the "ſtate of war" with another, and thereby he, that is guilty of it, makes a forfeiture of his life. For quitting reaſon, which is the rule given between man and man, and uſing force, the way of beaſts, he becomes liable to be deſtroyed by him, he uſes force againſt, as any ſavage, ravenous beaſt, that is dangerous to his being.

182. BUT, becauſe the miſcarriages of the father are no faults of the children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithſtanding the brutiſhneſs and injuſtice of the father; the father, by his miſcarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his guilt, or deſtruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preſervation of all mankind, as much

as is poſſible, hath made to belong to the children, to keep them from periſhing, do ſtill continue to belong to his children. For ſuppoſing them not to have joined in the war, either through infancy, abſence, or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare title of having ſubdued him, that by force attempted his deſtruction; though perhaps, he may have ſome right to them, to repair the damages he has ſuſtained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how far it reaches to the poſſeſſions of the conquered, we ſhall ſee by and by. So that he that, by conqueſt, has a right over a man's perſon to deſtroy him, if he pleaſes, has not thereby a right over his eſtate, to poſſeſs and enjoy it. For it is the brutal force the aggreſſor has uſed, that gives his adverſary a right, to take away his life, and deſtroy him, if he pleaſes, as a noxious creature; but 'tis damage ſuſtained, that alone gives him title to another man's goods: for, though I may kill a thief, that ſets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which ſeems leſs) take away his money, and let him go; this would be robbery on my ſide. His force, aud the ſtate of war he put himſelf in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right, then, of conqueſt extends only to the lives of thoſe, who joined in the war, not to their eſtates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reſervation of the right of the innocent wife and children.

183. Let the conqueror have as much juſtice on his ſide, as could be ſuppoſed, he has no right to ſeize more than the vanquiſhed could forfeit; his life is at the victor's mercy, and his ſervice and goods he may appropriate, to make himſelf reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their ſhares in the eſtate he poſſeſſed. For example, I in the ſtate of nature (and all commonwealths are in the ſtate of nature, one with another) have injured another man, and refuſing to give ſatisfaction, it comes to a ſtate of war, wherein my defending by force, what I had gotten unjuſtly, makes me the aggreſſor. I am conquered: my life, 'tis true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. They made not the war, nor aſſiſted in it. I could not forfeit their lives, they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a ſhare in my eſtate, that neither could I forfeit. And my children alſo, being born of me, had a right to be maintained, out of my labour, or ſubſtance. Here then is the caſe; the conqueror has a title to reparation, for damages received, and the children have a title to their father's eſtate, for their ſubſiſtence. For, as to the wife's ſhare, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, 'tis plain, her huſband could not forfeit what was her's. What muſt be done in the caſe? I anſwer, The fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, ſhould be preſerved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to ſatisfy both, viz. for the conqueror's loſſes, and children's maintenance, he that hath, and to ſpare, muſt remit ſomething of his full ſatisfaction, and give way to the preſſing and preferable title of thoſe, who are in danger to periſh without it.

184. But ſuppoſing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror to the uttermoſt farthing; and that the children of the vanquiſhed, ſpoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to ſtarve and periſh; yet the ſatisfying of what ſhall, on this ſcore, be due to the conqueror, will ſcarce give him a title to any country, he ſhall conquer. For the damages of war can ſcarce amount to the value of any conſiderable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is poſſeſſed, and none lies waſte. And, if I have not taken away the conqueror's land, which, being vanquiſhed, it is impoſſible I ſhould; ſcarce any other ſpoil I have done him, can amount to the value of mine, ſuppoſing it equally cultivated, and of an extent, any way, coming near what I had over-run of his, The deſtruction of a year's product or two, (for it ſeldom reaches four, or five) is the utmoſt ſpoil, that uſually can be done. For as to money, and ſuch riches, and treaſure taken away, theſe are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantaſtical, imaginary value; nature has put no ſuch upon them: they are of no more account, by her ſtandard, than

the wampompeke of the Americans, to an European, or the ſilver money of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is poſſeſſed, and none remains waſte, to be taken up by him that is diſſeized: which will eaſily be granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the diſproportion being more than between five and five hundred. Though, at the ſame time, half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being no more land, than the inhabitants poſſeſs, and make uſe of, any one has liberty to make uſe of the waſte: but, there, conquerors take little care to poſſeſs themſelves of the lands of the vanquiſhed. No damage therefore, that men in the ſtate of nature (as all princes and governments are, in reference to one another) ſuffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to diſpoſſeſs the poſterity of the vanquiſhed, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the poſſeſſion of them and their deſcendants, to all generations. The conqueror, indeed, will be apt to think himſelf maſter: and it is the very condition of the ſubdued, not to be able to diſpute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other title, than what bare force gives to the ſtronger, over the weaker: and, by this reaſon, he that is ſtrongeſt will have a right to whatever he pleaſes to ſeize on.

185. Over thoſe, then, that joined with him in the war, and over thoſe of the ſubdued country, that oppoſed him not, and the poſterity even of thoſe that did, the conqueror, even in a juſt war, hath, by his conqueſt, no right of dominion: they are free from any ſubjection to him, and if their former government be diſſolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themſelves.

186. The conqueror, it is true, uſually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a ſword at their breaſt, to ſtoop to his conditions, and ſubmit to ſuch a government, as he pleaſes to afford them; but the enquiry is, "What "right he has to do ſo?" If it be ſaid, they ſubmit, by their own conſent, then this allows their own conſent to be neceſſary, to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be conſidered, whether promiſes, extorted by force, without right, can be thought conſent, and how far they bind. To which I ſhall ſay, they bind not at all; becauſe whatſoever another gets from me by force, I ſtill retain the right of, and he is obliged preſently to reſtore. He that forces my horſe from me, ought preſently to reſtore him, and I have ſtill a right to retake him. By the ſame reaſon, he that forced a promiſe from me, ought preſently to reſtore it, i. e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may reſume it myſelf, i. e. chuſe whether I will perform it. For the law of nature laying an obligation on me, only by the rule ſhe preſcribes, cannot oblige me, by the violation of her rules: ſuch is the extorting any thing from me, by force. Nor does it at all alter the caſe to ſay, "I gave my promiſe," no more than it excuſes the force, and paſſes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purſe myſelf to a thief, who demands it with a piſtol at my breaſt.

187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, impoſed by force on the ſubdued, againſt whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war againſt him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them.

188. But let us ſuppoſe, that all the men of that community, being all members of the ſame body politick, may be taken to have joined in that unjuſt war, wherein they are ſubdued, and ſo their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror.

189. I say, this concerns not their children, who are in their minority. For ſince a father hath not, in himſelf, a power over the life and liberty of his child, no act of his can poſſibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the abſolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther, than the perſons of the men, that were ſubdued by him, and dies with them; and ſhould he govern them as ſlaves, ſubjected to his abſolute, arbitrary power, he has no ſuch right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over them, but by their own conſent, whatever he may drive them to ſay, or do; and he has no lawful authority, whilſt force, and not choice, compells them to ſubmiſſion.

190. Every man is born with a double right: firſt, a right of freedom to his perſon, which no other man has a power over, but the free diſpoſal of it lies in himſelf. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit, with his brethren, his father's goods.

191. By the firſt of theſe, a man is naturally free from ſubjection to any government, though he be born in a place, under its juriſdiction. But if he diſclaim the lawful government of the country, he was born in, he muſt alſo quit the right, that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the poſſeſſions there, deſcending to him from his anceſtors, if it were a government made by their conſent.

192. By the ſecond, the inhabitants of any country, who are deſcended and derive a title to their eſtates, from thoſe who are ſubdued, and had a government forced upon them, againſt their free conſents, retain a right to the poſſeſſion of their anceſtors, though they conſent not freely to the government, whoſe hard conditions were by force impoſed on the poſſeſſors of that country. For, the firſt conqueror, never having had a title to the land of that country, the people, who are the deſcendants of, or claim under, thoſe who were forced to ſubmit to the yoke of a government, by conſtraint, have always a right to ſhake it off, and free themſelves from the uſurpation, or tyranny, which the ſword hath brought in upon them, until their rulers put them under ſuch a frame of government, as they willingly and of choice conſent to. Who doubts, but the Grecian chriſtians, deſcendants of the ancient poſſeſſors of that country, may juſtly caſt off the Turkiſh yoke, which they have ſo long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience, from a people, who have not freely conſented to it; which they can never be ſuppoſed to do, till either they are put in a full ſtate of liberty, to chuſe their government and governors, or at leaſt 'till they have ſuch ſtanding laws, to which they have, by themſelves or their repreſentatives, given their free conſent, and alſo, 'till they are allowed their due property, which is ſo to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own conſent; without which, men, under any government, are not in the ſtate of freemen, but are direct ſlaves under the force of war.

193. But granting that the conqueror, in a juſt war, has a right to the eſtates, as well as power over the perſons, of the conquered; which 'tis plain he hath not: nothing of abſolute power will follow from hence, in the continuance of the government: becauſe, the deſcendants of theſe being all freemen, if he grants them eſtates and poſſeſſions, to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatſoever he grants them, they have, ſo far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that "without a man's own conſent it cannot be taken from him."

194. Their perſons are free, by a native right, and their properties, be they more or leſs, are their own, and at their own diſpoſal and not at his; or elſe it is no property. Suppoſing the conqueror gives to one man a thouſand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thouſand acres for his life, under the rent of 50l. or 500l. per ann. Has not the one of theſe a right to his thouſand acres for ever, and the other during his life, paying the ſaid rent? Aud hath not the tenant for life a property, in all that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and induſtry, during the ſaid term, ſuppoſing it be double the rent? Can any one ſay, the king or conqueror, after his grant, may, by his power of conqueror, take away all, or part of the land, from the heirs of one, or from the other, during his life, he paying the rent? Or can he take away from either, the goods, or money, they have got upon the ſaid land, at his pleaſure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts ceaſe, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to diſſolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promiſes of men in power, are but mockery and colluſion. For can there be any thing more ridiculous, than to ſay, "I give you and yours this "for ever; and that in the ſureſt and moſt ſolemn way of conveyance can be "deviſed: and yet it is to be underſtood that I have a right, if I pleaſe, to take "it away from you again to-morrow?"

x delusion.

195. I will

195. I will not diſpute now, whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country: but this I am ſure, they owe ſubjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. Thoſe are ſo great, and ſo ſtrong, in the caſe of promiſes, that Omnipotency itſelf can be tied by them. Grants, promiſes, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty; whatever ſome flatterers ſay to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in compariſon of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a duſt on the balance, inconſiderable, nothing.

196. The ſhort of the caſe, in conqueſt, is this, The conqueror, if he have a juſt cauſe, has a deſpotical right over the perſons of all, that actually aided, and concurred in the war againſt him, and a right to make up his damage and coſt, out of their labour and eſtates, ſo he injure not the right of any other. Over the reſt of the people, if there were any that conſented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themſelves, or the poſſeſſions of either, he has no power, and ſo can have, by virtue of conqueſt, no lawful title himſelf to dominion over them, or derive it to his poſterity, but is an aggreſſor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himſelf in a ſtate of war againſt them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his ſucceſſors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke caſt off, as ſoon as God ſhall give thoſe, under their ſubjection, courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithſtanding whatever title the kings of Aſſyria had over Judah by the ſword, God aſſiſted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. "And the Lord was with Hezekiah, and he proſpered; " wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled againſt the king of Aſſyria, and " ſerved him not," 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence 'tis plain, that ſhaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath ſet over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that, which he allows and countenances, though even promiſes and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened. For it is very probable, to any one that reads the ſtory of Ahaz, and Hezekiah attentively, that the Aſſyrians ſubdued Ahaz, and depoſed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father's life-time; and that Hezekiah, by agreement, had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.

CHAP. XVII.

Of uſurpation.

197. As conqueſt may be called a foreign uſurpation, ſo uſurpation is a kind of domeſtick conqueſt; with this difference, that an uſurper can never have right on his ſide, it being no uſurpation, but where one is got into the poſſeſſion of what another has right to. This, ſo far as it is uſurpation, is a change only of perſons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for if the uſurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors, of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to uſurpation.

198. In all lawful governments, the deſignation of the perſons, who are to bear rule, is as natural and neceſſary a part, as the form of the government itſelf, and is that, which had its firſt eſtabliſhment originally from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it ſhall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to deſign the perſon, that ſhall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government eſtabliſhed, have rules alſo of appointing thoſe, who are to have any ſhare in the publick authority, and ſettled methods of conveying the right to them. For the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it ſhall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know, or deſign, the perſon, that ſhall have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exerciſe of any part of the power, by other ways than

what the laws of the community have preſcribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be ſtill preſerved; ſince he is not the perſon the laws have appointed, and conſequently not the perſon the people have conſented to. Nor can ſuch an uſurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, 'till the people are both at liberty to conſent, and have actually conſented to allow, and confirm in him, the power he hath, 'till then uſurped.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of tyranny.

199. As uſurpation is the exerciſe of power, which another hath a right to; ſo tyranny is the exerciſe of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to. And this is making uſe of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of thoſe, who are under it, but for his own private, ſeparate advantage: when the governor, however entituled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his command and actions are not directed to the preſervation of the properties of his people, but the ſatisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetouſneſs, or any other irregular paſſion.

200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reaſon, becauſe it comes from the obſcure hand of a ſubject, I hope the authority of a king will make it paſs with him. King James the firſt, in his ſpeech to the parliament 1603, tells them thus, "I will ever prefer the weal of the publick, and of the whole com-" monwealth, in making of good laws and conſtitutions, to any particu-" lar and private ends of mine. Thinking ever the wealth and weal of the " commonwealth to be my greateſt weal and worldly felicity; a point, wherein " a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant. For I do acknowledge, that " the ſpecial and greateſt point of difference, that is between a rightful king and " an uſurping tyrant, is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth " think his kingdom and people are only ordain'd for ſatisfaction of his deſires " and unreaſonable appetites; the righteous and juſt king doth by the contra-" ry, acknowledge himſelf to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and " proſperity of his people." And again, in his ſpeech to the parliament 1609, he hath theſe words, "the king binds himſelf, by a double oath, to the ob-" ſervation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom. Tacitly, as by being a " king, and ſo bound to protect, as well the people, as the laws of his king-" dom; and expreſly, by his oath at his coronation; ſo as every juſt king, in a " ſettled kingdom, is bound to obſerve that paction, made to his people, by his " laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction, " which God made with Noah, after the deluge: "hereafter, ſeed-time and " harveſt, and cold and heat, and ſummer and winter, and day and night ſhall " not ceaſe, while the earth remaineth." And, therefore, a king governing in a " ſettled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as ſoon as " he leaves off to rule according to his laws." And, a little after, "therefore " all kings, that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themſelves, " within the limits of their laws. And they that perſuade them the contrary, " are vipers and peſts, both againſt them and the commonwealth." Thus that learned king, who well underſtood the notions of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant, to conſiſt only in this, that one makes the laws, the bounds of his power; and the good of the publick, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

201. It is a miſtake to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that. For, wherever the power, that is put in any hands, for the government of the people, and the preſervation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made uſe of to impoveriſh, haraſs, or ſubdue them to the arbitrary, and irregular commands of thoſe that have it; there it preſently becomes tyranny, whether thoſe, that thus uſe it, are one, or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syra-

cuſe; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri, at Rome, was nothing better.

202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins; if the law be trangreſſed to another's harm. And whoſoever in authority exceeds the power, given him by the law, and makes uſe of the force he has, under his command, to compaſs that, upon the ſubject which the law allows not, ceaſes in that to be a magiſtrate, and acting without authority, may be oppoſed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in ſubordinate magiſtrates. He that hath authority to ſeize my perſon in the ſtreet, may be oppoſed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my houſe to execute a writ, notwithſtanding that I know, he has ſuch a warrant, and ſuch a legal authority, as will impower him to arreſt me abroad. And why this ſhould not hold in the higheſt, as well as in the moſt inferior magiſtrate, I would gladly be inform'd. Is it reaſonable that the eldeſt brother, becauſe he has the greateſt part of his father's eſtate, ſhould thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brother's portions? Or that a rich man, who poſſeſſed a whole country, ſhould from thence have a right to ſeize, when he pleaſed, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully poſſeſſed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greateſt part of the ſons of Adam, is ſo far from being an excuſe, much leſs a reaſon, for rapine and oppreſſion, which the endamaging another, without authority, is; that it is a great aggravation of it. For the exceeding the bounds of authority, is no more a right in a great, than a petty officer; no more juſtifiable in a king, than a conſtable: but it is ſo much the worſe in him, in that he has more truſt put in him, has already a much greater ſhare, than the reſt of his brethren, and is ſuppoſed from the advantages of his education, employment, and counſellors, to be more knowing in the meaſures of right and wrong.

203. "May the commands, then of a prince be oppoſed? May he be reſiſt-
"ed, as often as any one ſhall find himſelf aggrieved, and but imagine he has
"not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and inſtead
"of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confuſion."

204. To this I anſwer: That force is to be oppoſed to nothing, but to unjuſt and unlawful force; whoever makes any oppoſition, in any other caſe, draws on himſelf a juſt condemnation, both from God and man; and ſo no ſuch danger, or confuſion, will follow, as is often ſuggeſted. For,

205. Firſt, As in ſome countries the perſon of the prince, by the law, is ſacred; and ſo, whatever he commands, or does, his perſon is ſtill free from all queſtion or violence, not liable to force, nor any judicial cenſure, or condemnation: but yet oppoſition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other, commiſſion'd by him, unleſs he will, by actually putting himſelf into a ſtate of war with his people, diſſolve the government, and leave them to that defence, which belongs to every one in the ſtate of nature. For of ſuch things, who can tell what the end will be? And a neighbour kingdom has ſhew'd the world an odd example. In all other caſes, the ſacredneſs of the perſon exempts him from all inconveniences, whereby he is ſecure whiſt the government ſtands, from all violence and harm whatſoever; than which there cannot be a wiſer conſtitution. For the harm he can do in his own perſon, not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itſelf far; nor being able, by his ſingle ſtrength, to ſubvert the laws, nor oppreſs the body of the people, ſhould any prince have ſo much weakneſs and ill nature, as to be willing to do it; the inconveniency of ſome particular miſchiefs, that may happen ſometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompenſed by the peace of the publick, and ſecurity of the government, in the perſon of the chief magiſtrate, thus ſet out of the reach of danger: it being ſafer for the body, that ſome few, private men ſhould be ſometimes in danger to ſuffer, than that the head of the republick ſhould be eaſily, and upon ſlight occaſions, expos'd.

206. Secondly, But this privilege belonging only to the king's perſon, hinders not, but they may be queſtioned, oppoſed and reſiſted, who uſe unjuſt force, hough they pretend a commiſſion from him, which the law authorizes not. As

is plain in the caſe of him, who has the king's writ to arreſt a man, which is a full commiſſion from the king; and yet he, that has it, cannot break open a man's houſe to do it, nor execute this command of the king, upon certain days, nor in certain places; though this commiſſion have no ſuch exception in it, but they are the limitations of the law, which, if any one tranſgreſs, the king's commiſſion excuſes him not. For the king's authority being given him, only by the law, he cannot impower any one to against the law, or juſtify him, by his commiſſion, in ſo doing. The commiſſion, or command, of any magiſtrate, where he has no authority, being as void and inſignificant, as that of any private man. The difference, between the one and the other, being, that the magiſtrate has ſome authority ſo far, and to ſuch ends, and the private man has none at all. For 'tis not the commiſſion, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and againſt the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithſtanding ſuch reſiſtance, the king's perſon and authority are ſtill both ſecured, and ſo no danger to governor, or government.

207. Thirdly, SUPPOSING a government, wherein the perſon of the chief magiſtrate is not thus ſacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulneſs of reſiſting all unlawful exerciſes of his power, will not, upon every ſlight occaſion, endanger him, or embroil the government. For where the injured party may be reliev'd, and his damages repair'd, by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be uſed, where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law. For nothing is to be accounted hoſtile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of ſuch an appeal. And 'tis ſuch force alone, that puts him, that uſes it, into a ſtate of war, and makes it lawful to reſiſt him. A man, with a ſword in his hand, demands my purſe in the high-way, when perhaps I have not 12d. in my pocket; this man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100l. to hold, only whilſt I alight, which he refuſes to reſtore me, when I am got up again, but draws his ſword to defend the poſſeſſion of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The miſchief this man does me, is a hundred, or poſſibly a thouſand times more, than the other perhaps intended me, (whom I kill'd, before he really did me any) and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot ſo much as hurt the other lawfully. The reaſon whereof is plain; becauſe the one, uſing force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to ſecure it: and when it was gone, 'twas too late to appeal: the law could not reſtore life to my dead carcaſs: the loſs was irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to deſtroy him, who had put himſelf into a ſtate of war with me, and threatened my deſtruction. But, in the other caſe, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100l. that way.

208. Fourthly, BUT if the unlawful acts, done by the magiſtrate, be maintained (by the power he has got) and the remedy, which is due by law, be, by the ſame power, obſtructed; yet the right of reſiſting, even in ſuch manifeſt acts of tyranny, will not ſuddenly, or on ſlight occaſions, diſturb the government. For, if it reach no farther, than ſome private men's caſes, tho' they have a right to defend themſelves, and to recover by force, what, by unlawful force, is taken from them; yet the right to do ſo will not eaſily engage them in a conteſt, wherein they are ſure to periſh; it being as impoſſible for one, or a few, oppreſſed men to diſturb the government, where the body of the people do not think themſelves concerned in it, as for a raving madman, or heady malecontent, to overturn a well-ſettled ſtate; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.

209. BUT, if either theſe illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the miſchief and oppreſſion has light only on ſome few, but in ſuch caſes, as the precedent and conſequences ſeem to threaten all, and they are perſuaded in their conſciences, that their laws, and, with them, their eſtates, liberties, and lives, are in danger, and perhaps their religion too, how they will be hindered from reſiſting illegal force uſed againſt them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confeſs, that attends all governments whatſoever, when the governors have brought it to this paſs, to be generally ſuſpected of their people;

the moſt dangerous ſtate, which they can poſſibly put themſelves in; wherein they are the leſs to be pitied, becauſe it is ſo eaſy to be avoided; it being as impoſſible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preſervation of them and their laws together, not to make them ſee and feel it; as it is for a father of a family, not to let his children ſee he loves, and takes care of them.

210. But, if all the world ſhall obſerve pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts uſed to elude the law, and the truſt of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in ſome things, left in the prince's hand, to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end, for which it was given: if the people ſhall find the miniſters and ſubordinate magiſtrates choſen, ſuitable to ſuch ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably, as they promote, or oppoſe them: if they ſee ſeveral experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured (though publickly proclaimed againſt) which is readieſt to introduce it; and the operators in it ſupported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved ſtill, and liked the better: if a long train of actings ſhew the councils all tending that way, how can a man any more hinder himſelf from being perſuaded in his own mind, which way things are going, or from caſting about how to ſave himſelf; than he could from believing the captain of the ſhip he was in, was carrying him and the reſt of the company to Algiers, when he found him always ſteering that courſe, though croſs winds, leaks in his ſhip, and want of men and proviſions did often force him to turn his courſe another way for ſome time, which he ſteadily returned to again, as ſoon as the wind, weather, and other circumſtances would let him?

CHAP. XIX.

Of the diſſolution of government.

211. He that will, with any clearneſs, ſpeak of the diſſolution of government, ought, in the firſt place, to diſtinguiſh between the diſſolution of the ſociety, and the diſſolution of the government. That, which makes the community, and brings men out of the looſe ſtate of nature, into one politick ſociety, is the agreement, which every one has with the reſt to incorporate, and act as one body, and ſo be one diſtinct commonwealth. The uſual and almoſt only way, whereby this union is diſſolved, is the inroad of foreign force, making a conqueſt upon them. For in that caſe, (not being able to maintain and ſupport themſelves, as one entire and independent body) the union belonging to that body, which conſiſted therein, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe, and ſo every one return to the ſtate, he was in before, with a liberty to ſhift for himſelf, and provide for his own ſafety, as he thinks fit, in ſome other ſociety. Whenever the ſociety is diſſolved, it is certain the government of that ſociety cannot remain. Thus conquerors ſwords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle ſocieties to pieces, ſeparating the ſubdued, or ſcattered multitude, from the protection of, and dependance on, that ſociety, which ought to have preſerved them from violence. The world is too well inſtructed in, and too forward to allow of this way of diſſolving of governments, to need any more to be ſaid of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that, where the ſociety is diſſolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impoſſible, as for the frame of an houſe to ſubſiſt, when the materials of it are ſcattered and diſſipated by a whirlwind, or jumbled into a confuſed heap by an earthquake.

212. Besides this overturning from without, governments are diſſolved from within,

Firſt, When the legiſlative is altered. Civil ſociety being a ſtate of peace, amongſt thoſe who are of it, from whom the ſtate of war is excluded, by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legiſlative, for the ending all differences, that may ariſe amongſt any of them; it is in their legiſlative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent, living body. This is the ſoul, that gives form, life and unity to the commonwealth: from hence the ſeveral members have their mutual influence, ſympathy and connection: and therefore, when the legiſlative is broken, or diſſolved, diſſolution and death follows. For the eſſence, and union, of the ſociety, conſiſting in having one will, the legiſlative, when once eſtabliſhed by the majority, has the declaring, and, as it were, keeping of that will. The conſtitution of the legiſlative is the firſt and fundamental act of the ſociety, whereby proviſion is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of perſons, and bonds of laws, made by perſons, authorized thereunto, by the conſent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongſt them can have authority of making laws, that ſhall be binding to the reſt. When any one or more, ſhall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed ſo to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey, by which means they come again to be out of ſubjection, and may conſtitute to themſelves a new legiſlative, as they think beſt, being in full liberty to reſiſt the force of thoſe, who, without authority, would impoſe any thing upon them. Every one is at the diſpoſure of his own will, when thoſe, who had, by the delegation of the ſociety, the declaring of the publick will, are excluded from it, and others uſurp the place, who have no ſuch authority, or delegation.

213. This being uſually brought about, by ſuch, in the commonwealth, who miſuſe the power they have; it is hard to conſider it aright, and know at whoſe door to lay it, without knowing the form of government, in which it happens. Let us ſuppoſe, then, the legiſlative placed in the concurrence of three diſtinct perſons.

1. A single, hereditary perſon having the conſtant, ſupreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking and diſſolving the other two, within certain periods of time.

2. An aſſembly of hereditary nobility.

3. An aſſembly of repreſentatives, choſen pro tempore by the people: ſuch a form of government ſuppoſed, it is evident,

214. Firſt, That when ſuch a ſingle perſon, or prince, ſets up his own arbitrary will, in place of the laws, which are the will of the ſociety, declared by the legiſlative, then the legiſlative is changed. For that being in effect the legiſlative, whoſe rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are ſet up, and other rules pretended and enforced, than what the legiſlative, conſtituted by the ſociety, have enacted, it is plain, that the legiſlative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized, by the fundamental appointment of the ſociety, or ſubverts the old, diſowns and overturns the power, by which they were made, and ſo ſets up a new legiſlative.

215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legiſlative from aſſembling, in its due time, or from acting freely, purſuant to thoſe ends, for which it was conſtituted, the legiſlative is altered. For it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unleſs they have alſo freedom of debating, and leiſure of perfecting what is for the good of the ſociety, wherein the legiſlative conſiſts; when theſe are taken away, or altered, ſo as to deprive the ſociety of the due exerciſe of their power, the legiſlative is truly altered. For it is not names, that conſtitute governments, but the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe powers, that were intended to accompany them; ſo that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legiſlative, in its due ſeaſons, in effect takes away the legiſlative, and puts an end to the government.

216. Thirdly, When by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the conſent, and contrary to the common intereſt of the people, there alſo the legiſlative is altered. For if others, than thoſe whom the ſociety hath authorized thereunto, do chuſe, or in another way than what the ſociety hath preſcribed, thoſe choſen are not the legiſlative appointed by the people.

217. Fourthly, The delivery, alſo, of the people into the ſubjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legiſlative, is certainly a change of the legiſlative, and ſo a diſſolution of the government. For the end, why people entered into ſociety, being to be preſerved one entire, free, independent ſociety, to be governed by its own laws; this is loſt, whenever they are given up into the power of another.

218. Why, in ſuch a conſtitution as this, the diſſolution of the government in theſe caſes is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; becauſe he having the force, treaſure and offices of the ſtate to employ, and often perſuading himſelf, or being flattered by others, that as ſupreme magiſtrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advances towards ſuch changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify, or ſuppreſs oppoſers, as factious, ſeditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legiſlative, or people is capable, by themſelves, to attempt any alteration of the legiſlative, without open, and viſible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conqueſt. Beſides, the prince, in ſuch a form of government, having the power of diſſolving the other parts of the legiſlative, and thereby rendering them private perſons, they can never, in oppoſition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legiſlative by a law, his conſent being neceſſary to give any of their decrees that ſanction. But yet, ſo far as the other parts of the legiſlative, any way, contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or do not what lies in them hinder ſuch deſigns, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greateſt crime men can be guilty of, one towards another.

219. There is one way more, whereby ſuch a government may be diſſolved, and that is, when he, who has the ſupreme, executive power, neglects and abandons that charge, ſo that the laws already made, can no longer be put in execution. This is demonſtratively to reduce all to anarchy, and ſo effectually to diſſolve the government. For, laws not being made for themſelves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the ſociety, to keep every part of the body politick in its due place and function, when that totally ceaſes, the government viſibly ceaſes, and the people become a confuſed multitude, without order or connection. Where there is no longer the adminiſtration of juſtice, for the ſecuring of men's rights, nor any remaining power, within the community, to direct the force, or provide for the neceſſities of the publick, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one, as if there were no laws; and a government without laws, is, I ſuppoſe a myſtery in politicks, inconceivable to human capacity, and inconſiſtent with human ſociety.

220. In theſe and the like caſes, when the government is diſſolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themſelves, by erecting a new legiſlative differing from the other, by the change of perſons, or form, or both, as they ſhall find it moſt for their ſafety and good. For the ſociety can never, by the fault of another, loſe the native and original right it has to preſerve itſelf, which can only be done by a ſettled legiſlative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the ſtate of mankind is not ſo miſerable, that they are not capable of uſing this remedy, 'till it be too late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themſelves, by erecting a new legiſlative, when by oppreſſion, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief, when it is too late, and the evil is paſt cure. This is in effect no more, than to bid them firſt be ſlaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely ſo, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be ſecure from tyranny, if there be no means to eſcape it, till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

221. There is therefore, ſecondly, another way whereby governments are diſſolved, and that is, when the legiſlative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their truſt.

Firſt, The legiſlative acts againſt the truſt repoſed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the ſubject, and to make themſelves, or any part of the community, maſters, or arbitrary diſpoſers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

222. The reaſon, why men enter into ſociety, is the preſervation of their property; and the end, why they chuſe and authorize a legiſlative, is that there may be laws made, and rules ſet, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the ſociety, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the ſociety. For ſince it can never be ſuppoſed to be the will of the ſociety, that the legiſlative ſhould have a power to deſtroy that, which every one deſigns to ſecure, by entering into ſociety, and for which the people ſubmitted themſelves to legiſlators of their own making, whenever the legiſlators endeavour to take away, and deſtroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to ſlavery under arbitrary power, they put themſelves into a ſtate of war with the people, who are thereupon abſolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, againſt force and violence. Whenſoever, therefore, the legiſlative ſhall tranſgreſs this fundamental rule of ſociety; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to graſp themſelves, or put into the hands of any other an abſolute power over the lives, liberties, and eſtates of the people; by this breach of truſt, they forfeit the power, the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to reſume their original liberty, and, by the eſtabliſhment of a new legiſlative, (ſuch as they ſhall think fit) provide for their own ſafety and ſecurity, which is the end, for which they are in ſociety. What I have ſaid here, concerning the legiſlative in general, holds true alſo, concerning the ſupreme executor, who having a double truſt put in him, both to have a part in the legiſlative, and the ſupreme execution of the law, acts againſt both, when he goes about to ſet up his own arbitrary will, as the law of the ſociety. He acts alſo contrary to his truſt, when he either employs the force, treaſure, and offices of the ſociety, to corrupt the repreſentatives, and gain them to his purpoſes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and preſcribes to their choice, ſuch, whom he has by ſollicitations, threats, promiſes, or otherwiſe won to his deſigns; and employs them to bring in ſuch, who have promiſed before-hand, what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the way of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poiſon the very fountain of publick ſecurity? For the people having reſerved to themſelves the choice of their repreſentatives, as a fence of their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely choſen, and ſo choſen, freely act and adviſe, as the neceſſity of the commonwealth, and the publick good ſhould, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, thoſe, who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reaſons on all ſides, are not capable of doing. To prepare ſuch an aſſembly as this, and endeavour to ſet up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true repreſentatives of the people, and the law-makers of the ſociety, is certainly as great a breach of truſt, and as perfect a declaration of a deſign to ſubvert the government, as is poſſible to be met with. To which, if one ſhall add rewards and puniſhments, viſibly employed to the ſame end, and all the arts of perverted law made uſe of, to take off and deſtroy all, that ſtand in the way of ſuch a deſign, and will not comply and conſent to betray the liberties of their country, 'twill be paſt doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the ſociety, who thus employ it, contrary, to the truſt went along with it, in its firſt inſtitution, is eaſy to determine; and one cannot but ſee, that he, who has once attempted any ſuch thing as this, cannot any longer be truſted.

223. To this perhaps it will be ſaid, that the people being ignorant, and always diſcontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unſteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expoſe it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to ſubſiſt, if the people may ſet up a new legiſlative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I anſwer, quite the contrary.

trary. People are not ſo eaſily got out of their old forms, as ſome are apt to ſuggeſt. They are hardly to be prevailed with, to amend the acknowledged faults, in the frame they have been accuſtomed to. And, if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones, introduced by time or corruption; 'tis not an eaſy thing to get them changed, even when all the world ſees there is an opportunity for it. This ſlowneſs and averſion in the people, to quit their old conſtitutions, has in the many revolutions, which have been ſeen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, ſtill kept us to, or, after ſome interval of fruitleſs attempts, ſtill brought us back again to, our old legiſlative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken, from ſome of our princes heads, they never carried the people ſo far, as to place it in another line.

224. But 'twill be ſaid, this hypotheſis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I anſwer,

Firſt, No more than any other hypotheſis. For when the people are made miſerable, and find themſelves expoſed to the ill uſage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for ſons of Jupiter, let them be ſacred and divine, deſcended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom, or what you pleaſe, the ſame will happen. The people, generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occaſion to eaſe themſelves of a burden, that ſits heavy upon them. They will wiſh and ſeek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakneſs and accidents in human affairs ſeldom delays long to offer itſelf. He muſt have lived but a little while in the world, who has not ſeen examples of this in his time; and he muſt have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it, in all ſorts of governments in the world.

225. Secondly, I answer, ſuch revolutions happen not, upon every little miſmanagement in publick affairs. Great miſtakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the ſlips of human frailty, will be borne by the people without mutiny, or murmur. But, if a long train of abuſes, prevarications and artifices, all tending the ſame way, make the deſign viſible to the people, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and ſee whither they are going; 'tis not to be wondered, that they ſhould then rouze themſelves, and endeavour to put the rule into ſuch hands, which may ſecure to them the ends, for which government was at firſt erected; and without which, ancient names and ſpecious forms, are ſo far from being better, that they are much worſe than the ſtate of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

226. Thirdly, I answer, That this doctrine, of a power in the people, of providing for their ſafety a-new, by a new legiſlative, when their legiſlators have acted contrary to their truſt, by invading their property, is the beſt fence againſt rebellion, and the probableſt means to hinder it. For rebellion being an oppoſition, not to perſons but authority, which is founded only in the conſtitutions and laws of the government; thoſe, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force juſtify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when men, by entering into ſociety and civil government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preſervation of property, peace and unity amongſt themſelves, thoſe, who ſet up force again, in oppoſition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the ſtate of war, and are properly rebels: which they, who are in power, (by the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of thoſe about them) being likelieſt to do; the propereſt way to prevent the evil, is to ſhew them the danger and injuſtice of it, who are under the greateſt temptation to run into it.

227. In both the forementioned caſes, when either the legiſlative is changed, or the legiſlators act contrary to the end, for which they were conſtituted; thoſe who are guilty, are guilty of rebellion. For if any one by force takes away the eſtabliſhed legiſlative of any ſociety, and the laws by them made, purſuant to their truſt, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had conſented to, for a peaceable deciſion of all their controverſies, and a bar to the

ſtate of war amongſt them. They, who remove, or change the legiſlative, take away this deciſive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and conſent of the people; and ſo deſtroying the authority, which the people did, and no body elſe can ſet up, and introducing a power, which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a ſtate of war, which is that of force, without authority: and thus by removing the legiſlative, eſtabliſhed by the ſociety, (in whoſe deciſions the people acquieſced and united, as to that of their own will) they untye the knot, and expoſe the people anew to the ſtate of war. And if thoſe, who by force take away the legiſlative, are rebels, the legiſlators themſelves, as has been ſhewn, can be no leſs eſteemed ſo; when they, who were ſet up for the protection and preſervation of the people, their liberties and properties, ſhall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and ſo they putting themſelves into a ſtate of war with thoſe, who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greateſt aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.

228. But if they, who ſay, "it lays a foundation for rebellion," mean that it may occaſion civil wars, or inteſtine broils, to tell the people, they are abſolved from obedience, when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties, or properties, and may oppoſe the unlawful violence of thoſe, who were their magiſtrates, when they invade their properties, contrary to the truſt put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being ſo deſtructive to the peace of the world: they may as well ſay, upon the ſame ground, that honeſt men may not oppoſe robbers, or pirates, becauſe this may occaſion diſorder, or bloodſhed. If any miſchief come in ſuch caſes, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him, that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honeſt man muſt quietly quit all he has for peace ſake, to him, who will lay violent hands upon it, I deſire it may be conſidered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which conſiſts only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppreſſors. Who would not think it an admirable peace, betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb without reſiſtance yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of ſuch a peace, and ſuch a government, wherein Ulyſſes and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to ſuffer themſelves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulyſſes, who was a prudent man, preached up paſſive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet ſubmiſſion, by repreſenting to them of what concernment peace was to mankind; and by ſhewing the inconveniencies might happen, if they ſhould offer to reſiſt Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is beſt for mankind, that the people ſhould be always expoſed to the boundleſs will of tyranny, or that the rulers ſhould be ſometimes liable to be oppoſed, when they grow exorbitant in the uſe of their power, and employ it for the deſtruction, and not the preſervation of the properties of their people?

230. Nor let any one ſay, that miſchief can ariſe from hence, as often as it ſhall pleaſe a buſy head, or turbulent ſpirit, to deſire the alteration of the government. 'Tis true, ſuch men may ſtir, whenever they pleaſe, but it will be only to their own juſt ruin and perdition. For 'till the miſchief be grown general, and the ill deſigns of the rulers become viſible, or their attempts ſenſible to the greater part, the people, who are more diſpoſed to ſuffer, than right themſelves by reſiſtance, are not apt to ſtir. The examples of particular injuſtice, or oppreſſion, of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But, if they univerſally have a perſuaſion, grounded upon manifeſt evidence, that deſigns are carrying on, againſt their liberties, and the general courſe and tendency of things, cannot but give them ſtrong ſuſpicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themſelves into this ſuſpicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the ſenſe of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwiſe, than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into ſuch a poſture, that they would not have them thought to be, as they are?

I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men, have ſometimes cauſed great diſorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to ſtates and kingdoms. But whether the miſchief hath oftner begun in the people's wantonneſs, and a deſire to caſt off the lawful authority of their rulers; or in the ruler's inſolence, and endeavours to get and exerciſe an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppreſſion, or diſobedience, gave the firſt riſe to the diſorder, I leave it to impartial hiſtory to determine. This I am ſure, whoever, either ruler, or ſubject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince, or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the conſtitution and frame of any juſt government, is highly guilty of the greateſt crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to anſwer for all thoſe miſchiefs of blood, rapine and deſolation, which the breaking to pieces of goverments bring on a country. And he, who does it, is juſtly to be eſteemed the common enemy and peſt of mankind; and is to be treated accordingly.

231. That ſubjects, or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties of any people, may be reſiſted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that magiſtrates doing the ſame thing, may be reſiſted, hath of late been denied: as if thoſe who had the greateſt privileges and advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break thoſe laws, by which alone they were ſet in a better place than their brethren, whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater ſhare, they have by the law, and breaking alſo that truſt, which is put into their hands by their brethren.

232. Whosoever uſes force, without right, as every one does in ſociety, who does it without law, puts himſelf into a ſtate of war with thoſe, againſt whom he ſo uſes it, and in that ſtate all former ties are cancelled, all other rights ceaſe, and every one has a right to defend himſelf, and to reſiſt the aggreſſor. This is ſo evident, that Barclay himſelf, that great aſſertor of the power and ſacredneſs of kings, is forced to confeſs, that it is lawful for the people in ſome caſes to reſiſt their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to ſhew, that the divine law ſhuts up the people from all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that ſince they may in ſome caſes reſiſt, all reſiſting of princes is not rebellion. His words are theſe: "Quod ſiquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicæ crudelitati & furori jugulum ſemper præbebit? Ergone multitudo civitates ſuas fame, ferro, & flammâ vaſtari, ſeque, conjuges, & liberos fortunæ ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitæ pericula, omneſque miſerias & moleſtias, à rege deduci patientur? Num illis, quod omni animantium generi eſt à natura tributum, denegari debet, ut ſcilicet vim vi repellant, ſeſeque ab injuriâ tueantur? Huic breviter reſponſum ſit, populo univerſo negari defenſionem, quæ juris naturalis eſt, neque ultionem, quæ præter naturam eſt, adverſus regem concedi debere. Quapropter, ſi rex non in ſingulares tantum perſonas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, ſed corpus etiam reipublicæ, cujus ipſe caput eſt, i. e. totum populum, vel inſignem aliquam ejus partem, immani & intolerandâ ſævitiâ ſeu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem, hoc caſu, reſiſtendi, ac tuendi ſe ab injuriâ, poteſtas competit, ſed tuendi ſe tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: & reſtituendæ injuriæ illatæ, non recedendi à debitâ reverentiâ propter acceptam injuriam. Præſentem denique impetum propulſandi, non vim præteritam ulciſcendi jus habet. Horum enim alterum à naturâ eſt, ut vitam, ſcilicet, corpuſque tueamur. Alterum vero, contra naturam, ut inferior de ſuperiori ſupplicium ſumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum ſit, impedire poteſt, ne fiat, id poſtquam factum eſt, in regem, authorem ſceleris, vindicare non poteſt: populus igitur hoc amplius, quam privatus quiſpiam, habet: quod huic, vel ipſis adverſariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum niſi in patientia remedium ſupereſt. Cùm ille, ſi intolerabilis tyrannus eſt, (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) reſiſtere cum reverentiâ poſſit. Barclay contra Monarchom." L. 3. c. 8.

In Engliſh thus:

233. “ But, if any one ſhould aſk, “ Muſt the people then always lay themſelves
“ open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Muſt they ſee their cities pillaged
“ and laid in aſhes, their wives and children expoſed to the tyrant's luſt and
“ fury, and themſelves and families reduced by their king to ruin, and all the
“ miſeries of want and oppreſſion, and yet ſit ſtill? Muſt men alone be debarred
“ the common privilege, of oppoſing force with force, which nature allows
“ ſo freely to all other creatures, for their preſervation from injury? I anſwer:
“ Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be denied the community,
“ even againſt the king himſelf: but to revenge themſelves upon him muſt
“ by no means be allowed them, it being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore,
“ if the king ſhall ſhew an hatred, not only to ſome particular perſons,
“ but ſets himſelf againſt the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the
“ head, and ſhall, with intolerable ill uſage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole,
“ or a conſiderable part of the people, in this caſe, the people have a right to
“ reſiſt and defend themſelves from injury: but it muſt be with this caution,
“ that they only defend themſelves, but do not attack their prince: they may
“ repair the damages receiv'd, but muſt not for any provocation exceed the
“ bounds of due reverence and reſpect. They may repulſe the preſent attempt,
“ but muſt not revenge paſt violences. For it is natural for us to defend life
“ and limb; but that an inferior ſhould puniſh a ſuperior, is againſt nature. The
“ miſchief, which is deſign'd them, the people may prevent, before it be done;
“ but, when it is done, they muſt not revenge it on the king, though author
“ of the villainy. This, therefore, is the privilege of the people in general,
“ above what any private perſon hath; that particular men are allowed, by our
“ adverſaries themſelves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy,
“ but patience; but the body of the people may with reſpect reſiſt intolerable
“ tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it.”

234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of reſiſtance.

235. It is true, he has annex'd two limitations to it to no purpoſe:

Firſt, He ſays it muſt be with reverence.

Secondly, It muſt be without retribution, or puniſhment; and the reaſon he gives is, “ Becauſe an inferior cannot puniſh a ſuperior.”

Firſt, How to reſiſt force without ſtriking again, or how to ſtrike with reverence, will need ſome ſkill to make intelligible. He that ſhall oppoſe an aſſault, only with a ſhield to receive the blows, or in any more reſpectful poſture, without a ſword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the aſſailant, will be quickly at an end of his reſiſtance, and will find ſuch a defence ſerve only to draw on himſelf the worſe uſage. This is as ridiculous a way of reſiſting, as Juvenal thought it of fighting; “ ubi tu pulſas, ego vapulo tantum.” And the ſucceſs of the combat will be unavoidably the ſame he there deſcribes it:

> —— “ libertas pauperis hæc eſt:
> “ Pulſatus rogat, & pugnis conciſus, adorat,
> “ Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.”

This will always be the event of ſuch an imaginary reſiſtance, where men may not ſtrike again. He, therefore, who may reſiſt, muſt be allow'd to ſtrike. And then, let our author, or any body elſe, join a knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and reſpect, as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, deſerve for his pains a civil, reſpectful cudgeling, where-ever he can meet with it.

Secondly, As to his ſecond, “ an inferior cannot puniſh a ſuperior;” that is true, generally ſpeaking, whilſt he is his ſuperior. But to reſiſt force with force, being the ſtate of war, that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, reſpect, and ſuperiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that he, who oppoſes the unjuſt aggreſſor, has this ſuperiority over him, that he has a right when he prevails, to puniſh the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay, therefore, in another place, more

coherently to himſelf, denies it to be lawful to reſiſt a king, in any caſe. But he
there aſſigns two caſes, whereby a king may unking himſelf. His words are,

“ Quid ergo, nulline caſus incidere poſſunt, quibus populo ſeſe erigere, atque
“ in regem, impotentius dominantem, arma capere, & invadere, jure ſuo ſuâ-
“ que authoritate, liceat? Nulli certe. quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex
“ divinis id obſtat, “ Regem honorificato; & qui poteſtati reſiſtit, Dei ordina-
“ tioni reſiſtit: Non aliàs igitur in eum populo poteſtas eſt, quam ſi id commit-
“ tat, propter quod ipſo jure rex eſſe deſinat. Tunc enim ſe ipſe principatu ex-
“ uit, atque in privatis conſtituit liber: hoc modo populus & ſuperior efficitur,
“ reverſo ad eum ſcilicet jure illo, quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno
“ habuit. At ſunt paucorum generum commiſſa juſmodi, quæ hunc effectum
“ pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perluſtrem, duo tantum invenio, duos,
“ inquam, caſus, quibus rex ipſo facto ex rege non regem ſe facit, & omni ho-
“ nore & dignitate regali, atque in ſubditos poteſtate, deſtituit; quorum etiam
“ meminit Winzerus. Horum unus eſt, ſiregnum diſperdat quemadmodum de
“ Nerone fertur, quod is nempe ſenatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo
“ urbem ipſam ferro flammaque vaſtare, ac novas ſibi ſedes quærere decreviſſet.
“ Et de Caligulâ, quod palam denunciarit ſe neque civem neque principem ſena-
“ tui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriuſque ordinies electiſſi-
“ mo quoque, Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret,
“ unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur & molitur ſerio,
“ omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in ſub-
“ ditos amittit, ut dominus ſervi pro derelicto habiti dominium.”

236. “ Alter caſus eſt, ſi rex in alicujus clientelam ſe contulit, ac regnum,
“ quod liberum à majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienæ ditioni mancipa-
“ vit. Nam tunc, quamvis forte non eâ mente id agit, populo plane ut incom-
“ modet: tamen, quia, quod præcipuum eſt regiæ dignitatis, amiſit, ut ſum-
“ mum ſcilicet in regno ſecundum Deum ſit, & ſolo Deo inferior atque populum,
“ etiam totum ignorantem, vel invitum, cujus libertatem ſartam & tectam con-
“ ſervare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & poteſtatem dedidit; hâc velut
“ quâdam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec, quod ipſe in regno imperium ha-
“ buit, retineat, nec in eum, cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat;
“ atque ita eo facto liberum jam & ſuæ poteſtatis populum relinquit, cujus rei
“ exemplum unum annales Scotici ſuppeditant.” Barclay contra Monarchom.
l. 3. c. 16.

Which in Engliſh runs thus:

237. “ What then, Can there no caſe happen, wherein the people may of
“ right, and by their own authority, help themſelves, take arms, and ſet upon
“ their king, imperiouſly domineering over them? None at all, whilſt he re-
“ mains a king. “ Honour the king, and he that reſiſts the power, reſiſts the
“ ordinance of God;” are divine oracles that will never permit it. The people,
“ therefore, can never come by a power over him, unleſs he does ſomething,
“ that makes him ceaſe to be a king. For then he diveſts himſelf of his crown
“ and dignity, and returns to the ſtate of a private man, and the people become
“ free and ſuperior, the power, which they had in the interregnum, before they
“ crowned him king, devolving to them again. But there are but few miſcar-
“ riages, which bring the matter to this ſtate. After conſidering it well on all
“ ſides, I can find but two. Two caſes there are, I ſay, whereby a king, ipſo
“ facto, becomes no king; and loſes all power, and regal authority over his
“ people; which are alſo taken notice of by Winzerus.

“ The firſt is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he
“ have a purpoſe and deſign to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is
“ recorded of Nero, that he reſolved to cut off the ſenate and people of Rome,
“ lay the city waſte with fire and ſword, and then remove to ſome other place.
“ And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head
“ to the people, or ſenate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the wor-
“ thieſt men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wiſhed that
“ the people had but one neck, that he might diſpatch them all at a blow. Such
“ deſigns as theſe, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and ſeriouſly pro-

“ motes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth;
“ and conſequently forfeits the power of governing his ſubjects, as a maſter does
“ the dominion over his ſlaves whom he hath abandon'd.

238. “ The other caſe is, when a king makes himſelf the dependent of ano-
“ ther, and ſubjects his kingdom, which his anceſtors left him, and the people
“ put free into his hands, to the dominion of another. For however, perhaps,
“ it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet, becauſe he has there-
“ by loſt the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be, next and immediately
“ under God, ſupreme in his kingdom; and alſo becauſe he betray'd, or forced his
“ people, whoſe liberty he ought to have carefully preſerv'd, into the power and
“ dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it were alienation of his kingdom,
“ he himſelf loſes the power he had in it before, without transferring any the
“ leaſt right to thoſe, on whom he would have beſtowed it; and ſo, by this act,
“ ſets the people free, and leaves them at their own diſpoſal. One example of
“ this is to be found in the Scotch annals.”

239. In theſe caſes Barclay, the great champion of abſolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be reſiſted, and ceaſes to be a king. That is, in ſhort, not to multiply caſes, In whatſoever he has no authority, there he is no king, and may be reſiſted: for, whereſoever the authority ceaſes, the king ceaſes too, and becomes like other men, who have no authority. And theſe two caſes he inſtances in, differ little from thoſe above-mention'd, to be deſtructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle, from which his doctrine flows; and that is the breach of truſt, in not preſerving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itſelf, which is the publick good, and preſervation of property. When a king has dethroned himſelf, and put himſelf in a ſtate of war with his people, what ſhall hinder them from proſecuting him, who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himſelf into a ſtate of war with them? Barclay, and thoſe of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther I deſire may be taken notice of, out of Barclay, that he ſays, “ The miſchief that is deſigned them, the people may prevent before it be done, whereby he allows reſiſtance, when tyranny is but in deſign. Such deſigns as theſe (ſays he) when any king harbours in his thoughts, and ſeriouſly promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth;” ſo that, according to him, the neglect of the publick good is to be taken, as an evidence of ſuch deſign, or at leaſt for a ſufficient cauſe of reſiſtance. And the reaſon of all, he gives in theſe words, “ Becauſe he betrayed, or forced his people, whoſe liberty he ought carefully to have preſerved.” What he adds, “ into the power and dominion of a foreign nation,” ſignifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loſs of their liberty, which he ought to have preſerved, and not in any diſtinction of the perſons, to whoſe dominion they were ſubjected. The people's right is equally invaded, and their liberty loſt, whether they are made ſlaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and againſt this only have they the right of defence. And there are inſtances to be found in all countries, which ſhew, that 'tis not the change of nations in the perſons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilſon,* a biſhop of our church, and a great ſtickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if I miſtake not, in his treatiſe of Chriſtian ſubjection, acknowledge, “ that princes may forfeit their power,” and their title to the obedience of their ſubjects; and if there needed authority in a caſe, where reaſon is ſo plain, I could ſend my reader to Bracton, Forteſcue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be ſuſpected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to ſatisfy thoſe men, who relying on him for their eccleſiaſtical polity, are, by a ſtrange fate, carried to deny thoſe principles, upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabrick, they were beſt to look. This I am ſure, their civil policy is ſo new, ſo dangerous, and ſo deſtructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it; ſo it may be hoped, thoſe to come, redeemed from the impoſitions of

theſe Egyptian under-taſk-maſters, will abhor the memory of ſuch ſervile flatterers, who, whilſt it ſeemed to ſerve their turn, reſolved all government into abſolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean ſouls fitted them for, ſlavery.

240. Here, 'tis like, the common queſtion will be made, "Who ſhall be "judge," whether the prince, or legiſlative, act contrary to their truſt? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may ſpread amongſt the people, when the prince only makes uſe of his due prerogative. To this I reply; "The people "ſhall be judge;" for who ſhall be judge, whether his truſtee, or deputy, acts well, and according to the truſt repoſed in him, but he who deputes him, and muſt, by having deputed him, have ſtill a power to diſcard him, when he fails in his truſt? If this be reaſonable, in particular caſes of private men, why ſhould it be otherwiſe in that of the greateſt moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and alſo where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redreſs very difficult, dear, and dangerous?

241. But farther, this queſtion, "(Who ſhall be judge?)" cannot mean, that there is no judge at all. For where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controverſies amongſt men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, 'tis true, is judge of the right. But "every man is judge for himſelf," as in all other caſes, ſo in this, whether another hath put himſelf into a ſtate of war with him, and whether he ſhould appeal to the ſupreme judge, as Jephtha did?

242. If a controverſy ariſe, betwixt a prince and ſome of the people, in a matter, where the law is ſilent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great conſequence, I ſhould think the proper umpire, in ſuch a caſe, ſhould be the body of the people. For in caſes, where the prince hath a truſt repoſed in him, and is diſpenſed from the common, ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men find themſelves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that truſt, who ſo proper to judge, as the body of the people, (who, at firſt, lodged that truſt in him) how far they meant it ſhould extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the adminiſtration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven. Force between either perſons, who have no known ſuperior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a ſtate of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven, and in that ſtate the injured party muſt judge for himſelf, when he will think fit to make uſe of that appeal, and put himſelf upon it.

243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the ſociety, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the ſociety laſts, but will always remain in the community; becauſe, without this, there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: ſo alſo, when the ſociety hath placed the legiſlative in any aſſembly of men, to continue in them, and their ſucceſſors, with direction and authority for providing ſuch ſucceſſors, the legiſlative can never revert to the people, whilſt that government laſts: becauſe, having provided a legiſlative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legiſlative, and cannot reſume it. But if they have ſet limits to the duration of their legiſlative, and made this ſupreme power in any perſon, or aſſembly, only temporary: or elſe, when by the miſcarriages of thoſe in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time ſet, it reverts to the ſociety, and the people have a right to act as ſupreme, and continue the legiſlative in themſelves; or erect a new form; or, under the old form, place it in new hands, as they think good.

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A
LETTER
CONCERNING
TOLERATION:
Humbly ſubmitted, &c.

Ea eſt ſumma ratio & ſapientia boni civis commoda civium non divellere atque omnes æquitate eâdem continere. Cic. de Officiis.

TO THE

READER.

THE enſuing letter concerning toleration, firſt printed in latin, this very year in Holland, has already been tranſlated both into Dutch and French. So general and ſpeedy an approbation may, therefore, beſpeak its favourable reception in England. I think, indeed, there is no nation under heaven, in which ſo much has already been ſaid upon that ſubject, as ours. But yet, certainly, there is no people that ſtand in more need, of having ſomething further both ſaid and done amongſt them, in this point than we do.

OUR government has not only been partial, in matters of religion; but thoſe alſo, who have ſuffered under that partiality, and have, therefore, endeavoured, by their writings, to vindicate their own rights and liberties, have, for the moſt part, done it upon narrow principles, ſuited only to the intereſts of their own ſects.

THIS narrowneſs of ſpirit, on all ſides, has undoubtedly been the principal occaſion of our miſeries and confuſions. But, whatever have been the occaſion, it is now high time to ſeek for a thorough cure, We have need of more generous remedies, than what have yet been made uſe of, in our diſtemper. It is neither declarations of indulgence, nor acts of comprehenſion, ſuch as have yet been practiſed, or projected, amongſt us, that can do the work. The firſt will but palliate, the ſecond encreaſe our evil.

ABSOLUTE liberty, juſt and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty, is the thing that we ſtand in need of. Now, though this has, indeed, been much talked of, I doubt it has not been much underſtood; I am ſure not at all practiſed, either by our governors towards the people in general, or, by any diſſenting parties of the people, towards one another.

I CANNOT, therefore, but hope, that this diſcourſe, which treats of that ſubject, however briefly, yet more exactly, than any we have yet ſeen, demonſtrating both the equitableneſs and practicableneſs of the thing, will be eſteemed highly ſeaſonable, by all men, that have ſouls large enough to prefer the true intereſt of the publick, before that of a party.

IT is for the uſe of ſuch, as are already ſo ſpirited, or to inſpire that ſpirit into thoſe that are not, that I have tranſlated it into our language. But the thing it ſelf is ſo ſhort, that it will not bear a longer preface. I leave it, therefore, to the conſideration of my countrymen, and heartily wiſh they may make the uſe of it, that it appears to be deſigned for.

A
LETTER
CONCERNING
TOLERATION.

Honoured Sir,

SINCE you are pleaſed to enquire, what are my thoughts, about the mutual toleration of chriſtians, in their different profeſſions of religion, I muſt needs anſwer you freely, that I eſteem that toleration to be the chief characteriſtical mark of the true church. For, whatſoever ſome people boaſt of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worſhip; others, of the reformation of their diſcipline; all of the orthodoxy of their faith; (for every one is orthodox to himſelf;) theſe things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men, ſtriving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Chriſt. Let any one have never ſo true a claim to all theſe things, yet if he be deſtitute of charity, meekneſs, and good-will, in general, towards all mankind, even to thoſe, that are not chriſtians, he is certainly yet ſhort of being a true chriſtian himſelf. "The kings of the gentiles exerciſe lordſhip over them, ſaid our Saviour to his diſciples, but ye ſhall not be ſo." The buſineſs of true religion is quite another thing. It is not inſtituted, in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of eccleſiaſtical dominion, nor to the exerciſing of compulſive force; but to the regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whoſoever will liſt himſelf under the banner of Chriſt, muſt, in the firſt place, and above all things, make war upon his own luſts and vices. It is in vain for any man to uſurp the name of chriſtian, without holineſs of life, purity of manners, benignity and meekneſs of ſpirit. "Let every one that nameth the name of Chriſt, depart from iniquity. Thou, when thou art converted, ſtrengthen thy brethren," ſaid our Lord to Peter. It would indeed, be very hard for one, that appears careleſs about his own ſalvation, to perſuade me, that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impoſſible, that thoſe ſhould ſincerely and heartily apply themſelves to make other people chriſtians, who have not really embraced the chriſtian religion in their hearts. If the goſpel and the apoſtles may be credited, no man can be a chriſtian without charity, and without that faith which works not by force but by love. Now I appeal to the conſciences of thoſe, that perſecute, torment, deſtroy, and kill other men, upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendſhip and kindneſs towards them, or no: and I ſhall then, indeed, and not till then, believe they do ſo, when I ſhall ſee thoſe fiery zealots correcting, in the ſame manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance, for the manifeſt ſins they commit againſt the precepts of the goſpel; when I ſhall ſee them proſecute, with fire and ſword, the members of their own communion, that are tainted with enormous vices; and, without amendment, are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I ſhall ſee them thus expreſs their love and deſire of the ſalvation of their ſouls, by the infliction of torments, and exerciſe of all manner of cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men's ſouls, that they deprive them of their eſtates, maim them with corporal puniſhments, ſtarve and torment them in noiſome priſons, and, in the end, even take away their lives: I ſay, if all this be done merely to make men chriſtians, and procure their ſalvation, why then do they ſuffer "whoredom, fraud, malice, and ſuch like enormities," which (accord-

Luke xxii. 25.

2 Tim. ii. 19.

Luke xxii. 32.

(acording to the apoſtle) manifeſtly reliſh of heatheniſh corruption, to predominate ſo much and abound amongſt their flocks and people? Theſe, and ſuch like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the church, and to the ſalvation of ſouls, than any conſcientious diſſent from eccleſiaſtical deciſion, or ſeparation from publick worſhip, whilſt accompanied with innocency of life. Why then does this burning zeal for God, for the church, and for the ſalvation of ſouls; burning, I ſay, literally, with fire and faggot; paſs by thoſe moral vices and wickedneſſes, without any chaſtiſement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically oppoſite to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity; and bend all its nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the eſtabliſhment of opinions, which for the moſt part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary underſtandings? Which of the parties, contending about theſe things, is in the right, which of them is guilty of ſchiſm, or hereſy, whether thoſe that domineer, or thoſe that ſuffer, will then at laſt be manifeſt, when the cauſe of their ſeparation comes to be judged of. He certainly that follows Chriſt, embraces his doctrine, and bears his yoke, though he forſake both father and mother, ſeparate from the publick aſſemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomſoever, or whatſoever elſe he relinquiſhes, will not then be judged an heretick. Rom. i.

Now, though the diviſions, that are amongſt ſects, ſhould be allowed to be never ſo obſtructive of the ſalvation of ſouls; yet nevertheleſs "adultery, fornication, uncleanneſs, laſciviouſneſs, idolatry, and ſuch like things, cannot be "denied to be works of the fleſh;" concerning which the apoſtle has expreſsly declared, that "they who do them ſhall not inherit the kingdom of God." Whoſoever, therefore, is ſincerely ſolicitous about the kingdom of God, and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongſt men, ought to apply himſelf with no leſs care and induſtry to the rooting out of theſe immoralities, than no the extirpation of ſects. But if any one do otherwiſe, and whilſt he is cruel and implacable towards thoſe that differ from him in opinion, he be indulgent to ſuch iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a chriſtian, let ſuch a one talk never ſo much of the church, he plainly demonſtrates by his actions, that 'tis another kingdom he aims at, and not the advancement of the kingdom of God. Gal. v.

THAT any man ſhould think fit to cauſe another man, whoſe ſalvation he heartily deſires, to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted eſtate, would, I confeſs, ſeem very ſtrange to me, and, I think, to any other alſo. But no body, ſurely, will ever believe that ſuch a carriage can proceed from charity, love, or good-will. If any one maintain that men ought to be compelled, by fire and ſword, to profeſs certain doctrines, and conform to this, or that, exterior worſhip, without any regard had unto their morals; if any one endeavour to convert thoſe, that are erroneous, unto the faith, by forcing them to profeſs things, that they do not believe, and allowing them to practiſe things, that the goſpel does not permit; it cannot be doubted, indeed, but ſuch a one is deſirous to have a numerous aſſembly, joined in the ſame profeſſion with himſelf; but that he principally intends, by thoſe means, to compoſe a truly chriſtian church, is altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, if thoſe, who who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion, and of the church of Chriſt, make uſe of arms, that do not belong to the chriſtian warfare. If, like the Captain of our ſalvation, they ſincerely deſired the good of ſouls, they would tread in the ſteps, and follow the perfect example of that Prince of peace, who ſent out his ſoldiers to the ſubduing of nations, and gathering them into his church, not armed with the ſword, or other inſtruments of force, but prepared with the goſpel of peace, and with the exemplary holineſs of their converſation. This was his method. Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if thoſe that are either blind, or obſtinate, were to be drawn off from their errors, by armed ſoldiers, we know very well that it was much more eaſy for him to do it with armies of heavenly legions, than for any ſon of the church, how potent ſoever, with all his dragoons.

THE toleration of thoſe, that differ from others, in matters of religion, is ſo agreeable to the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt, and to the genuine reaſon of mankind, that it ſeems monſtrous for men to be ſo blind, as not to perceive the neceſſity and advantage of it, in ſo clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and ambition of ſome, the paſſion and uncharitable zeal of others. Theſe are faults from which human affairs can perhaps ſcarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet ſuch as nobody will bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with ſome ſpecious colour; and ſo pretend to commendation, whilſt they are carried away by their own irregular paſſions. But however, that ſome may not colour their ſpirit of perſecution and unchriſtian cruelty, with a pretence of care of the publick weal and obſervation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not ſeek impunity for their libertiniſm, or licentiouſneſs; in a word, that none may impoſe, either upon himſelf or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderneſs and ſincerity in the worſhip of God; I eſteem it, above all things, neceſſary to diſtinguiſh exactly the buſineſs of civil government from that of religion, and to ſettle the juſt bounds, that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controverſies, that will be always ariſing between thoſe that have, or at leaſt pretend to have, on the one ſide, a concernment for the intereſt of men's ſouls, and on the other ſide, a care of the commonwealth.

THE commonwealth ſeems to me to be a ſociety of men, conſtituted only for the procuring, preſerving, and advancing their own civil intereſts.

CIVIL intereſts I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the poſſeſſion of outward things, ſuch as money, lands, houſes, furniture, and the like.

IT is the duty of the civil magiſtrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to ſecure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his ſubjects in particular, the juſt poſſeſſion of theſe things belonging to this life. If any preſume to violate the laws of publick juſtice and equity, eſtabliſhed for the preſervation of thoſe things, his preſumption is to be checked by the fear of puniſhment, conſiſting of the deprivation, or diminution, of thoſe civil intereſts, or goods, which otherwiſe he might and ought to enjoy. But ſeeing no man does willingly ſuffer himſelf to be puniſhed, by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much leſs of his liberty, or life, therefore is the magiſtrate armed with the force and ſtrength of all his ſubjects, in order to the puniſhment of thoſe, that violate any other man's rights.

Now that the whole juriſdiction of the magiſtrate reaches only to theſe civil concernments; and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting theſe things; and that it neither can, nor ought, in any manner, to be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls, theſe following conſiderations ſeem unto me abundantly to demonſtrate.

Firſt, BECAUSE the care of ſouls is not committed to the civil magiſtrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I ſay, by God; becauſe it appears not, that God has ever given any ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. Nor can any ſuch power be veſted in the magiſtrate, by the conſent of the people; becauſe no man can ſo far abandon the care of his own ſalvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince, or ſubject, to preſcribe to him what faith, or worſhip, he ſhall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion conſiſt in the inward and full perſuaſion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profeſſion we make, to whatever outward worſhip we conform, if we are not fully ſatisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well-pleaſing unto God, ſuch profeſſion and ſuch practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obſtacles to our ſalvation. For in this manner, inſtead of expiating other ſins, by the exerciſe of religion, I ſay, in offering thus unto God Almighty ſuch a worſhip, as we eſteem to be diſpleaſing unto him, we add unto the number of our other ſins, thoſe alſo of hypocriſy, and contempt of his divine majeſty.

IN the ſecond place. The care of ſouls cannot belong to the civil magiſtrate, becauſe his power conſiſts only in outward force; but true and ſaving religion conſiſts in the inward perſuaſion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And ſuch is the nature of the underſtanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing, by outward force. Confiſcation of eſtate, impriſonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any ſuch efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment, that they have framed of things.

IT may indeed be alledged, that the magiſtrate may make uſe of arguments, and thereby draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their ſalvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In teaching, inſtructing, and redreſſing the erroneous by reaſon, he may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magiſtracy does not oblige him to put off either humanity, or chriſtianity. But it is one thing to perſuade, and another to command; one thing to preſs with arguments, another with penalties. This the civil power alone has a right to do; to the other good-will is authority enough. Every man has a commiſſion to admoniſh, exhort, convince another of error, and by reaſoning to draw him into truth: but to give laws, receive obedience, and compel with the ſword, belongs to none but the magiſtrate. And upon this ground I affirm, that the magiſtrate's power extends not to the eſtabliſhing of any articles of faith, or forms of worſhip, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties, and penalties, in this caſe, are abſolutely impertinent; becauſe they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profeſſion of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worſhip, (as has been already ſaid) can be available to the ſalvation of ſouls, unleſs the truth of the one, and the acceptableneſs of the other unto God, be thoroughly believed by thoſe that ſo profeſs and practiſe. But penalties are no ways capable to produce ſuch a belief. It is only light and evidence, that can work a change in men's opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from corporal ſufferings, or any other outward penalties.

IN the third place. The care of the ſalvation of men's ſouls cannot belong to the magiſtrate; becauſe though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would not that help at all to the ſalvation of their ſouls. For there being but one truth, one way to heaven; what hopes is there that more men would be led into it, if they had no rule, but the religion of the Court, and were put under a neceſſity to quit the light of their own reaſon, and oppoſe the dictates of their own conſciences, and blindly to reſign up themſelves to the will of their governors, and to the religion, which either ignorance, ambition, or ſuperſtition had chanced to eſtabliſh in the countries, where they were born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much divided, as in their ſecular intereſts, the narrow way would be much ſtraitened; one country alone would be in the right, and all the reſt of the world put under an obligation of following their princes, in the ways that lead to deſtruction; and that, which heightens the abſurdity, and very ill ſuits the notion of a deity, men would owe their eternal happineſs, or miſery, to the places of their nativity.

THESE conſiderations, to omit many others, that might have been urged to the ſame purpoſe, ſeem unto me ſufficient to conclude, that all the power of civil government relates only to men's civil intereſts, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come.

LET us now conſider what a church is. "A church then, I take to be a voluntary ſociety of men, joining themſelves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worſhipping of God, in ſuch a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the ſalvation of their ſouls."

I SAY it is a free and voluntary ſociety. Nobody is born a member of any church; otherwiſe the religion of parents would deſcend unto children, by the ſame right of inheritance, as their temporal eſtates, and every one would hold his faith, by the ſame tenure, he does his lands; than which, nothing can be imagined more abſurd. Thus, therefore, that matter ſtands. No man, by nature

ture is bound unto any particular church, or ſect; but every one joins himſelf voluntarily to that ſociety, in which he believes he has found that profeſſion and worſhip, which is truly acceptable to God. The hopes of ſalvation, as it was the only cauſe of his entrance into that communion, ſo it can be the only reaſon of his ſtay there. For if afterwards he diſcover any thing, either erroneous in the doctrine, or incongruous in the worſhip of that ſociety, to which he has joined himſelf, Why ſhould it not be as free for him to go out, as it was to enter? No member of a religious ſociety can be tied with any other bonds, but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A church, then, is a ſociety of members, voluntarily uniting to this end.

IT follows now, that we conſider, what is the power of this church, and unto what laws it is ſubject.

FORASMUCH as no ſociety, how free ſoever, or upon whatſoever ſlight occaſion inſtituted, (whether of philoſophers, for learning, of merchants for commerce, or of men of leiſure for mutual converſation and diſcourſe) no church, or company, I ſay, can in the leaſt ſubſiſt and hold together, but will preſently diſſolve and break in pieces, unleſs it be regulated by ſome laws, and the members all conſent to obſerve ſome order. Place, and time of meeting muſt be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding members muſt be eſtabliſhed; diſtinction of officers, and putting things into a regular courſe, and ſuch like, cannot be omitted. But ſince the joining together of ſeveral members into this church-ſociety, as has already been demonſtrated, is abſolutely free and ſpontaneous, it neceſſarily follows, that the right of making its laws can belong to none, but the ſociety itſelf, or at leaſt (which is the ſame thing) to thoſe whom the ſociety, by common conſent, has authoriſed thereunto.

SOME, perhaps, may object, that no ſuch ſociety can be ſaid to be a true church, unleſs it have in it a biſhop, or preſbyter, with ruling authority, derived from the very apoſtles, and continued down unto the preſent times, by an uninterrupted ſucceſſion.

To theſe I anſwer. In the firſt place. Let them ſhew me the edict, by which Chriſt has impoſed that law upon his church. And let not any man think me impertinent, if, in a thing of this conſequence, I require that the terms of that edict be very expreſs and poſitive. For the promiſe he has made us, that "whereſoever two or three are gathered together in his name, he will "be in the midſt of them," ſeems to imply the contrary. Whether ſuch an aſſembly want any thing neceſſary to a true church, pray do you conſider. Certain I am, that nothing can be there wanting unto the ſalvation of ſouls; which is ſufficient to our purpoſe.

NEXT, pray obſerve how great have always been the diviſions, amongſt even thoſe, who lay ſo much ſtreſs upon the divine inſtitution, and continued ſucceſſion of a certain order of rulers in the church. Now their very diſſention unavoidably puts us upon a neceſſity of deliberating, and conſequently allows a liberty of chuſing that, which upon conſideration we prefer.

AND in the laſt place. I conſent that theſe men have a ruler of their church, eſtabliſhed by ſuch a long ſeries of ſucceſſion, as they judge neceſſary; provided I may have liberty at the ſame time to join myſelf to that ſociety, in which I am perſuaded thoſe things are to be found, which are neceſſary to the ſalvation of my ſoul. In this manner eccleſiaſtical liberty will be preſerved, on all ſides, and no man will have a legiſlator impoſed upon him, but whom himſelf has choſen.

BUT ſince men are ſo ſolicitous about the true church, I would only aſk them here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the church of Chriſt, to make the conditions of her communion conſiſt in ſuch things, and ſuch things only, as the Holy Spirit has, in the holy ſcriptures, declared, in expreſs words, to be neceſſary to ſalvation? I aſk, I ſay, whether this be not more agreeable to the church of Chriſt, than for men to impoſe their own inventions and interpretations upon others; as if they were of divine authority, and to eſtabliſh, by eccleſiaſtical laws, as abſolutely neceſſary to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, ſuch things as the holy ſcriptures do either not mention, or at leaſt not expreſſly ly command? Whoſoever requires thoſe things, in order to eccleſiaſtical communion, which Chriſt does not require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed conſtitute a ſociety, accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that can be called the church of Chriſt, which is eſtabliſhed upon laws, that are not his, and which excludes ſuch perſons from its communion, as he will one day receive into the kingdom of heaven, I underſtand not. But this being not a proper place to enquire into the marks of the true church, I will only mind thoſe, that contend ſo earneſtly for the decrees of their own ſociety, and that cry out continually, "the church, the "church?" with as much noiſe, and perhaps upon the ſame principle, as the Epheſian ſilverſmiths did for their Diana; this, I ſay, I deſire to mind them of, that the goſpel frequently declares that the true diſciples of Chriſt muſt ſuffer perſecution; but that the church of Chriſt ſhould perſecute others, and force others by fire and ſword, to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find, in any of the books of the new teſtament.

THE end of a religious ſociety (as has already been ſaid) is the publick worſhip of God; and, by means thereof, the acquiſition of eternal life. All diſcipline ought therefore, to tend to that end, and all eccleſiaſtical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought, nor can be tranſacted in this ſociety, relating to the poſſeſſion of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made uſe of, upon any occaſion whatſoever: for force belongs wholly to the civil magiſtrate, and the poſſeſſion of all outward goods is ſubject to his juriſdiction.

BUT it may be aſked, "By what means then ſhall eccleſiaſtical laws be "eſtabliſhed, if they muſt be thus deſtitute of all compulſive power?" I anſwer, They muſt be eſtabliſhed by means, ſuitable to the nature of ſuch things, whereof the external profeſſion and obſervation, if not proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind, is altogether uſeleſs and unprofitable. The arms, by which the members of this ſociety are to be kept within their duty, are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If, by theſe means, the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing farther to be done, but that ſuch ſtubborn and obſtinate perſons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, ſhould be caſt out and ſeparated from the ſociety. This is the laſt and utmoſt force of eccleſiaſtical authority: no other puniſhment can thereby be inflicted, than that the relation ceaſing between the body and the member, which is cut off, the perſon ſo condemned ceaſes to be a part of that church.

THESE things being thus determined, let us enquire in the next place, "How far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from every one "by it?"

AND firſt, I hold, that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain any ſuch perſon in her boſom, as, after admonition, continues obſtinately to offend againſt the laws of the ſociety. For theſe being the condition of communion, and the bond of the ſociety, if the breach of them were permitted, without any animadverſion, the ſociety would immediately be thereby diſſolved. But nevertheleſs, in all ſuch caſes, care is to be taken, that the ſentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough uſage of word or action, whereby the ejected perſon may any wiſe be damnified, in body or eſtate. For all force (as has often been ſaid) belongs only to the magiſtrate, nor ought any private perſons, at any time, to uſe force; unleſs it be in ſelf-defence againſt unjuſt violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated perſon of any of thoſe civil goods, that he formerly poſſeſſed. All thoſe things belong to the civil government, and are under the magiſtrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication conſiſts only in this, that the reſolution of the ſociety, in that reſpect, being declared, the union, that was between the body and ſome member, comes thereby to be diſſolved; and that relation ceaſing, the participation of ſome certain things, which the ſociety communicated to its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes alſo to ceaſe. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated perſon, by the church miniſter's refuſing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of the lord's ſupper, which was not bought with his, but other men's money.

Secondly, No private perſon has any right, in any manner, to prejudice another perſon, in his civil enjoyments, becauſe he is of another church, or religion. All the rights and franchiſes, that belong to him as a man, or as a deniſon, are inviolably to be preſerved to him. Theſe are not the buſineſs of religion. No violence, no injury is to be offered him, whether he be chriſtian or pagan. Nay, we muſt not content ourſelves with the narrow meaſures of bare juſtice; charity, bounty, and liberality, muſt be added to it. This the goſpel enjoins, this reaſon directs, and this that natural fellowſhip, we are born into, requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor, therefore, art thou to puniſh him in the things of this life, becauſe thou ſuppoſeſt he will be miſerable in that which is to come.

WHAT I ſay, concerning the mutual toleration of private perſons differing from one another in religion, I underſtand alſo of particular churches: which ſtand, as it were, in the ſame relation to each other, as private perſons among themſelves, nor has any one of them any manner of juriſdiction over any other, no not even when the civil magiſtrate, (as it ſometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that, whether the magiſtrate join himſelf to any church, or ſeparate from it, the church remains always as it was before, a free and voluntary ſociety. It neither acquires the power of the ſword, by the magiſtrate's coming to it; nor does it loſe the right of inſtruction and excommunication, by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a ſpontaneous ſociety, that it has power to remove any of its members, who tranſgreſs the rules of its inſtitution: but it cannot, by the acceſſion of any new members, require any right of juriſdiction over thoſe, that are not joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendſhip, are always mutually to be obſerved by particular churches, in the ſame manner as by private perſons, without any pretence of ſuperiority, or juriſdiction, over one another.

THAT the thing may be made yet clearer, by an example; let us ſuppoſe two churches, the one of Arminians, the other of Calviniſts, reſiding in the city of Conſtantinople. Will any one ſay, that either of theſe churches has a right to deprive the members of the other, of their eſtates and liberty, (as we ſee practiſed elſewhere) becauſe of their differing from it, in ſome doctrines or ceremonies, whilſt the Turks, in the mean while, ſilently ſtand by, and laugh to ſee, with what inhuman cruelty, chriſtians thus rage againſt chriſtians? But if one of theſe churches hath this power of treating the other ill, I aſk, Which of them it is, to whom that power belongs, and by what right? It will be anſwer'd, undoubtedly, That it is the orthodox church, which has the right of authority over the erroneous, or heretical. This is, in great and ſpecious words, to ſay juſt nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itſelf; to others erroneous, or heretical. For whatſoever any church believes, it believes to be true; and the contrary unto thoſe things, it pronounces to be error. So that the controverſy between theſe churches, about the truth of their doctrines, and the purity of their worſhip, is on both ſides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Conſtantinople, or elſewhere upon earth, by whoſe ſentence it can be determined. The deciſion of that queſtion belongs only to the ſupreme judge of all men, to whom alſo alone belongs the puniſhment of the erroneous. In the mean while, let thoſe men conſider, how heinouſly they ſin, who adding injuſtice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do raſhly and arrogantly take upon them to miſuſe the ſervants of another maſter, who are not at all accountable to them.

NAY, farther: if it could be manifeſt which of theſe two diſſenting churches were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of deſtroying the other. The churches have neither any juriſdiction, in worldly matters; nor are fire and ſword any proper inſtruments, wherewith to convince men's minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us ſuppoſe, nevertheleſs, that the civil magiſtrate, inclined to favour one of them, and to put his ſword into their hands, that (by his conſent) they might chaſtiſe the diſſenters, as they pleaſed. Will any man ſay, that any right can be derived unto a chriſtian church, over its brethren, from a Turkiſh emperor? An infidel, who has himſelf no authority to puniſh chriſtians, for the articles of their faith, cannot confer ſuch an authority upon any ſociety of chriſtians, nor give unto them a right, which he has not himſelf. This would be the caſe at Conſtantinople. And the reaſon of the thing is the ſame, in any chriſtian kingdom. The civil power is the ſame in every place: nor can that power, in the hands of a chriſtian prince, confer any greater authority upon the church, than in the hands of an heathen; which is to ſay, juſt none at all.

NEVERTHELESS, it is worthy to be obſerved and lamented, that the moſt violent of theſe defenders of the truth, the oppoſers of error, the exclaimers againſt ſchiſm, do hardly ever let looſe this their zeal for God, with which they are ſo warmed and enflamed; unleſs where they have the civil magiſtrate on their ſide. But, ſo ſoon as ever court favour has given them the better end of the ſtaff, and they begin to feel themſelves the ſtronger, then preſently peace and charity are to be laid aſide: otherwiſe, they are religiouſly to be obſerved. Where they have not the power to carry on perſecution, and to become maſters, there they deſire to live upon fair terms, and preach up toleration. When they are not ſtrengthened with the civil power, then they can bear moſt patiently, and unmovedly, the contagion of idolatry, ſuperſtition and hereſy, in their neighbourhood; of which, on other occaſions, the intereſt of religion, makes them to be extremely apprehenſive. They do not forwardly attack thoſe errors, which are in faſhion at court, or are countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to ſpare their arguments: which yet (with their leave) is the only right method of propagating truth, which has no ſuch way of prevailing, as when ſtrong arguments and good reaſon, are joined with the ſoftneſs of civility and good uſage.

NO body therefore, in fine, neither ſingle perſons, nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any juſt title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other, upon pretence of religion. Thoſe, that are of another opinion, would do well to conſider with themſelves, how pernicious a ſeed of diſcord and war, how powerful a provocation to endleſs hatreds, rapines and ſlaughters, they thereby furniſh unto mankind. No peace and ſecurity, no not ſo much as common friendſhip, can ever be eſtabliſhed, or preſerved amongſt men ſo long as this opinion prevails, "That dominion is founded in grace," and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.

IN the third place, let us ſee, what the duty of toleration requires from thoſe who are diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of mankind, (from the laity, as they pleaſe to call us) by ſome eccleſiaſtical character and office: whether they be biſhops, prieſts, preſbyters, miniſters, or however elſe dignified or diſtinguiſhed. It is not my buſineſs to enquire here, into the original of the power, or dignity, of the clergy. This only I ſay, that whenceſoever their authority be ſprung, ſince it is eccleſiaſtical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs; becauſe the church itſelf is a thing abſolutely ſeparate and diſtinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both ſides, are fixed and immoveable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things moſt remote and oppoſite, who mixes theſe two ſocieties; which are, in their original, end, buſineſs, and in every thing, perfectly diſtinct, and infinitely different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatſoever eccleſiaſtical office he be dignified, can deprive another man, that is not of his church and faith, either of liberty, or any part of his worldly goods, upon the account of that difference between them in religion. For whatſoever is not lawful to the whole church, cannot, by any eccleſiaſtical right, become lawful to any of its members.

BUT this is not all. It is not enough that eccleſiaſtical men abſtain from violence and rapine, and all manner of perſecution. He that pretends to be a ſucceſſor of the apoſtles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is obliged alſo to admoniſh his hearers of the duties of peace, and good-will towards all men; as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards thoſe that differ from them in faith and worſhip, as well as towards thoſe that agree with them therein: and he ought induſtriouſly to exhort all men, whether private perſons, or magiſtrates, (if any ſuch there be in his church) to charity, meekneſs, and toleration; and diligently endeavour to allay and temper all that heat, and unreaſonable averſeneſs of mind, which either any man's fiery zeal for his own ſect, or the craft of others, has kindled againſt diſſenters. I will not undertake to repreſent how happy and how great would be the fruit, both in church and ſtate, if the pulpits every where ſounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration; leſt I ſhould ſeem to reflect too ſeverely upon thoſe men, whoſe dignity I deſire not to detract from, nor would have it diminiſhed, either by others, or themſelves. But this I ſay, that thus it ought to be. And if any one, that profeſſes himſelf to be a miniſter of the word of God, a preacher of the goſpel of peace, teach otherwiſe, he either underſtands not, or neglects, the buſineſs of his calling, and ſhall one day give account thereof, unto the prince of peace. If chriſtians are to be admoniſhed, that they abſtain from all manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries, how much more ought they, who ſuffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear violence, and abſtain from all manner of ill uſage towards thoſe, from whom they have received none. This caution and temper they ought certainly to uſe towards thoſe, who mind only their own buſineſs, and are ſolicitous for nothing, but that (whatever men think of them) they may worſhip God in that manner, which they are perſuaded is acceptable to him, and in which they have the ſtrongeſt hopes of eternal ſalvation. In private, domeſtick affairs, in the management of eſtates, in the conſervation of bodily health, every man may conſider what ſuits his own conveniency, and follow what courſe he likes beſt. No man complains of the ill management of his neighbours affairs. No man is angry with another for an error, committed in ſowing his land, or in marrying his daughter. No body corrects a ſpendthrift for conſuming his ſubſtance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make whatſoever expences he pleaſes, no body murmurs, no body controuls him; he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there conform his behaviour, exactly, to the accuſtomed ceremonies, or if he brings not his children to be initiated in the ſacred myſteries of this, or the other congregation, this immediately cauſes an uproar. The neighbourhood is filled with noiſe and clamour, Every one is ready to be the avenger of ſo great a crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from violence and rapine, ſo long till the cauſe be heard, and the poor man be, according to form, condemned to the loſs of liberty, goods, or life. Oh that our eccleſiaſtical orators, of every ſect, would apply themſelves with all the ſtrength of arguments, that they are able, to the confounding of men's errrors! but let them ſpare their perſons. Let them not ſupply their want of reaſons with the inſtruments of force, which belong to another juriſdiction, and do ill become a churchman's hands. Let them not call in the magiſtrate's authority, to the aid of their eloquence, or learning; leſt, perhaps, whilſt they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing nothing but fire and ſword, betray their ambition, and ſhew that what they deſire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to perſuade men of ſenſe, that he, who with dry eyes, and ſatisfaction of mind, can deliver his brother to the executioner, to be burnt alive, does ſincerely and heartily concern himſelf, to ſave that brother from the flames of hell, in the world to come.

IN the laſt place. Let us now conſider what is the magiſtrate's duty in the buſineſs of toleration: which certainly is very conſiderable.

WE have already proved, That the care of ſouls does not belong to the magiſtrate: not a magiſterial care, I mean (if I may ſo call it) which conſiſts in preſcribing by laws, and compelling by puniſhments. But a charitable care, which conſiſts in teaching, admoniſhing, and perſuading, cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man's ſoul belongs unto himſelf, and is to be left unto himſelf. But what if he neglect the care of his ſoul? I anſwer, What if he neglect the care of his health, or of his eſtate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the magiſtrate than the other? Will the magiſtrate provide, by an expreſs law, that ſuch an one ſhall not become poor, or ſick? Laws provide, as much as is poſſible, that the goods and health of ſubjects be not injured, by the fraud or violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence, or ill huſbandry, of the poſſeſſors themſelves. No man can be forced to be rich, or healthful, whether he will or no. Nay, God himſelf will not ſave men againſt their wills. Let us ſuppoſe, however, that ſome prince were deſirous to force his ſubjects to accumulate riches, or to preſerve the health and ſtrength of their bodies. So ſhall it be provided by law, that they muſt conſult none but Roman phyſicians, and ſhall every one be bound to live according to their preſcriptions? What, ſhall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is prepared either in the Vatican, ſuppoſe, or in a Geneva ſhop? Or, to make theſe ſubjects rich, ſhall they all be obliged, by law, to become merchants, or muſicians? Or, ſhall every one turn victualler, or ſmith, becauſe there are ſome that maintain their families plentifully, and grow rich in thoſe profeſſions? But it may be ſaid, there are a thouſand ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. 'Tis well ſaid, indeed, eſpecially by thoſe that plead for compelling men into this or the other way. For if there were ſeveral ways, that lead thither, there would not be ſo much as a pretence left, for compulſion. But now, if I be marching on, with my utmoſt vigour, in that way which, according to the ſacred geography, leads ſtraight to Jeruſalem; Why am I beaten and ill uſed by others; becauſe perhaps, I wear not buſkins; becauſe my hair is not of the right cut; becauſe perhaps I have not been dipt in the right faſhion; becauſe I eat fleſh upon the road, or ſome other food, which agrees with my ſtomach; becauſe I avoid certain by-ways, which ſeem unto me to lead into briars or precipices; becauſe, amongſt the ſeveral paths, that are in the ſame road, I chuſe that to walk in, which ſeems to be the ſtraighteſt and cleaneſt; becauſe I avoid to keep company with ſome travellers that are leſs grave, and others that are more ſour, than they ought to be; or in fine, becauſe I follow a guide, that either is, or is not, clothed in white, and crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we conſider right, we ſhall find that, for the moſt part, they are ſuch frivolous things as theſe, that (without any prejudice to religion, or the ſalvation of ſouls, if not accompanied with ſuperſtition, or hypocriſy) might either be obſerved, or omitted; I ſay, they are ſuch-like things as theſe, which breed implacable enmities amongſt chriſtian brethren, who are all agreed in the ſubſtantial and truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto theſe zealots, who condemn all things, that are not of their mode, that from theſe circumſtances ariſe different ends. What ſhall we conclude from thence? There is only one of theſe, which is the true way to eternal happineſs. But in this great variety of ways, that men follow, it is ſtill doubted which is this right one. Now neither the care of the commonwealth, nor the right of enacting laws, does diſcover this way, that leads to heaven, more certainly to the magiſtrate, than every private man's ſearch and ſtudy diſcovers it unto himſelf. I have a weak body, ſunk under a languiſhing diſeaſe, for which (I ſuppoſe) there is one only remedy, but that unknown. Does it, therefore, belong unto the magiſtrate to preſcribe me a remedy, becauſe there is but one, and becauſe it is unknown? Becauſe there is but one way for me to eſcape death, will it, therefore, be ſafe for me to do whatſoever the magiſtrate ordains? Thoſe things, that every man ought ſincerely to enquire into himſelf, and by meditation, ſtudy, ſearch, and his own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon, as the peculiar profeſſion of any one ſort of men. Princes, indeed, are born ſuperior unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right, nor the art of ruling, does neceſſarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things; and leaſt of all, of the true religion. For, if it were ſo, how could it come to paſs, that the lords of the earth ſhould differ ſo vaſtly, as they do, in religious matters? But let us grant, that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a prince, than by his ſubjects; or at leaſt, that in this incertitude of things, the ſafeſt and moſt commodious way for private perſons, is to follow his dictates. You will ſay, What then? If he ſhould bid you follow merchandiſe for your livelihood, would you decline that courſe, for fear it ſhould not ſucceed? I anſwer, I would turn merchant, upon the prince's command; becauſe, in caſe if I ſhould have ill ſucceſs in trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loſs, ſome other way. If it be true, as he pretends, that he deſires I ſhould thrive and grow rich, he can ſet me up again, when unſucceſsful voyages have broke me. But this is not the caſe, in the things that regard the life to come. If there I take a wrong courſe, if in that reſpect I am once undone, it is not in the magiſtrate's power to repair my loſs, to eaſe my ſuffering, nor to reſtore me in any meaſure, much leſs entirely to a good eſtate. What ſecurity can be given for the kingdom of heaven?

Perhaps, ſome will ſay, that they do not ſuppoſe this infallible judgment, that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil magiſtrate, but in the church. What the church has determined, that the civil magiſtrate orders to be obſerved; and he provides, by his authority, that no body ſhall either act, or believe, in the buſineſs of religion, otherwiſe than the church teaches. So that the judgment of thoſe things is in the church. The magiſtrate himſelf yields obedience thereunto, and requires the like obedience from others. I anſwer: Who ſees not how frequently the name of the church, which was venerable in the time of the apoſtles, has been made uſe of to throw duſt in people's eyes, in the following ages? But however, in the preſent caſe, it helps us not. The one only narrow way, which leads to heaven, is not better known to the magiſtrate, than to private perſons; and, therefore, I cannot ſafely take him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way, as myſelf, and who certainly is leſs concerned for my ſalvation, than I myſelf am. Amongſt ſo many kings of the Jews, how many of them were there, whom any Iſraelite, thus blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry, and thereby into deſtruction? Yet nevertheleſs, you bid me be of good courage, and tell me that all is now ſafe and ſecure, becauſe the magiſtrate does not now enjoin the obſervance of his own decrees, in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the church. Of what church, I beſeech you? Of that certainly, which likes him beſt. As if he that compels me, by laws and penalties, to enter into this, or the other church, did not interpoſe his own judgment in the matter. What difference is there, whether he lead me himſelf, or deliver me over to be led by others? I depend, both ways, upon his will, and it is he that determines, both ways, of my eternal ſtate. Would an Iſraelite, that worſhipped Baal, upon the command of his king, have been in any better condition; becauſe ſome body had told him, that the king ordered nothing in religion, upon his own head, nor commanded any thing to be done, by his ſubjects, in divine worſhip, but what was approved by the counſel of prieſts, and declared to be of divine right, by the doctors of their church? If the religion of any church become therefore, true and ſaving; becauſe the head of that ſect, the prelates and prieſts, and thoſe of that tribe, do, all of them, with all their might, extol and praiſe it; what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, falſe and deſtructive? I am doubtful, concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I am ſuſpicious of the way of worſhip, practiſed by the Papiſts or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot ſafer for me to join either unto the one, or the other of thoſe churches, upon the magiſtrate's command; becauſe he commands nothing in religion, but by the authority and counſel of the doctors of that church?

But to ſpeak the truth, we muſt acknowledge that the church (if a convention of clergymen, making canons, muſt be called by that name) is, for the moſt part, more apt to be influenced by the court, than the court by the church. How the church was under the viciſſitude of orthodox and Arian emperors, is very well known. Or if thoſe things be too remote, our modern Engliſh hiſtory affords us freſh examples, in the reigns of Henry the VIIIth, Edward the VIth, Mary and Elizabeth, how eaſily and ſmoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worſhip, every thing according to the inclination of thoſe kings and queens. Yet were thoſe kings and queens of ſuch different minds, in point of religion, and enjoined thereupon ſuch different things, that no man in his wits (I had almoſt ſaid, none but an atheiſt) will preſume to ſay, that any ſincere and upright worſhipper of God could, with a ſafe conſcience, obey their ſeveral decrees. To conclude: It is the ſame thing, whether a king, that preſcribes laws to another man's religion, pretned to do it by his own judgment, or by the eccleſiaſtical authority and advice of others. The deciſions of churchmen, whoſe differences and diſputes are ſufficiently known, cannot be any ſounder or ſafer than his: nor can all their ſuffrages joined together, add any new ſtrength unto the civil power, Though this alſo muſt be taken notice of, that princes ſeldom have regard to the ſuffrages of eccleſiaſticks, that are not favourers of their own faith, and way of porſhip.

BUT after all, the principal conſideration, and which abſolutely determines this controverſy, is this. Although the magiſtrate's opinion in religion be ſound, and the way, that he appoints, be truly evangelical; yet if I be not thoroughly perſuaded thereof, in my own mind, there will be no ſafety for me, in following it, No way whatſoever, that I ſhall walk in, againſt the dictates of my conſcience, will ever bring me to the manſions of the bleſſed. I may grow rich, by an art, that I take not delight in; I may be cured of ſome diſeaſe, by remedies, that I have not faith in; but I cannot be ſaved by a religion, that I diſtruſt, and by a worſhip, that I abhor. It is in vain for an unbeliever, to take up the outward ſhew of another man's profeſſion, Faith only, and inward ſincerity, are the things, that procure acceptance with God. The moſt likely and moſt approved remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his ſtomach reject it as ſoon as taken. And you will in vain cram a medicine down a ſick man's throat, which his particular conſtitution will be ſure to turn into poiſon, In a word: whatſoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at leaſt is certain, that no religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either true, or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their ſubjects to come into their church-communion, under pretence of ſaving their ſouls. If they believe, they will come of their own accord: if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great ſoever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, men cannot be forced to be ſaved, whether they will or no, And therefore, when all is done, they muſt be left to their own conſciences.

HAVING thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another, in matters of religion, let us now conſider what they are to do. All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publickly worſhipped. Why otherwiſe do they compel one another unto the publick aſſemblies? Men, therefore, conſtituted in this liberty, are to enter into ſome religious ſociety, that they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world, that they worſhip God, and offer unto his divine majeſty ſuch ſervice, as they themſelves are not aſhamed of, and ſuch as they think not unworthy of him, nor unacceptable to him; and finally, that by their purity of doctrine, holineſs of life, and decent form of worſhip, they may draw others unto the love of the true relgion, and perform ſuch other things in religion, as cannot be done by each private man apart.

THESE religious ſocieties I call churches: and theſe, I ſay, the magiſtrate ought to tolerate. For the buſineſs of theſe aſſemblies of the people is nothing, but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of; I mean the ſalvation of their ſouls; nor, in this caſe, is there any difference between the national church, and other ſeparated congregations.

BUT as, in every church, there are two things eſpecially to be conſidered; the outward form and rites of worſhip, and the doctrines and articles of faith; theſe things muſt be handled each diſtinctly; that ſo the whole matter of toleration may the more clearly be underſtood,

CONCERNING OUTWARD WORSHIP, I ſay (in the firſt place) that the magiſtrate has no power to enforce by law, either in his own church, or much leſs in another, the uſe of any rites, or ceremonies whatſoever, in the worſhip of God. And this, not only, becauſe theſe churches are free ſocieties, but becauſe whatſoever is practiſed in the worſhip of God, is only ſo far juſtifiable, as it is believed, by thoſe that practiſe it, to be acceptable unto him, Whatſoever is not done with that aſſurance of faith, is neither well in itſelf, nor can be acceptable to God. To impoſe ſuch things, therefore, upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to offend God: which, conſidering that the end of all religion is to pleaſe him, and that liberty is eſſentially neceſſary to that end, appears to be abſurd beyond expreſſion.

BUT, perhaps, it may be concluded from hence, that I deny unto the magiſtrate all manner of power about indifferent things; which, if it be not granted, the whole ſubject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none but ſuch, are ſubjected to the legiſlative power. But it does not therefore follow, that the magiſtrate may ordain, whatſoever he pleaſes, concerning any thing that is indifferent. The publick good is the rule and meaſure of all law-making. If a thing be not uſeful to the commonwealth, though it be never ſo indifferent, it may not preſently be eſtabliſhed by a law.

AND farther: things never ſo indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the church and worſhip of God, are removed out of the reach of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction; becauſe, in that uſe, they have no connection at all with civil affairs, The only buſineſs of the church is the ſalvation of ſouls: and it no ways concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this, or the other ceremony be there made uſe of. Neither the uſe, nor the omiſſion of any ceremonies, in thoſe religious aſſemblies, does either advantage, or prejudice the life, liberty, or eſtate of any man. For example: let it be granted, that the waſhing of an infant with water is in itſelf an indifferent thing. Let it be granted alſo, that if the magiſtrate underſtand ſuch waſhing to be profitable to the curing, or preventing, of any diſeaſe, that children are ſubject unto, and eſteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of, by a law; in that caſe he may order it to be done, But will any one therefore ſay, that a magiſtrate has the ſame right to ordain, by law, that all children ſhall be baptized by prieſts, in the ſacred font, in order to the purification of their ſouls? The extreme difference of theſe two caſes is viſible to every one, at firſt ſight. Or, let us apply the laſt caſe to the child of a Jew, and the thing ſpeaks itſelf. For what hinders but a chriſtian magiſtrate may have ſubjects that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge that ſuch an injury may not be done unto a Jew, as to compel him, againſt his own opinion, to practiſe in his religion a thing, that is in its nature indifferent; how can we maintain that any thing of this kind may be done to a chriſtian?

AGAIN: Things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority, be made any part of the worſhip of God; for this very reaſon; becauſe they are indifferent. For, ſince indifferent things are not capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the deity; no human power, or authority, can confer on them ſo much dignity and excellency, as to enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life, that uſe of indifferent things, which God has not forbidden, is free and lawful; and therefore, in thoſe things human authority has place. But it is not ſo, in matters of religion. Things indifferent are not otherwiſe lawful, in the worſhip of God, than as they are inſtituted by God himſelf; and as he, by ſome poſitive command, has ordained them to be made a part of that worſhip, which he will vouchſafe to accept, at the hands of poor, ſinful men, Nor when an incenſed deity ſhall aſk us, "Who has required "theſe, or ſuch like things, at your hands?" will it be enough to anſwer him, that the magiſtrate commanded them? If civil juriſdiction extended thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodge-podge of ceremonies, what ſuperſtitious inventions, built upon the magiſtrate's authority, might not (againſt conſcience) be impoſed upon the worſhippers of God? For the greateſt part of theſe ceremonies and ſuperſtitions conſiſts in the religious uſe of ſuch things as are, in their own nature, indifferent: nor are they ſinful, upon any other account, than becauſe God is not the author of them. The ſprinkling of water, and the uſe of bread and wine, are both in their own nature, and in the ordinary occaſions of life, altogether indifferent. Will any man, therefore, ſay, that theſe things could have been introduced into religion, and made a part of divine worſhip, if not by divine inſtitution? If any human authority, or civil power, could have done this, why might it not alſo enjoin the eating of fiſh, and drinking of ale, in the holy banquet, as a part of divine worſhip? Why not the ſprinkling of the blood of beaſts in churches, and expiations by water and fire, and abundance more of this kind? but theſe things, how indifferent ſoever they be, in common uſes, when they come to be annexed unto divine worſhip, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God, as the ſacrifice of a dog. And why a dog ſo abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in reſpect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely diſtant from all affinity with matter; unleſs it be that God required the uſe of the one, in his worſhip, and not of the other? We ſee, therefore, that indifferent things, how much ſoever they be under the power of the civil magiſtrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be introduced into religion, and impoſed upon religious aſſemblies; becauſe, in the worſhip of God, they wholly ceaſe to be indifferent. He that worſhips God, does it with deſign to pleaſe him and procure his favour. But that cannot be done by him, who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that, which he knows will be diſpleaſing to him, becauſe not commanded by himſelf. This is not to pleaſe God, or appeaſe his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke him, by a manifeſt contempt; which is a thing abſolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worſhip.

BUT it will be here aſked: if nothing, belonging to divine worſhip, be left to human diſcretion, how is it then, that churches themſelves have the power of ordering any thing, about the time, and place of worſhip, and the like? To this I anſwer; that in religious worſhip we muſt diſtinguiſh between what is part of the worſhip itſelf, and what is but a circumſtance. That is a part of the worſhip, which is believed to be appointed by God, and to be well-pleaſing to him; and therefore, that is neceſſary. Circumſtances are ſuch things which, though in general they cannot be ſeparated from worſhip, yet the particular inſtances, or modifications, of them are not determined: and therefore, they are indifferent. Of this ſort are the time and place of worſhip, the habit and poſture of him that worſhips. Theſe are circumſtances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any expreſs command about them. For example: amongſt the Jews, the time and place of their worſhip, and the habits of thoſe that officiated in it, were not mere circumſtances, but a part of the worſhip itſelf; in which, if any thing were defective, or different from the inſtitution, they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But theſe, to chriſtians, under the liberty of the goſpel, are mere circumſtances of worſhip, which the prudence of every church may bring into ſuch uſe, as ſhall be judged moſt ſubſervient to the end of order, decency, and edification. But, even under the goſpel, thoſe, who believe the firſt, or the ſeventh day, to be ſet apart by God, and conſecrated ſtill to his worſhip, to them that portion of time is not a ſimple circumſtance, but a real part of divine worſhip, which can neither be changed, nor neglected.

IN the next place: as the magiſtrate has no power, to impoſe by his laws, the uſe of any rites and ceremonies in any church, ſo neither has he any power to forbid the uſe of ſuch rites and ceremonies, as are already received, approved, and practiſed by any church: becauſe, if he did ſo, he would deſtroy the church itſelf: the end of whoſe inſtitution is only to worſhip God with freedom after its own manner.

YOU will ſay, by this rule, if ſome congregations ſhould have a mind to ſacrifice infants, or (as the primitive chriſtians were falſly accuſed) luſtfully pollute themſelves, in promiſcuous uncleanneſs, or practiſe any other ſuch heinous enormities, is the magiſtrate obliged to tolerate them, becauſe they are committed in a religious aſſembly? I anſwer, No. Theſe things are not lawful, in the ordinary courſe of life, nor in any private houſe; and therefore, neither are they ſo, in the worſhip of God, or in any religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people, congregated upon account of religion, ſhould be deſirous to ſacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a law. Melibæus, whoſe calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it, that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man's goods. And, for the ſame reaſon, he may kill his calf alſo, in a religious meeting. Whether the doing ſo be well-pleaſing to God, or no, it is their part to conſider, that do it. The part of the magiſtrate is only to take care that the commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or eſtate; and thus, what may be ſpent on a feaſt, may be ſpent on a ſacrifice. But if peradventure ſuch were the ſtate of things, that the intereſt of the commonwealth required all ſlaughter of beaſts ſhould be forborn for ſome while, in order to the increaſing of the ſtock of cattle, that had been deſtroyed by ſome extraordinary murrain? who ſees not that the magiſtrate, in ſuch a caſe, may forbid all his ſubjects to kill any calves, for any uſe whatſoever? only it is to be obſerved, that, in this caſe, the law is not made about a religious, but a political matter: nor is the ſacrifice, but the ſlaughter of calves thereby prohibited.

BY this we ſee what difference there is, between the church and the commonwealth. Whatſoever is lawful in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magiſtrate, in the church. Whatſoever is permitted unto any of his ſubjects, for their ordinary uſe, neither can, nor ought to be, forbidden by him, to any ſect of people, for their religious uſes. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either ſitting or kneeling, in his own houſe, the law ought not to abridge him of the ſame liberty, in his religious worſhip; though in the church, the uſe of bread and wine be very different, and be there applied to the myſteries of faith, and rites of divine worſhip. But thoſe things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people, in their ordinary uſe, and are therefore forbidden by laws, thoſe things ought not to be permitted to churches in their ſacred rites. Only the magiſtrate ought always to be very careful that he do not miſuſe his authority, to the oppreſſion of any church, under pretence of publick good.

IT may be ſaid, What if a church be idolatrous, is that alſo to be tolerated by the magiſtrate? I anſwer, What power can be given to the magiſtrate for the ſuppreſſion of an idolatrous church, which may not, in time and place be made uſe of, to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it muſt be remembered, that the civil power is the ſame every-where, and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himſelf. If, therefore, ſuch a power be granted unto the civil magiſtrate in ſpirituals, as that at Geneva, (for example) he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion, which is there reputed idolatrous; by the ſame rule, another magiſtrate in ſome neighbouring country, may oppreſs the reformed religion; and in India, the chriſtian. The civil power can either change every thing in religion, according to the prince's pleaſure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce any thing into religion, by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but it will, in the ſame manner, be lawful to alter every thing, according to that rule of truth, which the magiſtrate has framed unto himſelf. No man whatſoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of his terreſtrial enjoyments, upon account of his religion. Not even Americans ſubjected unto a chriſtian prince, are to be puniſhed, either in body or goods, for not embracing our faith and worſhip. If they are perſuaded that they pleaſe God, in obſerving the rites of their own country, and that they ſhould obtain happineſs, by that means, they are to be left unto God and themſelves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An inconſiderable and weak number of chriſtians, deſtitute of every thing, arrive in a pagan country; theſe foreigners beſeech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would ſuccour them with the neceſſaries of life; thoſe neceſſaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The chriſtian religion, by this means, takes root in that country, and ſpreads itſelf; but does not ſuddenly grow the ſtrongeſt. While things are in this condition, peace, friendſhip, faith, and equal juſtice, are preſerved amongſt them. At length the magiſtrate becomes a chriſtian; and, by that means, their party becomes the moſt powerful. Then, immediately, all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated: and unleſs theſe innocent pagans, ſtrict obſervers of the rules of equity and the law of nature, and no ways offending againſt the laws of the ſociety; I ſay, unleſs they will forſake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and ſtrange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and poſſeſſions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itſelf. Then, at laſt, it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the deſire of dominion, is capable to produce; and how eaſily the pretence of religion, and of the care of ſouls, ſerves for a cloak to covetouſneſs, rapine, and ambition.

Now, whoſoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place, by laws, puniſhments, fire and ſword, may apply this ſtory to himſelf. For the reaſon of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither pagans nor any diſſenting chriſtians here, can with any right be deprived of their worldly goods, by the predominating faction of a court-church: nor are any civil rights to be either changed, or violated, upon the account of religion, in one place, more than another.

But idolatry (ſome ſay) is a ſin, and therefore not to be tolerated. If they ſaid, it were therefore to be avoided, the inference were good. But it does not follow, that becauſe it is a ſin, it ought, therefore to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. For it does not belong unto the magiſtrate, to make uſe of his ſword, in puniſhing every thing, indifferently, that he takes to be a ſin againſt God. Covetouſneſs, uncharitableneſs, idleneſs, and many other things are ſins, by the conſent of all men, which yet no man ever ſaid were to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. The reaſon is, becauſe they are not prejudicial to other men's rights, nor do they break the publick peace of ſocieties. Nay, even the ſins of lying and perjury are no where puniſhable by laws; unleſs, in certain caſes, in which the real turpitude of the thing, and the offence againſt God, are not conſidered, but only the injury done unto men's neighbours, and to the commonwealth. And what if, in another country, to a mahometan or a pagan prince, the chriſtian religion ſeem falſe and offenſive to God; may not the chriſtians, for the ſame reaſon, and after the ſame manner, be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther, "That, by the law of Moſes, idolaters were "to be rooted out." True indeed, by the law of Moſes, but that is not obligatory to us, chriſtians. No body pretends that every thing, generally, enjoined by the law of Moſes, ought to be practiſed by chriſtians; but there is nothing more frivolous, than that common diſtinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial law, which men ordinarily make uſe of. For no poſitive law whatſoever can oblige any people, but thoſe, to whom it is given. "Hear, O Iſrael," ſufficiently reſtrains the obligation of the law of Moſes, only to that people. And this conſideration alone is anſwer enough unto thoſe, that urge the authority of the law of Moſes, for the inflicting of capital puniſhments upon idolaters. But, however, I will examine this argument a little more particularly.

The caſe of idolaters, in reſpect of the Jewiſh commonwealth, falls under a double conſideration. The firſt is of thoſe, who, being initiated in the Moſaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards apoſtatiſe from the worſhip of the God of Iſrael. Theſe were proceeded againſt, as traitors and rebels, guilty of no leſs than high-treaſon. For the commonwealth of the Jews, different in that, from all others, was an abſolute theocracy: nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that commonwealth and the church. The laws eſtabliſhed there, concerning the worſhip of one, inviſible deity, were the civil laws of that people, and a part of their political government, in which God himſelf was the legiſlator. Now if any one can ſhew me, where there is a commonwealth, at this time, conſtituted upon that foundation I will acknowledge that the eccleſiaſtical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil; and that the ſubjects of that government both may, and ought to, be kept in ſtrict conformity with that church, by the civil power. But there is abſolutely no ſuch thing, under the goſpel, as a chriſtian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and kingdoms, that have embraced the faith of Chriſt, but they have retained their ancient form of governmant; with which the law of Chriſt has not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they may attain eternal life. But he inſtituted no commonwealth. He preſcribed unto his followers no new and peculiar form of government, nor put he the ſword into any magiſtrate's hand, with commiſſion to make uſe of it, in forcing men to forſake their former religion, and receive his.

Secondly, Foreigners, and ſuch as were ſtrangers to the commonwealth of Iſrael, were not compelled by force to obſerve the rites of the Moſaical law. But, on the contrary, in the very ſame place, where it is ordered, "that an Iſ-"raelite, that was an idolater, ſhould be put to death, there it is provided, "that ſtrangers ſhould not be vexed, nor oppreſſed." I confeſs that the ſeven nations, that poſſeſſed the land, which was promiſed to the Iſraelites, were utterly to be cut off. But this was not ſingly, becauſe they were idolaters. For, if that had been the reaſon, why were the Moabites and other nations to be ſpared? No, the reaſon is this. God being in a peculiar manner the king of the Jews, he could not ſuffer the adoration of any other deity (which was properly an act of high-treaſon againſt himſelf) in the land of Canaan, which was his kingdom. For ſuch a manifeſt revolt could no ways conſiſt with his dominion, which was perfectly political, in that country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out of the bounds of his kingdom; becauſe it was an acknowledgment of another God, that is to ſay, another king; againſt the laws of empire. The inhabitants were alſo to be driven out, that the entire poſſeſſion of the land might be given to the Iſraelites. And for the like reaſon, the Emims and the Horims were driven out of their countries, by the children of Eſau and Lot; and their lands, upon the ſame grounds, given by God to the invaders. But though all idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation of the Gibeonites, articled with Joſhua, and were allowed by treaty: and there were many captives amongſt the Jews, who were idolaters. David and Solomon ſubdued many countries, without the confines of the land of promiſe, and carried their conqueſts as far as Euphrates. Amongſt ſo many captives taken, of many nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the Jewiſh religion, and the worſhip of the true God, and puniſhed for idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one, indeed, becoming a proſelyte, deſired to be made a deniſon of their commonwealth, he was obliged to ſubmit to their laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by conſtraint. He did not willingly ſubmit, to ſhew his obedience; but he ſought and ſolicited for it, as a privilege. And, as ſoon as he was admitted, he became a ſubject to the laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden, within the borders of the land of Canaan. But that law (as I have ſaid) did not reach to any of thoſe regions, however ſubjected unto the Jews, that were ſituated without thoſe bounds.

Thus far concerning outward worſhip. Let us now conſider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are ſome of them practical, and ſome ſpeculative. Now, though both ſorts conſiſt in the knowledge of truth, yet theſe terminate ſimply in the underſtanding, thoſe influence the will and manners. Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith (as they are called) which are required only to be believed, cannot be impoſed on any church, by the law of the land. For it is abſurd that things ſhould be enjoined by laws, which are not in men's power to perform. And to believe this, or that to be true, does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been ſaid already. But (will ſome ſay) let men at leaſt profeſs that they believe. A ſweet religion indeed, that obliges men to diſſemble, and tell lies both to God and man, for the ſalvation of their ſouls! If the magiſtrate thinks to ſave men thus, he ſeems to underſtand little of the way of ſalvation. And if he does it not, in order to ſave

them,

them, why is he ſo ſolicitous about the articles of faith, as to enact them by a law?

FARTHER, The magiſtrate ought not to forbid the preaching, or profeſſing of any ſpeculative opinions in any church, becauſe they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the ſubjects. If a Roman catholick believe that to be really the body of Chriſt, which another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew does not believe the new teſtament to be the word of God, he does not thereby alter any thing in men's civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both teſtaments, he is not, therefore, to be puniſhed as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magiſtrate, and the eſtates of the people, may be equally ſecure, whether any man believe theſe things, or no. I readily grant, that theſe opinions are falſe and abſurd. But the buſineſs of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the ſafety and ſecurity of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and perſon. And ſo it ought to be. For truth certainly would do well enough, if ſhe were once left to ſhift for herſelf. She ſeldom has received, and I fear never will receive, much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom ſhe is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has ſhe any need of force, to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the aſſiſtance of foreign and borrowed ſuccours. But if truth makes not her way into the underſtanding, by her own light, ſhe will be but the weaker for any borrowed force, violence, can add to her. Thus much for ſpeculative opinions. Let us now proceed to practical ones.

A GOOD life, in which conſiſts not the leaſt part of religion and true piety, concerns alſo the civil government: and in it lies the ſafety both of men's ſouls, and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the juriſdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and domeſtick governor; I mean both of the magiſtrate and conſcience. Here, therefore, is great danger, leſt one of theſe juriſdictions intrench upon the other, and diſcord ariſe between the keeper of the publick peace, and the overſeers of ſouls. But if what has been already ſaid concerning the limits of both theſe governments be rightly conſidered, it will eaſily remove all difficulty in this matter.

EVERY man has an immortal ſoul, capable of eternal happineſs, or miſery: whoſe happineſs depending upon his believing and doing thoſe things, in this life, which are neceſſary to the obtaining of God's favour, and are preſcribed by God, to that end; it follows from thence, 1ſt, That the obſervance of theſe things is the higheſt obligation, that lies upon mankind, and that our utmoſt care, application and diligence, ought to be exerciſed in the ſearch and performance of them; becauſe there is nothing in this world, that is of any conſideration, in compariſon with eternity. 2dly, That ſeeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his erroneous opinions, and undue manner of worſhip, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs; therefore the care of each man's ſalvation belongs only to himſelf. But I would not have this underſtood, as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions, and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors; which are indeed, the greateſt duty of a chriſtian. Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleaſes, towards the promoting of another man's ſalvation. But all force and compulſion are to be forborn. Nothing is to be done imperiouſly. No body is obliged, in that matter, to yield obedience unto the admonitions, or injunctions, of another, farther than he himſelf is perſuaded. Every man, in that, has the ſupreme and abſolute authority of judging for himſelf. And the reaſon is, becauſe no body elſe is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

BUT, beſides their ſouls, which are immortal, men have alſo their temporal lives, here upon earth; the ſtate whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of ſeveral outward conveniencies to the ſupport thereof, which are to be procured, or preſerved, by pains and induſtry. For thoſe things that are neceſſary, to the comfortable ſupport of our lives, are not the ſpontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themſelves, fit and prepared for our uſe. This part, therefore, draws on another care, and neceſſarily gives another employment. But the pravity of mankind being ſuch, that they had rather injuriouſly prey upon the fruits of other men's labours, than take pains to provide for themſelves; the neceſſity of preſerving men, in the poſſeſſion of what honeſt induſtry has already acquired, and alſo of preſerving their liberty and ſtrength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into ſociety with one another; that, by mutual aſſiſtance and joint force, they may ſecure unto each other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comforts and happineſs of this life: leaving, in the mean while, to every man the care of his own eternal happineſs, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man's induſtry, nor can the loſs of it turn to any other man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him, by any external violence. But foraſmuch as men, thus entering into ſocieties, grounded upon mutual compacts of aſſiſtance, for the defence of their temporal goods, may nevertheleſs be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow-citizens, or by the hoſtile violence of foreigners; the remedy of this evil conſiſts in arms, riches, and multitudes of citizens; the remedy of the other in laws; and the care of all things, relating both to the one and the other, is committed, by the ſociety, to the civil magiſtrate. This is the original, this is the uſe, and theſe are the bounds of the legiſlative (which is the ſupreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean, that proviſion may be made for the ſecurity of each man's private poſſeſſions; for the peace, riches and publick commodities of the whole people: and, as much as poſſible, for the increaſe of their inward ſtrength, againſt foreign invaſions.

THESE things being thus explained, it is eaſy to underſtand to what end the legiſlative power ought to be directed, and by what meaſures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward proſperity of the ſociety; which is the ſole reaſon of men's entering into ſociety, and the only thing they ſeek and aim at, in it. And it is alſo evident, what liberty remains to men, in reference to their eternal ſalvation, and that is, that every one ſhould do what he, in his conſcience, is perſuaded to be acceptable to the almighty, on whoſe good pleaſure and acceptance depends their eternal happineſs. For obedience is due, in the firſt place to God, and afterwards to the laws.

BUT ſome may aſk, "What, if the magiſtrate ſhould enjoin any thing, by "his authority, that appears unlawful to the conſcience of a private perſon? I anſwer, that if government be faithfully adminiſtred, and the councils of the magiſtrate be, indeed, directed to the publick good, this will ſeldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do ſo fall out, I ſay, that ſuch a private perſon is to abſtain from the action, that he judges unlawful; and he is to undergo the puniſhment, which it is not unlawful for him to bear; for the private judgment of any perſon, concerning a law, enacted in political matters, for the publick good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deſerve a diſpenſation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things, that lye not within the verge of the magiſtrate's authority; (as for example, that the people, or any party amongſt them, ſhould be compelled to embrace a ſtrange religion, and join in the worſhip and ceremonies of another church) men are not, in theſe caſes, obliged by that law, againſt their conſciences. For the political ſociety is inſtituted for no other end, but only to ſecure every man's poſſeſſion of the things of this life. The care of each man's ſoul, and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth, nor can be ſubjected to it, is left entirely to every man's ſelf. Thus the ſafeguard of men's lives, and of the things that belong unto this life, is the buſineſs of the commonwealth; and the preſerving of thoſe things unto their owners, is the duty of the magiſtrate. And, therefore, the magiſtrate cannot take away theſe worldly things from this man, or party, and give them to that; nor change property amongſt fellow-ſubjects, (no not, even by a law) for a cauſe, that has no relation to the end of civil government; I mean, for their religion; which, whether it be true or falſe, does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow-ſubjects, which are the things, that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

"BUT what if the magiſtrate believe ſuch a law, as this, to be for the pub-"lick good?" I anſwer, as the private judgment of any particular perſon, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of the law, ſo the private judgment (as I may call it) of the magiſtrate does not give him any new right, of impoſing laws upon his ſubjects, which neither was, in the conſtitution of the government, granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant: much leſs, if he make it his buſineſs to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-ſectaries, with the ſpoils of others. But what if the magiſtrate believes that he has a right to make ſuch laws, and that they are for the publick good; and his ſubjects believe the contrary? Who ſhall be judge between them? I anſwer, God alone. For there is no judge upon earth, between the ſupreme magiſtrate and the people. God, I ſay, is the only judge in this caſe, who will retribute unto every one, at the laſt day, according to his deſerts; that is, according to his ſincerity and uprightneſs, in endeavouring to promote piety, and the publick weal and peace of mankind. But what ſhall be done in the mean while? I anſwer: the principal and chief care of every one ought to be, of his own ſoul, firſt; and in the next place, of the publick peace; tho' yet there are very few will think it is peace there, where they ſee all laid waſte. There are two ſorts of conteſts amongſt men; the one managed by law, the other by force: and they are of that nature, that were the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my buſineſs to enquire into the power of the magiſtrate, in the different conſtitutions of nations. I only know what uſually happens where controverſies ariſe, without a judge to determine them. You will ſay then the magiſtrate, being the ſtronger, will have his will, and carry his point. Without doubt. But the queſtion is not here, concerning the doubtfulneſs of the event, but rhe rule of right.

BUT to come to particulars. I ſay, firſt, no opinions, contrary to human ſociety, or to thoſe moral rules, which are neceſſary to the preſervation of civil ſociety, are to be tolerated by the magiſtrate. But of theſe, indeed, examples in any church are rare. For no ſect can eaſily arrive to ſuch a degree of madneſs, as that it ſhould think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, ſuch things as manifeſtly undermine the foundations of ſociety, and are, therefore, condemned by the judgment of all mankind: becauſe their own intereſt, peace, reputation, and every thing would be thereby endangered.

ANOTHER more ſecret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themſelves, and to thoſe of their own ſect, ſome peculiar prerogative, covered over with a ſpecious ſhew of deceitful words; but, in effect, oppoſite to the civil right of the community. For example: We cannot find any ſect, that teaches expreſly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promiſe: that princes may be dethroned by thoſe that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themſelves. For theſe things, propoſed thus nakedly and plainly, would ſoon draw on them the eye and hand of the magiſtrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth, to a watchfulneſs againſt the ſpreading of ſo dangerous an evil. But nevertheleſs, we find thoſe that ſay the ſame things, in other words. What elſe do they mean, who teach that, "faith is not to be kept with hereticks?" Their meaning, forſooth, is, that the priviledge of breaking faith belongs unto themſelves; for they declare all, that are not of their communion, to be hereticks: or, at leaſt, may declare them ſo, whenſoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their aſſerting, that "kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns "and kingdoms?" It is evident that they thereby arrogate, unto themſelves, the power of depoſing kings, becauſe they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. "That dominion is founded "in grace," is alſo an aſſertion, by which thoſe, that maintain it, do plainly lay claim to the poſſeſſion of all things. For they are not ſo wanting to themſelves, as not to believe, or at leaſt as not to profeſs, themſelves to be the truly pious and faithful. Theſe therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themſelves, any peculiar privilege, or power, above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who, upon pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over ſuch, as are not aſſociated with them, in their eccleſiaſtical communion; I ſay, theſe have no right to be tolerated by the magiſtrate; as neither thoſe, that will not own, and teach, the duty of tolerating all men, in matters of mere religion. For what do all theſe and the like doctrines ſignify, but that they may, and are ready, upon any occaſion, to ſeize the government, and poſſeſs themſelves of the eſtates and fortunes of their fellow-ſubjects; and that they only aſk leave to be tolerated by the magiſtrate, ſo long, until they find themſelves ſtrong enough to effect it?

Again: That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magiſtrate, which is conſtituted upon ſuch a bottom, that all thoſe, who enter into it, do thereby, *ipſo facto*, deliver themſelves up to the protection and ſervice of another prince. For, by this means, the magiſtrate would give way to the ſettling of a foreign juriſdiction in his own country, and ſuffer his own people to be liſted, as it were, for ſoldiers againſt his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious diſtinction, between the court and the church, afford any remedy to this inconvenience; eſpecially, when both the one and the other are equally ſubject to the abſolute authority of the ſame perſon; who has not only power to perſuade the members of his church to whatſoever he liſts, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but can alſo enjoin it them, on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profeſs himſelf to be a mahometan, only in his religion, but in every thing elſe a faithful ſubject to a chriſtian magiſtrate; whilſt, at the ſame time, he acknowledges himſelf bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of Conſtantinople; who himſelf is entirely obedient to the Ottoman emperor, and frames the feigned oracles of that religion, according to his pleaſure. But this mahometan, living amongſt chriſtians, would yet more apparently renounce their government, if he acknowledged the ſame perſon to be head of his church, who is the ſupreme magiſtrate in the ſtate.

Lastly, Thoſe are not at all to be tolerated, who deny the being of a God. Promiſes, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human ſociety, can have no hold upon an atheiſt. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, diſſolves all. Beſides alſo, thoſe, that by their atheiſm undermine and deſtroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion, whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions, though not abſolutely free from all error, if they do not tend to eſtabliſh domination over others, or civil impunity to the church, in which they are taught, there can be no reaſon why they ſhould not be tolerated.

It remains that I ſay ſomething, concerning theſe aſſemblies, which being vulgarly called, and perhaps having ſometimes been, conventicles, and nurſeries of factions and ſeditions, are thought to afford the ſtrongeſt matter of objection againſt this doctrine of toleration. But this has not happened by any thing, peculiar unto the genius of ſuch aſſemblies, but by the unhappy circumſtances of an oppreſſed, or ill-ſettled liberty. Theſe accuſations would ſoon ceaſe, if the law of toleration were once ſo ſettled, that all churches were obliged to lay down toleration, as the foundation of their own liberty; and teach, that liberty of conſcience is every man's natural right, equally belonging to diſſenters as to themſelves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion, either by law, or force. The eſtabliſhment of this one thing would take away all ground of complaints and tumults, upon account of conſcience. And theſe cauſes of diſcontents and animoſities being once removed, there would remain nothing in theſe aſſemblies, that were not more peaceable, and leſs apt to produce diſturbance of ſtate, than in any other meetings whatſoever. But let us examine particularly the heads of theſe accuſations.

You'll ſay, That "aſſemblies and meetings endanger the publick peace, and "threaten the commonwealth." I anſwer: If this be ſo, why are there daily ſuch numerous meetings in markets, and courts of judicature? Why are crowds upon the exchange, and a concourſe of people, in cities, ſuffered? You'll reply; Thoſe are civil aſſemblies; but theſe we object againſt, are eccleſiaſtical. I anſwer: 'Tis a likely thing, indeed, that ſuch aſſemblies, as are altogether remote from civil affairs, ſhould be moſt apt to embroil them. O, but civil aſſemblies are compoſed of men, that differ from one another in matters of religion; but theſe eccleſiaſtical meetings are of perſons, that are all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of religion, were in effect a conſpiracy againſt the commonwealth; or as if men would not be ſo much the more warmly unanimous in religion, the leſs liberty they had of aſſembling. But it will be urged ſtill, That civil aſſemblies are open, and free for any one to enter into; whereas religious conventicles are more private, and thereby give opportunity to clandeſtine machinations. I anſwer, That this is not ſtrictly true: for many civil aſſemblies are not open to every one. And if ſome religious meetings be private, who are they (I beſeech you) that are to be blamed for it? thoſe that deſire, or thoſe that forbid their being publick? Again: You'll ſay, that religious communion does exceedingly unite men's minds and affections to one another, and is therefore the more dangerous. But if this be ſo, why is not the magiſtrate afraid of his own church; and why does he not forbid their aſſemblies, as things dangerous to his government? You'll ſay, becauſe he himſelf is a part, and even the head of them. As if he were not alſo a part of the commonwealth, and the head of the whole people.

LET us therefore deal plainly. The magiſtrate is afraid of other churches, but not of his own; becauſe he is kind and favourable to the one, but ſevere and cruel to the other. Theſe he treats like children, and indulges them even to wantonneſs. Thoſe he uſes as ſlaves; and how blameleſly ſoever they demean themſelves, recompenſes them no otherwiſe, than by gallies, priſons, confiſcations and death. Theſe he cheriſhes and defends: Thoſe he continually ſcourges and oppreſſes. Let him turn the tables: or let thoſe diſſenters enjoy but the ſame privileges, in civil, as his other ſubjects, and he will quickly find that theſe religious meetings will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into ſeditious conſpiracies, 'tis not religion inſpires them to it in their meetings; but their ſufferings and oppreſſions, that make them willing to eaſe themſelves. Juſt and moderate governments are every where quiet, every where ſafe. But oppreſſion raiſes ferments, and makes men ſtruggle to caſt off an uneaſy and tyrannical yoke. I know that ſeditions are very frequently raiſed upon pretence of religion. But 'tis as true, that, for religion, ſubjects are frequently ill treated, and live miſerably. Believe me, the ſtirs that are made, proceed not from any peculiar temper of this, or that church, or religious ſociety; but from the common diſpoſition of all mankind, who, when they groan under any heavy burthen, endeavour naturally to ſhake off the yoke, that galls their necks. Suppoſe this buſineſs of religion were let alone, and that there were ſome other diſtinction made between men and men, upon account of their different complexions, ſhapes, and features, ſo that thoſe who have black hair (for example) or grey eyes, ſhould not enjoy the ſame privileges as other citizens; that they ſhould not be permitted either to buy or ſell, or live by their callings; that parents ſhould not have the government and education of their own children; that all ſhould either, be excluded from the benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but theſe perſons, thus diſtinguiſhed from others, by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united together, by one common perſecution, would be as dangerous to the magiſtrate, as any others, that had aſſociated themſelves, merely upon the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit: others, for want of buſineſs, have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins ſome, and religion others. But there is only one thing, which gathers people into ſeditious commotions, and that is oppreſſion.

You will ſay; What, will you have people to meet at divine ſervice, againſt the magiſtrate's will? I anſwer; Why, I pray, againſt his will? Is it not both lawful and neceſſary, that they ſhould meet? againſt his will, do you ſay? that's what I complain of. That is the very root of all the miſchief. Why are aſſemblies leſs ſufferable in a church, than in a theatre, or market? thoſe, that meet there are not either more vicious, or more turbulent, than thoſe that meet elſewhere. The buſineſs in that is, that they are ill uſed, and therefore they are not to be ſuffered. Take away the partiality, that is uſed towards them, in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties, unto which they are ſubjected, and all things will immediately become ſafe and peaceable: nay, thoſe, that are averſe to the religion of the magiſtrate, will think themſelves ſo much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth, as their condition is better in that place, than elſewhere; and all the ſeveral, ſeparate congregations, like ſo many guardians of the publick peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated, or changed, in the form of the government: becauſe they can hope for nothing better, than what they already enjoy; that is, an equal condition with their fellow-ſubjects, under a juſt and moderate government. Now if that church, which agrees in religion with the prince, be eſteemed the chief ſupport of any civil government, and that for no other reaſon (as has already been ſhewn) than becauſe the prince is kind, and the laws are favourable to it; how much greater will be the ſecurity of a government, where all good ſubjects, of whatſoever church they be, without any diſtinction upon account of religion, enjoying the ſame favour of the prince, and the ſame benefit of the laws, ſhall become the common ſupport and guard of it; and where none will have any occaſion to fear the ſeverity of the laws, but thoſe, that do injuries to their neighbours, and offend againſt the civil peace?

THAT we may draw towards a concluſion. "The ſum of all we drive at "is, That every man may enjoy the ſame rights, that are granted to others." Is it permitted to worſhip God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva form alſo. Is it permitted to ſpeak Latin in the market-place? Let thoſe, that have a mind to it, be permitted to do it alſo in the church. Is it lawful for any man, in his own houſe, to kneel, ſtand, ſit, or uſe any other poſture: and to cloath himſelf in white or black, in ſhort or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine, or waſh with water in the church. In a word, whatſoever things are left free by law, in the common occaſions of life, let them remain free unto every church, in divine worſhip. Let no man's life, or body, or houſe, or eſtate, ſuffer any manner of prejudice upon theſe accounts. Can you allow of the preſbyterian diſcipline? Why ſhould not the epiſcopal alſo have what they like? eccleſiaſtical authority, whether it be adminiſter'd by the heads of a ſingle perſon, or many, is every where the ſame; and neither has any juriſdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulſion, nor cany thing at all to do with riches and revenues.

ECCLESIASTICAL aſſemblies, and ſermons, are juſtified by daily experience, and publick allowance. Theſe are allowed to people of ſome one perſuaſion: Why not to all? if any thing paſs in a religious meeting ſeditiouſly, and contrary to the publick peace, it is to be puniſhed in the ſame manner, and no otherwiſe, than as if it had happen'd in a fair, or market. Theſe meetings ought not to be ſanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows: nor ought it to be leſs lawful for men to meet in churches, than in halls: nor are one part of the ſubjects to be eſteemed more blameable, for their meeting together, than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions, and no man is to be laid under a ſuſpicion, or odium, for the fault of another. Thoſe that are ſeditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, ſlanderers, &c. of whatſoever church, whether national or not, ought to be puniſhed and ſuppreſſed. But thoſe, whoſe doctrine is peaceable, and whoſe manners are pure and blameleſs, ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-ſubjects. Thus if ſolemn aſſemblies, obſervations of feſtivals, publick worſhip, be permitted to any one ſort of profeſſors; all theſe things ought to be permitted to the preſbyterians, independants, anabaptiſts, arminians, quakers, and others, with the ſame liberty. Nay, if we may openly ſpeak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither pagan nor mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of his religion. The goſpel commands no ſuch thing. The
1 Cor. v. 12, 13. church, "which judgeth not thoſe that are without," wants it not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men, that are honeſt, peaceable and induſtrious, requires it not. Shall we ſuffer a pagan to deal and trade with us, and ſhall we not ſuffer him to pray unto, and worſhip, God? If we allow the Jews to have private houſes and dwellings amongſt us, Why ſhould

we not allow them to have ſynagogues, Is their doctrine more falſe, their worſhip more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered, by their meeting in publick, than private houſes? but if theſe things may be granted to Jews and pagans; ſurely the condition of any chriſtians ought not to be worſe than theirs in a chriſtian commonwealth.

You will ſay, perhaps, yes, it ought to be: becauſe they are more inclineable to factions, tumults, and civil wars. I anſwer: Is this the fault of the chriſtian religion? If it be ſo, truly the chriſtian religion is the worſt of all religions, and ought neither to be embraced by any particular perſon, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the genius, this the nature of the chriſtian religion, to be turbulent, and deſtructive to the civil peace, that church itſelf, which the magiſtrate indulges, will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to ſay any ſuch thing of that religion, which carries the greateſt oppoſition to covetouſneſs, ambition, diſcord, contention, and all manner of inordinate deſires; and is the moſt modeſt and peaceable religion, that ever was. We muſt, therefore, ſeek another cauſe of thoſe evils, that are charged upon religion. And if we conſider right, we ſhall find it to conſiſt wholly in the ſubject, that I am treating of. It is not the diverſity of opinions, (which cannot be avoided) but the refuſing of toleration to thoſe, that are of different opinions, (which might have been granted) that has produced all the buſtles and wars, that have been in the chriſtian world, upon account of religion. The heads and leaders of the church, moved by avarice, and inſatiable deſire of dominion, making uſe of the immoderate ambition of magiſtrates, and the credulous ſuperſtition of the giddy multitude, have incenſed and animated them againſt thoſe, that diſſent from themſelves; by preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the goſpel, and to the precepts of charity, that ſchiſmaticks and hereticks are to be outed of their poſſeſſions, and deſtroyed. And thus have they mixed together, and confounded two things, that are in themſelves moſt different, the church and the commonwealth. Now, as it is very difficult for men patiently to ſuffer themſelves to be ſtript of the goods, which they have got by their honeſt induſtry; and contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to be delivered up for a prey to other men's violence and rapine; eſpecially when they are otherwiſe altogether blameleſs; and that the occaſion, for which they are thus treated, does not at all belong to the juriſdiction of the magiſtrate, but entirely to the conſcience of every particular man; for the conduct of which, he is accountable to God only; what elſe can be expected, but that theſe men, growing weary of the evils, under which they labour, ſhould, in the end, think it lawful for them to reſiſt force with force, and to defend their natural rights, (which are not forfeitable, upon account of religion) with arms, as well as they can? That this has been hitherto the ordinary courſe of things, is abundantly evident in hiſtory: and that it will continue to be ſo hereafter, is but too apparent in reaſon. It cannot indeed, be otherwiſe, ſo long as the principle of perſecution for religion ſhall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magiſtrate and people; and ſo long as thoſe, that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord, ſhall continue, with all their art and ſtrength, to excite men to arms, and ſound the trumpet of war. But that magiſtrates ſhould thus ſuffer theſe incendiaries, and diſturbers of the publick peace, might juſtly be wondered at; if it did not appear that they have been invited by them, unto a participation of the ſpoil, and have, therefore, thought fit to make uſe of their covetouſneſs and pride, as means, whereby to increaſe their own power. For who does not ſee, that theſe good men, are, indeed, more miniſters of the government, than miniſters of the goſpel: and that, by flattering the ambition, and favouring the dominion of princes, and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might, to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth, which otherwiſe they ſhould not be able to eſtabliſh in the church? This is the unhappy agreement, that we ſee between the church and ſtate. Whereas, if each of them would contain itſelf within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the comonwealth, the other to the ſalvation of ſouls, it is impoſſible that any diſcord ſhould ever have happened between them. "Sed, pudet hæc opprobria, &c." God Almighty grant, I beſeech him, that the goſpel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magiſtrates, growing more careful to conform their own conſciences to the law of God, and leſs ſolicitous about the binding of men's conſciences, by human laws, may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counſels and endeavours to promote univerſally the civil welfare of all their children; except only of ſuch as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and that all eccleſiaſtical men, who boaſt themſelves to be the ſucceſſors of the apoſtles, walking peaceably and modeſtly in the apoſtles ſteps, without intermeddling with ſtate affairs, may apply themſelves wholly to promote the ſalvation of ſouls. Farewell.

PERHAPS it may not be amiſs to add a few things, concerning hereſy and ſchiſm.

A TURK is not, nor can be, either heretick or ſchiſmatick, to a chriſtian: and if any man fall off, from the chriſtian faith, to mahometiſm, he does not thereby become a heretick, or ſchiſmatick, but an apoſtate and an infidel. This no body doubts of. And by this it appears, that men of different religions cannot be hereticks, or ſchiſmaticks, to one another.

WE are to enquire, therefore, what men are of the ſame religion. Concerning which, it is manifeſt that thoſe, who have one and the ſame rule of faith and worſhip, are of the ſame religion: and thoſe, who have not the ſame rule of faith and worſhip, are of different religions. For ſince all things, that belong unto that religion, are contained in that rule, it follows neceſſarily that thoſe, who agree in one rule, are of one and the ſame religion: and vice verſâ, Thus Turks and chriſtians are of different religions: becauſe theſe take the holy ſcriptures to be the rule of their religion, and thoſe the alcoran. And, for the ſame reaſon, there may be different religions alſo, even amongſt chriſtians. The papiſts and the Lutherans, though both of them profeſs faith in Chriſt, and are, therefore called chriſtians, yet are not both of the ſame religion: becauſe theſe acknowledge nothing, but the holy ſcriptures, to be the rule and foundation of their religion; thoſe take in all traditions and the decrees of popes, and of theſe together, make the rule of their religion. And thus the chriſtians of St. John, (as they are called)and the chriſtians of Geneva, are of different religions: becauſe theſe alſo take only the ſcriptures, and thoſe I know not what traditions, for the rule of their religion.

THIS being ſettled, it follows: Firſt, That hereſy is a ſeparation made in eccleſiaſtical communion between men of the ſame religion, for ſome opinions, no way contained in the rule itſelf. And, ſecondly, That amongſt thoſe, who acknowledge nothing, but the holy ſcriptures, to be their rule of faith, hereſy is a ſeparation made in their chriſtian communion, for opinions not contained in the expreſs words of ſcripture. Now this ſeparation may be made in a twofold manner.

1. WHEN the greater part, or (by the magiſtrate's patronage) the ſtronger part of the church ſeparates itſelf from others, by excluding them out of her communion, becauſe they will not profeſs their belief of certain opinions, which are not the expreſs words of the ſcripture. For it is not the paucity of thoſe that are ſeparated, nor the authority of the magiſtrate, that can make any man guilty of hereſy. But he only is an heretick, who divides the church into parts, introduces names and marks of diſtinction, and voluntarily makes a ſeparation, becauſe of ſuch opinions.

2. WHEN any one ſeparates himſelf from the communion of a church, becauſe that church does not publickly profeſs ſome certain opinions, which the holy ſcriptures do not expreſly teach.

BOTH theſe are "hereticks, becauſe they err in fundamentals, and they err "obſtinately againſt knowledge." For when they have determined the holy ſcriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheleſs lay down certain propoſitions, as fundamental, which are not in the ſcripture: and becauſe others will not acknowledge theſe additional opinions of theirs, nor build upon them, as if they were neceſſary and fundamental; they, therefore, make a ſeparation in the church; either by withdrawing themſelves from others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it ſignify any thing for them to ſay, that their confeſſions and ſymbols are agreeable to ſcripture, and to the analogy of faith. For if they be conceived in the expreſs words of ſcripture, there can be no queſtion about them; becauſe thoſe things are acknowledged, by all chriſtians, to be of divine inſpiration, and therefore fundamental. But if they ſay, that the articles, which they require to be profeſſed, are conſequences deduced from the ſcripture; it is undoubtedly well done of them, who believe and profeſs ſuch things, as ſeem unto them ſo agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude thoſe things upon others, unto whom they do not ſeem to be the indubitable doctrines of the ſcripture. And to make a ſeparation, for ſuch things as theſe, which neither are, nor can be fundamental, is to become hereticks. For I do not think, there is any man arrived to that degree of madneſs, as that he dare give out his conſequences and interpretations of ſcripture, as divine inſpirations, and compare the articles of faith, that he has framed, according to his own fancy, with the authority of the ſcripture. I know there are ſome propoſitions, ſo evidently agreeable to ſcripture, that no body can deny them to be drawn from thence: but about thoſe, therefore, there can be no difference. This only I ſay, that however clearly we may think this, or the other doctrine, to be deduced from ſcripture, we ought not, therefore, to impoſe it upon others, as a neceſſary article of faith; becauſe we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith; unleſs we would be content alſo that other doctrines ſhould be impoſed upon us, in the ſame manner; and that we ſhould be compelled to receive and profeſs all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calviniſts, remonſtrants, anabaptiſts, and other ſects, which the contrivers of ſymbols, ſyſtems, and confeſſions, are accuſtomed to deliver to their followers, as genuine and neceſſary deductions from the holy ſcriptnre. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of thoſe men, who think that they themſelves can explain things, neceſſary to ſalvation, more clearly than the Holy Ghoſt, the eternal, and infinite wiſdom of God.

THUS much concerning hereſy; which word, in common uſe, is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now conſider ſchiſm, which is a crime near a-kin to it. For both theſe words ſeem to me to ſignify "an ill-"grounded ſeparation, in eccleſiaſtical communion, made about things, not ne-"ceſſary." But ſince uſe, which is the ſupreme law in matter of language, has determined that hereſy relates to errors in faith, and ſchiſm to thoſe in worſhip, or diſcipline, we muſt conſider them under that diſtinction.

SCHISM then, for the ſame reaſons, that have already been alledged, is nothing elſe but a ſeparation, made in the communion of the church, upon account of ſomething in divine worſhip, or eccleſiaſtical diſcipline, that is not any neceſſary part of it. Now nothing in worſhip, or diſcipline can be neceſſary to chriſtian communion, but what Chriſt our legiſlator, or the apoſtles, by inſpiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in expreſs words.

IN a word: He that denies not any thing, that the holy ſcriptures teach in expreſs words, nor makes a ſeparation, upon occaſion of any thing, that is not manifeſtly contained in the ſacred text; however he may be nick-named, by any ſect of chriſtians, and declared by ſome, or all of them, to be utterly void of true chriſtianity; yet, indeed and in truth, this man cannot be either a heretick, or ſchiſmatick.

THESE things might have been explained more largely, and more advantageouſly; but it is enough to have hinted at them, thus briefly to a perſon of your parts.

A SECOND
LETTER
CONCERNING
TOLERATION.

TO THE AUTHOR OF THE

Argument of the letter, concerning toleration, briefly conſidered and anſwered.

SIR,

YOU will pardon me, if I take the ſame liberty with you, that you have done with the author of the letter concerning toleration; to conſider your arguments, and endeavour to ſhew you the miſtakes of them. Page 12, 13, 14. For, ſince you have ſo plainly yielded up the queſtion to him, and do own that "the ſeverities, he would diſſuade chriſtians from, are utterly unapt, "and improper to bring men to embrace that truth which muſt ſave them:" I am not without ſome hopes to prevail with you, to do that yourſelf, which you ſay is the only juſtifiable aim of men differing about religion, even in the uſe of the ſevereſt methods, viz. carefully and impartially to weigh the whole matter, and thereby to remove that prejudice, which makes you yet favour ſome remains of perſecution: promiſing myſelf that ſo ingenious a perſon will either be convinced by the truth, which appears ſo very clear and evident to me; or elſe confeſs, that were either you, or I, in authority, we ſhould very unreaſonably and very unjuſtly uſe any force upon the other, which differ'd from him, upon any pretence of want of examination. And if force be not to be uſed, in your caſe, or mine, becauſe unreaſonable, or unjuſt; you will, I hope, think fit that it ſhould be forborn in all others, where it will be equally unjuſt and unreaſonable; as I doubt not but to make it appear, it will unavoidably be, where-ever you will go about to puniſh men for want of conſideration. For the true way to try ſuch ſpeculations as theſe, is to ſee how they will prove, when they are reduced into practice.

THE firſt thing, you ſeem ſtartled at, in the author's letter, is the largeneſs Page 1. of the toleration he propoſes: and you think it ſtrange, that he would not have ſo much as "a pagan, mahometan, or Jew, excluded from the civil rights of "the commonwealth, becauſe of his religion." We pray, every day, for their converſion, and I think it our duty ſo to do: but it will, I fear, hardly be believed, that we pray in earneſt, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of converſion; either by driving them from, or perſecuting them, when they are amongſt us. Force, you allow, is improper to convert men to any religion. Toleration is but the removing that force. So that, why thoſe ſhould not be tolerated, as well as others, if you wiſh their converſion, I do not ſee. But you ſay, "It ſeems hard to conceive how the author of that letter Page 2. "ſhould think to do any ſervice to religion, in general, or to the chriſtian religion, by recommending and perſuading ſuch a toleration. For how much "ſoever it may tend to the advancement of trade and commerce, (which ſome "ſeem to place above all other conſiderations) I ſee no reaſon, from any experiment, that has been made, to expect that true religion would be a gainer by "it; that it would be either the better preſerved, the more widely propagated, "or render'd any whit the more fruitful, in the lives of its profeſſors, by it." Before I come to your doubt itſelf, "Whether true religion would be a gainer by ſuch a toleration;" give me leave to take notice, that if, "by other conſiderations, you mean any thing but religion, your parentheſis is wholly beſides the matter; and that if you do not know, that the author of the letter places the advancement of trade above religion, your inſinuation is very uncharitable. But I go on.

" You ſee no reaſon, you ſay, from any experiment, that has been made, to " expect that true religion would be a gainer by it." True religion and chriſtian religion are, I ſuppoſe, to you, and me, the ſame thing. But of this, you have an experiment in its firſt appearance in the world, and ſeveral hundreds of years after. It was then " better preſerv'd, more widely propagated (in proportion) " and render'd more fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors," than ever ſince; though then Jews and pagans were tolerated, and more than tolerated, by the governments of thoſe places, where it grew up. I hope, you do not imagine that the chriſtian religion has loſt any of its firſt beauty, force, or reaſonableneſs, by having been almoſt 2000 years in the world; that you ſhould fear, it ſhould be leſs able now to ſhift for itſelf, without the help of force. I doubt not but you look upon it ſtill to be " the power and wiſdom of God, for our ſalva- " tion;" and, therefore, cannot ſuſpect it leſs capable to prevail now, by its own truth and light, than it did in the firſt ages of the church, when poor, contemptible men, without authority, or the countenance of authority, had alone the care of it. This, as I take it, has been made uſe of, by chriſtians, generally, and by ſome of our church in particular, as an argument for the truth of the chriſtian religion; that it grew and ſpread, and prevail'd, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being. And, if it be a mark of the true religion, that it will prevail by its own light and ſtrength, (but that falſe religions will not, but have need of force and foreign helps to ſupport them) nothing certainly can be more for the advantage of true religion, than to take away compulſion every-where. And, therefore, it is " no more hard to conceive how " the author of the letter ſhould think to do ſervice to religion in general, or to " the chriſtian religion;" than it is hard to conceive, that he ſhould think there is a true religion, and that the chriſtian religion is it; which its profeſſors have always owned not to need force, and have urged that, as a good argument to prove the truth of it. The inventions of men in religion need the force and helps of men to ſupport them. A religion, that is of God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail. I gueſs, when this dropp'd from you, you had narrowed your thoughts to your own age and country: but if you will enlarge them a little, beyond the confines of England, I do not doubt but you will eaſily imagine, that if in Italy, Spain, Portugal, &c. the inquiſition; and, in France, their dragooning; and, in other parts, thoſe ſeverities, that are uſed to keep, or force, men to the national religion, were taken away; and inſtead thereof, the toleration, propoſed by the author, were ſet up, the true religion would be a gainer by it.

THE author of the letter ſays, " Truth would do well enough, if ſhe were " once left to ſhift for herſelf. She ſeldom hath received, and ~~the~~ she fears never " will receive, much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom ſhe is " but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. Errors indeed prevail, by the " aſſiſtance of foreign and borrowed ſuccours, Truth makes way into our un- " derſtanding, by her own light, and is but the weaker, for any borrowed force, " that violence can add to her." " Theſe words of his (how hard ſoever they " may ſeem to you) may help you to conceive, how he ſhould think to do ſer- " vice to true religion, by recommending and perſuading ſuch a toleration, as " he propoſed." And now, pray tell me yourſelf, whether you do not think true religion would be a gainer by it, if ſuch a toleration, eſtabliſhed there, would permit the doctrine of the church of England to be freely preached, and its worſhip ſet up, in any popiſh, mahometan, or pagan country? If you do not, you have a very ill opinion of the religion of the church of England, and muſt own, that it can only be propagated and ſupported by force. If you think it would gain in thoſe countries, by ſuch a toleration, you are, then, of the author's thor's mind, and do not find it ſo hard to conceive how the recommending ſuch a toleration, might do ſervice to that, which you think true religion, But if you allow ſuch a toleration uſeful to truth, in other countries, you muſt find ſomething very peculiar in the air, that muſt make it leſs uſeful to truth, in England. And it will ſavour much of partiality, and be too abſurd, I fear, for you to own, that toleration will be advantageous to true religion, all the world over, except only in this iſland; though, I much ſuſpect, this, as abſurd as it is, lies at the bottom; and you build all you ſay, upon this lurking ſuppoſition, that the national religion now in England, back'd by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion, and therefore no other is to be tolerated. Which being a ſuppoſition, equally unavoidable, and equally juſt in other countries, (unleſs we can imagine that every where, but in England, men believe what, at the ſame time, they think to be a lie) will, in other places, exclude toleration, and thereby hinder truth from the means of propagating itſelf.

WHAT the fruits of toleration are, which in the next words you complain do "remain ſtill among us," and which, you ſay, "give no encouragement to "hope for any advantages from it;" what fruits, I ſay, theſe are, or whether they are owing to the want, or wideneſs, of toleration among us, we ſhall then be able to judge, when you tell us what they are. In the mean time, I will boldly ſay, that if the magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt vice, in whomſoever it is found, and leave men to their own conſciences, in their articles of faith, and ways of worſhip; "True religion will be ſpread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors," than ever hitherto it has been, by the impoſition of creeds and ceremonies.

YOU tell us, "That no man can fail of finding the way of ſalvation, who Page 7.
"ſeeks it as he ought. I wonder you had not taken notice, in the places you quote for this, how we are directed there, to the right way of ſeeking. The words (John vii. 17.) are; "If any man will do his will, he ſhall know of the "doctrine whether it be of God." And, Pſalm xxv. 12, 14. which are alſo quoted by you, tell us, "The meek will he guide in judgment, and the meek "will he teach his way. What man is he that feareth the Lord? him ſhall he "teach in the way that he ſhall chuſe. The ſecret of the lord is with them "that fear him, and he will ſhew them his covenant." So that theſe places, if they prove what you cite them for, "that no man can fail of finding the way of ſalvation, who ſeeks it, as he ought;" they do alſo prove, that a good life is the only way to ſeek, as we ought, and that therefore the magiſtrates, if they would put men upon ſeeking the way of ſalvation, as they ought, ſhould, by their laws and penalties, force them to a good life; a good converſation being the readieſt and ſureſt way to a right underſtanding. Puniſhments and ſeverities, thus applied, we are ſure, are both practicable, juſt, and uſeful. How puniſhments will prove, in the way you contend for, we ſhall ſee when we come to conſider it.

HAVING given us theſe broad marks of your good-will to toleration, you tell us, "'Tis not your deſign to argue againſt it, but only to enquire, what our Page 3.
"author offers for the proof of his aſſertion." And then you give us this ſcheme of his argument.

1. "THERE is but one way of ſalvation, or but one true religion."
2. "NO man can be ſaved by this religion, who does not believe it to be the "true religion."
3. "THIS belief is to be wrought in men, by reaſon and argument, not "by outward force and compulſion."
4. "THEREFORE, all ſuch force is utterly of no uſe, for the promoting "true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls."
5. "AND, therefore no body can have any right, to uſe any force, or compulſion, for the bringing men to the true religion."

AND you tell us,, "the whole ſtrength of what that letter urged, for the pur-"poſe of it, lies in this argument," which, I think, you have no more reaſon to ſay, than if you would tell us, that only one beam of a houſe had any ſtrength in it, when there are ſeveral others, that would ſupport the building, were that gone.

THE purpoſe of the letter is plainly to defend toleration, exempt from all force; eſpecially civil force, or the force of the magiſtrate. Now if it be a true conſequence, "that men muſt be tolerated, if magiſtrates have no commiſſion, or authority, to puniſh them, for matters of religion; then the only ſtrength of the letter lies not in the unfitneſs of force to convince men's underſtanding." Vid. Let. p. 252.

AGAIN; If it be true, that "magiſtrates, being as liable to error, as the reſt of mankind, their uſing of force, in matters of religion, would not at all advance the ſalvation of mankind," (allowing that even force could work upon them, and magiſtrates had authority to uſe it, in religion) then the argument, you mention, is not "the only one in that letter, of ſtrength to prove the neceſſity of toleration." Vid. Lett. p. 253. For the argument of the unfitneſs of force, to convince men's minds, being quite taken away, either of the other would be a ſtrong proof for toleration. But let us conſider the argument, as you have put it.

Page 4. "THE two firſt propoſitions, you ſay, you agree to." As to the third, you grant "that force is very improper, to be uſed, to induce the mind to aſſent to any truth." But yet you deny, "that force is utterly uſeleſs for the promoting true religion, and the ſalvation of men's ſouls;" which you call the author's fourth propoſition; but, indeed, that is not the author's fourth propoſition, or any propoſition of his, to be found in the pages you quote, or any where elſe, in the whole letter, either in thoſe terms, or in the ſenſe you take it. In the 253d page, which you quote, the author is ſhewing that the magiſtrate has no power, that is, not right, to make uſe of force in matters of religion, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls. And the reaſon, he gives for it, there, is, becauſe force has no efficacy to convince men's minds; and that, without a full perſuaſion of the mind, the profeſſion of the true religion itſelf is not acceptable to God. "Upon this ground, ſays he, I affirm, that the magiſtrate's power extends not to the eſtabling any articles of faith, or forms of worſhip, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all, without penalties; and penalties, in this caſe, are abſolutely impertinent, becauſe they are not proper to convince the mind." And ſo again, pag. 261, which is the other place you quote, the author ſays; "Whatſoever may be doubted in religion, yet this at leaſt is certain; that no religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either true, or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their ſubjects to come into their church-communion, under the pretence of ſaving their ſouls." And more to this purpoſe. But in neither of thoſe paſſages, nor any where elſe, that I remember, does the author ſay, that it is impoſſible that force ſhould any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, be uſeful towards the promoting of true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; for that is it, which you mean by "utterly of no uſe." He does not deny, that there is any thing, which God in his goodneſs does not, or may not, ſometimes, graciouſly make uſe of, towards the ſalvation of men's ſouls (as our Saviour did of clay and ſpittle to cure blindneſs) and that ſo, force alſo may be ſometimes uſeful. But that, which he denies, and you grant, is, that force has any proper efficacy to enlighten the underſtanding, or produce belief. And from thence he infers, that therefore the magiſtrate cannot lawfully compel men, in matters of religion. This is, what the author ſays, and what I imagine will always hold true, whatever you, or any one, can ſay, or think, to the contrary.

Page 5. THAT which you ſay is, "Force indirectly, and at a diſtance, may do ſome ſervice." What you mean by doing ſervice at a diſtance, towards the bringing men to ſalvation, or to embrace the truth, I confeſs I do not underſtand; unleſs perhaps it be, what others, in propriety of ſpeech, call by accident. But be it what it will, it is ſuch a ſervice, as cannot be aſcribed to the direct and proper efficacy of force, And ſo, ſay you, "Force, indirectly, and at a diſtance, may do ſome ſervice." I grant it: make your beſt of it. What do you conclude from thence, to your purpoſe? That therefore the magiſtrate may make uſe of it? That I deny, that ſuch an indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, will authorize the civil power, in the uſe of it, that will never be proved. Loſs of eſtate and dignities may make a proud man humble: ſufferings and impriſonment may make a wild and debauched man ſober: and ſo theſe things may "indirectly and at a diſtance, be ſerviceable towards the ſalvation of men's ſouls." I doubt not but God has made ſome, or all of theſe, the occaſions of good, to many men. But will you, therefore infer, that the magiſtrate may take away a man's honour, or eſtate, or liberty, for the ſalvation of his ſoul: or torment him in this, that he may be happy in the other world? What is otherwiſe unlawful, in itſelf (as it certainly is to puniſh a man without a fault) can never be made lawful by ſome good that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, or if you pleaſe, indirectly by accident, may follow from it. Running a man through may ſave his life, as it has done by chance, opening a lurking impoſthume. But will you ſay therefore, that this is lawful, juſtifiable chirurgery? The gallies, it is like, might reduce many a vain, looſe proteſtant to repentance, ſobriety of thought, and a true ſenſe of religion: and the torments they ſuffered in the late perſecution, might make ſeveral conſider the pains of hell, and put a due eſtimate of vanity and contempt on all things of this world. But will you ſay, becauſe thoſe puniſhments might, indirectly, and at a diſtance, ſerve to the ſalvation of men's ſouls, that therefore the king of France had a right and authority to make uſe of them? If your indirect, and at a diſtance ſerviceableneſs, may authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force in religion, all the cruelties uſed by the heathens againſt chriſtians, by papiſts againſt proteſtants, and all the perſecuting of chriſtians one amongſt another, are all juſtifiable.

BUT what, if I ſhould tell you now, of other effects, contrary effects, that puniſhments in matters of religion may produce; and ſo may ſerve to keep men from the truth and from ſalvation? What then will become of your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs? for in all pleas for any thing, becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay, as you do, (and is the utmoſt, that can be ſaid for it) that it may be ſerviceable: but it muſt be conſidered not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce. Page 5. And the greater good, or harm likely to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it. To ſhew you what effects one may expect from force, of what uſefulneſs it is to bring men to embrace the truth, be pleaſed to read what you yourſelf have writ. "I cannot but remark, ſay Page 13. "you, that theſe methods (viz. depriving men of their eſtates, corporal puniſhments, ſtarving and tormenting them in priſons, and in the end, even taking away their lives to make them chriſtians) are ſo very improper, in reſpect to the deſign of them, that they uſually produce the quite contrary effect. For whereas, all the uſe, which force can have, for the advancing true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, is (as has already been ſhewed) by diſpoſing men to ſubmit to inſtruction: and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons, that are offered, for the enlightning their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them; theſe cruelties have the misfortune to be commonly looked upon, as ſo juſt a prejudice againſt any religion, that uſes them, as makes it needleſs to look any farther into it; and to tempt men to reject it, as both falſe and deteſtable, without ever vouchſafing to conſider the rational grounds and motives of it. This effect they ſeldom fail to work, upon the ſufferers of them. And, as to the ſpectators, if they be not beforehand well inſtructed in thoſe grounds and motives, they will be much tempted, likewiſe, not only to entertain the ſame opinion of ſuch a religion, but withal to judge much more favourably of that of the ſufferers; who, they will be apt to think, would not expoſe themſelves to ſuch extremities, which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not thoroughly ſatisfied of the juſtice of their cauſe." Here then you allow that taking away men's eſtates, or liberty, and corporal puniſhments, are apt to drive away both ſufferers and ſpectators, from the religion, that makes uſe of them, rather than to it. And ſo theſe you renounce. Now, if you give up puniſhments of a man, in his perſon, liberty, and eſtate, I think we need not ſtand with you, for any other puniſhments that may be made uſe of. But, by what follows, it ſeems you ſhelter yourſelf under the name of ſeverities. For moderate puniſhments, as you call them, in another place, you think may be ſerviceable; indirectly,

rectly, and at a diſtance ſerviceable, to bring men to the truth. And I ſay, any ſort of puniſhments, diſproportioned to the offence, or, where there is no fault at all, will always be ſeverity, unjuſtifiable ſeverity, and will be thought ſo, by the ſufferers and by-ſtanders; and ſo will uſually produce the effects, you have mentioned, contrary to the deſign they are uſed for. Not to profeſs the national faith, whilſt one believes it not to be true; nor to enter into church-communion with the magiſtrate, as long as one judges the doctrine, there profeſſed, to be erroneous, or the worſhip not ſuch as God has either preſcribed, or will accept; this you allow, and all the world with you muſt allow, not to be a fault. But yet you would have men puniſhed for not being of the national religion; that Page 14. is, as you yourſelf confeſs, for no fault at all. Whether this be not ſeverity, nay ſo open and avowed injuſtice, that it will give men a juſt prejudice againſt the religion that uſes it, and produce all thoſe ill effects, you there mention, I leave you to conſider. So that the name of ſeverities, in oppoſition to the moderate puniſhments, you ſpeak for, can do you no ſervice at all. For, where there is no fault, there can be no moderate puniſhment: all puniſhment is immoderate, where there is no fault to be puniſhed. But of your moderate puniſhment we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more in another place. It ſuffices here to have ſhewn, that whatever puniſhments you uſe, they are as likely to drive men from the religion, that uſes them, as to bring them to the truth; and much more likely, as we ſhall ſee, before we have done; and ſo, by your own confeſſion, they are not to be uſed.

One thing, in this paſſage of the author, it ſeems, appears abſurd to you; that he ſhould ſay, “ That to take away men’s lives, to make them chriſtians, “ was but an ill way of expreſſing a deſign of their ſalvation. I grant there is a great abſurdity ſomewhere in the caſe. But it is in the practice of thoſe who, perſecuting men under a pretence of bringing them to ſalvation, ſuffer the temper of their good-will to betray itſelf, in taking away their lives. And whatever abſurdities there be, in this way of proceeding, there is none in the author’s way of expreſſing it; as you would more plainly have ſeen, if you had looked into the latin original, where the words are, “ vita deniq; ipſa privant, ut fide- “ les, ut ſalvi fiant,’ p. 5. which though more literally, might be thus rendered, “ to bring them to the faith and to ſalvation;” yet the tranſlator is not to be blamed, if he choſe to expreſs the ſenſe of the author, in words, that very lively repreſented the extreme abſurdity, they are guilty of, who, under pretence of zeal for the ſalvation of ſouls, proceed to the taking away their lives. An example whereof we have, in a neighbouring country, where the prince declares, he will have all his diſſenting ſubjects ſaved; and purſuant thereto, has taken away the lives of many of them. For thither, at laſt, perſecution muſt come, as I fear notwithſtanding your talk of moderate puniſhments, you your Page 23. ſelf intimate in theſe words: “ Not that I think the ſword is to be uſed, in this “ buſineſs, (as I have ſufficiently declared already) but, becauſe all coactive “ power reſolves at laſt into the ſword; ſince all (I do not ſay, that will not “ be reformed in this matter, by leſſer penalties, but) that refuſe to ſubmit to “ leſſer penalties, muſt at laſt fall under the ſtroke of it.” In which words, if you mean any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeem to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments, when leſſer are not ſufficient to bring men to be convinced. But let that paſs.

Page 5. You ſay, “ If force be uſed, not inſtead of reaſon and arguments, that is, “ not to convince, by its own proper efficacy, which it cannot do, &c. I think thoſe, who make laws, and uſe force to bring men to church-conformity in religion, ſeek only the compliance, but concern themſelves not for the conviction, of thoſe they puniſh; and ſo never uſe force to convince. For, pray tell me, when any diſſenter conforms, and enters into the church-communion, is he ever examined, to ſee whether he does it upon reaſon, and conviction, and ſuch grounds, as would become a chriſtian, concerned for religion? If perſecution (as is pretended) were for the ſalvation of men’s ſouls, this would be done; and men not driven to take the ſacrament, to keep their places, or to obtain licences to ſell ale, (for ſo low have theſe holy things been proſtituted) who, perhaps, knew nothing of its inſtitution; and conſidered no other uſe of it, but the ſecuring ſome poor ſecular advantage, which, without taking of it, they ſhould have loſt. So that this exception of yours, “of the uſe of force, inſtead of arguments, to convince men,” I think is needleſs; thoſe, who uſe it, not being (that ever I heard) concerned that men ſhould be convinced.

BUT you go on in telling us your way of uſing force, “only to bring men Page 5. to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince them; but which, without being forced, they would not conſider.” And, ſay you, “Who can deny but that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it does ſome ſervice, towards bringing men to embrace that truth, which either, through negligence, they would never acquaint themſelves with, or through prejudice, they would reject and condemn unheard? Whether this way of puniſhment is like to increaſe, or remove prejudice, we have already ſeen. And what that truth is, which you can poſitively ſay, any man, without being “forced by puniſhment, would through careleſneſs, never acquaint himſelf with,” I deſire you to name. Some are called at the third, ſome at the ninth, and ſome at the eleventh hour. And whenever they are called, they embrace all the truth, neceſſary to ſalvation. But theſe ſlips may be forgiven, amongſt ſo many groſs and palpable miſtakes, as appear to me, all through your diſcourſe. For example; You tell us that “force uſed to bring men to conſider, does indirectly, and at a diſtance, ſome ſervice.” Here now you walk in the dark, and endeavour “to cover yourſelf with obſcurity, by omitting two neceſſary parts. As, firſt, who muſt uſe this force: which, though you tell us not here; yet, by other parts of your treatiſe, ’tis plain you mean the magiſtrate. And, ſecondly, you omit to ſay, upon whom it muſt be uſed, who it is muſt be puniſhed: and thoſe, if you ſay any thing to your purpoſe, muſt be diſſenters from the national religion, thoſe, who come not into church-communion with the magiſtrate. And then your propoſition, in fair plain terms, will ſtand thus: If the magiſtrate puniſh diſſenters, only to bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper to convince them; who can deny but that, indirectly and at a diſtance, it may do ſervice, &c. towards bringing men to embrace that truth, which orherwiſe they would never be acquainted with?” &c. In which propoſition, 1. There is ſomething impracticable. 2. Something unjuſt. And, 3. Whatever efficacy there is in force (your way applied) to bring men to conſider and be convinced, it makes againſt you.

1. IT is impracticable to puniſh diſſenters, as diſſenters, only to make them conſider. For if you puniſh them as diſſenters (as certainly you do, if you puniſh them alone, and them all, without exception) you puniſh them, for not being of the national religion. And to puniſh a man, for not being of the national religion, is not to puniſh him, only to make him conſider; unleſs not to be of the national religion, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing. But you will ſay, the deſign is only to make diſſenters conſider; and therefore they may be puniſhed, only to make them conſider. To this I reply; It is impoſſible you ſhould puniſh one, with a deſign, only to make him conſider, whom you puniſh for ſomething elſe, beſides want of conſideration; or if you puniſh him, whether he conſider, or no; as you do, if you lay penalties on diſſenters in general. If you ſhould make a law to puniſh all ſtammerers; could any one believe you, if you ſaid it was deſigned only to make them leave ſwearing; would not every one ſee, it was impoſſible that puniſhment ſhould be only againſt ſwearing, when all ſtammerers were under the penalty? Such a propoſal as this, is in itſelf, at firſt ſight, monſtrouſly abſurd. But you muſt thank yourſelf for it. For to lay penalties upon ſtammerers, only to make them not ſwear, is not more abſurd and impoſſible, than it is to lay penalties upon diſſenters, only to make them conſider.

2. TO puniſh men, out of the communion of the national church, to make them conſider, is unjuſt. They are puniſhed, becauſe out of the national church: and they are out of the national church, becauſe they are not yet convinced. Their ſtanding out, therefore, in this ſtate, whilſt they are not yet convinced, nor ſatisfied in their minds, is no fault; and, therefore, cannot juſtly be pu-

niſhed. But your method is, "Puniſh them, to make them conſider ſuch rea-"ſons and arguments, as are proper to convince them." Which is juſt ſuch juſtice, as it would be for the magiſtrate to puniſh you, for not being a Carteſian, "only to bring you to conſider ſuch reaſons and arguments, as are proper and "ſufficient to convince you." When it is poſſible, 1. That you, being ſatiſfied of the truth of your own opinion in philoſophy, did not judge it worth while to conſider that of Des Cartes. 2. It is poſſible you are not able to conſider, and examine, all the proofs and grounds, upon which he endeavours to eſtabliſh his philoſophy. 3. Poſſibly you have examined, and can find no reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you.

3. WHATEVER indirect efficacy there be in force, applied by the magiſtrate your way, it makes againſt you. "Force uſed by the magiſtrate, to bring men "to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to "convince them, but which, without being forced, they would not conſider; "may, ſay you, be ſerviceable indirectly, and at a diſtance, to make men em-"brace the truth, which muſt ſave them." And thus, ſay I, it may be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood, which will deſtroy them. So that force and puniſhment, by your own confeſſion, not being able directly, by its proper efficacy, to do men any good, in reference to their future eſtate; though it be ſure directly to do them harm, in reference to their preſent condition here; and indirectly, and in your way of applying it, being proper to do, at leaſt as much harm, as good; I deſire to know, what the uſefulneſs is, which ſo much recommends it, even to a degree, that you pretend it needful and neceſſary. Had you ſome new untried chymical preparation, that was as proper to kill, as to ſave, an infirm man (of whoſe life, I hope, you would not be more tender, than of a weak brother's ſoul) would you give it your child, or try it upon your friend, or recommend it to the world, for its rare uſefulneſs? I deal very favourably with you, when I ſay as proper to kill, as to ſave: for force, in your indirect way, of the "magiſtrate's applying it, to make men "conſider thoſe arguments, that otherwiſe they would not; to make them lend "an ear to thoſe, who tell them, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to "ſhew them the right;" I ſay, in this way, force is much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and embrace error, than the truth.

1. BECAUSE men, out of the right way, are as apt, I think, I may ſay, apter, to uſe force, than others. For truth, I mean the truth of the goſpel, which is that of the true religion, is mild and gentle, and meek, and apter to uſe prayers and intreaties, than force, to gain a hearing.

Page 16. 2. BECAUSE the magiſtrates of the world, or the civil ſovereigns (as you think it more proper to call them) being few of them in the right way; (not one of ten, take which ſide you will) perhaps you will grant not one of an hundred, being of the true religion; 'tis likely your indirect way of uſing of force would do an hundred, or at leaſt ten times, as much harm as good: eſpecially if you conſider, that as the magiſtrate will certainly uſe it, to force men to hearken to the proper miniſters of his religion, let it be what it will; ſo you having ſet no time, nor bounds, to this conſideration of arguments and reaſons, ſhort of being convinced; you, under another pretence, put into the magiſtrate's hands, as much power, to force men to his religion, as any the openeſt perſecutors can pretend to. For what difference, I beſeech you, between puniſhing you to bring you to maſs, and puniſhing you to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince you, that you ought to go to maſs; for, 'till you are brought to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince you; that is, 'till you are convinced; you are puniſhed on. If you reply, you meant reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them of the truth: I anſwer, if you meant ſo, why did you not ſay ſo? But if you had, it would in this caſe do you little ſervice. For the maſs, in France, is as much ſuppoſed the truth, as the liturgy here. And your way of applying force will as much promote popery in France, as proteſtantiſm in England. And you ſee how ſerviceable it is, to make men receive and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them.

HOWEVER you tell us, in the ſame page, that "if force ſo applied, as is above-mentioned, may, in ſuch ſort as has been ſaid, i. e. indirectly, and at a diſtance, be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace the truth, you think it ſufficient to ſhew the uſefulneſs of it in religion." Where I ſhall obſerve, 1ſt, That this uſefulneſs amounts to no more but this, That it is not impoſſible but that it may be uſeful. And ſuch a uſefulneſs one cannot deny, to auricular confeſſion, doing of penance, going of a pilgrimage to ſome ſaint, and what not? Yet our church does not think fit to uſe them: though it cannot be denied, but they may have ſome of your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; that is, perhaps may do ſome ſervice, indirectly, and by accident. Page 5.

2. FORCE, your way applied, as it may be uſeful, ſo alſo it may be uſeleſs. For, 1ſt, Where the law puniſhes diſſenters, without telling them, it is to make them conſider, they may, through ignorance and overſight, neglect to do it, and ſo your force prove uſeleſs. 2. Some diſſenters may have conſidered already, and then force employed upon them, muſt needs be uſeleſs; unleſs you can think it uſeful to puniſh a man to make him do that, which he has done already. 3. God has not directed it: and, therefore, we have no reaſon to expect he ſhould make it ſucceſsful.

3. IT may be hurtful; nay, it is likely to prove more hurtful than uſeful. 1ſt, Becauſe to puniſh men for that, which 'tis viſible cannot be known, whether they have performed or no, is ſo palpable an injuſtice, that it is likelier to give them an averſion to the perſons, and religion, that uſes it, than to bring them to it. 2dly, Becauſe the greateſt part of mankind, being not able to diſcern betwixt truth and falſhood, that depend upon long and many proofs, and remote conſequences; nor have ability enough to diſcover the falſe grounds, and reſiſt the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men, verſed in controverſies; are ſo much more expoſed, by the force, which is uſed, to make them hearken to the information and inſtruction of men, appointed to it by the magiſtrate, or thoſe of his religion, to be led into falſhood and error, than they are likely, this way, to be brought to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them; by how much the national religions of the world are, beyond compariſon, more of them falſe or erroneous, than ſuch as have God for their author, and truth for their ſtandard. And that ſeeking and examining, without the ſpecial grace of God, will not ſecure even knowing and learned men from error, we have a famous inſtance in the two Reynold's (both ſcholars and brothers, but one a proteſtant, the other a papiſt) who, upon the exchange of papers between them, were both turned; but ſo, that neither of them, with all the arguments he could uſe, could bring his brother back to the religion, which he himſelf had found reaſon to embrace. Here was ability to examine and judge, beyond the ordinary rate of moſt men. Yet one of theſe brothers was ſo caught, by the ſophiſtry and ſkill of the other, that he was brought into error, from which he could never again be extricated. This we muſt unavoidably conclude; unleſs we can think, that wherein they differed, they were both in the right; or that truth can be an argument to ſupport a falſhood; both which are impoſſible. And now, I pray, which of theſe two brothers would you have puniſhed, to make him bethink himſelf, and bring him back to the truth? For 'tis certain ſome ill grounded cauſe of aſſent alienated one of them from it. If you examine your principles, you will find that, according to your rule, the papiſt muſt be puniſhed in England, and the proteſtant in Italy. So that, in effect, (by your rule) "paſſion, humour, prejudice, luſt, impreſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpect, and the like incompetent motives," muſt always be ſuppoſed on that ſide, on which the magiſtrate is not.

I HAVE taken the pains here, in a ſhort recapitulation, to give you the view of the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, which you make ſuch a noiſe with, and lay ſo much ſtreſs on. Whereby I doubt not, but it is viſible, that its uſefulneſs and uſeleſneſs, laid in the balance againſt each other, the pretended uſefulneſs is ſo far from outweighing, that it can neither encourage, nor excuſe, the uſing of puniſhments; which are not lawful to be uſed, in our caſe, without ſtrong probability of ſucceſs. But when, to its uſeleſneſs, miſchief is added,

ded, and it is evident that more, much more harm may be expected from it than good, your own argument returns upon you. For if it be reaſonable to uſe it, becauſe it may be ſerviceable to promote true religion and the ſalvation of ſouls, it is much more reaſonable to let it alone, becauſe it may be more ſerviceable to the promoting falſhood, and the perdition of ſouls. And therefore you will do well hereafter not to build ſo much on the uſefulneſs of force, applied your way, your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, which amounts but to the ſhadow and poſſibility of uſefulneſs, but with an overbalancing weight of miſchief and harm annexed to it. For upon a juſt eſtimate, this indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs, can directly go for nothing; or rather leſs than nothing.

BUT to ſuppoſe force, applied your way, were as uſeful for the promoting true religion, as I ſuppoſe I have ſhewed it to be the contrary; it does not from thence follow that it is lawful, and may be uſed. It may be very uſeful in a pariſh, that has no teacher, or as bad as none, that a layman, who wanted not abilities for it (for ſuch we may ſuppoſe to be) ſhould ſometimes preach to them the doctrine of the goſpel, and ſtir them up to the duties of a good life. And yet this, (which cannot be denied, may be at leaſt "indirectly, and at a "diſtance ſerviceable, towards the promoting true religion, and the ſalvation "of ſouls") you will not (I imagine) allow, for this uſefulneſs, to be lawful: and that, becauſe he has not commiſſion and authority to do it. The ſame might be ſaid of the adminiſtration of the ſacraments, and any other function of the prieſtly office. This is juſt our caſe. Granting force, as you ſay, indirectly, and at a diſtance, uſeful to the ſalvation of men's ſouls; yet it does not, therefore, follow that it is lawful for the magiſtrate to uſe it: becauſe, as the author ſays, the magiſtrate has no commiſſion, or authority, to do ſo. For however you have put it thus, (as you have framed the author's argument) "force is utterly of no uſe, for the promoting of true religion, and the ſalvation "of ſouls; and, therefore, nobody can have any right to uſe any force, or "compulſion, for the bringing men to the true religion;" yet the author does not, in thoſe pages you quote, make the latter of theſe propoſitions, an inference barely from the former; but makes uſe of it, as a truth, proved by ſeveral arguments, he had before brought to that purpoſe. For though it be a good argument; it is not uſeful, therefore not fit to be uſed: yet this will not be good logic; it is uſeful, therefore any one has a right to uſe it. For if the uſefulneſs makes it lawful, it makes it lawful in any hands, that can ſo apply it; and ſo private men may uſe it.

"WHO can deny, ſay you, but that force, indirectly, and at a diſtance, may "do ſome ſervice, towards the bringing men to embrace that truth, which "otherwiſe they would never acquaint themſelves with." If this be good arguing in you, for the uſefulneſs of force, towards the ſaving of men's ſouls; give me leave to argue after the ſame faſhion. 1. I will ſuppoſe, which you will not deny me, that as there are many, who take up their religion upon wrong grounds, to the endangering of their ſouls: ſo there are many, that abandon themſelves to the heat of their luſts, to the endangering of their ſouls. 2dly, I will ſuppoſe, that as force applied, your way, is apt to make the inconſiderate conſider, ſo force applied, another way, is apt to make the laſcivious chaſte. The argument then, in your form, will ſtand thus: "Who can deny, "but that force, indirectly, and at a diſtance, may, by caſtration, do ſome "ſervice towards bringing men to embrace that chaſtity, which otherwiſe they "would never acquaint themſelves with." Thus you ſee, "caſtration may, in"directly, and at a diſtance, be ſerviceable towards the ſalvation of men's ſouls." But will you ſay, from ſuch an uſefulneſs as this, becauſe it may indirectly, and at a diſtance, conduce to the ſaving of any of his ſubjects ſouls, that therefore the magiſtrate has a right to do it, and may by force make his ſubjects eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven? It is not for the magiſtrate, or any body elſe upon an imagination of its uſefulneſs, to make uſe of any other means, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of our faith hath directed. You may be miſtaken, in what you think uſeful. Dives thought, and ſo, perhaps ſhould you and I too, if not better informed by the ſcriptures, that it would be uſeful to rouze and awaken men, if one ſhould come to them from the dead. But he was miſtaken. And we are told, that if men will not hearken to Moſes and the prophets, the means appointed, neither will the ſtrangeneſs, nor terror, of one coming from the dead perſuade them. If what we are apt to think uſeful were thence to be concluded ſo, we ſhould (I fear) be obliged to believe the miracles, pretended to, by the church of Rome, For miracles, we know, were once uſeful for the promoting true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; which is more than you can ſay, for your political puniſhments: but yet we muſt conclude that God thinks them not uſeful now; "unleſs we "will ſay (that, which, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and "benign diſpoſer and governor of all things does not now uſe all uſeful means "for promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls." I think this conſequence will hold, as well as what you draw, in near the ſame words.

LET us not, therefore, be more wiſe than our maker, in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural work of our ſalvation. The ſcripture, that reveals it to us, contains all that we can know, or do, in order to it: and where that is ſilent, it is in us preſumption to direct. When you can ſhew any commiſſion in ſcripture for the uſe of force, to compel men to hear, any more than to embrace, the doctrine of others, that differ from them, we ſhall have reaſon to ſubmit to it, and the magiſtrate have ſome ground to ſet up this new way of perſecution. But till then, it will be fit for us to obey that precept of the goſpel, which bids us "take heed what we hear," So that hearing is not always ſo uſeful as you Mark iv. 24. ſuppoſe. If it had, we ſhould never have had ſo direct a caution againſt it. It is not any imaginary uſefulneſs, you can ſuppoſe, which can make that a puniſhable crime, which the magiſtrate was never authorized to meddle with. "Go "and teach all nations," was a commiſſion of our Saviour's: But there was not added to it, puniſh thoſe, that will not hear and conſider what you ſay. No; but "if they will not receive you, ſhake off the duſt of your feet," leave them and apply yourſelves to ſome others. And St. Paul knew no other means to make men hear, but the preaching of the goſpel; as will appear to any one who will read, Romans the xth, xivth, &c. "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing "by the word of God."

YOU go on, and, in favour of your beloved force, you tell us, that it is not on- Page 6. ly uſeful but needful. And here, after having at large, in the four following pages, ſet out the negligence, or averſion, or other hindrances, that keep men from examining, with that application and freedom of judgment they ſhould, the grounds, upon which they take up, and perſiſt in, their religion, you come to conclude force neceſſary. Your words are: "If men are generally averſe to a Page 10. "due conſideration of things, where they are moſt concerned to uſe it; if they "uſually take up their religion, without examining it, as they ought, and then "grow ſo opinionative and ſo ſtiff in their prejudice, that neither the gentleſt "admonitions, nor the moſt earneſt intreaties, ſhall ever prevail with them af- "terwards to do it; what means is there left (beſides the grace of God) to re- "duce thoſe of them, that are got into a wrong way, but to lay thorns and briars "in it? That, ſince they are deaf to all perſuaſions, the uneaſineſs, they meet "with, may, at leaſt, put them to a ſtand, and incline them to lend an ear to "thoſe, who tell them, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them "the right way. What means is there left, ſay you, but force? What to do? "To reduce men, who are out of it, into the right way." So you tell us here. And to that, I ſay, there is other means beſides force; that, which was appointed and made uſe of, from the beginning, the preaching of the goſpel.

"But, ſay you, to make them hear, to make them conſider, to make them "examine, there is no other means but puniſhment; and therefore it is ne- "ceſſary."

I ANSWER, 1ſt. What, if God, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, would not have men compelled to hear; but thought the good tidings of ſalvation, and the propoſals of life and death, means and inducements enough, to make them hear and conſider, now, as well as heretofore? Then your means, your puniſhments are not neceſſary. What if God would have men left to their freedom in this point, if they will hear, or if they will forbear, will you conſtrain them? Thus we are ſure he did with his own people: and this, when they were in captivity: and it is very like were ill-treated, for being of a different religion from the national, and ſo were puniſhed as diſſenters. Yet then God expected not that thoſe puniſhments ſhould force them to hearken, more than at other times: as appears by Ezek. iii. 11. And this alſo is the method of the goſpel. "We are "ambaſſadors for Chriſt; as if God did beſeech by us, we pray, in Chriſt's "ſtead, ſays St. Paul, 2 Cor. v. 20." If God had thought it neceſſary to have men puniſhed, to make them give ear, he could have called magiſtrates to be ſpreaders and miniſters of the goſpel, as well as poor fiſhermen, or Paul a perſecutor, who yet wanted not power to puniſh, where puniſhment was neceſſary, as is evident in Ananias and Saphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian. Ezek. xi. 5, 7.

2dly, WHAT if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the hands of men, as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error, as the reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means to bring men into the right way?

3dly, WHAT if there be other means? Then yours ceaſes to be neceſſary, upon the account, that there is no means left. For you yourſelf allow, "that "the grace of God is another means." And I ſuppoſe, you will not deny it to be both a proper and ſufficient means; and which is more, the only means; ſuch means, as can work by itſelf, and without which, all the force in the world can do nothing. God alone can open the ear, that it may hear, and open the heart, that it may underſtand; and this he does, in his own good time, and to whom he is graciouſly pleaſed; but not according to the will and fancy of man, when he thinks fit, by puniſhments, to compel his brethren. If God has pronounced againſt any perſon, or people, what he did againſt the Jews, (Iſa. vi. 10.) "Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and ſhut "their eyes; leſt they ſee with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and un"derſtand with their hearts, and convert, and be healed:" Will all the force, you can uſe, be a means to make them hear and underſtand, and be converted?

BUT, Sir, to return your argument: "You ſee no other means left (taking "the world as we now find it) to make men thoroughly and impartially exa"mine a religion, which they embraced, upon ſuch inducements, as ought to "have no ſway at all in the matter, and with little, or no, examination of the "proper grounds of it." And thence you conclude the uſe of force, by the magiſtrate, upon diſſenters, neceſſary. And, I ſay, I ſee no other means left (taking the world, as we now find it, wherein the magiſtrates never lay penalties, for matters of religion, upon thoſe of their own church, nor is it to be expected they ever ſhould;) to make men of the national church, any where, "thoroughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embraced, upon "ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter; and, there"fore, with little, or no, examination of the proper grounds of it." And therefore, I conclude the uſe of force, by diſſenters, upon conformiſts, neceſſary. I appeal to the world, whether this be not as juſt and natural a concluſion, as yours. Though, if you will have my opinion, I think the more genuine conſequence is, that force, to make men examine matters of religion, is not neceſſary at all. But you may take which of theſe conſequences you pleaſe. Both of them, I am ſure, you cannot avoid. It is not for you and me, out of an imagination, that they may be uſeful, or are neceſſary, to preſcribe means, in the great and myſterious work of ſalvation, other than what God himſelf has directed. God has appointed force as uſeful and neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed; is a way of arguing, becoming the ignorance and humility of poor creatures. But I think force uſeful or neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed; has, methinks, a little too much preſumption in it. You aſk, "What "means elſe is there left?" None, ſay I, to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in the ſcriptures, wherein are contained all the means and methods of ſalvation. "Faith is the gift of God." And we are not to uſe any other means, to procure this gift to any one, but what God himſelf has preſcribed. If he has there appointed that any ſhould be forced, "to hear thoſe, who tell them, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right," and that they ſhould be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, if they did not; 'twill be paſt doubt, it is to be made uſe of. But 'till that can be done, 'twill be in vain to ſay, what other means is there left? If all the means God has appointed, to make men hear and conſider, be "exhortation in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon," &c. together with prayer for them, and the example of meekneſs and a good life; this is all ought to be done, "whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear."

BY theſe means the goſpel at firſt made itſelf to be heard, through a great part of the world; and in a crooked and perverſe generation, led away by luſts, humours, and prejudice, (as well as this you complain of) prevailed with men to hear and embrace the truth, and take care of their own ſouls; without the aſſiſtance of any ſuch force of the magiſtrate, which you now think needful. But whatever neglect, or averſion, there is in ſome men, impartially and thoroughly to be inſtructed; there will, upon a due examination (I fear) be found no leſs a neglect and averſion in others, impartially and thoroughly to inſtruct them. 'Tis not the talking even general truths in plain and clear language; much leſs a man's own fancies, in ſcholaſtick, or uncommon, ways of ſpeaking, an hour or two, once a week, in publick; that is enough to inſtruct even willing hearers, in the way of ſalvation, and the grounds of their religion. They are not politick diſcourſes, which are the means of right information, in the foundations of religion. For with ſuch (ſometimes venting anti-monarchical principles, ſometimes, again, preaching up nothing but abſolute monarchy and paſſive obedience, as the one, or other, have been in vogue, and the way to preferment) have our churches rung in their turns, ſo loudly, that reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth, in the controverted points of religion, and to direct them in the right way to ſalvation, were ſcarce any where to be heard. But how many, do you think, by friendly and chriſtian debates with them at their houſes, and by the gentle methods of the goſpel, made uſe of in private converſation, might have been brought into the church; who, by railing from the pulpit, ill and unfriendly treatment out of it, and other neglects and miſcarriage of thoſe, who claimed to be their teachers, have been driven from hearing them? Paint the defects and miſcarriages frequent on this ſide, as well as you have done thoſe on the other, and then do you, with all the world, conſider whether thoſe, whom you ſo handſomely declaim againſt, for being miſled by "education, paſſion, humour, prejudice, obſtinacy," &c. do deſerve all the puniſhment. Perhaps it will be anſwered; If there be ſo much toil in it, that particular perſons muſt be applied to, who then will be a miniſter? And what if a layman ſhould reply: If there be ſo much toil in it, that doubts muſt be cleared, prejudice removed, foundations examined, &c. Who then will be a proteſtant? The excuſe will be as good hereafter, for the one as for the other.

THIS new method of yours, which you ſay no "body can deny, but that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it does ſome ſervice, towards bringing men to embrace the truth;" was never yet thought on, by the moſt refined perſecutors. Though indeed it is not altogether unlike the plea made uſe of, to excuſe the late barbarous uſage of the proteſtants in France (deſigned to extirpate the reformed religion there) from being a perſecution for religion. The French king requires all his ſubjects to come to maſs: thoſe, who do not, are puniſhed with a witneſs. For what? Not for their religion, ſay the pleaders for that diſcipline, but for diſobeying the king's laws. So, by your rule, the diſſenters (for thither you would, and thither you muſt come, if you mean any thing) muſt be puniſhed. For what? Not for their religion, ſay you, not for "following the light of their own reaſon, not for obeying the dictates of their own conſciences." That you think not fit. For what then are they to be puniſhed? "To make them, ſay you, examine the religion they have embraced, and the religion they have rejected." So that they are puniſhed, not for having offended againſt a law: for there is no law of the land, that requires them to examine. And which now is the fairer plea, pray judge. You ought, indeed, to have the credit of this new invention. All other law-makers have conſtantly taken this method; that where any thing was to be amended, the fault was firſt declared, and then penalties denounced againſt all thoſe, who, after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. This the common ſenſe of mankind, and the very reaſon of laws (which are intended not for puniſhment, but correction) has made ſo plain, that the ſubtileſt and moſt refined law-makers have not gone out of this courſe, nor have the moſt ignorant and barbarous nations miſſed it. But you have out-done Solon and Lycurgus, Moſes and our Saviour, and are reſolved to be a law-maker of a way by yourſelf. 'Tis an old and obſolete way, and will not ſerve your turn, to begin with warnings and threats of penalties to be inflicted, on thoſe who do not reform, but continue to do that, which you think they fail in. To allow of impunity to the innocent, or the opportunity of amendment to thoſe, who would avoid the penalties, are formalities not worth your notice. You are for a ſhorter and ſurer way. Take a whole tribe, and puniſh them at all adventures; whether guilty or no, of the miſcarriage, which you would have amended; or without ſo much as telling them what it is you would have them do, but leaving them to find it out, if they can. All theſe abſurdities are contained in your way of proceeding; and are impoſſible to be avoided, by any one, who will puniſh diſſenters, and only diſſenters, "to make them "conſider and weigh the grounds of their religion, and impartially examine, "whether it be true or no, and upon what grounds they took it up, that ſo "they may find and embrace the truth that muſt ſave them." But that this new ſort of diſcipline may have all fair play, let us enquire,

Page 10. Firſt, WHO it is you would have be puniſhed. In the place above cited, they are "thoſe, who are got into a wrong way, and are deaf to all perſuaſions." If theſe are the men to be puniſhed, let a law be made againſt them: you have my conſent; and that is the proper courſe to have offenders puniſhed. For you do not, I hope, intend to puniſh any fault, by a law, which you do not name in the law; nor make a law againſt any fault, you would not have puniſhed. And now, if you are ſincere, and in earneſt, and are (as a fair man ſhould be) for what your words plainly ſignify, and nothing elſe; what will ſuch a law ſerve for? Men in the wrong way are to be puniſhed: but who are in the wrong way, is the queſtion. You have no more reaſon to determine it againſt one, who differs from you; than he has to conclude againſt you, who differ from him. No, not though you have the magiſtrate and the national church, on your ſide. For, if to differ from them be, to be in the wrong way; you, who are in the right way in England, will be in the wrong way in France. Every one here muſt be judge for himſelf; and your law will reach no body, 'till you have convinced him, he is in the wrong way. And then, there will be no need of puniſhment to make him conſider; unleſs you will affirm again, what you have denied, and have men puniſhed, for embracing the religion, they believe to be true, when it differs from yours, or the publick.

BESIDES being in the wrong way, thoſe, whom you would have puniſhed, muſt be ſuch as are deaf to all perſuaſions. But any ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you will hardly find, who hearken to no body, not to thoſe of their own way. If you mean, by deaf to all perſuaſions, all perſuaſions of a contrary party, or of a different church; ſuch I ſuppoſe, you may abundantly find in your own church, as well as elſewhere; and I preſume to them you are ſo charitable, that you would not have them puniſhed, for not lending an ear to ſeducers. For conſtancy in the truth, and perſeverance in faith, is (I hope) rather to be encouraged, than by any penalties checked in the orthodox. And your church, doubtleſs, as others, is orthodox to itſelf, in all its tenets. If you mean by all perſuaſion, all your perſuaſion, or all perſuaſion of thoſe of your communion; you do beg the queſtion, and ſuppoſe you have a power to puniſh thoſe, who differ from, and will not comply with you.

YOUR next words are, "When men fly from the means of a right information, and will not ſo much as conſider, how reaſonable it is, thoroughly and impartially to examine a religion, which they embraced, upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter; and, therefore, with little or no examination of the proper grounds of it; what human method can be uſed, to bring them to act like men, in an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penalties upon them, as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way before the true, and recover them to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves; whether it be really worth the while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe, or for rejecting another (if that be the caſe) which, for any thing they know, may be true,, 'till they have brought it to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there.' Here you again bring in ſuch as prefer a falſe way before a true: to which having anſwered already, I ſhall here ſay no more, but that ſince our church will not allow thoſe to be in a falſe way, who are out of the church of Rome, becauſe the church of Rome (which pretends infallibility) declares hers to be the only true way; certainly no one of our church (nor any other, which claims not infallibility) can require any one, to take the teſtimony of any church, as a ſufficient proof of the truth of her own doctrine. So that true and falſe (as it commonly happens, when we ſuppoſe them for ourſelves, or our party) in effect, ſignify juſt nothing, or nothing to the purpoſe; unleſs we can think that true or falſe in England, which will not be ſo at Rome, or Geneva, and vice verſa. As for the reſt of the deſcription, of thoſe, on whom you are here laying penalties; I beſeech you conſider, whether it will not belong to any of your church, let it be what it will. Conſider, I ſay, if there be none in your church, "who have embraced her religion, upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore, with little, or no, examination, of the proper grounds of it; who have not been inclined by prejudices; who do not adhere to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe, and who have rejected another, which, for any thing they know, may be true." If you have any ſuch in your communion (and it will be an admirable, though I fear but a little, flock that has none ſuch in it) conſider well what you have done. You have prepared rods for them, for which I imagine they will con you no thanks. For to make any tolerable ſenſe of what you here propoſe, it muſt be underſtood that you would have men of all religions puniſhed, to make them conſider, "whether it be really worth the while, to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion, which for any thing they know may be falſe." If you hope to avoid that, by what you have ſaid of true and falſe; and pretend that the ſuppoſed preference of the true way in your church, ought to preſerve its members from your puniſhment; you manifeſtly trifle. For every church's teſtimony, that it has choſen the true way, muſt be taken for itſelf; and then none will be liable; and your new invention, of puniſhment, is come to nothing: or elſe the differing churches teſtimonies muſt be taken one for another; and then they will be all out of the true way, and your church need penalties, as well as the reſt. So that, upon your principles, they muſt all, or none, be puniſhed. Chuſe which you pleaſe: one of them, I think, you cannot eſcape. Page 11.

WHAT you ſay in the next words, "Where inſtruction is ſtifly refuſed, and all admonitions and perſuaſions prove vain and ineffectual;" differs nothing, but in the way of expreſſing, from deaf to all perſuaſions: and ſo that is anſwered already. Ibid.

IN another place, you give us another deſcription of thoſe, you think ought to be puniſhed, in theſe words; "Thoſe, who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the ſpiritual government of the proper miniſters of religion, who by ſpecial deſignation are appointed to exhort, admoniſh, reprove," &c. Here then, thoſe to be puniſhed, "are ſuch who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the proper miniſters of religion." Page 20.

Whereby,

Whereby, we are as much ſtill at uncertainty, as we were before, who thoſe are, who (by your ſcheme, and laws ſuitable to it) are to be puniſhed. Since every church has, as it thinks, its proper miniſters of religion. And "if you mean "thoſe, that refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of "the miniſters of another church;" then all men will be guilty, and muſt be puniſhed; even thoſe of your church, as well as others. If you mean thoſe who refuſe, &c. the miniſters of their own church; very few will incur your penalties. But if, by theſe proper miniſters of religion, the miniſters of ſome particular church are intended, why do you not name it? Why are you ſo reſerved, in a matter wherein, if you ſpeak not out, all the reſt, that you ſay, will be to no purpoſe? Are men to be puniſhed for "refuſing to embrace the "doctrine, and ſubmit to the government, of the proper miniſters of the "church of Geneva?" For this time, (ſince you have declared nothing to the contrary) let me ſuppoſe you of that church: and then, I am ſure, that is it that you would name. For, of whatever church you are, if you think the miniſters of any one church ought to be hearkened to, and obeyed, it muſt be thoſe of your own. There are perſons to be puniſhed, you ſay. This you contend for, all through your book; and lay ſo much ſtreſs on it, that you make the preſervation and propagation of religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, to depend on it: and yet you deſcribe them, by ſo general and equivocal marks; that, unleſs it be upon ſuppoſitions, which nobody will grant you, I dare ſay, neither you, nor any body elſe, will be able to find one guilty. Pray find me, if you can, a man whom you can judicially prove (for he that is puniſhed, by the law muſt be fairly tried) is in a wrong way, in reſpect of his faith, I mean, "who "is deaf to all perſuaſions, who flies from all means of a right information, "who refuſes to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the "ſpiritual paſtors." And, when you have done that, I think, I may allow you what power, you pleaſe, to puniſh him; without any prejudice to the toleration the author of the letter propoſes.

BUT why, I pray, all this boggling, all this looſe talking, as if you knew not what you meant, or durſt not ſpeak it out? Would you be for puniſhing ſomebody, you know not whom? I do not think ſo ill of you. Let me then ſpeak out for you. The evidence of the argument has convinced you, that men ought not to be perſecuted for their religion; That the ſeverities in uſe, amongſt Chriſtians, cannot be defended; That the magiſtrate has not authority to compel any one to his religion. This you are forced to yield. But you would fain retain ſome power in the magiſtrate's hands, to puniſh diſſenters, upon a new pretence; viz. not for having embraced the doctrine and worſhip, they believe to be true and right, but for not having well conſidered their own and the magiſtrate's religion. To ſhew you, that I do not ſpeak wholly without book; give me leave to mind you of one paſſage of yours. The words are, "Penalties "to put them upon a ſerious and impartial examination of the controverſy, be"tween the magiſtrates and them." Though theſe words be not intended to tell us, whom you would have puniſhed, yet it may be plainly inferred from them. And they more clearly point out, whom you aim at, than all the foregoing places, where you ſeem to (and ſhould) deſcribe them. For they are ſuch as "between whom and the magiſtrate, there is a controverſy:" that is, in ſhort, who differ from the magiſtrate in religion. And now, indeed, you have given us a note, by which thoſe, you would have puniſhed, may be known. We have, with much ado, found at laſt, whom it is, we may preſume, you would have puniſhed. Which, in other caſes, is uſually not very difficult: becauſe there the faults, to be mended, eaſily deſign the perſons to be corrected. But yours is a new method, and unlike all, that ever went before it.

Page 26.

IN the next place; let us ſee, for what you would have them puniſhed. You tell us, and it will eaſily be granted you, that not to examine and weigh impartially, and without prejudice or paſſion, (all which, for ſhortneſs ſake, we will expreſs by this one word, conſider) the religion one embraces, or refuſes, is a fault very common, and very prejudicial to true religion and the ſalvation of men's ſouls. But penalties and puniſhments are very neceſſary, ſay you, to remedy this evil.

LET us ſee now, how you apply this remedy. Therefore, ſay you, let all diſſenters be puniſhed. Why? Have no diſſenters conſidered of religion? Or have all conformiſts conſidered? That you yourſelf will not ſay. Your project, therefore, is juſt as reaſonable, as if a lethargy growing epidemical in England; you ſhould propoſe to have a law made to bliſter and ſcarify and ſhave the heads of all, who wear gowns: though it be certain that neither all, who wear gowns, are lethargick, nor all, who are lethargick, wear gowns,

—— "Dii te Damaſippe, deæq;
"Verum ob conſilium, donent tonſore."

For there could not be certainly a more learned advice, than that one man ſhould be pull'd by the ears, becauſe another is aſleep. This, when you have conſidered of it again, (for I find, according to your principle, all men have, now and then, need to be jogg'd) you will, I gueſs, be convinced is not like a fair phyſician, to apply a remedy to a diſeaſe; but like an enraged enemy, to vent one's ſpleen upon a party. Common ſenſe, as well as common juſtice, requires, that the remedies of laws and penalties ſhould be directed againſt the evil, that is to be removed, where-ever it be found. And if the puniſhment, you think ſo neceſſary, be (as you pretend) to cure the miſchief, you complain of, you muſt let it purſue, and fall on, the guilty, and thoſe only, in what company ſoever they are; and not, as you here propoſe, and is the higheſt injuſtice, puniſh the innocent, conſidering diſſenter, with the guilty, and, on the other ſide, let the inconſiderate, guilty conformiſt eſcape, with the innocent. For one may rationally preſume, that the national church has ſome, nay more in proportion, of thoſe who little conſider, or concern themſelves about, religion, than any congregation of diſſenters. For conſcience, or the care of their ſouls, being once laid aſide; intereſt of courſe leads men into that ſociety, where the protection and countenance of the government, and hopes of preferment, bid faireſt to all their remaining deſires. So that if careleſs, negligent, inconſiderate men, in matters of religion, who, without being forced, would not conſider, are to be rouzed into a care of their ſouls, and a ſearch after truth, by puniſhments; the national religion, in all countries, will certainly have a right, to the greateſt ſhare of thoſe puniſhments; at leaſt, not to be wholly exempt from them.

THIS is that, which the author of the letter, as I remember, complains of; and that juſtly, viz. "That the pretended care of men's ſouls always expreſſes "itſelf, in thoſe, who would have force any way made uſe of, to that end, in "very unequal methods; ſome perſons, being to be treated with ſeverity, whilſt "others, guilty of the ſame faults, are not to be ſo much as touched." Tho' you are got pretty well out of the deep mud, and renounce puniſhments directly for religion; yet you ſtick ſtill in this part of the mire; whilſt you would have diſſenters puniſhed to make them conſider, but would not have any thing done to conformiſts, though never ſo negligent, on this point of conſidering. The author's letter pleaſed me, becauſe it is equal to all mankind, is direct, and will, I think, hold every where: which I take to be a good mark of truth. For I ſhall always ſuſpect, that neither to comport with the truth of religion, or the deſign of the goſpel, which is ſuited to only ſome one country, or party. What is true and good in England, will be true and good at Rome too, in China, or Geneva. But whether your great and only method for the propagating of truth, by bringing the inconſiderate, by puniſhments, to conſider, would (according to your way of applying your puniſhments, only to diſſenters from the national religion) be of uſe, in thoſe countries, or any where, but where you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate to be in the right, judge you. Pray, Sir, conſider a little, whether prejudice has not ſome ſhare in your way of arguing. For this is your poſition, "Men are generally negligent in examining the grounds of their "religion." This I grant. But could there be a more wild and incoherent conſequence, drawn from it, than this; "Therefore diſſenters muſt be puniſhed?" Page 12.

BUT, that being laid aſide, let us now ſee, to what end they muſt be puniſhed. Sometimes it is, "To bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, Page 5.

"which are proper and ſufficient to convince them." Of what? That it is not eaſy to ſet Grantham ſteeple upon Paul's church. Whatever it be, you would have them convinced of, you are not willing to tell us. And ſo it may Page 10. be any thing. Sometimes it is, "To incline them to lend an ear to thoſe, who "tell them, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right." Page 27. Which is to lend an ear to all, who differ from them in religion; as well crafty Page 23. ſeducers as others. Whether this be for the procuring the ſalvation of their ſouls, the end, for which, you ſay, this force is to be uſed, judge you. But this I am ſure; Whoever will lend an ear to all, who will tell them they are out of the way, will not have much time for any other buſineſs.

Page 11. Sometimes it is, "To recover men to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, as "ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, Whether it be really worth their "while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion which, for "any thing they know, may be falſe; or for rejecting another (if that be the "caſe) which, for aught they know, may be true, 'till they have brought it to "the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there." Which, in ſhort, amounts to thus much, viz. "To make them examine whether their religion be true, "and ſo worth the holding, under thoſe penalties that are annexed to it?" Diſſenters are indebted to you, for your great care of their ſouls. But what, I beſeech you, ſhall become of thoſe of the national church, every-where (which make far the greater part of mankind) who have no ſuch puniſhments to make them conſider; who have not this only remedy provided for them; but are left in Page 27. that deplorable condition you mention, "of being ſuffer'd quietly, and without "moleſtation, to take no care at all of their ſouls; or, in doing of it, to follow "their own prejudices, humours, or ſome crafty ſeducers?" Need not thoſe of the national church, as well as others, "bring their religion to the bar of "reaſon, and give it a fair trial there?" And if they need to do ſo, (as they muſt, if all national religions cannot be ſuppoſed true) they will always need that, which, you ſay, is the only means to make them do ſo. So that if you Page 12. are ſure, as you tell us, that there is need of your method; I am ſure, there is as much need of it, in national churches, as any other. And ſo, for aught I can ſee, you muſt either puniſh them, or let others alone; unleſs you think it reaſonable that the far greater part of mankind ſhould conſtantly be without that ſovereign and only remedy, which they ſtand in need of, equally with other people.

Page 13. Sometimes the end, for which men muſt be puniſhed, is, "to diſpoſe "them to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons, offered for the enlightening their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them." If their own words may be taken for it, there are as few diſſenters as conformiſts, in any country, who will not profeſs they have done, and do this. And if their own words may not be taken; who I pray muſt be judge? You and your magiſtrates? If ſo, then it is plain you puniſh them, not to diſpoſe them to ſubmit to inſtruction, but to your inſtruction: not to diſpoſe them to give a fair hearing to reaſons offered for the enlightning their minds, but to give an obedient hearing to your reaſons. If you mean this; it had been fairer and ſhorter to have ſpoken out plainly, than thus, in fair words, of indefinite ſignification, to ſay that which amounts to nothing. For what ſenſe is it, to puniſh a man, "to diſpoſe him to ſubmit to inſtruction, and give a fair hearing to reaſons, of"fered for the enlightning his mind, and diſcovering truth to him," who goes two or three times a week, ſeveral miles, on purpoſe to do it, and that with the hazard of his liberty, or purſe? Unleſs you mean your inſtructions, your reaſons, your truth: which brings us but back to what you have diſclaimed, plain perſecution for differing in religion.

Page 14. Sometimes this is to be done, "to prevail with men, to weigh matters "in religion carefully and impartially." Diſcountenance and puniſhment put into one ſcale, with impunity and hopes of preferment put into the other, is as ſure a way to make a man weigh impartially, as it would be for a prince to bribe and threaten a judge to make him judge uprightly.

Sometimes it is "To make men bethink themſelves, and put it out of Page 20. the power of any fooliſh humour, or unreaſonable prejudice, to alienate them from truth and their own happineſs." Add but this, to put it out of the power of any humour, or prejudice, of their own, or other men's; and I grant the end is good, if you can find the means to procure it. But why it ſhould not be put out of the power of other men's humour, or prejudice, as well as their own, wants (and will always want) a reaſon to prove. Would it not, I beſeech you, to an indifferent by-ſtander, appear humour, or prejudice, or ſomething as bad; to ſee men, who profeſs a religion revealed from heaven, and which they own contains all in it neceſſary to ſalvation, exclude men from their communion, and perſecute them, with the penalties of the civil law, for not joining in the uſe of ceremonies, which are no where to be found in that reveal'd religion? Would it not appear humour, or prejudice, or ſome ſuch thing, to a ſober, impartial heathen; to ſee chriſtians exclude and perſecute one of the ſame faith, for things, which they themſelves confeſs to be indifferent, and not worth the contending for? Prejudice, humour, paſſion, luſts, im- Page 6, 7, preſſions of education, reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, 8, 9, 10. love of their own choice, and the like," (to which you juſtly impute many men's taking up, and perſiſting in their religion) are, indeed, good words; and ſo on the other ſide, are theſe following; "truth, the right way, enlightening reaſon, ſound judgment;" but they ſignify nothing at all, to your purpoſe, 'till you can evidently and unqueſtionably ſhew the world, that the latter, (viz. "truth, and the right way, &c.) are always, and in all countries, to be found only in the national church; and the former (viz. "paſſion, prejudice," &c.) only amongſt the diſſenters. But to go on:

Sometimes it is, "to bring men to take ſuch care, as they ought, of Page 22. their ſalvation. What care is ſuch as men ought to take," whilſt they are out of your church, will be hard for you to tell me. But you endeavour to explain yourſelf, in the following words; "that they may not blindly leave it to the choice, neither of any other perſon, nor yet of their own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them, what faith, or what worſhip, they ſhall embrace." You do well to make uſe of puniſhment, to ſhut paſſion out of the choice, becauſe you know fear of ſuffering is no paſſion. But let that paſs. You would have men puniſhed, "to bring them to take ſuch care of their ſalvation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any other perſon, to preſcribe to them." Are you ſincere? Are you in earneſt? Tell me then truly: Did the magiſtrate, or national church, any where, or yours in particular, ever puniſh any man, to bring him to have this care, which, you ſay, he ought to take of his ſalvation? Did you ever puniſh any man, that he might not blindly leave it to the choice of his pariſh-prieſt, or biſhop, or the convocation, what faith, or worſhip, he ſhould embrace? 'Twill be ſuſpected care of a party, or any thing elſe, rather than care of the ſalvation of men's ſouls; if, having found out ſo uſeful, ſo neceſſary a remedy, the only method there is room left for, Page 12. you will apply it but partially, and make trial of it, only on thoſe, whom you have truly leaſt kindneſs for. This will, unavoidably, give one reaſon to imagine, you do not think ſo well of your remedy, as you pretend, who are ſo ſparing of it to your friends; but are very free of it to ſtrangers, who, in other things, are uſed very much like enemies. But your remedy is like the helleboraſter, that grew in the woman's garden, for the cure of worms in her neighbour's children: for truly it wrought too roughly, to give it to any of her own. Methinks your charity, in your preſent proſecution, is muchwhat as prudent as juſtifiable, as that good woman's. I hope I have done you no injury, that I here ſuppoſe you of the church of England. If I have, I beg your pardon. It is no offence of malice, I aſſure you: for I ſuppoſe no worſe of you, than I confeſs of myſelf.

Sometimes this puniſhment, that you contend for, is "to bring men to Page 22. act according to reaſon and ſound judgment."

"Tertius é cælo cecidit Cato."

THIS is reformation, indeed! If you can help us to it, you will deſerve ſtatues to be erected to you, as to the reſtorer of decay'd religion. But, if all men have not reaſon and ſound judgment, will puniſhment put it in them? Beſides, concerning this matter, mankind is ſo divided, that he acts according to reaſon and ſound judgment at Auſburgh, who would be judged to do the quite contrary at Edinburgh. Will puniſhment make men know what is reaſon and ſound judgment? If it will not, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould make them act according to it. Reaſon and ſound judgment are the elixir itſelf, the univerſal remedy: and you may as reaſonably puniſh men to bring them to have the philoſopher's ſtone, as to bring them to act according to reaſon and ſound judgment. Page 26.

SOMETIMES it is, "To put men upon a ſerious and impartial examina-"tion of the controverſy between the magiſtrate and them, which is the way "for them to come to the knowledge of the truth." But what if the truth be on neither ſide (as I am apt to imagine you will think it is not, where neither the magiſtrate, nor the diſſenter, is either of them of your church) how will "the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and him be the way to "come to the knowledge of the truth?" Suppoſe the controverſy between a Lutheran and a papiſt; or, if you pleaſe, between a preſbyterian magiſtrate and a quaker ſubject, "Will the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate "and the diſſenting ſubject, in this caſe, bring him to the knowledge of the "truth?" If you ſay Yes, then you grant one of theſe to have the truth on his ſide. For the examining the controverſy between a preſbyterian and a quaker, leaves the controverſy either of them has with the church of England, or any other church, untouched. And ſo one, at leaſt, of thoſe being already come to the knowledge of the truth, ought not to be put under your diſcipline of puniſhment; which is only to bring him to the truth. If you ſay, No, and that "the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and the diſſenter, "in this caſe, will not bring him to the knowledge of the truth;" you confeſs your rule to be falſe, and your method to no purpoſe.

To conclude, your ſyſtem is, in ſhort, this: you would have all men (laying aſide "prejudice, humour, paſſion, &c.) examine the grounds of their "religion, and ſearch for the truth." This, I confeſs, is heartily to be wiſhed. The means, that you propoſe, to make men do this, is, that diſſenters ſhould be puniſhed, to make them do ſo. It is, as if you ſaid: Men generally are guilty of a fault; therefore let one ſect, who have the ill luck to be of an opinion different from the magiſtrate, be puniſhed. This, at firſt ſight, ſhocks any, who has the leaſt ſpark of ſenſe, reaſon or juſtice. But having ſpoken of this already, and concluding that, upon ſecond thoughts, you yourſelf will be aſhamed of it; let us conſider it put ſo, as to be conſiſtent with common ſenſe, and with all the advantage it can bear; and then let us ſee what you can make of it. "Men are negligent in examining the religions they embrace, refuſe, "or perſiſt in; therefore it is fit they ſhould be puniſhed to make them do it." This is a conſequence, indeed, which may, without defiance to common ſenſe, be drawn from it. This is the uſe, the only uſe, which you think puniſhment can indirectly, and at a diſtance have, in matters of religion. You would have men, by puniſhments, driven to examine. What? Religion. To what end? To bring them to the knowledge of the truth, But I anſwer:

Firſt. EVERY one has not the ability to do this.

Secondly, EVERY one has not the opportunity to do it.

WOULD you have every poor proteſtant, for example, in the palatinate, examine thoroughly; whether the pope be infallible, or head of the church: whether there be a purgatory; whether ſaints are to be prayed to, or the dead prayed for; whether the ſcripture be the only rule of faith; whether there be no ſalvation out of the church; and whether there be no church without biſhops; and an hundred other queſtions in controverſy, between the papiſts and thoſe proteſtants; and when he had maſtered theſe, go on to fortify himſelf againſt the opinions and objections of other churches, he differs from? This, which is no ſmall taſk, muſt be done, before a man can have brought his religion to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there. And if you will puniſh men, 'till this be done; the countryman muſt leave off plowing and ſowing, and betake himſelf to the ſtudy of Greek and Latin; and the artiſan muſt ſell his tools, to buy fathers and ſchool-men, and leave his family to ſtarve. If ſomething leſs than this will ſatisfy you, pray tell me what is enough. Have they conſidered and examined enough, if they are ſatisfied themſelves, where the truth lies? If this be the limits of their examination, you will find few to puniſh; unleſs you will puniſh them to make them do, what they have done already. For, however he came by his religion, there is ſcarce any one to be found, who does not own himſelf ſatisfied that he is in the right. Or elſe, muſt they be puniſhed to make them conſider and examine, 'till they embrace that, which you chuſe for truth? If this be ſo, what do you but in effect chuſe for them, when yet you would have men puniſhed, "to bring them to ſuch a care of their Page 22. "ſouls, that no other perſon might chuſe for them?" If it be truth in general, you would have them, by puniſhments, driven to ſeek; that is to offer matter of diſpute, and not a rule of diſcipline. For to puniſh any one to make him ſeek, 'till he find truth, without a judge of truth; is to puniſh for you know not what; and is all one, as if you ſhould whip a ſcholar to make him find out the ſquare root of a number, you do not know. I wonder not, therefore, that you could not reſolve with yourſelf, what degree of ſeverity you would have uſed, nor how long continued; when you dare not ſpeak out directly whom you would have puniſhed, and are far from being clear to what end they ſhould be under penalties.

CONSONANT to the uncertainty, of whom, or what to be puniſhed; you tell us, "that there is no queſtion of the ſucceſs of this method. Force will "certainly do, if duly proportioned to the deſign of it." Page 12.

WHAT, I pray, is the deſign of it? I challenge you, or any man living, out of what you have ſaid in your book, to tell me directly what it is. In all other puniſhments, that ever I heard of yet, 'till now, that you have taught the world a new method, the deſign of them has been to cure the crime, they are denounced againſt; and ſo I think it ought to be here. What, I beſeech you, is the crime here? diſſenting? that you ſay not, any where, is a fault. Beſides you tell us, "that the magiſtrate hath not an authority to compel any one to his religion: Page 21. and that you do not require that men ſhould have no rule, but the religion Page 25. of their country. Page 26. And the power, you aſcribe to the magiſtrate is given "him to bring men, not to his own, but to the true religion." If diſſenting be not the fault; is it that a man does not examine his own religion, and the grounds of it? Is that the crime your puniſhments are deſigned to cure? neither that dare you ſay; leſt you diſpleaſe more, than you ſatisfy, with your new diſcipline. And then again, (as I ſaid before) you muſt tell us, how far you would have them examine, before you puniſh them for not doing it. And I imagine, if that were all we required of you, it would be long enough, before you would trouble us with a law, that ſhould preſcribe to every one, how far he was to examine matters of religion: wherein if he failed and came ſhort, he was to be puniſhed; if he performed, and went in his examination to the bounds ſet by the law, he was acquitted and free. Sir, when you conſider it again, you will perhaps think this a caſe reſerved to the great day, when the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open. For I imagine it is beyond the power, or judgment, of man, in that variety of circumſtances, in reſpect of parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in this world, to determine what is every one's duty, in this great buſineſs of ſearch, enquiry, examination, or to know, when any one has done it. That, which makes me believe, you will be of this mind, is, that where you undertake for the ſucceſs of this method, if rightly uſed, it is with a limitation, upon ſuch as are not altogether incurable. So that when your remedy is prepared according to art, (which art is yet unknown) and rightly applied, and Page 12. given in a due doſe, (all which are ſecrets) it will then infallibly cure. Whom? All that are not incurable by it. And ſo will a pippin poſſet, eating fiſh in Lent, or a preſbyterian lecture, certainly cure all that are not incurable by them. For I am ſure you do not mean, it will cure all, but thoſe who are abſolutely incurable; becauſe you yourſelf allow one means left of cure, when yours will not

Page 10. do, viz. the grace of God. Your words are; “What means is there left (except the grace of God) to reduce them, but to lay thorns and briars in their Page 12. way?” And here alſo, in the place we were conſidering, you tell us “the incurable are to be left to God.” Whereby, if you mean, they are to be left to thoſe means, he has ordained, for men's converſion and ſalvation, yours muſt never be made uſe of: for he, indeed, has preſcribed preaching and hearing of his word; but as for thoſe, who will not hear, I do not find any where, that he has commanded they ſhould be compelled, or beaten to it.

THERE is a third thing, that you are as tender and reſerved in, as either naming the criminals to be puniſhed, or poſitively telling us the end, for which they ſhould be puniſhed: and that is, with what ſort of penalties, what degree of puniſhment they ſhould be forced. You are, indeed, ſo gracious to them, that you renounce the ſeverities and penalties hitherto made uſe of. You tell us, Page 24. they ſhould be but moderate penalties. But if we aſk you, what are moderate penalties, you confeſs you cannot tell us. So that, by moderate, here, you yet Page 15. mean nothing. You tell us, “the outward force to be applied, ſhould be duly tempered.” But what that due temper is, you do not, or cannot ſay; and ſo in effect, it ſignifies juſt nothing. Yet if in this, you are not plain and direct, all the reſt of your deſign will ſignify nothing. For it being to have ſome men, and to ſome end, puniſhed; yet if it cannot be found, what puniſhment is to be uſed, it is (notwithſtanding all you have ſaid) utterly uſeleſs. “You tell us Page 12. modeſtly, that to determine preciſely the juſt meaſure of the puniſhment, will require ſome conſideration.” If the faults were preciſely determined, and could be proved, it would require no more conſideration to determine the meaſure of the puniſhment, in this, than it would in any other caſe, where thoſe were known. But, where the fault is undefined, and the guilt not to be proved, (as I ſuppoſe it will be found, in this preſent buſineſs of examining) it will, without doubt, require conſideration to proportion the force to the deſign. Juſt ſo much conſideration, as it will require to fit a coat to the moon, or proportion a ſhoe to the feet of thoſe, who inhabit her. For to proportion a puniſhment to a fault, that you do not name, (and ſo we, in charity, ought to think, you do not yet know) and a fault that, when you have named it, will be impoſſible to be proved who are, or are not guilty of it; will (I ſuppoſe) require as much conſideration, as to fit a ſhoe to feet whoſe ſize and ſhape are not known.

HOWEVER, you offer ſome meaſures, whereby to regulate your puniſhment; which, when they are looked into, will be found to be juſt as good as Page 14. none; they being impoſſible to be any rule, in the caſe. The firſt is, “So much force, or ſuch penalties, as are ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, to weigh matters of religion, carefully and impartially, and without which, ordinarily, they would not do this.” Where it is to be obſerv'd:

Firſt, THAT who are theſe men of common diſcretion, is as hard to know, as to know what is a fit degree of puniſhment in the caſe; and ſo you do but regulate one uncertainty by another. Some men will be apt to think, that he, who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite concernment to him, without puniſhment, cannot, in reaſon, be thought a man of common diſcretion. Many women, of common diſcretion enough, to manage the ordinary affairs of their families, are not able to read a page in an ordinary author, or to underſtand and give an account what it means, when read to them. Many men of common diſcretion in their callings, are not able to judge, when an argument is concluſive, or no; much leſs to trace it through a long train of conſequences. What penalties ſhall be ſufficient to prevail with ſuch (who, upon examination, I fear, will not be found to make the leaſt part of mankind) to examine and weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially? The law allows all to have common diſcretion, for whom it has not provided guardians, or Bedlam. So that, in effect, your men of common diſcretion are all men, not judged ideots, or madmen; and penalties ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, are penalties ſufficient to prevail with all men, but ideots and madmen. Which, what a meaſure it is to regulate penalties by, let all men of common diſcretion judge.

Secondly. You may be pleaſed to conſider, that all men of the ſame degree of diſcretion, are not apt to be moved by the ſame degree of penalties. Some are of a more yielding, ſome of a more ſtiff temper; and what is ſufficient to prevail on one, is not half enough to move the other; though both men of common diſcretion. So that common diſcretion will be here of no uſe, to determine the meaſure of puniſhment: eſpecially, when in the ſame clauſe you except men deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, who are as hard to be known, as what you ſeek; viz. the juſt proportions of puniſhments, neceſſary to prevail with men to conſider, examine, and weigh matters of religion; wherein if a man tells you, he has conſidered, he has weighed, he has examined, and ſo goes on in his former courſe, it is impoſſible for you ever to know, whether he has done his duty, or whether he be deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. So that this exception ſignifies juſt nothing.

THERE are many things, in your uſe of force and penalties, different from any I ever met with elſewhere. One of them, this clauſe of yours, concerning the meaſure of puniſhments, now under conſideration, offers me: wherein you proportion your puniſhments, only to the yielding and corrigible, not to the perverſe and obſtinate; contrary to to the common diſcretion, which has hitherto made laws in other caſes, which levels the puniſhments againſt refractory offenders, and never ſpares them, becauſe they are obſtinate. This, however, I will not blame, as an overſight in you. Your new method, which aims at ſuch impracticable and inconſiſtent things, as laws cannot bear, nor penalties be uſeful to, forced you to it. The uſefulneſs, abſurdity, and unreaſonableneſs of great ſeverities, you had acknowledged in the foregoing paragraphs. Diſſenters, you Page 13, 14. would have brought to conſider, by moderate penalties. They lie under them; but whether they have conſidered or no (for that you cannot tell) they ſtill continue diſſenters. What is to be done now? Why, the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us, p. 12. Your puniſhments were not meant to prevail on the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as you tell us here. And ſo, whatever be the ſucceſs, your puniſhments are however juſtified.

YOU have given us, in another place, ſomething like another boundary to your moderate penalties: but when examined, it proves juſt like the reſt, trifling only, in good words, ſo put together as to have no direct meaning; an art very much in uſe, amongſt ſome ſort of learned men. The words are theſe: "Such Page 26. "penalties as may not tempt perſons, who have any concern for their eternal "ſalvation, (and thoſe, who have none, ought not to be conſidered) to renounce "a religion, which they believe to be true, or profeſs one, which they do not "believe to be ſo." If by any concern, you mean a true concern for their eternal ſalvation, by this rule you may make your puniſhment, as great as you pleaſe; and all the ſeverities, you have diſclaimed, may be brought in play again: for none of thoſe will be able to make a man, "who is truly concerned "for his eternal ſalvation, renounce a religion, he believes to be true, or profeſs "one he does not believe to be ſo." If, by thoſe who have any concern, you mean ſuch, who have ſome faint wiſhes for happineſs hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them, in the other world, but will venture nothing in this world for it; theſe the moderateſt puniſhments you can imagine, will make change their religion. If, by any concern, you mean, whatever may be between theſe two; the degrees are ſo infinite, that to proportion your puniſhments by that, is to have no meaſure of them at all.

ONE thing, I cannot but take notice of, in this paſſage, before I leave it: and that is, that you ſay here, "Thoſe, who have no concern for their ſalva-"tion, deſerve not to be conſidered." In other parts of your letter, you pretend to have compaſſion on the careleſs, and provide remedies for them; but here, of a ſudden, your charity fails you; and you give them up to eternal perdition, without the leaſt regard, the leaſt pity, and ſay, they deſerve not to be conſidered. Our Saviour's rule was, "The ſick, and not the whole, need a phyſi-"cian. Your rule here is, Thoſe, that are careleſs, are not to be conſidered, but are to be left to themſelves. This would ſeem ſtrange, if one did not obſerve what drew you to it. You perceived that, if the magiſtrate was to uſe no puniſhments, but ſuch as would make no body change their religion, he was to uſe none at all; for the careleſs would be brought to the national church, with any ſlight puniſhments; and when they are once there, you are, it ſeems, ſatiſfied, and look no farther after them. So that by your own meaſures, "if the "careleſs, and thoſe who have no concern for their eternal ſalvation," are to be regarded and taken care of; if the ſalvation of their ſouls is to be promoted, there is to be no puniſhment uſed at all: and, therefore, you leave them out, as not to be conſidered.

THERE remains yet one thing to be enquired into, concerning the meaſure of the puniſhments, and that is the length of their duration. Moderate puniſhments that are continued, that men find no end of, know no way out of, ſit heavy, and become immoderately uneaſy. Diſſenters you would have puniſhed to make them conſider. Your penalties have had the effect on them you intended; they have made them conſider; and they have done their utmoſt in conſidering. What now muſt be done with them? They muſt be puniſhed on; for they are ſtill diſſenters. If it were juſt, if you had reaſon at firſt to puniſh a diſſenter, to make him conſider, when you did not know but that he had conſidered already; it is as juſt, and you have as much reaſon to puniſh him on, even when he has performed what your puniſhments were deſigned for, when he has conſidered, but yet remains a diſſenter. For I may juſtly ſuppoſe, and you muſt grant, that a man may remain a diſſenter, after all the conſideration, your moderate penalties can bring him to; when we ſee greater puniſhments, even thoſe ſeverities you diſown, as too great, are not able to make men to conſider, ſo far as to be convinced, and brought over to the national church.

IF your puniſhments may not be inflicted on men, to make them conſider, who have, or may have conſidered already, for aught you know; then diſſenters are never to be once puniſhed, no more than any other ſort of men. If diſſenters are to be puniſhed, to make them conſider, whether they have conſidered or no; then their puniſhments, though they do conſider, muſt never ceaſe, as long as they are diſſenters, which whether it be to puniſh them, only to bring them to conſider, let all men judge. This I am ſure; puniſhments in your method, muſt either never begin upon diſſenters, or never ceaſe. And ſo, pretend moderation as you pleaſe, the puniſhments, which your method requires, muſt be either very immoderate, or none at all.

AND now, you have yielded to our author, and that upon very good reaſons, which you yourſelf urge, and which I ſhall ſet down in your own words: "That to proſecute men with fire and ſword, or to deprive them of their eſtates, "to maim them with corporal puniſhments, to ſtarve and torture them in noiſome priſons, and in the end even to take away their lives, to make them "chriſtians, is but an ill way of expreſſing men's deſire of the ſalvation of thoſe, "whom they treat in this manner. And that it will be very difficult to perſuade "men of ſenſe, that he, who with dry eyes and ſatisfaction of mind, can deliver his brother to the executioner, to be burnt alive, does ſincerely and heartily concern himſelf, to ſave that brother from the flames of hell, in the world "to come. And that theſe methods are ſo very improper, in reſpect to the deſign of them, that they uſually produce the quite contrary effect. For, whereas all the uſe, which force can have, for the advancing true religion, and the "ſalvation of ſouls, is (as has already been ſhewed) by diſpoſing men to ſubmit "to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons, which are offered, "for the enlightening their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them, theſe "cruelties have the misfortune to be commonly looked upon, as ſo juſt a prejudice againſt any religion, that uſes them, as makes it needleſs to look any "farther into it; and to tempt men to reject it, as both falſe and deteſtable, "without ever vouchſafing to conſider the rational grounds and motives of it. "This effect they ſeldom fail to work upon the ſufferers of them; and, as to "the ſpectators, if they be not before-hand well inſtructed in thoſe grounds "and

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“ and motives, they will be much tempted likewiſe, not only to entertain the ſame opinion of ſuch a religion, but withal to judge much more favourable of that of the ſufferers: who, they will be apt to think, would not expoſe themſelves to ſuch extremities, which they might avoid by compliance, if they were not thoroughly ſatisfied of the juſtice of their cauſe.” And upon theſe reaſons you conclude, “ That theſe ſeverities are utterly unapt and improper, for the bringing men to embrace that truth, which muſt ſave them.” Again, you have acknowledged, “ That the authority of the magiſtrate is not Page 21. an authority to compel any one to his religion.” And again, “ That the ri- Page 24. gor of laws, and force of penalties, are not capable to convince and change Page 25. men's minds.” And yet farther, “ That you do not require that men ſhould have no rule, but the religion of the court; or that they ſhould be put under a neceſſity to quit the light of their own reaſon, and oppoſe the dictates of their own conſciences, and blindly reſign up themſelves to the will of their governors; but that the power, you aſcribe to the magiſtrate, is given him to bring men not to his own, but to the true religion.” Now, you having, I ſay, granted this, whereby you directly condemn and aboliſh all laws, that have been made here, or any where elſe (that ever I heard of) to compel men to conformity; I think the author, and whoſoever elſe are moſt for liberty of conſcience, might be content with the toleration you allow, by condemning the laws about religion, now in force: and reſt ſatisfied, until you had made your new method conſiſtent and practicable, by telling the world plainly and directly;

1. WHO are to be puniſhed.
2. For what.
3. WITH what puniſhments.
4. How long.
5. WHAT advantage to true religion it would be, if magiſtrates everywhere did ſo puniſh.
6. AND laſtly, Whence the magiſtrate had commiſſion to do ſo.

WHEN you have done this plainly and intelligibly, without keeping in the uncertainty of general expreſſions, and without ſuppoſing all along your church in the right, and your religion the true, (which can no more be allowed to you, in this caſe, whatever your church, or religion be, than it can be to a papiſt, or a lutheran, a preſbyterian, or an anabaptiſt; nay, no more to you, than it can be allowed to a Jew, or a mahometan;) when, I ſay, you have, by ſetling theſe points, framed the parts of your new engine, ſet it together, and ſhewed that it will work, without doing more harm, than good, in the world, I think, then, men may be content to ſubmit to it. But imagining this, and an engine to ſhew the perpetual motion, will be found out together; I think toleration, in a very good ſtate, notwithſtanding your anſwer; wherein you have ſaid ſo much for it, and for aught I ſee, nothing againſt it; unleſs an impracticable chimera be, in your opinion, ſomething mightily to be apprehended.

WE have now ſeen and examined the main of your treatiſe; and, therefore, I think, I might here end, without going any farther. But, that you may not think yourſelf, or any of your arguments neglected, I will go over the remainder, and give you my thoughts on every thing, I ſhall meet with in it, that ſeems to need any anſwer. In one place you argue againſt the author thus: “ If then the author's fourth propoſition, as you call it, viz. that force is of no uſe for promoting true religion and the ſalvation of ſouls, “ be not true (as per- Page 15. haps by this time, it appears it is not) then the laſt propoſition, which is built upon it, muſt fall with it:” which laſt propoſition is this, viz. “ That no body can have any right to uſe any outward force, or compulſion, to bring men to the true religion, and ſo to ſalvation.” If this propoſition were built, as you alledge, upon that, which you call his fourth; then indeed, if the fourth fell, this built upon it would fall with it. But that not being the author's propoſition, (as I have ſhewed) nor this built wholly on it, but on other reaſons, (as I have already proved, and any one may ſee, in ſeveral parts of his letter, particularly page 244, 245,) what you alledge falls of itſelf.

The buſineſs of the next paragraph is to prove, that “ if force be uſeful, then “ ſomebody muſt certainly have a right to uſe it.” The firſt argument, you go about to prove it by, is this, “ That uſefulneſs is as good an argument, to “ prove, there is ſomewhere a right to uſe it, as uſeleſneſs is to prove, no body “ has ſuch a right.” If you conſider the things, of whoſe uſefulneſs, or uſeleſneſs, we are ſpeaking, you will perhaps be of another mind. It is puniſhment, or force uſed in puniſhing. Now all puniſhment is ſome evil, ſome inconvenience, ſome ſuffering; by taking away, or abridging, ſome good thing, which he, who is puniſhed, has otherwiſe a right to. Now to juſtify the bringing any ſuch evil upon any man, two things are requiſite. Firſt, that he, who does it, has commiſſion and power ſo to do. Secondly, that it be directly uſeful for the procuring ſome greater good. Whatever puniſhment one man uſes to another, without theſe two conditions, whatever he may pretend, proves an injury and injuſtice, and ſo, of right, ought to have been let alone. And therefore, though uſefulneſs (which is one of the conditions, that makes puniſhments juſt) when it is away, may hinder puniſhments from being lawful, in any body's hands; yet uſefulneſs, when preſent (being but one of thoſe conditions) cannot give the other, which is a commiſſion to puniſh; without which alſo puniſhment is unlawful. From whence it follows, that though uſeleſs puniſhment be unlawful, from any hand; yet uſeful puniſhment, from every hand, is not lawful. A man may have the ſtone, and it may be uſeful (more than indirectly, and at a diſtance uſeful) to him to be cut; but yet this uſefulneſs will not juſtify the moſt ſkilful chirurgeon in the world, by force, to make him endure the pain and hazard of cutting; becauſe he has no commiſſion, no right, without the patient's own conſent to do ſo. Nor is it a good argument, cutting will be uſeful to him; therefore there is a right ſomewhere to cut him, whether he will or no: much leſs will there be an argument for any right, if there be only a poſſibility that it may prove uſeful, indirectly and by accident.

Your other argument is this; “ If force, or puniſhment, be of neceſſary “ uſe, then it muſt be acknowledged, that there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it; “ unleſs we will ſay (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and “ benign diſpoſer and governor of all things has not furniſhed mankind with “ competent means, for promoting his own honour in the world, and the good “ of ſouls.” If your way of arguing be true; it is demonſtration, that force is not of neceſſary uſe. For I argue thus, in your form. We muſt acknowledge force not to be of neceſſary uſe; “ unleſs we will ſay (what, without “ impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe diſpoſer and governor of all things did “ not, for above 300 years after Chriſt, furniſh his church with competent “ means, for promoting his own honour, in the world, and the good of ſouls.” It is for you to conſider, whether theſe arguments be concluſive, or no. This I am ſure, the one is as concluſive as the other. But if your ſuppoſed uſefulneſs places a right ſomewhere to uſe it, pray tell me, in whoſe hands it places it, in Turkey, Perſia, or China, or any country, where chriſtians of different churches live under a heathen, or mahometan ſovereign? And if you cannot tell me, in whoſe hands it places it there (as I believe you will find it pretty hard to do) there are then (it ſeems) ſome places, where (upon your ſuppoſition of the neceſſary uſefulneſs of force) “ the wiſe and benign governor and “ diſpoſer of all things, has not furniſhed men with competent means, for pro- “ moting his own honour, and the good of ſouls;” unleſs you will grant, “ that the wiſe and benign diſpoſer and governor of all things, hath, for the “ promoting of his honour, and the good of ſouls, placed a power in mahome- “ tan or heathen princes, to puniſh chriſtians, to bring them to conſider rea- “ ſons and arguments, proper to convince them.” But this is the advantage of ſo fine an invention, as that of force doing ſome ſervice, indirectly, and at a diſtance; which uſefulneſs, if we may believe you, places a right in mahometan, or pagan princes hands, to uſe force upon chriſtians; for fear leſt mankind, in thoſe countries, ſhould be furniſhed with means, for the promoting God's honour, and the good of ſouls. For thus you argue; “ If there be ſo great uſe

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"of force, then there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it. And if there be ſuch a Page 16. "right ſomewhere, where ſhould it be, but in the civil ſovereign?" Who can deny now, but that you have taken care, great care, for the promoting of truth, and the chriſtian religion? But yet it is as hard for me, I confeſs, and I believe for others, to conceive, how you ſhould think to do any ſervice to truth and the chriſtian religion, by putting a right into mahometans, or heathens hands, to puniſh chriſtians; as it was for you to conceive, how the author ſhould think "to do any ſervice to truth, and the chriſtian religion," by exempting the profeſſors of it from puniſhment every where; ſince there are more pagan, mahometan, and erroneous princes in the world, than orthodox; truth and the chriſtian religion (taking the world as we find it) is ſure to be more puniſhed and ſuppreſſed, than error and falſhood.

THE author having endeavoured to ſhew, that no body at all, of any rank or condition, had a power to puniſh, torment, or uſe any man ill, for matters of religion; you tell us, "you do not yet underſtand, why clergymen are not as Page 17. "capable of ſuch power, as other men." I do not remember that the author any where, by excepting eccleſiaſticks more than others, gives you any occaſion to ſhew your concern in this point. Had he foreſeen that this would have touched you ſo nearly, and that you ſet your heart ſo much upon the clergy's power of puniſhing; it is like he would have told you, he thought eccleſiaſticks as capable of it as any men; and that if forwardneſs and diligence in the exerciſe of ſuch power may recommend any to it, clergymen, in the opinion of the world, ſtand faireſt for it. However you do well to put in your claim for them, though the author excludes them, no more than their neighbours. Nay, they muſt be allowed the pretence of the faireſt title. For I never read of any ſeverities, that were to bring men to Chriſt, but thoſe of the law of Moſes; which is therefore called a pedagogue, Gal. iii. 24. And the next verſe tells us, that "after that faith is come, we are no longer under a ſchoolmaſter." But yet, if we are ſtill to be driven to Chriſt by a rod, I ſhall not envy them the pleaſure of wielding it: only I deſire them, when they have got the ſcourge into their hands, to remember our Saviour, and follow his example, who never uſed it but once; and that they would, like him, employ it only to drive vile and ſcandalous traffickers for the things of this world, out of their church, rather than to drive whoever they can into it. Whether that latter be not a proper method to make their church, what our Saviour there pronounced of the temple, they who uſe it, were beſt look. For, in matters of religion, none are ſo eaſy to be driven, as thoſe, who have nothing of religion at all; and next to them, the vicious, the ignorant, the worldling, and the hypocrite; who care for no more of religion, but the name, nor no more of any church, but its proſperity and power; and who, not unlike thoſe deſcribed by our Saviour, Luke xx. 47. for a ſhew come to, or cry up, the prayers of the church, "that they "may devour widows, and other helpleſs peoples, houſes." I ſay not this of the ſerious profeſſors of any church, who are in earneſt in matters of religion. Such I value, who conſcientiouſly, and out of a ſincere perſuaſion, embrace any religion, though different from mine, and in a way, I think, miſtaken. But no body can have reaſon to think otherwiſe, than what I have ſaid, of thoſe, who are wrought upon, to be of any church, by ſecular hopes and fears. Thoſe truly place trade above all other conſiderations, and merchandize with religion itſelf, who regulate their choice, by worldly profit and loſs.

YOU endeavour to prove, againſt the author, that civil ſociety is not inſtituted only for civil ends, i. e. the procuring, preſerving, and advancing men's civil intereſts. Your words are: "I muſt ſay, that our author does but beg the queſ- Page 18. "tion, when he affirms, that the commonwealth is conſtituted only, for the "procuring, preſerving, and advancing the civil intereſts of the members of it. "That commonwealths are inſtituted for theſe ends, no man will deny. But "if there be any other ends, beſides theſe, attainable by the civil ſociety and "government, there is no reaſon to affirm, that theſe are the only ends, for "which they are deſigned. Doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted, for the

" attaining of all the benefits, which political government can yield. And, " therefore, if the ſpiritual, and eternal intereſts of men may, any way, be " procured, or advanced, by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts muſt, in all reaſon, be reckoned among the ends of civil " ſocieties, and ſo, conſequently fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction." I have ſet down your words at large, to let the reader ſee, that you, of all men, had the leaſt reaſon to tell the author, he does but beg the queſtion; unleſs you mean to juſtify yourſelf, by the pretence of his example. You argue thus: " If there be any other ends, attainable by civil ſociety, then " civil intereſts are not the only ends, for which commonwealths are inſtituted." And how do you prove there be other ends? Why thus, " Doubtleſs common" wealths are inſtituted, for the attaining of all the benefits, which political go" vernment can yield." Which is as clear a demonſtration, as, doubtleſs, can make it to be. The queſtion is, Whether civil ſociety be inſtituted, only for civil ends? You ſay, No; and your proof is, Becauſe, doubtleſs, it is inſtituted for other ends. If I now ſay, Doubtleſs, this is a good argument; is not every one bound, without more ado, to admit it, for ſuch? If not, doubtleſs, you are in danger to be thought to beg the queſtion.

But notwithſtanding you ſay here, that the author begs the queſtion, in the following page, you tell us, " That the author offers three conſiderations, " which ſeem to him abundantly to demonſtrate, that the civil power neither " can, nor ought, in any manner to be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls." He does not then beg the queſtion. For the queſtion being, " Whether civil " intereſt be the only end of civil ſociety;" he gives this reaſon for the negative, " That civil power has nothing to do with the ſalvation of ſouls; and offers " three conſiderations" for the proof of it. For it will always be a good conſequence, that, if the civil power has nothing to do with the ſalvation of ſouls, " then civil intereſt is the only end of civil ſociety." And the reaſon of it is plain; becauſe, a man, having no other intereſt, but either in this world, or the world to come; if the ends of civil ſociety reach not to a man's intereſts, in the other world, (all which is comprehended, in the ſalvation of his ſoul) 'tis plain, that the ſole end of civil ſociety is civil intereſt, under which the author comprehends the good things of this world.

And now let us examine the truth of your main poſition, viz. " That civil " ſociety is inſtituted for the attaining of all the benefits, that it may any way " yield." Which if true, then this poſition muſt be true, viz. " That all ſo" cieties whatſoever are inſtituted, for the attaining all the benefits, that they " may any way yield;" there being nothing, peculiar to civil ſociety in the caſe, why that ſociety ſhould be inſtituted for the attaining all the benefits, it can any way yield, and other ſocieties not. By which argument it will follow, that all ſocieties are inſtituted for one and the ſame end, i. e. " for attaining all the be" nefits, that they can any way yield." By which account there will be no difference between church and ſtate, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the Eaſt-India company; all which have, hitherto, been thought diſtinct ſorts of ſocieties, inſtituted for different ends. If your hypotheſis hold good, one of the ends of the family muſt be to preach the goſpel, and adminiſter the ſacraments; and one buſineſs of an army to teach languages, and propagate religion; becauſe theſe are benefits, " ſome way or other, attainable" by thoſe ſocieties: unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſufficient impediment: and that will be ſo too in other caſes.

'Tis a benefit to have true knowledge and philoſophy, embraced and aſſented to, in any civil ſociety, or government. But will you ſay, therefore, that it is a benefit to the ſociety, or one of the ends of government, that all, who are not peripateticks, ſhould be puniſhed, to make men find out the truth, and profeſs it. This, indeed, might be thought a fit way to make ſome men embrace the peripatetick philoſophy, but not a proper way to find the truth. For, perhaps, the peripatetick philoſophy may not be true; perhaps a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy it: perhaps a great many, who ſtudied it, cannot be convinced of the truth of it: and, therefore it cannot be a benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of the ends of it, that theſe members of the ſociety ſhould be diſturbed and diſeaſed to no purpoſe, when they are guilty of no fault. For juſt the ſame reaſon, it cannot be a benefit to civil ſociety, that men ſhould be puniſh'd in Denmark, for not being lutherans; in Geneva, for not being calviniſts; and in Vienna, for not being papiſts; as a means, to make them find out the true religion. For ſo, upon your grounds, men muſt be treated, in thoſe places, as well as in England, for not being of the Church of England. And then, I beſeech you, conſider the great benefit will accrue to men, in ſociety, by this method; and I ſuppoſe it will be a hard thing for you to prove, that ever civil governments were inſtituted to puniſh men, for not being of this, or that ſect in religion, however by accident, "indirectly, and at a diſtance," it may be an occaſion to one, perhaps of a thouſand, or an hundred, to ſtudy that controverſy, which is all you expect from it. If it be a benefit, pray tell me what benefit it is. A civil benefit it cannot be. For men's civil intereſts are diſturb'd, injured, and impaired by it. And what ſpiritual benefit that can be, to any multitude of men, to be puniſhed for diſſenting from a falſe, or erroneous, profeſſion, I would have you find out: unleſs it be a ſpiritual benefit, to be in danger to be driven into a wrong way. For if, in all differing ſects, one is in the wrong, 'tis a hundred to one but that, from which one diſſents, and is puniſhed for diſſenting from, is the wrong.

I GRANT it is paſt doubt, that the nature of man is ſo covetous of good, that no one would have excluded from any action he does, or form any inſtitution he is concerned in, any manner of good, or benefit, that it might any way yield. And if this be your meaning it will not be denied you. But then you ſpeak very improperly, or rather very miſtakenly, if you call ſuch benefits as may, any way (i. e. indirectly, and at a diſtance, or by accident) be attained by civil, or any other ſociety, the ends, for which it is inſtituted. Nothing can "in reaſon, be reckoned amongſt the ends of any ſociety," but what may, in reaſon, be ſuppoſed to be deſigned by thoſe, who enter into it. Now no body can, in reaſon, ſuppoſe, that any one enter'd into civil ſociety, for the procuring, ſecuring, or advancing the ſalvation of his ſoul; when he, for that end, needed not the force of civil ſociety. "The procuring, therefore, ſecuring, "and advancing the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of men, cannot, in reaſon, be "reckoned amongſt the ends of civil ſocieties;" though perhaps it might ſo fall out, that, in ſome particular inſtance, ſome man's ſpiritual intereſt might be advanced by your, or any other, way of applying civil force. A nobleman, whoſe chapel is decayed, or fallen, may make uſe of his dining-room for praying and preaching. Yet whatever benefit were attainable, by this uſe of the room, no body can, in reaſon, reckon this amongſt the ends for which it was built: no more than the accidental breeding of ſome bird, in any part of it (though it were a benefit it yielded) could, in reaſon, be reckoned among the ends of building the houſe.

BUT, ſay you, "Doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted, for the attaining of "all the benefits, which political government can yield; and, therefore, if the "ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may, any way, be procured, or ad"vanced, by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts, "muſt, in all reaſon, be reckoned amongſt the ends of civil ſociety, and ſo "conſequently fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction." Upon the ſame grounds, I thus reaſon: Doubtleſs churches are inſtituted for the attaining of all the benefits, which eccleſiaſtical government can yield: and, therefore, if the temporal and ſecular intereſts of men may, any way, be procured, or advanced, by eccleſiaſtical polity, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts, muſt, in all reaſon, be reckoned among the ends of religious ſocieties, and ſo, conſequently, fall within the compaſs of churchmen's juriſdiction. The church of Rome has openly made its advantage of "ſecular intereſts, to be pro"cured, or advanced, indirectly, and at a diſtance, and in ordine ad ſpiritualia;" all which ways (if I miſtake not Engliſh) are comprehended under your, any way. But I do not remember that any of the reformed churches have hitherto directly profeſſed it. But there is a time for all things. And if the commonwealth,

wealth, once invades the ſpiritual ends of the church, by meddling with the ſalvation of ſouls (which ſhe has always been ſo tender of) who can deny, that the church ſhould have liberty to make herſelf ſome amends, by repriſals?

BUT, Sir, however you and I may argue from wrong ſuppoſitions, yet unleſs the apoſtle, Eph. iv. where he reckons up the church officers, which Chriſt hath inſtituted in his church, had told us they were for ſome other ends than "for the perfecting of the ſaints, for the work of the miniſtry, for the edifying "of the body of Chriſt;" the advancing of their ſecular intereſts will ſcarce be allow'd to be their buſineſs, or within the compaſs of their juriſdiction. Nor, 'till it can be ſhewn that civil ſociety is inſtituted for ſpiritual ends, or that the magiſtrate has commiſſion to interpoſe his authority, or uſe force, in matters of religion; your ſuppoſition, "of ſpiritual benefits, indirectly and at a diſtance, "attainable," by political government, will never prove the advancing of thoſe intereſts, by force, to be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, "and to fall within the com-"paſs of his juriſdiction." And then the force of the arguments, which the author has brought againſt it, (in the 244th and following pages of his letter) will hold good.

COMMONWEALTHS, or civil ſocieties and governments, if you will believe the judicious Mr. Hooker, are, as St. Peter calls them 1 Pet. ii. 13. *ἀνθρωπίνη κτισίς*, the contrivance and inſtitution of man; and he ſhews there for what end; viz. "for the puniſhment of evil doers, and the praiſe of them that "do well." I do not find, any where, that it is for the puniſhment of thoſe, who are not in church-communion with the magiſtrate, to make them ſtudy controverſies in religion, or hearken to thoſe, who, will tell them, "they have "miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right one." You muſt ſhew them ſuch a commiſſion, if you ſay it is from God. And, in all ſocieties, inſtituted by man, the ends of them can be no other than what the inſtitutors appointed, which, I am ſure, could not be their ſpiritual and eternal intereſt. For they could not ſtipulate about theſe, one with another, nor ſubmit this intereſt to the power of the ſociety, or any ſovereign, they ſhould ſet over it. There are nations in the Weſt-Indies, which have no other end of their ſociety, but their mutual defence againſt their common enemies. In theſe, their captain, or prince, is ſovereign commander in time of war; but, in time of peace, neither he, nor any body elſe, has any authority over any of the ſociety. You cannot deny but other, even temporal ends, are attainable by theſe commonwealths, if they had been otherwiſe inſtituted and appointed to thoſe ends. But all your ſaying, "doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted, for the attaining of all the be-"nefits, which they can yield," will not give authority to any one, or more, in ſuch a ſociety, by political government, or force, to procure directly, or indirectly, other benefits, than that, for which it was inſtituted: and therefore, there, it falls not within the compaſs of thoſe princes juriſdictions, to puniſh any one of the ſociety, for injuring another; becauſe he has no commiſſion ſo to do; whatever reaſon, you may think there is, that that ſhould be reckoned amongſt the ends of their ſociety.

BUT to conclude: your argument has that defect in it, which turns it upon yourſelf. And that is, that the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of ſouls, your way, is not a benefit to the ſociety: and ſo, upon your own ſuppoſition, "the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual intereſts of "ſouls, any way, cannot be one of the ends of civil ſociety; unleſs the procu-"ring and advancing the ſpiritual intereſt of ſouls," in a way proper to do more harm, than good, towards the ſalvation of ſouls, be to be accounted ſuch a benefit, as to be one of the ends of civil ſocieties. For that yours is ſuch a way, I have proved already. So that, were it hard to prove that political government, whoſe only inſtrument is force, could no way by force, (however applied) more advance, than hinder, the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men; yet having proved it, againſt your particular, new way of applying force, I have ſufficiently vindicated the author's doctrine, from any thing you have ſaid againſt it. Which is enough for my preſent purpoſe.

YOUR next page tells us, that this reaſoning of the author, viz. "that the power of the magiſtrate cannot be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls, becauſe the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate; is proving the thing by itſelf," As if you ſhould ſay, when I tell you that you could not extend your power, to meddle with the money of a young gentleman, you travelled with, as tutor, becauſe the care of his money was not committed to you, were proving it, the thing by itſelf. For it is not neceſſary that you ſhould have the power of his money; it may be intruſted to a ſteward, who travels with him; or it may be left to himſelf. If you have it, it is but a delegated power. And, in all delegated powers, I thought this a fair proof; you have it not, or cannot uſe it, (which is what the author means here, by extended to) becauſe it is not committed to you. In the ſumming up of this argument, p. 18. the author ſays, "nobody, therefore, in fine, neither commonwealths, &c. hath any title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of another, upon pretence of religion." Which is an expoſition of what he means, in the beginning of the argument, "by the magiſtrate's power cannot be extended to the ſalvation of ſouls." So that, if we take theſe laſt cited words, equivalent to thoſe in the former place, his proof will ſtand thus: "The magiſtrate has no title, to invade the civil rights, or worldly goods, of any one, upon pretence of religion; becauſe the care of ſouls is not committed to him." This is the ſame, in the author's ſenſe, with the former. And whether either this, or that, be a proving the ſame thing by itſelf, we muſt leave to others to judge. Page 19.

You quote the author's argument, which he brings to prove, that the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate, in theſe words: "It is not committed to him by God; becauſe it appears not that God has ever given any ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion," This, when firſt I read it, I confeſs, I thought a good argument. But you ſay, "This is quite beſides the buſineſs;" and the reaſon you give, is, "For the authority of the magiſtrate is not an authority to compel any one to his religion, but only an authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of it," &c. I fear, Sir, you forget yourſelf. The author was not writing againſt your new hypotheſis, before it was not known in the world. He may be excuſed, if he had not the gift of prophecy, to argue againſt a notion, which was not yet ſtarted. He had in view only the laws hitherto made, and the puniſhments (in matters of religion) in uſe in the world. The penalties, as I take it, are laid on men, for being of different ways of religion. Which, what is it other, but to compel them to relinquiſh their own, and to conform themſelves to that, from which they differ? If this be not to compel them to the magiſtrate's religion, pray tell us what is? This muſt be neceſſarily ſo underſtood; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that the law intends not to have that done, which, with penalties, it commands to be done: or that puniſhments are not compulſion, not that compulſion, the authour complains of. The law ſays, "Do this, and live;" embrace this doctrine, conform to this way of worſhip, and be at eaſe, and free; or elſe be fined, impriſoned, baniſhed, burnt. If you can ſhew among the laws, that have been made in England, concerning religion, (and, I think, I may ſay any where elſe) any one, that puniſhes men, for "not having impartially examined the religion, they have embraced, or refuſed," I think I may yield you the cauſe. Law-makers have been generally wiſer, than to make laws, that could not be executed: and, therefore, their laws were againſt non-conformiſts, which could be known; and not for impartial examination, which could not. 'Twas not then, beſides the author's buſineſs, to bring an argument againſt the perſecutions here in faſhion, He did not know that any one, who was ſo free as to acknowledge, that "the magiſtrate has not an authority to compel any one to his religion," and thereby, at once (as you have done) give up all the laws, now in force, againſt diſſenters, had yet rods in ſtore for them, and, by a new trick, would bring them under the laſh of the law, when the old pretences were too much exploded, to ſerve any longer. Have you never heard of ſuch a thing, as the religion eſtabliſhed by law? Page 20.

Which is, it ſeems, the lawful religion of a country and to be complied with, as ſuch. There being ſuch things, ſuch notions yet in the world, it was not quite beſides the author's buſineſs to alledge, that "God never gave ſuch authority, to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion." I will grant, if you pleaſe, "religion eſtabliſhed by law" is a pretty odd way of ſpeaking, in the mouth of a chriſtian; (and yet it is much in faſhion) as if the magiſtrate's authority could add any force, or ſanction, to any religion, whether true or falſe. I am glad to find you have ſo far conſidered the magiſtrate's authority, that you agree with the author, that "he hath none to compel men to his religion." Much leſs can he, by any eſtabliſhment of law, add any thing to the truth, or validity, of his own, or any religion whatſoever.

IT remains now to examine, whether the author's argument will not hold good, even againſt puniſhments in your way. "For, if the magiſtrate's authority, as you here ſay, be only to procure all his ſubjects, (mark what you ſay, ALL HIS SUBJECTS) the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that NONE remain ignorant of it, or refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices, as may render them ineffectual." If this be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, in reference to ALL HIS SUBJECTS; I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me, how this can be done, by the application of force, only to a part of them; unleſs you will ſtill vainly ſuppoſe ignorance, negligence, or prejudice, only amongſt that part, which any where differs from the magiſtrate. If thoſe of the magiſtrate's church may be ignorant of the way of ſalvation; if it be poſſible, there may be amongſt them, thoſe, "who refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices, as may render them ineffectual:" What, in this caſe, becomes of the magiſtrate's authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation? Muſt theſe of his ſubjects be neglected, and left without the means he has authority to procure them? Or muſt he uſe force upon them too? And then, pray, ſhew me how this can be done. Shall the magiſtrate puniſh thoſe of his own religion, "to procure them the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure, as much as in him lies, that they remain not ignorant of it, or refuſe not to embrace it?" Theſe are ſuch contradictions in practice, this is ſuch condemnation of a man's own religion, as no one can expect from the magiſtrate; and I dare ſay, you deſire not of him. And yet this is, that he muſt do, "If his authority be to procure, all his ſubjects, the means of diſcovering the way to ſalvation." And if it be ſo needful, as you ſay it is, that he ſhould uſe it, I am ſure force cannot do that, till it be applied wider, and puniſhment be laid upon more, than you would have it. For "if the magiſtrate be, by force, to procure, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of the way of ſalvation?" muſt he not puniſh all thoſe, who are ignorant of the way of ſalvation? And pray tell me, how is this any way practicable, but by ſuppoſing none in the national church ignorant, and all out of it ignorant, of the way of ſalvation. Which, what is it, but to puniſh men, barely for not being of the magiſtrate's religion; the very thing, you deny, he has authority to do? So that the magiſtrate having, by your own confeſſion, no authority thus to uſe force; and it being otherways impracticable "for the procuring all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation;" there is an end of force. And ſo force being laid aſide, either as unlawful, or unpracticable, the author's argument holds good againſt force, even in your way of applying it.

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BUT if you ſay, as you do in the foregoing page, That the magiſtrate has authority "to lay ſuch penalties upon thoſe, who refuſe to embrace the doctrine of the proper miniſters of religion, and to ſubmit to their ſpiritual government, as to make them bethink themſelves, ſo as not to be alienated from the truth." "(For as for fooliſh humour, and uncharitable prejudice," &c. which are but words of courſe, that oppoſite parties give one another, as marks of diſlike and preſumption, I omit them, as ſignifying nothing to the queſtion; being ſuch as will, with the ſame reaſon, be retorted, by the other ſide;) againſt

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that alſo the author's argument holds, that the magiſtrate has no ſuch authority. 1ſt, Becauſe God never gave the magiſtrate an authority to be judge of truth, for another man, in matters of religion: and ſo he cannot be judge, whether any man be alienated from the truth, or no. 2dly, Becauſe the magiſtrate had never authority given him, "to lay any penalties on thoſe, who refuſe to embrace the "doctrine of the proper miniſters of his religion, (or of any other) or to ſubmit "to their ſpiritual government," more than on any other men.

To the author's argument, that the magiſtrate cannot receive ſuch authority from the people; becauſe no man has power to leave it to the choice of any other man, to chuſe a religion for him; you give this pleaſant anſwer: "As the Page 22. "power of the magiſtrate, in reference to religion, is ordained for the bringing "men to take ſuch care, as they ought, of their ſalvation, that they may not "blindly leave it to the choice, neither of any other perſon, nor yet of their "own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them, what faith, or worſhip, they "ſhall embrace: ſo, if we ſuppoſe this power to be veſted in the magiſtrate, by "the conſent of the people; this will not import their abandoning the care of "their ſalvation, but rather the contrary. For if men, in chuſing their religion, "are ſo generally ſubject, as has been ſhewed, when left wholly to themſelves, "to be ſo much ſway'd by prejudice and paſſion, as either not at all, or not "ſufficiently to regard the reaſons and motives, which ought alone to determine "their choice; then it is every man's true intereſt, not to be left wholly to himſelf, in this matter; but that care ſhould be taken, that, in an affair of ſo vaſt "concernment to him, he may be brought, even againſt his own inclination, if "it cannot be done otherwiſe, (which is ordinarily the caſe) to act according "to reaſon and ſound judgment. And then, what better courſe can men take "to provide for this, than by veſting the power I have deſcribed, in him who "bears the ſword? Wherein, I beſeech you, conſider; 1ſt, Whether it be not pleaſant, that you ſay "the power of the magiſtrate is ordained to bring men "to take ſuch care;" and thence infer, "Then it is every one's intereſt to veſt "ſuch power in the magiſtrate?" For if it be the power of the magiſtrate, it is his. And what need the people veſt it in him, unleſs there be need, and "it "be the beſt courſe, they can take, to veſt a power in the magiſtrate," which he has already? 2dly, Another pleaſant thing, you here ſay, is; "That the "power of the magiſtrates is to bring men to ſuch a care of their ſalvation, that "they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any perſon, or their own luſts "or paſſions, to preſcribe to them, what faith, or worſhip, they ſhall embrace;" and yet, that 'tis "their beſt courſe to veſt a power in the magiſtrate," liable to the ſame luſts, and paſſions as themſelves, to chuſe for them. For if they veſt a power in the magiſtrate to puniſh them, when they diſſent from his religion; "to bring them to act, even againſt their own inclination, according to reaſon "and ſound judgment;" which is, (as you explain yourſelf, in another place) "to bring them to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them:" How far is this from "leaving it to the choice of another man, "to preſcribe to them, what faith, or worſhip, they ſhall embrace?" Eſpecially if we conſider, that you think it a ſtrange thing, "That the author would have Page 27. "the care of every man's ſoul left to himſelf alone. So that this care being veſted in the magiſtrate, with a power "to puniſh men to make them conſider reaſons "and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them" of the truth of his religion; the choice is evidently in the magiſtrate; as much as it can be in the power of one man, to chuſe for another, what religion he ſhall be of, which conſiſts only in a power of compelling him by puniſhments to embrace it.

I DO neither you, nor the magiſtrate, injury, when I ſay, that the power you give the magiſtrate, "of puniſhing men, to make them conſider reaſons and "arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them," is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never, in his opinion, "act according to reaſon and ſound judgment, (which is the thing you "here ſay, men ſhould be brought to, by the magiſtrate, even againſt their "own inclination") 'till they embrace his religion. And if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you, "to

" bring you to conſider any other reaſons and arguments, but ſuch as are pro-" per to convince you" of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you ſhift forwards and backwards. You ſay, " the magiſtrate has no " power to puniſh men, to compel them to his religion; but only to compel " them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper to convince them" of the truth of his religion, which is all one as to ſay, nobody has power to chuſe your way for you to Jeruſalem; but yet the lord of the manor has power to puniſh you, " to bring you to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to " convince you." Of what? That the way he goes in, is the right, and ſo to make you join in company, and go along with him. So that, in effect, what is all your going about, but to come at laſt to the ſame place again; and put a power into the magiſtrate's hands (under another pretence) to compel men to his religion; which uſe of force, the author has ſufficiently overthrown, and you yourſelf have quitted. But I am tired to follow you ſo often round the ſame circle.

Page 22. YOU ſpeak of it here, as the moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that " men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider and examine " the grounds of their religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after the truth." This you make the great miſcarriage of mankind. And for this you ſeem ſolicitous, all through your treatiſe, to find out a remedy; and there is ſcarce a leaf, wherein you do not offer yours. But what if, after all, now you ſhould be found Page 7. to prevaricate? " Men have contrived to themſelves, ſay you, a great variety of " religions:" it is granted. " They ſeek not the truth of this matter, with that " application of mind, and that freedom of judgment which is requiſite:" it is confeſs'd. " All the falſe religions, now on foot in the world, have taken their " riſe from the ſlight and partial conſideration, which men have contented them-" ſelves with, in ſearching after the true; and men take them up, and perſiſt in " them, for want of due examination:" be it ſo. " There is need of a remedy " for this, and I have found one, whoſe ſucceſs cannot be queſtion'd:" very well. What is it? let us hear it. " Why, diſſenters muſt be puniſhed." Can any body, that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt; and that want of examination is the thing, you would have amended, when want of examination is not the thing you would have puniſhed? if want of examination be the fault, want of examination muſt be puniſhed; if you are, as you pretend, fully ſatisfied, that puniſhment is the proper and only means to remedy it. But if, in all your treatiſe, you can ſhew me one place, where you ſay, that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining thoroughly the truth of their own and others religion, &c. are to be puniſhed; I will allow your remedy for a good one. But you have not ſaid any thing like this; and which is more, I tell you beforehand, you dare not ſay it. And, whilſt you do not, the world has reaſon to judge, that, however want of examination be a general fault, which you, with great vehemency, have exaggerated; yet you uſe it only for a pretence to puniſh diſſenters; and either diſtruſt your remedy, that it will not cure this evil, or elſe care not to have it generally cured. This evidently appears, from your whole management of the argument. And he, that reads your treatiſe with attention, will be more confirm'd in this opinion, when he ſhall find, that you (who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed, to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way to ſalvation) have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the ſcripture; which had been as good a rule for a chriſtian, to have ſent them to, " as to reaſons and arguments " proper to convince them," of you know not what; " as to the inſtruction and " government of the proper miniſters of religion," which, who they are, men are yet far from being agreed; " or, as to the information of thoſe, who tell " them they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right;" and to the like uncertain and dangerous guides; which were not thoſe, that our Saviour and the apoſtles ſent men to, but to the ſcriptures. " Search the ſcriptures, " for in them you think you have eternal life," ſays our Saviour, to the unbelieving, perſecuting Jews, John v. 39. And it is the ſcriptures, which St. Paul ſays, " are able to make us wiſe unto ſalvation." 2 Tim. iii. 15.

TALK no more, therefore, if you have any care of your reputation, how much "it is every man's intereſt, not to be left to himſelf, without moleſtation, "without puniſhment, in matters of religion." Talk not "of bringing men to "embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them, by putting them upon examination." Talk no more "of force and puniſhment, as the only way left, to bring men to "examine." It is evident you mean nothing leſs. For, though want of examination be the only fault, you complain of, and puniſhment be, in your opinion, the only way to bring men to it; and this the whole deſign of your book; yet you have not once propoſed in it, that thoſe, who do not impartially examine, ſhould be forced to it. And, that you may not think I talk at random, when I ſay you dare not; I will, if you pleaſe, give you ſome reaſons for my ſaying ſo.

Firſt, BECAUSE, if you propoſe, that all ſhould be puniſhed, who are ignorant, who have not uſed "ſuch conſideration, as is apt and proper to manifeſt "the truth; but have been determined, in the choice of their religion, by im-"preſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, prejudices, "and the like incompetent motives; and have taken up their religion, without "examining it, as they ought;" you will propoſe to have ſeveral of your own church (be it what it will) puniſhed; which would be a propoſition, too apt to offend too many of it, for you to venture on. For, whatever need there be of reformation, every one will not thank you, for propoſing ſuch an one, as muſt begin at (or at leaſt reach to) the houſe of God.

Secondly, BECAUSE, if you ſhould propoſe that all thoſe, who are ignorant, careleſs and negligent in examining, ſhould be puniſhed, you would have little to ſay, in this queſtion of toleration. For if the laws of the ſtates were made, as they ought to be, equal to all the ſubjects, without diſtinction of men of different profeſſions in religion; and the faults to be amended by puniſhments, were impartially puniſhed, in all, who are guilty of them; this would immediately produce a perfect toleration, or ſhew the uſefulneſs of force, in matters of religion. If therefore, you think it ſo neceſſary, as you ſay, for the promoting "of true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, that men ſhould be puniſhed, to "make them examine;" do but find a way to apply force to all, that have not thoroughly and impartially examined, and you have my conſent. For though force be not the proper means of promoting religion; yet there is no better way to ſhew the uſeleſneſs of it, than the applying it equally to miſcarriages, in whomſoever found; and not to diſtinct parties, or perſuaſions, of men, for the reformation of them alone, when others are equally faulty.

Thirdly, BECAUSE, without being for as large a toleration, as the author propoſes, you cannot be truly and ſincerely for a free and impartial examination. For, whoever examines, muſt have the liberty to judge, and follow his judgment; or elſe you put him upon examination to no purpoſe. And, whether that will not as well lead men from, as to your church, is ſo much a venture, that, by your way of writing, 'tis evident enough, you are loth to hazard it; and, if you are of the national church, 'tis plain your brethren will not bear with you, in the allowance of ſuch a liberty. You muſt, therefore, either change your method; and, if the want of examination be that great and dangerous fault, you would have corrected, you muſt equally puniſh all, that are equally guilty of any neglect, in this matter; and then, take your only means, your beloved force, and make the beſt of it; or elſe, you muſt put off your maſk, and confeſs that you deſign not your puniſhments to bring men to examination, but to conformity. For the fallacy, you have uſed, is too groſs to paſs upon this age.

WHAT follows to page 26. I think I have conſidered ſufficiently already. But there you have found out ſomething worth notice. In this page, out of abundant kindneſs, when the diſſenters have their heads (without any cauſe) broken, you provide them a plaiſter. For, ſay you, "If, upon ſuch examination of the "matter," (i. e. brought to it by the magiſtrate's puniſhment) "they chance to "find, that the truth does not lie on the magiſtrate's ſide; they have gained "thus much, however, even by the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that "they know better, than they did before, where the truth does lie." Which is as true, as if you ſhould ſay, Upon examination I find ſuch an one is out of the Page 26.

the way to York; therefore, I know better, than I did before, that I am in the right. For neither of you may be in the right. This were true indeed, if there were but two ways in all; a right and a wrong. But where there be an hundred ways, and but one right; your knowing upon examination, that that which I take is wrong, makes you not know, any thing better than before, that yours is the right. But, if that be the beſt reaſon, you have for it, 'tis ninety eight to one ſtill againſt you, that you are in the wrong. Beſides, he that has been puniſhed, may have examined before, and then you are ſure he gains nothing. However, you think, you do well to encourage the magiſtrate in puniſhing, and comfort the man, who has ſuffered unjuſtly, by ſhewing what he ſhall gain by it. Whereas, on the contrary, in a diſcourſe of this nature, where the bounds of right and wrong are enquired into, and ſhould be eſtabliſhed, the magiſtrate was to be ſhewed the bounds of his authority, and warned of the injury he did, when he miſapplied his power, and puniſhed any man who deſerved it not, and not to be ſoothed into injuſtice, by conſideration of gain, that might thence accrue to the ſufferer. "Shall we do evil that good may come "of it?" There are a ſort of people, who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power, and the injuſtice and ill conſequences of his miſapplying it; at leaſt, ſo long as it is miſapplied, in favour of them, and their party. I know not, whether you are of their number. But this I am ſure; you have the misfortune here, to fall into their miſtake. The magiſtrate, you confeſs, may, in this caſe, miſapply his power; and inſtead of repreſenting to him the injuſtice of it, and the account he muſt give to his ſovereign, one day, of this great truſt put into his hands, for the equal protection of all his ſubjects; you pretend advantages, which the ſufferer may receive from it: and ſo inſtead of diſheartening from, you give encouragement to, the miſchief. Which, upon your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man, after arbitrary power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right.

Page 15. FOR thus ſtands your ſyſtem: "If force, i. e. puniſhment, may be any way "uſeful for promoting the ſalvation of ſouls, there is a right ſomewhere to uſe "it." And "this right (ſay you) is in the magiſtrate." Page 16. Who then, upon your grounds, may quickly find reaſon, where it ſuits his inclination, or ſerves his turn, to puniſh men directly to bring them to his religion, For if he may uſe force, becauſe "it may be, indirectly, and at a diſtance, any way, uſeful "towards the ſalvation of ſouls," towards the procuring any degree of glory; why may he not, by the ſame rule, uſe it, where it may be uſeful, at leaſt indirectly, and at a diſtance, towards the procuring a greater degree of glory? For S. Paul aſſures us, that "the afflictions of this life work for us a far more ex"ceeding weight of glory." So that, why ſhould they not be puniſhed, if in the wrong, to bring them into the right way; if in the right, to make them, by their ſufferings, "gainers of a far more exceeding weight of glory?" But whatever you ſay, "of puniſhment being lawful, becauſe indirectly, and at a "diſtance, it may be uſeful;" I ſuppoſe, upon cooler thoughts, you will be apt to ſuſpect that, however ſufferings may promote the ſalvation of thoſe, who make a good uſe of them, and to ſet men ſurer in the right way, or higher in a ſtate of glory; yet thoſe, who make men unduly ſuffer, will have the heavier account, and greater weight of guilt upon them, to ſink them deeper in the pit of perdition; and that, therefore, they ſhould be warned to take care of ſo uſing their power. Becauſe, whoever be gainers by it, they themſelves will (without repentance and amendment) be ſure to be loſers. But, by granting that the magiſtrate miſapplies his power, when he puniſhes thoſe who have the right on their ſide, whether it be to bring them to his own religion, or whether it be "to bring them to conſider reaſons and arguments proper to convince them," you grant all, that the author contends for. All that he endeavours, is to ſhew the bounds of civil power; and that, in puniſhing others for religion, the magiſtrate miſapplies the force, he has in his hands, and ſo goes beyond right, beyond the limits of his power. For I do not think the author of the letter ſo vain (I am ſure for my part I am not) as to hope by arguments, though never ſo clear, to reform, preſently, all the abuſes in this matter; eſpecially whilſt men of art, and religion, endeavour ſo induſtriouſly to palliate and diſguiſe, what truth, yet, ſometimes, unawares forces from them.

Do not think, I make a wrong uſe of your ſaying, “the magiſtrate miſapplies his power,” when I ſay, you therein grant all, that the author contends for. For if the magiſtrate miſapplies, or makes a wrong uſe of his power, when he puniſhes, in matters of religion, any one, who is in the right, though it be but to make him conſider, (as you grant he does) he alſo miſapplies, or makes wrong uſe of his power, when he puniſhes any one, whomſoever, in matters of religion, to make him conſider. For every one is here judge for himſelf, what is right; and, in matters of faith, and religious worſhip, another cannot judge for him. So that to puniſh any one, in matters of religion, though it be but to make him conſider, is, by your own confeſſion, beyond the magiſtrate's power. And that puniſhing in matters of religion is beyond the magiſtrate's power, is what the author contends for.

Page 26.

You tell us in the following words, “All the hurt, that comes to them, by it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences; which certainly is no ſuch miſchief to mankind, as to make it more eligible, that there ſhould be no ſuch power, veſted in the magiſtrate, but the care of every man's ſoul ſhould be left to himſelf alone (as this author demands it ſhould be;) that is, that every man ſhould be ſuffered quietly, and, without the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care at all of his ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed; or, in doing it, to follow his own groundleſs prejudices, or unaccountable humour, or any crafty ſeducer, whom he may think fit to take for his guide.” Why ſhould not care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf, rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it? Is the magiſtrate commonly more careful of his own, than other men are of theirs? Will you ſay the magiſtrate is leſs expoſed in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men? If you cannot lay your hand upon your heart, and ſay all this, What then will be got by the change? And “why may not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf?” Eſpecially, if a man be in ſo much danger to miſs the truth, “who is ſuffered quietly, and without the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care of his ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed, or to follow his own prejudices,” &c. For if want of moleſtation be the dangerous ſtate, wherein men are likelieſt to miſs the right way; it muſt be confeſſed, that of all men, the magiſtrate is moſt in danger to be in the wrong, and ſo the unfitteſt, (if you take the care of men's ſouls from themſelves) of all men, to be entruſted with it. For he never meets with that great and only antidote of yours againſt error, which you here call moleſtation. He never has the benefit of your ſovereign remedy, puniſhment, to make him conſider; which you think ſo neceſſary, that you look on it, as a moſt dangerous ſtate for men to be without it; and therefore tell us, “'Tis every man's true intereſt, not to be left wholly to himſelf, in matters of religion.”

Thus, Sir, I have gone through your whole treatiſe, and, as I think, have omitted nothing in it material. If I have, I doubt not but I ſhall hear of it. And now I refer it to yourſelf, as well as to the judgment of the world, whether the author of the letter, in ſaying no body hath a right; or you, in ſaying, the magiſtrate hath a right, to uſe force, in matters of religion; has moſt reaſon. In the mean time, I leave this requeſt with you: That if ever you write again, about “the means of bringing ſouls to ſalvation,” (which certainly is the beſt deſign, any one can employ his pen in) you would take care, not to prejudice ſo good a cauſe, by ordering it ſo, as to make it look, as if you writ for a party. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

May 27, 1690.

Philanthropus.

A THIRD

A THIRD

LETTER

FOR

TOLERATION,

To the AUTHOR of the

THIRD LETTER

CONCERNING

TOLERATION.

The reader may be pleaſed to take notice, that

L. 1. Stands for the letter concerning toleration.

A. For the argument of the letter, concerning toleration, briefly conſidered and anſwered.

L. 2. The ſecond letter concerning toleration.

Pag. The Pages of the third letter concerning toleration.

A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION.

CHAP. I.

SIR,

THE buſineſs, which your letter, concerning toleration, found me engaged in, has taken up ſo much of the time, my health would allow me, ever ſince, that I doubt, whether I ſhould now, at all, have troubled you, or the world, with an anſwer, had not ſome of my friends, ſufficiently ſatisfied of the weakneſs of your arguments, with repeated inſtances, perſuaded me, it might be of uſe to truth, in a point of ſo great moment, to clear it from thoſe fallacies, which might, perhaps, puzzle ſome unwary readers; and, therefore, prevailed on me, to ſhew the wrong grounds and miſtaken reaſonings, you make uſe of, to ſupport your new way of perſecution. Pardon me, Sir, that I uſe that name, which you are ſo much offended at: for if puniſhment be puniſhment, though it come ſhort of the diſcipline of fire and faggot; it is as certain, that puniſhment, for religion, is truly perſecution, though it be only ſuch puniſhment, as you, in your clemency, think fit to call "moderate and "convenient penalties." But however you pleaſe to call them, I doubt not but to let you ſee, that, if you will be true to your own principles, and ſtand to what you have ſaid, you muſt carry your "ſome degrees of force" (as you phraſe it) to all thoſe degrees which, in words, you declare againſt.

You have indeed, in this laſt letter of yours, altered the queſtion; for page 26. you tell me the queſtion between us, is, "Whether the magiſtrate hath any "right to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion? Whereas you yourſelf own the queſtion to be, "Whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force, in Page 17.
"matters of religion?" Whether this alteration be, at all, to the advantage of truth, or your cauſe, we ſhall ſee. But hence you take occaſion, all along, to lay a load on me, for charging you with the abſurdities of a power, in the magiſtrates, to puniſh men, to bring them to their religion: whereas, you here tell us, they have a right to uſe force, "only to bring men to the true." But, whether I were more to blame, to ſuppoſe you talk coherently, and mean ſenſe, or you, in expreſſing yourſelf ſo doubtfully and uncertainly, where you were concerned to be plain and direct, I ſhall leave to our readers to judge; only here, in the beginning, I ſhall endeavour to clear myſelf, of that imputation, I ſo often meet with, of charging on you conſequences, you do not own, and arguing againſt an opinion, that is not yours, in thoſe places, where I ſhew, how little advantage it would be to truth, or the ſalvation of men's ſouls, that all magiſtrates ſhould have a right, to uſe force, to bring men to embrace their religion. This I ſhall do, by proving, that if, upon your grounds, the magiſtrate, as you pretend, be obliged to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, it will neceſſarily follow, that every magiſtrate, who believes his religion to be true, is obliged to uſe force, to bring men to his.

You tell us, "that, by the law of nature, the magiſtrate is inveſted with co- Page 31.
"active power, and obliged to uſe it, for all the good purpoſes, which it might "ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful, even for the reſtraining of "falſe

Page 31. "falſe and corrupt religion: and that it is the magiſtrate's duty, to which he "is commiſſioned, by the law of nature; but the ſcripture does not properly "give it him."

Page 35. I SUPPOSE, you will grant me, that any thing laid upon the magiſtrate, as a duty, is ſome way, or other, practicable. Now, the magiſtrate being obliged to uſe force, in matters of religion, but yet ſo as to bring men, only to the true religion, he will not be in any capacity, to perform this part of his duty, unleſs the religion, he is thus to promote, be, what he can certainly know, or elſe, what it is ſufficient for him, to believe to be the true: either his knowledge, or his opinion, muſt point out that religion to him, which he is, by force, to promote; or elſe he may promiſcuouſly and indifferently promote any religion, and puniſh men, at a venture, to bring them from that they are in, to any other. This laſt, I think, no body has been ſo wild as to ſay.

IF, therefore, it muſt be either his knowledge, or his perſuaſion, that muſt guide the magiſtrate herein, and keep him within the bounds of his duty, if the magiſtrates of the world cannot know, certainly know, the true religion, to be the true religion; but it be of a nature to exerciſe their faith, (for where viſion, knowledge and certainty is, there faith is done away) then, that, which gives them the laſt determination herein, muſt be their own belief, their own perſuaſion.

To you and me the chriſtian religion is the true, and that is built (to mention no other articles of it) on this, that Jeſus Chriſt was put to death at Jeruſalem, and roſe again from the dead. Now do you, or I, know this, (I do not aſk, with what aſſurance we believe it; for that, in the higheſt degree, not being knowledge, is not what we now enquire after.) Can any magiſtrate demonſtrate to himſelf (and if he can to himſelf, he does ill not to do it to others) not only all the articles of his church, but the fundamental ones of the chriſtian religion? For, whatever is not capable of demonſtration (as ſuch remote matters of fact are not) is not, unleſs it be ſelf-evident, capable to produce knowledge, how well grounded and great ſoever the aſſurance of faith may be wherewith it is received; but faith it is ſtill, and not knowledge; perſuaſion, and not certainty. This is the higheſt the nature of the thing will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion, which are, therefore, called matters of faith: a perſuaſion of our own minds, ſhort of knowledge, is the laſt reſult, that determines us in ſuch truths. 'Tis all God requires, in the Goſpel, for men to be ſaved: and 'twould be ſtrange, if there were more required of the magiſtrate, for the direction of another, in the way to ſalvation, than is required of him, for his own ſalvation. Knowledge then, properly ſo called, not being to be had, of the truths neceſſary to ſalvation, the magiſtrate muſt be content with faith and perſuaſion, for the rule of that truth, he will recommend and enforce upon others; as well as of that, whereon he will venture his own eternal condition. If, therefore, it be the magiſtrate's duty, to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, it can be only to that religion, which he believes to be true: ſo that, if force be at all to be uſed, by the magiſtrate, in matters of religion, it can only be for the promoting that religion, which he only believes to be true, or none at all. I grant, that a ſtrong aſſurance of any truth, ſettled upon prevalent and well-grounded arguments of probability, is often called knowledge, in popular ways of talking: but being here to diſtinguiſh, between knowledge and belief, to what degrees of confidence ſoever raiſed, their boundaries muſt be kept, and their names not confounded. I know not what greater pledge, a man can give, of a full perſuaſion of the truth of any thing, than his venturing his ſoul upon it, as he does, who ſincerely embraces any religion, and receives it for true. But, to what degree ſoever, of aſſurance, his faith may riſe, it ſtill comes ſhort of knowledge. Nor can one now, I think, arrive to greater evidence, of the truth of the chriſtian religion, than the firſt converts, in the time of our Saviour and the apoſtles, had; of whom yet nothing more was required, but to believe.

BUT, ſuppoſing all the truths of the chriſtian religion, neceſſary to ſalvation, could be ſo known to the magiſtrate, that, in his uſe of force, for the bringing men to embrace theſe, he could be guided by infallible certainty; yet, I fear, this would not ſerve your turn, nor authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force, to bring men in England, or any where elſe, into the communion of the national church, in which ceremonies of human inſtitution were impoſed, which could not be known, nor (being confeſſed, things, in their own nature, indifferent) ſo much as thought neceſſary to ſalvation.

BUT of this, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak, in another place: all the uſe I make of it here, is, to ſhew, that the croſs in baptiſm, kneeling at the ſacrament, and ſuch like things, being impoſſible to be known, neceſſary to ſalvation, a certain knowledge of the truth of the articles of faith, of any church, could not authorize the magiſtrate, to compel men, to embrace the communion of that church, wherein any thing were made neceſſary to communion, which he did not know was neceſſary to ſalvation.

BY what has been already ſaid, I ſuppoſe it is evident, that, if the magiſtrate be to uſe force, only for promoting the true religion, he can have no other guide, but his own perſuaſion, of what is the true religion, and muſt be led by that, in his uſe of force, or elſe not uſe it at all, in matters of religion. If you take the latter of theſe conſequences, you and I are agreed: if the former, you muſt allow all magiſtrates, of whatſoever religion, the uſe of force, to bring men to theirs, and ſo be involved in all thoſe ill conſequences, which you cannot, it ſeems, admit, and hoped to decline, by your uſeleſs diſtinction, of force to be uſed, not for any, but for the true religion. "It is the duty, you ſay, of the "magiſtrate, to uſe force, for promoting the true religion." And, in ſeveral places, you tell us, he is obliged to it. Perſuade magiſtrates, in general of this; and then tell me, how any magiſtrate ſhall be reſtrained from the uſe of force, for the promoting, what he thinks to be true? For, he being perſuaded that it is his duty, to uſe force, to promote the true religion, and being alſo perſuaded his is the true religion, What ſhall ſtop his hand? Muſt he forbear the uſe of force, till he be got beyond believing, into a certain knowledge, that all, he requires men to embrace, is neceſſary to ſalvation? If that be it, you will ſtand to, you have my conſent, and, I think there will be no need of any other toleration. But, if the believing his religion to be true, be ſufficient for the magiſtrate to uſe force, for the promoting of it, will it be ſo only to the magiſtrates of the religion, that you profeſs? And muſt all other magiſtrates ſit ſtill, and not do their duty, till they have your permiſſion? If it be your magiſtrate's duty to uſe force, for the promoting the religion, he believes to be the true, it will be every magiſtrate's duty to uſe force, for the promoting what he believes to be the true, and he ſins, if he does not receive and promote it, as if it were true. If you will not take this upon my word, yet I deſire you to do it, upon the ſtrong reaſon of a very judicious and reverend prelate of the preſent church of England, in a diſcourſe concerning conſcience, printed in 4to, 87. p. 18. you will find theſe following words, and much more to this purpoſe: "Where a man is miſ- "taken in his judgment, even, in that caſe, it is always a ſin to act againſt it. "Though we ſhould take that for a duty, which is really a ſin; yet ſo long, "as we are thus perſuaded, it will be highly criminal in us, to act, in contradic- "tion to this perſuaſion: and the reaſon of this is evident; becauſe, by ſo doing, "we wilfully act againſt the beſt light, which at preſent we have, for the di- "rection of our actions. So that, when all is done, the immediate guide of our "actions can be nothing but our conſcience, our judgment and perſuaſion. If "a man, for inſtance, ſhould of a Jew become a chriſtian, whilſt yet, in his "heart, he believed that the Meſſiah is not yet come, and that our Lord Jeſus "was an impoſtor: or, if a papiſt ſhould renounce the communion of the "Roman church, and join with ours, whilſt yet he is perſuaded, that the Ro- "man church is the only catholick church, and that our reformed churches are "heretical, or ſchiſmatical: though now there is none of us, that will deny, that "the men in both theſe caſes, have made a good change, as having changed "a falſe religion for a true one; yet for all that, I dare ſay, we ſhould all "agree, they were both of them great villains, for making that change; becauſe "they made it not, upon honeſt principles, and in purſuance of their judg-

"ment, but in direct contradiction to both." So that it being the magiſtrate's duty, to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion; and, he being perſuaded his is the true, I ſuppoſe you will no longer queſtion, but that he is as much obliged, to uſe force, to bring men to it, as if it were the true. And then, Sir, I hope you have too much reſpect for magiſtrates, not to allow them to believe the religion to be true, which they profeſs. Theſe things put together, I deſire you to conſider, whether if magiſtrates are obliged, to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, every magiſtrate is not obliged to uſe force, to bring men to that religion, he believes to be true?

THIS being ſo, I hope I have not argued, ſo wholly beſides the purpoſe, as you all, through your letter, accuſe me, for charging on your doctrine, all the ill conſequences, all the prejudice, it would be, to the true religion, that magiſtrates ſhould have power, to uſe force, to bring men to their religions: and I preſume, you will think, you yourſelf concerned to give, to all theſe places, in the firſt and ſecond letter concerning toleration, which ſhew the inconveniencies and Page 24. abſurdities of ſuch an uſe of force, ſome other anſwer, than that, "you are for "puniſhing, only ſuch, as reject the true religion. That it is plain the force, "you ſpeak of, is not force, my way applied, i. e. applied to the promoting "the true religion only, but to the promoting all the national religions in the Page 29. "world." And again, to my arguing, that force, your way applied, if it can propagate any religion, it is likelier to be the falſe, than the true, becauſe few Page 27. of the magiſtrates of the world are in the right way. You reply, "this would "have been to the purpoſe, if you had aſſerted that every magiſtrate may uſe "force, your indirect way, (or any way) to bring men to his own religion, "whatever it be. But if you aſſerted no ſuch thing, (as no man, you think, "but an atheiſt will aſſert it) then, this is quite beſides the buſineſs." This is the great ſtrength of your anſwer, and your refuge, almoſt in every page. So that I preſume it reaſonable to expect, that you ſhould clearly and directly anſwer, what I have here ſaid, or elſe find ſome other anſwer, than what you have done, to the ſecond letter concerning toleration. However acute you are, in your way, in ſeveral places on this occaſion, as p. 11, 12. for my anſwer to which, I ſhall refer you to another place.

Page 15. TO my argument againſt force, from the magiſtrate's being as liable to error, as the reſt of mankind, you anſwer, "That I might have conſidered, that this "argument concerns none, but thoſe who aſſert, that every magiſtrate has a "right to uſe force, to promote his own religion, whatever it be, which you "think no man, that has any religion, will aſſert." I ſuppoſe you may think now this anſwer will ſcarce ſerve, and you muſt aſſert either no magiſtrate to have right to promote his religion, by force, or be involved in the condemnation, you paſs on thoſe, who aſſert it, of all magiſtrates. And here I think, as to the deciſion of the queſtion betwixt us, I might leave this matter: but there being, in your letter, a great many other groſs miſtakes, wrong ſuppoſitions, and fallacious arguings, which, in thoſe general and plauſible terms, you have made uſe of, in ſeveral places, as beſt ſerved your turn, may poſſibly have impoſed on yourſelf, as well as they are fitted to do ſo, on others, and therefore will deſerve to have ſome notice taken of them; I ſhall give myſelf the trouble of examining your letter, a little farther.

TO my ſaying, "It is not for the magiſtrate, upon an imagination of its uſe"fulneſs, to make uſe of any other means, than what the author and finiſher Page 31. "of our faith had directed; you reply, "Which, how true ſoever, is not, "I think, very much to the purpoſe. For, if the magiſtrate does only aſſiſt "that miniſtry, which our Lord has appointed, by uſing ſo much of his co"active power, for the furthering their ſervice, as common experience diſcovers "to be uſeful and neceſſary, for that end; there is no manner of ground to "ſay, that "upon an imagination of its uſefulneſs, he makes uſe of any other "means, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of "our faith has directed." 'Tis true, indeed, the author and finiſher of our "faith has given the magiſtrate no new power, or commiſſion; nor was there "any need, that he ſhould, (if himſelf had had any temporal power to give:)

“ for he found him already, even by the law of nature, “ the miniſter of God “ to the people for good, and bearing the ſword not in vain,” i. e. inveſted with “ coactive power, and obliged to uſe it, for all the good purpoſes, which it “ might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful; even for the reſtraining of falſe and corrupt religion; as Job long before (perhaps, before any “ part of the ſcriptures were written) acknowledged, when he ſaid, that the “ worſhipping the ſun, or the moon, was “ an iniquity to be puniſhed by the “ judge.” But, though our Saviour has given the magiſtrates no new power; “ yet being king of kings, he expects and requires, that they ſhould ſubmit “ themſelves to his ſceptre, and uſe the power, which always belonged to “ them, for his ſervice, and for the advancing his ſpiritual kingdom, in the “ world. And even that charity, which our great maſter ſo earneſtly recommends, and ſo ſtrictly requires, of all his diſciples, as it obliges all men to “ ſeek and promote the good of others, as well as their own, eſpecially their “ ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means, as their ſeveral places and relations “ enable them to uſe; ſo does it, eſpecially, oblige the magiſtrate to do it, as a “ magiſtrate, i. e. by that power, which enables him to do it, above the rate of “ other men.”

“ So far, therefore, is the chriſtian magiſtrate, when he gives his helping “ hand, to the furtherance of the goſpel, by laying convenient penalties, upon “ ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from uſing any other means for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of our faith has directed, that he does no more, than his duty to God, to his Redeemer, and to “ his ſubjects, requires of him.”

THE ſum of your reply amounts to this, that, by the law of nature, the magiſtrate may make uſe of his coactive power, where it is uſeful and neceſſary, for the good of the people. If it be from the law of nature, it muſt be to all magiſtrates equally: and then I aſk, Whether this good, they are to promote, without any new power, or commiſſion, from our Saviour, be, what they think to be ſo, or what they certainly know to be ſo. If it be, what they think to be ſo, then all magiſtrates may uſe force, to bring men to their religion: and what good, this is like to be to men, or of what uſe, to the true religion, we have elſewhere conſidered. If it be only, that good, which they certainly know it to be ſo, they will be very ill enabled to do, what you require of them, which you here tell us is, to aſſiſt that miniſtry, which our Lord has appointed. Which of the magiſtrates of your time did you know to have ſo well ſtudied the controverſies, about ordination and church-government, to be ſo well verſed in church-hiſtory and ſucceſſion, that you can undertake, that he certainly knew, which was the miniſtry, which our Lord had appointed, either that of Rome, or that of Sweden, whether the epiſcopacy, in one part of this iſland, or the preſbytery in another, were the miniſtry, which our Lord had appointed? If you ſay, being firmly perſuaded of it, be ſufficient to authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force; you, with the atheiſts, as you call them, who do ſo, give the people up, in every country, to the coactive force of the magiſtrate, to be employ'd for the aſſiſting the miniſters of his religion: and king Lewis, of good right, comes in, with his dragoons; for 'tis not much doubted that he, as ſtrongly believed his popiſh prieſts and jeſuits, to be the miniſtry, which our Lord appointed, as either king Charles, or king James the ſecond, believed that of the church of England to be ſo. And of what uſe ſuch an exerciſe of the coactive power of all magiſtates, is to the people, or to the true religion, you are concerned to ſhew. But 'tis (you know) but to tell me, I only trifle, and this is all anſwered.

WHAT, in other places, you tell us, is to make men “ hear, conſider, ſtudy, embrace, and bring men to the true religion,” you here do very well to tell us, is to aſſiſt the miniſtry: and to that 'tis true, “ common experience diſcovers the magiſtrate's coactive force, to be uſeful and neceſſary,” viz. to thoſe, who taking the reward, but not over-buſying themſelves in the care of ſouls, find it for their eaſe, that the magiſtrate's coactive power ſhould ſupply their want of paſtoral care, and be made uſe of, to bring thoſe into an outward conformity

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formity to the national church, whom either for want of ability, they cannot, or want of due and friendly application, joined with an exemplary life, they never ſo much as endeavoured to prevail on heartily to embrace it. That there may be ſuch neglects, in the beſt conſtituted national church in the world, the complaints of a very knowing biſhop of our church, in a late diſcourſe of the paſtoral care, is too plain an evidence.

WITHOUT ſo great an authority, I ſhould ſcarce have ventured (tho' it lay juſt in my way) to have taken notice of what is ſo viſible, that it is in every one's mouth, for fear you ſhould have told me again, that "I made myſelf an occa- "ſion to ſhew my good will towards the clergy." For you will not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect that eminent prelate to have any ill will to them.

IF this were not ſo, that ſome were negligent, I imagine the preachers of the true religion (which lies, as you tell us, ſo obvious and expoſed, as to be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from the falſe) would need, or deſire, no other aſſiſtance from the magiſtrate's coactive power, but what ſhould be directed againſt the irregularity of men's lives; their luſts being that alone, as you tell us, that makes force neceſſary to aſſiſt the true religion; which, were it not for our depraved nature, would, by its light and reaſonableneſs, have the advantage againſt all falſe religions.

Page 13. YOU tell us too, That the magiſtrate may impoſe creeds and ceremonies; indeed you ſay ſound creeds, and decent ceremonies, but that helps not your cauſe: for who muſt be judge of that ſound, and that decent? If the impoſer, then thoſe words ſignify nothing at all, but that the magiſtrate may impoſe thoſe creeds and ceremonies, which he thinks ſound and decent, which is, in effect, ſuch as he thinks fit. Indeed, you telling us, a little above, in the ſame page, that it is "a vice, not to worſhip God, in ways preſcribed by thoſe, to whom "God has left the ordering of ſuch matters;" you ſeem to make other judges, of what is ſound and decent, and the magiſtrate but the executioner of their decrees, with the aſſiſtance of his coactive power. A pretty foundation, to eſtabliſh creeds and ceremonies on, that God has left the ordering of them to thoſe, who cannot impoſe them, and the impoſing of them to thoſe, who cannot order them. But ſtill the ſame difficulty returns; for, after they have preſcribed, muſt the magiſtrate judge them to be ſound and decent, or muſt he impoſe them, tho' he judge them not ſound, or decent? If he muſt judge them ſo himſelf, we are but where we were: if he muſt impoſe them, when preſcribed, tho' he judge them not ſound, nor decent, 'tis a pretty ſort of drudgery is put on the magiſtrate. And how far is this ſhort of implicit faith? But, if he muſt not judge, what is ſound and decent, he muſt judge at leaſt, who are thoſe, to whom God has left the ordering of ſuch matters; and then the king of France is ready again, with his dragoons, for the ſound doctrine, and decent ceremonies of his preſcribers, in the council of Trent, and that, upon this ground, with as good right, as any other has, for the preſcriptions of any others. Do not miſtake me again, Sir; I do not ſay, he judges as right; but I do ſay, that, whilſt he judges the council of Trent, or the clergy of Rome to be thoſe, to whom God has left the ordering of thoſe matters, he has as much right to follow their decrees, as any other, to follow the judgment of any other ſet of mortal men, whom he believes to be ſo.

BUT, whoever is to be judge, of what is ſound or decent in the caſe, I aſk,

OF what uſe and neceſſity is it to impoſe creeds and ceremonies? For that uſe and neceſſity is all the commiſſion, you can find the magiſtrate hath to uſe his coactive power, to impoſe them.

1. OF what uſe and neceſſity is it among Chriſtians, that own the ſcripture to be the word of God, and rule of faith, to make and impoſe a creed? What commiſſion for this hath the magiſtrate, from the law of nature? God hath given a revelation, that contains in it all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and of this his people are all perſuaded. What neceſſity, now, is there? How does their good require it, that the magiſtrate ſhould ſingle out, as he thinks fit, any number of thoſe truths, as more neceſſary to ſalvation, than the reſt, if God himſelf has not done it?

2. BUT next, are theſe creeds in the words of the ſcripture, or not? If they are, they are certainly ſound, as containing nothing but truth in them: and ſo they were before, as they lay in the ſcripture. But thus, though they contain nothing but ſound truth, yet they may be imperfect, and ſo unſound rules of faith; ſince they may require more, or leſs, than God requires to be believed, as neceſſary to ſalvation. For what greater neceſſity, I pray, is there, that a man ſhould believe that Chriſt ſuffered under Pontius Pilate, than that he was born at Bethlehem of Judah? Both are certainly true, and no chriſtian doubts of either: but how comes one to be made an article of faith, and impoſed by the magiſtrate, as neceſſary to ſalvation, (for otherwiſe there can be no neceſſity of impoſition) and the other not?

Do not miſtake me, here, as if I would lay by that ſummary of the chriſtian religion, which is contained in that, which is called the apoſtles creed; which, though no body, who examines the matter, will have reaſon to conclude, of the apoſtles, compiling, yet is certainly of reverend antiquity, and ought ſtill to be preſerved in the church. I mention it not to argue againſt it, but againſt your impoſition, and to ſhew that, even that creed, though of that antiquity, though it contain in it all the credenda, neceſſary to ſalvation, cannot yet, upon your principles, be impoſed, by the coercive power of the magiſtrate, who, even by the commiſſion, you have found out for him, can uſe his force for nothing, but what is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation.

BUT if the creed, to be impoſed, be not in the words of divine revelation; then it is in plainer, more clear and intelligible expreſſions, or not: if no plainer, what neceſſity of changing thoſe, which men, inſpired by the Holy Ghoſt, made uſe of? If you ſay, they are plainer; then, they explain and determine the ſenſe of ſome obſcure and dubious places of ſcripture; which explication, not being of divine revelation, though ſound to one man, may be unſound to another, and cannot be impoſed, as truths, neceſſary to ſalvation. Beſides that, this deſtroys what you tell us, of the obviouſneſs of all truths, neceſſary to ſalvation. Page 29.

AND, as to rites and ceremonies, are there any neceſſary to ſalvation, which Chriſt has not inſtituted? if not, how can the magiſtrate impoſe them? What commiſſion has he, from the care he ought to have, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, to uſe his coactive force, for the eſtabliſhment of any new ones, which our Lord and Saviour (with due reverence be it ſpoken) had forgotten? He inſtituted two rites in his church; can any one add any new one, to them? Chriſt commanded ſimply to baptize in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt; but the ſigning of the croſs, how came that neceſſary? "human authority, which is neceſſary to aſſiſt the truth, againſt the corruption of human nature," has made it ſo. But it is a decent ceremony. I aſk, Is it ſo decent, that the adminiſtration of baptiſm, ſimply, as our Saviour inſtituted, would be indecent without it? If not, then there is no reaſon to impoſe it, for decency's ſake; for there can be no reaſon to alter, or add any thing to the inſtitution of Chriſt, or introduce any ceremony, or circumſtance, into religion, for decency, where the action would be decent, without it. The command to "do all things decently and in order," gave no authority to add, to Chriſt's inſtitution any new ceremony; it only preſcribed the manner how, what was neceſſary to be done, in the congregation, ſhould be there done, viz. after ſuch a manner, that, if it were omitted, there would appear ſome indecency, whereof the congregation, or collective body, was to be judge; for to them that rule was given: and if that rule go beyond what I have ſaid, and give power to men to introduce into religious worſhip, whatever they ſhall think decent, and impoſe the uſe of it: I do not ſee, how the greateſt part of the infinite ceremonies of the church of Rome could be complained of, or refuſed, if introduced into another church, and there impoſed by the magiſtrate. But, if ſuch a power were given to the magiſtrate, that whatever he thought a decent ceremony, he might, de novo, impoſe, he would need ſome expreſs commiſſion from God, in ſcripture, ſince the commiſſion, you ſay, he has from the law of nature, will never give him a power, to inſtitute new ceremonies, in the chriſtian religion, which, be they decent, or what they will, can never be neceſſary to ſalvation.

THE goſpel was to be preached in their aſſemblies; the rule then was, that the habit, geſture, voice, language, &c. of the preacher (for theſe were neceſſary circumſtances of the action) ſhould have nothing ridiculous, or indecent, in it. The praiſes of God were to be ſung; it muſt be, then, in ſuch poſtures and tunes, as became the ſolemnity of that action. And ſo a convert was to be baptized; Chriſt inſtituted the eſſential part of that action, which was waſhing with water, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; in which, care was alſo to be had, that, in the doing this, nothing ſhould be omitted, that preſerved a decency, in all the circumſtances of the action. But no body will ſay, if the croſs were omitted, that, upon that account, there would be any thing indecent in baptiſm.

WHAT is to be done, in the aſſemblies of chriſtians, for the ſalvation of ſouls, is ſufficiently preſcribed in ſcripture: but, ſince the circumſtances of the actions were ſo various, and might, in ſeveral countries and ages have different appearances (as that appears decent, in one country, which is quite contrary in another) concerning them, there could be no other rule given, than what is, viz. "decently, in order, and to edification;" and, in avoiding indecencies, and not adding any new ceremonies, (how decent ſoever) this rule conſiſts.

I JUDGE no man, in the uſe of the croſs, in baptiſm. The impoſition of that or any other ceremony, not inſtituted by Chriſt himſelf, is what I argue againſt, and ſay, is more, than you, upon your principles, can make good.

COMMON ſenſe has ſatisfied all mankind, that it is above their reach to determine what things, in their own nature indifferent, were fit to be made uſe of, in religion, and would be acceptable to the ſuperior beings, in their worſhip; and therefore, they have, every where, thought it neceſſary to derive that knowledge, from the immediate will and dictates of the gods themſelves, and have taught, that their forms of religion, and outward modes of worſhip, were founded upon revelation, no body daring to do ſo abſurd and inſolent a thing, as to take upon him, to preſume with himſelf, or to preſcribe to others, by his own authority, which ſhould, in theſe indifferent and mean things, be worthy of the deity, and make an acceptable part of his worſhip. Indeed, they all agreed, in the duties of natural religion, and we find them, by common conſent, owning that piety and virtue, that clean hands, and a pure heart, not polluted with the breaches of the law of nature, was the beſt worſhip of the gods. Reaſon diſcovered to them, that a good life was the moſt acceptable thing to the deity; this the common light of nature put paſt doubt. But, for their ceremonies and outward performances, for them, they appeal always to a rule, received from the immediate direction of the ſuperior powers themſelves; there they made uſe, and had need, of revelation. A plain confeſſion of mankind that, in theſe things, we have neither knowledge to diſcern, nor authority to preſcribe: that men cannot, by their own ſkill, find out what is fit; or, by their own power, make any thing worthy to be a part of religious worſhip. 'Tis not for them to invent or impoſe ceremonies, that ſhall recommend men to the deity. 'Twas ſo obvious and viſible, that it became men to have leave, from God himſelf, before they dared to offer, to the divine Majeſty, any of theſe trifling, mean, and to him uſeleſs things, as a grateful and valuable part of his worſhip, that no body, any where, amongſt the various and ſtrange religions, they led men into, bid ſuch open defiance to common ſenſe, and the reaſon of all mankind, as to preſume to do it, without vouching the appointment of God himſelf. Plato, who of all the heathens, ſeems to have had the moſt ſerious thoughts about religion, ſays, that the magiſtrate, or whoever has any ſenſe, will never introduce, of his own head, any new rites, into his religion, for which he gives this convincing reaſon; "For, ſays he, he muſt know it is impoſſible, for human nature, to "know any thing certainly, concerning theſe matters." Epinom. poſt medium. It cannot, therefore, but be matter of aſtoniſhment, that any who call themſelves chriſtians, who have ſo ſure, and ſo full a revelation, which declares all the counſel of God, concerning the way of attaining eternal ſalvation, ſhould dare by their own authority, to add any thing, to what is therein preſcribed, and impoſe it on others, as a neceſſary part of religious worſhip, without the obſervance of which human inventions, men ſhall not be permitted the publick worſhip of God. If thoſe rites and ceremonies, preſcribed to the Jews, by God himſelf, and delivered, at the ſame time, and by the ſame hand, to the Jews, that the moral law was, were called beggarly elements, under the goſpel, and laid by, as uſeleſs and burthenſome, what ſhall we call thoſe rites, which have no other foundation, but the will and authority of men, and of men very often, who have not much thought of the purity of religion, and practiſed it leſs.

BECAUSE you think your argument for the magiſtrate's right, to uſe force, has not had its due conſideration; I ſhall here ſet it down, in your own words, as it ſtands, and endeavour to give you ſatisfaction to it. You ſay there, " If A. P. 16.
" ſuch a degree of outward force, as has been mentioned, be of great and even " neceſſary uſe, for the advancing thoſe ends, (as, taking the world as we find " it, I think it appears to be) then it muſt be acknowledged, that there is a " right, ſomewhere, to uſe it, for the advancing thoſe ends; unleſs we will ſay " (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer " and Governor of all things has not furniſhed mankind, with competent " means, for the promoting his own honour, in the world, and the good of " ſouls."

" And, if there be ſuch a right ſomewhere, where ſhould it be, but where " the power of compelling reſides? That is principally, and, in reference to " the publick, in the civil ſovereign." Which words, if they have any argument in them, it, in ſhort, ſtands thus. Force is uſeful and neceſſary: the good and wiſe God (who, without impiety, cannot be ſuppoſed not to have furniſhed men, with competent means, for their ſalvation) has, therefore given a right to ſome men, to uſe it, and thoſe men are the civil ſovereigns.

TO make this argument of any uſe, to your purpoſe, you muſt ſpeak a little more diſtinctly, (for here you, according to your laudable and ſafe way of writing, are wrapped up, in the uncertainty of general terms) and muſt tell us, beſides the end, for which it is uſeful and neceſſary, to whom it is uſeful and neceſſary. Is it uſeful and neceſſary to all men? That you will not ſay, for many are brought to embrace the true religion, by bare preaching, without any force. Is it, then, neceſſary to all thoſe, and thoſe only, who, as you tell us, " reject the true religion, tendered with ſufficient evidence; or, at leaſt, ſo far " manifeſted to them, as to oblige them to receive it, and to leave them with-" out excuſe, if they do not!" To all, therefore, who rejecting the true religion ſo tendered, are without excuſe, your moderate force is uſeful and neceſſary. But is it to all thoſe competent, i. e. ſufficient means? That 'tis evident in matter of fact, it is not; for, after all, many ſtand out. 'Tis like, you will ſay, which is all you have to ſay, that thoſe are ſuch, to whom, having reſiſted this laſt means, moderate force, God always refuſeth his grace, without which no means is efficacious. So that your competent at laſt, are only ſuch means, as are the utmoſt, that God has appointed, and will have uſed, and, which when men reſiſt, they are without excuſe, and ſhall never after, have the aſſiſtance of his grace, to bring them to that truth, they have reſiſted, and ſo be as the apoſtle, 2 Tim. iii. 8. calls ſuch, " men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning " the faith." If then it ſhall be, that the day of grace ſhall be over, to all thoſe, who reject the truth, manifeſted to them, with ſuch evidence, as leaves them without excuſe, and that bare preaching and exhortation ſhall be, according to the good pleaſure of the benign Diſpoſer of all things, enough (when neglected) " to make their hearts fat, their ears heavy, and ſhut their eyes, that " they ſhould not perceive, nor underſtand, nor be converted, that God ſhould " heal them: "——I ſay, if this ſhould be the caſe, then your force, whatever you imagine of it, will neither be competent, uſeful, nor neceſſary. So that it will reſt upon you to prove, that your moderate degrees of force are thoſe means of grace, which God will have, as neceſſary to ſalvation, tried upon every one, before he will paſs that ſentence, in Iſaiah, " make his heart fat, &c." and that your degree of moderate force is that, beyond which God will have no other, or more powerful, means uſed, but, that thoſe, whom that works not upon, ſhall be left reprobate, concerning the faith. And, until you have proved this, you will, in vain pretend your moderate force (whatever you might think of it, if you had the ordering of that matter, in the place of God) to be uſeful, neceſſary, and competent means, For, if preaching, exhortation, inſtruction, &c. as ſeems by the whole current of the ſcripture, (and it appears not that Iſaiah, in the place above-cited, made their hearts fat, with any thing but his words) be that means, which, when rejected to ſuch a degree, as he ſees fit, God will puniſh with a reprobate mind, and that there be no other means of grace, to come after; you muſt confeſs, that, whatever good opinion you have, of your moderate force, after this ſentence is paſſed, it can do no good, have no efficacy, neither directly, nor indirectly, and at a diſtance, towards the bringing men to the truth.

If your moderate force be not that preciſe, utmoſt means of grace, which when ineffectual, God will not afford his grace, to any other, then your moderate force is not the competent means, you talk of. This, therefore, you muſt prove, that preaching alone is not, but that your moderate force, joined to it, is that means of grace, which when neglected, or reſiſted, God will aſſiſt no other means, with his grace, to bring men into the obedience of the truth; and this, let me tell you, you muſt prove by revelation. For it is impoſſible to know, but by revelation, the juſt meaſures of God's long-ſuffering, and what thoſe means are, which when men's corruptions have rendered ineffectual, his Spirit ſhall no longer ſtrive with them, nor his grace aſſiſt any other means, for their converſion, or ſalvation. When you have done this, there will be ſome ground for you to talk, of your moderate force, as the means, which God's wiſdom and goodneſs is engaged to furniſh men with; but to ſpeak of it, as you do now, as if it were that, both neceſſary and competent means, that it would be an imputation to the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, if men were not furniſhed with it, when it is evident, that the greateſt part of mankind have always been deſtitute of it, will, I fear, be not eaſily cleared from that impiety, you mention; for though the magiſtrate had the right to uſe it, yet wherever that moderate force was not made uſe of, there men were not furniſhed with your competent means of ſalvation.

It is neceſſary for the vindication of God's juſtice and goodneſs, that thoſe, who miſcarry, ſhould do ſo, by their own fault, that their deſtruction ſhould be from themſelves, and they left inexcuſable: but pray, how will you ſhew us, that it is neceſſary, that any, who have reſiſted the truth, tendered to them, only by preaching, ſhould be ſaved; any more, than it is neceſſary that thoſe, who have reſiſted the truth, when moderate force has been joined to the ſame preaching, ſhould be ſaved? They are inexcuſable, one as well as the other, and thereby have incurred the wrath of God, under which he may juſtly leave the one, as well as the other; and, therefore, he cannot be ſaid, not to have been furniſhed with competent means of ſalvation, who having rejected the truth, preached to him, has never any penalties laid on him, by the magiſtrate, to make him conſider the truths, he before rejected.

All the ſtreſs of your hypotheſis, for the neceſſity of force, lies on this, that the majority of mankind are not prevailed on, by preaching, and, therefore, the goodneſs and wiſdom of God is obliged to furniſh them, with ſome more effectual means, as you think. But who told you, that the majority of mankind ſhould ever be brought into the ſtraight way, and narrow gate? Or that force, in your moderate degree, was the neceſſary and competent, i. e. the juſt, fit means to do it, neither over, nor under, but that that only, and nothing but that, could do it? If, to vindicate his wiſdom and goodneſs, God muſt furniſh mankind with other means, as long as the majority, yet unwrought upon, ſhall give any forward demander, occaſion to aſk, "What other means is there left?" he muſt alſo, after your moderate penalties have left the greater part of mankind, unprevailed on, be bound to furniſh mankind with higher degrees of force, upon this man's demand: and thoſe degrees of force, proving ineffectual to the majority, to make them truly and ſincerely chriſtians, God muſt be bound to furniſh the world again, with a new ſupply of miracles, upon the demand of another wiſe controuler, who, having ſet his heart upon miracles, as you have yours on force, will demand, "What other means is there left but miracles?" For it is like this laſt gentleman would take it very much amiſs of you, if you ſhould not allow this to be a good and unqueſtionable way of arguing; or, if you ſhould deny that, after the utmoſt force had been uſed, miracles might not do ſome ſervice, at leaſt, indirectly, and at a diſtance, towards the bringing men to embrace the truth. And, if you cannot prove that miracles may not thus do ſome ſervice, he will conclude, juſt as you do, that the cauſe is his.

LET us try your method, a little farther. Suppoſe that, when neither the gentleſt admonitions, nor the moſt earneſt entreaties will prevail, ſomething elſe is to be done, as the only means left, What is it muſt be done? What is this neceſſary, competent means, that you tell us of? "It is to lay briars and thorns "in their way." This, therefore, being ſuppoſed neceſſary, you ſay, "there "muſt ſomewhere be a right to uſe it. Let it be ſo. Suppoſe I tell you that right is in God, who certainly has a power to lay briars and thorns, in the way of thoſe, who are got into a wrong one, whenever he is graciouſly pleaſed, that other means, beſides inſtructions and admonitions, ſhould be uſed to reduce them. And we may as well expect, that thoſe thorns and briars, laid in their way, by God's providence, without telling them for what end, ſhould work upon them as effectually, though indirectly and at a diſtance, as thoſe laid in their way, by the magiſtrate, without telling them for what end. God alone knows where it is neceſſary, and on whom it will be uſeful, which no man being capable of knowing, no man, though he has coercive power in his hand, can be ſuppoſed to be authorized to uſe it, by the commiſſion he has to do good, on whomſoever you ſhall judge it to be of great and even neceſſary uſe: no more than your judging it to be of great and even neceſſary uſe, would authorize any one, who had got one of the inciſion-knives of the hoſpital in his hand, to cut thoſe for the ſtone, with it, whom he could not know needed cutting, or that cutting would do them any good, when the maſter of the hoſpital had given him no expreſs order, to uſe his inciſion-knife, in that operation; nor was it known to any but the maſter, who needed, and on whom it would be uſeful; nor would he fail to uſe it himſelf, where-ever he found it neceſſary. Page 10.

BE force of as great and neceſſary uſe, as you pleaſe; let it be ſo, the competent means for the promoting the honour of God in the world, and the good of ſouls, that the right to uſe it muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhere. This right cannot poſſibly be, where you would have it, in the civil ſovereigns, and that for the very reaſon you give, viz. becauſe it muſt be, where the power of compelling reſides. For ſince civil ſovereigns cannot compel themſelves, nor can the compelling power of one civil ſovereign reach another civil ſovereign, it will not, in the hands of the civil ſovereigns, reach the moſt conſiderable part of mankind, and thoſe, who, both for their own and their ſubjects good, have moſt need of it. Beſides, if it go along with the power of compelling, it muſt be in the hands of all civil ſovereigns, alike: which, by this, as well as ſeveral other reaſons I have given, being unavoidably to be ſo, this right will be ſo far from uſeful, that, whatever efficacy force has, it will be employed to the doing more harm than good; ſince the greateſt part of civil ſovereigns being of falſe religions, force will be employed for the promoting of thoſe.

BUT let us grant, what you can never prove, that, though all civil ſovereigns have compelling power, yet only thoſe of the true religion have a right to uſe force, in matters of religion: your own argument of mankind being unfurniſhed (which is impiety to ſay) with competent means for the promoting the honour of God, and the good of ſouls, ſtill preſſes you. For the compelling power, of each civil ſovereign, not reaching beyond his own dominions, the right of uſing force, in the hands only of the orthodox, civil ſovereigns, leaves the reſt, which is the far greater part of the world, deſtitute of this your neceſſary and competent means, for promoting the honour of God, in the world, and the good of ſouls.

SIR, I return you my thanks, for having given me this occaſion to take a review of your argument, which you told me, I had miſtaken; which, I hope, I now have not, and have anſwered to your ſatisfaction.

I CONFESS, I miſtook, when I ſaid, that cutting, being judged uſeful, could not authorize even a ſkilful ſurgeon to cut a man, without any farther commiſſion: for it ſhould have been thus; that, though a man has the inſtruments in his hand, and force enough to cut with, and cutting be judged, by you, of great and even neceſſary uſe, in the ſtone; yet this, without any farther commiſſion, will not authorize any one, to uſe his ſtrength and knife, in cutting, who knows not, who has the ſtone, nor has any light, or meaſures, to judge, to whom cutting may be neceſſary, or uſeful.

Page 53. BUT, let us ſee what you ſay, in anſwer to my inſtance: "That the ſtone "does not always kill, though it be not cured; but men do often live to a "great age, with it, and die, at laſt, of other diſtempers. But averſion to "the true religion is certainly and inevitably mortal to the ſoul, if not cured; "and ſo of abſolute neceſſity to be cured." Is it of abſolute neceſſity to be cured, in all? If ſo, will you not here again think it requiſite, that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, ſhould furniſh competent means, for what is of abſolute neceſſity? For will it not be impiety to ſay, that God hath left mankind unfurniſhed of competent, i. e. ſufficient means, for what is abſolutely neceſſary? For it is plain, in your account, men have not been furniſhed with ſufficient means, for what is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured in all, if, in any of them, it be left uncured. For, as you allow none to Page 51. be ſufficient evidence, but what certainly gains aſſent; ſo, by the ſame rule, you cannot call that ſufficient means, which does not work the cure. It is in vain to ſay, the means were ſufficient, had it not been for their own fault, when that fault of theirs is the very thing to be cured. You go on: "And yet, if Page 53. "we ſhould ſuppoſe the ſtone, as certainly deſtructive of this temporal life, as "that averſion is of men's eternal ſalvation: even ſo, the neceſſity of curing it "would be, as much leſs, than the neceſſity of curing that averſion, as this "temporal life falls ſhort, in value, of that, which is eternal." This is built upon a ſuppoſition, that the neceſſity of the means is increaſed, by the value of the end, which being, in this caſe, the ſalvation of men's ſouls, that is of infinite concernment to them, you conclude ſalvation abſolutely neceſſary: which makes you ſay that averſion, &c. being inevitably mortal to the ſoul, is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured. Nothing is of abſolute neceſſity, but God: whatſoever elſe can be ſaid to be of neceſſity, is ſo only relatively, in reſpect to ſomething elſe; and therefore nothing can indefinitely thus be ſaid, to be of abſolute neceſſity, where the thing, it relates to, is not abſolutely neceſſary. We may ſay, wiſdom and power, in God, are abſolutely neceſſary; becauſe God himſelf is abſolutely neceſſary: but we cannot crudely ſay, the curing, in men, their averſion to the true religion, is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe it is not abſolutely neceſſary, that men ſhould be ſaved. But this is very proper and true to be ſaid, that curing this averſion is abſolutely neceſſary in all, that ſhall be ſaved. But I fear, that would not ſerve your turn, though it be certain, that your abſolute neceſſity, in this caſe, reaches no farther than this, that to be cured of this averſion is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation, and ſalvation is abſolutely neceſſary to happineſs; but neither of them, nor the happineſs, itſelf, of any man, can be ſaid to be abſolutely neceſſary.

THIS miſtake makes you ſay, that "ſuppoſing the ſtone certainly deſtruc-"tive of this temporal life, yet the neceſſity of curing it would be, as much "leſs, than the neceſſity of curing that averſion, as this temporal life falls ſhort, "in value, of that, which is eternal." Which is quite otherwiſe, for, if the ſtone will certainly kill a man without cutting, it is as abſolutely neceſſary to cut a man, for the ſtone, for the ſaving of his life, as it is to cure the averſion, for the ſaving of his ſoul. Nay, if you have but eggs to fry, fire is as abſolutely neceſſary, as either of the other, though the value of the end be, in theſe caſes, infinitely different; for, in one of them, you loſe only your dinner, in the other your life, and, in the other your ſoul. But yet, in theſe caſes, fire, cutting, and curing that averſion, are each of them, abſolutely and equally neceſſary, to their reſpective ends, becauſe thoſe ends cannot be attained, without them.

YOU ſay farther, "Cutting for the ſtone is not always neceſſary, in order to "the cure: but the penalties, you ſpeak of, are altogether neceſſary, (without extraordinary grace) to cure that pernicious, and otherwiſe untractable, "averſion." Let it be ſo; but do the ſurgeons know, who has this ſtone, this averſion ſo, that it will certainly deſtroy him, unleſs he be cut? Will you undertake to tell, when the averſion is ſuch, in any man, that it is incurable, by preaching, exhortation and intreaty, if his ſpiritual phyſician will be inſtant with him, in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon; but certainly curable, if moderate force be made uſe of? 'Till you are ſure of the former of theſe, you can never ſay, your moderate force is neceſſary: till you are ſure of the latter, you can never ſay, it is competent means. What you will determine, concerning extraordinary grace, and when God beſtows that, I leave you to conſider, and ſpeak clearly of it at your leiſure. Page 53.

YOU add, That even, "where cutting for the ſtone is neceſſary, it is withal "hazardous by my confeſſion. But your penalties can no way endanger, or "hurt, the ſoul; but, by the fault of him, that undergoes them." If the magiſtrate uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, he muſt judge, which is the true religion; and he can judge no other to be it, but that, which he believes to be the true religion, which is his own religion. But, for the magiſtrate to uſe force, to bring men to his own religion, has ſo much danger in it to men's ſouls, that, by your own confeſſion, none but an atheiſt will ſay, that magiſtrates may uſe force to bring men to their own religion. Page 53.

THIS I ſuppoſe is enough to make good all, that I aimed at, in my inſtance of cutting for the ſtone, which was, that, though it were judged uſeful, and I add now neceſſary, to cut men for the ſtone, yet that was not enough to authorize a ſurgeon to cut a man, but he muſt have, beſides that general one of doing good, ſome more ſpecial commiſſion; and that, which I there mentioned, was the patient's conſent. But you tell me. "That though, as things now "ſtand, no ſurgeon has any right to cut his calculous patient, without his conſent; yet, if the magiſtrate ſhould, by a publick law, appoint and authorize "a competent number, of the moſt ſkilful, in that art, to viſit ſuch, as labour "under that diſeaſe, and to cut thoſe (whether they conſent, or not) whoſe "lives they unanimouſly judge it impoſſible to ſave otherwiſe: you are apt to "think, I ſhould find it hard to prove that, in ſo doing, he exceeded the bounds "of his power; and you are ſure, it would be as hard to prove, that thoſe artiſts would have no right, in that caſe, to cut ſuch perſons." Shew ſuch a law, from the great Governor of the univerſe, and I ſhall yield that your ſurgeons ſhall go to work, as faſt as you pleaſe. But where is the publick law? "Where "is the competent number of magiſtrates, ſkilful in this art, who muſt unanimouſly judge of the diſeaſe and its danger?" You can ſhew nothing of all this; yet you are ſo liberal of this ſort of cure, that one cannot take you for leſs, than cutting Morecraft himſelf. But, Sir, if there were a competent number of ſkilful and impartial men, who were to uſe the inciſion-knife on all, in whom they found this ſtone, of averſion to the true religion; what do you think; would they find no work in your hoſpital? Page 54.

AVERSION to the true religion, you ſay, is of abſolute neceſſity to be cured: What, I beſeech you, is that true religion? that of the church of England? For that, you own to be the only, true religion, and, whatever you ſay, you cannot, upon your principles, name any other national religion, in the world, that you will own to be the true. It being, then, of abſolute neceſſity, that men's averſion to the national religion of England ſhould be cured: Has all mankind, in whom it has been abſolutely neceſſary to be cured, been furniſh'd with competent and neceſſary means, for the cure of this averſion? Page 11.

IN the next place, what is your neceſſary and ſufficient means for this cure, that is of abſolute neceſſity? and that is, moderate penalties, made uſe of by the magiſtrate, where the national is the true religion, and ſufficient means are provided for all men's inſtruction in the true religion. And here again, I aſk, Have all men, to whom this cure is of abſolute neceſſity, been furniſhed with this neceſſary means?

Thirdly, How is your neceſſary remedy to be applied; And that is, in a way, wherein it cannot work the cure, though we ſhould ſuppoſe the true religion, the national, every-where, and all the magiſtrates, in the world, zealous for it. To this true religion, ſay you, men have a natural and great averſion, of abſolute neceſſity to be cured, and the only cure for it, is force, your way applied, i. e. penalties muſt be laid upon all, that diſſent from the national religion, 'till they conform. Why are men averſe to the true? Becauſe it croſſes the profits and pleaſures of this life; and, for the ſame reaſon they have an averſion to penalties: theſe, therefore, if they be oppoſed one to another, and penalties be ſo laid, that men muſt quit their luſts, and heartily embrace the true religion, or elſe endure the penalties, there may be ſome efficacy in force, towards bringing men to the true religion; but, if there be no oppoſition between an outward profeſſion of the true religion, and men's luſts; penalties laid on men, 'till they outwardly conform, are not a remedy laid to the diſeaſe. Puniſhments, ſo applied, have no oppoſition to men's luſts, nor, from thence, can be expected any cure. Men muſt be driven from their averſion to the true religion, by penalties, they have a greater averſion to. This is all the operation of force. But if, by getting into the communion of the national church, they can avoid the penalties, and yet retain their natural corruption and averſion to the true religion, what remedy is there to the diſeaſe, by penalties ſo applied? You would, you ſay, have men made uneaſy. This, no doubt, will work on men, and make them endeavour to get out of this uneaſy ſtate, as ſoon as they can. But it will always be, by that way, wherein they can be moſt eaſy; for it is the uneaſineſs alone, they fly from, and therefore, they will not exchange one uneaſineſs for another; not for a greater, nor an equal, nor any at all, if they can help it. If therefore, it be ſo uneaſy for men to mortify their luſts, as you tell us, which the true religion requires of them, if they embrace it in earneſt: but, which outward conformity to the true religion, or any national church, does not require, what need, or uſe, is there of force applied ſo, that it meets not at all with men's luſt, or averſion to the true religion, but leaves them the liberty of a quiet enjoyment of them, free from force and penalties, in a legal and approved conformity? Is a man negligent of his ſoul, and will not be brought to conſider? obſtinate, and will not embrace the truth? Is he careleſs, and will not be at the pains to examine matters of religion? Corrupt, and will not part with his luſts, which are dearer to him than his firſt-born? it is but owning the national profeſſion, and he may be ſo ſtill: if he conform, the magiſtrate has done puniſhing; he is a ſon of the church, and need not conſider any thing farther, for fear of penalties; they are removed, and all is well. So that, at laſt, there neither being an abſolute neceſſity, that averſion to the true religion ſhould, in all men be cured: nor the magiſtrate being a competent judge, who have this ſtone, of averſion, or who have it to that degree, as to need force to cure it, or in whom it is curable, were force a proper remedy, as it is not: nor having any commiſſion to uſe it, notwithſtanding what you have anſwered: it is ſtill, not only as, but more, reaſonable for the magiſtrate, upon pretence of its uſefulneſs, or neceſſity, to cut any one for the ſtone without his own conſent, than to uſe force, your way, to cure him of averſion to the true religion.

Page 7.

To my queſtion, in whoſe hands this right (we were, a little above, ſpeaking of) was in Turky, Perſia, or China? you tell me, "you anſwer roundly "and plainly, in the hands of the ſovereign, to uſe convenient penalties for the "promoting the true religion." I will not trouble you here, with a queſtion, you will meet with elſewhere; who in theſe countries muſt be judge, of the true religion? but I will aſk, whether you, or any wiſe man, would have put a right of uſing force, into a mahometan, or pagan prince's hand, for the promoting of chriſtianity? which of my pagans, or mahometans, would have done otherwiſe?

Page 55.

BUT God, you ſay, has done it, and you make it good by telling me, in the following words, "If this ſtartles me, then you muſt tell me further, that you "look upon the ſupreme power, to be the ſame, all the world over, in what “hands ſoever it is placed, and this right to be contained in it: and if thoſe, that have it, do not uſe it, as they ought, but, inſtead of promoting true religion, by proper penalties, ſet themſelves to enforce mahometaniſm, or paganiſm, or any other falſe religion: all that can, or that needs be, ſaid to the matter, is, that God will, one day, call them to an account, for the neglect of their duty, for the diſhonour they do to him, and for the ſouls that periſh, by their fault.” Your taking this right, to be a part of the ſupreme power, of all civil ſovereigns, (which is the thing in queſtion) is not, as I take it, proving it to be ſo. But let us take it ſo, for once; what then is your anſwer? “God will one day call thoſe ſovereigns to an account, for the neglect of their duty.” The queſtion is not, what God will do with the ſovereigns, who have neglected their duty; but how mankind is furniſhed, with your competent means, for the promoting of God's honour in the world, and the good of ſouls, in countries, where the ſovereign is of a wrong religion? For there, how clearly ſoever the right of uſing it, be in the ſovereign; yet, as long as he uſes not force, to bring his ſubjects to the true religion, they are deſtitute of your competent means. For I imagine, you do not make the right to uſe that force, but the actual application of it, by penal laws, to be your uſeful and neceſſary means. For, if you think the bare having that right be enough, if that be your ſufficient means, without the actual uſe of force, we readily allow it you. And (as I tell you elſewhere) I ſee not, then, what need you had, of miracles, “to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, till chriſtianity was ſupported, and encouraged, by the laws of the empire:” for, by your own rule, the magiſtrates of the world, during the three firſt centuries, after the publiſhing the chriſtian religion, had the ſame right, if that had been enough, that they have now in Turky, Perſia, or China. That this is all, that can be ſaid, in this matter, I eaſily grant you; but that it is all, that needs be ſaid, to make good your doctrine, I muſt beg your pardon.

In the ſame ſentence, wherein you tell me, I ſhould have added neceſſity to uſefulneſs, I call it neceſſary uſefulneſs, which, I imagine, is not much different. But that, with the following words, wherein my argument lay, had the ill luck to be overſeen; but if you pleaſe to take my argument, as I have now again laid it before you, it will ſerve my turn.

L. 2. P. 282.

In your next paragraph you tell me, that what is ſaid by me, is with the ſame ingenuity, I have uſed in other places; my words, in that place, are theſe: “The author having endeavoured to ſhew, that nobody at all, of any rank, or condition, had any power to puniſh, torment, or uſe any man ill, for matter of religion: you tell us, you do not underſtand, why clergymen are not as capable of ſuch power, as other men:” which words of mine containing in them nothing but true matter of fact, give you no reaſon to tax my ingenuity: nor will, what you alledge, make it otherwiſe, than ſuch power; for if the power, you there ſpeak of, were externally coactive power, is not that the ſame power, the author was ſpeaking of, made uſe of, to thoſe ends, he mentions, of tormenting and puniſhing; And do not you own that thoſe, who have that power, ought to puniſh thoſe, who offend, in rejecting the true religion? As to the remaining part of that paragraph, I ſhall leave the reader to judge, whether I ſought any occaſion, ſo much as to name the clergy; or whether the itching of your fingers to be handling the rod, guided not your pen to what was nothing to the purpoſe: for the author had not ſaid any thing, ſo much as tending to exclude the clergy, from ſecular employments, but only (if you will take your own report of it) that no eccleſiaſtical officer, as ſuch, has any externally coactive power; whereupon you cry out, that “you do not yet underſtand, why eccleſiaſticks, or clergymen, are not as capable of ſuch power, as other men.” Had you ſtood to be conſtable of your pariſh, or of the hundred, you might have had cauſe to vindicate thus your capacity, if orders had been objected to you; or if your aim be at a juſtice of peace, or lord chief juſtice of England, much more. However, you muſt be allowed to be a man of forecaſt, in clearing the way to ſecular power, if you know yourſelf, or any of your friends, deſirous of it: otherwiſe, I confeſs you have reaſon to be, on this occaſion, a little out of humour, as you are, for bringing this matter in queſtion, ſo wholly out of ſeaſon. Nor will (I fear) the ill-fitted excuſe you bring, give yourſelf, or A. P. 17. one, who conſults the places, in both yours and the author's letter, a much better opinion of it. However, I cannot but thank you, for your wonted ingenuity, in ſaying, that "it ſeems, I wanted an occaſion, to ſhew my good will to "the clergy, and ſo I made myſelf one." And, to find more work for the excellent gift, you have this way, I deſire you to read over that paragraph of mine again, and tell me, whether you can find any thing ſaid in it, not true? any advice in it, that you yourſelf would diſown; any thing, that any worthy clergyman that adorns his function, is concern'd in? and, when you have ſet it down in my words, the world ſhall be judge, whether I have ſhewed any ill will to the clergy. 'Till then, I may take the liberty to own, that I am more a friend to them, and their calling, than thoſe amongſt them, who ſhew their forwardneſs to leave the word of God, to ſerve other employments. The office of a miniſter of the goſpel requires ſo the whole man, that the very looking after their Acts vi. 2. poor was, by the joint voice of the twelve apoſtles, called, "leaving the word "of God, and ſerving of tables." But, if you think no men's faults can be ſpoken of, without ill will, you will make a very ill preacher: or, if you think this to be ſo, only in ſpeaking of miſtakes, in any of the clergy, there muſt be, in your opinion, ſomething peculiar in their caſe, that makes it ſo much a fault to mention any of theirs; which I muſt be pardoned for, ſince I was not aware of it: and there will want but a little cool reflection, to convince you, that had not the preſent church of England a greater number, in proportion, than poſſibly any other age of the church, ever had, of thoſe who, by their pious lives and labours in their miniſtry, adorn their profeſſion, ſuch buſy men, as cannot be content to be divines, without being laymen too, would ſo little keep up the reputation, which ought to diſtinguiſh the clergy, or preſerve the eſteem due to a holy, i. e. a ſeparate order, that nobody can ſhew greater good will to them, than, by taking all occaſions to put a ſtop to any forwardneſs, to be meddling out of their calling. This I ſuppoſe made a learned prelate of our church, out of kindneſs to the clergy, mind them of their ſtipulation, and duty, in a late treatiſe, and tell them, that "the paſtoral care is to be a man's entire bu"ſineſs, and to poſſeſs both his thoughts and his time." Diſc. of paſtoral care, page 121.

A. P. 20. To your ſaying, "That the magiſtrate may lay penalties upon thoſe, who re"fuſe to embrace the doctrine of the proper miniſters of religion, or are alienated L. 2. P. 287. "from the truth:" I anſwered, "God never gave the magiſtrate an authority, "to be judge of truth, for another man." This you grant; but withal ſay, Page 64. "That if the magiſtrate knows the truth, tho' he has no authority to judge of "truth, for another man; yet he may be judge, whether other men be alienated from the truth, or no; and ſo may have authority to lay ſome penalties "upon thoſe, whom he ſees to be ſo, to bring them to judge more ſincerely for "themſelves." For example: The doctrine of the proper miniſters of religion is, that the three creeds, Nice, Athanaſius's, and that commonly called the apoſtles creed, out to be thoroughly received and believed: as alſo, that the old and new teſtament contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation. The one of theſe doctrines a papiſt ſubject embraces not; and a Socinian the other. What now is the magiſtrate, by your commiſſion, to do? He is to lay penalties upon them, and continue them: How long? Only 'till they conform, i. e. 'till they profeſs, they embrace theſe doctrines, for true. In which caſe, he does not judge of the truth for other men: he only judges that other men are alienated from the truth. Do you not now admire your own ſubtilty and acuteneſs? I, that cannot apprehend this, tell you my dull ſenſe, in the caſe. He, that thinks another man in an error, judges him, as you phraſe it, alienated from the truth, and then judges of truth and falſhood, only for himſelf. But, if he lays any penalty upon others, which they are to lie under, 'till they embrace for a truth, what he judges to be ſo, he is, then, ſo far a judge of truth, for thoſe others. This is what, I think, to judge of truth, for another, means: If you will tell me, what elſe it ſignifies, I am ready to learn.

“ You grant, you ſay, God never gave the magiſtrate any authority, to be “ judge of truth for another man:” and then add, “ But how does it follow, “ from thence, that he cannot be judge, whether any man be alienated from “ the truth, or no?” And I aſk you, who ever ſaid any ſuch thing did follow “ from thence? That, which I ſay, and which you ought to diſprove, is, That whoever puniſhes others, for not being of the religion, he judges to be true, judges of truth for others. But, you prove that a man may be judge of truth, without having authority to judge of it, for other men, or to preſcribe to them, what they ſhall believe; which you might have ſpared, 'till you meet with ſome body that denies it. But yet, your proof of it, is worth remembering: “ Rectum (ſay you) eſt index ſui & obliqui. And certainly, whoever does but “ know the truth, may eaſily judge, whether other men be alienated from it or “ no.” But tho' “ Rectum be index ſui & obliqui,” yet a man may be ignorant of that, which is the right, and make take error for truth. The truth of religion, when known, ſhews what contradicts it, is falſe: but yet, that truth may be unknown to the magiſtrate, as well as to any other man. But you conclude (I know not upon what ground) as if the magiſtrate could not miſs it, or were ſurer to find it, than other men. I ſuppoſe, you are thus favourable only to the magiſtrate of your own profeſſion, as no doubt in civility, a papiſt, or a preſbyterian, would be to thoſe of his. And then infer; “ And, therefore, if “ the magiſtrate knows the truth, tho' he has no authority to judge of truth for “ other men; yet he may be judge, whether other men be alienated from the “ truth, or no.” Without doubt! who denies it him? 'Tis a privilege that he and all men have, that, when they know the truth, or believe the truth, and have embraced an error for truth, they may judge, whether other men are alienated from it, or no, if thoſe other men own their own opinions, in that matter.

You go on, with your inference: “ And ſo may have authority to lay ſome “ penalties upon thoſe, whom he ſees to be ſo.” Now, Sir, you go a little too faſt. This he cannot do, without making himſelf judge of truth for them: the magiſtrate, or any one, may judge, as much as he pleaſes, of men's opinions and errors; he, in that, judges only for himſelf: but, as ſoon as he uſes force to bring them, from their own, to his opinion, he makes himſelf judge of truth for them; let it be to bring them, to judge more ſincerely for themſelves, as you here call it, or, under what pretence, or colour, ſoever; for that, what you ſay, is but a pretence, the very expreſſion diſcovers. For, does any one ever judge inſincerely for himſelf, that he needs penalties tc make him judge more ſincerely for himſelf? A man may judge wrong for himſelf, and may be known, or thought, to do ſo: But who can either know, or ſuppoſe, another is not ſincere, in the judgment he makes for himſelf, or (which is the ſame thing) that any one knowingly puts a mixture of falſhood into the judgment he makes? For, as ſpeaking inſincerely is to ſpeak otherwiſe than one thinks, let what he ſays be true, or falſe; ſo judging inſincerely muſt be to judge otherwiſe, than one thinks, which I imagine is not very feaſible. But how improper ſoever it be, to talk of judging inſincerely for one's ſelf, it was better for you in that place, to ſay, penalties were to bring men to judge more ſincerely, rather than to ſay, more rightly, or more truly: for, had you ſaid, the magiſtrate might uſe penalties, to bring men to judge more truly, that very word had plainly diſcovered, that he made himſelf a judge of truth for them. You, therefore, wiſely choſe to ſay, what might beſt cover this contradiction to yourſelf, whether it were ſenſe, or no, which, perhaps, whilſt it ſounded well, every one would not ſtand to examine.

ONE thing give me leave here to obſerve to you, which is, That, when you ſpeak of the entertainment, ſubjects are to give to truth, i. e. the true religion, you call it believing; but this, in the magiſtrate, you call knowing. Now let me aſk you, Whether any magiſtrate, who laid penalties on any, who diſſented from what he judged the true religion, or, as you call it here, were alienated from the truth, was, or could be determined, in his judging of that truth, by any aſſurance, greater than believing? When you have reſolved that, you will then ſee, to what purpoſe is all you have ſaid here, concerning the magiſtrate's knowing the truth; which, at laſt, amounting to no more, than the aſſurance, wherewith a man certainly believes, and receives a thing for true, will put every magiſtrate under the ſame, if there be any obligation to uſe force, while he believes his own religion. Beſides, if a magiſtrate knows his religion to be true, he is to uſe means, not to make his people believe, but know it alſo; knowledge of them, if that be the way of entertaining the truths of religion, being as neceſſary to the ſubjects, as the magiſtrate. I never heard yet of a maſter of mathematicks, who had the care of informing others, in thoſe truths, who ever went about to make any one believe one of Euclid's propoſitions.

Page 65, 66. A. p. 22. The pleaſantneſs of your anſwer, notwithſtanding what you ſay, doth remain ſtill the ſame: for you making, (as is to be ſeen) "the power of the magiſtrate, ORDAINED for the bringing men to take ſuch care, as they ought, of their ſalvation;" the reaſon why it is every man's intereſt, to veſt this power, in the magiſtrate, muſt ſuppoſe this power, ſo ordained, before the people veſted it; or elſe, it could not be an argument for their veſting it, in the magiſtrate. For, if you had not here built upon your fundamental ſuppoſition, that this power of the magiſtrate is ordained by God, to that end, the proper and intelligible A. p. 22. way of expreſſing your meaning had not been to ſay, as you do; "As the power of the magiſtrate is ordained, for bringing, &c. ſo, if we ſuppoſe this POWER veſted in the magiſtrate by the people:" in which way of ſpeaking this power of the magiſtrate is evidently ſuppoſed, already ordained. But a clear way of making your meaning underſtood, had been to ſay, That for the people to ordain ſuch a power of the magiſtrate, or to veſt ſuch a power in the magiſtrate, (which is the ſame thing) was their true intereſt: but whether it were your meaning, or your expreſſion, that was guilty of the abſurdity, I ſhall leave it with the reader.

As to the other pleaſant thing of your anſwer, it will ſtill appear, by barely reciting it: L. 2. p. 218. A. p. 22. the pleaſant thing, I charge on you, is, that you ſay, That "the power of the magiſtrate is to bring men to ſuch a care of their ſalvation, that they may not blindly leave it, to the choice of any perſon, or their own luſts, or paſſions to preſcribe to them what faith, or worſhip, they ſhall embrace;" and yet that 'tis their beſt courſe "to veſt a power in the magiſtrate," liable to the ſame luſts and paſſions, as themſelves, to chuſe for them. To this you anſwer, by aſking, where it is that you ſay, that it is the people's beſt courſe, to veſt a power in the magiſtrate, to chuſe for them? That you tell me, I do not pretend to ſhew. If you had given yourſelf the pains to have gone on, to the end of the paragraph, or will be pleaſed to read it, as I have here again ſet it down, for your peruſal, you will find that I, at leaſt, pretended to ſhew it: my words are theſe; "If they veſt a power in the magiſtrate, to puniſh them, when they diſſent from his religion, to bring them to act, even againſt their own inclination, according to reaſon and ſound judgment," which is (as you explain yourſelf, in another place) "to bring them to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient, to convince them; how far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man, to preſcribe to them, what faith, or worſhip, they ſhall embrace?" Thus far you cite my words, to which let me join the remaining part of the paragraph, to let you ſee, that I pretended to ſhew that the courſe, you propoſed to the people, as beſt for them, was to veſt a power in the magiſtrate, to chuſe for them. My words, which follow thoſe, L. 2. p. 288. where you left off, are theſe; "Eſpecially, if we conſider, that you think it a ſtrange thing, that the author would have the care of every man's ſoul left to himſelf. So that this care, being veſted in the magiſtrate, with a power to puniſh men, to make them conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them, of the truth of his religion; the choice is evidently in the magiſtrate, as much as it can be in the power of one man, to chuſe for another, what religion he ſhall be of; which conſiſts only in a power of compelling him, by puniſhments, to embrace it." But all this, you tell me, Page 66. "is juſt nothing to my purpoſe." Why, I beſeech you? Becauſe "you ſpeak not of the magiſtrate's religion, but of the true religion, and that, propoſed, with ſufficient evidence."

THE caſe, in ſhort, is this: Men are apt to be miſled by their paſſions, luſts, and other men, in the choice of their religion. For this great evil, you propoſe a remedy, which is, That men (for you muſt remember, you are here ſpeaking of the people, putting this power into the magiſtrate's hand) ſhould chuſe ſome of their fellow-men, and give them a power, by force, to guard them, that they might not be alienated from the truth, by their own paſſions, luſts, or by other men. So it was, in the firſt ſcheme; or, as you have it now, to puniſh them, whenever they rejected the true religon, and that propoſed, with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it. A pretty remedy, and manifeſtly effectual at firſt ſight: that, becauſe men were all promiſcuouſly apt to be miſled, in their judgment, or choice of their religion, by paſſion, luſt, and other men, therefore they ſhould chuſe ſome amongſt themſelves, who might, they and their ſucceſſors, men, made juſt like themſelves, puniſh them, when they rejected the true religion.

"IF the blind lead the blind, both ſhall fall into the ditch," ſays our Saviour. If men, apt to be miſled by their paſſions and luſts, will guard themſelves from falling into error, by puniſhments, laid on them, by men, as apt to be miſled by paſſions and luſts, as themſelves, how are they the ſafer from falling into error? Now, hear the infallible remedy for this inconvenience, and admire; the men, to whom they have given this power, muſt not uſe it, 'till they find thoſe, who gave it them, in an error. A friend, to whom I ſhewed this expedient, anſwer'd, This is none: for why is not a man, as fit to judge for himſelf, when he is in an error, as another to judge for him, who is as liable to error himſelf? I anſwer'd, This power, however, in the other can do him no harm but may indirectly, and at a diſtance, do him good; becauſe the magiſtrate, who has this power to puniſh him, muſt never uſe it, but when he is in the right, and he, that is puniſhed, is in the wrong. But ſaid my friend, who ſhall be judge, whether he be in the right, or no? For men, in an error, think themſelves in the right, and that, as confidently, as thoſe, who are moſt ſo. To which I replied, No body muſt be judge; but the magiſtrate may know, when he is in the right. And ſo may the ſubject too (ſaid my friend) as well as the magiſtrate, and therefore, it was as good ſtill be free from a puniſhment, that gives a man no more ſecurity from error, than he had without it. Beſides, ſaid he, who muſt be judge, whether the magiſtrate knows, or no? For he may miſtake, and think it to be knowledge and certainty, when it is but opinion and belief. It is no matter, for that, in this ſcheme, replied I, the magiſtrate, we are told, may know, which is the true religion, and he muſt not uſe force, but to bring men to the true religion; and, if he does, God will, one day, call him to an account for it, and ſo all is ſafe. As ſafe as beating the air can make a thing, replied my friend: for if believing, being aſſured, being confidently perſuaded, that they know, that the religion they profeſs is true, or any thing elſe, ſhort of true knowledge, will ſerve the turn, all magiſtrates will have this power, alike; and ſo men will be well guarded, or recovered from falſe religions, by putting it into the magiſtrate's hand, to puniſh them, when they have alienated themſelves from it.

IF the magiſtrate be not to puniſh men, but when he knows, i. e. is infallibly certain (for ſo is a man, in what he knows) that his national religion is all true, and knows alſo, that it has been propoſed to thoſe, he puniſhes, with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it: 'twould have been as good, this power had never been given him, ſince he will never be in a condition to exerciſe it; and, at beſt, it was given him to no purpoſe, ſince thoſe, who gave it him were, one with another, as little diſpoſed to conſider impartially, examine diligently, ſtudy, find, and infallibly know the truth, as he. But, ſaid he, at parting, to talk thus of the magiſtrate's puniſhing men, that reject the true religion, without telling us, who thoſe magiſtrates are, who have a power to judge which is the true religion, is to put this power in all magiſtrates hands, alike, or none, For to ſay, he only is to be judge, which is the true religion, who is of it, is but to begin the round of enquiries again, which can, at laſt, end no where, but in every one's ſuppoſing his own to be it. But, ſaid he, if you will continue to talk on thus, there is nothing more to be done with you, but to pity, or laugh at, you, and ſo he left me.

I ASSURE you, Sir, I argued this part of your hypotheſis, with all the advantage, I thought your anſwer afforded me: and, if I have erred in it, or there be any way to get out of the ſtrait (if force muſt, in your way, be uſed) either of the magiſtrate's puniſhing men, for rejecting the true religion, without judging, which is the true religion; or elſe that the magiſtrate ſhould judge, which is the true religion; which ever way of the two, you ſhall determine it, I ſee not of what advantage it can be to the people (to keep them from chuſing amiſs) that this power, of puniſhing them, ſhould be put into the magiſtrate's hands.

AND then, if the magiſtrate muſt judge, which is the true religion, (as how he ſhould, without judging, puniſh any one, who rejects it, is hard to find) and puniſh men, who reject it, till they do embrace it, (let it be, to make them conſider, or what you pleaſe) he does, I think, chuſe their religion for them. And if you have not the dexterity, to chuſe the national religion, where-ever you are, I doubt not but you would think ſo too, if you were in France, tho' there were none but moderate penalties laid on you, to bring you, even againſt your own inclination, to act according to, what they there call, reaſon and ſound judgment.

THAT paragraph and mine, to which it is an anſwer, runs thus:

L. 2. Page 312. “ I do neither you, nor the magiſtrate, injury, when I ſay, that the power, you give the magiſtrate, “ of puniſhing men, to make them conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them,” is to convince them of the truth of his religion, and to bring them to it. For men will never, in his opinion, act according to reaſon and ſound judgment, (which is the thing, you here ſay, men ſhould be brought to, by the magiſtrate, even againſt their own inclination) 'till they embrace his religion. And, if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay, the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you, to bring you to conſider any other reaſons and arguments, but ſuch as are proper to convince you, of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Thus you ſhift forwards and backwards, You ſay, “ the magiſtrate has no power to puniſh men to compel them to his religion; but only to compel them, to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper to convince them of

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L. 3. Page 67. “ BUT it ſeems you have not done with this yet: for you ſay,” you do neither me, nor the magiſtrate, injury, when you ſay, that the power, I give the magiſtrate, of puniſhing men, to make them conſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his religion, (whatever that be) and to bring them to it. “ Which ſeems a little ſtrange and pleaſant too. But thus you prove it:” for men will never, in his opinion, act according to reaſon and ſound judgment, till they embrace his religion. And, if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay, the magiſtrate will ever puniſh you, to bring you to conſider any other reaſons and arguments, but ſuch as are proper to convince you, of the truth of his religion, and to bring you to that. Which (beſides the pleaſant talk of ſuch reaſons and arguments, as are proper and ſufficient to convince men, of the truth of the magiſtrate's religion, “ though it be a falſe one) is juſt as much as to ſay, it is ſo, becauſe, in the magiſtrate's opinion, it is ſo; and, becauſe it is not to be expected, that he will act againſt his opinion. As if the magiſtrate's opinion could change the nature of things, and turn a power to promote the true religion, into a power to promote a falſe one. No, Sir, the magiſtrate's opinion has no ſuch virtue. It may, indeed, keep him from exerciſing the power, he has, to promote the true religion: and it may lead him to abuſe the pretence of it, to the promoting a falſe one: but it can neither deſtroy that power, nor make it any thing, but what it is. And, therefore, whatever the magiſtrate's opinion be, his power was given him (as the apoſtles power was to them) for edification only, not for deſtruction: and it

“ may

"the truth of his religion; "which is all one, as to ſay, "no body has power to chuſe "your way for you to Jeruſalem: but yet, the lord of "the manor has power to "puniſh you, "to bring you "to conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince you," "(of what?) that the way "he goes in, is the right, "and ſo to make you join in "company, and go along "with him. So that, in effect, what is all your going "about, but to come, at laſt, "to the ſame place again; "and put a power into the "magiſtrate's hands, (under "another pretence) to compel men to his religion; "which uſe of force the author has ſufficiently overthrown, and you yourſelf "have quitted. But I am "tired to follow you ſo often, "round the ſame circle."

"may always be ſaid of him, (what St. Paul "ſaid of himſelf) that "he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth." And, "therefore, if the magiſtrate puniſhes me, to "bring me to a falſe religion; it is not his opinion, that will excuſe him, when he comes to "anſwer for it to his judge. For certainly, men "are as accountable for their opinions (thoſe of "them, I mean, which influence their practice) "as they are for their actions."

"HERE is, therefore, no ſhifting forwards "and backwards, as you pretend; nor any circle, but in your own imagination. For tho' "it be true that I ſay," the magiſtrate has no "power to puniſh men, to compel them to his religion; "yet I no where ſay, nor will it follow "from any thing I do ſay, that he has power" to compel them to conſider reaſons and arguments, proper to convince them of the truth of his religion. "But I do not much wonder, that "you endeavour to put this upon me. For I "think, by this time, it is pretty plain, that, otherwiſe, you would have but little to ſay: "and it is "an art very much in uſe among "ſome ſort of learned men," when they cannot "confute, what an adverſary does ſay, to make "him ſay, what he does not; that they may "have ſomething, which they can confute."

THE beginning of this anſwer is part of the old ſong of triumph; "What! "reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince men, of the truth of "falſhood?" Yes, Sir, the magiſtrate may uſe force, to make men conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which he thinks proper and ſufficient, to convince men, of the truth of his religion, though his religion be a falſe one. And this is as poſſible, for him to do, as for a man, as learned as yourſelf, to write a book, and uſe arguments, as he thinks, proper and ſufficient to convince men, of the truth of his opinion, though it be a falſhood.

As to the remaining part of your anſwer, the queſtion is not, "Whether the "magiſtrate's opinion can change the nature of things, or the power he has, can "excuſe him to his judge, for miſuſing of it?" but this, that ſince all magiſtrates, in your opinion, have commiſſion, and are obliged to promote the true religion, by force; and they can be guided, in the diſcharge of this duty, by nothing, but their own opinion of the true religion, What advantage can this be, to the true religion, what benefit to their ſubjects, or whether it amounts to any more, than a commiſſion, to every magiſtrate, to uſe force, for the promoting his own religion? To this queſtion, therefore, you will do well to apply your anſwer, which a man of leſs ſkill than you, will be ſcarce able to do.

YOU tell us, indeed, that "whatever the magiſtrate's opinion be, his power "was given him (as the apoſtles power was to them) for edification only, and "not for deſtruction." But, if the apoſtles power had been given them for one end, and St. Paul, St. Peter, and nine other of the twelve, had had nothing to guide them, but their own opinion, which led them to another end; I aſk you, whether the edification of the church could have been carried on, as it was?

YOU tell us farther, that "it may always be ſaid, of the magiſtrate (what "St. Paul ſaid of himſelf) that he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for "the truth." Witneſs the king of France. If you ſay this, in the ſame ſenſe, that St. Paul ſaid it, of himſelf, who in all things, requiſite for edification, had the immediate direction and guidance of the unerring Spirit of God, and ſo was infallible, we need not go to Rome, for an infallible guide, every country has one, in their magiſtrate. If you apply theſe words to the magiſtrate, in another ſenſe, than what St. Paul ſpoke them in, of himſelf, ſober men will be apt to think, you have a great care to inſinuate into others, a high veneration for the magiſtrate; but that you yourſelf have no over-great reverence for the ſcripture, which you thus uſe: nor for the truth, which you thus defend.

To deny the magiſtrate, to have a power, to compel men to his religion: but yet to ſay, the magiſtrate has a power, and is bound to puniſh men, to make them conſider, 'till they ceaſe to reject the true religion; of which true religion he muſt be judge, or elſe nothing can be done, in diſcharge of this his duty, is ſo like going round about, to come to the ſame place, that it will always be a circle, in mine and other peoples imagination, and not only there, but in your hypotheſis.

Page 76. ALL that you ſay, turns upon the truth, or falſhood, of this propoſition; "that whoever puniſhes any one, in matters of religion, to make him conſider, "takes upon him to be judge for another, what is right, in matters of religion." This, you think, plainly involves a contradiction; and ſo it would, if theſe general terms had, in your uſe of them, their ordinary and uſual meaning. But, Sir, be but pleaſed to take along with you, that, whoever puniſhes any man, your way, in matters of religion, to make him conſider, as you uſe the word conſider, takes upon him to be judge for another what is right, in matters of religion; and you will find it ſo far from a contradiction, that it is a plain truth. For, your way of puniſhing is a peculiar way, and is this: that the magiſtrate, where the national religion is the true religion, ſhould puniſh thoſe, who diſſent from it, to make them conſider, as they ought, i. e. 'till they ceaſe to reject; or, in other words, 'till they conform to it. If, therefore, he puniſhes none but thoſe, who diſſent from, and puniſhes them, 'till they conform to that, which he judges the true religion, does he not take on him to judge for them, what is the true religion?

'TIS true, indeed, what you ſay, there is no other reaſon to puniſh another, to make him conſider, but that he ſhould judge for himſelf; and this will always hold true, amongſt thoſe, who, when they ſpeak of conſidering, mean conſidering, and nothing elſe. But then, theſe things will follow from thence: 1. That, in inflicting of penalties, to make men conſider, the magiſtrate of a country, where the national religion is falſe, no more miſapplies his power, than he, whoſe religion is true; for one has as much right to puniſh the negligent, to make him conſider, ſtudy, and examine matters of religion, as the other. Page 27. 2. If the magiſtrate puniſhes men, in matters of religion, truly to make them conſider, he will puniſh all, that do not conſider, whether conformiſts, or nonconformiſts. 3. If the magiſtrate puniſhes, in matters of religion, to make men conſider, it is, as you ſay, "to make men judge for themſelves: for there is no "uſe of conſidering, but in order to judging." But then, when a man has judged for himſelf, the penalties, for not conſidering, are to be taken off: for elſe, your ſaying "that man is puniſhed to make him conſider, that he may judge "for himſelf," is plain mockery. So that either, you muſt reform your ſcheme, or allow this propoſition to be true, viz. "Whoever puniſhes any man, in mat-"ters of religion, to make him, in your ſenſe, conſider, takes upon him to "judge for another, what is right in matters of religion:" and with it the concluſion, viz. "Therefore, whoever puniſhes any one, in matters of religion, "to make him conſider, takes upon him to do, what no man can do; and, "conſequently, miſapplies his power of puniſhing, if he has that power. Which "concluſion, you ſay, you ſhould readily admit as ſufficiently demonſtrated, if "the propoſition, before-mentioned, were true.

BUT farther, if it could enter into the head of any law-maker, but you, to puniſh men, for the omiſſion of, or to make them perform, any internal act of the mind, ſuch as is conſideration; whoever, in matters of religion, would lay an injunction on men to make them conſider, could not do it without judging for them in matters of religion, unleſs they had no religion at all; and then, they come not within our author's toleration, which is a toleration only of men of different religions, or of different opinions in religion. For, ſuppoſing you the magiſtrate, with full power, and (as you imagined) right, of puniſhing any one, in matters of religion, how could you poſſibly puniſh any one, to make him conſider, without judging for him, what is right, in matters of religion? I will ſuppoſe myſelf brought before your worſhip, under what character you pleaſe, and then I deſire to know what one or more queſtions, you would aſk me, upon my anſwer to which, you could judge me fit to be puniſhed, to make me conſider, without taking upon you to judge for me, what is right, in matters of religion? For I conclude, from the faſhion of my coat, or the colour of my eyes, you would not judge, that I ought to be puniſhed, in matters of religion, to make me conſider. If you could, I ſhould allow you, not only as capable, but much more capable, of coactive power, than other men.

BUT, ſince you could not judge me to need puniſhment, in matters of religion, to make me conſider, without knowing my thoughts, concerning religion, we will ſuppoſe you (being of the church of England) would examine me, in the catechiſm and liturgy of that church, which, poſſibly, I could neither ſay, nor anſwer right to. 'Tis like, upon this, you would judge me fit to be puniſhed, to make me conſider. Wherein, 'tis evident, you judged for me, that the religion of the church of England was right; for, without that judgment of yours, you would not have puniſhed me. We will ſuppoſe you to go yet farther, and examine me concerning the goſpel, and the truth of the principles of the chriſtian religion, and you find me anſwer therein, not to your liking: here again, no doubt, you will puniſh me, to make me conſider; but is it not, becauſe you judge for me, that the chriſtian religion is the right? Go on thus, as far as you will, and, 'till you find, I had no religion at all, you could not puniſh me, to make me to conſider, without taking upon you to judge for me, what is right, in matters of religion.

To puniſh, without a fault, is injuſtice; and to puniſh a man, without judging him guilty of that fault, is alſo injuſtice; and, to puniſh a man, who has any religion, to make him conſider, or, which is the ſame thing, for not having ſufficiently conſidered, is no more, nor leſs, but puniſhing him, for not being of the religion, you think beſt for him; that is the fault, and that is the fault, you judge him guilty of, call it conſidering, as you pleaſe. For let him fall into the hands of a magiſtrate, of whoſe religion he is, he judgeth him to have conſidered ſufficiently. From whence 'tis plain, 'tis religion is judged of, and not conſideration, or want of conſideration. And 'tis in vain to pretend, that he is puniſhed, to make him judge for himſelf: for he, that is of any religion, has already judged for himſelf; and if you puniſh him, after that, under pretence to make him conſider, that he may judge for himſelf, 'tis plain you puniſh him, to make him judge otherwiſe, than he has already judged, and to judge, as you have judged for him.

YOUR next paragraph complains, of my not having contradicted the following words of yours, which I had cited, out of your A. p. 26. which that the reader may judge of, I ſhall here ſet down again. “ And all the hurt, that “ comes to them, by it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, “ for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their “ own conſciences; which certainly is no ſuch miſchief to mankind, as to “ make it more eligible, that there ſhould be no ſuch power veſted in the ma“ giſtrate; but the care of every man's ſoul ſhould be left to him alone, (as this “ author demands, it ſhould be:) that is, that every man ſhould be ſuffered “ quietly, and, without the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care at all of his “ ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed; or, in doing it, to follow his own groundleſs preju“ dices, or unaccountable humour, or any crafty ſeducer, whom he may think “ fit, to take for his guide.” To which I ſhall here ſubjoin my anſwer, and your reply.

L. 2. page 316.	L. 3. p. 76.
“ Why ſhould not “ the care of every “ man's ſoul be left to	“ Which words you ſet down at large; “ but inſtead of contradicting them, or offering to ſhew, “ that the miſchief ſpoken of, is ſuch, as makes it more “ eligible, &c. you only demand,” Why ſhould not the

“ to himſelf,” rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it? Is the magiſtrate commonly more careful of his own, than other men are of theirs? Will you ſay the magiſtrate is leſs expoſed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men? If you cannot lay your hand upon your heart, and ſay all this, What then will be got by the change? And why may not the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf? Eſpecially, if a man be in ſo much danger to miſs the truth, who is ſuffered quietly, and without the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care of his ſoul, if he be ſo pleaſed, or to follow his own prejudices,” &c. “For, if want of moleſtation be the dangerous ſtate, wherein men are likelieſt to miſs the right way; it muſt be confeſſed, that of all men, the magiſtrate is moſt in danger to be in the wrong, and ſo the unfitteſt, (if you take the care of men's ſouls from themſelves) of all men, to be entruſted “with

care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf, rather than the magiſtrate? Is the magiſtrate like to be more concerned for it? Is the magiſtrate like to take more care of it, &c. “As if, not to leave the care of every man's ſoul to himſelf alone, were, as you expreſs it afterwards,” “to take the care of men's ſouls from themſelves:” or, as if to veſt a power in the magiſtrate, to procure, as much as in him lies (i. e. as far as it can be procured, by convenient penalties) that men take ſuch care of their ſouls, as they ought to do, were to leave the care of their ſouls “to the magiſtrate, rather than to themſelves:” Which no man, but yourſelf will imagine. I acknowledge, as freely as you can do, that as every man is more concerned, than any man elſe can be: ſo he is likewiſe more obliged to take care of his ſoul, and that no man can, by any means, be diſcharged of the care of his ſoul; which, when all is done, will never be ſaved, but by his own care of it. But do I contradict any thing of this, when I ſay, that the care of every man's ſoul ought not to be left to himſelf alone? Or, that it is the intereſt of mankind, that the magiſtrate be entruſted and obliged to take care, as far as lies in him, that no man neglect his own ſoul: I thought, I confeſs, that every man was, in ſome ſort, charged with the care of his neighbour's ſoul. But, in your way of reaſoning, he that affirms this, takes away the care of every man's ſoul, from himſelf, and leaves it to his neighbour, rather than to himſelf. But, if this be plainly abſurd, as every one ſees it is, then ſo it muſt be likewiſe, to ſay, that he, that veſts ſuch a power, as we here ſpeak of, in the magiſtrate, “takes away the care of men's ſouls, from themſelves, and places it in the magiſtrate, rather than in themſelves.

“WHAT trifling, then, is it to ſay, here, “if you cannot lay your hand, upon your heart, and ſay all this, (viz. that the magiſtrate is like to be more concerned for other men's ſouls, than themſelves, &c.) What then will be got by the change? For it is plain, here is no ſuch change, as you would inſinuate: but the care of ſouls, which I aſſert to the magiſtrate, is ſo far from diſcharging any man, of the care of his own ſoul, or leſſening his obligation to it, that it ſerves to no other purpoſe, in the world, but to bring men, who otherwiſe would not, to conſider, and do, what the intereſt of their ſouls obliges them to.”

“IT is therefore manifeſt, that the thing, here to be conſidered, is not, whether the magiſtrate be” like to be more concerned for other men's ſouls, or to take more care of themſelves: nor, Whether he be commonly more careful of his own ſoul, than other men are of theirs: nor, Whether he be leſs expoſed, in matters of religion, to prejudices, humours, and crafty ſeducers, than other men: nor yet, Whether he be not more in danger to be in the wrong, than other men, in regard that he never meets with that great and only antidote of mine (as you call it) againſt error, which I here call moleſtation. “But the point, upon which this matter “turns

“ with it. For he never meets with that great and only antidote of yours againſt error, which you here call moleſtation. He never has the benefit of your ſovereign remedy, puniſhment, to make him conſider; which you think ſo neceſſary, that you look on it, as a moſt dangerous ſtate for men to be without it; and therefore tell us,” 'Tis every man's true intereſt, not to be left wholly to himſelf, in matters of religion.”

“ turns, is only this, Whether the ſalvation of ſouls be not better provided for, if the magiſtrate be obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, that every man take ſuch care as he ought, of his ſoul, than if he be not ſo obliged, but the care of every man's ſoul be left to himſelf alone: which certainly any man of common ſenſe may eaſily determine, For, as you will not, I ſuppoſe, deny, but God has more amply provided, for the ſalvation of your own ſoul, by obliging your neighbour, as well as yourſelf, to take care of it; though 'tis poſſible. your neighbour may not be more concerned for it, than yourſelf; or may not be more careful of his own ſoul, than you are of yours; or may be no leſs expoſed, in his matters of religion, to prejudices, &c. than you are; becauſe if you are yourſelf wanting to your own ſoul, it is more likely that you will be brought to take care of it, if your neighbour be obliged to admoniſh and exhort you to it, than if he be not; though it may fall out, that he will not do, what he is obliged to do in that caſe: ſo, I think, it cannot be denied, but the ſalvation of all men's ſouls is better provided for, if, beſides the obligation, which every man has, to take care of his own ſoul (and that, which every man's neighbour has, likewiſe to do it) the magiſtrate alſo be entruſted and obliged to ſee, that no man neglect his ſoul, than it would be, if every man were left to himſelf, in this matter: becauſe, tho' we ſhould admit that the magiſtrate is not like to be, or is not ordinarily more concerned for other men's ſouls, than they themſelves are, &c. it is nevertheleſs, undeniably true ſtill, that whoever neglects his ſoul, is more likely to be brought to take care of it, if the magiſtrate be obliged to do what lies in him, to bring him to do it, than if he be not. Which is enough to ſhew, that it is every man's true intereſt, that the care of his ſoul ſhould not be left to himſelf alone, but that the magiſtrate ſhould be ſo far entruſted with it, as I contend, that he is.”

YOUR complaint of my not having formally contradicted the words abovecited, out of A. p. 26. looking, as if there were ſome weighty argument in them: Page 27.
I muſt inform my reader, that you have ſubjoined to thoſe, wherein you recommend the uſe of force, in matters of religion, by the gain, thoſe, that are puniſhed, ſhall make by it, though it be miſapplied by the magiſtrate, to bring them to a wrong religion. So that theſe words of yours, “all the hurt that comes to them by it,” is all the hurt, that comes to men by a miſapplication of the magiſtrate's power, when, being of a falſe religion, he uſes force to bring men to it. And then your propoſition ſtands thus: “That the ſuffering, what you call tolerable inconveniencies, for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences, is no ſuch miſchief to mankind as to make it more eligible, that there ſhould be no power veſted in the magiſtrate,” to uſe force to bring men to the true religion, though the magiſtrate miſapply this power, i. e. uſe it to bring men to their own religion, when falſe.

THIS is the ſum of what you ſay, if it has any coherent meaning in it: for it being to ſhew the uſefulneſs of ſuch a power, veſted in the magiſtrate, under the miſcarriages and miſapplications it is, in common practice, obſerved to be liable to, can have no other ſenſe. But I having proved, that if ſuch a power be, by the law of nature, veſted in the magiſtrate, every magiſtrate is obliged to uſe it, for the promoting his religion, as far as he believes it to be true, ſhall not much trouble myſelf, if, like a man of art, you ſhould uſe your ſkill, to give it another ſenſe: for ſuch is your natural talent, or great caution, that you love to ſpeak indefinitely, and, as ſeldom as may be, leave yourſelf accountable for any propoſitions, of a clear, determined ſenſe; but, under words of doubtful, but ſeeming plauſible ſignification, conceal a meaning, which, plainly expreſſed, would, at firſt ſight, appear to contradict your own poſitions, or common ſenſe. Inſtances whereof, more than one, we have here, in this ſentence of yours. For, 1. The words, tolerable inconveniencies, carry a very fair ſhew, of ſome very ſlight matter; and yet, when we come to examine them, may comprehend any of thoſe ſeverities, lately uſed in France. For theſe tolerable inconveniencies are the ſame, you, in this very page and elſewhere, call convenient penalties. Convenient, for what? In this very place, they muſt be ſuch, as may keep men "from following their own groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, and crafty ſeducers." And you tell us, the magiſtrate may require men, Page 48. "under convenient penalties, to forſake their falſe religions, and embrace the true." Who now muſt be judge, in theſe caſes, what are convenient penalties? Common ſenſe will tell us, the magiſtrate, that uſes them: but, beſides, Page 50. we have your word for it, that the magiſtrate's prudence and experience enables him to judge beſt, what penalties do agree, with your rule of moderation, which, as I have ſhewn, is no rule at all. So that, at laſt, your tolerable inconveniencies are ſuch, as the magiſtrate ſhall judge convenient, to oppoſe to men's prejudices, humours, and to ſeducers; ſuch, as he ſhall think convenient, to bring men from their falſe religions, or to puniſh their rejecting the true; which, whether they will not reach men's eſtates and liberties, or go as far as any the king of France has uſed, is more than you can be ſecurity for. 2. Another ſet of good words we have here, which, at firſt hearing, are apt to engage men's concern, as if too much could not be done, to recover men from ſo perilous a ſtate, as they ſeem to deſcribe; and thoſe are "men's following "their own groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, or crafty ſeducers." Are not theſe expreſſions to ſet forth a deplorable condition, and to move pity in all, that hear them? Enough to make the unattentive reader ready to cry out, Help, for the Lord's ſake; do any thing, rather than ſuffer ſuch poor, prejudiced, ſeduced people, to be eternally loſt. Whereas, he that examines, what perſons theſe words can, in your ſcheme, deſcribe, will find, they are only ſuch, as any where diſſent from thoſe articles of faith, and ceremonies of outward worſhip, which the magiſtrate, or, at leaſt you, his director, approve of. For whilſt you talk thus, of the true religion, in general, (and that ſo general, that you cannot allow yourſelf to deſcend ſo near to particulars, as to recommend the ſearching and ſtudy of the ſcriptures to find it) and that the power, in the magiſtrate's hands, to uſe force, is to bring men to the true religion; I aſk, Whether you do not think, either he, or you, muſt be judge, which is the true religion, before he can exerciſe that power? And then, he muſt uſe his force upon all thoſe, who diſſent from it, who are then the prejudiced, humourſome, and ſeduced, you here ſpeak of. Unleſs this be ſo, and the magiſtrate be judge, I aſk, Who ſhall reſolve, which is the prejudiced perſon, the prince, with his politicks, or he that ſuffers for his religion? Which the more dangerous ſeducer, Lewis the XIVth, with his dragoons, or Mr. Claude, with his ſermons? It will be no ſmall difficulty to find out the perſons, who are guilty of following groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, or crafty ſeducers, unleſs, in thoſe places, where you ſhall be graciouſly pleaſed to decide the queſtion; and, out of the plenitude of your power and infallibility, to declare, which of the civil ſovereigns, now in being, do, and which do not, eſpouſe the one, only, true religion; and then, we ſhall certainly know, that thoſe, who diſſent from the religion of thoſe magiſtrates, are theſe prejudiced, humourſome, ſeduced perſons.

BUT truly, as you put it here, you leave the matter perplexed, when you defend the eligibleneſs of veſting a power, in the magiſtrate's hands, to remedy, by penalties, men's following their own groundleſs prejudices, unaccountable humours, and crafty ſeducers, when, in the ſame ſentence, you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate, who is veſted with this power, may inflict thoſe penalties on men, "for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their "own conſciences;" which, when you have conſidered, perhaps, you will not think my anſwer ſo wholly beſides the matter, though it ſhewed you, but that one abſurdity, without a formal contradiction to ſo looſe and undetermined a propoſition, that it required more pains, to unravel the ſenſe of what was covered, under deceitful expreſſions, than the weight of the matter, contained in them, was worth.

FOR, beſides what is already ſaid to it: how is it poſſible for any one (who had the greateſt mind, in the world, to contradiction) to deny it to be more eligible, that ſuch a power ſhould be veſted in the magiſtrate, until he knows, to whom you affirm it to be more eligible? Is it more eligible to thoſe, who ſuffer by it, for following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences? for theſe you know, are gainers by it, for they know better, than they did before, where the truth does lie. Is it more eligible to thoſe, who have no other thoughts of religion, but to be of that of their own country without any farther examination? Or is it more eligible to thoſe, who think it their duty to examine matters of religion, and to follow that, which, upon examination, appears to them the truth? The former of theſe two, make, I think, the greater part of mankind, though the latter be the better adviſed: but, upon what grounds it ſhould be more eligible to either of them, that the magiſtrate ſhould, than that he ſhould not, have a power veſted in him, to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, when it cannot be employed, but to bring men to that, which he thinks the true, i. e. to his own religion, is not eaſy to gueſs. Or is it more eligible to the prieſts and miniſters of national religions, every where, that the magiſtrate ſhould be veſted with this power? Who being ſure to be orthodox, will have right to claim the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrate's power, to bring thoſe, whom their arguments cannot prevail, or no arguments can prevail on, to embrace their true religion, and to worſhip God, in decent ways, preſcribed by thoſe, to whom God has left the ordering of ſuch matters. Or, laſt of all, Is it more eligible to all mankind? And are the magiſtrates of the world ſo careful, or ſo lucky, in the choice of their religion, that it would be an advantage to mankind, that they ſhould have a right to do, what in them lies, i. e. to uſe all the force they have, if they think convenient, to bring men to the religion, they think true? When you have told us to which of theſe, or what other, it is more eligible; I ſuppoſe the reader will, without my contradicting it, ſee how little truth there is in it, or how little to your purpoſe.

IF you will pardon me, for not having contradicted that paſſage of yours, we have been conſidering, I will endeavour to make you amends, in what you ſay, in reply to my anſwer to it, and tell you that, notwithſtanding all you ſay to the contrary, ſuch a power, as you would have to be veſted in the magiſtrate, takes away the care of men's ſouls from themſelves, and places it in the magiſtrate, rather than in themſelves. For if, when men have examined, and, upon examination, embrace what appears to them the true religion, the magiſtrate has a right to treat them, as miſled by prejudice, humour, or ſeducers; if he may uſe what force, and inflict what puniſhments, he ſhall think convenient, until they conform to the religion, the magiſtrate judges the true, I think you will ſcarce deny, but that the care of their ſouls is, by ſuch a power, placed rather in the magiſtrate, than in themſelves, and taken, as much from them as, by force and authority, it can be. This whatever you pretend, is the power, which your ſyſtem places in the magiſtrate. Nor can he, upon your principles, exerciſe it otherwiſe, as I imagine I have ſhewed.

YOU ſpeak here, as if this power, which you would have to be veſted in the magiſtrate, did not at all diſcharge, but aſſiſt the care, every one has, or ought to have, of his own ſoul. I grant, were the power, you would place in the magiſtrate, ſuch, as every man has to take care of his neighbour's ſoul, which is to expreſs itſelf, only by the counſel, arguments and perſuaſion; it left him ſtill the free liberty of judging for himſelf; and ſo the care of his ſoul remain'd ſtill in his own hands. But, if men be perſuaded, that the wiſe and good God has veſted a power in the magiſtrate, to be ſo far judge for them, what is the true religion, as to puniſh them for rejecting the religion, which the magiſtrate thinks the true, when offered with ſuch evidence, as he judges ſufficient to convince them; and to puniſh them on, 'till they conſider ſo, as to embrace it; what remains, but that they render themſelves to the care and conduct of a guide, that God, in his goodneſs, has appointed them, who hath authority and commiſſion from God to be judge for them, which is the true religion, and what are arguments proper and ſufficient to convince any one of it; and, he himſelf being convinced of it, why ſhould they be ſo fooliſh, as to ſuffer puniſhments, in oppoſition to a power, which is in the right, and they ought to ſubmit to? To what purpoſe ſhould they, under the weight of penalties, waſte time and pains in examining, ſince, whatever they ſhould judge, upon examination, the magiſtrate judging the arguments and reaſons he offers, for the truth of his religion, proper and ſufficient to convince them, they muſt ſtill lie under the puniſhment, the magiſtrate ſhall think convenient, 'till they do comply?

BESIDES, when they are thus puniſhed, by their magiſtrate, for not conforming, what need they examine? ſince you tell them, "It is not ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation, that all, that are of the true religion, ſhould underſtand the grounds of it." The magiſtrate being of the one only true religion, knows it to be ſo; and he knows, that that religion was tendered to them with ſufficient evidence, and therefore is obliged to puniſh them for rejecting it. This is that, which men muſt, upon your ſcheme, ſuppoſe; for it is, what you yourſelf muſt ſuppoſe, before the magiſtrate can exerciſe that power, you contend to be veſted in him, as is evident to any one, who will put your ſyſtem together, and particularly weigh what you ſay.

Page 48. WHEN, therefore, men are put into ſuch a ſtate as this, that the magiſtrate may judge, which is the true religion; the magiſtrate may judge what is ſufficient evidence of its truth; the magiſtrate may be judge, to whom it is tendered with ſufficient evidence, and puniſh them, that reject it, ſo propoſed, with ſuch penalties, as he ſhall alſo judge convenient, and all this, by God's appointment, and an authority received from the wiſe and benign Governor of all things, I aſk, whether the care of men's ſouls are not taken out of their own hands, and put into the magiſtrate's? Whether, in ſuch a ſtate, they can, or will, think there is any need, or that it is to any purpoſe for them to examine? And whether this be a cure for the natural averſion, that is in men, to conſider and weigh matters of religion; and the way to force, or ſo much as encourage them to examine?

Page 78. BUT, ſay you, the ſalvation of all men's ſouls is better provided for; if, "beſides the obligation, that every man has, to take care of his own ſoul, the magiſtrate alſo be entruſted, and obliged, to ſee, that no man neglect his own ſoul, than it would be, if every man were left to himſelf, in that matter."
Page 64. Whatever ground another may have to ſay this, you can have none: you, who give ſo good reaſon, why conformiſts, tho' never ſo ignorant and negligent, in examining matters of religion, cannot yet be puniſhed to make them conſider, muſt acknowledge, that "ALL men's ſalvation is not the better provided for, by a power veſted in the magiſtrate," which cannot reach the far greateſt part
Page. 22. of men, which are every-where the conformiſts to the national religion. You, that plead ſo well, for the magiſtrate's not examining, whether thoſe, that conform, do it upon reaſon, or conviction, but ſay, it is ordinarily preſumable, they do ſo; wherein, I beſeech you, do you put this care of men's ſalvation, that is placed in the magiſtrate? even in bringing them to outward conformity to the national religion, and there leaving them. And are the ſouls of all mankind the better provided for, if the magiſtrates of the world are veſted with a power, to uſe force, to bring men to an outward profeſſion of what they think the true religion, without any other care of their ſalvation? For thither, and no farther, reaches their uſe of force, in your way of applying it.

GIVE me leave, therefore, to trifle with you once again, and to deſire you, to lay your hand upon your heart, and tell me, what mankind ſhall gain by the change? For I hope, by this time, it is not ſo much a paradox to you, that, if the magiſtrate be commiſſioned by God, to take care of men's ſouls, in your way, it takes away the care of men's ſouls from themſelves, in all thoſe, who have need of this aſſiſtance of the magiſtrate, i. e. all thoſe, who neglect to conſider, and are averſe to examination.

ONE thing more give me leave to obſerve to you, and that is, that taking care of men's ſouls, or taking care, that they neglect not their ſouls, and laying penalties on them, to bring them, in outward profeſſion, to the national religion, are two very different things, tho' in this place and elſewhere, you confound them, and would have penal laws, requiring church-conformity, paſs under the name of care of men's ſouls, for that is the utmoſt, your way of applying force does, or can reach to; and what care is therein taken of men's ſouls, may be ſeen, by the lives and knowledge obſervable, in not a few conformiſts. This is not ſaid to lay any blame on conformity, but to ſhew how improperly you ſpeak, when you call penal laws, made to promote conformity, and force uſed to bring men to it, a care of men's ſouls; when even the exacteſt obſervers, and moſt zealous advancers of conformity, may be, as irreligious, ignorant, and vicious, as any other men.

IN the firſt treatiſe, we heard not a ſyllable of any other uſe, or end, of force, in matters of religion, but only to make men conſider. But, in your ſecond, being forced to own bare-faced the puniſhing of men, for their religion, you call it "a vice to reject the true faith, and to refuſe to worſhip God, in decent ways, "preſcribed by thoſe, to whom God has left the ordering of it;" and tell us, that "it is a fault, which may juſtly be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, not to be "of the national religion, where the true is the national religion." To make this doctrine of perſecution ſeem limited, and go down the better, to your telling us it muſt be only where the national religion is the true, and that the penalties muſt be moderate and convenient; both which limitations, having no other judge, but the magiſtrate: (as I have ſhewed elſewhere, are no limitations at all) you, in words, add a third, that, in effect, ſignifies juſt as much, as the other two: and that is, "If there be a ſufficient means of inſtruction, provided "for all, for inſtructing them, in the truth of it;" of which proviſion the magiſtrate alſo being to be judge, your limitations leave him as free, to puniſh all diſſenters, from his own religion, as any perſecutor can wiſh; for what he will think ſufficient means of inſtruction, it will be hard for you to ſay. Page 13. Page 20. Page 20.

IN the mean time, as far as may be gathered from what you ſay in another place, we will examine what you think ſufficient proviſion for inſtructing men, which you have expreſſed in theſe words: "For, if the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently, for the inſtruction of all his ſubjects, in the true religion; and then, "requires them all, under convenient penalties, to hearken to the teachers and "miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it, with one accord, under their "direction, in publick aſſemblies." That, which ſtumbles one, at the firſt view, of this your method of inſtruction, is, that you leave it uncertain, whether diſſenters muſt firſt be inſtructed, and then profeſs: or elſe firſt profeſs, and then be inſtructed, in the national religion. This you will do well to be a little more clear in, the next time; for you mentioning no inſtruction, but in publick aſſemblies, and perhaps meaning it for a country, where there is little other pains, taken with diſſenters, but the confutation and condemnation of them in aſſemblies, where they are not, they muſt ceaſe to be diſſenters, before they can partake of this ſufficient means of inſtruction. Page 63.

AND now, for thoſe, who do with one accord put themſelves under the direction of the miniſters of the national, and hearken to theſe teachers of the true religion. I aſk, whether one half of thoſe, whereof moſt of the aſſemblies are made up, do, or can (ſo ignorant, as they are) underſtand what they hear from the pulpit? and then, whether, if a man did underſtand, what in many aſſemblies, ordinarily is delivered once a week there, for his inſtruction, he might not yet, at threeſcore years end, be ignorant of the grounds and principles of the chriſtian religion? Your having ſo often, in your letter, mentioned ſufficient proviſion of inſtruction, has forced theſe two ſhort queſtions from me. But I forbear to tell you, what I have heard very ſober people, even of the church of England ſay, upon this occaſion: for you have warned me already, that it ſhall be interpreted, to be a quarrel, to the clergy, in general, if any thing ſhall be taken notice of, in any of them, worthy to be mended. I leave it to thoſe, whoſe profeſſion it is to judge, whether divinity be a ſcience, wherein men may be inſtructed, by an harangue, or two, once a week, upon any ſubject, at a venture, which has no coherence with that, which preceded, or that which is to follow, and this made to people, that are ignorant of the firſt principles of it, and are not capable of underſtanding ſuch ways of diſcourſes. I am ſure, he that ſhould think this a ſufficient means of inſtructing people, in any other ſcience, would at the end of ſeven, or twenty years, find them very little advanced in it. And bating, perhaps, ſome terms and phraſes, belonging to it, would be as far from all true and uſeful knowledge of it, as when they firſt began. Whether it be ſo, in matters of religion, thoſe who have the opportunity to obſerve, muſt judge. And if it appear that, amongſt thoſe of the national church, there be very many ſo ignorant, that there is nothing more frequent, than for the miniſters themſelves to complain of it, it is manifeſt, from thoſe of the national church (whatever may be concluded, from diſſenters) that the means of inſtruction, provided by the law, are not ſufficient, unleſs that be ſufficient means of inſtruction, which men, of ſufficient capacity for other things, may live under, many years, and yet know very little by. If you ſay, it is for want of conſideration, muſt not your remedy of force be uſed, to bring them to it? Or how will the magiſtrate anſwer for it, if he uſe force, to make diſſenters conſider, and let thoſe of his own church periſh, for want of it.

THIS being all, one can well underſtand, by your ſufficient means of inſtruction, as you there explain it, I do not ſee, but men, who have no averſion to be inſtructed, may yet fail of it, notwithſtanding ſuch a proviſion. Perhaps by "exerciſing the true religion, with one accord, under the direction of the "miniſters of it, in publick aſſemblies," you mean ſomething farther; but that not being an ordinary phraſe, will need your explication, to make it underſtood.

CHAP. II.

Of the magiſtrate's commiſſion, to uſe force in matters of religion.

THOUGH, in the foregoing chapter, our examining your doctrine, concerning the magiſtrates, who may, or may not, uſe force, in matters of religion, we have, in ſeveral places, happened to take notice of the commiſſion, whereby you authorize magiſtrates to act; yet we ſhall, in this chapter more particularly conſider that commiſſion. You tell us, "to uſe force, in matters of "religion, is a duty of the magiſtrate, as old as the law of nature, in which "the magiſtrate's commiſſion lies: for the ſcripture does not properly give it "him, but ſuppoſes it." And, more at large, you give us an account of the magiſtrate's commiſſion, in theſe words: "It is true indeed, the author and finiſher "of our faith has given the magiſtrate no new power, or commiſſion; nor was "there any need, that he ſhould, (if himſelf had any temporal power to give:) "for he found him already, even by the law of nature, "the miniſter of God "to the people for good, and bearing the ſword not in vain," i. e. inveſted with "coactive power, and obliged to uſe it, for all the good purpoſes, which it "might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful; even for the reſtraining of falſe and corrupt religion; as Job long before (perhaps, before any "part of the ſcriptures were written) acknowledged, when he ſaid, that "the "worſhipping the ſun, or the moon, was an iniquity to be puniſhed by the "judge." But, though our Saviour has given the magiſtrates no new power; "yet, being king of kings, he expects and requires, that they ſhould ſubmit "themſelves to his ſceptre, and uſe the power, which always belonged to "them, for his ſervice, and for the advancing his ſpiritual kingdom, in the "world. And even that charity, which our great Maſter ſo earneſtly recom-"mends

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Job xxi. 26, 27, 28.

“mends, and ſo ſtrictly requires, of all his diſciples, as it obliges men all to ſeek and promote the good of others, as well as their own, eſpecially their ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means, as their ſeveral places and relations enable them to uſe; ſo does it, eſpecially, oblige the magiſtrate to do it, as a magiſtrate, i. e. by that power, which enables him to do it, above the rate of other men.”

“So far, therefore, is the chriſtian magiſtrate, when he gives his helping hand, to the furtherance of the goſpel, by laying convenient penalties, upon ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from uſing any other means for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the author and finiſher of our faith has directed, that he does no more, than his duty to God, to his Redeemer, and to his ſubjects, requires of him.”

“Christ, you ſay, has given no new power, or commiſſion, to the magiſtrate:” and for this you give ſeveral reaſons, 1. “There was no need that he ſhould.” Yet it ſeems ſtrange, that the chriſtian magiſtrate alone ſhould have an exerciſe of coactive power, in matters of religion; and yet our Saviour ſhould ſay nothing of it, but leave them to that commiſſion, which was common to them, with all other magiſtrates. The chriſtian religion, in caſes of leſs moment, is not wanting, in its rules; and I know not, whether you will not charge the new teſtament, with a great defect, if that law alone, which teaches the only true religion, that law, which all magiſtrates, who are of the true religion, receive and embrace, ſhould ſay nothing at all, of ſo neceſſary and important a duty, to thoſe, who alone are in a capacity to diſcharge it, but leave them only to that general law of nature, which others, who are not qualified to uſe this force, have in common with them.

This, at leaſt, ſeems needful, if a new commiſſion does not, that the chriſtian magiſtrates ſhould have been inſtructed, what degree of force, they ſhould uſe, and been limited to your moderate penalties; ſince, for above 1200 years, though they have readily enough found out your commiſſion, to uſe force, they never found out your moderate uſe of it, which is that alone, which, you aſſure us, is uſeful and neceſſary.

2. You ſay, “if our Saviour had any temporal power to give” whereby you ſeem to give this, as a reaſon, why he gave not the civil magiſtrate power, to uſe force, in matters of religion, that he had it not to give. You tell us, in the ſame paragraph, that “he is king of kings;” and he tells us himſelf, “that all power is given unto him, in heaven and earth:” ſo that he could have given, what power, to whom, and to what purpoſe, he had pleaſed: and concerning this there needs no, if.

Matt. xxviii. 18.

3. “For he found him already, by the law of nature, inveſted with coactive power, and obliged to uſe it, for all the good purpoſes, which it might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful.’ He found alſo fathers, huſbands, maſters, inveſted with their diſtinct powers, by the ſame law, and under the ſame obligation: and yet he thought it needful to preſcribe to them, in the uſe of thoſe powers: but there was no need he ſhould do ſo, to the civil magiſtrates, in the uſe of their power, in matters of religion; becauſe, though fathers, huſbands, maſters, were liable to exceſs in the uſe of theirs, yet chriſtian magiſtrates were not, as appears, by their having always kept to thoſe moderate meaſures, which you aſſure us, to be the only neceſſary and uſeful.

And what, at laſt, is their commiſſion? “Even that of charity, which obliges all men to ſeek and promote the good of others, eſpecially their ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means, as their ſeveral places, and relations, enable them to uſe, eſpecially magiſtrates, as magiſtrates.” This duty of charity is well diſcharged, by the magiſtrate, as magiſtrate, is it not? in bringing men to an outward profeſſion of any, even of the true religion, and leaving them there? But, Sir, I aſk you, who muſt be judge, what is for the ſpiritual and eternal good of his ſubjects, the magiſtrate himſelf, or no? if not he himſelf, who for him? or can it be done, without any one's judging, at all? If he, the magiſtrate, muſt judge, every where, himſelf, what is for the ſpiritual and eternal good of his ſubjects, as I ſee no help for it; if the magiſtrate be, every where, by the law of nature, obliged to promote their ſpiritual and eternal good, is not the true religion like to find great advantage in the world, by the uſe of force, in the magiſtrate's hands? And is not this a plain demonſtration, that God has, by the law of nature, given commiſſion to the magiſtrate, to uſe force, for the promoting the true religion; ſince (as it is evident) the execution of ſuch a commiſſion will do ſo much more harm, than good?

To ſhew that your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, with a general neceſſity of force, authorizes the civil power in the uſe of it, you uſe the following words, “ That force does ſome ſervice, towards the making of ſcholars and Page 17. “ artiſts, I ſuppoſe you will eaſily grant. Give me leave, therefore, to aſk, how “ it does it? I ſuppoſe you will ſay, not by its direct and proper efficacy, (for “ force is no more capable to work learning, or arts, than the belief of true “ religion, in men, by its direct and proper efficacy;) but, by prevailing upon “ thoſe, who are deſigned for ſcholars, or artiſts, to receive inſtruction, and to “ apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe means and helps, which are proper to “ make them, what they are deſigned to be: that is, it does it indirectly and at “ a diſtance. Well then, if all the uſefulneſs of force, towards bringing “ ſcholars, or apprentices, to the learning, or ſkill, they are deſigned to attain, be “ only an indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; I pray what is it, that warrants “ and authorizes ſchoolmaſters, tutors, or maſters, to uſe force upon their “ ſcholars, or apprentices, to bring them to learning, or the ſkill of their arts, and “ trades, if ſuch an indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs, of force, together “ with that neceſſity of it, which experience diſcovers, will not do it: I “ believe, you will acknowledge, that even ſuch an uſefulneſs, together with that “ neceſſity, will ſerve the turn, in theſe caſes. But then, I would fain know, “ why the ſame kind of uſefulneſs, joined with the like neceſſity, will not, as “ well, do it, in the caſe before us? I confeſs, I ſee no reaſon, why it ſhould “ not; nor do I believe, you can aſſign any. You aſk here, what authorizes “ ſchoolmaſters, or maſters, to uſe force, on their ſcholars, and apprentices, if “ ſuch an indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, together with neceſſity, does not “ do it?” I anſwer, neither your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, nor the neceſſity, you ſuppoſe, of it. For I do not think, you will ſay, that any ſchoolmaſter has a power to teach, much leſs to uſe force to any one's child, without the conſent and authority of the father: but a father, you will ſay, has a power to uſe force, to correct his child, to bring him to learning, or ſkill, in that trade, he is deſigned to; and to this, the father is authorized, by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force. This I deny, that the mere ſuppoſed uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force authorizes the father to uſe it; for then, whenever he judged it uſeful and neceſſary for his ſon, to prevail with him to apply himſelf to any trade, he might uſe force upon him, to that purpoſe; which I think, neither you, nor any body elſe, will ſay, a father has a right to do, on his idle, and, perhaps, married ſon, at 30 or 40 years old.

THERE is, then, ſomething elſe, in the caſe; and whatever it be, that authorizes the father, to uſe force upon his child, to make him a proficient in it, authorizes him alſo, to chuſe that trade, art, or ſcience, he would have him a proficient in: for the father can no longer uſe force upon his ſon, to make him attain any art, or trade, than he can preſcribe to him, the art, or trade, he is to attain. Put your parallel now, if you pleaſe: the father, by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force, is authorized to uſe it upon his child, to make him attain any art or ſcience; therefore, the magiſtrate is authorized to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, becauſe it is uſeful and neceſſary. Thus far you have uſed it, and you think it does well. But let us go on with the parallel: this uſefulneſs and neceſſity of force authorizes the father to uſe it, to make his ſon apply himſelf, to the uſe of the means, and helps, which are proper to make him, what he is deſigned to be, no longer than it authorizes the father to deſign what his ſon ſhall be, and to chuſe for him, the art, or trade, he ſhall be of: and ſo the uſefulneſs and neceſſity, you ſuppoſe, in force, to bring men to any church, cannot authorize the magiſtrate, to uſe force, any farther, than he has a right to chuſe for any one, what church, or religion, he ſhall be of. So that if you will ſtick to this argument, and allow the parallel, between the magiſtrate and a father, and the right they have, to uſe force, for the inſtructing of their ſubjects in religion, and children in arts, you muſt either allow the magiſtrate to have power, to chuſe what religion his ſubjects ſhall be of, which you have denied, or elſe, that he has no power to uſe force to make them uſe means to be of it.

A FATHER being entruſted with the care and proviſion for his child, is, as well bound in duty, as fitted by natural love and tenderneſs, to ſupply the defects of his tender age. When it is born, the child cannot move itſelf for the eaſe and help of natural neceſſities, the parents hands muſt ſupply that inability, and feed, cleanſe and ſwaddle it. Age having given more ſtrength, and the exerciſe of the limbs, the parents are diſcharged from the trouble, of putting meat into the mouth of the child, clothing or unclothing, or carrying him in their arms. The ſame duty and affection, which required ſuch kind of helps to the infant, makes them extend their thoughts to other cares for him, when he is grown a little bigger; it is not only a preſent ſupport, but a future, comfortable ſubſiſtence begins to be thought on: to this, ſome art, or ſcience, is neceſſary, but the child's ignorance and want of proſpect makes him unable to chuſe. And hence the father has a power to chuſe for him, that the flexible and docile part of life may not be ſquandered away, and the time of inſtruction and improvement be loſt, for want of direction. The trade, or art, being choſen by the father, it is the exerciſe and induſtry of the child muſt acquire it to himſelf; but induſtry, uſually wanting in children, the ſpur, which reaſon and foreſight gives to the endeavours of grown men, the father's rod and correction is fain to ſupply that want, to make him apply himſelf to the uſe of thoſe means and helps, which are proper to make him, what he is deſigned to be. But, when the child is once come to the ſtate of manhood, and to be the poſſeſſor and free diſpoſer of his goods and eſtate, he is then diſcharged from this diſcipline of his parents, and they have, no longer, any right to chuſe any art, ſcience, or courſe of life for him; or, by force, to make him apply himſelf to the uſe of thoſe means, which are proper to make him be, what he deſigns to be. Thus the want of knowledge to chuſe a fit calling, and want of knowledge of the neceſſity of pains and induſtry, to attain ſkill in it, puts a power into the parents hands, to uſe force, where it is neceſſary, to procure the application and diligence of their children, in that, which their parents have thought fit to ſet them to; but it gives this power to the parents, only, and to no other, whilſt they live: and, if they die, whilſt their children need it, to their ſubſtitutes; and there it is ſafely placed: for ſince their want of knowledge, during their nonage, makes them want direction; and want of reaſon often makes them need puniſhment and force, to excite their endeavours, and keep them intent to the uſe of thoſe means, that lead to the end, they are directed to, the tenderneſs and love of parents will engage them to uſe it, only for their good, and generally to quit it too, when, by the title of manhood, they come to be above the direction and diſcipline of children. But, how does this prove, that the magiſtrate has any right, to force men, to apply themſelves, to the uſe of thoſe means and helps, which are proper to make them of any religion, more than it proves, that the magiſtrate has a right to chuſe for them, what religion they ſhall be of?

TO your queſtion therefore, "What is it, that warrants and authorizes ſchool-"maſters, tutors, and maſters, to uſe force upon their ſcholars, or apprentices?" I anſwer, a commiſſion from the father, or mother, or thoſe, who ſupply their places; for, without that, no indirect, or at a diſtance, uſefulneſs, or ſuppoſed neceſſity, could authorize them.

BUT then, you will aſk, Is it not this uſefulneſs and neceſſity, that gives this power to the father and mother? I grant it. "I would fain know then, ſay you, "why the ſame uſefulneſs, joined with the like neceſſity, will not as well do, "in the caſe before us?" And I, Sir, will as readily tell you: becauſe the underſtanding of the parents is to ſupply the want of it, in the minority of their children; and, therefore, they have a right, not only to uſe force, to make their children apply themſelves to the means of acquiring any art, or trade, but to chuſe alſo the trade, or calling, they ſhall be of. But when, being come out of the ſtate of minority, they are ſuppoſed of years of diſcretion, to chuſe what they will deſign themſelves to be, they are alſo at liberty to judge what application and induſtry they will uſe, for the attaining of it; and then, how negligent ſoever they are, in the uſe of the means, how averſe ſoever to inſtruction, or application, they are paſt the correction of a ſchool-maſter, and their parents can no longer chuſe, or deſign, for them, what they ſhall be, nor "uſe force to prevail with them, to apply themſelves, to the uſe of thoſe means, "and helps, which are proper to make them, what they are deſigned to be." He that imagines a father, or tutor, may ſend his ſon to ſchool, at thirty, or forty, years old, and order him to be whipp'd there, or that any indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs will authorize him to be ſo uſed, will be thought fitter to be ſent thither himſelf, and there to receive due correction.

When you have conſidered, it is otherwiſe, in the caſe of the magiſtrate uſing force, your way, in matters of religion; that there his underſtanding is not to ſupply the defect of underſtanding, in his ſubjects, and that only for a time; that he cannot chuſe, for any of his ſubjects, what religion he ſhall be of, as you yourſelf confeſs; and that this power of the magiſtrate, if it be (as is claimed by you) over men of all ages, parts and endowments, you will perhaps, "ſee ſome reaſon, why it ſhould not do, in the caſe before us, as well as in "that of ſchoolmaſters, and tutors, though you believe, I cannot aſſign any." But, Sir, will your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, together with your ſuppoſed neceſſity, authorize the maſter of the ſhoe-makers company, to take any one, who comes into his hands, and puniſh him, for not being of the ſhoe-makers company, and not coming to their guild, when he, who has a right to chuſe, of what trade and company he will be, thinks it not his intereſt to be a ſhoe-maker? nor can he, or any body elſe, imagine, that this force, this puniſhment, is uſed to make him a good ſhoe-maker, when it is ſeen and avowed, that the puniſhments ceaſe, and they are free from it, who enter themſelves of the company, whether they are really ſhoe-makers, or in earneſt apply themſelves to be ſo or no. How much it differs from this, that the magiſtrate ſhould puniſh men, for not being of his church, who chuſe not to be of it, and when they are once enter'd into the communion of it, are puniſhed no more, though they are as ignorant, unſkilful, and unpractiſed in the religion of it, as before: how much, I ſay, this differs, from the caſe I propoſed, I leave you to conſider. For, after all your pretences, of uſing force, for the ſalvation of ſouls, and conſequently, to make men really chriſtians, you are fain to allow, and you give reaſons for it, that force is uſed, only to thoſe who are out of your church: but whoever are once in it, are free from force, whether they be really chriſtians, and apply themſelves to thoſe things, which are for the ſalvation of their ſouls, or no.

As to what you ſay, that, whether they chuſe it, or no, they ought to chuſe it; for your magiſtrate's religion is the true religion; that is the queſtion between you and them: but be that as it will, if force be to be uſed, in the caſe, I have proved that, be the magiſtrate's religion true, or falſe, he, whilſt he believes it to be true, is under an obligation to uſe force, as if it were true.

But, ſince you think your inſtance of children ſo weighty and preſſing, to return you your queſtion; I aſk you then, are not parents as much authorized to teach their children their religion, as they are to teach them their trade, when they have deſigned them to it? May they not as lawfully correct them, to make them learn their catechiſe, or the principles of their religion, as they may to make them learn Clenard's grammar? or may they not uſe force, to make them go to maſs, or whatever they believe, to be the worſhip of the true religion, as to go to ſchool, or learn any art, or trade? if they may, as I think you will not deny, unleſs you will ſay, that none but orthodox parents may teach their children any religion; if they may, I ſay then, pray tell me a reaſon (if your arguments, from the diſcipline of children, be good) why the magiſtrate may not uſe force, to bring men to his religion, as well as parents may uſe force, to inſtruct children, and bring them up in theirs? When you have conſider'd this, you will, perhaps, find ſome difference between the ſtate of children and grown men, betwixt thoſe, under tutelage, and thoſe, who are free and at their own diſpoſal; and be inclined to think, that thoſe reaſons, which ſubject children, in their nonage, to the uſe of force, may not, nor do concern men, at years of diſcretion.

You tell us farther, "That commonwealths are inſtituted, for the attaining "of all the benefits, which political government can yield: and therefore, if "the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may, any way, be procured, or ad"vanced, by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts "muſt, in all reaſon, be received, amongſt the ends of civil ſociety, and ſo "conſequently, fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction." A. P. 18. Concerning the extent of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction, and the ends of civil ſociety, whether the author, or you, have begged the queſtion, which is the chief buſineſs of your 56th, and two or three following pages, I ſhall leave it to the readers to judge, and bring the matter, if you pleaſe, to a ſhorter iſſue. The queſtion is, Whether the magiſtrate has any power to interpoſe force, in matters of religion, or for the ſalvation of ſouls? The argument againſt it is, that civil ſocieties are not conſtituted for that end, and the magiſtrate cannot uſe force, for ends, for which the commonwealth was not conſtituted.

THE end of a commonwealth conſtituted can be ſuppoſed no other, than what men, in the conſtitution of, and entering into it, propoſed; and that could be nothing, but protection, from ſuch injuries from other men, which, they deſiring to avoid, nothing but force could prevent, or remedy: all things, but this, being as well attainable by men, living in a neighbourhood, without the bonds of a commonwealth, they could propoſe to themſelves no other thing, but this, in quitting their natural liberty, and putting themſelves under the umpirage of a civil ſovereign, who, therefore, had the force of all the members of the commonwealth put into his hands, to make his decrees to this end be obeyed. Now ſince no man, or ſociety of men can, by their opinions in religion, or ways of worſhip, do any man, who differed from them any injury, which he could not avoid, or redreſs, if he deſired it, without the help of force; the puniſhing any opinion, in religion, or ways of worſhip, by the force given the magiſtrate, could not be intended by thoſe, who conſtituted, or entered into the commonwealth, and ſo could be no end of it, but quite the contrary. For force, from a ſtronger hand, to bring a man to a religion, which another thinks the true, being an injury, which in the ſtate of nature, every one would avoid, protection, from ſuch injury, is one of the ends of a commonwealth, and ſo every man has a right to toleration.

IF you will ſay, that commonwealths are not voluntary ſocieties, conſtituted by men, and by men freely entered into, I ſhall deſire you to prove it.

IN the mean time, allowing it you for good, that commonwealths are conſtituted by God, for ends, which he has appointed, without the conſent and contrivance of men. If you ſay, that one of thoſe ends is the propagation of the true religion, and the ſalvation of men's ſouls; I ſhall deſire you to ſhew me, any ſuch end, expreſly appointed by God, in revelation; which ſince, as you confeſs, you cannot do, you have recourſe to the general law of nature; and what is that? the law of reaſon, whereby every one is commiſſioned to do good. And the propagating the true religion, for the ſalvation of mens ſouls, being doing good, you ſay, the civil ſovereigns are commiſſioned and required, by that law, to uſe force, for thoſe ends. But ſince, by this law, all civil ſovereigns are commiſſioned, and obliged, alike, to uſe their coactive power, for the propagating the true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls; and it is not poſſible, for them, to execute ſuch a commiſſion, or obey that law, but by uſing force, to bring men to that religion, which they judge the true; by which uſe of force, much more harm, than good, would be done, towards the propagating the true religion, in the world, as I have ſhewed elſewhere: therefore, no ſuch commiſſion, whoſe execution would do more harm than good, more hinder than promote the end, for which it is ſuppoſed given, can be a commiſſion from God by the law of nature. And this, I ſuppoſe, may ſatisfy you about the end of civil ſocieties, or commonwealths, and anſwer what you ſay, concerning the ends, attainable by them.

But that you may not think the great poſition of yours, which is ſo often uſhered in, with doubtleſs, (for which, you imagine, you have ſufficient warrant, in a miſapplied ſchool-maxim) is paſt over too ſlightly, and is not ſufficiently anſwer'd; I ſhall give you that farther ſatisfaction.

Page 58. You ſay, " civil ſocieties are inſtituted, for the attaining all the benefits, " which civil ſociety, or political government can yield;" and the reaſon you give for it, " becauſe it has hitherto been univerſally acknowledged, that no " power is given in vain:" and therefore, " if I except any of thoſe benefits, I " ſhall be obliged to admit that the power of attaining them was given in vain." And, if I do omit it, no harm will follow in human affairs: or if I may borrow an elegant expreſſion of yours, out of the foregoing leaf, " the fortune of " Europe does not turn upon it." In the voluntary inſtitution, and beſtowing of power, there is no abſurdity, or inconvenience, at all, that power, ſufficient for ſeveral ends, ſhould be limited by thoſe, that give the power, only to one, or ſome part of them. The power, which a general, commanding a potent army, has, may be enough to take more towns, than one, from the enemy, or to ſuppreſs a domeſtick ſedition; and yet the power of attaining thoſe benefits, which is in his hand, will not authorize him to employ the force of the army therein, if he be commiſſioned only to beſiege, and take one certain place. So it is in a commonwealth. The power, that is in the civil ſovereign, is the force of all the ſubjects of the commonwealth, which ſuppoſing it ſufficient, for other ends, than the preſerving the members of the commonwealth, in peace, from injury and violence: yet if thoſe, who gave him that power, limited the application of it, to that ſole end, no opinion of any other benefits, attainable by it, can authorize him to uſe it otherwiſe.

Our Saviour tells us expreſly, That " all power was given him in heaven Mat. xxviii. 18. " and earth." By which power, I imagine you will not ſay, " that the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt" of thoſe men, whom, you think need the help of political force, and of all other men too, could not, any way, be procured, or advanced; and yet, if you will hear him in another place, you will find this power (which being all power, could certainly have wrought on all men) limited John xvii. 2. to a certain number: he ſays, " Thou haſt given him [i. e. thy ſon] " power over all fleſh, that he ſhould give eternal life, to as many, as thou " haſt given him." Whether your univerſally acknowledged maxim, of logick, be true enough, to authorize you, to ſay, that any part of this power was given him in vain, and to enable you to draw conſequences from it, you were beſt ſee.

But, were your maxim ſo true, that it proved, that ſince it might " indirectly and at a diſtance" do ſome ſervice, towards the " procuring, or advancing, the ſpiritual intereſt" of ſome few ſubjects of a commonwealth, therefore force was to be employed to that end; yet that will ſcarce make good this Page 56. doctrine of yours; " doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted, for the attaining " all thoſe benefits, which political government can yield: therefore, if the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men may, any way be procured, or advanced, " by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts muſt, " in all reaſon, be reckoned among the ends of civil ſocieties, and ſo, conſequently, fall within the compaſs of the magiſtrate's juriſdiction. For granting it true, that commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining all thoſe benefits, which political government can yield, it does not follow, that the procuring and advancing the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt" of ſome few members of the commonwealth, by an application of power, which indirectly, and at a diſtance, or by accident, may do ſome ſervice, that way, whilſt, at the ſame time it prejudices a far greater number, in their civil intereſts, can, with reaſon, be reckoned among the ends of civil ſociety,

" That commonwealths are inſtituted for theſe ends, viz. for the procuring, Page 55. preſerving and advancing men's civil intereſts, you will ſay, no man will " deny."

"deny." To ſacrifice, therefore, theſe civil intereſts, of a great number of people, which are the allowed ends of the commonwealth, to the uncertain expectation of ſome ſervice, to be done, indirectly and at a diſtance, to a far leſs number, as experience has always ſhewed thoſe really converted, to the true religion by force, to be, if any at all; cannot be one of the ends of the commonwealth. Though the advancing of the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt be of infinite advantage to the perſons, who receive that benefit; yet, if it can be thought a benefit to the commonwealth, when it is procured them, with the diminiſhing or deſtroying the civil intereſts of great numbers of their fellow-citizens; then, the ravaging of an enemy, the plague, or a famine, may be ſaid, to bring a benefit to the commonwealth: for either of theſe may, indirectly and at a diſtance, do ſome ſervice, towards the advancing, or procuring, the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of ſome of thoſe, who ſuffer in it.

In the two latter paragraphs, you except againſt my want of exactneſs in ſetting down your opinion, I am arguing againſt. Had it been, any way, to take off the force of what you ſay, or that the reader could have been miſled by my words, in any part of the queſtion, I was arguing againſt, you had had reaſon to complain: if not, you had done better to have entertained the reader, with a clearer anſwer to my argument, than ſpent your ink, and his time, needleſsly, to ſhew ſuch niceneſs. Page 57.

My argument is as good againſt your tenet, in your own words, as in mine, which you except againſt; your words are, "doubtleſs commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining of all the benefits, which political government can yield; and, therefore, if the ſpiritual and eternal intereſt of men may, any way, be procured, or advanced, by political government, the procuring and advancing thoſe intereſts muſt, in all reaſon, be reckoned amongſt the ends of civil ſocieties." A. P. 18.

To which I anſwered, that if this be ſo, "Then this poſition muſt be true, viz. that all ſocieties, whatſoever, are inſtituted, for the attaining all the benefits, that they may, any way, yield; there being nothing peculiar to civil ſociety, in the caſe, why that ſociety ſhould be inſtituted, for the attaining all the benefits, it can, any way, yield, and other ſocieties not. By which argument, it will follow, that all ſocieties are inſtituted, for one and the ſame end, i. e. for the attaining all the benefits, that they can any way yield. By which account, there will be no difference between church and ſtate, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the Eaſt-India company: all which have hitherto been thought diſtinct ſorts of ſocieties, inſtituted for different ends. If your hypotheſis hold good, one of the ends of the family muſt be to preach the goſpel, and adminiſter the ſacrament; and one buſineſs of an army to teach languages, and propagate religion; becauſe theſe are benefits, ſome way or other, attainable by thoſe ſocieties; unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſufficient impediment: and that will be ſo in other caſes." To which you reply, "nor will it follow from hence, that all ſocieties are inſtituted for one and the ſame end (as you imagine it will) unleſs you ſuppoſe all ſocieties enabled, by the power they are endued with, to attain the ſame end, which I believe no man hitherto did ever affirm. And therefore, notwithſtanding this poſition, there may be ſtill as great a difference, as you pleaſe, between church and ſtate, a commonwealth and an army, or between a family and the Eaſt-India company. Which ſeveral ſocieties, as they are inſtituted for different ends, ſo are they, likewiſe, furniſhed with different powers, proportionate to their reſpective ends." In which, the reaſon, you give, to deſtroy my inference, I am to thank you for, if you underſtood the force of it, it being the very ſame I bring, to ſhew that my inference, from your way of arguing, is good, I ſay, that from your way of reaſonings about the ends of government, "it would follow, that all ſocieties were inſtituted, for one and the ſame end; unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſufficient impediment." And you tell me, here, it will not follow, "unleſs I ſuppoſe all ſocieties enabled, by the powers they are endued with, to attain the ſame end;" which, in other words, is, unleſs I ſup- L. 2. p. 283. Page 58.

I ſuppoſe all, who have, in their hands, the force of any ſociety, to have all of them the ſame commiſſion.

THE natural force of all the members of any ſociety, or of thoſe, who, by the ſociety, can be procured to aſſiſt it, is, in one ſenſe, called the power of that ſociety. This power of force, is generally put into ſome one, or few, perſons hands, with direction and authority how to uſe it; and this, in another ſenſe, is called alſo the power of the ſociety: and this is the power you here ſpeak of, and in theſe following words, viz. “ ſeveral ſocieties, as they are inſtituted for different ends; ſo likewiſe are they furniſhed with different powers, proportionate to their reſpective ends.” The power, therefore of any ſociety, in this ſenſe, is nothing but the authority and direction, given to thoſe, that have the management of the force, or natural power, of the ſociety, how, and to what ends, to uſe it, by which commiſſion the ends of ſocieties are known and diſtinguiſhed. So that all ſocieties, wherein thoſe, who are intruſted with the management of the force, or natural power of the ſociety, have commiſſion and authority to uſe that force, or natural power, of the ſociety, to attain the ſame benefits, are inſtituted for the ſame end. And therefore, if in all ſocieties thoſe, who have the management of the force, or natural power of the ſociety, are commiſſioned, or authorized, to uſe that force, to attain all the benefits, attainable by it, all ſocieties are inſtituted to the ſame end: and ſo, what I ſaid, will Page 51. ſtill be true, viz. “ That a family and an army, a commonwealth and a church, have all the ſame. And, if your hypotheſis hold good, one of the ends of a family muſt be to preach the goſpel, and adminiſter the ſacraments; and one buſineſs of an an army to teach languages, and propagate religion, becauſe theſe are benefits, ſome way or other, attainable by thoſe ſocieties; unleſs you take want of commiſſion and authority to be a ſufficient impediment: and that will be ſo too in other caſes.” To which you have ſaid nothing, but what does confirm it, which you will a little better ſee, when you have conſidered, that any benefit, attainable by force, or natural power, of a ſociety, does not Page 58. prove the ſociety to be inſtituted for that end, 'till you ſhew, that thoſe, to whom the management of the force of the ſociety is intruſted, are commiſſioned to uſe it, to that end.

AND therefore, to your next paragraph, I ſhall think it anſwer enough, to print here, ſide by ſide, with it, that paragraph of mine, to which you intended it as an anſwer.

L. 2. page 283. “ It is a benefit to have true knowledge and philoſophy embraced and aſſented to, in any civil ſociety, or government. But will you ſay, therefore, that it is a benefit to the ſociety, or one of the ends of government, that all who are not peripateticks, ſhould be puniſhed, to make men find out the truth, and profeſs it? This, indeed, might be thought a fit way, to make ſome men embrace the peripatetick philoſophy, but not a proper way, to find the truth. For, perhaps the peripatetick philoſophy may not be true; perhaps, a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy it: perhaps a great many, who have ſtudied it, cannot be convinced of the truth of it: and therefore, it cannot be a benefit to the commonwealth, nor one of the ends of it, that theſe members of the ſociety ſhould be diſturbed, and diſ-

L. 3. p. 58. To your next paragraph, after what has already been ſaid, I think it may ſuffice to ſay, as follows, though perhaps the peripatetick philoſophy may not be true, (and perhaps it is no great matter, if it be not) yet the true religion is undoubtedly true. And though perhaps a great many have not time, nor parts to ſtudy that philoſophy, (and perhaps it may be no great matter neither, if they have not) yet all, who have the true religion duly tendered them, have time, and all, but ideots and madmen, have parts likewiſe, to ſtudy it, as much as it is neceſſary for them, to ſtudy it. And, though perhaps a great many, who have ſtudied that philoſophy, cannot be convinced of the truth of it, (which perhaps is no great wonder) yet no man ever ſtudied the true religion, with ſuch care and diligence,

“ eaſed to no purpoſe, when they are guilty of no fault. For juſt the ſame reaſon, it cannot be a benefit to civil ſociety, that men ſhould be puniſhed in Denmark for not being lutherans, in Geneva, for not being calviniſts, and in Vienna, for not being papiſts, as a means to make them find out the true religion. For ſo, upon your grounds, men muſt be treated in thoſe places, as well as in England, for not being of the church of England. And then, I beſeech you, conſider the great benefit will accrue to men, in ſociety, by this method: and I ſuppoſe it will be a hard thing for you to prove, that ever civil governments were inſtituted, to puniſh men, for not being of this, or that, ſect in religion; however, by accident, indirectly and at a diſtance, it may be an occaſion to one, perhaps, of a thouſand, or an hundred, to ſtudy that controverſy, which is all you expect from it. If it be a benefit, pray tell me what benefit it is. A civil benefit, it cannot be. For men's civil intereſts are diſturbed, injured, and impaired by it. And what ſpiritual benefit that can be, to any multitude of men, to be puniſhed for diſſenting from a falſe, or erroneous profeſſion, I would have you find out; unleſs it be a ſpiritual benefit to be in danger to be driven into a wrong way. For, if in all differing ſects, one is in the wrong, it is a hundred to one but that, from which any one diſſents, and is puniſhed for diſſenting from, is the wrong.”

as he might, and ought to, uſe, and with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it. And that thoſe, who cannot otherwiſe be brought to do this, ſhall be a little diſturbed and diſeaſed, to bring them to it, I take to be the intereſt, not only of thoſe particular perſons, who, by this means, may be brought into the way of ſalvation, but of the commonwealth, likewiſe upon theſe two accounts.

1. Becauſe the true religion, which this method propagates, makes good men; and good men are always the beſt ſubjects, or members of a commonwealth; not only as they do more ſincerely and zealouſly promote the publick good than other men; but likewiſe in regard of the favour of God, which they often procure to the ſocieties, of which they are members. And,

2. Becauſe this care, in any commonwealth, of God's honour and men's ſalvation, entitles it to his ſpecial protection and bleſſing. So that, where this method is uſed, it proves both a ſpiritual and a civil benefit to the commonwealth.

YOU tell us, “the true religion is undoubtedly true.” If you had told us too, who is undoubtedly judge of it, you had put all paſt doubt: but till you will be pleaſed to determine that, it would be undoubtedly true, that the king of Denmark is as undoubtedly judge of it, at Copenhagen, and the emperor at Vienna, as the king of England, in this iſland. I do not ſay, they judge as right, but they are by as much right judges, and therefore have as much right to puniſh thoſe, who diſſent from lutheraniſm and popery, in thoſe countries, as any other civil magiſtrate has to puniſh any diſſenters from the national religion, any where elſe. And who can deny, but theſe briars and thorns, laid in their way, by the penal laws of thoſe countries, may do ſome ſervice, indirectly and at a diſtance, to bring men there, ſincerely and impartially to examine matters of religion, and ſo to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them, which the bare outward profeſſion of any religion in the world will not do.

“THIS true religion, which is undoubtedly true, you tell us too, never any body ſtudied with ſuch care and diligence, as he might, and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it.”

IF you will reſolve it, in your ſhort, circular way, and tell me ſuch diligence, as one ought to uſe, is ſuch diligence, as brings one to be convinced, it is a queſtion too eaſy to be aſked. If I ſhould deſire to know plainly, what is to be underſtood by it, it would be a queſtion too hard for you to anſwer, and therefore I ſhall not trouble you with demanding, what this diligence, which a man may, and ought to uſe, is; nor what you mean by an honeſt mind. I only aſk you, Whether force, your way applied, be able to produce them? that ſo the commonwealth may have the benefits you propoſe, from men's being convinced of, and conſequently embracing, the true religion, which, you ſay, no body can miſs, who is brought to that diligence, and that honeſt mind.

THE benefits to the commonwealth are, 1. "That the true religion, that this "method propagates, makes good men, and good men are always the beſt ſubjects, and often procure the favour of God, to the ſociety, they are members "of." Being forward enough to grant, that nothing contributes ſo much to the benefit of a ſociety, as that it be made up of good men, I began preſently to give into your method, which promiſes ſo ſure a way, to make them ſo ſtudy the true religion, that they cannot miſs the being convinced of the truth of it, and ſo hardly avoid being really of the true religion, and conſequently good men. But that I might not miſtake, in a thing of that conſequence, I began to look about, in thoſe countries, where force had been made uſe of, to propagate, what you allowed to be the true religion, and found complaints of as great a ſcarcity of good men there, as in other places. A friend, whom I diſcourſed, on this point, ſaid, it might poſſibly be, that the world had not yet had the benefit of your method; becauſe law-makers had not yet been able to find that juſt temper of penalties, on which your propagation of the true religion was built; and that, therefore, it was great pity, you had not yet diſcovered this great ſecret, but it was to be hoped you would. Another, who ſtood by, ſaid, he did not ſee how your method could make men, it wrought on, and brought to conformity, better than others, unleſs corrupt nature, with impunity, were like to produce better men, in one outward profeſſion, than another. To which I replied, That we did not look on conformiſts, through a due medium; for if we did, with you, allow it preſumable that all, who conformed, did it upon conviction, there could be no juſt complaint of the ſcarcity of good men: and ſo we got over that difficulty.

THE ſecond benefit, you ſay, your uſe of force brings to the commonwealth, is, "That this care, in any commonwealth, of God's honour and men's ſalva-"tion, entitles it to his ſpecial protection and bleſſing." Then certainly, all commonwealths, that have any regard to the protection and bleſſing of God, will not neglect to entitle themſelves to it, by uſing of force, to promote that religion, they believe to be true. But I beſeech you, what care is this of the honour of God, and men's ſalvation, you ſpeak of? Is it, as you have owned it, a care, by penalties, to make men outwardly conform, and, without any farther care or enquiry, to preſume that they do it, upon conviction, and with a ſincere embracing of, and obedience to the truth? But if the honour of God, and men's ſalvation, conſiſts not in an outward conformity to any religion, but in ſomething farther, what bleſſing they may expect, whoſe care goes ſo far, and then preſume the reſt, which is the hardeſt part, and therefore leaſt to be preſumed, the prophet Jeremy will tell you, who ſays, "curſed be he that does the work "of the Lord negligently:" which thoſe, who think it is the magiſtrate's buſineſs, to uſe force, to bring men heartily to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them, were beſt ſeriouſly to conſider. Chap. xlviii. 10.

Page 59. YOUR next paragraph containing nothing but poſitions of yours, which you ſuppoſe elſewhere proved, and I elſewhere examined, it is not fit the reader ſhould be troubled, any farther, about them.

I ONCE knew a gentleman, who having crack'd himſelf with an ungovernable ambition, could never afterwards hear the place, he aimed at, mentioned, without ſhewing marks of his diſtemper. I know not what the matter is, that when there comes in your way, but the mention of ſecular power, in your, or eccleſiaſtick hands, you cannot contain yourſelf: we have inſtances of it, in other parts of your letter; and here again, you fall into a fit, which ſince it produces rather marks of your breeding, than arguments for your cauſe, I ſhall leave them, as they are, to the reader, if you can make them go down with him, for reaſons, from a grave man, or for a ſober anſwer to what I ſay, in that and the following paragraph.

MUCH-WHAT of the ſame ſize is your ingenious reply, to what I ſay, in the next paragraph, viz. "that commonwealths, or civil ſocieties and governments, "if you will believe the judicious Mr. Hooker, are, as St. Peter calls them, "ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, the contrivance and inſtitution of man." To which you ſmartly reply, for your choler was up, "it it well for St. Peter, that he had "the judicious Mr. Hooker on his ſide." And it would have been well for you too, to have ſeen that Mr. Hooker's authority was made uſe of, not to confirm the authority of St. Peter, but to confirm that ſenſe, I gave, of St. Peter's words, which is not ſo clear in our tranſlation, but that there are thoſe, who, as I doubt not but you know, do not allow of it. But this being ſaid, when paſſion, it ſeems, rather employed your wit, than your judgment, though nothing to the purpoſe, may yet perhaps, indirectly and at a diſtance, do ſome ſervice. Page. 61. 1 Pet. ii. 13.

AND now, Sir, if you can but imagine that men, in the corrupt ſtate of nature, might be authorized and required, by reaſon, the law of nature, to avoid the inconveniencies of that ſtate, and, to that purpoſe, to put the power of governing them into ſome one, or more men's hands, in ſuch forms, and under ſuch agreements, as they ſhould think fit: which governors, ſo ſet over them, for a good end, by their own choice, though they received all their power from thoſe, who, by the law of nature, had a power to confer it on them, may very fitly be called "powers ordained of God;" being choſen and appointed by thoſe, who had authority from God, ſo to do. [For he that receives commiſſion, (limited according to the diſcretion of him that gives it) from another, who had authority from his prince ſo to do, may truly be ſaid, ſo far as his commiſſion reaches, to be appointed, or ordained, by the prince himſelf.] It may ſerve as an anſwer to your two next paragraphs, and to ſhew, that there is no oppoſition, or difficulty, in all that St. Peter, St. Paul, or the judicious Mr. Hooker ſays; nor any thing, in what either of them ſays, to your purpoſe. And, though it be true, "thoſe powers that are, are ordained of God?" yet it may, nevertheleſs, be true, that the power, any one has, and the ends, for which he has it, may be by the contrivance and appointment of men.

TO my ſaying, "the ends of commonwealths, appointed by the inſtitutors of "them, could not be their ſpiritual and eternal intereſt, becauſe they could not "ſtipulate about thoſe, one with another, nor ſubmit this intereſt to the power "of the ſociety, or any ſovereign, they ſhould ſet over them." You reply, "Very true, Sir; but they can ſubmit to be puniſhed, in their temporal intereſt, Page 52. "if they deſpiſe, or neglect, thoſe greater intereſts." How they can ſubmit to be puniſhed, by any men, in their temporal intereſt, for that, which they cannot ſubmit to be judged by any man, when you can ſhew, I ſhall admire your politicks. Beſides, if the compact, about matters of religion, be, that thoſe ſhould be puniſhed, in their temporal, who neglect, or deſpiſe, their eternal intereſt, who, I beſeech you, is, by this agreement, rather to be puniſhed, a ſober diſſenter, who appears concerned for religion and his ſalvation, or an irreligious, profane, or debauched conformiſt? By ſuch as deſpiſe, or neglect thoſe greater intereſts, you here mean, only diſſenters from the national religion: for thoſe, only, you puniſh, though you repreſent them, under ſuch a deſcription, as belongs not peculiarly to them; but that matters not, ſo long as it beſt ſuits your occaſion.

IN your next paragraph you wonder at my news from the Weſt-Indies, I ſuppoſe, becauſe you found it not in your books of Europe, or Aſia. But, whatever you may think, I aſſure you, all the world is not at Mile-end. But that you may be no more ſurprized with news, let me aſk you, Whether it be not poſſible that men, to whom the rivers and woods afford the ſpontaneous proviſions of life, and ſo with no private poſſeſſions of land, had no enlarged deſires after riches, or power, ſhould live together in ſociety, make one people, of one language, under one chieftain, who ſhall have no other power, but to command them in time of war, againſt their common enemies, without any municipal laws, judges, or any perſon with ſuperiority, eſtabliſhed amongſt them, but ended all their private differences, if any aroſe, by the extemporary determination of their neighbours, or of arbitrators choſen by the parties. I aſk you, whether, in ſuch a commonwealth, the chieftain, who was the only man of authority amongſt them, had any power, to uſe the force of the commonwealth, to any other end, but the defence of it, againſt an enemy, though other benefits were attainable by it?

The paragraph of mine, to which you mean your next for an anſwer, ſhall anſwer for itſelf.

L. 2. p. 286. You quote the author's argument, which he brings to prove, that the care of ſouls is not committed to the magiſtrate, in theſe words: “It is not committed to him by God, becauſe it appears not, God has ever given any ſuch authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion.” This, when firſt I read it, I confeſs I thought a good argument. But you ſay, this is quite beſides the buſineſs; and the reaſon you give, is; “For the authority of the magiſtrate is not an authority to compel any one to his religion, but only an authority to procure all his ſubjects, the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure, withal, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of it,” &c. I fear, Sir, you forget yourſelf. The author was not writing againſt your new hypotheſis, before it was known in the world. He may be excuſed, if he had not the gift of prophecy, to argue againſt a notion, which was not yet ſtarted. He had in view only to the laws, hitherto made, and the puniſhments (in matters of religion) in uſe in the world. The penalties, as I take it, are laid on men, for being of different ways of religion: which, what is it other, but to compel them, to relinquiſh their own, and to conform themſelves to that, from which they differ? If this be not to compel them to the magiſtrate's religion, pray tell us, what is? This muſt be neceſſarily ſo underſtood; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that the law intends not to have that done, which, with penalties, it commands to be done; or that puniſhments are not compulſion, not that compulſion the author complains of. The law ſays, “Do this, and live;” embrace this doctrine, conform to this way of worſhip, and be at eaſe and free? or elſe be fined, impriſoned, baniſhed, burnt. If you can ſhew among the laws, that have been made in England, concerning religion, (and I think I may ſay, any where elſe) any one, that puniſhes men, for not having impartially examined the religion, they have embraced, or refuſed,” I think I may yield you the cauſe. Law-makers have been generally wiſer, than to make laws, that could not be executed: and therefore their laws were againſt nonconformiſts, which could be known: and not for impartial examination, which could not. It was not then beſides the author's buſineſs, to bring an argument againſt the perſecutions here in faſhion. He did not know, that any one, who was ſo free as to acknowledge that the “magiſtrate has not an authority to compel any one to his religion,” and thereby at once (as you have done) give up all the laws, now in force, againſt diſſenters, had yet rods in ſtore for them, and, by a new trick, would bring them under the laſh of the law, when the old pretences were too much exploded, to ſerve any longer: have you never heard of ſuch a thing, as the religion eſtabliſhed by law? which is, it ſeems, the lawful religion of a country, and to be complied with, as ſuch. There being ſuch things, ſuch notions yet in the world, it was not quite beſides the author's buſineſs to alledge, that “God never gave ſuch authority to one man, over another, as to compel any one to his religion.”

L. 3. p. 65. As to your next paragraph, I think I might now wholly paſs it over. I ſhall only tell you, that as I have often heard, ſo I hope I ſhall always hear, of “religion eſtabliſhed by law.” For though the magiſtrate's authority can “add no force, or ſanction, to any religion, whether true or falſe, nor any thing to the truth, or validity, of his own, or any religion whatſoever;” yet I think, it may do much, towards the upholding and preſerving the true religion, within his juriſdiction; and, in that reſpect, may properly enough, be ſaid to eſtabliſh it.

"religion." I will grant, if you pleaſe, religion eſtabliſhed by law is a pretty "odd way of ſpeaking, in the mouth of a chriſtian, (and yet it is much in "faſhion) as if the magiſtrate's authority could add any force or ſanction, to any "religion, whether true or falſe. I am glad to find you have ſo far conſidered "the magiſtrate's authority, that you agree with the author, that he hath none "to compel men to his religion. Much leſs can he, by any eſtabliſhment "of law, add any thing to the truth, or validity, of his own, or any religion "whatſoever."

THAT above-annexed is all the anſwer, you think this paragraph of mine deſerves. But yet, in that little, you ſay, you muſt give me leave to take notice, "that if, as you ſay, the magiſtrate's authority may do as much, towards the "upholding and preſerving the true religion within his juriſdiction; ſo alſo may it do much, towards the upholding and preſerving of a falſe religion, and, in that reſpect, if you ſay true, may be ſaid to eſtabliſh it. For I think, I need not mind you, here again, that it muſt unavoidably depend upon his opinion, what ſhall be eſtabliſhed, for true, or rejected, as falſe.

AND thus you have my thoughts concerning the moſt material of what you ſay, touching the magiſtrate's commiſſion to uſe force, in matters of religion, together with ſome incident places, in your anſwer, which I have taken notice of, as they have come in my way.

CHAP. III.

Who are to be puniſhed by your ſcheme.

TO juſtify the largeneſs of the author's toleration, who would not have Jews, mahometans and pagans excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of their religion; I ſaid, "I feared it will hardly be L. 2. p. 2. "believed, that we pray in earneſt for their converſion, if we exclude them "from the ordinary and probable means of it, either by driving them from us, "or perſecuting them, when they are among us. You reply; "Now I con- Page 2. "feſs, I thought men might live quietly enough among us, and enjoy the pro-"tection of the government, againſt all violence and injuries, without being "endenizon'd, or made members of the commonwealth; which alone can en-"title them to the civil rights and privileges of it. But as to Jews, mahome-"tans and pagans, if any of them do not care to live amongſt us, unleſs they "may be admitted to the rights and privileges of the commonwealth; the re-"fuſing them that favour is not, I ſuppoſe, to be looked upon, as driving them "from us, or excluding them the ordinary and probable means of converſion; "but as a juſt and neceſſary caution, in a chriſtian commonwealth, in reſpect "to the members of it: who, if ſuch, as profeſs judaiſm, or mahometaniſm, "or paganiſm, were permitted to enjoy the ſame rights, with them, would be "much the more in danger, to be ſeduced by them; ſeeing they would loſe "no worldly advantage, by ſuch a change of their religion; whereas, if they "could not turn to any of thoſe religions, without forfeiting the civil rights of "the commonwealth, by doing it, it is likely, they would conſider well, be-"fore they did it, what ground there was to expect, that they ſhould get "any thing by the exchange, which would countervail the loſs they ſhould "ſuſtain by it." I thought protection and impunity of men, not offending in civil things, might have been accounted the civil rights of the commonwealth, which the author meant; but you, to make it ſeem more, add the word, privileges. Let it be ſo. Live amongſt you, then, Jews, mahometans and pagans may; but endenizoned they muſt not be. But why? Are there not thoſe, who are members of your commonwealth, who do not embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, any more than they? What think you of the ſocinians, papiſts, anabaptiſts, quakers, preſbyterians? if they do not reject the truth, neceſſary to ſalvation, Why do you puniſh them? or, if ſome, that are in the way to perdition, may be members of the commonwealth, Why muſt theſe be excluded, upon the account of religion? For, I think, there is no great odds, as to ſaving of ſouls (which is the only end, for which they are puniſhed) amongſt thoſe religions, each whereof will make thoſe, who are of it, miſs ſalvation. Only, if there be any fear of ſeducing thoſe, who are of the national church, the danger is moſt, from that religion, which comes neareſt to it, and moſt reſembles it. However, this you think "but a juſt and neceſſary caution, in a "chriſtian commonwealth, in reſpect of the members of it." I ſuppoſe (for you love to ſpeak doubtfully) theſe members of a chriſtian commonwealth, you take ſuch care of, are members alſo of the national church, whoſe religion is the true; and therefore you call them, in the next paragraph, "ſubjects of "Chriſt's kingdom, to whom he has a ſpecial regard." For diſſenters, who are puniſh'd, to be made good chriſtians, to whom force is uſed, "to bring them to "the true religion, and to the communion of the church of God," it is plain, are not in your opinion good chriſtians, or of the true religion; unleſs you puniſh them, to make them, what they are already. The diſſenters, therefore, who are already perverted, and reject the truth, that muſt ſave them, you are not, I ſuppoſe, ſo careful of, leſt they ſhould be ſeduced. Thoſe, who have already the plague, need not be guarded from infection: nor can you fear, that men, ſo deſperately perverſe, that penalties and puniſhments, joined to the light and ſtrength of the truth, have not been able to bring, from the opinions, they have eſpouſed, into the communion of the church, ſhould be ſeduced to judaiſm, mahometaniſm, or paganiſm, neither of which has the advantage of truth, or intereſt, to prevail by. It is, therefore, thoſe of the national church, as I conclude alſo, from the cloſe of this paragraph, (where you ſpeak of God's own peculiar people) whom you think, would be much the more in danger to be ſeduced by them, if they were endenizoned, ſince they would loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change of their religion, i. e. by quitting the national church, to turn Jews, mahometans or pagans.

THIS ſhews, whatever you ſay of the ſufficient means of inſtruction, provided by the law, how well you think the members of the national church are inſtructed in the true religion. It ſhews alſo, whatever you ſay of its being preſumable, that they embrace it, upon conviction, how much you are ſatisfied, that the members of the national church, are convinced of the truth of religion, they profeſs, or rather herd with, ſince you think them in great danger, to change it, for judaiſm, mahometaniſm, or paganiſm itſelf, upon equal terms, and becauſe they ſhould loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change. But if the forfeiting the civil rights of the commonwealth, be the proper remedy, to keep men in the communion of the church, why is it uſed to keep men from judaiſm, or paganiſm, and not from phanaticiſm? upon this account, why might not Jews, pagans and mahometans be admitted to the rights of the commonwealth, as far as papiſts, independents and quakers? But you diſtribute to every one, according to your good pleaſure: and doubtleſs are fully juſtified by the following words: "And, whether this be not a reaſonable and neceſſary "caution, any man may judge, who does but conſider, within how few ages, "after the flood, ſuperſtition and idolatry prevailed over the world, and how "apt even God's own peculiar people were to receive that mortal infection, not-"withſtanding all that he did to keep them from it." A. p. 3.

WHAT the ſtate of religion was in the firſt ages after the flood, is ſo imperfectly known now, that, as I have ſhewed you in another place, you can make little advantage to your cauſe, from thence. And, ſince it was the ſame corruption then, which, as you own, withdraws men now from the true religion, and hinders it from prevailing, by its own light, without the aſſiſtance of force; and it is the ſame corruption, that keeps diſſenters, as well as Jews, mahometans and pagans, from embracing of the truth; why different degrees of puniſhments ſhould be uſed to them, until there be found in them different degrees of obſtinacy, would need ſome better reaſon. Why this common pravity of human nature ſhould make judaiſm, mahometaniſm, or paganiſm, more catching than any ſort of conconformity, which hinders men from embracing the true religion, ſo that Jews, mahometans and pagans muſt, for fear of infecting others, be ſhut out from the commonwealth, when others are not, I would fain know? Whatever it was, that ſo diſpoſed the Jews to idolatry, before the captivity, ſure it is, they firmly reſiſted it, and refuſed to change, not only, where they might have done it, on equal terms, but have had great advantage to boot; and therefore it is poſſible, that there is ſomething in this matter, which neither you, nor I, do fully comprehend, and may, with a becoming humility, ſit down and confeſs, that in this, as well as other parts of his providence, God's ways are paſt finding out. But this we may be certain, from this inſtance of the Jews, that it is not reaſonable to conclude, that, becauſe they were once inclined to idolatry, that therefore they, or any other people, are in danger to turn pagans, whenever they ſhall loſe no worldly advantage, by ſuch a change. But, if we may oppoſe nearer and known inſtances to more remote and uncertain, look into the world, and tell me, ſince Jeſus Chriſt brought life and immortality to light through the goſpel, where the chriſtian religion meeting judaiſm, mahometaniſm, or paganiſm, upon equal terms, loſt ſo plainly by it, that you have reaſon to ſuſpect the members of a chriſtian commonwealth would be in danger to be ſeduced to either of them, if they ſhould loſe no worldly advantage, by ſuch a change of their religion, rather than likely to increaſe among them? 'Till you can find, then, ſome better reaſon for excluding Jews, &c. from the rights of the commonwealth, you muſt give us leave to look on this, as a bare pretence. Beſides, I think you are under a miſtake, which ſhews your pretence againſt admitting Jews, mahometans and pagans, to the civil rights of the commonwealth, is ill-grounded: for what law, I pray, is there in England, that they, who turn to any of thoſe religions, forfeit the civil rights of the commonwealth, by doing it? ſuch a law, I deſire you to ſhew me; and, if you cannot, all this pretence is out of doors, and men of your church, ſince, on that account, they would loſe no worldly advantage, by the change, are in as much danger to be ſeduced, whether Jews, mahometans and pagans are endenizoned, or no.

BUT, that you may not be thought too gracious, you tell us, "That, as to pagans particularly, you are ſo far from thinking, that they ought not to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, becauſe of their religion, "that you cannot ſee, how their religion can be ſuffer'd, by any commonwealth, that knows and worſhips the only true God, if they would be thought to retain any jealouſy for his honour, or even for that of human nature." Thus, then, you order the matter: jews and mahometans may be permitted to live in a chriſtian commonwealth with the exerciſe of their religion, but not be endenizoned: pagans may alſo be permitted to live there, but not to have the exerciſe of their religion, nor be endenizoned. Page 3.

THIS, according to the beſt of my apprehenſion, is the ſenſe of your words; for the clearneſs of your thoughts, or your cauſe, does not always ſuffer you to ſpeak plainly and directly; as here, having been ſpeaking a whole page before, what uſage the perſons of Jews, mahometans and pagans, were to have, you, on a ſudden, tell us their religion is not to be ſuffered, but ſay not, what muſt be done with their perſons, For do you think it reaſonable that men, who have any religion, ſhould live amongſt you, without the exerciſe of that religion, in order to their converſion? which is no other, but to make them downright irreligious, and render the very notion of a deity inſignificant, and of no influence to them, in order to their converſion: it being leſs dangerous to religion, in general, to have men ignorant of a deity, and ſo without any religion; than to have them acknowledge a ſuperior being, but yet to teach, or allow, them to neglect, or refuſe, worſhipping him, in that way, that, they believe, he requires, to render them acceptable to him. It being a great deal leſs fault (and that, which we were, every one of us, once guilty of) to be ignorant of him, than acknowledging a God, and not to pay him the honour, which we think due to him. I do not ſee, therefore, how thoſe, who retain any jealouſy for the honour of God, can permit men to live amongſt them, in order to their converſion, and require of them, not to honour God, according to the beſt of their knowledge: unleſs you think it a preparation to your true religion, to require men, ſenſibly and knowingly, to affront the deity; and to perſuade them, that the religion, you would bring them to, can allow men to make bold with the ſenſe they have of him, and to refuſe him the honour, which in their conſciences they are perſuaded is due to him, which muſt, to them and every body elſe, appear inconſiſtent with all religion. Since, therefore, to admit their perſons, without the exerciſe of their religion, cannot be reaſonable, nor conducing to their converſion; if the exerciſe of their religion, as you ſay, be not to be ſuffered among us, until they are converted, I do not ſee how their perſons can be ſuffered amongſt us, if that exception muſt be added, 'till they are converted; and whether, then, they are not excluded from the ordinary means of converſion, I leave you to conſider. Page 62.

I WONDER this neceſſity had not made you think on another way, of their having the ordinary means of converſion, without their living amongſt us, that way, by which, in the beginning of chriſtianity, it was brought to the heathen world, by the travels and preaching of the apoſtles. But the ſucceſſors of the apoſtles are not, it ſeems, ſucceſſors to this part of their commiſſion, "Go and "teach all nations." And, indeed, it is one thing to be an embaſſador from God, to people, that are already converted, and have provided good benefices, another to be an embaſſador from heaven, in a country where you have neither the countenance of the magiſtrate, nor the devout obedience of the people. And, who ſees not, how he is bound to be zealous for the propagating of the true religion, and the convincing, converting and ſaving of ſouls, in a country, where it is eſtabliſhed by law? who can doubt, but that there thoſe, who talk ſo much of it, are in earneſt? though yet ſome men will hardly forbear doubting, that thoſe men, however they pray for it, are not much concerned for the converſion of pagans, who will neither go to them, to inſtruct them, nor ſuffer them to come to us, for the means of converſion.

IT is true, what you ſay, "what pagans call religion, is abomination to the "Almighty." But if that requires any thing from thoſe, who retain any jealouſy for the honour of God, it is ſomething more, than barely about the place, where thoſe abominations ſhall be committed. The true concern, for the honour of God, is not, that idolatry ſhould be ſhut out of England, but that it ſhould be leſſened every where, and, by the light and preaching of the goſpel, be baniſhed out of the world. If pagans and idolaters are, are as you ſay, "the "greateſt diſhonour conceivable to God Almighty," they are as much ſo, on the other ſide of Tweed, or the ſea, as on this; for he, from his throne, equally beholds all the dwellers upon earth. Thoſe, therefore, who are truly jealous for the honour of God, will not, upon the account of his honour, be concerned for their being in this, or in that place, while there are idolaters in the world; but that the number of thoſe, who are ſuch a diſhonour to him, ſhould every day be, as much as poſſible, diminiſhed, and they be brought to give him his due tribute of honour and praiſe, in a right way of worſhip. It is in this, that a jealouſy, which is in earneſt for God's honour, truly ſhews itſelf, in wiſhing, and endeavouring to abate the abomination, and drive idolatry out of the world, not in driving idolaters out of any one country, or ſending them away to places and company, where they ſhall find more encouragement to it. It is a ſtrange jealouſy for the honour of God, that looks not beyond ſuch a mountain, or river, as divides a chriſtian and pagan country. Where-ever idolatry, is committed, there God's honour is concerned; and thither men's jealouſy for his honour, if it be ſincere indeed, will extend, and be in pain to leſſen, and take away, the provocation. But the place God is provoked and diſhonour'd in, which is a narrow conſideration, in reſpect of the lord all the earth, will no otherwiſe employ their zeal, who are in earneſt, than as it may, more or leſs, conduce to the converſion of the offenders.

BUT, if your jealouſy for the honour of God, engages you ſo far againſt men's committing idolatry, in certain places, that you think thoſe ought to be excluded from the rights of the commonwealth, and not be ſuffered to be denizons, who, according to that place in the Romans, brought by you, "are "without excuſe; becauſe, when they knew God, they glorified him not as "God, but became vain in their imaginations, and changed the glory of the in- "corruptible God, into an image made like to corruptible man." I ſhall only change ſome of the words in the text you cite, out of Iſaiah; "I have baked "part thereof on the coals, and eaten it, and ſhall I make the reſidue thereof a "God? ſhall I fall down to that, which comes of a plant?" And ſo leave them with you, to conſider, whether your jealouſy in earneſt carries you ſo far, as you talk of; and whether, when you have look'd about you, you are ſtill of the mind, that thoſe, who do ſuch things ſhould be disfranchiſed and ſent away, and the exerciſe of no ſuch religion be any where permitted amongſt us? for thoſe things are no leſs an abomination to God, under a chriſtian, than pagan name. One word more I have to ſay, to your jealouſy for the honour of God, that if it be any thing more than in talk, it will ſet itſelf no leſs earneſtly, againſt other abominations, and the practiſers of them, than againſt that of idolatry.

As to that in Job xxxi. 26, 27, 28. where he ſays, "idolatry is to be puniſh- "ed by the judge; this place alone, were there no other, is ſufficient to confirm their opinion, who conclude that book to be writ by a Jew. And how little the puniſhing of idolatry, in that commonwealth, concerns our preſent caſe, I refer you, for information, to the author's letter. But how does your jealouſy, for the honour of God, carry you to an excluſion of the pagan religion from amongſt you, but yet admit of the Jewiſh and mahometan? or is not the honour of God concerned, in their denying our Saviour?

If we are to look upon Job to have been writ, before the time of Moſes, as the author would have it, p. 32. and ſo by a ſtranger to the commonwealth of Iſrael, it is plain, the general apoſtaſy, he lays ſo much ſtreſs on, was not ſpread ſo far, but that there was a government, by his own confeſſion, eſtabliſhed out of Judea, free from, nay zealous againſt idolatry. And, why there might not be many more, as well as this, which we hear of, but by chance, it will concern him to ſhew.

You go on, "but as to the converting Jews, mahometans and pagans to "chriſtianity, I fear there will be no great progreſs made in it, until chriſtians "come to a better agreement and union among themſelves. I am ſure our Sa- "viour prayed that all, that ſhould believe in him, might be one in the Father "and him," (i. e. I ſuppoſe in that holy religion, which he taught them from the Father) "that the world might believe that the father had ſent him:" "and, "therefore, when he comes to make inquiſition, why no more Jews, maho- "metans and pagans, have been converted to his religion, I very much fear, "that a great part of the blame will be found to lie upon the authors and pro- "moters of ſects, and diviſions, among the profeſſors of it: which therefore, "I think, all, that are guilty, and all that would not be guilty, ought well to "conſider." Page 4

I easily grant, that "our Saviour prayed, that all might be one, in that "holy religion, which he taught them," and in that very prayer teaches what that religion is, "This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true "God, and Jeſus Chriſt whom thou haſt ſent." But muſt it be expected, that, therefore, they ſhould all be of one mind, in things not neceſſary to ſalvation? for whatever unity it was, our Saviour prayed for, here, 'tis certain, the apoſtles themſelves did not, all of them, agree in every thing: but even the chief of them have had differences amongſt them in matters of religion, as appears, Gal. ii. 11. John xvii. 3, 22.

An agreement in truths, neceſſary to ſalvation, and the maintaining of charity and brotherly kindneſs, with the diverſity of opinions, in other things, is that, which will very well conſiſt with chriſtian unity, and is all, poſſibly, to be had in this world, in ſuch an incurable weakneſs and difference of men's underſtandings. This, probably, would contribute more to the converſion of Jews, mahometans and pagans, if there were propoſed to them and others, for their admittance into the church, only the plain and ſimple truths of the goſpel neceſſary to ſalvation, than all the fruitleſs pudder, and talk, about uniting chriſtians, in matters of leſs moment, according to the draught and preſcription of a certain ſet of men, any where.

"WHAT blame will lie on the authors and promoters of ſects and diviſions," and (let me add) animoſities amongſt chriſtians, "when Chriſt comes to make "inquiſition, why no more Jews, mahometans and pagans were converted, "they, who are concerned, ought certainly well to conſider." And to abate, in great meaſure, this miſchief for the future, they who talk ſo much of ſects and diviſions, would do well to conſider too, whether thoſe are not moſt authors and promoters of ſects and diviſions, who impoſe creeds, ceremonies and articles, of men's making; and make things, not neceſſary to ſalvation, the neceſſary terms of communion, excluding and driving from them ſuch as, out of conſcience and perſuaſion, cannot aſſent and ſubmit to them; and treating them as if they were utter aliens from the church of God, and ſuch as were deſervedly ſhut out, as unfit to be members of it; who narrow chriſtianity, within Page 48. bounds of their own making, and which the goſpel knows nothing of; and often, for things, by themſelves confeſſed indifferent, thruſt men out of their communion, and then puniſh them, for not being of it.

WHO ſees not, but the bond of unity might be preſerved, in the different perſuaſions of men, concerning things not neceſſary to ſalvation, if they were not made neceſſary to the church communion? What two thinking men, of the church of England, are there, who differ not, one from the other, in ſeveral material points of religion, who nevertheleſs are members of the ſame church, and in unity one with another? Make but one of thoſe points the Shibboleth of a party, and erect it into an article of the national church, and they are preſently divided: and he of the two, whoſe judgment happens not to agree with national orthodoxy, is immediately cut off from communion. Who, I beſeech you, is it, in this caſe, that makes the ſect? Is it not thoſe, who contract the church of Chriſt, within limits of their own contrivance? who, by articles and ceremonies of their own forming, ſeparate, from their communion, all that have not perſuaſions, which juſt jump with their model?

It is frivolous, here to pretend authority. No man has, or can have authority, to ſhut any one out of the church of Chriſt, for that, for which Chriſt himſelf will not ſhut him out of heaven. Whoſoever does ſo, is truly the author and promoter of ſchiſm and diviſion, ſets up a ſect, and tears in pieces the church of Chriſt, of which every one, who believes, and practiſes what is neceſſary to 1 Pet. v. 2, 3. ſalvation, is a part and member; and cannot, without the guilt of ſchiſm, be ſeparated from, or kept out of, its external communion. In this "lording it over the heritage of God," and thus overſeeing, by impoſition, on the unwilling, and not conſenting, which ſeems to be the meaning of St. Peter, moſt of the laſting ſects, which ſo mangle chriſtianity, had their original, and continue to have their ſupport: and were it not for theſe eſtabliſhed ſects, under the ſpecious name of national churches, which, by their contracted and arbitrary limits of communion, juſtify, againſt themſelves, the ſeparation and like narrowneſs of others, the difference of opinions, which do not ſo much begin to be, as to appear, and be owned, under toleration, would either make no ſect, nor diviſion; or elſe, if they were ſo extravagant as to be oppoſite to what is neceſſary to ſalvation, and ſo neceſſitate a ſeparation, the clear light of the goſpel, joined with a ſtrict diſcipline of manners, would quickly chaſe them out of the world. But, whilſt needleſs impoſitions, and moot points, in divinity, are eſtabliſhed, by the penal laws of kingdoms, and the ſpecious pretences of authority, what hopes are there, that there ſhould be ſuch an union amongſt chriſtians, any where, as might invite a rational Turk, or infidel, to embrace a religion, whereof he is told they have a revelation from God, which yet, in ſome places, he is not ſuffered to read, and, in no place, ſhall be permitted to underſtand for himſelf, or to follow, according to the beſt of his underſtanding, when it ſhall at all thwart (though in things, confeſſed, not neceſſary to ſalvation) any of thoſe ſelect points of doctrine, diſcipline, or outward worſhip, whereof the national church has been pleaſed to make up its articles, polity, and ceremonies?

And I aſk, what a ſober, ſenſible heathen muſt think, of the diviſions amongſt chriſtians, not owing to toleration, if he ſhould find in an iſland, where chriſtianity ſeems to be in its greateſt purity, the ſouth and north parts, eſtabliſhing churches, upon the differences of only, whether fewer, or more, thus and thus choſen, ſhould govern: though the revelation, they both pretend to be their rule, ſay nothing directly, one way or the other: each contending, with ſo much eagerneſs, that they deny each other to be churches of Chriſt; that is, in effect, to be true chriſtians; to which, if one ſhould add tranſubſtantiation, conſubſtantiation, real preſence, articles and diſtinctions, ſet up by men, without authority from ſcripture, and other leſs differences, (which good chriſtians may diſſent about, without endangering their ſalvation) "eſtabliſhed by law" in the ſeveral parts of Chriſtendom: I aſk, Whether the magiſtrates interpoſing, in matters of religion, and eſtabliſhing national churches, by the force of penalties of civil laws, with their diſtinct (and, at home, reputed neceſſary) confeſſions and ceremonies, do not, by law and power, authorize and perpetuate ſects among chriſtians, to the great prejudice of chriſtianity, and ſcandal to infidels, more than any thing, that can ariſe from a mutual toleration, with charity and a good life?

THOSE, who have ſo much in their mouths, "the authors of ſects and diviſions," with ſo little advantage to their cauſe, I ſhall deſire to conſider, whether national churches eſtabliſhed, as now they are, are not as much ſects and diviſions in chriſtianity, as ſmaller collections, under the name of diſtinct churches, are in reſpect of the national? Only with this difference, that theſe ſubdiviſions and diſcountenanced ſects, wanting power, to enforce their peculiar doctrines and diſcipline, uſually live more friendly like chriſtians, and ſeem only to demand chriſtian liberty; whereby there is leſs appearance of unchriſtian diviſion among them: whereas thoſe national ſects, being back'd by the civil power, which they never fail to make uſe of, at leaſt as a pretence of authority over their brethren, uſually breathe out nothing but force and perſecution, to the great reproach, ſhame and diſhonour of the chriſtian religion.

I SAID, "That, if the magiſtrates would ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt vice, in whomſoever it is found, and leave men to their own conſciences, in their articles of faith, and ways of worſhip, true religion would ſpread wider, and be more fruitful in the lives of its profeſſors, than ever hitherto it has done, by the impoſing of creeds and ceremonies." Here I call only immorality of manners, vice: you, on the contrary, in your anſwer, give the name of vice, to errors in opinion, and difference, in ways of worſhip, from the national church: for this is the matter in queſtion between us, expreſs it as you pleaſe. This being a conteſt, only about the ſignification of a ſhort ſyllable, in the Engliſh tongue, we muſt leave to the maſters of that language, to judge, which of theſe two is the proper uſe of it. But yet, from my uſing the word vice, you conclude preſently, (taking it in your ſenſe, not mine) that the magiſtrate has a power in England (for England we are ſpeaking of) to puniſh diſſenters from the national religion, becauſe it is a vice. I will, if you pleaſe, in what I ſaid, change the word vice, into that I meant by it, and ſay thus, [If the magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt the diſhoneſty and debauchery of men's lives, and ſuch immoralities, as I contra-diſtinguiſh from errors, in ſpeculative opinions of religion, and ways of worſhip:] and then pray ſee how your anſwer will look, for thus it runs: "It ſeems, then, with you, the rejecting the true religion, and refuſing to worſhip God, in decent ways, preſcribed by thoſe, to whom God has left the ordering of thoſe matters, are not comprehended in the name, vice". But you tell me, "If I except theſe things, and will not allow them to be called, by the name of vice, perhaps other men may think it as reaſonable, to except ſome other things [i. e. "from being called vices"] which they have a kindneſs for: for inſtance, ſome may, perhaps, except arbitrary divorce, polygamy, concubinage, ſimple fornication, or marrying within degrees thought forbidden." Let them except theſe, and if you will, drunkenneſs, theft, and murder too, from the name, of vice; nay, call them virtues: will they, by their calling them ſo, be Page 13.

be exempt from the magiſtrate's power of puniſhing them? Or can they claim an impunity, by what I have ſaid? Will theſe immoralities, by the names, any one ſhall give, or forbear to give them, "become articles of faith, or ways of "worſhip?" which is all, as I expreſsly ſay in the words, you here cite, of mine, that I would have the magiſtrates leave men to their own conſciences in. But, Sir, you have, for me, liberty of conſcience, to uſe words, in what ſenſe you pleaſe; only I think, where another is concerned, it ſavours more of ingenuity and love of truth, rather to mind the ſenſe of him that ſpeaks, than to make a duſt and noiſe with a miſtaken word, if any ſuch advantage were given you.

YOU ſay, "That ſome men would through careleſneſs, never acquaint them-"ſelves with the truth, which muſt ſave them, without being forced to do it, "which (you ſuppoſe) may be very true, notwithſtanding that (as I ſay) ſome "are called at the third hour, ſome at the ninth, and ſome at the eleventh "hour; and, whenever they are called, they embrace all the truths, neceſſary "to ſalvation. At leaſt I do not ſhew, why it may not: and, therefore, this "may be no ſlip, for any thing I have ſaid, to prove it to be one." This, I take not to be an anſwer to my argument, which was, that ſince ſome are not called until the eleventh hour, no body can know, who thoſe are, "who would "never acquaint themſelves with thoſe truths, that muſt ſave them, without "force," which is therefore neceſſary, and may indirectly and at a diſtance do them ſome ſervice. Whether that was my argument, or no, I leave the reader to judge: but that you may not miſtake it, now again, I tell you here it is ſo, and needs another anſwer.

YOUR way of uſing puniſhments, in ſhort is this, that all, that conform not to the national church, where it is true, as in England, ſhould be puniſhed; What for? "To make them conſider." This, I told you, had ſomething of impracticable. To which you reply, that you uſed the word, only, in another ſenſe, which I miſtook: whether I miſtook your meaning, in the uſe of that word, or no, or whether it was natural ſo to take it, or whether that opinion, which I charged on you, by that miſtake, when you tell us, "that not exa-"mining, is, indeed, the next end, for which they are puniſhed," be not your opinion, let us leave to the reader: for when you have that word, in what ſenſe you pleaſe, what I ſaid will be nevertheleſs true, viz. "That to puniſh diſſenters, "as diſſenters, to make them conſider, has ſomething impracticable in it, un-"leſs not to be of the national religion, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing." Theſe words you anſwer nothing to, having, as you thought, a great advantage of talking about my miſtake of your word, only. But, unleſs you will ſuppoſe, not to be of the national church, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing, it will follow, that to puniſh diſſenters, as diſſenters, to make them conſider, has ſomething of impracticable in it.

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THE law puniſhes all diſſenters: For what? To make them all conform, that's evident; To what end? To make them all conſider, ſay you: that cannot be, for it ſays nothing of it; nor is it certain, that all diſſenters have not conſidered; nor is there any care taken, by the law, to enquire, whether they have conſidered, when they do conform; yet this was the end, intended by the magiſtrate. So then, with you, it is practicable and allowable, in making laws, for the legiſlator to lay puniſhments, by law, on men, for an end, which they may be ignorant of, for he ſays nothing of it; on men, whom he never takes care to enquire, whether they have done it, or no, before he relax the puniſhment, which had no other next end, but to make them do it. But, though he ſays nothing of conſidering, in laying on the penalties, nor aſks any thing about it, when he takes them off; yet every body muſt underſtand, that he ſo meant it. Sir, Sancho Pancha, in the government of his iſland, did not expect, that men ſhould underſtand his meaning, by his gaping: but in another iſland it ſeems, if you had the management, you would not think it to have any thing of impracticable, or impolitick, in it. For, how far the proviſion, of means of inſtruction, takes this off, we ſhall ſee in another place. And laſtly, to lay puniſhments on men, for an end, which is already attained, (for ſome, among the diſſenters, may have already conſidered) is what other law-makers look on, as impracticable, or at leaſt unjuſt. But to this you anſwer, in your uſual way of circle. "That, if I ſuppoſe, you are for puniſhing diſſenters, whether they Page 24. "conſidered, or no, I am in a great miſtake; for the diſſenters (which is my "word, not yours) whom you are for puniſhing, are only ſuch, as reject the "true religion, propoſed to them, with reaſons and arguments, ſufficient to "convince them of the truth of it, who, therefore, can never be ſuppoſed to "conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, as they ought, whilſt they perſiſt, in "rejecting that religion, or (in my language) continue diſſenters: for, if they "did ſo conſider them, they would not continue diſſenters." Of the fault, for which men were to be puniſhed, diſtinguiſhed from the end, for which they were to be puniſhed, we heard nothing as I remember, in the firſt draught of your ſcheme, which we had, in the arguments conſidered, &c. But I doubt not but, in your general terms, you will be able to find it, or what elſe you pleaſe: for now, having ſpoken out that men, who are of a different religion from the true, which has been tendered them, with ſufficient evidence, (and who are they, whom the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not furniſhed, with competent means of ſalvation) are criminals, and are, by the magiſtrate, to be puniſhed, as ſuch, it is neceſſary your ſcheme ſhould be compleated; and whither that will carry you, it is eaſy to ſee.

BUT pray, Sir, are there no conformiſts, that ſo reject the true religion? And would you have them puniſhed too, as you here profeſs? Make that practicable, by your ſcheme, and you have done ſomething, to perſuade us, that your end, in earneſt, in the uſe of force, is to make men conſider, underſtand, and be of the true religion; and that the rejecting the true religion, tendered with ſufficient evidence, is the crime, which, bona fide, you would have puniſhed; and until you do this, all that you may ſay, concerning puniſhing men, "to "make them conſider, as they ought, to make them receive the true religion, "to make them embrace the truth that muſt ſave them," &c. will, with all ſober, judicious, and unbiaſſed readers, paſs only for the mark of great zeal, if it eſcape amongſt men, as warm and ſagacious as you are, a harſher name: whilſt thoſe conformiſts, who neglect matters of religion, who reject the ſaving truths of the goſpel, as viſibly and as certainly as any diſſenters, have yet no penalties laid upon them.

YOU talk much "of conſidering, and not conſidering, as one ought; of em"bracing, and rejecting, the true religion," and abundance more to this purpoſe: which all, however very good and ſavoury words, that look very well, when you come to the application of force, to procure that end, expreſſed in them, amount to no more, but conformity and non-conformity. If you ſee not this, I pity you; for I would fain think you a fair man, who mean well, though you have not light upon the right way, to the end you propoſe: but if you ſee it, and perſiſt in your uſe of theſe good expreſſions, to lead men into a miſtake, in this matter; conſider what my pagans and mahometans could do worſe, to ſerve a bad cauſe.

WHATEVER you may imagine, I write ſo, in this argument, as I have before my eyes the account, I ſhall one day render for my intention, and regard to truth, in the management of it. I look on myſelf, as liable to error, as others; but this I am ſure of, I would neither impoſe on you, myſelf, nor any body; and ſhould be very glad to have the truth, in this point, clearly eſtabliſhed; and therefore, it is, I deſire you again to examine, whether all the ends, you name, to be intended, by your uſe of force, do, in effect, when force is to be your way put in practice, reach any farther, than bare outward conformity? Pray conſider, whether it be not that, which makes you ſo ſhy of the term, diſſenters, which, you tell me, is mine, not your word. Since none are, by your ſcheme, to be puniſhed, but thoſe, who do not conform to the national religion. Diſſenters, I think, is the proper name to call them by; and I can ſee no reaſon, you have to boggle at it, unleſs your opinion has ſomething in it, you are unwilling ſhould be ſpoke out, and called by its right name: but, whether you like it or no, perſecution, and perſecution of diſſenters, are names, that belong to it, as it ſtands now.

Page 24. AND now I think I may leave you your queſtion, wherein you aſk; “But cannot diſſenters be puniſhed, for not being of the national religion, as the fault, and yet only to make them conſider, as the end, for which they are puniſhed?” to be anſwered by yourſelf, or be uſed again, where you think there is any need, of ſo nice a diſtinction, as between the fault, for which men are puniſhed, by laws, and the end, for which they are puniſhed; for, to me, I confeſs it is hard, to find any other immediate end of puniſhments, in the intention of human laws, but the amendment of the fault, puniſhed; though it may be ſubordinate to other and remoter ends. If the law be only to puniſh non-conformity, one may truly ſay, to cure that fault, or to produce that conformity, is the end of that law; and there is nothing elſe, immediately aimed at, by that law, but conformity, and whatever elſe it tends to, as an end, muſt be only as a conſequence of conformity, whether it be edification, increaſe of charity, or ſaving of ſouls, or whatever elſe may be thought a conſequence of conformity. So that, in a law, which, with penalties, requires conformity, and nothing elſe; one cannot ſay (properly I think) that conſideration is the end of that law; unleſs conſideration be a conſequence of conformity, to which conformity is ſubordinate, and does naturally conduce, or elſe is neceſſary to it.

Page 21. To my arguing that it is unjuſt, as well as impracticable, you reply, “Where
“ the national church is the true church of God, to which all men ought to
“ join themſelves, and ſufficient evidence is offered, to convince men, that it is
“ ſo: there it is a fault, to be out of the national church; becauſe it is a fault,
“ not to be convinced that the national church is that true church of God. And,
“ therefore, ſince there, men's not being ſo convinced, can only be imputed to
“ their not conſidering, as they ought, the evidence, which is offered to convince
“ them; it cannot be unjuſt to puniſh them, to make them ſo to conſider
“ it.” Pray tell me, which is a man's duty, to be of the national church firſt;
or to be convinced firſt, that its religion is true, and then to be of it? if it be
his duty to be convinced firſt, why then do you puniſh him, for not being of
it, when it is his duty to be convinced of the truth of its religion, before it is his
duty to be of it? If you ſay, it is his duty to be of it; Why, then, is not force
uſed to him afterwards, tho' he ſtill be ignorant and unconvinced? but you anſwer,
“It is his fault not to be convinced.” What every one's fault, every
where? No, you limit it to places, where “ſufficient evidence is offered, to
“ convince men, that the national church is the true church of God.” To
which, pray let me add, the national church is ſo the true church of God, that
nobody, out of its communion, can embrace the truth, that muſt ſave him, or
be in the way to ſalvation. For, if a man may be in the way to ſalvation, out
of the national church, he is enough in the true church, and needs no force to
bring him into any other: for, when a man is in the way to ſalvation, there is
no neceſſity or force, to bring him into any church, of any denomination, in
order to his ſalvation. So that, not to be of the national church, though true,
will not be a fault, which the magiſtrate has a right to puniſh, until ſufficient
Page 51. evidence is offered to prove, that a man cannot be ſaved, out of it. Now, ſince
you tell us, that, by ſufficient evidence, you mean ſuch, as will certainly win
aſſent; when you have offered ſuch evidence, to convince men, that the national
church, any where, is ſo the true church, that men cannot be ſaved, out of
its communion, I think I may allow them to be ſo faulty, as to deſerve what
puniſhment, you ſhall think fit. If you hope to mend the matter, by the following
words, where you ſay, that where ſuch “evidence is offered, there
“ men's not being convinced, can only be imputed to men's not conſidering, as
Page 25. “ they ought,” they will not help you. For, “to conſider as they ought,” being,
by your own interpretation, “to conſider ſo as not to reject;” then your
Page 40. anſwer amounts to juſt thus much, “That it is a fault, not to be convinced,
“ that the national church is the true church of God, where ſufficient evidence
“ is offered, to convince men that it is ſo. Sufficient evidence is ſuch, as will

“ certainly gain aſſent with thoſe, who conſider as they ought, i. e. who conſider ſo, as not to reject, or to be moved heartily to embrace, ” which I think is to be convinced. Who can have the heart now, to deny any of this? Can there any thing ſurer, than that men's not being convinced, is to be imputed to them, if they are not convinced, where ſuch evidence is offered to them, as does convince them? And to puniſh all ſuch, you have my free conſent.

Whether all, you ſay, have any thing more in it, than this, I appeal to my readers; and ſhould willingly do it to you, did not I fear, that the jumbling of thoſe good and plauſible words, in your head, “ of ſufficient evidence, “ conſider as you ought, &c.” might a little jargogle your thoughts, and lead you hoodwinked the round of your own beaten circle. This is a danger, thoſe are much expoſed to, who accuſtom themſelves to relative and doubtful terms, and ſo put together, that, though aſunder, they ſignify ſomething; yet, when their meaning comes to be caſt up, as they are placed, it amounts to juſt nothing.

Page 25. **You** go on, “ What juſtice it would be, for the magiſtrate, to puniſh one, “ for not being a carteſian, it will be time enough to conſider, when I have “ proved it to be as neceſſary for men to be carteſians, as it is to be chriſtians, “ or members of God's church.” This will be a much better anſwer to what I ſaid, when you have proved, that to be a chriſtian, or a member of God's church, it is neceſſary for a diſſenter, to be of the church of England. If it be not juſtice, to puniſh a man, for not being a carteſian, becauſe it is not as neceſſary to be a carteſian, as to be a chriſtian; I fear the ſame argument will hold, againſt puniſhing a man, for not uſing the croſs in baptiſm, or not kneeling at the Lord's ſupper; and it will lie on you to prove, that it is as neceſſary, to uſe the croſs in baptiſm, or kneeling at the Lord's ſupper, as it is to be a chriſtian: for, if they are not as neceſſary, as it is to be a chriſtian, you cannot, by your own rule, without injuſtice, puniſh men, for not conforming to a church, wherein they are made an indiſpenſible part of conformity; and, by this rule, it will be injuſtice, to puniſh any man, for not being of that church, wherein any thing is required, not neceſſary to ſalvation; for that, I think, is, the neceſſity of being a chriſtian.

L. 2. P. 270. **To** ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of puniſhing diſſenters, to make them examine, I ſaid, that ſo, they were puniſhed, for not having offended againſt a law; for there is no law of the land, that requires them to examine. Your reply is, That Page 45. “ you think the contrary is plain enough: for where the laws provide ſufficient means of inſtruction in the true religion; and, then, require all “ men to embrace that religion; you think the moſt natural conſtruction of “ thoſe laws, is, that they require men to embrace it, upon inſtruction and “ conviction, as it cannot be expected, they ſhould do, without examining the “ grounds, upon which it ſtands.” Your anſwer were very true, if they could not embrace, without examining and conviction. But, ſince there is a ſhorter way to embracing, which coſts no more pains, than walking as far as the church, your anſwer no more proves, that the law requires examining, than if a man, at Harwich, being ſubpœnaed to appear in Weſtminſter-Hall, next term, you ſhould ſay the ſubpœna required him to come by ſea, becauſe there was ſufficient means provided for his paſſage, in the ordinary boat, that, by appointment, goes conſtantly from Harwich to London: but he, taking it to be more for his eaſe and diſpatch, goes the ſhorter way, by land, and finds, that having made his appearance in court, as was required, the law is ſatisfied, and there is no enquiry made, what way he came thither.

A. P. 6, &c. **If**, therefore, men can embrace, ſo as to ſatisfy the law, without examining, and it be true, that they ſo “ fly from the means of right information, are ſo “ negligent in, and averſe to, examining,” that there is need of penalties, to make them do it, as you tell us, at large; how is it a natural conſtruction of thoſe laws, that they require men to examine, which, having provided ſufficient means of inſtruction, require men only to conform, without ſaying any thing of examining? eſpecially, when the cauſe, aſſigned by you of men's neglecting

Page 53. to examine, is not want of "means of inſtruction, but want of penalties to over-balance their averſion" to the uſing thoſe means; which you yourſelf L. 2. P. 281. confeſs, where you ſay, "When the beſt proviſion is made, that can be, for the inſtruction of the people, you fear a great part of them will ſtill need penalties, to bring them to hear and receive inſtruction:" and therefore, perhaps, the remainder of that paragraph, when you have conſidered it again, will not appear ſo impertinent a declamation, as you are pleaſed to think it: for it charged your method (as it then ſtood) of puniſhing men, for not conſidering and examining, with theſe abſurdities. That it puniſhed men, for not doing that, which the law did not require of them, nor declare the neglect of to be a fault, contrary to the ends of all laws, contrary to the common ſenſe of mankind, and the practice of all law-makers, who always firſt declared the fault, and then denounced the penalties againſt thoſe, who, after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. It charged your method, that it allows not impunity to the innocent, but puniſhes whole tribes together, the innocent with the guilty; and that the thing, deſigned in the law, was not mentioned in it, but left to the people (whoſe fault was want of conſideration) to be, by conſideration, found out.

To avoid theſe abſurdities, you have reformed your ſcheme, and now, in your reply, own, with the frankeſt perſecutors, that you puniſh men downright for their religion, and that to be a diſſenter from the true religion, is a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. This, indeed, is plain dealing, and clears your method from theſe abſurdities, as long as you keep to it: but wherever you tell us, that your laws are to make men hear, to make men conſider, to make men examine; whilſt the laws themſelves ſay nothing, of hearing, conſidering and examining, there you are ſtill chargeable with all theſe abſurdities: nor will the diſtinction, which, without any difference, you would ſet up between the fault, for which men are to be puniſhed, and the end, for which they are to be puniſhed, do you any ſervice herein, as I have ſhewed you in another place.

To what I ſaid L. 2. from p. 292, to p. 297, concerning thoſe who, by your ſcheme, are to be puniſhed, you having thought fit not to anſwer any thing, I ſhall here again offer it to your conſideration.

"Let us enquire, firſt, who it is, you would have be puniſhed. In the place above-cited, they are thoſe, who are got into a wrong way, and are deaf to all perſuaſions. If theſe are the men to be puniſhed, let a law be made againſt them: you have my conſent: and that is the proper courſe to have offenders puniſhed. For you do not, I hope, intend to puniſh any fault, by a law, which you do not name in the law; nor make a law againſt any fault, you would not have puniſhed. And now, if you are ſincere, and in earneſt, and are (as a fair man ſhould be) for what your words plainly ſignify, and nothing elſe; what will ſuch a law ſerve for? "Men in the wrong way are to be puniſhed;" but who are in the wrong way, is the queſtion. You have no more reaſon to determine it, againſt one, who differs from you, than he has to conclude, againſt you, who differ from him: no, not tho' you have the magiſtrate and the national church on your ſide. For if to differ from them be, to be in the wrong way: you, who are in the right way, in England, will be in the wrong way, in France. Every one here muſt be judge for himſelf: and your law will reach nobody, until you have convinced him, he is in the wrong way. And then, there will be no need of puniſhment to make him conſider; unleſs you will affirm again, what you have denied, and have men puniſhed for embracing the religion, they believe to be true, when it differs from yours, or the publick.

"Besides being in the wrong way, thoſe, whom you would have puniſhed, muſt be ſuch, as are deaf to all perſuaſions, But any ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you will hardly find, who hearken to nobody, not to thoſe of their own way. If you mean, by deaf to all perſuaſions, all perſuaſions of a contrary party, or of a different church; ſuch, I ſuppoſe, you may abundantly find, in your own church, as well as elſewhere; and, I preſume, to them you are

" ſo charitable, that you would not have them puniſhed, for not lending an ear " to ſeducers. For conſtancy in the truth, and perſeverance in the faith, is (I " hope) rather to be encouraged, than, by any penalties, checked in the ortho- " dox. And your church, doubtleſs, as well as all others, is orthodox to itſelf, " in all its tenets. If you mean, by all perſuaſion, all your perſuaſion, or all " perſuaſion of thoſe of your communion; you do but beg the queſtion, and " ſuppoſe you have a right to puniſh thoſe, who differ from, and will not com- " ply with, you.

" YOUR next words are," When men fly from the means of a right information, and will not ſo much as conſider, how reaſonable it is, thoroughly and impartially to examine a religion, which they embraced, upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway, at all, in the matter; and, therefore, with little, or no, examination of the proper grounds of it; What human method can be uſed, to bring them to act like men, in an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penalties upon them, as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way, before the true, and recover them to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, Whether it be really worth the while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe, or for rejecting another, (if that be the caſe) which, for any thing they know, may be true, until they have brought it to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there? " Here you " again bring in ſuch as prefer a falſe way, before a true: to which, having " anſwered already, I ſhall here ſay no more, but, that ſince our church will " not allow thoſe to be in a falſe way, who are out of the church of Rome, " becauſe the church of Rome (which pretends infallibility) declares hers, to " be the only true way; certainly no one of our church (nor any other, which " claims not infallibility) can require any one to take the teſtimony of any " church, as a ſufficient proof of the truth of her own doctrine. So that true " and falſe (as it commonly happens, when we ſuppoſe them, for ourſelves, or " our party) in effect, ſignify juſt nothing, or nothing to the purpoſe; unleſs " we can think, that true or falſe, in England, which will not be ſo at Rome, " or Geneva; and vice verſâ. As for the reſt of the deſcription of thoſe, on " whom, you are here laying penalties: I beſeech you conſider, whether it " will not belong to any of your church, let it be what it will," Conſider, I ſay, if there be none of your church, who have embraced her religion, upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway, at all, in the matter; and, therefore, with little, or no, examination of the proper grounds of it; who have not been inclined by prejudices; who do not adhere to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe; and who have rejected another, which, for any thing they know, may be true. " If you have any ſuch, in your communion, " (and it will be an admirable, though I fear but a little flock, that has none " ſuch in it) conſider well what you have done. You have prepared rods for " them, for which I imagine they will con you no thanks. For, to make any " tolerable ſenſe of what you here propoſe, it muſt be underſtood, that you " would have men of all religions puniſhed, to make them conſider, " Whe- " ther it be really worth the while, to undergo ſuch inconveniencies for ad- " hering to a religion, which, for any thing they know, may be falſe." If " you hope to avoid that, by what you have ſaid, of true and falſe; and pre- " tend, that the ſuppoſed preference of the true way, in your church, ought " to preſerve its members from your puniſhment; you manifeſtly trifle. For " every church's teſtimony, that it has choſen the true way, muſt be taken for " itſelf: and, then, none will be liable, and your new invention, of puniſh- " ment, is come to nothing: or elſe, the differing churches teſtimonies muſt " be taken, one for another; and then, they will be all out of the true way, " and your church need penalties, as well as the reſt. So that, upon your prin- " ciples, they muſt all, or none, be puniſhed, chuſe which you pleaſe; one of " them, I think, you cannot eſcape.

WHAT you ſay, in the next words; “ Where inſtruction is ſtiffly refuſed, “ and all admonitions and perſuaſions prove vain and ineffectual, differs nothing, “ but in the way of expreſſing, from “ deaf to all perſuaſions :” and ſo that is “ anſwered already.

“ IN another place, you give us another deſcription of thoſe, you think, “ ought to be puniſhed, in theſe words ;” Thoſe, who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the ſpiritual government, of the proper miniſters of religion, who, by a ſpecial deſignation, are appointed to exhort, admoniſh, reprove, &c. “ Here then, thoſe to be puniſhed,” are ſuch, who refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the proper miniſters of “ religion. “ Whereby we are as much ſtill at uncertainty, as we were before, “ who, thoſe are, who (by your ſcheme, and laws ſuitable to it) are to be puniſhed ; ſince every church has, as it thinks, its proper miniſters of religion ; “ and if you mean thoſe, that refuſe to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to “ the government of the miniſters of another church ; then all men will be “ guilty, and muſt be puniſhed, even thoſe of your own church, as well as “ others. If you mean thoſe, who refuſe, &c. the miniſters of their own “ church, very few will incur your penalties : but if, by theſe proper miniſters “ of religion, the miniſters of ſome particular church, are intended, Why do “ you not name it ? Why are you ſo reſerved, in a matter, wherein, if you “ ſpeak not out, all the reſt, that you ſay, will be to no purpoſe ? Are men to “ be puniſhed, for “ refuſing to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government of the proper miniſters of the church of Geneva ?” For this time, “ (ſince you have declared nothing to the contrary) let me ſuppoſe you of that “ church ; and then I am ſure, that is it, that you would name : for of whatever church you are, if you think the miniſters of any one church ought to be “ hearkened to, and be obeyed, it muſt be thoſe of your own. There are perſons to be puniſhed, you ſay : this you contend for, all through your book, “ and lay ſo much ſtreſs on it, that you make the preſervation and propagation “ of religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, to depend on it ; and yet, you deſcribe “ them, by ſo general and equivocal marks, that, unleſs it be upon ſuppoſitions, which nobody will grant you, I dare ſay, neither you , nor any body “ elſe, will be able to find one guilty. Pray find me, if you can, a man, whom “ you can judicially prove (for he that is to be puniſhed by law, muſt be fairly “ tried) is in a wrong way, in reſpect of his faith ; I mean, “ who is deaf to “ all perſuaſions, who flies from all means of a right information, who refuſes “ to embrace the doctrine, and ſubmit to the government, of the ſpiritual “ paſtors.” And when you have done that, I think I may allow you, what “ power, you pleaſe, to puniſh him, without any prejudice to the toleration, “ the author of the letter propoſes.

“ BUT why, I pray, all this bogling, all this looſe talking, as if you knew “ not what you meant, or durſt not ſpeak it out ? Would you be for puniſhing “ ſome body, you know not whom ? I do not think ſo ill of you. Let me, “ then, ſpeak out for you. The evidence of the argument has convinced you, “ that men ought not to be perſecuted for their religion ; that the ſeverities, in “ uſe among chriſtians, cannot be defended ; that the magiſtrate has not authority to compel any one to his religion. This you are forced to yield. But “ you would fain retain ſome power in the magiſtrate's hands, to puniſh diſſenters, upon a new pretence, viz. not for having embraced the doctrine and “ worſhip, they believe to be true and right, but for not having well conſidered “ their own and the magiſtrate's religion. To ſhew you that I do not ſpeak “ wholly without book, give me leave to mind you of one paſſage of yours : “ the words are, “ penalties, to put them upon a ſerious and impartial examination of the controverſy, between the magiſtrate and them.” Though theſe “ words be not intended to tell us, whom you would have puniſhed, yet it may “ be plainly inferred from them. And they more clearly point out, whom you “ aim at, than all the foregoing places, where you ſeem to (and ſhould) deſcribe them. For they are ſuch, as, “ between whom and the magiſtrate “ there is a controverſy ;” that is, in ſhort, who differ from the magiſtrate in re-

“ligion. And now, indeed, you have given us a note, by which theſe, you would have puniſhed, may be known. We have, with much ado, found, at laſt, whom it is, we may preſume, you would have puniſhed. Which, in other caſes, is uſually not very difficult: becauſe, there the faults to be amended, eaſily deſign the perſons to be corrected. But yours is a new method, and unlike all that ever went before it.

“In the next place, let us ſee, for what you would have them puniſhed. You tell us, and it will eaſily be granted you, that not to examine and weigh impartially, and without prejudice, or paſſion, (all which, for ſhortneſs ſake, we will expreſs by this one word, conſider) the religion, one embraces, or refuſes, is a fault, very common, and very prejudicial to true religion, and the ſalvation of men's ſouls. But penalties and puniſhments are very neceſſary, you ſay, to remedy this evil.

“Let us now ſee, how you apply this remedy. Therefore, ſay you, let all diſſenters be puniſhed. Why? Have no diſſenters conſidered of religion? Or have all conformiſts conſidered? That you yourſelf will not ſay. Your project, therefore, is juſt as reaſonable, as if a lethargy growing epidemical, in England, you ſhould propoſe to have a law made, to bliſter and ſcarify, and ſhave the heads of all, who wear gowns; though it be certain that neither all, who wear gowns, are lethargick, nor all, who are lethargick, wear gowns.

——“Dii te, Damaſippe, deæq;
“Verum ob conſilium donent tonſore.”

“For there could not be, certainly, a more learned advice, than that one man ſhould be pulled by the ears, becauſe another is aſleep. This, when you have conſidered of it again, (for I find, according to your principle, all men have, now and then, need to be jogged) you will, I gueſs, be convinced, is not like a fair phyſician, to apply a remedy to a diſeaſe; but, like an enraged enemy, to vent one's ſpleen upon a party. Common ſenſe, as well as common juſtice, requires, that the remedies, of laws and penalties, ſhould be directed againſt the evil, that is to be removed, wherever it be found. And, if the puniſhment, you think ſo neceſſary, be (as you pretend) to cure the miſchief, you complain of, you muſt let it purſue, and fall on the guilty, and thoſe only, in what company ſoever they are; and not, as you here propoſe, and is the higheſt injuſtice, puniſh the innocent, conſidering diſſenter, with the guilty; and on the other ſide, let the inconſiderate, guilty conformiſt eſcape, with the innocent. For one may rationally preſume, that the national church has ſome, nay, more, in proportion, of thoſe, who little conſider, or concern themſelves, about religion, than any congregation of diſſenters. For conſcience, or the care of their ſouls, being once laid aſide; intereſt, of courſe, leads men into that ſociety, where the protection and countenance of government, and hopes of preferment, bid faireſt to all their remaining deſires. So that, if careleſs, negligent, inconſiderate men, in matters of religion, “who, without being forced, would not conſider,” are to be rouzed into a care of their ſouls, and a ſearch, after truth, by puniſhment; the national religion, in all countries, will certainly have a right to the greateſt ſhare of thoſe puniſhments, at leaſt, not be wholly exempt from them.

“This is that, which the author of the letter, as I remember, complains of, and that juſtly,” viz. That the pretended care of men's ſouls always expreſſes itſelf, in thoſe, who would have force, any way, made uſe of, to that end, in very unequal methods; ſome perſons being to be treated with ſeverity, whilſt others, guilty of the ſame fault, are not to be ſo much as touched. “Though you are got pretty well out of the deep mud, and renounce puniſhments, directly for religion; yet you ſtick ſtill in this part of the mire; whilſt you would have diſſenters puniſhed, to make them conſider, but would not have any thing done to conformiſts, though never ſo negligent, in this point of conſidering. The author's letter pleaſed me, becauſe it is equal to all

" mankind, is direct, and will, I think, hold every where; which I take to be " a good mark of the truth. For I ſhall always ſuſpect that, neither to comport with the truth of religion, or the deſign of the goſpel, which is ſuited " to only ſome one country, or party. What is true and good in England, " will be true and good at Rome too, in China, or Geneva. But, whether " your great and only method, for the propagating of truth, by bringing the " inconſiderate, by puniſhments, to conſider, would (according to your way of " applying your puniſhments, only to diſſenters from the national religion) be " of uſe, in thoſe countries, or any where, but where you ſuppoſe the magiſtrate to be in the right, judge you. Pray, Sir, conſider a little, whether " prejudice has not ſome ſhare in your way of arguing. For this is your poſition; " men are generally negligent in examining the grounds of their religion." This I grant. But could there be a more wild and incoherent conſequence drawn from it, than this; therefore diſſenters muſt be puniſhed?"

ALL this you are pleaſed to paſs over, without the leaſt notice: but, perhaps, you think, you have made me full ſatisfaction, in your anſwer to my demand, Who are to be puniſhed? We will here, therefore, conſider that, as it ſtands, Page 48. where you tell us, " Thoſe who are to be puniſhed, according to the whole " tenor of your anſwer, are no other but ſuch, as having ſufficient evidence " tendered them, of the true religion, do yet reject it: whether utterly refuſing to conſider that evidence, or not conſidering, as they ought, viz. with " ſuch care and diligence, as the matter deſerves and requires, and with honeſt " and unbiaſſed minds; and what difficulty there is, in this, you ſay you cannot imagine." You promiſed, you would tell the world, who they were, Page 46. plainly and directly. And, though you tell us, you cannot imagine what difficulty there is, in this your account, of who are to be puniſhed, yet there are ſome things in it, that make it, to my apprehenſion, not very plain and direct. For firſt, they muſt be only thoſe, who have the true religion tendered them with ſufficient evidence: wherein, there appears ſome difficulty to me, who ſhall be judge, what is the true religion: and for that, in every country it is moſt probable the magiſtrate will be. If you think of any other, pray tell us. Next, there ſeems ſome difficulty to know, who ſhall be judge, what is ſufficient evidence. For, where a man is to be puniſhed by law, he muſt be convicted of being guilty; which, ſince in this caſe he cannot be, unleſs it be proved, he has had the true religion tendered to him, with ſufficient evidence, it is neceſſary, that ſome body there muſt be judge, what is the true religion, and what is ſufficient evidence; and others to prove, it has been ſo tendered. If you were to be of the jury, we know, what would be your verdict, concerning Page 51. ſufficient evidence, by theſe words of yours, " To ſay, that a man, who " has the true religion propoſed to him, with ſufficient evidence of its truth, " may conſider it as he ought, or do his utmoſt in conſidering, and yet not perceive the truth of it, is neither more nor leſs, than to ſay, that ſufficient evidence is not ſufficient: For what does any man mean, by ſufficient evidence, " but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent, wherever it is duly conſidered?" Upon which, his conforming, or not conforming, would, without any farther queſtions, determine the point. But, whether the reſt of the jury could, upon this, be able ever to bring in any man guilty, and ſo liable to puniſhment, is a queſtion. For, if ſufficient evidence be only that, which certainly wins aſſent, wherever a man does his utmoſt, in conſidering, it will be very hard to prove, that a man, who rejects the true religion, has had it tendered with ſufficient evidence, becauſe it will be very hard to prove, he has not done his utmoſt, in conſidering it. So that, notwithſtanding all you have here ſaid, to puniſh any man, by your method, is not yet ſo very practicable.

BUT you clear all, in your following words, which ſay, " there is nothing " more evident than thoſe, who reject the true religion, are culpable, and deſerve to be puniſhed." By whom? By men: that is ſo far from being evident, as you talk, that it will require better proofs, than I have yet ſeen for it. Next you ſay, " it is eaſy enough to know, when men reject the true religion." Yes, when the true religion is known, and agreed on what ſhall be taken to be ſo, in judicial proceedings, which can ſcarce be, until it is agreed, who ſhall determine, what is true religion, and what not. Suppoſe a penalty ſhould, in the univerſity, be laid on thoſe, who rejected the true peripatetick doctrine, could that law be executed, on any one, unleſs it were agreed, who ſhould be judge, what was the true peripatetick doctrine? If you ſay, it may be known, out of Ariſtotle's writings: then I anſwer, that it would be a more reaſonable law, to lay the penalty on any one, who rejected the doctrine, contained in the books, allowed to be Ariſtotle's, and printed under his name. You may apply this to the true religion, and the books of the ſcripture, if you pleaſe: though, after all, there muſt be a judge, agreed on, to determine, what doctrines are contained in either of thoſe writings, before the law can be practicable.

BUT you go on to prove, that "it is eaſy to know when men reject the "true religion: for, ſay you, that requires no more, than that we know, that "that religion was tendered to them, with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it. "And that it may be tendered to men, with ſuch evidence, and that it may be "known, when it is ſo tendered, theſe things, you ſay, you take leave here to "ſuppoſe." You ſuppoſe then, more, than can be allowed you. For that it can be judicially known, that the true religion has been tendered to any one, with ſufficient evidence, is what I deny, and that for reaſons above-mentioned, which, were there no other difficulty in it, were ſufficient to ſhew the unpracticableneſs of your method. Page 48.

YOU conclude this paragraph, thus: "Which is all, that needs be ſaid, upon "this head, to ſhew the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of this method: and "what do you, any where, ſay againſt this?" Whether I ſay any thing, or no, againſt it, I will bring a friend of yours, that will ſay, that diſſenters ought to be puniſhed, for being out of the communion of the church of England, I will aſk you now, how can it be proved that ſuch an one is guilty of rejecting the one, only, true religion? Perhaps it is, becauſe he ſcruples the croſs in baptiſm, or godfathers and godmothers, as they are uſed, or kneeling at the Lord's ſupper; perhaps it is, becauſe he cannot pronounce all damned, that believe not all Athanaſius's creed, or cannot join with ſome of thoſe repetitions, in our common-prayer, thinking them to come within the prohibition of our Saviour, each of which ſhuts a man out from the communion of the church of England, as much as if he denied Jeſus Chriſt, to be the Son of God. Now, Sir, I beſeech you, how can it be known, that ever ſufficient evidence was tendered to ſuch a diſſenter to prove, that what he rejects, is a part of that one, only true religion, which, unleſs he be of, he cannot be ſaved? Or, indeed, how can it be known, that any diſſenter rejects that one, only, true religion, when being puniſhed, barely for not conforming, he is never aſked, what part it is he diſſents from, or rejects? And ſo, it may be, ſome of thoſe things, which, I imagine, will always want ſufficient evidence, to prove them, to be parts of that one, only, true religion, without the hearty embracing whereof, no man can be ſaved.

CHAP. IV.

What degrees of puniſhment.

HOW much ſoever you have endeavoured to reform the doctrine of perſecution, to make it ſerve your turn, and give it the colour of care and zeal, for the true religion, in the country where alone you are concerned, it ſhould be made uſe of; yet you have laboured in vain, and done no more, but given the old engine a new varniſh, to ſet it off the better, and make it look leſs frightful: for, by what has been ſaid, in the foregoing chapters, I think it will appear, that, if any magiſtrate have power to puniſh men in matters of religion, all have; and that diſſenters from the national religion muſt be puniſhed, every where, or no where. The horrid cruelties that, in all ages, and, of late, in our view, have been committed, under the name, and upon the account, of religion, give ſo juſt an offence and abhorrence to all, who have any remains, not only of religion, but humanity left, that the world is aſhamed to own it. This objection, therefore, as much as words, or profeſſions, can do, you have laboured to fence againſt; and to exempt your deſign, from the ſuſpicion of any ſeverities, you take care in every page almoſt, to let us hear of moderate force, moderate penalties; but all in vain: and I doubt not but, when this part too is examined, it will appear, that, as you neither have, nor can limit the power of puniſhing, to any diſtinct ſort of magiſtrates, nor exempt from puniſhment the diſſenters from any national religion: ſo neither have, nor can you limit the puniſhment to any degree, ſhort of the higheſt, if you will uſe puniſhments at all, in matters of religion. What you have done, in this point, beſides giving us good words, I will now examine.

Page 1. YOU tell me, "I have taken a liberty which will need pardon; becauſe I ſay, "you have plainly yielded the queſtion, by owning thoſe greater ſeverities to be improper and unfit." But, if I ſhall make it out, that thoſe are as proper and fit, as your moderate penalties: and that, if you will uſe one, you muſt come to the other, as will appear, from what you yourſelf ſay; whatever you may think, I ſhall not imagine other readers will conclude, I have taken too great a liberty, or ſhall much need pardon. Page 2. For if, as you ſay in the next page, "authority may, reaſonably and juſtly, uſe ſome degrees of force, where it is needful;" I ſay, they may alſo uſe any degrees of force, where it is needful. Now, upon your grounds, fire and ſword, tormenting and undoing, and thoſe other puniſhments, which you condemn, will be needful, even to torments of the higheſt ſeverity, and be as neceſſary, as thoſe moderate penalties, which you will not name. For, I aſk you, to what purpoſe do you uſe any degrees of force? Is it to prevail on men to do ſomething, that is in their power, or that is not? The latter, I ſuppoſe, you will not ſay, till your love of force is ſo increaſed, that you ſhall think it neceſſary, to be made uſe of, to produce impoſſibilities: if force, then, be to be uſed, only to bring men to do what is in their power, what is the neceſſity you aſſign of it? Only this, as I remember, viz. "That "when gentle admonitions and earneſt entreaties, will not prevail, what other means is there left, but force?" And I, upon the ſame ground, reply; if leſſer degrees of force will not prevail, what other means is there left but greater; if the loweſt degrees of force be neceſſary, where gentler means will not prevail, becauſe there is no other means left; higher degrees of force are neceſſary, where lower will not prevail, for the ſame reaſon. Unleſs you will ſay all degrees of force work alike; and that lower penalties prevail as much, on men, as greater, and will equally bring them to do what is in their power. If ſo, a philip on the forehead, or a farthing mulct, may be penalty enough, to bring men to what you propoſe. But, if you ſhall laugh at theſe, as being, for their ſmallneſs, inſufficient, and, therefore, will think it neceſſary to increaſe them; I ſay, where-ever experience ſhews any degree of force to be inſufficient to prevail, there will be ſtill the ſame neceſſity to increaſe it. For where-ever the end is neceſſary, and force is the means, the only means left to procure it, both which you ſuppoſe in our caſe, there it will be found always neceſſary, to increaſe the degrees of force, where the lower prove ineffectual, as well until you come to the higheſt as when you begin with the loweſt. So that, in your preſent caſe, I do not wonder, you uſe ſo many ſhifts, as I ſhall ſhew, by and by, you do, to decline naming the higheſt degree of, what you call, moderate. If any degree be neceſſary, you cannot aſſign any one (condemn it in words, as much as you pleaſe) which may not be ſo, and which you muſt not come to the uſe of. If there be no ſuch neceſſity of force, as will juſtify thoſe higher degrees of it, which are ſeverities you condemn, neither will it juſtify the uſe of your lower degrees.

Page 7. IF, as you tell us, "falſe religions prevail againſt the true, merely by the advantage they have, in the corruption and pravity of human nature left to itſelf, unbridled by authority." If the not receiving the true religion be a mark, and effect, merely of the prevalency of the corruption of human nature;

may not, nay, muſt not the magiſtrate, if leſs will not do, uſe his utmoſt force, to bring men to the true religion? his force being given him to ſuppreſs that corruption; eſpecially, ſince you give it for a meaſure, of the force to be uſed, that it muſt be "ſo much, as, without which ordinarily, they will not embrace the "truth, that muſt ſave them." What, ordinarily, ſignifies here, to make any determinate meaſure, is hard to gueſs; but, ſignify it what it will, ſo much force muſt be uſed, as, "without which, men will not embrace the truth;" which, if it ſignify any thing intelligible, requires, that where lower degrees will not do, greater muſt be uſed, till you come to what will ordinarily do: but what that ordinarily is, no man can tell. If one man will not be wrought on by as little force as another, muſt not greater degrees of force be uſed to him? Shall the magiſtrate who is obliged to do what lies in him, be excuſed, for letting him be damned, without the uſe of all the means, that was in his power? and will it be ſufficient for him to plead, that though he did not all, that lay in him, yet he did what ordinarily prevailed, or what prevailed on ſeveral others. Force, if that be the remedy, muſt be proportioned to the oppoſition. If the doſe, that has frequently wrought on others, will not purge a man, whoſe life lies on it, muſt it not, therefore, be made ſufficient and effectual, becauſe it will be more, than what is called, ordinarily? Or, can any one ſay, the phyſician has done his duty, who lets his patient, in an extraordinary caſe, periſh, in the uſe of only moderate remedies, and pronounces him incurable, before he has tried the utmoſt he can, with the powerfulleſt remedies, which are in his reach?

HAVING renounced loſs of eſtate, corporal puniſhments, impriſonment, and ſuch ſort of ſeverities, as unfit to be uſed in matters of religion; you aſk, "Will "it follow from hence, that the magiſtrate has not a right to uſe any force?" Page 19. Yes, it will follow, until you give ſome anſwer to what I ſay in that place, viz. That, if you give up puniſhments of a man, "in his perſon, liberty and eſtate, "I think we need not ſtand with you, for any puniſhment may be made uſe "of." But this you paſs by without any notice. I doubt not, but you will here think, you have a ready anſwer, by telling me, you mean only "depriving men of their eſtates, maiming them with corporal puniſhments, ſtarving "and tormenting them in noiſome priſons," and other ſuch ſeverities, which you have, by name, excepted; but lower penalties may yet be uſed, for penalties is the word, you carefully uſe, and diſclaim that of puniſhments, as if you Page 1. diſowned the thing. I wiſh you would tell us too, by name, what thoſe lower penalties are, you would have uſed, as well as, by name, you tell us thoſe ſeverities, you diſallow. They may not maim a man with corporal puniſhments; may they uſe any corporal puniſhments at all? They may not ſtarve and torment them in noiſome priſons, for religion; that you condemn, as much as I; May they put them in priſon, at all? They may not deprive men of their eſtates; I ſuppoſe you mean their whole eſtates; may they take away half, or a quarter, or an hundredth part? It is ſtrange, you ſhould be able to name the degrees of ſeverity that will hinder, more than promote, the progreſs of religion, and cannot name thoſe degrees, that will promote, rather than hinder it; that thoſe, who would take their meaſures by you, and follow your ſcheme, might know, how to proceed ſo, as not to do more harm than good: for, ſince you are ſo certain, that there are degrees of puniſhments, or penalties, that will do good, and other degrees of them, that will do harm; ought you not to have told us, what that true degree is, or how it may be known, without which all your goodly ſcheme is of no uſe? For allowing all you have ſaid, to be as true, as you would have it, no good can be done, without ſhewing the juſt meaſure of puniſhment to be uſed.

IF the degree be too great, it will, you confeſs, do harm; can one, then, not err on the other hand, by uſing too little? If you ſay, no; we are agreed and I deſire no better toleration. If, therefore, too great will do harm, and too little, in your opinion, will do no good, you ought to tell us the juſt mean. This I preſſed upon you; whereof, that the reader may be judge, I ſhall here trouble him with the repetition.

"THERE

L. 2. p. 300. “ THERE is a third thing, that you are as tender and reſerved in, as either
“ naming the criminals to be puniſhed, or poſitively telling us the end, for
“ which they ſhould be puniſhed: and that is, with what ſort of penalties,
“ what degree of puniſhment, they ſhould be forced. You are, indeed, ſo gracious
A. p. 24. “ to them, that you renounce the ſeverities and penalties, hitherto made
“ uſe of. You tell us, they ſhould be but moderate penalties. But if we aſk
“ you, what are moderate penalties? you confeſs you cannot tell us: ſo that,
A. p. 15. “ by moderate, here, you yet mean nothing, You tell us, “ the outward force
“ to be applied, ſhould be duly tempered.” But what that due temper is, you
“ do not, or cannot ſay; and ſo, in effect, it ſignifies juſt nothing. Yet if, in
“ this, you are not plain and direct, all the reſt of your deſign will ſignify nothing;
“ For it being to have ſome men, and to ſome end, puniſhed; yet if it
“ cannot be found, what puniſhment is to be uſed, it is (notwithanding all
A. p. 12. “ you have ſaid) utterly uſeleſs. You tell us modeſtly, “ that to determine
“ preciſely the juſt meaſure of the puniſhment, will require ſome conſideration.”
“ If the faults were preciſely determined, and could be proved, it would require
“ no more conſideration, to determine the meaſure of the puniſhment, in
“ this, than it would, in any other caſe, where thoſe were known. But, where
“ the fault is undefined, and the guilt not to be proved, (as I ſuppoſe it will be
“ found, in this preſent buſineſs of examining) it will, without doubt, require
“ conſideration to proportion the force to the deſign: juſt ſo much conſideration,
“ as it will require to fit a coat to the moon, or proportion a ſhoe to the
“ feet of thoſe, who inhabit her. For, to proportion a puniſhment to a fault,
“ that you do not name, (and ſo we, in charity, ought to think you do not yet
“ know) and a fault that, when you have named, it will be impoſſible to be
“ proved, who are, or who are not, guilty of it, will, I ſuppoſe, require as much
“ conſideration, as to fit a ſhoe to feet, whoſe ſize and ſhape are not known.

“ HOWEVER, you offer ſome meaſures, whereby to regulate your puniſhments;
“ which, when they are looked into, will be found to be juſt as good
A. p. 14. “ as none, they being impoſſible to be any rule, in the caſe. The firſt is,” ſo
much force, or ſuch penalties, as are ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men of
common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; to weigh matters
of religion carefully and impartially, and, without which, ordinarily they
will not do this. “ Where it is to be obſerved:

“ Firſt, THAT, who are theſe men of common diſcretion, is as hard to
“ know, as to know, what is a fit degree of puniſhment, in the caſe; and ſo
“ you do but regulate one uncertainty by another. Some men will be apt to
“ think, that he who will not weigh matters of religion, which are of infinite
“ concernment to him, without puniſhment, cannot, in reaſon, be thought a
“ man of common diſcretion. Many women of common diſcretion enough, to
“ manage the ordinary affairs of their families, are not able to read a page, in
“ an ordinary author, or to underſtand and give an account what it means,
“ when read to them. Many men of common diſcretion, in their callings, are
“ not able to judge, when an argument is concluſive, or no; much leſs to trace
“ it through a long train of conſequences. What penalties ſhall be ſufficient to
“ prevail with ſuch (who, upon examination, I fear, will not be found to make
“ the leaſt part of mankind) to examine and weigh matters of religion carefully
“ and impartially? the law allows all to have common diſcretion, for whom it
“ has not provided guardians, or Bedlam. So that, in effects, your men of common
“ diſcretion, are all men, not judged ideots, or madmen: and penalties,
“ ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, are penalties ſufficient to
“ prevail with all men, but ideots and madmen. Which, what a meaſure it is
“ to regulate penalties by, let all men of common diſcretion judge.

“ Secondly, You may be pleaſed to conſider, that all men of the ſame degree
“ of diſcretion, are not apt to be moved by the ſame degree of penalties. Some
“ are of a more yielding, ſome of a more ſtiff temper; and what is ſufficient to
“ prevail on one, is not half enough to move the other; though both men of
“ common diſcretion. So that the common diſcretion will be here of no uſe, to
“ determine the meaſure of puniſhment: eſpecially, when, in the ſame clauſe,

“ you except men deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; who are as hard to be “ known, as what you ſeek, viz. the juſt proportions of puniſhments, neceſſary “ to prevail with men to conſider, examine, and weigh matters of religion; “ wherein, if a man tells you, he has conſidered, he has weighed, he has exa- “ mined, and ſo goes on, in his former courſe, it is impoſſible for you ever to “ know, whether he has done his duty, or whether he be deſperately perverſe “ and obſtinate. So that this exception ſignifies juſt nothing.

“ THERE are many things, in your uſe of force and penalties, different from “ any I ever met with, elſewhere. One of them, this clauſe of yours, con- “ cerning the meaſure of puniſhments, now under conſideration, offers me; “ wherein you proportion your puniſhments, only to the yielding and corrigible, “ not to the perverſe and obſtinate; contrary to the common diſcretion, which “ has hitherto made laws, in other caſes, which levels the puniſhments againſt “ refractory offenders, and never ſpares them, becauſe they are obſtinate. This “ however, I will not blame as an overſight in you. Your new method, which “ aims at ſuch impracticable and inconſiſtent things, as laws cannot bear, nor “ penalties be uſeful to, forced you to it. The uſeleſſneſs, abſurdity, and un- “ reaſonableneſs of great ſeverities, you had acknowledged, in the foregoing pa- “ ragraphs: diſſenters you would have brought to conſider, by moderate penal- “ ties; they lie under them; but whether they have conſidered, or no, (for that “ you cannot tell) they ſtill continue diſſenters. What is to be done now? Why, “ the incurable are to be left to God, as you tell us. Your puniſhments were A. p. 12. “ not meant to prevail, on the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as you tell us “ here. And ſo, whatever be the ſucceſs, your puniſhments are however juſtified.”

THE fulneſs of your anſwer to my queſtion. “ With what puniſhments?” made you, poſſibly, paſs by theſe two or three pages, without making any particular reply to any thing I ſaid in them: we will, therefore, examine that anſwer of yours, where you tell us, “ That having, in your anſwer, declared, that you Page 49. “ take the ſeverities, ſo often mentioned (which either deſtroy men, or make “ them miſerable) to be utterly unapt and improper (for reaſons there given) “ to bring men to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them: but juſt how far “ within thoſe bounds that force extends itſelf, which is really ſerviceable to that “ end, you do not preſume to determine.” To determine how far moderate force reaches, when it is neceſſary to your buſineſs, that it ſhould be determined, is not preſuming: you might, with more reaſon, have called it preſuming, to talk of moderate penalties, and not to be able to determine, what you mean by them; or to promiſe, as you do, that you will tell plainly and directly, with what puniſhments; and here to tell us, “ you do not preſume to determine.” But you give a reaſon for this modeſty of yours, in what follows, where you tell me, I have not ſhewn any cauſe, why you ſhould. And yet, you may find, in what is above repeated to you, theſe words, “ if, in this, you are not plain and di- “ rect, all the reſt of your deſign will ſignify nothing.” But had I failed in ſhewing any cauſe, why you ſhould; and your charity would not enlighten us, unleſs driven by my reaſons, I dare ſay yet, if I have not ſhewn any cauſe, why you ſhould determine in this point, I can ſhew a cauſe why you ſhould not. For I will be anſwerable to you, that you cannot name any degree of puniſhment, which will not be either too great, as to come among thoſe you condemn, and ſhew what your moderation, what your averſion to perſecution is; or elſe too little, to attain thoſe ends, for which you propoſe it. But, whatever you tell me, that I have ſhewn no cauſe, why you ſhould determine, I thought it might have paſſed for a cauſe, why you ſhould determine more particularly, that (as you will find, in thoſe pages) I had proved, that the meaſures you offer, whereby to regulate your puniſhments, are juſt as good as none.

YOUR meaſures in your argument conſidered, and which you repeat here again, are in theſe words; “ ſo much force, or ſuch penalties, as are ordinarily Ibid. “ ſufficient to prevail with men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately per- “ verſe, to weigh matters of religion carefully and impartially, and, without “ which ordinarily, they will not do this; ſo much force, or ſuch penalties may “ fitly and reaſonably be uſed, for the promoting true religion in the world, and the ſalvation of ſouls. And what juſt exception this is liable to, you do not underſtand.” Some of the exceptions it is liable to, you might have ſeen in what I have here again cauſed to be reprinted, if you had thought them worth Page 49. your notice. But you go on to tell us here, “ That, when you ſpeak of men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you think it is plain enough, that by common diſcretion, you exclude not ideots only, and ſuch as we uſually call madmen, but likewiſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, who, perhaps, may well enough deſerve that name, though they be not wont to be ſent to Bedlam.”

WHETHER, by this, you have at all taken off the difficulty, and ſhewn your meaſure to be any at all, in the uſe of force, I leave the reader to judge. I aſked, ſince great ones are unfit, what degrees of puniſhment, or force, are to be uſed? you anſwer, “ ſo much force, and ſuch penalties, as are ordinarily ſufficient, to prevail with men of ordinary diſcretion.” I tell you, it is as hard to know, who thoſe men of common diſcretion are, as what degree of puniſhment you would have uſed; unleſs we will take the “ determination of the law, which allows all to have common diſcretion, for whom it has not provided guardians, or Bedlam: ſo that, in effect, your men of common diſcretion, are all men, not judged ideots or madmen.” To clear this, you tell us, “ when you ſpeak of men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you think it is plain enough, by common diſcretion, you exclude not ideots only, and ſuch as are uſually called madmen, but likewiſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” It may be, you did, for you beſt know, what you meant, in writing: but if, by men of common diſcretion, you excluded the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, let us put what you meant, by the words, men of common diſcretion, in the place of thoſe words themſelves, and then, according to your meaning, your rule ſtands thus; penalties ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and with men not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate: ſo that at laſt, by men of common diſcretion, either you excluded only ideots and madmen; or, if we muſt take your word for it, that by them you excluded likewiſe the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and ſo meant ſomething elſe; it is plain, you meant only a very uſeleſs and inſignificant tautology.

Ibid. YOU go on to tell us, “ if the penalties, you ſpeak of, be intended for the curing men's unreaſonable prejudices and refractorineſs, againſt the true religion, then the reaſon, why the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are not to be regarded, in meaſuring theſe penalties, is very apparent. For, as remedies are not provided for the incurable, ſo in the preparing and tempering them, regard is to be had, only to thoſe, for whom they are deſigned.” Which true or falſe, is nothing to the purpoſe, in a place, where you profeſs to inform us, what puniſhments are to be uſed. We are enquiring, who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, and not, whether they are to be puniſhed, or no? you pretend to give us a rule, to know what degrees of force are to be uſed, and tell us, “ it is ſo much, as is ordinarily ſufficient, to prevail with men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” We again aſk, Who are your men of common diſcretion? you tell us, “ ſuch as are not madmen, or ideots, or deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” Very well; but who are thoſe deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? How ſhall we know them? and, to this, you tell us, “ they are not to be regarded in meaſuring theſe penalties.” Where-Page 50. by certainly we have got a plain meaſure of your moderate penalties. No, not yet; you go on, in the next paragraph, to perfect it, where you ſay, “ to prevent a little cavil, it may be needful to note that there are degrees of perverſeneſs and obſtinacy, and that men may be perverſe and obſtinate, without being deſperately ſo.” So then, now we have your meaſure compleat; and to determine the juſt degrees of puniſhments, and to clear up the doubt, who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, we need but be told that “ there are degrees of perverſeneſs and obſtinacy: and that men may be perverſe and obſtinate, without being deſperately ſo: and that, therefore, ſome perverſe and obſtinate perſons may be thought curable, tho' ſuch as are deſperately ſo, cannot.”

" not." But does all this tell us, who are the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? which is the thing, we want to be informed in; nor, until you have told us that, have you removed the objection.

BUT if, by deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you will tell us, you meant thoſe, that are not wrought upon, by your moderate penalties, as you ſeem to intimate, in your reaſon, why the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are not to be regarded, in meaſuring theſe penalties: " for, ſay you, as remedies are not " provided for the incurable; ſo, in preparing and tempering them, regard is to " be had, only to thoſe, for whom they are deſigned." So that, by the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you will perhaps ſay, it was plain, you meant the incurable; for you ordinarily ſhift off the doubtfulneſs of one place, by appealing to as doubtful an expreſſion in another. If you ſay, then, that, by deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, you mean incurable; I aſk you again, by what, incurable? By your lower degrees of force? for I hope, where force is proper to work, thoſe, who are not wrought on by lower degrees, may yet be, by higher. If you mean ſo, then your anſwer will amount to thus much, moderate penalties are ſuch, as are ſufficient to prevail on thoſe, who are not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate. The deſperately perverſe and obſtinate are thoſe, who are incurable; and the incurable are thoſe, on whom moderate penalties are not ſufficient to prevail: whereby, at laſt, we have got a ſure meaſure of what are moderate penalties; juſt ſuch an one, as, if having a ſovereign, univerſal medicine put into your hand, which will never fail, if you can hit the right doſe, which, the inventor tells you, muſt be moderate; you ſhould aſk him, what was the moderate quantity, it is to be given in; and he ſhould anſwer, in ſuch a quantity, as was ordinarily ſufficient to work on common conſtitutions, and not deſperate perverſe and obſtinate. And, to your aſking again, Who were of deſperately perverſe and obſtinate conſtitutions? It ſhould be anſwered, thoſe that were incurable. And who were incurable? thoſe, whom a moderate quantity would not work on. And thus, to your ſatisfaction, you know the moderate doſe, by the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; and the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, by being incurable; and the incurable, by the moderate doſe. For if, as you ſay, remedies are not provided for the incurable, and none, but moderate penalties, are to be provided, Is it not plain, that you mean, that all that will not be wrought on, by your moderate penalties, are, in your ſenſe, incurable? Page 49.

TO eaſe you, Sir, of juſtifying yourſelf, and ſhewing, that I have miſtaken you, do but tell us poſitively what, in penalties, is the higheſt degree of moderate; who are deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; or who are incurable, without this relative and circular way. of defining one by the other; and I will yield myſelf to have miſtaken you, as much as you pleaſe.

IF, by incurable, you mean ſuch, as no penalties, no puniſhments, no force is ſufficient to work on; then your meaſure of moderate penalties will be this, that they are ſuch, as are ſufficient to prevail with men not incurable, i. e. who cannot be prevailed on, by any puniſhments, any force whatſoever; which will be a meaſure of moderate puniſhments, which (whatſoever you do) ſome will be very apt to approve of.

BUT, let us ſuppoſe, by theſe marks (ſince you will afford us no better) that we can find, who are deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, we are yet, as far as ever, from finding the meaſures of your moderate puniſhments, until it can be known, what degree of force it is, that is ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with all, that are men of common diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate; for you are told, that all men of the ſame degree of diſcretion are not apt to be moved, with the ſame degree of penalties: but to this too, you anſwer nothing, and ſo we are ſtill without any rule, or means of knowing how to adjuſt your puniſhments, that being ordinarily ſufficient to prevail upon one, the double whereof is not ordinarily ſufficient to prevail on another. I tell you in the ſame place, " That you have given us, in another place, ſome things like another " boundary, to your moderate penalties: but, when examined, it proves juſt like " the reſt, amuſing us only with good words, ſo put together, as to have no di- L. 2. p. 279.

rect meaning: an art very much in uſe, amongſt ſome ſort of learned men: the words are theſe; “ſuch penalties, as may not tempt perſons, who have any concern for their eternal ſalvation (and thoſe, who have none, ought not to be conſidered) to renounce a religion, which they believe to be true, or profeſs one, which they do not believe to be ſo.” If by any concern, you mean ſuch, as men ought to have, for their eternal ſalvation: by this rule, you may make your puniſhments as great, as you pleaſe; and all the ſeverities, you have diſclaimed, may be brought in play again: for none of thoſe will be able to make a man, who is truly “concerned for his eternal ſalvation, renounce a religion he believes to be true, or profeſs one, he does not believe to be ſo.” If, by thoſe, who have any concern, you mean ſuch, who have ſome faint wiſhes for happineſs hereafter, and would be glad to have things go well with them, in the other world, but will venture nothing in this world for it; theſe, the moderateſt puniſhments you can imagine, will make to change their religion.” If, by any concern, you mean, whatever may be between theſe two; the degrees are ſo infinite, that to proportion your puniſhments, by that, is to have no meaſure of them at all.” To which all
Page 50. the reply, I can find, is only this, That there are degrees of careleſneſs, in men, of their ſalvation, as well as of concern for it. So that ſuch, as have ſome concern for their ſalvation, may yet be careleſs of it, to a great degree. And therefore, if thoſe, who have any concern for their ſalvation, deſerve regard and pity; then ſo may ſome careleſs perſons; though thoſe, who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered, which ſpoils a little harangue, you give us, p. 43.” If you think this to be an anſwer to what I ſaid, or that it can ſatisfy any one, concerning the way of knowing what degrees of puniſhments are to be uſed, pray tell us ſo. The enquiry is, “what degrees of puniſhment will tempt a man, who has any concern for his eternal ſalvation, to renounce a religion he believes to be true?” and it is anſwered, “there are degrees of careleſneſs in men of their ſalvation, as well as concern for it.” A happy diſcovery! What is the uſe of it? “ſo that ſuch, as have ſome concern for their ſalvation, may yet be careleſs of it, to a great degree.” Very true: by this we may know what degree of force is to be uſed. No, not a word of that, but the inference is, “and therefore, if thoſe, who have any concern for their ſalvation, deſerve regard and pity; then, ſo may ſome careleſs perſons; tho' thoſe who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered.” And by this time, we know what degree of force will make a man, who has any concern for his ſalvation, renounce a religion he believes true, and profeſs one, he does not believe to be ſo. This might do well at croſs queſtions: but you are ſatisfied with what you have done, and what that is, you tell me in the next words, “which ſpoils a little harangue of yours given us, p. 43. the harangue, I ſuppoſe, is contained in theſe words.

“ONE thing I cannot but take notice of, in this paſſage, before I leave it:
L. 2. p. 279. and that is, that you ſay here, “thoſe, who have no concern for their ſalvation, deſerve not to be conſidered.” In other parts of your letter, you pretend to have compaſſion on the careleſs, and provide remedies for them: But here, of a ſudden, your charity fails you, and you give them up to eternal perdition, without the leaſt regard, the leaſt pity, and ſay, “they deſerve not to be conſidered.” Our Saviour's rule was, the ſick, and not the whole, need a phyſician: your rule here, is; “thoſe, that are careleſs, are not to be conſidered, but are to be left to themſelves.” This would ſeem ſtrange, if one did not obſerve, what drew you to it. You perceived that, if the magiſtrate was to uſe no puniſhments, but ſuch as would make nobody change their religion, he was to uſe none at all: for the careleſs would be brought to the national church, with any ſlight puniſhments; and, when they are once there, you are, it ſeems, ſatisfied, and look no farther after them. So that, by your own meaſures, if the careleſs, and thoſe, who have no concern for the eternal ſalvation of their ſouls are to be regarded and taken care of, if the ſalvation of their ſouls is to be promoted, there is to be no puniſhments to be uſed at all: and therefore, you leave them out, as not to be conſidered.”

What you have ſaid is ſo far from ſpoiling that harangue, as you are pleaſed to call it, that you, having nothing elſe to ſay to it, allow what is laid to your charge in it.

You wind up all, concerning the meaſure of your force, in theſe words; "and, as thoſe medicines are thought ſafe and adviſable, which do ordinarily cure, tho' not always (as none do) ſo thoſe penalties, or puniſhments, which are ordinarily found ſufficient (as well as neceſſary) for the ends, for which they are deſigned, may, fitly and reaſonably, be uſed for the compaſſing theſe ends." Here your, ordinarily, comes to your help again; and here one would think that you meant, ſuch as cure, ſometimes, not always; ſome, tho' not all: and in this ſenſe, will not the utmoſt ſeverities come within your rule? for can you ſay, if puniſhments are to be uſed to prevail on any, that the greater will (where lower fail) prevail on none? At leaſt can you be ſure of it, until they have been tried, for the compaſſing theſe ends? Which, as we ſhall ſee in another place, you have aſſigned various enough. I ſhall only take notice of two or three, often repeated by you, and thoſe are, to make men hear, to make men conſider, to make men conſider as they ought, i. e. as you explain it, to make men conſider ſo, as not to reject. The greatneſs of the force, then, according to this meaſure, muſt be ſufficient to make men hear, ſufficient to make men conſider, and ſufficient to make men embrace the true religion. Page 50.

And now, the magiſtrate has all your rules, about the meaſures of puniſhments to be uſed, and may confidently and ſafely go to work, to eſtabliſh it by law: for, he having theſe marks to guide him, that they muſt be great enough ordinarily to prevail with thoſe, who are not idiots, or madmen, nor deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, great enough ordinarily to prevail with men to hear, conſider and embrace the true religion, and yet not ſo great, as might tempt perſons, who have any concern for their eternal ſalvation, to renounce a religion, which they believe to be true, or profeſs one, which they do not believe to be ſo: Do you not think, you have ſufficiently inſtructed him, in your meaning, and enabled him to find the juſt temper of his puniſhments, according to your ſcheme, neither too much, nor too little? but however you may be ſatisfied with them, I ſuppoſe others, when it comes to be put in practice, will, by theſe meaſures, (which are all I can find, in your ſcheme) be ſcarce able to find, what are the puniſhments you would have uſed.

In Utopia there is a medicine called Hiera Picra, which, it is ſuppoſed, would cure a troubleſome diſeaſe of that country; but it is not to be given, but in the doſe preſcribed by the law, and, in adjuſting the doſe, lies all the ſkill: for, if you give too much, it heightens the diſtemper, and ſpreads the mortal contagion; and, if too little, it does no good at all. With this difficulty, the law-makers have been perplexed, theſe many ages, and could not light on the right doſe, that would work the cure, until lately there came an undertaker, who would ſhew them, how they could not miſtake. He bid them preſcribe ſo much, as would ordinarily be effectual upon all, that were not idiots, or madmen, or in whom the humour was not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, to produce the end for which it was deſigned: but not ſo much, as would make a man in health, who had any concern for his life, fall into a mortal diſeaſe. Theſe were good words, and he was rewarded for them: but when, by them, they came to fix the doſe, they could not tell, whether it ought to be a grain, a dram, or an ounce, or a whole pound, any more than before; and ſo the doſe of the Hiera Picra, notwithſtanding this gentleman's pains, is as uncertain, and that ſovereign remedy as uſeleſs, as ever it was.

In the next paragraph you tell us, "You do not ſee what more can be required to juſtify the rule here given." So quick a ſight needs no ſpectacles. "For, if I demand, that it ſhould expreſs, what penalties particularly are ſuch, as it ſays, may fitly and reaſonably be uſed; this, I muſt give you leave to tell me, is a very unreaſonable demand." It is an unreaſonable demand, if your rule be ſuch, that, by it, I may know, without any more ado, the particular penalties that are fit; otherwiſe it is not unreaſonable to demand them by name, if your marks be not ſufficient to know them by. But let us hear your Page 50.

reaſon, “ for what rule is there, that expreſſes the particulars, that agree with it.” And it is an admirable rule, with which one can find no particulars that agree; for I challenge you to inſtance in one: “ a rule, you ſay, is intended for a common meaſure; by which particulars are to be examined, and therefore muſt “ neceſſarily be general; ſo general looſe, and inconſiſtent, that no particulars can be examined, by it: for again, I challenge you, or any man living, to meaſure out any puniſhment, by this your common meaſure, and eſtabliſh it by a law. You go on; “ and thoſe, to whom it is given, are ſuppoſed to be able to “ apply it, and to judge of particulars by it. Nay, it is often ſeen that they “ are better able to do this, than thoſe, that give it: and ſo it is, in the preſent “ caſe, the rule, hereby laid down, is, that by which you ſuppoſe governors “ and law-givers ought to examine the penalties they uſe, for the promoting “ the true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls.” Such a rule, it ought to be, I “ grant, and ſuch an one is deſired: but that yours is ſuch a rule, as magiſtrates can take any meaſure by, for the puniſhments, they are to ſettle by law, is denied, and you are again deſired to ſhew. Page 50. You proceed; “ but certainly, no man “ doubts, but their prudence and experience enables them to uſe and apply it, “ better than other men, and to judge more exactly, what penalties do agree “ with it, and what do not; and therefore, you think I muſt excuſe you, if “ you do not take upon you to teach them, what it becomes you, rather to learn from them.” If we are not to doubt, but their prudence and experience enables magiſtrates to judge beſt what penalties are fit, you have, indeed, given us at laſt a way to know the meaſure of puniſhments, to be uſed: but it is ſuch an one, as puts an end to your diſtinction of moderate penalties; for no magiſtrates, that I know, when they once began to uſe force, to bring men to their religion, ever ſtopped, until they came to uſe ſome of thoſe ſeverities, you condemn; and if you pretend to teach them moderation for the future, with hopes to ſuceeed, you ought to have ſhewed them the juſt bounds, beyond which they ought not to go, in a model ſo wholly new, and beſides all experience. But if it be to be determined, by their prudence and experience, whatever degrees of force, they ſhall uſe, will always be the right.

LAW-MAKERS and governors, however beholden to you for your good opinion of their prudence and experience; yet have no reaſon to thank you, for your compliment, by giving ſuch an exerciſe to their prudence and experience, as to put it upon them, to find out the juſt meaſures of puniſhment, by rules you give them, which are ſuch, that neither yourſelf, nor any body elſe can find out any meaſures by. The other part of your compliment will be ſuſpected, not to be ſo much out of your abundant reſpect to law-makers and governors, as out of the great regard you have, to yourſelf; for you in vain pretend, you forbear to name any particular puniſhments, becauſe you will not take upon you, to teach governors and law-makers, when you yourſelf own, in the ſame breath, that you are laying down rules, by which they are to proceed, in the uſe of penalties, for promoting religion, which is little different from teaching: and your whole book is nothing elſe, but about the magiſtrate's power and duty. I excuſe you, therefore, for your own ſake, from naming any particular puniſhments, by your rules: for you have a right to it, as all men have a right to be excuſed from doing, what is impoſſible to be done.

SINCE, therefore, you grant, that thoſe ſeverities you have named, “ are “ more apt to hinder than promote true religion;” and you cannot aſſign any meaſures of puniſhment (ſhort of thoſe great ones you have condemned) which are fit to promote it, I think it argument enough, to prove againſt you, that no puniſhments are fit, until you have ſhewed ſome others, either by name, or ſuch marks, as they may certainly be known by, which are fit to promote the true religion: and therefore, nothing you have ſaid there, or any where elſe, will ſerve to ſhew, “ that it is with little reaſon, as you tell me, that I ſay, Page 19. “ That, if your indirect and at a diſtance ſerviceableneſs may authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force in religion, all the cruelties, uſed by the heathens againſt “ chriſtians, by papiſts againſt proteſtants, and all the perſecuting of chriſtians, “ one amongſt another, are all juſtifiable.” To which you add, “ Not to

“ take notice, at preſent, how oddly it ſounds, that that, which authorizes the “ magiſtrates to uſe moderate penalties, to promote the true religion, ſhould “ juſtify all the cruelties, that ever were uſed to promote heatheniſm, or popery.

As oddly as it ſounds to you, it will be evidently true, as long as that, which authorizes one, authorizes all magiſtrates of any religion, which they believe to be true, to uſe force to promote it; and, as long as you cannot aſſign any bounds to your moderate puniſhments, ſhort of thoſe great ones; which you, therefore, are not able to do, becauſe your principles, whatever your words deny, will carry you to thoſe degrees of ſeverity, which, in profeſſion, you condemn: and this, whatever you do, I dare ſay, every conſidering reader, beſides you, will plainly ſee. So that this imputation is not ſo unreaſonable, ſince it is evident, that you muſt either renounce all puniſhment whatſoever, in religion, or make uſe of thoſe you condemn: for, in the next page you tell us, “ That all, who have Page 20.
“ ſufficient means of inſtruction provided for them, may juſtly be puniſhed, for “ not being of the national religion, where the true is the national religion; “ becauſe it is a fault, in ſuch, not to be of the national religion.” In England then, for example, not to be of the national religion is a fault, and a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate. The magiſtrate, to cure this fault, lays, on thoſe, who diſſent, a lower degree of penalties, a fine of 1d. per month. This proving inſufficient, what is the magiſtrate to do? If he be obliged, as you ſay, to amend this fault by penalties, and that low one, of 1 d. per month, be not ſufficient to procure its amendment, is he not to increaſe the penalty? He, therefore, doubles the fine to 2 d. per month. This, too, proves ineffectual; and, therefore, 'tis ſtill, for the ſame reaſon, doubled, 'till it come to 1 s. 5 s. 10 l. 100 l. 1000 l. None of theſe penalties working, but yet, by being conſtantly levied, leaving the delinquents no longer able to pay, impriſonment and other corporal puniſhments follow, to enforce an obedience, 'till, at laſt, this gradual increaſe of penalties and force, each degree whereof wrought on ſome few, riſes to the higheſt ſeverities, againſt thoſe who ſtand out. For the magiſtrate, who is obliged to correct this vice, as you call it, and to do what in him lies, to cure this fault, which oppoſes their ſalvation: and who (if I miſtake not, you tell us) is “ anſwerable for all that may follow from his neglect,” had Page 8.
no reaſon to raiſe the fine from 1d to 2d. but becauſe the firſt was ineffectual: and, if that were a ſufficient reaſon, for raiſing, from the firſt to the ſecond degree, why is it not a ſufficient one to proceed from the ſecond to the third, and ſo gradually on? I would fain have any one ſhew me, where, and upon what ground, ſuch a gradual increaſe of force can ſtop, 'till it come to the utmoſt extremities. If, therefore, diſſenting from the church of England be a fault, to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, I deſire you tell me, where he ſhall hold his hand; to name the ſort, or degree, of puniſhment, beyond which he ought not to go, in the uſe of force, to cure them of that fault, and bring them to conformity. 'Till you have done that, you might have ſpared that paragraph, where you ſay, “ With what ingenuity I draw you in, to condemn Page 19.
“ force in general; only becauſe you acknowledge the ill effects of proſecuting “ men with fire and ſword, &c. you may leave every man to judge.” And I leave, whom you will, to judge, whether, from your own principles, it does not unavoidably follow, that, if you condemn any penalties, you muſt condemn all, as I have ſhewn; if you will retain any, you muſt retain all; you muſt either take, or leave, all together. For, as I have ſaid, and you deny not, “ Where Page 19.
“ there is no fault, there no puniſhment is moderate,” ſo I add, Where there is a fault to be corrected by the magiſtrate's force, there no degree of force, which is ineffectual, and not ſufficient to amend it, can be immoderate; eſpecially, if it be a fault of great moment in its conſequences, as certainly that muſt be, which draws after it the loſs of man's eternal happineſs.

You will, 'tis likely, be ready to ſay here again, (for a good ſubterfuge is never to be forſaken) that “ you except the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate.” I deſire to know, for what reaſon you except them? Is it, becauſe they ceaſe to be faulty? Next, I aſk you, who are, in your ſenſe, the deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? Thoſe, that 1 s, or 5 s. or 5 l. or 100 l. or no fine, will work upon? Thoſe, who can bear loſs of eſtate, but not loſs of liberty; or loſs of liberty and eſtate, but not corporal pains and torments? or all this, but not loſs of life? For, to theſe degrees, do men differently ſtand out. And, ſince there are men wrought on, by the approaches of fire and faggot, which other degrees of ſeverity could not prevail with, where will you bound your deſperately perverſe and obſtinate? The king of France, tho' you will allow him not to have truth on his ſide: yet, when he came to dragooning, found few ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, as not to be wrought on. And, why ſhould truth, which in your opinion wants force, and nothing but force, to help it, not have the aſſiſtance of thoſe degrees of force, (when leſs will not do to make it prevail) which are able to bring men over to falſe religions; which have no light and ſtrength of their own to help them? You will do well, therefore, to conſider, whether your name of ſeverities, in oppoſition to the moderate puniſhments you ſpeak of, has, or can, do you any ſervice; whether the diſtinction, between compelling and coactive power, be of any uſe, or difference, at all. For Page 41. you deny the magiſtrate to have power to compel: and you contend for his uſe Page 27. of his coactive power; which will then be a good diſtinction, when you can find a way to uſe coactive, or, which is the ſame, compelling power, without compulſion. I deſire you alſo to conſider, if, in matters of religion, puniſhments are to be employ'd, becauſe they may be uſeful, whether you can ſtop at any degree, that is ineffectual to the end, which you propoſe, let that end be what it will. If it be barely to gain a hearing, as, in ſome places, you ſeem to ſay, I think, for that, ſmall puniſhments will generally prevail, and you do well to put that and moderate penalties together. If it to be to make men conſider, as in other places you ſpeak, you cannot tell, when you have obtained that end. But if your end be, which you ſeem moſt to inſiſt on, to make men conſider, as they ought, i. e. 'till they embrace, there are many, on whom all your moderate penalties, all under thoſe ſeverities, you condemn, are too weak to prevail. So that, you muſt either confeſs, “not conſidering, ſo as to embrace the true re“ligion, i. e. not conſidering, as they ought,” is no fault to be puniſhed, by the coactive force of the magiſtrate; or elſe, you muſt reſume thoſe ſeverities, which you have renounced: chuſe you whether of the two you pleaſe.

L. 2. p. 264. THEREFORE it was not ſo much at random, that I ſaid, that thither at laſt perſecution muſt come. Indeed, from what you had ſaid, of falling under the A. p. 13. ſtroke of the ſword, which was nothing to the purpoſe, I added, “That if, by “ that, you meant any thing, to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeem to have a re“ſerve for greater puniſhments, when leſs are not ſufficient to bring men to be Page 21. “ convinced.” Which hath produced this warm reply of yours; “And will “ you ever pretend to conſcience, or modeſty, after this? for I beſeech you, Sir, “ what words could I have uſed, more expreſs, or effectual, to ſignify, that ,in “ my opinion, no diſſenters from the true religion ought to be puniſhed with “ the ſword, but ſuch as chuſe rather to rebel againſt the magiſtrate, than to “ ſubmit to leſſer penalties? (for how any ſhould refuſe to ſubmit to thoſe pe“nalties, but by rebelling againſt the magiſtrate, I ſuppoſe you will not under“take to tell me.) It was for this very purpoſe, that I uſed thoſe words, to “ prevent cavils, (as I was then ſo ſimple, as to think, I might:) and I dare “ appeal to any man of common ſenſe and common honeſty, whether they are “ capable of any other meaning. And yet, the very thing, which I ſo plainly “ diſclaim in them, you pretend (without ſo much as offering to ſhew how) to “ collect from them.” [Thither, you ſay, at laſt, (viz. to the taking away mens lives, for the ſaving of their ſouls) perſecution muſt come; as you fear, notwithſtanding my talk of moderate puniſhments, I myſelf intimate in thoſe words: and if I mean any thing in them, to the buſineſs in hand, I ſeem to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments, when leſſer are not ſufficient to bring men to be convinced.] “Sir, I ſhould expect fairer dealing from one of your pagans, or “ mahometans. But I ſhall only add, that I would never wiſh, than any man, “ who has undertaken a bad cauſe, ſhould more plainly confeſs it, than by ſer“ving it, as here (and not here only) you ſerve yours.” Good Sir, be not ſo angry, leſt, to obſerving men, you increaſe the ſuſpicion. One may, without forfeiting of modeſty, or conſcience, fear what men's principles threaten, though their words diſclaim it. Nonconformity to the national, when it is the true religion, as in England, is a fault, a vice, ſay you, to be corrected, by the coactive power of the magiſtrate. If ſo, and force be the proper remedy, he muſt increaſe it, until it be ſtrong enough to work the cure; and muſt not neglect his duty (for ſo you make it) when he has force enough in his hand, to make this remedy more powerful. For, where-ever force is proper to work on men, and bring them to a compliance, its not producing that effect can only be imputed to its being too little: and if ſo, whither at laſt muſt it come, but to the late methods of procuring conformity (and as his moſt chriſtian majeſty called it of ſaving of ſouls) in France, or ſeverities like them, when more moderate ones cannot produce it? for to continue inefficacious penalties, inſufficient upon trial to maſter the fault, they are applied to, is unjuſtifiable cruelty; and that, which nobody can have a right to uſe, it ſerving only to diſeaſe and harm people, without amending them: for you tell us, "they ſhould be ſuch penalties, as ſhould "make them uneaſy." Page 44.

HE that ſhould vex and pain a ſore, you had, with frequent dreſſing it with ſome moderate, painful, but inefficacious plaiſter, that promoted not the cure, would juſtly be thought, not only an ignorant, but a diſhoneſt ſurgeon. If you are in the ſurgeon's hands, and his help is requiſite, and the cure that way to be wrought, corroſives and fire are the moſt merciful, as well as only juſtifiable way of cure, when the caſe needs them. And therefore, I hope, I may ſtill pretend to modeſty and conſcience, though I ſhould have thought you ſo rational a man, as to be led by your own principles; and ſo honeſt, charitable, and zealous for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, as not to vex and diſeaſe them with inefficacious remedies, to no purpoſe, and let them miſs of ſalvation, for want of more vigorous proſecutions. For, if conformity to the church of England be neceſſary to ſalvation, (for elſe, what neceſſity can you pretend of puniſhing men at all, to bring them to it?) it is cruelty to their ſouls (if you have authority for any ſuch means) to uſe ſome, and not to uſe ſufficient force, to bring them to conform. And, I dare ſay, you are ſatisfied, that the French diſcipline, of dragooning, would have made many in England conformiſts, whom your lower penalties will not prevail on to be ſo.

BUT to inform you, that my apprehenſions, were not ſo wholly out of the way, I beſeech you to read here, what you have writ in theſe words, "For how "confidently ſoever you tell me here, that it is more than I can ſay for my "political puniſhments, that they were ever uſeful for the promoting true religion; I appeal to all obſerving perſons, whether, where-ever true religion, "or ſound chriſtianity, has been nationally received, and eſtabliſhed by moderate, penal laws, it has not always loſt ground, by the relaxation of thoſe "laws: whether ſects, or hereſies, (even the wildeſt and moſt abſurd) and even "Epicuriſm and atheiſm, have not continually, thereupon, ſpread themſelves "and whether the very ſpirit and life of chriſtianity has not ſenſibly decayed, as "well as the number of ſound profeſſors of it been daily leſſened upon it: not "to ſpeak of what, at this time, our eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving offence; though I hope it will be none to any, that have a juſt concern for "truth and piety, to take notice of the books and pamphlets, which now fly "ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of ſects "and diviſions, and even to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion among us." Page 34. Here you bemoan the decaying ſtate of religion amongſt us at preſent, by reaſon of taking off the penalties from proteſtant diſſenters: and I beſeech you, what penalties were they? Such, whereby many have been ruined in their fortunes; ſuch, whereby many have loſt their liberties, and ſome their lives in priſons; ſuch as have ſent ſome into baniſhment, ſtripp'd of all they had. Theſe were the penal laws, by which the national religion was eſtabliſhed in England; and theſe you call moderate: for you ſay, "Where-ever true religion, or ſound "chriſtianity, has been nationally received, and eſtabliſhed by moderate penal "laws;" and I hope, you do not here, exclude England, from having its religion, ſo eſtabliſhed by law, which we ſo often hear of; or if to ſerve the preſent

occaſion

occaſion you ſhould, would you alſo deny, that, in the following words, you ſpeak of the preſent relaxation in England? where, after your appeal to all obſerving people, for the diſmal conſequences, which you ſuppoſe to have, every-where followed, from ſuch relaxations, you add theſe pathetical words, "Not "to ſpeak of what, at this time, our eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving of- "fence:" ſo heavy does the preſent relaxation ſit on your mind; which ſince it is of penal laws, you call moderate, I ſhall ſhew you what they are.

In the firſt year of queen Elizabeth, there was a penalty of 1 s. a Sunday, and holiday, laid upon every one, who came not to the common-prayer, then eſtabliſhed. This penalty, of 1 s. a time not prevailing, as was deſired, in the twenty-third year of her reign, was increaſed to 20 l. a month, and impriſonment for non-payment, within three months after judgment given. In the twenty-ninth year of Eliz. to draw this yet cloſer, and make it more forcible, 'twas enacted, That whoever, upon conviction, did not continue to pay on, the 20 l. per month, without any other conviction, or proceedings againſt him, 'till he ſubmitted and conformed, ſhould forfeit all his goods, and two thirds of his land, for his life. But this being not yet thought ſufficient, it was, in the thirty-fifth year of that queen, compleated, and the moderate, penal laws, upon which our national religion was eſtabliſhed, and whoſe relaxation you cannot bear, but from thence date the decay of the very ſpirit and life of chriſtianity, were brought to perfection. For then, going to conventicles, or a month's abſence from church, was to be puniſhed with impriſonment, 'till the offender conformed; and if he conformed not within three months, then he was to abjure the realm, and forfeit all his goods and chattels for ever, and his lands and tenements, during his life: and, if he would not abjure, or abjuring, did not depart the realm within a time prefixed, or returned again, he was to ſuffer death, as a felon. And thus your moderate, penal laws ſtood, for the eſtabliſhed religion, 'till their penalties were, in reſpect of proteſtant diſſenters, lately taken off. And now, let the reader judge, whether your pretence to moderate puniſhments, or my ſuſpicion, of what a man of your principles might have in ſtore for diſſenters, have more of modeſty, or conſcience, in it; ſince you openly declare your regret, for the taking away ſuch an eſtabliſhment, as, by the gradual increaſe of penalties, reached men's eſtates, liberties and lives; and which you muſt be preſumed to allow, and approve of, 'till you tell us plainly, where, according to your meaſures, thoſe penalties ſhould; or, according to your principles, they could have ſtopped.

You tell us, That, where this only, true religion, viz. of the church of England, is received, other religions ought "to be diſcouraged, in ſome meaſure." A pretty expreſſion for undoing, impriſonment, baniſhment, for thoſe have been ſome of the diſcouragements, given to diſſenters, here in England. You will again, no doubt, cry aloud, that you tell me, you condemn theſe, as much as I do. If you heartily condemn them, I wonder you ſhould ſay ſo little to diſcourage them; I wonder you are ſo ſilent, in repreſenting, to the magiſtrate, the unlawfulneſs and danger of uſing them, in a diſcourſe, where you are treating of the magiſtrate's power and duty, in matters of religion; eſpecially this being the ſide, on which, as far as we may gueſs by experience, their prudence is apteſt to err: but your modeſty, you know, leaves all to the magiſtrate's prudence and experience, on that ſide, though you, over and over again, encourage them, not to neglect their duty, in the uſe of force, to which you ſet no bounds,

Page 50. You tell us, "Certainly no man doubts, but the prudence and experience of "governors and lawgivers enables them to uſe and apply it," viz. your rule for the meaſure of puniſhments, which I have ſhewed to be no rule at all; "And "to judge more exactly, what penalties do agree with it; and, therefore, you "muſt be excuſed, if you do not take upon you to teach them, what it be- "comes you rather to learn from them." If your modeſty be ſuch, and you then did, what became you, you could not but learn, from your governors and law-givers; and ſo be ſatisfied 'till, within this year or two, that thoſe penalties, which they meaſured out, for the eſtabliſhment of true religion, though they reached to men's eſtates, liberties and lives, were ſuch as were fit. But what you have learned, of your law-makers and governors, ſince the relaxation, or what opinion you have, of their experience and prudence, now, is not ſo eaſy to ſay.

PERHAPS, you will ſay again, that you have, in expreſs words, declared againſt "fire and ſword, loſs of eſtate, maiming with corporal puniſhments, "ſtarving and tormenting in noiſome priſons; and one cannot, either in modeſty, or conſcience, diſbelieve you: yet, in the ſame letter, you, with ſorrow and regret, ſpeak of the relaxation of ſuch penalties, laid on non-conformity by which men have loſt their eſtates, liberties, and lives too, in noiſome priſons, and in this too, muſt we not believe you? I dare ſay, there are very few, who read that paſſage of yours, ſo feelingly it is penned, who want modeſty, or con- Page 34. ſcience to believe you, therein, to be in earneſt; and the rather, becauſe what drops from men by chance, when they are not upon their guard, is always thought the beſt interpretation of their thoughts.

YOU name "loſs of eſtate, of liberty, and of tormenting, which is cor- "poral puniſhment," as if you were againſt them: certainly, you know what you meant by theſe words, when you ſaid, you condemned them; was it any degree of loſs of liberty, or eſtate, any degree of corporal puniſhment, that you condemned, or only the utmoſt, or ſome degree between theſe? unleſs you had, then, ſome meaning, and unleſs you pleaſe to tell us, what that meaning was; where 'tis, that in your opinion, the magiſtrate ought to ſtop, who can believe you are in earneſt? This, I think you may and ought to do, for our information, in your ſyſtem, without any apprehenſion that governors and lawgivers will deem themſelves much taught by you, which your modeſty makes you ſo cautious of. Whilſt you refuſe to do this, and keep yourſelf under the maſk of moderate, convenient, and ſufficient force and penalties, and other ſuch like, uncertain, and undetermined puniſhments, I think a conſcientious and ſober diſſenter might expect fairer dealing, from one of my pagans, or mahometans, as you pleaſe to call them, than from one, who ſo profeſſes moderation, that what degrees of force, what kind of puniſhments will ſatisfy him, he either knows not, or will not declare. For your moderate and convenient, may, when you come to interpret them, ſignify what puniſhments you pleaſe: for the cure being to be wrought by force, that will be convenient, which the ſtubbornneſs of the evil requires; and that moderate, which is but enough to work the cure. And, therefore, I ſhall return your own compliment, "That I would "never wiſh, that any man, who has undertaken a bad cauſe, ſhould more "plainly confeſs it, than by ſerving it, as here (and not here only) you ſerve "yours." I ſhould beg your pardon for this ſort of language, were it not your own. And what right you have to it, the ſkill you ſhew, in the management of general and doubtful words and expreſſions, of uncertain and undetermined ſignification, will, I doubt not, abundantly convince the reader. An inſtance Page 49. we have in the argument before us: for I appeal to any ſober man, who ſhall carefully read, what you write, where you pretend, to tell the world, plainly and directly, what puniſhments are to be uſed, by your ſcheme, whether, after having weighed all you ſay, concerning that matter, he can tell, what a nonconformiſt is to expect from you, or find any thing, but ſuch acuteneſs and ſtrength, as lies in the uncertainty and reſerve of your way of talking; which whether it be any way ſuited to your modeſty, and conſcience, where you have undertaken to tell us, what the puniſhments are, whereby you would have men brought to embrace the true religion, I leave you to conſider.

IF having ſaid, "Where-ever true religion, or ſound chriſtianity, has been Page 34. "nationally received, and eſtabliſhed by moderate, penal laws;" you ſhall, for your defence of the eſtabliſhment of the religion in England, by law, ſay, which is all is left you to ſay, that, though ſuch ſevere laws were made, yet it was only by the execution of moderate, penal laws, that it was eſtabliſhed and ſupported: but that thoſe ſevere laws, which touched men's eſtates, liberties and lives, were never put in execution. Why, then, do you ſo ſeriouſly bemoan the loſs of them? But I adviſe you not to make uſe of that plea, for there are examples, in the memory of hundreds now living, of every one of thoſe laws of queen Elizabeth being put in execution; and pray remember, if by denying it you require this truth to be made good, 'tis you, that force the publiſhing of a catalogue of men, that have loſt their eſtates, liberties and lives in priſon, which it would be more for the advantage of the religion, eſtabliſhed by law, ſhould be forgotten.

BUT, to conclude this great accuſation of yours: If you were not conſcious to yourſelf, of ſome tendency that way, why ſuch an outcry? Why was modeſty and conſcience called in queſtion? Why was it leſs fair dealing, than you could have expected from a pagan, or mahometan, for me to ſay, if, in thoſe words, "you meant any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeemed to have a "reſerve for greater puniſhments?" Your buſineſs there, being to prove, that there was a power, veſted in the magiſtrate, to uſe force, in matters of religion, what could be more beſides the buſineſs in hand, than to tell us, as you interpret your meaning here, that the magiſtrate had a power, to uſe force, againſt thoſe, who rebelled (for who ever denied that) whether diſſenters, or not diſſenters? Where was it queſtioned by the author, or me, that "whoever rebelled, were to fall under the ſtroke of the magiſtrate's ſword?" And, therefore, without breach of modeſty, or conſcience, I might ſay, what I again here repeat, "That if, in thoſe words, you meant any thing to the buſineſs in hand, "you ſeemed to have a reſerve for greater puniſhments."

ONE thing more give me leave to add, in defence of my modeſty, and conſcience, or rather to juſtify myſelf, from having gueſſed ſo wholly beſides the matter, if I ſhould have ſaid, (which I did not) "That I feared, you had a reſerve for greater puniſhments." L. 2. P. 290. For, I having brought the inſtances of Ananias and Sapphira, to ſhew that the apoſtles wanted not power to puniſh, if they found it neceſſary to uſe it; you infer, that therefore "puniſhments may be "ſometimes neceſſary." Page 38. What puniſhments, I beſeech you, for theirs coſt them their lives? He that, as you do, concludes from thence, that therefore, "puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary," will hardly avoid (whatever he ſays) to conclude capital puniſhments neceſſary: and when they are neceſſary, it is, you know, the magiſtrate's duty to uſe them. You ſee how natural it is for men to go, whither their principles lead them, though at firſt ſight, perhaps, they thought it too far.

IF, to avoid this, you now ſay, you meant it of the puniſhment of the inceſtuous Corinthian, whom I alſo mentioned, in the ſame place; I think, ſuppoſing yourſelf to lie under the imputation of a reſerve of greater puniſhments, you ought, in prudence, to have ſaid ſo there. Next, you know not what puniſhment it was, the inceſtuous Corinthian underwent, but it being "for the "deſtruction of the fleſh," it ſeems to be no very light one: and, if you will take your friend St. Auſtin's word for it, as he, in the very epiſtle you quote, tells you, it was a very ſevere one, making as much difference between it, and the ſeverities men uſually ſuffer in priſon, as there is between the cruelty of the devil, and that of the moſt barbarous jailor: ſo that, if your moderate puniſhments will reach to that, laid on the inceſtuous Corinthian, for the deſtruction of the fleſh, we may preſume them to be, what other people call ſeverities.

CHAP. V.

How long your puniſhments are to continue.

THE meaſure of puniſhments being to be eſtimated, as well by the length of their duration, as the intenſeneſs of their degrees, 'tis fit we take a view alſo of your ſcheme, in this part.

L. 2. p. 302. "I TOLD you, that moderate puniſhments, that are continued, that men "find no end of, know no way out of, ſit heavy, and become immoderately "uneaſy. Diſſenters you would have puniſhed, to make them conſider. Your "penalties have had the effect on them you intended; they have made them "conſider; and they have done their utmoſt, in conſidering. What now muſt "be done with them? They muſt be puniſhed on, for they are ſtill diſſenters. "If it were juſt, and you had reaſon, at firſt, to puniſh a diſſenter, to make "him conſider, when you did not know, but that he had conſidered already; "it is as juſt, and you have as much reaſon to puniſh him on, even when he "has performed what your puniſhment was deſigned for, and has conſidered, "but yet remains a diſſenter. For I may juſtly ſuppoſe, and you muſt grant, "that a man may remain a diſſenter, after all the conſideration your moderate "penalties can bring him to; when we ſee great puniſhments, even thoſe ſeverities you diſown, as too great, are not able to make men conſider, ſo far, as "to be convinced, and brought over to the national church. If your puniſhments may not be inflicted on men, to make them conſider, who have, or "may have, conſidered already, for aught we know; then diſſenters are never to be once puniſhed, no more than any other ſort of men. If diſſenters "are to be puniſhed, to make them conſider, whether they have conſidered, "or no; then their puniſhments, though they do conſider, muſt never ceaſe, as "long as they are diſſenters, which, whether it be to puniſh them, only to "bring them to conſider, let all men judge. This I am ſure; puniſhments, "in your method, muſt either never begin upon diſſenters, or never ceaſe. And "ſo pretend moderation, if you pleaſe, the puniſhments, which your method "requires, muſt be either very immoderate, or none at all." But to this, you ſay nothing, only for the adjuſting of the length of your puniſhments, and therein vindicating the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of your ſcheme, you tell us, "That, as long as men reject the true religion, duly propoſed to them, ſo long "they offend and deſerve puniſhment; and, therefore, it is but juſt that, ſo "long, they ſhould be left liable to it." You promiſed to anſwer to this queſtion, amongſt others, "plainly and directly." The queſtion is, How long they are to be puniſhed? And your anſwer is, "It is but juſt that, ſo long, they "ſhould be liable to puniſhment." This extraordinary caution, in ſpeaking out, if it were not very natural to you, would be apt to make one ſuſpect, it was accommodated more to ſome difficulties in your ſcheme, than to your promiſe, of anſwering plainly and directly; or, poſſibly, you thought, it would not agree to that character of moderation, you aſſume, to own, that all the penal laws, which were lately here in force, and whoſe relaxation you bemoan, ſhould be conſtantly put in execution. But your moderation, in this point, comes too late. For, as your charity, as you tell us in the next paragraph, "requires that "they be kept ſubject to penalties:" ſo the watchful charity of others, in this age, hath found out ways to encourage informers, and put it out of the magiſtrate's moderation, to ſtop the execution of the law againſt diſſenters, if he ſhould be inclined to it. Page 51. Page 46.

WE will, therefore, take it for granted, that, if penal laws be made, concerning religion, (for more zeal uſually animates them, than others) they will be put in execution: and, indeed, I have heard it argued to be very abſurd, to make, or continue, laws, that are not conſtantly put in execution. And now, to ſhew you how well your anſwer conſiſts with other parts of your ſcheme, I ſhall need only to mind you, that, if men muſt be puniſhed, as long as they reject the true religion, thoſe who puniſh them, muſt be judges, what is the true religion. But this objection, with ſome other, to which this part of your anſwer is obnoxious, having been made to you, more at large, elſewhere, I ſhall here omit, and proceed to other parts of your anſwer.

YOU begin with your reaſon, for the anſwer, you afterwards give us, in the words I laſt quoted: your reaſon runs thus; "For, certainly, nothing is more "reaſonable, than that men ſhould be ſubject to puniſhment, as long as they continue to offend. As long as men reject the true religion, tendered them with "ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, ſo long 'tis certain they offend." It is certainly very reaſonable, that men ſhould be ſubject to puniſhment, from thoſe they offend, as long as they continue to offend: but it will not from hence follow, that thoſe, who offend God, are always ſubject to puniſhment from men. For if they be, why does not the magiſtrate puniſh envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableneſs? If you anſwer, because they are not capable of judicial Page 50.

proofs: I think, I may ſay, 'tis as eaſy to prove a man guilty of envy, hatred or uncharitableneſs, as it is to prove him guilty of "rejecting the true religion, "tendered him with ſufficient evidence of the truth of it." But, if it be his duty, to puniſh all offences againſt God, why does the magiſtrate never puniſh lying, which is an offence againſt God, and is an offence capable of being judicially proved? It is plain, therefore, that it is not the ſenſe of all mankind, that it is the magiſtrate's duty to puniſh all offences againſt God; and, where it is not his duty to uſe force, you will grant the magiſtrate is not to uſe it, in matters of religion; becauſe where it is neceſſary, it is his duty to uſe it: but, where it is not neceſſary, you yourſelf ſay, it is not lawful. It would be convenient, therefore, for you to reform your propoſition, from that looſe generality it is now in, and then prove it, before it can be allowed you to be to your purpoſe: though it be never ſo true, that "you know not a greater crime a man "can be guilty of, than rejecting the true religion."

Page 51. YOU go on with your proof, that ſo long as men reject the true religion, &c. ſo long they offend, and conſequently may juſtly be puniſhed; "Becauſe, ſay "you, it is impoſſible for any man, innocently to reject the true religion, ſo "tendered to him. For, whoever rejects that religion, ſo tendered, does either "apprehend and perceive the truth of it, or he does not. If he does, I know "not what greater crime any man can be guilty of. If he does not perceive the "truth of it, there is no account to be given of that; but either, that he ſhuts "his eyes, againſt the evidence which is offer'd him, and will not at all conſider it; or that he does not conſider it, as he ought, viz. with ſuch care as is "requiſite, and with a ſincere deſire to learn the truth: either of which does "manifeſtly involve him in guilt.

TO ſay here, that a man, who has the true religion propoſed to him, with "ſufficient evidence of its truth, may conſider it, as he ought," or do his utmoſt in conſidering, "and yet not perceive the truth of it; is neither more nor "leſs, than to ſay, that ſufficient evidence is not ſufficient evidence. For what "does any man mean, by ſufficient evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win "aſſent, where-ever it is duly conſider'd?"

I SHALL not trouble myſelf here, to examine, when requiſite care, duly conſidered, and ſuch other words, which bring one back to the ſame place, from whence one ſet out, are caſt up, whether all this fine reaſoning will amount to any thing, but begging what is in the queſtion: but ſhall only tell you, that what you ſay, here and in other places, about ſufficient evidence, is built upon this, that the evidence, wherewith a man propoſes the true religion, he may know to be ſuch, as will not fail to gain the aſſent of whoſoever does what lies in him, in conſidering it. This is the ſuppoſition, without which all your talk, of ſufficient evidence, will do you no ſervice, try it where you will. But it is a ſuppoſition, that is far enough from carrying with it ſufficient evidence, to make it be admitted, without proof.

WHATEVER gains any man's aſſent, one may be ſure had ſufficient evidence, in reſpect of that man: but that is far enough from proving it evidence, ſufficient to prevail one another, let him conſider it, as long, and as much, as he can. The tempers of men's minds; the principles ſettled there, by time and education, beyond the power of the man himſelf, to alter them; the different capacities of men's underſtandings, and the ſtrange ideas they are often filled with, are ſo various and uncertain, that it is impoſſible to find that evidence (eſpecially in things of a mixed diſquiſition, depending on ſo long a train of conſequences, as ſome points of the true religion may) which, one can confidently ſay, will be ſufficient for all men. 'Tis demonſtration that 31876 is the product of 9467172 divided by 297, and yet I challenge you to find one man of a thouſand, to whom you can tender this propoſition with demonſtrative, or ſufficient, evidence, to convince him of the truth of it, in a dark room; or ever to make this evidence appear to a man, that cannot write and read, ſo as to make him embrace it as a truth, if another, whom he hath more confidence in, tells him it is not ſo. All the demonſtrative evidence the thing has, all the tender you can make of it, all the conſideration he can employ about it, will never be able to diſcover, to him, that evidence, which ſhall convince him it is true, unleſs you will, at threeſcore and ten (for that may be the caſe) have him neglect his calling, go to ſchool, and learn to write and read, and caſt accounts, which he may never be able to attain to.

You ſpeak, more than once, of men's being brought to lay aſide their prejudices, to make them conſider, as they ought, and judge right, of matters in religion; and I grant, without doing ſo, they cannot: but it is impoſſible for force, to make them do it, unleſs it could ſhew them, which are prejudices in their minds, and diſtinguiſh them from the truths there. Who is there, almoſt, that has not prejudices, that he does not know to be ſo; and what can force do, in that caſe? It can no more remove them, to make way for truth, than it can remove one truth, to make way for another; or rather remove an eſtabliſhed truth, or that which is looked on, as an unqueſtionable principle (for ſo are often men's prejudices) to make way for a truth not yet known, nor appearing to be one. 'Tis not every one knows, or can bring himſelf to Des Cartes's way of doubting, and ſtrip his thoughts of all opinions, 'till he brings them to ſelf-evident principles, and then, upon them, build all his future tenets.

Do not think all the world, who are not of your church, abandon themſelves to an utter careleſſneſs of their future eſtate. You cannot but allow, there are many Turks, who ſincerely ſeek truth, to whom yet you could never bring evidence ſufficient to convince them of the truth of the chriſtian religion, whilſt they look'd on it, as a principle, not to be queſtioned, that the Alcoran was of divine revelation. This, poſſibly, you will tell me, is a prejudice, and ſo it is; but yet, if this man ſhall tell you, 'tis no more a prejudice in him, than it is a prejudice in any one, among chriſtians, who having not examined it, lays it down as an unqueſtionable principle of his religion, that the ſcripture is the word of God; What will you anſwer to him? And yet, it would ſhake a great many chriſtians in their religion, if they ſhould lay by that prejudice, and ſuſpend their judgment of it, until they had made it out to themſelves, with evidence, ſufficient to convince one, who is not prejudiced in favour of it; and it would require more time, books, languages, learning and ſkill, than falls to moſt men's ſhare, to eſtabliſh them therein, if you will not allow them, in this ſo diſtinguiſhing and fundamental a point, to rely on the learning, knowledge, and judgment of ſome perſons, whom they have in reverence, or admiration. This, though you blame it as an ill way, yet you can allow, in one of your own religion, even to that degree, that he may be ignorant of the grounds of his religion. And why, then, may you not allow it to a Turk, not as a good way, or as having led him to the truth; but as a way, as fit for him, as for one of your church to acquieſce in; and as fit to exempt him from your force, as to exempt any one of your church from it? Page 42.

To prevent your commenting on this, in which you have ſhewn ſo much dexterity, give me leave to tell you, that, for all this, I do not think all religions equally true, or equally certain. But this, I ſay, is impoſſible for you, or me, or any man, to know whether another has done his duty, in examining the evidence, on both ſides, when he embraces that ſide of the queſtion, which we (perhaps, upon other views) judge falſe: and therefore, we can have no right to puniſh, or perſecute him, for it. In this, whether, and how far, any one is faulty, muſt be left to the ſearcher of hearts, the great and righteous judge of all men, who knows all their circumſtances, all the powers and workings of their minds; where 'tis they ſincerely follow, and by what default they at any time miſs truth: and he, we are ſure, will judge uprightly.

But, when one man ſhall think himſelf a competent judge, that the true religion is propoſed with evidence, ſufficient for another; and thence ſhall take upon him to puniſh him, as an offender, becauſe he embraces not (upon evidence that he, the propoſer, judges ſufficient) the religion, that he judges true, had need be able to look into the thoughts of men, and know their ſeveral abilities: unleſs he will make his own underſtanding and faculties, to be the meaſure of thoſe of all mankind, which if they be no higher elevated, no larger in their comprehenſion,

ſion, no more diſcerning, than thoſe of ſome men, he will not only be unfit to be a judge in that, but in almoſt any caſe whatſoever.

BUT ſince, 1. You make it a condition, to the making man an offender, in not being of the true religion, that it has been tendered to him, with ſufficient evidence. 2. Since you think it ſo eaſy for men to determine, when the true religion has been tendered to any one with ſufficient evidence. And, 3. Since you A. p. 16. pronounce "it impiety to ſay, that God has not furniſhed mankind, with competent means, for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good "of ſouls." Give me leave to aſk you a queſtion or two. 1. Can any one be ſaved, without embracing the one, only, true religion? 2. Were any of the Americans of that one, only, true religion, when the Europeans firſt came amongſt them? 3. Whether any of the Americans, before the chriſtians came amongſt them, had offended, in rejecting the true religion tendered with ſufficient evidence? When you have thought upon, and fairly anſwered theſe queſtions, you will be fitter to determine, how competent a judge man is what is ſufficient evidence; who do offend, in not being of the true religion; and what puniſhments they are liable to, for it.

BUT methinks here, where you ſpend almoſt a whole page, upon the crime of rejecting the true religion duly tendered, and the puniſhment, that is juſtly due to it, from the magiſtrate, you forget yourſelf, and the foundation of your plea for force; which is, that it it is neceſſary: which you are ſo far from proving it to be, in this caſe of puniſhing the offence, of rejecting the true religion, that, in this very page, you diſtinguiſhed it from what is neceſſary; where you tell us, "Your deſign does rather oblige you to conſider, how long men may need puniſhment, than how long it may be juſt to puniſh them." So that, though they offend, yet, if they do not need puniſhment, the magiſtrate cannot uſe it, if you ground, as you ſay you do, the lawfulneſs of force, for promoting the true religion, upon the neceſſity of it. Nor can you ſay, that, by his commiſſion from the law of nature, of doing good, the magiſtrate, beſides reducing his wandering ſubjects out of the wrong, into the right way, is appointed alſo to be the avenger of God's wrath on unbelievers, or thoſe that err in matters of religion. This, at leaſt, you thought not fit to own, in the firſt draught of your ſcheme; for I do not remember, in all your argument conſidered, one word of crime, or puniſhment: nay, in writing this ſecond treatiſe, you were ſo ſhy of owning any thing of puniſhment, that, to my remembrance, you ſcrupulouſly avoided the uſe of that word, 'till you came to this place; and always, where the repeating my words did not oblige you to it, carefully uſed the term, of penalties, for it, as any one may obſerve, who reads the preceding part of this letter of yours, which I am now examining. And you were ſo nice in the point, that three or four leaves backwards, where I ſay, By your rule, diſſenters muſt be puniſhed, you mend it, and ſay, "Or if I pleaſe, ſubjected to moderate penalties." But here, when the enquiry, How long force was to be continued on men, ſhewed the abſurdity of that pretence, that they were to be puniſhed on, without end, to make them conſider; rather than part with your beloved force, you open the matter a little farther, and profeſs directly, the puniſhing men for their religion. For though you do all, you can, to cover it, under the name of rejecting the true religion, duly propoſed; yet it is, in truth, no more, but being of a religion different from yours, that you would have them puniſhed for: for all that the author pleads for, and you can oppoſe, in writing againſt him, is toleration of religion. Your ſcheme, therefore, being thus mended, your hypotheſis enlarged, being of a different religion from the national found criminal, and puniſhments found juſtly to belong to it, it is to be hoped, that in good time, your puniſhments may grow too, and be advanced to all thoſe degrees you in the beginning, condemned; when, having conſider'd a little farther, you cannot miſs finding, that the obſtinacy of the criminals does not leſſen their crime, and therefore juſtice will require ſeverer execution to be done upon them.

Page 51. BUT you tell us here, "Becauſe your deſign does rather oblige you to conſider, how long men may need puniſhment, than how long it may be juſt to

" puniſh them; therefore, you ſhall add, That as long as men refuſe to em-" brace the true religion, ſo long penalties are neceſſary for them, to diſpoſe " them to conſider and embrace it: and that, therefore, as juſtice allows, ſo " charity requires, that they be kept ſubject to penalties, 'till they embrace the " true religion." Let us, therefore, ſee the conſiſtency of this, with other parts of your hypotheſis, and examine it a little by them.

YOUR doctrine is, That where intreaties and admonitions, upon trial, do not prevail, puniſhments are to be uſed; but they muſt be moderate. Moderate puniſhments have been tried, and they prevail not; What now is to be done? Are not greater to be uſed? No: For what reaſon? Becauſe thoſe, whom moderate penalties will not prevail on, being deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, remedies are not to be provided for the incurable, as you tell us in the page immediately preceding.

MODERATE puniſhments have been tried upon a man, once and again, and a third time, but prevail not all, make no impreſſion: they are repeated, as many times more, but are ſtill found ineffectual: pray tell me a reaſon, why ſuch a man is concluded ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, that greater degrees will not work upon him; but yet not ſo deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, but that the ſame degrees, repeated, may work upon him? I will not urge here, that this is to pretend to know the juſt degree of puniſhment, that will, or will not, work on any one, which I ſhould imagine a pretty intricate buſineſs: but this I have to ſay, that if you can think it reaſonable and uſeful, to continue a man ſeveral years, nay his whole life, under the ſame repeated puniſhments, without going any higher, tho' they work not at all, becauſe 'tis poſſible, ſome time or other, they may work on him; why is it not as reaſonable and uſeful (I am ſure it is much more juſtifiable and charitable) to leave him all his life, under the means, which, all agree, God has appointed, without going any higher, becauſe 'tis not impoſſible that, ſome time or other, preaching, and a word ſpoken in due ſeaſon, may work upon him? For, why ſhould you deſpair of the ſucceſs of preaching and perſuaſion, upon a fruitleſs trial, and thereupon think yourſelf authorized to uſe force; and yet not ſo deſpair of the ſucceſs of moderate force, as, after years of fruitleſs trial, to continue it on, and not to proceed to higher degrees of puniſhment, you are concerned, for the vindication of your ſyſtem, to ſhew a reaſon.

I MENTION the trial of preaching and perſuaſion, to ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of your hypotheſis, ſuppoſing ſuch a trial made: not that, in yours, or the common method, there is, or can be, a fair trial made, what preaching and perſuaſion can do. For care is taken by puniſhment and ill treatment, to indiſpoſe and turn away men's minds, and to add averſion to their ſcruples; an excellent way to ſoften men's inclinations, and temper them for the impreſſion of arguments and intreaties; tho' theſe two are only talked of: for I cannot but wonder to find you mention, as you do, giving ear to admonitions, intreaties and perſuaſions, when theſe are ſeldom, if ever, made uſe of, but in places, where thoſe, who are to be wrought on, by them, are known to be out of hearing; nor can be expected to come there, 'till, by ſuch means, they have been wrought on.

'TIS not without reaſon, therefore, you cannot part with your penalties, and would have no end put to your puniſhments, but continue them on; ſince you leave ſo much to their operation, and make ſo little uſe of other means, to work upon diſſenters.

CHAP. VI.

Of the end, for which force is to be uſed.

HE, that ſhould read the beginning of your argument conſidered, would think it, in earneſt, to be your deſign, to have force employed to make men ſeriouſly conſider, and nothing elſe: but he, that ſhall look a little farther into it, and, to that, add alſo your defence of it, will find, by the variety of ends, you deſign your force for, that either you not know well, what you would have it for, or elſe, whatever 'twas you aimed at, you called it ſtill, by that name, which beſt fitted the occaſion, and would ſerve beſt, in that place, to recommend the uſe of it.

Page 27. YOU aſk me, " Whether the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the goſpel deſtroys " the coactive power of the magiſtrate?" I anſwer, as you ſuppoſe, No: Upon which you infer, " Then it ſeems the magiſtrate may uſe his coactive power, " without offending againſt the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the goſpel." Yes, where he has commiſſion and authority to uſe it. " And ſo, ſay you, it will " conſiſt, well enough, with the mildneſs and gentleneſs of the goſpel, for the " magiſtrate to uſe his coactive power to procure them" [I ſuppoſe you mean the miniſters and preachers of the national religion] " a hearing, where their " prayers and intreaties will not do it." No, it will not conſiſt with the gentle and mild method of the goſpel, unleſs the goſpel has directed it, or ſomething elſe, to ſupply its want, 'till it could be had. As for miracles, which you pretend to have ſupplied the want of force, in the firſt ages of chriſtianity, you will find that conſidered in another place. But, Sir, ſhew me a country, where the miniſters and teachers, of the national and true religion, go about with prayers and intreaties, to procure a hearing, and cannot obtain it, and there, I think, I need not ſtand with you, for the magiſtrate to uſe force, to procure it them; but that, I fear, will not ſerve your turn.

To ſhew the inconſiſtency and unpracticableneſs of your method, I had ſaid, L. 2. P. 296. " Let us now ſee to what end they muſt be puniſhed:

A. p. 5. " SOMETIMES it is, " To bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince them:" Of what? That it " is not eaſy to ſee Grantham ſteeple upon Paul's church? Whatever it be, you " would have them convinced of, you are not willing to tell us; and ſo it may " be any thing.

A. p. 10. " SOMETIMES it is, " To incline them to lend an ear to thoſe, who tell them, " they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right." Which is, A. p. 27. " to lend an ear to all, who differ from them, in religion, as well crafty ſeducers, A. p. 23. " cers, as others. Whether this be for the procuring the ſalvation of their ſouls, " the end, for which, you ſay, this force is to be uſed, judge you. But this I " am ſure, Whoever will lend an ear to all, who will tell them, they are out of " the way, will not have much time for any other buſineſs.

A. p. 11. " SOMETIMES it is, " To recover men, to ſo much ſobriety and reflection, " as ſeriouſly to put the queſtion to themſelves, Whether it be really worth their " while to undergo ſuch inconveniencies, for adhering to a religion which, for " any thing they know, may be falſe; or, for rejecting another (if that be the " caſe) which, for aught they know, may be true, 'till they have brought it to " the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there." Which, in ſhort, amounts to " thus much, viz. " To make them examine, whether their religion be true, " and ſo worth the holding, under thoſe penalties, that are annexed to it." Diſſenters are indebted to you, for your great care of their ſouls. But what, I " beſeech you, ſhall become of thoſe of the national church, every where " (which makes far the greater part of mankind) who have no ſuch puniſhments, to make them conſider; who have not this only remedy provided for A. p. 27. " them, but are left, in that deplorable condition you mention, " of being ſuffered quietly, and without moleſtation, to take no care at all of their ſouls, " or, in doing of it, to follow their own prejudices, humours, or ſome crafty " ſeducers?" Need not thoſe of the national church, as well as others, bring " their religion to the bar of reaſon, and give it a fair trial there? And if they " need to do ſo, (as they muſt, if all national religions cannot be ſuppoſed true) A. p. 12. " they will always need that, which, you ſay, is the only means, to make them " do ſo. So that if you are ſure, as you tell us, that there is need of your method; I am ſure, there is as much need of it, in national churches, as any " other, And ſo, for aught I can ſee, you muſt either puniſh them, or let others " alone; unleſs you think it reaſonable, that the far greater part of mankind

“ ſhould, conſtantly, be without that ſovereign and only remedy, which they
ſtand in need of, equally with other people.

“ Sometimes the end, for which men muſt be puniſhed, is, “ To diſpoſe A. p. 13.
“ them to ſubmit to inſtruction, and to give a fair hearing to the reaſons, that
“ are offered, for the enlightning their minds, and diſcovering the truth to them.”
“ If their own words may be taken for it, there are as few diſſenters, as con-
“ formiſts, in any country, who will not profeſs, they have done, and do this.
“ And, if their own words may not be taken, who, I pray muſt be judge?
“ You and your magiſtrates? If ſo, then it is plain, you puniſh them not to diſ-
“ poſe them to ſubmit to inſtruction, but to your inſtruction; not to diſpoſe
“ them to give a fair hearing to reaſons, offered for the enlightning their minds,
“ but to give an obedient hearing to your reaſons. If you mean this, it had
“ been fairer and ſhorter to have ſpoken out plainly, than thus, in fair words, of
“ indefinite ſignification, to ſay that, which amounts to nothing. For what
“ ſenſe is it, to puniſh a man, to diſpoſe him to ſubmit to inſtruction, and give
“ a fair hearing to reaſons offered, for the enlightning his mind, and diſcover-
“ ing truth to him, who goes, two or three times a week, ſeveral miles, on
“ purpoſe to do it, and that, with the hazard of his liberty, or purſe? unleſs
“ you mean your inſtructions, your reaſons, your truth? which brings us but
“ back, to what you have diſclaimed, plain perſecution for differing in religion.

“ Sometimes this is to be done, “ To prevail with men, to weigh matters A. p. 14.
“ of religion, carefully and impartially.” Diſcountenance and puniſhment put
“ into one ſcale, with impunity and hopes of preferment put into the other, is
“ as ſure a way, to make a man weigh impartially, as it would be for a prince
“ to bribe and threaten a judge, to make him judge uprightly.

“ Sometimes it is, “ To make men bethink themſelves, and put it out of A. p. 20.
“ the power of any fooliſh humour, or unreaſonable prejudice, to alienate them
“ from truth and their own happineſs.” Add but this, to put it out of the power
“ of any humour or prejudice of their own, or other men’s, and I grant the end
“ is good, if you can find the means to procure it. But why it ſhould not be
“ put out of the power of other men’s humour, or prejudice, as well as their
“ own, wants (and will always want) a reaſon to prove. Would it not, I be-
“ ſeech you, to an indifferent by-ſtander, appear humour, or prejudice, or ſome-
“ thing as bad, to ſee men, who profeſs a religion, revealed from heaven, and
“ which, they own, contains all in it neceſſary to ſalvation, exclude men from
“ their communion, and perſecute them with the penalties of the civil law, for
“ not joining in the uſe of ceremonies, which are no where to be found, in that
“ revealed religion? Would it not appear humour, or prejudice, or ſome ſuch
“ thing, to a ſober, impartial heathen, to ſee chriſtians exclude and perſecute
“ one of the ſame faith, for things, which they themſelves confeſs to be indif-
“ ferent, and not worth the contending for? “ Prejudice, humour, paſſion, luſts, A. p. 6, 7, 8,
“ impreſſions of education, reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly re- 9, 10.
“ ſpects, love of their own choice, and the like,” (to which you juſtly impute
“ many men’s taking up, and perſiſting in, their religion) are, indeed, good
“ words; and ſo, on the other ſide, are theſe following, “ Truth, the right
“ way, enlightning, reaſon, ſound judgment;” but they ſignify nothing at all,
“ to your purpoſe, ’till you can evidently and unqueſtionably ſhew the world,
“ that the latter (viz. truth, and the right way, &c.) are always, and in all
“ countries, to be found only in the national church; and the former (viz.
“ paſſion and prejudice, &c.) only amongſt the diſſenters. But to go on:

“ Sometimes it is, “ To bring men to take ſuch care, as they ought, of A. p. 22.
“ their ſalvation.” “ What care is ſuch, as men ought to take, whilſt they are
“ out of your church, will be hard for you to tell me. But you endeavour to
“ explain yourſelf in the following words, “ That they may not blindly leave
“ it to the choice, neither of any other perſon, nor yet of their own luſts and
“ paſſions, to preſcribe to them, what faith, or worſhip, they ſhall embrace.”
“ You do well, to make uſe of puniſhment, to ſhut paſſion out of the choice;
“ becauſe you know, fear of ſuffering is no paſſion. But let that paſs. You
“ would have men puniſhed, “ to bring them to take ſuch care of their ſalva-

“ tion, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice, of any other perſon, to
“ preſcribe to them.” Are you ſincere? Are you in earneſt? Tell me, then,
“ truly: Did the magiſtrate, or the national church, any where, or yours, in
“ particular, ever puniſh any man, to bring him to have this care, which, you
“ ſay, he ought to take, of his ſalvation? Did you ever puniſh any man, that
“ he might not blindly leave it to the choice of his pariſh prieſt, or biſhop, or
“ the convocation, what faith, or worſhip, he ſhould embrace? 'Twill be ſuſpected
“ care of a party, or any thing elſe, rather than care of the ſalvation,
A. p. 12. “ of men's ſouls; if, having found out ſo uſeful, ſo neceſſary a remedy, the
“ only method there is room left for, you will apply it, but partially, and make
“ trial only on thoſe, whom you have truly leaſt kindneſs for. This will, unavoidably,
“ give one reaſon to imagine, you do not think ſo well of your remedy
“ as you pretend, who are ſo ſparing of it to your friends; but are very
“ free of it to ſtrangers, who in other things are uſed very much like enemies.
“ But your remedy is like the Helleboraſter, that grew in the woman's garden,
“ for the cure of worms in her neighbour's children: for truly it wrought too
“ roughly to give it to any of her own. Methinks your charity, in your preſent
“ perſecution, is much-what as prudent, as juſtifiable, as that good woman's.
“ I hope, I have done you no injury, that I here ſuppoſe you of the church of
“ England; if I have, I beg your pardon. It is no offence of malice, I aſſure
“ you: for I ſuppoſe no worſe of you, than I confeſs of myſelf.
A. p. 22. “ SOMETIMES this puniſhment that you contend for, is, “ to bring men to
“ act according to reaſon and judgment.”

Tertius è cœlo cecidit Cato.

“ THIS is reformation, indeed! If you can help us to it, you will deſerve
“ ſtatues to be erected to you, as to the reſtorer of decayed religion. But, if all
“ men have not reaſon and ſound judgment, will puniſhment put it into them?
“ Beſides, concerning this matter, mankind is ſo divided, that he acts according
“ to reaſon and ſound judgment at Auſpurg, who would be judged to do the
“ quite contrary, at Edinburgh. Will puniſhment make men know, what is
“ reaſon and ſound judgment? If it will not, 'tis impoſſible, it ſhould make
“ them act according to it. Reaſon and ſound judgment are the elixir itſelf, the
“ univerſal remedy: and you may, as reaſonably puniſh men, to bring them to
“ have the philoſopher's ſtone, as to bring them to act according to reaſon and
“ ſound judgment.
A. p. 26. “ SOMETIMES it is, “ To put men upon a ſerious and impartial examination
“ of the controverſy, between the magiſtrate and them, which is the way, for
“ them, to come to the knowledge of the truth.” But what, if the truth be
“ on neither ſide, (as I am apt to imagine, you will think it is not, where neither
“ the magiſtrate, nor the diſſenter is, either of them, of your church) how will
“ the examining the controverſy between the magiſtrate and him be the way, to
“ come to the knowledge of the truth? Suppoſe the controverſy between a lutheran
“ and a papiſt; or, if you pleaſe, between a preſbyterian magiſtrate and
“ a quaker ſubject. Will the examining the controverſy, between the magiſtrate
“ and the diſſenting ſubject, in this caſe, bring him to the knowledge of
“ the truth? If you ſay, Yes, then you grant, one of theſe to have the truth
“ on his ſide. For the examining the controverſy, between a preſbyterian and
“ a quaker, leaves the controverſy, either of them has, with the church of
“ England, or any other church, untouched. And ſo one, at leaſt, of thoſe
“ being already come to the knowledge of the truth, ought not to be put under
“ your diſcipline of puniſhment; which is only to bring him to the truth. If
“ you ſay, No, and that the examining the controverſy, between the magiſtrate
“ and the diſſenter, in this caſe, will not bring him to the knowledge of the
“ truth; you confeſs your rule to be falſe, and your method to no purpoſe.
“ To conclude; your ſyſtem is, in ſhort, this. You would have all men
“ (laying aſide prejudice, humour, paſſion, &c.) examine the grounds of their
“ religion, and ſearch for the truth. This, I confeſs, is heartily to be wiſhed.

“ The means, that you propoſe, to make men do this, is, that diſſenters ſhould be puniſhed, to make them do ſo. It is, as if you had ſaid, men generally are guilty of a fault: therefore let one ſect, who have the ill luck to be of an opinion, different from the magiſtrate, be puniſhed. This, at firſt ſight, ſhocks any one, who has the leaſt ſpark of ſenſe, reaſon, or juſtice. But having ſpoken of this already, and concluding that, upon ſecond thoughts, you yourſelf will be aſhamed of it; let us conſider it put ſo, as to be conſiſtent with common ſenſe, and with all the advantage it can bear, and then let us ſee, what you can make of it. “ Men are negligent, in examining the religions they embrace, refuſe, or perſiſt in; therefore, it is fit they ſhould be puniſhed, to make them do it. This is a conſequence, indeed, which may, without defiance to common ſenſe, be drawn from it. This is the uſe, the only uſe, which you think puniſhment can, indirectly and at a diſtance, have, in matters of religion. You would have men, by puniſhments, driven to examine. What? Religion. To what end? To bring them to the knowledge of the truth. But I anſwer.

“ Firſt, Every one has not the ability to do this.

“ Secondly. Every one has not the opportunity to do it.

“ Would you have every poor proteſtant, for example, in the palatinate, examine thoroughly, whether the pope be infallible, or head of the church; whether there be a purgatory; whether ſaints are to be pray'd to, or the dead pray'd for; whether the ſcripture be the rule of faith; whether there be no ſalvation out of the church; and whether there be no church, without biſhops; and an hundred other queſtions in controverſy, between the papiſts and thoſe proteſtants: and when he had maſtered theſe, go on to fortify himſelf againſt the opinions and objections of other churches, he differs from? this, which is no ſmall taſk, muſt be done, before a man can have brought his religion to the bar of reaſon, and given it a fair trial there. And, if you will puniſh men until this be done, the countryman muſt leave off ploughing and ſowing, and betake himſelf to the ſtudy of Greek and Latin; and the artiſan muſt ſell his tools, to buy fathers and ſchoolmen, and leave his family to ſtarve. If ſomething leſs than this will ſatisfy you, pray tell me, what is enough. Have they conſidered and examined enough, if they are ſatisfied themſelves where the truth lies? If this be the limits of their examination, you will find few to puniſh; unleſs you will puniſh them, to make them do what they have done already. For, however he came by his religion, there is ſcarce any one to be found, who does not own himſelf ſatisfied, that he is in the right: or elſe, they muſt be puniſhed, to make them conſider and examine, until they embrace that, which you chuſe for truth? if this be ſo, what do you but, in effect, chuſe for them, when, yet, you would have men puniſhed, “ to bring them to ſuch a care of their ſouls, that no A. p. 22. other perſon might chuſe for them?” If it be truth, in general, you would have them, by puniſhments, driven to ſeek; that is, to offer matter of diſpute, and not a rule of diſcipline. For to puniſh any one to make him ſeek, until he find truth, without a judge of truth, is to puniſh for, you know not what; and is all one, as if you ſhould whip a ſcholar to make him find out the ſquare root of a number, you do not know. I wonder not, therefore, that you could not reſolve with yourſelf, what degree of ſeverity, you would have uſed, nor how long continued; when you dare not ſpeak out, directly, whom you would have puniſhed, and are far from being clear, to what end they ſhould be under penalties.”

Consonant to this uncertainty, of whom, or what, to be puniſhed; you tell us, “ that there is no queſtion of the ſucceſs of this method. Force A. p. 12. will certainly do, if duly proportion'd to the deſign of it.”

“ What, I pray, is the deſign of it? I challenge you, or any man living, out of what you have ſaid, in your book, to tell me directly what it is. In all other puniſhments, that ever I heard of yet, until now, that you have taught the world a new method, the deſign of them has been to cure the crime, they are denounced againſt; and ſo, I think, it ought to be here.

“ What, I beſeech you, is the crime here? diſſenting? that you ſay not, any
A. p. 21. “ where is a fault. Beſides, you tell us, “ that the magiſtrate hath not an authority,
A. p. 25. “ to compel any one, to his religion.” And that “ you do not require
A. p. 26. “ that men ſhould have no rule, but the religion of the country.” And
“ the “ power, you aſcribe to the magiſtrate, is given him, to bring men, not
“ to his own, but to the true religion.” If diſſenting be not the fault; is it
“ that a man does not examine his own religion, and the grounds of it? is
“ that the crime, your puniſhments are deſigned to cure? neither that dare you
“ ſay, leſt you diſpleaſe, more than you ſatisfy, with your new diſcipline.
“ And then, again, (as I ſaid before) you muſt tell us, how far you would
“ have them examine, before you puniſh them for not doing it. And I imagine,
“ if that were all we required of you, it would be long enough, before
“ you would trouble us with a law, that ſhould preſcribe to every one, how
“ far he was to examine matters of religion; wherein, if he failed, and came
“ ſhort, he was to be puniſhed; if he performed, and went in his examination,
“ to the bounds ſet by the law, he was acquitted and free. Sir, when
“ you conſider it again, you will, perhaps, think this a caſe reſerved to the
“ great day, when the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be open. For I imagine, it is
“ beyond the power, or judgment, of man, in that variety of circumſtances, in
“ reſpect of parts, tempers, opportunities, helps, &c. men are in, in this world,
“ to determine, what is every one's duty, in this great buſineſs of ſearch, enquiry,
“ examination, or to know, when any one has done it. That, which
A. p. 12. “ makes me believe, you will be of this mind, is, that, where you undertake
“ for the ſucceſs of this method, if rightly uſed, it is with a limitation, upon
“ ſuch, as are not altogether incurable. So that, when your remedy is prepared
“ according to art, (which art is yet unknown) and rightly applied, and
“ given in a due doſe, (all which are ſecrets) it will then infallibly cure.
“ Whom? all that are not incurable by it. And ſo will a pippin-poſſet, eating
“ fiſh in Lent, or a preſbyterian lecture, eertainly cure all that are not incurable
“ by them. For, I am ſure, you do not mean, it will cure all, but
“ thoſe who are abſolutely incurable; becauſe you yourſelf allow one means
“ left of cure, when yours will not do, viz. “ the grace of God.”. Your words
“ are, “ What means is there left (except the grace of God) to reduce them,
A. p. 10. “ but to lay thorns and briars in their way?” And here alſo, in the place we
A. p. 12. were conſidering, you tell us, “ the incurable are to be left to God.” Whereby,
“ if you mean they are to be left to thoſe means, he has ordained, for men's
“ converſion and ſalvation, yours muſt never be made uſe of: for he, indeed, has
“ preſcribed preaching and hearing of his word; but as for thoſe, who will not
“ hear, I do not find, any where, that he has commanded, that they ſhould
“ be compelled, or beaten to it.”

I MUST beg my reader's pardon for ſo long a repetition, which I was forced
to, that he might be judge, whether, what I there ſaid, either deſerves no anſwer,
Page 48. or be fully anſwered in that paragraph, where you undertake to vindicate
your method, from all impracticableneſs, and inconſiſtency, chargeable upon it,
in reference to the end, for which you would have men puniſhed. Your words
are, for what? by which you ſay, “ you perceive I mean two things: for,
“ ſometimes, I ſpeak of the fault, and ſometimes, of the end, for which men
“ are to be puniſhed, (and, ſometimes, I plainly confound them.) Now, if it
“ be enquired, for what fault men are to be puniſhed? you anſwer, for rejecting
“ the true religion, after ſufficient evidence tendered them, of the truth of
“ it: which certainly is a fault, and deſerves puniſhment. But if I enquire,
“ for what end ſuch, as do reject the true religion, are to be puniſhed? you ſay,
“ to bring them to embrace the true religion; and, in order to that, to bring
“ them to conſider, and that carefully and impartially, the evidence which is
“ offered to convince them of the truth of it, which are undeniably juſt and
“ excellent ends; and which, through God's bleſſing, have often been procured,
“ and may yet be procured, by convenient penalties, inflicted for that
“ purpoſe. Nor do you know of any thing, I ſay, againſt any part of this,
“ which is not already anſwered.” Whether I, in this, confound two things
diſtinct,

diſtinct, or you diſtinguiſh, where there is no difference, the reader may judge, by what I have ſaid elſewhere. I ſhall here only conſider the ends of puniſhing, you, here again, in your reply to me, aſſign; and thoſe, as I find them ſcattered, are theſe.

SOMETIMES you ſpeak of this end, as if it were, "barely to gain a hearing Page 27. to thoſe, who, by prayers and intreaty, cannot:" and thoſe may be the preachers of any religion. But I ſuppoſe, you mean the preachers of the true religion. And who, I beſeech you, muſt be judge of that?

"WHERE the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for all, as well Page 28. as puniſhment for diſſenters, it is plain, to all concerned, that the puniſhment is intended to make them conſider." What? the means the law provides for their inſtruction. Who, then, is judge of what they are to be inſtructed in, and the means of inſtruction, but the law-maker?

"IT is to bring men to hearken to inſtruction." From whom? From any Page 37. body? "and to conſider and examine matters of religion, as they ought to do, and to bring thoſe, who are out of the right way, to hear, conſider and embrace the truth." When is this end attained, and the penalties, which are the means to this end, taken off? when a man conforms to the national church. And who, then, is judge of what is the truth to be embraced, but the magiſtrate?

"IT is to bring men, to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are Page 26. proper and ſufficient to convince them; but which, without being forced, they would not conſider." And when have they done this? when they have once conformed: for, after that, there is no force uſed to make them conſider farther.

"IT is to make men conſider as they ought; and that you tell us, is ſo to Page 40. conſider, as "to be moved heartily to embrace, and not to reject truth neceſſary Page 28. to ſalvation." And when is the magiſtrate, that has the cure of men's ſouls, and does all this for their ſalvation, ſatisfied, that they have ſo conſidered? as ſoon as they outwardly join communion with the national church.

"IT is to bring men to conſider and examine thoſe controverſies, which they Page 2. are bound to conſider and examine, i. e. thoſe, wherein they cannot err, without diſhonouring God, and endangering their own and other men's ſalvation. And to ſtudy the true religion, with ſuch care and diligence, as they might and Page 58. ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind." And when in your opinion, is it preſumable, that any man has done all this? even, when he is in the communion of your church.

"IT is to cure men's unreaſonable prejudices and refractorineſs againſt, and Page 53. averſion to, the true religion." Whereof none retain the leaſt tincture: or ſuſpicion, who are once got within the pale of your church.

"IT is to bring men into the right way, into the way of ſalvation," which Page 30, 58. force does, when it has conducted them, within the church-porch, and there leaves them.

"IT is to bring men to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them." And here, Page 26. in the paragraph, wherein you pretend to tell us, for what force is to be uſed, Page 49. you ſay, "it is to bring men to embrace the true religion; and, in order to that, to bring them to conſider, and that carefully and impartially, the evidence, which is offered, to convince them of the truth of it, which, as you ſay, are undeniable juſt and excellent ends;" but yet ſuch, as force, in your Page 47. method, can never practically be made a means to, without ſuppoſing what, you ſay you have no need to ſuppoſe, viz. that your religion is the true; unleſs you had rather, every where, leave it to the magiſtrate to judge, which is the right way, what is the true religion; which ſuppoſition, I imagine, will leſs accommodate you than the other. But take, which of them you will, you muſt add this other ſuppoſition to it, harder to be granted you, than either of the former, viz. That thoſe, who conform to your church here, (if you make yourſelf the judge) or to the national church, any where, (if you make the magiſtrate judge, of the truth that muſt ſave men) and thoſe only, have attained theſe ends.

THE magiſtrate, you ſay, is obliged to do, what in him lies, to bring all his ſubjects "to examine carefully and impartially matters of religion, and to conſider them, as they ought, i. e. ſo as to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them." The proper and neceſſary means, you ſay, to attain theſe ends, is force. And your method of uſing this force is, to puniſh all the diſſenters from the national religion, and none of thoſe, who outwardly conform to it. Make this practicable now, in any country in the world, without allowing the magiſtrate to be judge, what is the truth that muſt ſave them, and without ſuppoſing alſo, that whoever do embrace the outward profeſſion of the national religion, do, in their hearts, embrace, i. e. believe and obey the truth, that muſt ſave them; and then I think, nothing in government can be too hard for your undertaking.

Page 49. YOU conclude this paragraph in telling me, "You do not know of any thing I ſay, againſt any part of this, which is not already anſwered." Pray tell me, where 'tis you have anſwered thoſe objections, I made, to thoſe ſeveral ends, which you aſſigned, in your argument conſidered, and for which you would have force uſed, and which I have here reprinted again, becauſe I do not find you ſo much as to take notice of them: and, therefore, the reader muſt judge, whether they needed any anſwer, or no.

BUT to ſhew, that you have not here, where you promiſe and pretend to do it, clearly and diſtinctly told us, for what force and penalties are to be uſed, I ſhall, in the next chapter, examine what you mean, "by bringing men to embrace the true religion."

CHAP. VII.

Of your bringing men to the true religion.

TRUE religion is, on all hands, acknowledged to be ſo much the concern and intereſt of all mankind, that nothing can be named, which ſo much effectually beſpeaks the approbation and favour of the publick. The very entitling one's ſelf to that, ſets a man on the right ſide. Who dares queſtion ſuch a cauſe, or oppoſe what is offered, for the promoting the true religion? This advantage you have ſecured to yourſelf, from unattentive readers, as much as, by the often repeated mention of the true religion, is poſſible, there being ſcarce a page, wherein the true religion does not appear, as if you had nothing elſe, in your thoughts, but the bringing men to it, for the ſalvation of their ſouls. Whether it be ſo in earneſt, we will now ſee.

Page 7. YOU tell us, "Whatever hardſhips ſome falſe religions may impoſe, it will, however, always be eaſier to carnal and worldly-minded men, to give even the firſt-born for their tranſgreſſions, than to mortify the luſts, from which they ſpring, which no religion, but the true, requires of them." Upon this, you ground the neceſſity of force, to bring men to the true religion, and charge it, on the magiſtrate, as his duty to uſe it, to that end. What now, in appearance, can expreſs greater care, to bring men to the true religion? But let us ſee what you ſay, in p. 64. and we ſhall find that, in your ſcheme, nothing leſs is meant: there you tell us, "The magiſtrate inflicts the penalties, only upon them, that break the laws:" and, that law requiring nothing but conformity to the national religion, none but nonconformiſts are puniſhed. So that, unleſs an outward profeſſion of the national religion be, by the mortification of men's luſts, harder, than their giving their firſt-born for their tranſgreſſion, all the penalties, you contend for, concern not, nor can be intended to bring men effectually to, the true religion; ſince they leave them, before they come to the difficulty, which is to mortify their luſts, as the true religion requires. So that your bringing men to the true religion, being to bring them to conformity to the national, for then you have done with force, how far that outward conformity is, from being heartily of the true religion, may be known, by the diſtance there is, between the eaſieſt and the hardeſt thing in the world. For there is nothing eaſier,

ſier, than to profeſs in words; nothing harder, than to ſubdue the heart, and bring thoughts and deeds into obedience of the truth: the latter is what is required, to be of the true religion; the other, all that is required, by the penalties, your way applied. If you ſay, conformiſts to the national religion are required, by the law civil and eccleſiaſtical, to lead good lives, which is the difficult part of the true religion; I anſwer, Theſe are not the laws, we are here ſpeaking of, nor thoſe, which the defenders of toleration complain of, but the laws, that put a diſtinction between outward conformiſts and non-conformiſts: and thoſe, they ſay, whatever may be talked of the true religion, can never be meant, to bring men really to the true religion, as long as the true religion is, and is confeſſed to be, a thing of ſo much greater difficulty, than outward conformity.

MIRACLES, ſay you, ſupplied the want of force, in the beginning of chriſtianity; and, therefore, ſo far as they ſupplied that want, they muſt be ſubſervient to the ſame end. The end, then, was to bring men into the chriſtian church, into which they were admitted and received, as brethren, when they acknowledged that Jeſus was the Chriſt, the Son of God. Will that ſerve the turn? No: force muſt be uſed to make men embrace creeds and ceremonies, i. e. outwardly conform to the doctrine and worſhip of your church. Nothing more than that is required, by your penalties; nothing leſs than that will excuſe from puniſhment; that, and nothing but that, will ſerve the turn; that, therefore, and only that, is what you mean, by the true religion, you would have force uſed, to bring men to.

L. 2. P. 280. Page 10. WHEN I tell you, “You have a very ill opinion of the religion of the church of England, and muſt own, it can only be propagated and ſupported by force, if you do not think, it would be a gainer by a general toleration, all the world over:” You aſk, “Why you may not have as good an opinion of the church of England's, as you have of Noah's religion, notwithſtanding you think it cannot now be propagated, or ſupported, without uſing ſome kinds, or degrees, of force.” When you have proved that Noah's religion, that from eight perſons ſpread, and continued in the world, till the apoſtles times, as I have proved, in another place, was propagated and ſupported, all that while, by your kinds, or degrees, of force, you may have ſome reaſon to think as well of the religion of the church of England, as you have of Noah's religion, though you think, it cannot be propagated, and ſupported, without ſome kinds, or degrees, of force. But, 'till you can prove that, you cannot, upon that ground, ſay, you have reaſon to have ſo good an opinion of it.

Page 11. YOU tell me, “If I will take your word for it, you aſſure me, you think, there are many other countries in the world, beſides England, where my toleration would be as little uſeful to truth, as in England.” If you will name thoſe countries, which will be no great pains, I will take your word for it, that you believe toleration, there, would be prejudicial to truth: but, if you will not do that, neither I, nor any body elſe, can believe you. I will give you a reaſon, why I ſay ſo, and that is, Becauſe no body can believe that, upon your principles, you can allow any national religion, differing from that of the church of England, to be true; and, where the national religion is not true, we have already your conſent, as in Spain and Italy, &c. for toleration. Now, that you cannot, without renouncing your own principles, allow any national religion, differing from that eſtabliſhed here by law, to be true, is evident: for, why do you puniſh non-conformiſts here? “To bring them, ſay you, to the true religion. But what if they hold nothing, but what that other, differing, national church does, ſhall they be nevertheleſs puniſhed, if they conform not? You will certainly ſay, Yes: and if ſo, then you muſt either ſay, they are not of the true religion, or elſe you muſt own, you puniſh thoſe, to bring them to the true religion, whom you allow to be of the true religion already.

YOU tell me, “If I own, with our author, that there is but one true religion, and I owning myſelf to be of the church of England, you cannot ſee, how I can avoid ſuppoſing, that the national religion, now in England, back'd by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion.” If I own, as I do, all that you here expect from me, yet it will not ſerve to draw that concluſion from it, which you do, viz. That the national religion, now in England, is the only true religion; taking the true religion, in the ſenſe that I do, and you ought to take it. I grant, that there is but one true religion in the world, which is that, whoſe doctrine and worſhip are neceſſary to ſalvation. I grant too, that the true religion, neceſſary to ſalvation, is taught and profeſſed in the church of England: and yet it will not follow from hence, that the religion of the church of England, as eſtabliſhed by law, is the only true religion; if there be any thing, eſtabliſhed, in the church of England, by law, and made part of its religion, which is not neceſſary to ſalvation, and which any other church, teaching and profeſſing all that is neceſſary to ſalvation, does not receive.

If the national religion now in England, backed by the authority of the law, be, as you would have it, the only true religion; ſo the only true religion, that a man cannot be ſaved, without being of it: Pray reconcile this, with what you ſay, in the immediately preceding paragraph, viz. "That there are many other "countries, in the world, where my toleration would be as little uſeful, as in "England." For, if there be other national religions, differing from that of England, which you allow to be true, and wherein men may be ſaved, the national religion of England, as now eſtabliſhed by law, is not the only true religion, and men may be ſaved, without being of it. And then, the magiſtrate can, upon your principles, have no authority, to uſe force, to bring men to be of it. For you tell us, force is not lawful, unleſs it be neceſſary; and therefore the magiſtrate can never lawfully uſe it, but to bring men to believe and practiſe what is neceſſary to ſalvation. You muſt, therefore, either hold, that there is nothing in the doctrine, diſcipline and ceremonies of the church of England, as it is eſtabliſhed by law, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation: or elſe, you muſt reform your terms of communion, before the magiſtrate, upon your principles, can uſe penalties, to make men conſider, until they conform: or your can ſay, that the national religion of England is the only true religion, though it contain the only true religion in it; as poſſibly moſt, if not all, the differing chriſtian churches, now in the world, do.

Page 11. You tell us farther in the next paragraph, "That, where-ever this only true "religion, i. e. the national religion now in England, is received, all other re"ligions ought to be diſcouraged." Why, I beſeech you, diſcouraged, if they be true, any of them? for, if they be true, what pretence is there, for force, to bring men, who are of them to the true religion? If you ſay, all other religions, varying at all, from that of the church of England, are falſe; we know, then, your meaſure of the one, only, true religion. But that your care is only of conformity to the church of England, and that, by the true religion, you mean nothing elſe, appears too, from your way of expreſſing yourſelf, in this
Ibid. paſſage, where you own, that you ſuppoſe that, as this only true religion (to wit, the national religion now in England, backed with the publick authority of law) "ought to be received, where-ever it is preached; ſo where-ever it is "received, all other religions ought to be diſcouraged, in ſome meaſure, by "the civil powers." If the religion, eſtabliſhed by law in England, be the only true religion, ought it not to be preached and received every where, and all other religions diſcouraged, throughout the world? and ought not the magiſtrates, of all countries, to take care, that it ſhould be ſo? but you only ſay, where-ever it is preached, it ought to be received: and, where-ever it is received, other religions ought to be diſcouraged, which is well ſuited to your ſcheme, for enforcing conformity in England, but could ſcarce drop from a man, whoſe thoughts were on the true religion, and the promoting of it, in other parts of the world.

Force, then, muſt be uſed in England, and penalties laid on diſſenters, there. For what? "to bring them to the true religion," whereby, it is plain, you mean not only the doctrine, but diſcipline and ceremonies, of the church of England, and make them a part of the only, true religion: Why elſe do you puniſh all diſſenters, for rejecting the true religion, and uſe force to bring them to it? when yet a great, if not the greateſt, part of diſſenters in England, own and profeſs the doctrine of the church of England, as firmly, as thoſe in the communion of the church of England. They, therefore, though they believe the ſame religion with you, are excluded from the true church of God, that you would have men brought to, and are, amongſt thoſe, who reject the true religion.

I ASK, Whether they are not, in your opinion, out of the way of ſalvation, who are not joined in communion with the true church? And, whether there can be any true church, without biſhops? If ſo, all, but conformiſts, in England, that are of any church in Europe, beſides the lutherans and papiſts, are out of the way of ſalvation, and ſo, according to your ſyſtem, had need of force, to be brought into it: and theſe too, one for their doctrine of tranſubſtantiation, the other for that of conſubſtantiation, (to omit other things, vaſtly differing from the church of England) you will not, I ſuppoſe, allow to be of the true religion: and who, then, are left of the true religion, but the church of England? For the Abyſſines have too wide a difference, in many points, for me to imagine, that is one of thoſe places, you mean, where toleration would do harm, as well as in England. And I think the religion of the Greek church can ſcarce be ſuppoſed, by you, to be the true. For, if it ſhould, it would be a ſtrong inſtance againſt your aſſertion, that the true religion cannot ſubſiſt, but would quickly be effectually extirpated, without the aſſiſtance of authority, ſince this has ſubſiſted without any ſuch aſſiſtance, now, above 200 years. I take it, then, for granted, (and others with me cannot but do the ſame, 'till you tell us, what other religion there is, of any church, but that of England, which you allow to be the true religion) that all you ſay, of bringing men to the true religion, is only bringing them to the religion of the church of England. If I do you an injury in this, it will be capable of a very eaſy vindication: for it is but naming that other church differing from that of England, which you allow to have the true religion, and I ſhall yield myſelf convinced, and ſhall allow theſe words, viz. "The national religion, now in England, backed by the publick authority "of law, being the only true religion," only as a little haſty ſally of your zeal. In the mean time, I ſhall argue with you, about the uſe of force, to bring men to the religion of the church of England, as eſtabliſhed by law: ſince it is more eaſy to know, what that is, than what you mean by the true religion, if you mean any thing elſe. Page 27

To proceed, therefore; in the next place, I tell you, by uſing force, your way, to bring men to the religion of the church of England, you mean only, to bring them to an outward profeſſion of that religion; and that, as I have told you elſewhere, becauſe force uſed your way, being applied only to diſſenters, and ceaſing, as ſoon as they conform, (whether it be intended by the law-maker, for any thing more, or no, which we have examined, in another place) cannot be to bring men to any thing more, than outward conformity. For, if force be uſed to diſſenters, and them only, to bring men to the true religion, and always, as ſoon as it has brought men to conformity, it be taken off, and laid aſide, as having done all that is expected from it: 'tis plain, that, by bringing men to the true religion, and bringing them to outward conformity, you mean the ſame thing. You uſe and continue force upon diſſenters, becauſe you expect ſome effect from it: when you take it off, it has wrought that effect, or elſe, being in your power, why do you not continue it? The effect, then, that you talk of, being the embracing the true religion, and the thing, you are ſatisfied with, without any farther puniſhment, expectation, or enquiry, being outward conformity, 'tis plain, embracing the true religion, and outward conformity, with you, are the ſame things.

NEITHER can you ſay, it is preſumable that thoſe, who outwardly conform do really underſtand, and inwardly in their hearts embrace with a lively faith and a ſincere obedience, the truth that muſt ſave them. 1. Becauſe it being, as you tell us, the magiſtrate's duty to do, all that in him lies, for the ſalvation of all his ſubjects, and it being in his power to examine, whether they know and live ſuitable to the truth that muſt ſave them, as well as conform, he can, or ought, no more to preſume, that they do ſo, without taking an account of their knowledge and lives, than he can, or ought to, preſume that they conform,

form, without taking any account of their coming to church. Would you think that phyſician diſcharged his duty, and had (as was pretended) a care of men's lives, who having got them into his hands, and knowing no more of them, but that they come once or twice a week, to the apothecary's ſhop, to hear what is preſcribed them, and ſit there a while, ſhould ſay it was preſumable, they were recovered, without ever examining, whether his preſcriptions had any effect, or what eſtate their health was in?

2. IT cannot be preſumable, where there are ſo many viſible inſtances to the contrary. He muſt paſs for an admirable preſumer, who will ſeriouſly affirm, that it is preſumable, that all thoſe, who conform to the national religion, where it is true, do ſo underſtand, believe and practiſe it, as to be in the way of ſalvation.

Page 7. 3. IT cannot be preſumable, that men have parted with their corruptions and luſts, to avoid force, when they fly to conformity, which can ſhelter them from force, without quitting their luſts. That, which is dearer to men than their firſt-born is, you tell us, their luſts; that which is harder, than the hardſhips of falſe religions, is the mortifying of thoſe luſts: here lies the difficulty of the true religion, that it requires the mortifying of thoſe luſts; and 'till that be done, men are not of the true religion, nor in the way of ſalvation: and 'tis, upon this account only, that you pretend force to be needful. Force is uſed to make them hear; it prevails: men hear, but that is not enough, becauſe the difficulty lies not in that; they may hear arguments for the truth, and yet retain their corruption. They muſt do more, they muſt conſider thoſe arguments. Who requires it of them? the law that inflicts the puniſhment, does not; but this we may be ſure, their love of their luſts, and their hatred of puniſhment requires of them, and will bring them to, viz. to conſider how to retain their beloved luſts, and yet avoid the uneaſineſs of the puniſhment they lie under; this is preſumable they do; therefore, they go one eaſy ſtep farther, they conform, and then they are ſafe from force, and may ſtill retain their corruption. Is it therefore preſumable, they have parted with their corruption, becauſe force has driven them to take ſanctuary againſt puniſhment, in conformity, where force is no longer to moleſt them, or pull them from their darling inclination? The difficulty, in religion, is, you ſay, for men to part with their luſts; this makes force neceſſary: men find out a way, by conforming, to avoid force, without parting with their luſts, therefore it is preſumable, when they conform, that force, which they can avoid, without quitting their luſts, hath made them part with them; which is indeed, not to part with their luſts, becauſe of force, but to part with them gratis; which, if you can ſay, is preſumable, the foundation of your need of force (which you place, in the prevalency of corruption, and men's adhering to their luſts) will be gone, and ſo there will be no need of force, at all. If the great difficulty, in religion be, for men to part with, or mortify, their luſts, and the only counterbalance, in the other ſcale, to aſſiſt the true religion, to prevail againſt their luſts, be force; which, I beſeech you, is preſumable, if they can avoid force, and retain their luſts, that they ſhould quit their luſts, and heartily embrace the true religion, which is incompatible with them; or elſe, that they ſhould avoid the force, and retain their luſts? to ſay the former of theſe, is to ſay, that it is preſumable, that they will quit their luſts; and heartily embrace the true religion, for its own ſake: for he, that heartily embraces the true religion, becauſe of a force, which he can avoid at pleaſure, without quitting his luſts, cannot be ſaid to embrace it, becauſe of that force: ſince a force, he can avoid, without quitting his luſts, cannot be ſaid to aſſiſt truth, in making him quit them: for, in this, truth has no aſſiſtance from it, at all. So that this is to ſay, there is no need of force at all in the caſe.

TAKE a covetous wretch, whoſe heart is ſo ſet upon money, that he would give his firſt-born to ſave his bags: who is purſued, by the force of the magiſtrate to an arreſt, and compelled to hear, what is alledged againſt him; and the perſecution of the law, threatening impriſonment, or other puniſhment, if he do not pay the juſt debt, which is demanded of him: if he enters himſelf in the king's bench, where he can enjoy his freedom, without paying the debt, and parting with his money; will you ſay that it is preſumable he did it, to pay the debt, and not to avoid the force of the law? the luſt of the fleſh and pride of life are as ſtrong and prevalent, as the luſt of the eye: and if you will deliberately ſay, again, that it is preſumable, that men are driven, by force, to conſider, ſo as to part with their luſts, when no more is known of them, but that they do, what diſcharges them from the force, without any neceſſity of parting with their luſts; I think, I ſhall have occaſion to ſend you to my pagans and mahometans, but ſhall have no need to ſay any thing more to you, of this matter, myſelf.

I AGREE with you, that there is but one, only, true religion; I agree too, that that one, only, true religion is profeſſed and held in the church of England; and yet I deny, if force may be uſed to bring men to that true religion, that, upon your principles, it can lawfully be uſed, to bring men to the national religion, in England, as eſtabliſhed by law; becauſe force, according to your own rule, being only lawful, becauſe it is neceſſary; and, therefore, unfit to be uſed, where not neceſſary, i. e. neceſſary to bring men to ſalvation, it can never be lawful to be uſed, to bring a man to any thing, that is not neceſſary to ſalvation, as I have more fully ſhewn, in another place. If, therefore, in the national religion of England, there be any thing put in, as neceſſary to communion, that is, though true, not neceſſary to ſalvation, force cannot be lawfully uſed, to bring men to that communion, though the thing ſo required in itſelf may, perhaps, be true. Page 30.

THERE be a great many truths contained in ſcripture, which a man may be ignorant of, and conſequently not believe, without any danger to his ſalvation, or elſe, very few would be capable of ſalvation: for, I think, I may truly ſay, there was never any one, but he, that was the Wiſdom of the Father, who was not ignorant of ſome, and miſtaken in others, of them. To bring men, therefore, to embrace ſuch truths, the uſe of force, by your own rule, cannot be lawful; becauſe the belief, or knowledge, of thoſe truths themſelves, not being neceſſary to ſalvation, there can be no neceſſity, men ſhould be brought to embrace them, and ſo no neceſſity, to uſe force, to bring men to embrace them.

THE only true religion, which is neceſſary to ſalvation, may, in one national church, have that joined with it, which in itſelf, is manifeſtly falſe and repugnant to ſalvation; in ſuch a communion, no man can join, without quitting the way of ſalvation. In another national church, with this only, true religion may be joined, what is neither repugnant, nor neceſſary, to ſalvation; and, of ſuch, there may be ſeveral churches, differing one from another, in confeſſions, ceremonies and diſcipline, which are uſually called different religions, with either, or each, of which, a good man (if ſatisfied in his own mind) may communicate, without danger, whilſt another, not ſatisfied in conſcience, concerning ſomething in the doctrine, diſcipline, or worſhip, cannot ſafely, not without ſin, communicate with this, or that, of them. Nor can force be lawfully uſed, on your principles, to bring any man to either of them, becauſe ſuch things are required to their communion, which not being requiſite to ſalvation, men may ſeriouſly and conſcientiouſly differ, and be in doubt about, without endangering their ſouls.

THAT, which here raiſes a noiſe, and gives a credit to it, whereby many are miſled, into an unwarrantable zeal, is, that theſe are called different religions; and every one thinking his own the true, the only true, condemns all the reſt, as falſe religions. Whereas thoſe, who hold all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and add not thereto, any thing in doctrine, diſcipline or worſhip, inconſiſtent with ſalvation, are of one and the ſame religion, though divided into different ſocieties, or churches, under different forms: which, whether the paſſion and polity of deſigning, or the ſober and pious intention of well-meaning men, ſet up, they are no other, than the contrivances of men, and ſuch they ought to be eſteemed, in whatſoever is required in them, which God has not made neceſſary to ſalvation, however, in its own nature, it may be indifferent, lawful, or true. For none of theſe articles, or confeſſions of any church, that I know, containing in them all the truths of religion, though they contain ſome, that are not neceſſary to ſalvation, to garble thus the truths of religion, and, by their own authority, take ſome, not neceſſary to ſalvation, and make them the terms of communion; and leave out others, as neceſſary to be known and believed, is purely the contrivance of men: God never having appointed any ſuch diſtinguiſhing ſyſtem; nor, as I have ſhewed, can force, upon your principles, lawfully be uſed, to bring men to embrace it

CONCERNING ceremonies, I ſhall here only aſk you, whether you think kneeling at the Lord's-ſupper, or the croſs in baptiſm, are neceſſary to ſalvation? I mention theſe, as having been matter of great ſcruple: if you will not ſay, they are, how can you ſay, that force can be lawfully uſed, to bring men into a communion, to which theſe are made neceſſary? If you ſay, kneeling is neceſſary to a decent uniformity, (for of the croſs, in baptiſm, I have ſpoken elſewhere) though that ſhould be true, yet 'tis an argument, you cannot uſe for it, if you are of the church of England: for, if a decent uniformity may be well enough preſerved without kneeling at prayer, where decency requires it, at leaſt as much, as at receiving the ſacrament, why may it not well enough be preſerved, without kneeling at the ſacrament? Now, that uniformity is thought ſufficiently preſerved, without kneeling at prayer, is evident, by the various poſtures, men are at liberty to uſe, and may be generally obſerved, in all our congregations, during the miniſter's prayer, in the pulpit, before and after his ſermon, which, it ſeems, can conſiſt, well enough, with decency and uniformity; tho' it be at prayer, addreſſed to the great God of heaven and earth, to whoſe Majeſty it is, that the reverence to be expreſſed, in our geſtures, is due, when we put up petitions to him, who is invariably the ſame, in what, or whoſe, words ſoever, we addreſs ourſelves to him.

THE preface to the book of common-prayer tells us, “That the rites and “ceremonies, appointed to be uſed in divine worſhip, are things, in their own “nature, indifferent and alterable.” Here I aſk you, whether any human power can make any thing, in its own nature indifferent, neceſſary to ſalvation? If it cannot, than neither can any human power be juſtified, in the uſe of force, to bring men to conformity, in the uſe of ſuch things. If you think, men have authority, to make any thing, in itſelf indifferent, a neceſſary part of God's worſhip, I ſhall deſire you to conſider, what our author ſays of this matter, which has not yet deſerved your notice.

“THE miſapplying his power, you ſay, is a ſin in the magiſtrate, and lays “him open to divine vengeance.” And is it not a miſapplying of his power, and a ſin in him, to uſe force, to bring men to ſuch a compliance, in an indifferent thing, which, in religious worſhip, may be a ſin to them? Force, you ſay, may be uſed, to puniſh thoſe, who diſſent from the communion of the church of England. Let us ſuppoſe now, all its doctrines not only true, but neceſſary to ſalvation; but that there is put, into the terms of its communion, ſome indifferent action, which God has not enjoined, nor made a part of his worſhip, which any man is perſuaded, in his conſcience, not to be lawful; ſuppoſe kneeling at the ſacrament, which having been ſuperſtitiouſly uſed, in adoration of the bread, as the real body of Chriſt, may give occaſion of ſcruple to ſome, now, as well as eating of fleſh, offered to idols, did to others, in the apoſtles 1 Cor. viii. 13. time; which, though lawful in itſelf, yet the apoſtle ſaid, “he would eat no “fleſh, while the world ſtandeth, rather than to make his weak brother of“fend.” And if to lead, by example, the ſcrupulous into any action, in itſelf indifferent, which they thought unlawful, be a ſin, as appears at large, Rom. xiv. how much more is it, to add force to our example, and to compel men, by puniſhments, to that, which, though indifferent in itſelf, they cannot join in, without ſinning? I deſire you, to ſhew me, how force can be neceſſary, in ſuch a caſe, without which you acknowledge it not to be lawful. Not to kneel at the Lord's ſupper, God not having ordained it, is not a ſin; and the apoſtles receiving it, in the poſture of ſitting, or lying, which was then uſed at meat, is an evidence, it may be received not kneeling. But to him, that thinks kneeling is unlawful, it is certainly a ſin. And, for this, you may take the authority of a very judicious and reverend prelate of our church, in theſe words: "Where "a man is miſtaken in his judgment, even in that caſe, it is always a ſin to "act againſt it; by ſo doing, he wilfully acts againſt the beſt light, which, at "preſent, he has for the direction of his actions." I need not here repeat his reaſons, having already quoted him above, more at large; though the whole paſſage, writ (as he uſes) with great ſtrength and clearneſs, deſerves to be read and conſidered. If, therefore, the magiſtrate enjoins ſuch an unneceſſary ceremony, and uſes force, to bring any man to a ſinful communion, with our church, in it, let me aſk you, Doth he ſin, or miſapply his power, or no? Diſc. of conſcience, p. 18.

TRUE and falſe religions are names, that eaſily engage men's affections, on the hearing of them; the one being the averſion, the other the deſire (at leaſt as they perſuade themſelves) of all mankind. This makes men forwardly give into theſe names, wherever they meet with them; and when mention is made of bringing men from falſe, to the true religion (very often without knowing, what is meant, by thoſe names) they think nothing can be done too much, in ſuch a buſineſs, to which they entitle God's honour, and the ſalvation of men's ſouls.

I SHALL, therefore, deſire of you, if you are that fair and ſincere lover of truth, you profeſs, when you write again, to tell us what you mean, by true, and what by a falſe religion, that we may know which, in your ſenſe, are ſo; for, as you now have uſed theſe words, in your treatiſe, one of them ſeems to ſtand, only for the religion of the church of England, and the other for that of all other churches. I expect here, you ſhould make the ſame outcries againſt me, as you have in your former letter, for impoſing a ſenſe upon your words, contrary to your meaning: and, for this, you will appeal to your own words, in ſome other places: but of this, I ſhall leave the reader judge, and tell him, this is a way very eaſy and very uſual for men, who having not clear and conſiſtent notions, keep themſelves, as much as they can, under the ſhelter of general, and variouſly applicable terms, that they may ſave themſelves from the abſurdities, or conſequences of one place, by a help from ſome general, or contrary expreſſion in another: whether it be a deſire of victory, or a little too warm zeal for a cauſe, you have been hitherto perſuaded of, which hath led you into this way of writing; I ſhall only mind you, that the cauſe of God requires nothing, but what may be ſpoken out, plainly, in a clear, determined ſenſe, without any reſerve, or cover. In the mean time, this I ſhall leave with you, as evident, that force, upon your ground, cannot be lawfully uſed to bring men to the communion of the church of England, (that being all, that I can find you clearly mean, by the true religion) until you have proved that all, that is required of one, in that communion, is neceſſary to ſalvation.

HOWEVER, therefore, you tell us, "That convenient force, uſed to bring "men to the true religion, is all that you contend for, and all that you allow. "That it is for promoting the true religion. That it is to bring men to conſider, ſo as not to reject the truth, neceſſary to ſalvation. To bring men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them." And abundance more to this purpoſe. Yet all this talk, of the true religion, amounting to no more, but the national religion, eſtabliſhed by law, in England; and your bringing men to it, to no more, than bringing them to an outward profeſſion of it; it would better have ſuited that condition, (viz. without prejudice, and with an honeſt mind) which you require in others, to have ſpoke plainly, what you aimed at, rather than prepoſſeſs men's minds, in favour of your cauſe, by the impreſſions of a name that, in truth, did not properly belong to it. Page 21. Page 17, 18. Page 28, 29. Page 26.

IT was not, therefore, without ground that I ſaid, "I ſuſpected you built "all, on this lurking ſuppoſition, that the national religion, now, in England, "backed by the publick authority of the law, is the only true religion; and, "therefore, no other is to be tolerated: which being a ſuppoſition equally un"avoidable, and equally juſt, in other countries; unleſs we can imagine, that "every where, but in England, men believe what, at the ſame time, they "think to be a lie," &c. Here you erect your plumes, and to this your triumphant logick gives you not patience to anſwer, without an air of victory in the entrance: L. 2. p. 281.

Page 11. entrance : “ How, Sir, is this ſuppoſition equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, “ in other countries, where falſe religions are the national ? (for that you muſt “ mean, or nothing to the purpoſe.”) Hold, Sir, you go too faſt : take your own ſyſtem with you, and you will perceive, it will be enough to my purpoſe, if I mean thoſe religions, which you take to be falſe : for if there be any other national churches, which agreeing, with the church of England, in what is neceſſary to ſalvation, yet have eſtabliſhed ceremonies, different, here, from the church of England ; ſhould not any one, who diſſented here, from the church of England, upon that account, as preferring that, to our way of worſhip, be juſtly puniſhed ? If ſo, then puniſhment, in matters of religion, being only to bring men to the true religion, you muſt ſuppoſe him, not to be yet of it, and ſo the national church he approves of, not to be of the true religion. And yet, is it not equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, that that church ſhould ſuppoſe its religion, the only, true religion, as it is, that yours ſhould do ſo ; it agreeing with yours, in things neceſſary to ſalvation, and, having made ſome things, in their own nature indifferent, requiſite to conformity, for decency and order, as you have done ? So that my ſaying, It is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, in other countries, will hold good, without meaning, what you charge on me, that ſuppoſition is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, where the national religion is abſolutely falſe.

But, in that large ſenſe too, what I ſaid, will hold good ; and you would have ſpared your uſeleſs ſubtilties againſt it, if you had been as willing to take my meaning, and anſwered my argument, as you were to turn what I ſaid, to a ſenſe, which the words themſelves ſhew, I never intended. My argument, in ſhort, was this, That granting force to be uſeful, to propagate and ſupport religion, yet it would be no advantage to the true religion, that you, a member of the church of England, ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, ſhould thereby claim a right, to uſe force, ſince ſuch a ſuppoſition to thoſe, who were members of other churches, and believed other religions, was equally unavoidable, and equally juſt. And the reaſon, I annexed, ſhews, both this to be my meaning, and my aſſertion to be true : my words are, “ Unleſs we can ima- “ gine, that every-where, but in England, men believe what, at the ſame time, “ they think to be a lie.” Having, therefore, never ſaid, nor thought, that it is equally unavoidable, or equally juſt, that men, in every country, ſhould believe the national religion of the country ; but that it is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, that men, believing the national religion of their country, be it true or falſe, ſhould ſuppoſe it to be true ; and let me here add alſo, ſhould endeavour to propagate it : you, however, go on thus to reply : “ If ſo, then, “ I fear it will be equally true too, and equally rational : for otherwiſe, I ſee “ not how it can be equally unavoidable, or equally juſt : for, if it be not “ equally true, it cannot be equally juſt ; and if it be not equally rational, it “ cannot be equally unavoidable. But, if it be equally true, and equally ratio- “ nal, then either all religions are true, or none is true : for if they be all equal- “ ly true, and one of them be not true, then none of them can be true.” I challenge any one to put theſe four good words, “ unavoidable, juſt, rational, “ and true,” more equally together, or to make a better wrought deduction : but, after all, my argument will nevertheleſs be good, that it is no advantage to your cauſe, for you, or any one of it, to ſuppoſe yours to be the only true religion ; ſince it is equally unavoidable, and equally juſt, for any one, who believes any other religion, to ſuppoſe the ſame thing. And this will always be ſo, ’till you can ſhew, that men cannot receive falſe religions, upon arguments, that appear to them to be good ; or that having received falſhood, under the appearance of truth, they can, while it ſo appears, do otherwiſe, than value it, and be acted by it, as if it were true. For the equality, that is here in queſtion, depends not upon the truth of the opinion embraced, but on this, that the light and perſuaſion a man has at preſent, is the guide, which he ought to follow, and which, in his judgment of truth, he cannot avoid to be governed by. And therefore, the terrible conſequences you dilate on, in the following part of that page, I leave you, for your private uſe, on ſome fitter occaſion.

You, therefore, who are ſo apt, without cauſe, to complain of want of ingenuity in others, will do well hereafter to conſult your own, and, another time, change your ſtile; and not, under the undefined name, of the true religion, becauſe that is of more advantage to your argument, mean only the religion, eſtabliſhed by law, in England, ſhutting out all other religions, now profeſſed in the world. Though, when you have defined, what is the true religion, which you would have ſupported and propagated by force; and have told us, 'tis to be found in the liturgy and thirty-nine articles of the church of England; and it be agreed to you, that that is the only true religion, your argument (for force, as neceſſary to men's ſalvation) from the want of light and ſtrength enough, in the true religion, to prevail againſt men's luſts, and the corruption of their nature, will not hold; becauſe your bringing men by force, your way applied, to the true religion, be it what you will, is but bringing them to an outward conformity, to the national church. But the bringing them ſo far, and no farther, having no oppoſition to their luſts, no inconſiſtency with their corrupt nature, is not, on that account, at all neceſſary, nor does at all help, where only, on your grounds, you ſay, there is need of the aſſiſtance of force, towards their ſalvation.

CHAP. VIII.

Of ſalvation to be procured, by force, your way.

THERE cannot be imagined a more laudable deſign, than the promoting the ſalvation of men's ſouls, by any one, who ſhall undertake it. But, if it be a pretence, made uſe of, to cover ſome other by-intereſt, nothing can be more odious to men, nothing more provoking to the great God of heaven and earth, nothing more miſbecoming the name and character of a chriſtian. With what intention you took your pen in hand, to defend and encourage the uſe of force, in the buſineſs of men's ſalvation, 'tis fit in charity we take your word; but what your ſcheme, as you have delivered it is guilty of, 'tis my buſineſs to take notice of, and repreſent to you,

To my ſaying, that if perſecution, as is pretended, were for the ſalvation of L. 2. p.285. men's ſouls, bare conformity would not ſerve the turn, but men would be examined, whether they do it, upon reaſon and conviction? You anſwer, "who they be, that pretend, that perſecution is for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, you Page 22. know not." Whatever you know not, I know one, who, in the letter under conſideration, pleads for force, as "uſeful for the promoting the ſalvation of men's ſouls and, that the uſe of force is no other means, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed. Page 17. Page 31. That ſo far is the magiſtrate, when he gives his helping-hand to the furthe- Page 32. rance of the goſpel, by laying convenient penalties upon ſuch, as reject it or any part of it, from uſing any other means, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our faith has directed, that he does no more, than his duty, for promoting the ſalvation of ſouls. And, as the means Page 58. by which men may be brought into the way of ſalvation." Ay, but where do you ſay, that perſecution is for the ſalvation of ſouls? I thought, you had been arguing againſt my meaning, and againſt the things I ſay, and not againſt my words, in your meaning, which is not againſt me. That I uſed the word, perſecution, for what you call force and penalties, you knew: for, in pag. 21. that immediately precedes this, you take notice of it, with ſome little kind of wonder, in theſe words, "Perſecution, ſo it ſeems you call all puniſhments for religion." That I do ſo, then (whether properly or improperly) you could not be ignorant; and then, I beſeech you, apply your anſwer here, to what I ſay: my words are, "If perſecution (as is pretended) were, for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, men, that conform, would be examined, whether they did ſo, "upon reaſon and conviction." Change my word, perſecution, into puniſhment for religion, and then conſider the truth, or ingenuity, of your anſwer: for, in that ſenſe of the word, perſecution, "Do you know no body, that pretends perſecution, is for the ſalvation of men's ſouls?" So much for your ingenuity, and the arts you allow yourſelf, to ſerve a good cauſe. What do you think of one of my pagans, or mahometans? Could he have done better? For I ſhall often have occaſion to mind you of them. Now, to your argument. I ſaid, "That I thought thoſe who make laws, and uſe force, to bring men to "church-conformity in religion, ſeek only the compliance, but concern them- "ſelves not for the conviction, of thoſe, they puniſh, and ſo never uſe force to "convince. For, pray tell me, when any diſſenter conforms, and enters into "the church-communion, is he ever examined to ſee, whether he does it, upon "reaſon and conviction, and ſuch grounds as would become a chriſtian, con- "cerned for religion? if perſecution (as is pretended) were, for the ſalvation "of men's ſouls, this would be done, and men not driven to take the ſacra- "ment, to keep their places, or obtain licences to ſell ale, (for ſo low have "theſe holy things been proſtituted.") To this you here reply, "As to thoſe "magiſtrates, who having provided ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all under "their care, in the true religion, do make laws, and uſe moderate penalties to "bring men to the communion of the church of God, and conformity to the "rules and orders of it, I think, their behaviour, does plainly enough ſpeak "them, to ſeek, and concern themſelves for, conviction of thoſe, whom they "puniſh, and for their compliance only, as the fruit of their conviction." If means of inſtruction were all, that is neceſſary to convince people, the providing ſufficiently for inſtruction, would be an evidence, that thoſe, that did ſo, did ſeek and concern themſelves for men's conviction: but if there be ſomething, as neceſſary for conviction, as the means of inſtruction, and, without which, thoſe means will ſignify nothing, and that be ſevere and impartial examination; and, if force be, as you ſay, ſo neceſſary to make men thus examine, that they can, by no other way, but by force, be brought to do it; if magiſtrates do not lay their penalties on non- examination, as well as provide means of inſtruction, whatever you may ſay, you think, few people will find reaſon to believe, you think, thoſe magiſtrates ſeek, and concern themſelves much for, the conviction of thoſe, they puniſh, when that puniſhment is not levelled at that, which is a hindrance to their conviction, i. e, againſt their averſion to ſevere and impartial examination. To that averſion no puniſhment can be pretended to be a remedy, which does not reach and combat the averſion; which, it is plain, no puniſhment does, which may be avoided, without parting with, or abating the prevalency of that averſion. This is the caſe, where men undergo puniſhments, for not conforming, which they may be rid of, without ſeverely and impartially examining matters of religion.

Page 22.

Ibid.

To ſhew that, what I mentioned, was no ſign of unconcernedneſs in the magiſtrate, for men's conviction; you add, "nor does the contrary appear, from "the not examining diſſenters, when they conform, to ſee, whether they do "it, upon reaſon and conviction: for, where ſufficient inſtruction is provided, "it is ordinarily preſumable that, when diſſenters conform, they do it upon "reaſon and conviction." Here if, ordinarily, ſignifies any thing, (for it is a word, you make much uſe of, whether to expreſs, or cover your ſenſe, let the reader judge,) then you ſuppoſe there are caſes, wherein it is not preſumable; and I aſk you, whether in thoſe, or any caſes it be examined, whether diſſenters, when they conform, do it upon reaſon and conviction? at beſt, that it is ordinarily preſumable, is but gratis dictum, eſpecially, ſince you ſuppoſe, that it is the corruption of their nature, that hinders them from conſidering, as they ought, ſo as, upon reaſon and conviction to embrace the truth: which corruption of nature, that they may retain, with conformity, I think is very preſumable. But, be that as it will, this I am ſure is ordinarily and always preſumable, that if thoſe, who uſe force, were as intent upon men's conviction, as they are on their conformity, they would not wholly content themſelves with the one, without ever examining and looking into the other.

ANOTHER excuſe you make, for this neglect, is, “ That, as to irreligious Page 22. “ perſons, who only ſeek their ſecular advantage, how eaſy it is for them to “ pretend conviction, and to offer ſuch grounds, (if that were required) as “ would become a chriſtian, concerned for religion; that is, what no care of “ man can certainly prevent.” This is an admirable juſtification of your hypotheſis. Men are to be puniſhed: To what end? to make them ſeverely and impartially conſider matters of religion, that they may be convinced, and thereupon ſincerely embrace the truth. But what need of force, or puniſhment for this? becauſe their luſts and corruptions will otherwiſe keep them, both from conſidering as they ought, and embracing the true religion; and therefore, they muſt lie under penalties, until they have conſidered, as they ought, which is, when they have, upon conviction, embraced. But, how ſhall the magiſtrate know, when they, upon conviction, embrace, that he may, then, take off their penalties? that, indeed, cannot be known, and ought not to be enquired after, becauſe irreligious perſons, who only ſeek their ſecular advantage; or, in other words, all thoſe, who deſire, at their eaſe, to retain their beloved luſts and corruptions, may “ eaſily pretend conviction, and offer ſuch grounds (if it were “ required) as would become a chriſtian, concerned for religion: that is, what “ no care of man can certainly prevent.” Which is reaſon enough, why no buſy forwardneſs in man, to diſeaſe his brother, ſhould uſe force, upon pretence of prevailing againſt men's corruptions, that hinder their conſidering and embracing the truth, upon conviction, when it is confeſſed, it cannot be known, whether they have conſidered, are convinced, or have really embraced the true religion, or no. And thus you have ſhewn us your admirable remedy, which is not, it ſeems, for the irreligious, (for it is eaſy, you ſay, for them to pretend to conviction, and ſo avoid puniſhment) but for thoſe, who would be religious without it.

BUT here, in this caſe, as to the intention of the magiſtrate, how can it be ſaid, that the force, he uſes, is deſigned, by ſubduing men's corruptions, to make way for conſidering and embracing the truth, when it is ſo applied, that it is confeſſed here, that a man may get rid of the penalties, without parting with the corruptions, they are pretended to be uſed againſt? but you have a ready anſwer, “ this is what no care of man can certainly prevent;” which is but in other words to proclaim the ridiculouſneſs of your uſe of force, and to avow that your method can do nothing. If, by not certainly, you mean, it may, any way, or to any degree, prevent, Why is it not ſo done? If not, why is a word, that ſignifies nothing, put in, unleſs it be for ſhelter on occaſion? a benefit, you know how to draw, from this way of writing: but this here, taken how you pleaſe, will only ſerve to lay blame on the magiſtrate, or your hypotheſis, chuſe you whether. I, for my part, have a better opinion of the ability and management of the magiſtrate: what he aimed at, in his laws, that I believe he mentions in them, and as wiſe men do, in buſineſs, ſpoke out plainly, what he had a mind ſhould be done. But certainly, there cannot a more ridiculous character be put on law-makers, than to tell the world, they intended to make men conſider, examine, &c. but yet neither required, nor named, any thing, in their laws, but conformity. Tho' yet, when men are certainly to be puniſhed, for not really embracing the true religion, there ought to be certain matters of fact, whereby thoſe, that do, and thoſe that do not, ſo embrace the truth, ſhould be diſtinguiſhed; and for that you have, 'tis true, a clear and eſtabliſhed criterion, i. e. conformity and nonconformity: which do very certainly diſtinguiſh the innocent from the guilty; thoſe, that really and ſincerely do embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them, from thoſe that do not.

BUT, Sir, to reſolve the queſtion, Whether the conviction of men's underſtandings, and the ſalvation of their ſouls, be the buſineſs and aim of thoſe, who uſe force, to bring men into the profeſſion of the national religion; I aſk, whether, if that were ſo, there could be ſo many, as there are, not only in moſt country pariſhes, but, I think I may ſay, may be found, in all parts of England, groſly ignorant in the doctrines and principles of the chriſtian religion, if a ſtrict enquiry were made into it? If force be neceſſary to be uſed, to bring

men to ſalvation, certainly ſome part of it would find out ſome of the ignorant
and unconſidering, that are in the national church, as well as it does ſo diligent-
ly, all the nonconformiſts, out of it, whether they have conſidered, or are know-
Page 64. ing, or no. But to this, you give a very ready anſwer; “Would you have the
“ magiſtrate puniſh all indifferently, thoſe, who obey the law, as well as them
“ that do not?” What is the obedience the law requires? That you tell us, in
Page 63. theſe words, “If the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all
“ his ſubjects, in the true religion; and then, requires them all, under conve-
“ nient penalties, to hearken to the teachers and miniſters of it, and to profeſs
“ and exerciſe it with one accord, under their direction, in publick aſſemblies:”
which, in other words, is but conformity, which here you expreſs a little plainer,
Page 22. in theſe words: “But, as thoſe magiſtrates who, having provided ſufficiently, for
“ the inſtruction of all, under their care, in the true religion, do make laws,
“ and uſe moderate penalties, to bring men to the communion of the church
“ of God, and to conform to the rules and orders of it.” You add, “Is there
“ any pretence to ſay, that, in ſo doing, he [the magiſtrate] applies force, on-
“ ly to a part of his ſubjects, when the law is general, and excepts none?”
There is no pretence, I confeſs, to ſay that, in ſo doing, he applies force, only
to a part of his ſubjects, to make them conformiſts; from that, it is plain, the
law excepts none. But, if conformiſts may be ignorant, groſly ignorant, of the
principles and doctrines of chriſtianity: if there be no penalties uſed, to make
them conſider, as they ought, ſo as to underſtand, be convinced of, believe and
obey, the truths of the goſpel, are not they exempt from that force, which,
Page 37. you ſay, “is to make men conſider, and examine matters of religion, as they
“ ought to do?” Force is applied to all, indeed, to make them conformiſts:
but, if being conformiſts once, and frequenting the places of publick worſhip,
and there ſhewing an outward compliance with the ceremonies preſcribed, (for
that is all the law requires of all, call it how you pleaſe) they are exempt from
all force and penalties, though they are never ſo ignorant, never ſo far from un-
derſtanding, believing, receiving the truths of the goſpel; I think it is evident
Page 16. that, then, force is not applied to all, “to procure the conviction of the un-
Page 26. “ derſtanding. To bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which
“ are proper to convince the mind, and which, without being forced, they
Page 29. “ would not conſider. To bring men to that conſideration, which nothing
Page 23. “ elſe but force, (beſides the extraordinary grace of God) would bring them to.
Page 43. “ To make men good chriſtians. To make men receive inſtructions. To cure
Page 58. “ their averſion to the true religion. To bring men to conſider and examine
“ the controverſies, which they are bound to conſider and examine, i. e. thoſe,
Page 2. “ wherein they cannot err, without diſhonouring God, and endangering their
Page 16. “ own and other men's eternal ſalvation. To weigh matters of religion, carefully
Page 13. “ and impartially. To bring men to the true religion and to ſalvation.” That
then, force is not applied to all the ſubjects, for theſe ends, I think you will
not deny. Theſe are the ends, for which you tell us, in the places quoted,
that force is to be uſed in matters of religion; 'Tis, by its uſefulneſs and neceſ-
ſity to thoſe ends, that, you tell us, the magiſtrate is authorized and obliged to
uſe force, in matters of religion. Now, if all theſe ends be not attained, by a
bare conformity, and yet if, by a bare conformity, men are wholly exempt
from all force and penalties, in matters of religion, will you ſay that, for theſe
ends, force is applied to all the magiſtrate's ſubjects? If you will, I muſt ſend
you to my pagans and mahometans, for a little conſcience and modeſty. If
you confeſs force is not applied at all, for theſe ends, notwithſtanding any laws,
obliging all to conformity, you muſt alſo confeſs, that what you ſay, con-
cerning the laws being general, is nothing to the purpoſe; ſince all, that are
under penalties for not conforming, are not under any penalties, for ignorance,
irreligion, or the want of thoſe ends, for which, you ſay, penalties are uſeful
and neceſſary.

Page 22. You go on, “And, therefore, if ſuch perſons profane the ſacrament, to keep
“ their places, or to obtain licences to ſell ale, this is an horrible wickedneſs.” I
excuſe them not. “But it is their own, and they alone muſt anſwer for it.”

Yes, and thoſe who threatened poor ignorant and irreligious ale-ſellers, whoſe livelihood it was, to take away their licenſes, if they did not conform, and receive the ſacrament, may be thought, perhaps, to have ſomething to anſwer for. You add, “ But it is very unjuſt to impute it to thoſe, who make ſuch laws, and Page 23. “ uſe ſuch force, or to ſay, that they proſtitute holy things, and drive men to “ profane them.” Nor is it juſt to inſinuate, in your anſwer, as if that had been ſaid, which was not. But if it be true, that a poor, ignorant, looſe, irreligious wretch ſhould be threatened to be turned out of his calling and livelihood, if he would not take the ſacrament: may it not be ſaid theſe holy things have been ſo low proſtituted? And if this be not profaning of them, pray tell me what is?

This I think may be ſaid, without injuſtice to any body, that it does not appear, that thoſe, who make ſtrict laws, for conformity, and take no care to have it examined, upon what grounds men conform, are not very much concerned, that men's underſtandings ſhould be convinced: and though you go on to ſay, that “ they deſign, by their laws, to do what lies in them, to make men “ good chriſtians:” That will ſcarce be believed, if what you ſay be true, that force is neceſſary to bring “ thoſe, who cannot be otherwiſe brought to it, to ſtudy the Page 58. “ true religion, with ſuch care and diligence, as they might, and ought, to uſe, “ and with an honeſt mind.” And yet we ſee, a great part, or any of thoſe, who are ignorant in the true religion, have no ſuch force applied to them, eſpecially, ſince you tell us, in the ſame place, that “ no man ever ſtudied the true Ibid. “ religion, with ſuch care and diligence, as he might, and ought to, uſe, and “ with an honeſt mind, but he was convinced of the truth of it.” If then, force and penalties can produce that ſtudy, care, diligence and honeſt mind, which will produce knowledge and conviction, and (that, as you ſay in the following words) make good men; I aſk you, if there be found in the communion of the church, exempt from force, upon the account of religion, ignorant, irreligious, ill men; and that, to ſpeak moderately, not, in great diſproportion, fewer, than amongſt the nonconformiſts, will you believe yourſelf, when you ſay, “ the magiſtrates do, by their laws, all that in them lies, to make them “ good chriſtians;” when they uſe not that force to them, which you, not I, ſay, is neceſſary; and that they are, where it is neceſſary, obliged to uſe? And therefore, I give you leave to repeat again the words, you ſubjoin here, “ But if, after Page 23. “ all they [i. e. the magiſtrates] can do, wicked and godleſs men will ſtill “ reſolve to be ſo, they will be ſo, and I know not who, but God Almighty, can “ help it.” But this being ſpoken of conformiſts, on whom the magiſtrates lay no penalties, uſe no force for religion, give me leave to mind you of the ingenuity of one of my pagans, or mahometans.

You tell us, That the uſefulneſs of force to make ſcholars learn, authorizes ſchoolmaſters to uſe it. And would you not think, a ſchoolmaſter diſcharged his duty well, and had a great care of their learning, who uſed his rod, only to bring boys to ſchool; but, if they come there, once a week, whether they ſlept, or only minded their play, never examined, what proficiency they made, or uſed the rod to make them ſtudy and learn, though they would not apply themſelves without it?

But to ſhew you, how much you yourſelf are in earneſt, for the ſalvation of ſouls, in this your method, I ſhall ſet down what I ſaid, p. 304. of my letter, on that ſubject, and what you anſwer, page 68 of yours.

L. p. 304. “ You ſpeak of it here, as the “ moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that “ men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not “ be forced to conſider and examine the grounds “ of their religion, and ſearch impartially and “ diligently after the truth. This you make “ the great miſcarriage of mankind; and for “ this you ſeem ſolicitous, all through your “ treatiſe, to find out a remedy; and there is

L. 3. p. 68. Your next paragraph runs high, and charges me with nothing leſs than prevarication. For whereas, you tell me, I ſpeak of it here, as the moſt deplorable condition imaginable, that men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider

“ ſcarce a leaf, wherein you do not offer yours. But what if, after all, now, you ſhould be found to prevaricate? “Men have contrived to themſelves, ſay you, a great variety of religions: it is granted. They ſeek not the truth in this matter, with that application of mind, and that freedom of judgment which is requiſite: it is confeſſed. All the falſe religions, now on foot in the world, have taken their riſe from the ſlight and partial conſideration, which men have contented themſelves with, in ſearching after the true; and men take them up, and perſiſt in them for want of due examination:” be it ſo. “There is need of a remedy for this: and I have found one, whoſe ſucceſs cannot be queſtioned:” very well, What is it? let us hear it. Why “diſſenters muſt be puniſhed.” Can any body, that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt; and that want of examination is the thing you would have amended, when want of examination is not the thing, you would have puniſhed? If want of examination be the fault, want of examination muſt be puniſhed; if you are, as you pretend, fully ſatisfied, that puniſhment is the proper and only means to remedy it. But if, in all your treatiſe, you can ſhew me one place, where you ſay, that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining thoroughly the truth of their own and others religion, &c. are to be puniſhed, I will allow your remedy for a good one. But you have not ſaid any thing like this; and, which is more, I tell you beforehand, you dare not ſay it. And, whilſt you do not, the world has reaſon to judge, that however want of examination be a general fault, which you with great vehemency have exaggerated; yet you uſe it only, for a pretence to puniſh diſſenters; and either diſtruſt your remedy, that it will not cure this evil, or elſe care not to have it generally cured. This evidently appears, from your whole management of the argument. And he, that reads your treatiſe with attention; will be more confirmed in this opinion, when he ſhall find, that you (who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed, to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way to ſalvation) have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the ſcripture; which had been as good a rule for a chriſtian, to have them ſent to, as to reaſons and arguments proper to convince them, of you know not what: as to the inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of religion, which, who they are, men are yet far from being agreed; or, as to “the information of thoſe, who tell them

“ they

and examine the grounds of their religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after the truth, &c. It ſeems all the remedy I offer, is no more than this, “diſſenters muſt be puniſhed.” Upon which thus you inſult; “can any body that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt,” &c. Now here I acknowledge, that, though want, or neglect, of examination be a general fault, yet the method I propoſe, for curing it, does not reach to all that are guilty of it, but is limited to thoſe who reject the true religion, propoſed to them with ſufficient evidence. But then, to let you ſee, how little ground you have to ſay, that I prevaricate in this matter, I ſhall only deſire you to conſider, what it is that the author and myſelf were enquiring after: for it is not, What courſe is to be taken, to confirm and eſtabliſh thoſe in the truth, who have already embraced it? nor, how they may be enabled to propagate it to others, (for both which purpoſes I have already acknowledged it very uſeful, and a thing much to be deſired, that all ſuch perſons ſhould, as far as they are able, ſearch into the grounds upon which their religion ſtands, and challenges their belief;) but the ſubject of our enquiry is only, what method is to be uſed, to bring men to the true religion. Now, if this be the only thing, we were enquiring after, (as you cannot deny it to be) then every one ſees that, in ſpeaking to this point, I had nothing to do with any, who have already embraced the true religion; becauſe they are not to be brought to that religion; but only to be confirmed and edified in it, but was only to conſider, how thoſe, who reject it, may be brought to embrace it. So

that,

“they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right;” and to the like, uncertain, and dangerous guides; which were not thoſe, that our Saviour and the apoſtles ſent men to, but to the ſcriptures. * “Search the ſcriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life,” ſays our Saviour to the unbelieving, perſecuting Jews. And it is the ſcriptures, which St. Paul ſays, are able to make wiſe unto ſalvation. †

“TALK no more, therefore, if you have any care of your reputation, how much “it is every man's intereſt, not to be left to himſelf, without moleſtation, without puniſhment, in matters of religion.” Talk not “of bringing men to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, by putting them upon examination.” Talk no more of force and puniſhment, as the only way left to bring men to examine.” It is evident, you mean nothing leſs: for though want of examination be the only fault, you complain of, and puniſhment be, in your opinion, the only way, to bring men to it; and this the whole deſign of your book; yet you have not once propoſed in it, that thoſe, who do not impartially examine, ſhould be forced to it. And that you may not think, I talk at random, when I ſay you dare not; I will, if you pleaſe, give you ſome reaſons for my ſaying ſo.

“First, BECAUSE if you propoſe that all ſhould be puniſhed, who are ignorant, who have not “uſed ſuch conſideration, as is apt and proper to manifeſt the truth; but have been determined, in the choice of their religion, by impreſſions of education, admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, prejudices, and the like incompetent motives; and have taken up their religion without examining it, as they ought;” you will propoſe to have ſeveral of your own church (be it what it will) puniſhed; which would be a propoſition too apt to offend too many of it, for you to venture on. For whatever need there be of reformation, every one will not thank you for propoſing ſuch an one, as muſt begin at (or at leaſt reach to) the houſe of God.

“Secondly, BECAUSE, if you ſhould propoſe that all thoſe, who are ignorant, careleſs and negligent in examining, ſhould be puniſhed, you would have little to ſay, in this queſtion of toleration: for, if the laws of the ſtate were made, as they ought to be, equal to all the ſubjects, without diſtinction of men of different profeſſions in religion, and the faults to be amended by puniſhments, were impartially puniſhed in all, who are guilty of them; this would immediately produce a

that, how much ſoever any of thoſe, who own the true religion, may be guilty of neglect of examination; it is evident I was only concerned to ſhew how it may be cured in thoſe, who, by reaſon of it, reject the true religion, duly propoſed, or tendered to them. And certainly, to confine myſelf to this, is not to prevaricate, unleſs to keep within the bounds, which the queſtion, under debate, preſcribes me, be to prevaricate.

IN telling me, therefore, that, “I dare not ſay that the ignorant, the careleſs, the inconſiderate, the negligent in examining, &c. (i. e. all that are ſuch) are to be puniſhed,” you only tell me, that I dare not be impertinent, And therefore, I hope, you will excuſe me, if I take no notice of the three reaſons you offer, in your next page, for your ſaying ſo. And yet, if I had a mind to talk impertinently, I know not, why I might not have dared to do ſo, as well as other men.

THERE is one thing more in this paragraph, which though nothing more pertinent, than the reſt, I ſhall not wholly paſs over. It lies in theſe words; “He that reads your treatiſe with attention, will be more confirmed in this opinion,” (viz. that I uſe want of examination, only for a pretence to puniſh diſſenters, &c.) “when he ſhall find that you (who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed, to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way of ſalvation) have not ſaid one word of conſidering, ſearching and hearkening to the ſcripture; which had been as good a rule for a chriſtian, to have ſent them to, as to reaſons and arguments, proper to convince them, of

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* John v. 39.

† 2 Tim. iii. 15.

“ perfect toleration, or ſhew the uſeleſſneſs of force, in matters of religion. If therefore, you think it ſo neceſſary, as you ſay, “ for the promoting of true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, that men ſhould be puniſhed to make them examine;” do but find a way to apply force to all, that have not thoroughly and impartially examined, and you have my conſent. For though force be not the proper means of promoting religion; yet there is no better way to ſhew the uſeleſſneſs of it, than the applying it equally to miſcarriages, in whomſoever found, and not to diſtinct parties, or perſuaſions of men, for the reformation of them alone, when others are equally faulty.

“ Thirdly, BECAUSE, without being for as large a toleration, as the author propoſes, you cannot be truly and ſincerely for a free and impartial examination. For, whoever examines, muſt have the liberty to judge, and follow his judgment; or elſe you put him upon examination, to no purpoſe. And whether that will not as well lead men from, as to your church, is ſo much a venture, that, by your way of writing, 'tis evident enough, you are loth to hazard it; and if you are of the national church, 'tis plain your brethren will not bear with you, in the allowance of ſuch a liberty. You muſt, therefore, either change your method; and, if the want of examination be that great and dangerous fault you would have corrected, you muſt equally puniſh all, that are equally guilty of any neglect, in this matter, and then, take your only means, your beloved force, and make the beſt of it; or elſe, you muſt put off your maſk, and confeſs, that you deſign not your puniſhments, to bring men to examination, but to conformity. For the fallacy, you have uſed, is too groſs to paſs upon this age.

“ you know not what,” &c. How this confirms that opinion, I do not ſee; nor have you thought fit to inſtruct me. But as to the thing itſelf, viz. “ my not ſaying “ one word of conſidering, “ ſearching, and hearkening “ to the ſcripture;” whatever advantage a captious adverſary may imagine, he has in it, I hope it will not ſeem ſtrange to any indifferent and judicious perſon, who ſhall but conſider that, throughout my treatiſe, I ſpeak of the true religion, only in general, i. e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the ſcriptures; but, as reaching from the fall of Adam to the end of the world, and ſo comprehending the times, which preceded the ſcriptures: wherein yet God left not himſelf without witneſs, but furniſhed mankind, with ſufficient means, of knowing him and his will, in order to their eternal ſalvation. For I appeal to all men of art, whether, ſpeaking of the true religion, under this generality, I could be allowed to deſcend to any ſuch rules of it, as belong only to ſome particular times, or diſpenſations; ſuch as you cannot but acknowledge the old and new teſtaments to be.

Page 76, 77, 78.

IN this your anſwer, you ſay, “ the ſubject of our enquiry is only, what method is to be uſed to bring men to the true religion?” He that reads, what you ſay, again and again, “ That the magiſtrate is impowered and obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, i. e. as far as, by penalties, it can be procured, that NO MAN neglect his ſoul,” and ſhall remember how many pages you employ, A. p. 6, &c. And here, p. 6, &c. to ſhew, that it is the corruption of human nature, which hinders men from doing what they may, and ought, for the ſalvation of their ſouls, and that, therefore, penalties, no other means being left, and force, were neceſſary to be uſed by the magiſtrate to remove theſe great obſtacles, of luſts and corruptions, that “ none of his ſubjects might remain ignorant of the way of ſalvation, or refuſe to embrace it.” One would think, your enquiry had been after the means “ of CURING MEN's averſion to the true religion, (which you tell us p. 53. if not cured, is certainly deſtructive of men's eternal ſalvation)” that ſo they might heartily embrace it for their ſalvation. But here you tell us, “ your enquiry is only, what method is to be uſed, to bring men to the true religion:” whereby you evidently mean nothing, but outward conformity to that, which you think the true church, as appears by the next following words; "Now, if this be the only thing, we "were enquiring after; then every one ſees that, in ſpeaking to this point, I "had nothing to do with any, who have already embraced the true religion." And alſo every one ſees that, ſince amongſt thoſe, with whom (having already embraced the true religion) you and your penalties have nothing to do; there are thoſe, who have not conſidered and examined matters of religion, as they ought, whoſe luſts and corrupt natures keep them as far alienated from believing, and as averſe to a real obeying the truth that muſt ſave them, as any other men; it is manifeſt, that embracing the true religion, in your ſenſe, is only embracing the outward profeſſion of it, which is nothing but outward conformity. And that being the fartheſt, you would have your penalties purſue men, and there leave them, with as much of their ignorance of the truth, and careleſneſs of their ſouls, as they pleaſe, who can deny, but that it would be impertinent in you, to conſider how want of impartial examination, or averſion, to the true religion, ſhould, in them, be cured? Becauſe they are none of thoſe ſubjects of the commonwealth, whoſe ſpiritual and eternal intereſts are, by political government, to be procured, or advanced, none of thoſe ſubjects, whoſe ſalvation the magiſtrate is to take care of.

And therefore, I excuſe you, as you deſire, for not taking notice of my three reaſons; but whether the reader will do ſo, or no, is more than I can undertake. I hope you too, will excuſe me, for having uſed ſo harſh a word, as prevaricate, and impute it to my want of ſkill in the Engliſh tongue. But, when I find a man pretend to a great concern for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, and make it one of the great ends of civil government, that the magiſtrate ſhould make uſe of force, to bring all his ſubjects to conſider, ſtudy and examine, believe and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them: when I ſhall have to do, with a man, who, to this purpoſe, hath writ two books, to find out, and defend, the proper remedies for that general backwardneſs and averſion (which depraved, human nature keeps men in) to an impartial ſearch after, and hearty embracing the true religion; and who talks of nothing leſs, than obligations on ſovereigns, both from their particular duty, as well as from common charity, to take care, that none of their ſubjects ſhould want the aſſiſtance of this only means, left for their ſalvation: nay, who has made it ſo neceſſary to men's ſalvation, that he talks, as if the wiſdom and goodneſs of God would be brought in queſtion, if thoſe, who needed it, ſhould be deſtitute of it? and yet, notwithſtanding all this ſhew of concern for men's ſalvation, contrives the application of this ſole remedy ſo, that a great many, who lie under the diſeaſe, ſhould be out of the reach and benefit of his cure, and never have this only remedy applied to them: When this, I ſay, is ſo manifeſtly in his thoughts all the while, that he is forced to confeſs, "that, though want, or neglect, of examination be a general fault, yet "the method, he propoſes, for curing it, does not reach to all that are guilty of "it;" but frankly owns, that he was not concerned to ſhew, how the neglect of examination might be cured in thoſe who conform, but only in thoſe who, by reaſon of it, reject the true religion duly propoſed to them: which rejecting the true religion will require a man of art to ſhew to be, here, any thing, but nonconformity to the national religion. When, I ſay, I meet with a man, another time, that does this, who is ſo much a man of art, as to talk of all, and mean but ſome; talk of hearty embracing the true religion, and mean nothing but conformity to the national; pretend one thing, and mean another; if you pleaſe to tell me, what name I ſhall give it, I ſhall not fail; for who knows, how ſoon again I may have an occaſion for it.

If I would puniſh men for nonconformity, without owning of it, I could not uſe a better pretence than to ſay, it was to make them hearken to reaſons and arguments proper to convince them, or to make them ſubmit to the inſtruction and government of the proper miniſters of religion, without any thing elſe, ſuppoſing ſtill, at the bottom, the arguments for, and the miniſters of, my religion to be theſe, that 'till they outwardly complied with, they were to be puniſhed. But, if (inſtead of outward conformity to my religion, covered under theſe indefinite terms) I ſhould tell them, they were to examine the ſcripture,

ture, which was the fixed rule for them and me, not examining could not give me a pretence to puniſh them, unleſs I would alſo puniſh conformiſts, as ignorant and unverſed in the ſcripture, as they, which would not do my buſineſs.

BUT what need I uſe arguments to ſhew, that your puniſhing, to make men examine, is deſigned only againſt diſſenters, when in your anſwer to this very Page 68. paragraph of mine, you, in plain words, "acknowledge that though want of "examination be a general fault, yet the method you propoſe, for curing, does "not reach to all that are guilty of it?" To which if you pleaſe to add, what Page 22. you tell us, that, when diſſenters conform, the magiſtrate cannot know, and therefore never examines, whether they do it, upon reaſon and conviction, or no, though it be certain, that upon conforming, penalties, the neceſſary means, ceaſe; it will be obvious, that, whatever be talked, conformity is all that is aimed at, and that want of examination is but the pretence to puniſh diſſenters.

L. 2. p. 313. AND this, I told you, any one muſt be convinced of, who obſerves, that you (who are ſo earneſt to have men puniſhed to bring them to conſider and examine, that ſo they may diſcover the way of ſalvation) have not ſaid one word, of conſidering, ſearching, and hearkening to the ſcripture, which, you were told, was as good a rule for a chriſtian to have ſent men to, as to "the inſtruction and "government of the proper miniſters of religion, or to the information of thoſe, "who tell them, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the Page 59. "right." For this paſſing by the ſcripture, you give us this reaſon; that, "throughout your treatiſe, you ſpeak of the true religion, only in general, i. e. "not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the ſcriptures, "but, as reaching from the fall of Adam to the end of the world, &c. And "then you appeal to all men of art, whether ſpeaking of the true religion, under this generality, you could be allowed to deſcend, to any ſuch rules of it, "as belong only to ſome particular times, or diſpenſations, ſuch as I cannot but "acknowledge the old and new teſtaments to be."

THE author, that you write againſt, making it his buſineſs (as no body can doubt, who reads but the firſt page of his letter) to ſhew, that it is the duty of chriſtians to tolerate, both chriſtians and others, who differ from them, in religion, it is pretty ſtrange (in aſſerting againſt him, that the magiſtrate might and ought to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion) you ſhould mean any other magiſtrate than the chriſtian magiſtrate, or any other religion, than the chriſtian religion. But it ſeems, you took ſo little notice of the deſign of your adverſary, which was to prove, that chriſtians were not to uſe force, to bring any one to the true chriſtian religion; that you would prove that chriſtians, now were to uſe force, not only to bring men to the chriſtian, but alſo to the Jewiſh religion; or that of the true church, before the law, or, to ſome true religion, ſo general, that it is none of theſe. "For, ſay you, throughout your treatiſe, you "ſpeak of the true religion, only in general, i. e. not as limited to any particular "diſpenſation:" though one, that were not a man of art, would ſuſpect you to be of another mind yourſelf, when you told us, the ſhutting out the Jews from Page 3. the rights of the commonwealth, "is a juſt and neceſſary caution, in a chriſtian "commonwealth:" which you ſay, to juſtify your exception, in the beginning of your A. againſt the largeneſs of the author's toleration, who would not have Jews excluded. But ſpeak of the true religion, only in general, as much as you pleaſe, if your true religion be that, by which men muſt be ſaved, can you ſend a man, to any better guide, to that true religion now, than the ſcripture?

A. p. 13. IF when you were in your altitudes, writing the firſt book, your men of art could not allow you, to deſcend to any ſuch rules, as the ſcripture, (though even there you acknowledge the ſeverities ſpoken againſt, are ſuch as are uſed to make men chriſtians) becauſe there (by an art proper to yourſelf) you were to ſpeak of true religion, under a generality, which had nothing to do, with the duty of chriſtians, in reference to toleration: yet when here, in your ſecond book, where you condeſcend, all along, to ſpeak of the CHRISTIAN RELIGION, and tell us, "that the magiſtrates have authority to make laws, for promoting "the chriſtian religion; and do, by their laws, deſign to contribute what in "them lies to make men good CHRISTIANS;" and complain of toleration, as the very bane of the life and ſpirit of CHRISTIANITY, &c. and have vouchſafed particularly to mention the goſpel; why here, having been called upon for it, you could not ſend men to the ſcriptures, and tell them directly that thoſe, they were to ſtudy diligently, thoſe they were impartially and carefully to examine, to bring them to the true religion, and into the way of ſalvation: rather than talk to them, as you do, of receiving inſtruction, and conſidering reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them; rather than propoſe, as you do, all along, ſuch objects of examination and enquiry, in general terms, as are as hard to be found, as the thing itſelf, for which they are to be examined: why, I ſay, you have, here again, avoided ſending men to examine the ſcriptures, is juſt matter of enquiry. And, for this, you muſt apply yourſelf, again, to your men of art, to furniſh you with ſome other reaſon.

IF you will but caſt your eyes back, to your next page, you will there find that you build upon this, "That the ſubject of your and the author's enquiry is, only, "what method is to be uſed, to bring men to the true religion?" If this be ſo, your men of art, who cannot allow you to deſcend to any ſuch rule, as the ſcriptures, becauſe you ſpeak of the true religion in general, i. e. not as limited to any particular diſpenſation, or to the times of the ſcriptures, muſt allow, that you deſerve to be head of their college; ſince you are ſo ſtrict an obſerver of their rules, that though your enquiry be, "What method is to be uſed, to bring "men to the true religion" (now, under the particular diſpenſation of the goſpel, and under ſcripture-times) you think it an unpardonable fault, to recede ſo far from your generality, as to admit the ſtudy and examination of the ſcripture, into your method; for fear, 'tis like, your method will be too particular, if it would not now ſerve to bring men to the true religion, who lived before the flood. But had you had as good a memory, as is generally thought needful to a man of art, it is believed, you would have ſpared this reaſon, for your being ſo backward, in putting men upon examination of the ſcripture. And any one, but a man of art, who ſhall read what, you tell us, the magiſtrate's duty is; and Page 31. will but conſider, how convenient it would be, that men ſhould receive no inſtruction, but from the miniſtry, that you there tell us, the magiſtrate aſſiſts; examine no arguments, hear nothing of the goſpel, receive no other ſenſe of the ſcripture, but what that miniſtry propoſes; who, if they had but the co-active power (you think them as capable of, as other men) might aſſiſt themſelves; he, I ſay, who reflects but on theſe things, may, perhaps, find a reaſon, that may better ſatisfy the ignorant and unlearned, who have not had the good luck to arrive at being of the number of theſe men of art, why you cannot deſcend to propoſe, to men, the ſtudying of the ſcripture.

LET me for once ſuppoſe you in holy orders, (for we, that are not of the adepti, may be allowed to be ignorant of the punctilios in writing, obſerved by the men of art:) and let me then aſk, what art is this, whoſe rules are of that authority; that one, who has received commiſſion from heaven, to preach the goſpel, in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, for the ſalvation of ſouls, may not allow himſelf to propoſe the reading, ſtudying, examining of the ſcripture, which has, for at leaſt theſe ſixteen hundred years, contained the only true religion in the world; for fear ſuch a propoſal ſhould offend, againſt the rules of this art, by being too particular, and confined to the goſpel diſpenſation; and, therefore, could not paſs muſter, nor find admittance, in a treatiſe, wherein the author profeſſes it his only buſineſs, to "enquire, what method is to be uſed to bring men to the true "religion?" Do you expect any other diſpenſation, that you are ſo afraid of being too particular, if you ſhould recommend the uſe and ſtudy of the ſcripture, to bring men to the true religion, now, in the times of the goſpel? Why might you not as well ſend them to the ſcriptures, as to the miniſters and teachers of the true religion? Have thoſe miniſters any other religion to teach, than what is contained in the ſcriptures? But, perhaps, you do this out of kindneſs and care; becauſe, poſſibly, the ſcriptures could not be found; but who were the miniſters of the true religion, men could not poſſibly miſs. Indeed, you have allowed yourſelf, to deſcend to what belongs only to ſome particular times and diſpenſations, for their ſakes, when you ſpeak of the miniſters of the goſpel. But, whether it be as fully agreed on, amongſt chriſtians, who are the miniſters of the goſpel, that men muſt hearken to, and be guided by; as which are the writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts, that (if ſtudied) will inſtruct them in the way to heaven; is more than you, or your men of art, can be poſitive in. Where are the canons of this over-ruling art to be ſound, to which you pay ſuch reverence? May a man of no diſtinguiſhing character be admitted to the privilege of them? For, I ſee, it may be of notable uſe, at a dead lift, and bring a man off with flying colours, when truth and reaſon can do him but little ſervice. The ſtrong guard you have, in the powers you write for? and when you have engaged a little too far, the ſafe retreat you have always at hand, in an appeal to theſe men of art, made me almoſt at a ſtand, whether I were not beſt make a truce with one, who had ſuch auxiliaries. A friend of mine finding me talk thus, replied briſkly, 'Tis a matter of religion, which requires not men of art; and the aſſiſtance of ſuch art, as ſavours ſo little of the ſimplicity of the goſpel, both ſhews and makes the cauſe weaker. And ſo I went on, to your two next paragraphs.

In them, to vindicate a pretty ſtrange argument, for the magiſtrate's uſe of force, you think it convenient to repeat it, out of your anſwer, p. 26. And ſo, in compliance with you, ſhall I do here again. There you tell us, "The power, you aſcribe to the magiſtrate is given him to bring men, not to his own, " but to the true religion: and though (as our author puts us in mind) the religion of every prince is orthodox, to himſelf; yet, if this power keep within " its bounds, it can ſerve the intereſt of no other religion, but the true, among " ſuch as have any concern for their eternal ſalvation; (and thoſe that have " none, deſerve not to be conſidered) becauſe the penalties it enables him, that " has it, to inflict, are not ſuch, as may tempt ſuch perſons, either to renounce " a religion, which they believe to be true, or to profeſs one, which they do " not believe to be ſo; but only ſuch, as are apt to put them upon a ſerious and " impartial examination of the controverſy, between the magiſtrate and them, " which is the way for them, to come to the knowledge of the truth. And if, " upon ſuch examination of the matter, they chance to find, that the truth " does not lie on the magiſtrate's ſide, they have gained thus much, however, " even by the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that they know better, than " they did before, where the truth doth lie: and all the hurt, that comes to " them by it, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, for their following the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſciences; " which, certainly, is no ſuch miſchief to mankind, as to make it more eligible, that there ſhould be no ſuch power, veſted in the magiſtrate, but the " care of every man's ſoul ſhould be left to himſelf alone, (as this author ſuppoſes it ſhould be.")

L. 2. p. 314. To this, I tell you, "That here, out of abundant kindneſs, when diſſenters " have their heads (without any cauſe) broken, you provide for them a plaiſter.
Page 70. " For, ſay you, " If, upon ſuch examination of the matter (i. e. brought to it " by the magiſtrate's puniſhment) they chance to find that the truth does not " lie on the magiſtrate's ſide; they have gained thus much however, even by " the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, that they know better than they did " before, where the truth does lie." " Which is as true, as if you ſhould " ſay, Upon examination I find, ſuch an one is out of the way to York, therefore I know better, than I did before, that I am in the right. For neither of " you may be in the right. This were true indeed, if there were but two ways " in all, a right and a wrong." To this you reply here; " That whoever ſhall " conſider the penalties, will, you perſuade yourſelf, find no heads broken, and " ſo but little need of a plaiſter." The penalties, as you ſay, are to be ſuch, as " will not tempt ſuch, as have any concern for their eternal ſalvation, either " to renounce a religion, which they believe to be true, or profeſs one, which " they believe not to be ſo, but only ſuch as, (" being weighed in gold ſcales) " are juſt enough," or, as you expreſs it, are apt to put them upon a ſerious " and impartial examination of the controverſy between the magiſtrate and " them." If you had been pleaſed to have told us, what penalties thoſe were,

we might have been able to gueſs, whether there would have been broken heads, or no. But, ſince you have not vouchſafed to do it, and, if I miſtake not, will again appeal to your men of art, for another diſpenſation, rather than ever do it; I fear no body can be ſure, theſe penalties will not reach to ſomething worſe, than a broken head: eſpecially, if the magiſtrate ſhall obſerve, that Page 7. you impute the riſe and growth of falſe religions (which it is the magiſtrate's duty to hinder) to the pravity of human nature, unbridled by authority; which, by what follows he may have reaſon to think, is to uſe force, ſufficient to counterbalance Page 8. the folly, perverſeneſs and wickedneſs of men: and whether then, he may not lay on penalties ſufficient, if not to break men's heads, yet to ruin them in their eſtates and liberties, will be more than you can undertake. And, ſince you acknowledge here, that the magiſtrate may err ſo far, in the uſe of this his power, as to miſtake the perſons, that he lays his penalties on; will you be ſecurity, that he ſhall not alſo miſtake, in the proportion of them, and not lay on ſuch, as men would willingly exchange for a broken head? all the aſſurance, you give us of this is; "If this power keep within its bounds, i. e. as you here "explain it, if the penalties the magiſtrate makes uſe of, to promote a falſe religion, do not exceed the meaſure of thoſe, which he may warrantably uſe "for the promoting the true." The magiſtrate may, notwithſtanding any thing you have ſaid, or can ſay, uſe any ſort of penalties, any degree of puniſhment; you having neither ſhewed the meaſure of them, nor will ever be able to ſhew the utmoſt meaſure, which may not be exceeded, if any may be uſed.

BUT what is this I find here? "if the penalties the magiſtrate makes uſe of "to promote a FALSE RELIGION." Is it poſſible, that the magiſtrate can make uſe of penalties, to promote a falſe religion; of whom you told us, but three pages back, "that it may be always ſaid of him, (what St, Paul ſaid of "himſelf) that he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth?" By that one would have thought, you had undertaken to tell us, that the magiſtrate could no more uſe force, to promote a falſe religion, than St. Paul could preach, to promote a falſe religion. If you ſay, the magiſtrate, has no commiſſion to promote a falſe religion, and therefore it may always be ſaid of him, what St. Paul ſaid of himſelf, &c. I ſay, no miniſter was ever commiſſioned to preach falſhood; and therefore "it may always be ſaid of every miniſter, (what St. Paul ſaid of himſelf) "that he can do nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth:" whereby we ſhall very commodiouſly have an infallible guide, in every pariſh, as well as one in every commonwealth. But, if you thus uſe ſcripture, I imagine you will have reaſon to appeal again to your men of art; whether, though you may not be allowed to recommend to others the examination and uſe of ſcripture, to find the true religion; yet you yourſelf may not uſe the ſcripture, to what purpoſe, and in what ſenſe, you pleaſe, for the defence of your cauſe;

To the remainder of what I ſaid in that paragraph, your anſwer is nothing but an exception to an inference I made. The argument, you were upon, was to juſtify the magiſtrate's inflicting penalties, to bring men to a falſe religion, by the gain thoſe, that ſuffered them, would receive.

THEIR gain was this; "That they would know better, than they did before, L. 2. p. 314. "where the truth does lie." To which I replied, "Which is as true, "as if you ſhould ſay, upon examination, I find ſuch an one is out of the way "to York; therefore I know, better than I did before, that I am in the right." This conſequence you find fault with, and ſay it ſhould be thus; "therefore "I know better than I did before, where the right way lies." This, you tell me, "would have been true; which was not for my purpoſe." Theſe conſequences, one or the other, are much-what alike true. For he that, of an hundred ways, amongſt which there is but one right, ſhuts out one, that he diſcovers certainly to be wrong, knows as much better than he did before, that he is in the right, as he knows better than before, where the right way lies. For before it was 99 to one he was not in the right; and now he knows it is but 98 to one, that he is not in the right, and therefore knows ſo much better than before, that he is in the right, juſt as much as he knows, better than he did

before, where the right way lies. For let him, upon your ſuppoſition, proceed on; and every day, upon examination of a controverſy with ſome one, in one of the remaining ways, diſcover him to be in the wrong; he will every day know, better than he did before, equally, where the right way lies, and that he is in it; until, at laſt, he will come to diſcover the right way itſelf, and himſelf in it. And therefore your inference, whatſoever you think, is as much as the other for my purpoſe; which was to ſhew, what a notable gain a man made, in the variety of falſe opinions and religions in the world, by diſcovering that the magiſtrate had not the truth on his ſide; and what thanks he owed the magiſtrate, for inflicting penalties upon him, ſo much for his improvement, and for affording him ſo much knowledge, at ſo cheap a rate. And ſhould not a man have reaſon to boaſt of his purchaſe, if he ſhould, by penalties, be driven to hear and examine all the arguments, that can be propoſed, by thoſe in power, for all their fooliſh and falſe religions? and yet this gain is what you propoſe, as a juſtification of magiſtrates inflicting penalties for the promoting their falſe religions. "And an impartial examination of the controverſy, between
Page 70. "them and the magiſtrate, you tell us here, is the way for ſuch, as have any "concern for their eternal ſalvation, to come to the knowledge of the truth."

Page 71. To my ſaying, "He that is puniſhed may have examined before, and then I am ſure he gains nothing:" you reply, "but neither does he loſe much, if it be true, which you there add, that all the hurt, that befalls him, is only the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies, for his following the light of his reaſon, and the dictates of his conſcience." So it is, therefore, you would have a man rewarded for being an honeſt man; (for ſo is he, who follows the light of his own reaſon, and the dictates of his conſcience;) only with the ſuffering ſome tolerable inconveniencies. And yet thoſe tolerable inconveniencies are ſuch, as are to counterbalance men's luſts, and the corruption of depraved nature; which, you know, any ſlight penalty is ſufficient to maſter. But that the magiſtrate's diſcipline ſhall ſtop at thoſe, your, tolerable inconveniencies, is what you are loth to be guarantee for: for all the ſecurity, you dare give of it is, "If it be true, which you there add." But, if it ſhould be otherwiſe, the hurt may be more, I ſee, than you are willing to anſwer for.

L. 2. p. 306. "However, you think you do well to encourage the magiſtrate in puniſhing, and comfort the man, who has ſuffered unjuſtly, by ſhewing what he ſhall gain by it. Whereas, on the contrary, in a diſcourſe of this nature, where the bounds of right and wrong are enquired into, and ſhould be eſtabliſhed, the magiſtrate was to be ſhewed the bounds of his authority, and warned of the injury he did, when he miſapplied his power, and puniſhed any man who deſerved it not; and not to be ſoothed into injuſtice, by conſideration of gain, that might thence accrue to the ſufferer. Shall we do evil, that good may come of it?" There are a ſort of people, who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power, and the injuſtice and ill conſequences

L. 3. p. 71. As to what you ſay here, of the nature of my diſcourſe, I ſhall only put you in mind, that the queſtion there debated is, Whether the magiſtrate has any right, or authority, to uſe force, for the promoting the true religion? Which plainly ſuppoſes the unlawfulneſs and injuſtice of uſing force, to promote a falſe religion, as granted on both ſides. So that I could no way be obliged to take notice of it, in my diſcourſe, but only as occaſion ſhould be offered.

AND whether I have not ſhewed the bounds of the magiſtrate's authority, as far as I was, any way, obliged to do it, let any indifferent perſon judge. But to talk here of a "ſort of people, who are very wary of touching upon the magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his power," where I tell the magiſtrate, that the power I aſcribe to him, in reference to religion, is given him to bring men, "not to his own, but to the true religion;" and that he miſapplies it, when he endeavours to promote a falſe religion by it, is, methinks, at leaſt a little unſeaſonable.

NOR

"quences of his miſapplying it; at leaſt, ſo long as it is miſapplied in favour of them, and their party. I know not, whether you are of their number; but this I am ſure, you have the miſfortune, here, to fall into their miſtake. The magiſtrate, you confeſs, may, in this caſe, miſapply his power: and, inſtead of repreſenting to him the injuſtice of it, and the account he muſt give to his Sovereign, one day, of this great truſt, put into his hands, for the equal protection of all his ſubjects, you pretend advantages, which the ſufferer may receive from it: and ſo, inſtead of diſheartening from, you give encouragement to the miſchief. Which upon your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man, after arbitrary power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right."

Nor am I any more concerned, in what you ſay, of the magiſtrate's miſapplying his power, in favour of a party. For, as you have not yet proved, that his applying his power, to the promoting the true religion, (which is all that I contend for) is miſapplying it; ſo much leſs can you prove it, to be miſapplying it, in favour of a party.

But that "I encourage the magiſtrate, in puniſhing men to bring them to a falſe religion, (for that is the puniſhing we here ſpeak of) and ſooth him into injuſtice, by ſhewing what thoſe, who ſuffer unjuſtly, ſhall gain by it," when, in the very ſame breath, I tell him that, by ſo puniſhing, he miſapplies his power, is a diſcovery, which I believe none but yourſelf could have made. When I ſay, that the magiſtrate miſapplies his power, by ſo puniſhing, I ſuppoſe all other men underſtand me to ſay, that he ſins in doing it, and lays himſelf open to divine vengeance by it. And, can he be encouraged to this, by hearing what others may gain by what (without repentance) muſt coſt him ſo dear?

Here your men of art will do well to be at hand again. For it may be ſeaſonable for you to appeal to them, whether the nature of your diſcourſe will allow you to deſcend to ſhew "the magiſtrate the bounds of his authority, and warn him of the injury he does, if he miſapplies his power."

You ſay, "the queſtion there debated is, Whether the magiſtrate has any right, or authority, to uſe force, for promoting the true religion? which plainly ſuppoſes the unlawfulneſs, and injuſtice, of uſing force, to promote a falſe religion, as granted on both ſides." Neither is that the queſtion in debate; nor if it were, does it ſuppoſe what you pretend. But the queſtion in debate is, as you put it, Whether any body has a right to uſe force, in matters of religion? You ſay indeed, "The magiſtrate has, to bring men to the true Page 78. religion." If thereupon, you think the magiſtrate has none to bring men to a falſe religion, whatever your men of art may think, 'tis probable, other men would not have thought it to have been beſides the nature of your diſcourſe, to have warned the magiſtrate, that he ſhould conſider well, and impartially examine the grounds of his religion, before he uſe any force to bring men to it. This is of ſuch moment to men's temporal and eternal intereſts, that it might well deſerve ſome particular caution, addreſſed to the magiſtrate; who might, as much need to be put in mind of impartial examination, as other people. And it might, whatever your men of art may allow, be juſtly expected from you; who think it no deviation from the rules of art, to tell the ſubjects, that they muſt ſubmit to the penalties, laid on them, or elſe fall under the ſword of the magiſtrate; which how true ſoever, will hardly, by any body, be found to be much more to your purpoſe, in this diſcourſe, than it would have been, to have told the magiſtrate, of what ill conſequence it would be, to him and his people, if he miſuſed his power, and warned him to be cautious, in the uſe of it. But not a word that way. Nay even, where you mention the account he ſhall give, for ſo doing, it is ſtill to ſatiſfy the ſubjects, that they are well provided for, and not left unfurniſhed of the means of ſalvation, by the right, God has put into the magiſtrate's hands, to uſe his power, to bring them to the true religion; and therefore, they ought to be well content, becauſe, if the magiſtrate miſapply it, the Great Judge will puniſh him for it. Look, Sir, and ſee, whether, what you ſay, any where, of the magiſtrate's miſuſe of his power, have any other tendency: and then I appeal to the ſober reader, whether, if you had been as much concerned for the bounding, as for the exerciſe, of force, in the magiſtrate's hands, you would not have ſpoke of it, after another manner.

THE next thing you ſay, is, "that the queſtion (being, Whether the magiſtrate has any right to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion) ſuppoſes "the unlawfulneſs of uſing force, to promote a falſe religion, as granted on both "ſides;" which is ſo far from true, that I ſuppoſe quite the contrary, viz. That, if the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force, to promote the true, he muſt have a right to uſe force, to promote his own religion; and that for reaſons, I have given you elſewhere. But the ſuppoſition of a ſuppoſition ſerves to excuſe you from ſpeaking any thing directly, of ſetting bounds to the magiſtrate's power, or telling him his duty, in that point; though you are very frequent in mentioning the obligation he is under, that men ſhould not want the aſſiſtance of his force; and how anſwerable he is, if any body miſcarry for want of it; tho' there be not the leaſt whiſper of any care to be taken, that no body be miſled by it. And, now I recollect myſelf, I think your method would not allow it: for, if you ſhould have put the magiſtrate upon examining, it would have ſuppoſed him as liable to error, as other men; whereas, to ſecure the magiſtrate's acting right, upon your foundation, of never uſing force, but for the true religion, I ſee no help for it, but either he, or you (who are to licenſe him) muſt be got paſt the ſtate of examination, into that of certain knowledge and infallibility.

INDEED, as you ſay, "you tell the magiſtrate, that the power, you aſcribe to "him, in reference to religion, is given him to bring men, not to his own, but "to the true religion." But do you put upon him a ſevere and impartial examination, which, amongſt the many falſe, is the only true religion, he muſt uſe force, to bring his ſubjects to; that he may not miſtake and miſapply his power, in a buſineſs of that conſequence? Not a ſyllable of this. Do you, then, tell him, which it is he muſt take, without examination, and promote with force; whether that of England, France, or Denmark? This, methinks, is as much as the pope, with all his infallibility, could require of princes. And yet what is it leſs, than this, you do; when you ſuppoſe the religion of the church of England to be the only true; and, upon this your ſuppoſition, tell the magiſtrate, it is his duty, by force, to bring men to it; without ever putting him upon examining, or ſuffering him, or any body elſe, to queſtion, whether it be the only true religion, or no? For, if you will ſtick to what you, in another place, ſay: "That "it is enough to ſuppoſe, that there is one true religion, and but one, and that "that religion may be known, by thoſe, who profeſs it;" What authority will this knowableneſs of the true religion, give to the king of England, more than to the king of France, to uſe force, if he does not actually know the religion, he profeſſes, to be true; or to the magiſtrate, more than the ſubject, if he has not examined the grounds of his religion? But if he believe you, when you tell him, your religion is the true, all is well; he has authority enough to uſe force, and he need not examine any farther. If this were not the caſe; why you ſhould not be careful, to prepare a little advice, to make the magiſtrate examine, as well as you are ſolicitous to provide force to make the ſubject examine, will require the ſkill of a man of art to diſcover.

WHETHER you are not of the number of thoſe men, I there mentioned, (for that there have been ſuch men in the world, inſtances might be given) one may doubt, from your principles. For, if, upon a ſuppoſition, that yours is the true religion, you can give authority to the magiſtrate, to inflict penalties on all his ſubjects, that diſſent from the communion of the national church, without examining, whether theirs, too, may not be that only true religion, which is neceſſary to ſalvation; is not this to demand, that the magiſtrate's power ſhould be applied, only in favour of a party? and can any one avoid being confirmed in his ſuſpicion, when he reads that broad inſinuation of yours, page 34. as if our magiſtrates were not concerned for truth, or piety, becauſe they granted a

relaxation

relaxation of thoſe penalties, which you would have employed in favour of your party: for ſo it muſt be called, and not the church of God, excluſive of others: unleſs you will ſay, men cannot be ſaved, out of the communion of your particular church, let it be national, where you pleaſe.

YOU do not, you ſay, encourage the magiſtrate to miſapply his power; becauſe, "in the very ſame breath, you tell him, he miſapplies his power." I anſwer, let all men underſtand you, as much as you pleaſe, to ſay, that he ſins in doing it: that will not excuſe you, from encouraging him there; unleſs it be impoſſible that a man may be encouraged to ſin. If your telling the magiſtrate, that his ſubjects gain, by his miſapplying of force, be not an encouragement to him, to miſapply it, the doing good to others muſt ceaſe to be an encouragement to any action. And, whether it be not a great encouragement, in this caſe, to the magiſtrate, to go on, in the uſe of force, without impartially examining, whether his, or his ſubjects, be the true religion; when he is told that (be his religion true or falſe) his ſubjects, who ſuffer, will be ſure to be gainers by it; let any one judge. For the encouragement is not (as you put it) to the magiſtrate, to uſe force, to bring men to what he thinks a falſe religion; but it is an encouragement to the magiſtrate, who preſumes his to be the true religion, to puniſh his diſſenting ſubjects, without due and impartial examination, on which ſide the truth lies. For having never told the magiſtrate, that neglect of examination is a ſin in him; if you ſhould tell him a thouſand times, that he, who uſes his power, to bring men to a falſe religion, miſapplies it; he would not underſtand, by it, that he ſinned, whilſt he thought his the true; and ſo it would be no reſtraint to the miſapplying his power.

AND thus we have ſome proſpect of this admirable machine, you have ſet up, for the ſalvation of ſouls.

THE magiſtrate is to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion. But what if he miſapplies it, to bring men to a falſe religion? it is well ſtill for his ſubjects: they are gainers by it. But this may encourage him to a miſapplication of it. No: you tell him that he, that uſes it, to bring men to a falſe religion, miſapplies it; and therefore he cannot but underſtand, that you ſay, "he ſins, "and lays himſelf open to divine vengeance." No, he believes himſelf in the right; and thinks, as St. Paul, whilſt a perſecutor, that he does God good ſervice. And you aſſure him here, he makes his ſuffering ſubjects gainers; and ſo he goes on, as comfortably as St. Paul did. Is there no remedy for this? yes, a very ready one, and that is, that, "the one only true religion may be known, "by thoſe, who profeſs it, to be the only true religion."

To which if we add how you moderate, as well as direct, the magiſtrate's hand, in puniſhing, by making the laſt regulation of your convenient penalties to lie, in the prudence and experience of magiſtrates themſelves; we ſhall find the advantages of your method. For, are not your neceſſary means of ſalvation, which lie, in moderate penalties, uſed, to bring men to the true religion, brought to an happy ſtate; when that, which is to guide the magiſtrate in the knowledge of the true religion, is, that "the true religion may be known, by "thoſe, who profeſs it, to be the only true religion;" and the convenient penalties to be uſed, for the promoting of it, are ſuch as the magiſtrate ſhall, in his prudence, think fit; and that, whether the magiſtrate applies it right, or wrong, the ſubject will be a gainer by it? If, in either of your diſcourſes, you have given the magiſtrate any better direction, than this, to know the true religion by, which he is, by force, to promote; or any other intelligible meaſure to moderate his penalties by; or any other caution, to reſtrain the miſuſe of his power, I deſire you to ſhew it me: and then, I ſhall think, I have reaſon to believe, that, in this debate, you have had more care of the true religion, and the ſalvation of ſouls, than to encourage the magiſtrate, to uſe the power, he has, by your direction, and without examination, and to what degree he ſhall think fit, in favour of a party. For the matter thus ſtated, if I miſtake not, will ſerve any magiſtrate, to uſe any degree of force, againſt any, that diſſent from his national religion.

HAVING recommended to the ſubjects the magiſtrate's perſecution, by a ſhew of gain, which will accrue to them by it, you do well to bring in the example of Julian; who, whatever he did to chriſtians, would (no more than to you) own that it was perſecution, but for their advantage in the other world. But, whether his pretending gain to them, upon grounds, which he did not believe; or your pretending gain to them, which no body can believe to be one, be a greater mockery, you were beſt to look. This ſeems reaſonable; that his talk of philanthropy, and yours of moderation, ſhould be bound up together. For until you ſpeak, and tell them, plainly, what they may truſt to, the advantage, the perſecuted are to receive from your clemency, may, I imagine, make a ſecond part to what the chriſtians of that age received from his. But, you are ſolicitous for the ſalvation of ſouls, and diſſenters ſhall find the benefit of it.

CHAP. IX.

Of the uſefulneſs of force in matters of religion.

Page 10. YOU having granted that in all pleas for any thing, becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay, that it may be ſerviceable; but it muſt be conſidered, not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce; and the greater good, or harm, likely to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it; I think, there need nothing more to be ſaid, to ſhew the uſefulneſs of force, in the magiſtrate's hands, for promoting the true religion, after it has been proved that, if any, then all magiſtrates, who believe their religion to be true, are under an obligation to uſe it. But ſince the uſefulneſs, and neceſſity, of force, is the main foundation on which you build your hypotheſis, we will, in the two remaining chapters, examine particularly, what you ſay for them.

Ibid. TO the author's ſaying, "That truth ſeldom hath received, and he fears "never will receive, much aſſiſtance from the power of great men, to whom "ſhe is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome;" you anſwer, "And yet Iſaiah xlix. 23. "God himſelf foretold, and promiſed, that kings ſhould be nurſing fathers, and "queens nurſing mothers to his church." If we may judge of this prophecy, by what is paſt, or preſent, we ſhall have reaſon to think it concerns not our days; or if it does, that God intended not that the church ſhould have many ſuch nurſing fathers and nurſing mothers, that were to nurſe them up with moderate penalties, if thoſe were to be the ſwadling-clouts of this nurſery. Perhaps, if you read that chapter, you will think that you have little reaſon to buid much on this promiſe, 'till the reſtoring of Iſrael: and, when you ſee the Gentiles bring thy (i. e. as the ſtile of the chapter ſeems to import, the ſons of the Iſraelites) "ſons in their arms, and thy daughters be carried upon their ſhoul"ders," as is promiſed, in the immediately preceding words; you may conclude that, then, "kings ſhall be thy (i. e. Iſrael's) nurſing fathers, and queens thy "nurſing mothers." This ſeems to me, to be the time, deſigned by that prophecy, and I gueſs to a great many others, upon an attentive reading that chapter in Iſaiah. And to all ſuch, this text will do you little ſervice, 'till you make out the meaning of it better, than by barely quoting of it; which will ſcarce ever prove, that God hath promiſed, that ſo many princes ſhall be friends to the true religion, that it will be better for the true religion, that princes ſhould uſe force, for the impoſing, or propagating, of their religions, than not. For unleſs it proves that, it anſwers not the author's argument, as an indifferent reader muſt needs ſee. For he ſays not, "Truth never, but ſhe ſeldom hath received, and "he fears never will receive (not any, but) much aſſiſtance from the power of "great men, to whom ſhe is BUT RARELY KNOWN, and more RARELY 1 Cor. i. 26. "WELCOME." And therefore to this of Iſaiah pray join that of St. Paul to the Corinthians, "Not many wiſe, not many mighty, not many noble."

BUT, ſuppoſing many kings were to be nurſing fathers to the church, and that this prophecy were to fulfilled in this age, and the church were now to be their nurſery; 'tis, I think, more proper to underſtand this figurative promiſe, that their pains and diſcipline was to be employed on thoſe in the church, and that they ſhould feed and cheriſh them, rather than that theſe words meant, that they ſhould whip thoſe that were out of it. And therefore, this text will, I ſuppoſe, upon a juſt conſideration of it, ſignify very little againſt the known matter of fact which the author urges; unleſs you can find a country, where the cudgel and the ſcourge are more the badges and inſtruments of a good nurſe, than the breaſt and the bib; and that ſhe is counted a good nurſe of her own child, who buſies herſelf, in whipping children, not hers, nor belonging to her nurſery.

“The fruits, which give you no encouragement to hope for any advantage, Page 13. from the author's toleration, which almoſt all, but the church of England, enjoyed, in the times of the bleſſed reformation, as it was called, you tell us, were ſects and hereſies.” Here your zeal hangs a little in your light. It is not the author's toleration, which here you accuſe. That, you know, is univerſal: and the univerſality of it is, that which, a little before, you wondered at, and complained of. Had it been the author's toleration, it could not have been almoſt all, but the church of England; but it had been the church of England, and all others. But let us take it, that ſects and hereſies were, or will be, the fruits of a free toleration; i. e. men are divided in their opinions and ways of worſhip. Differences in the ways of worſhip, wherein there is nothing mixed, inconſiſtent with the true religion, will not hinder men from ſalvation, who ſincerely follow the beſt light they have; which they are as likely to do under toleration, as force. And, as for difference of opinions, ſpeculative opinions in religion, I think I may ſafely ſay, that there are ſcarce, any where, three, conſidering men (for 'tis want of conſideration, you would puniſh) who are, in their opinions, throughout of the ſame mind. Thus far then, if charity be preſerved, (which it is likelier to be, where there is toleration, than where there is perſecution) though without uniformity, I ſee no great reaſon to complain of thoſe ill fruits of toleration.

But men will run, as they did, in late times, into “dangerous and deſtructive errors, and extravagant ways of worſhip.” As to errors in opinion; If men, upon toleration, be ſo apt to vary in opinions, and run ſo wide, one from another, 'tis evident they are not ſo averſe to thinking, as you complain. For 'tis hard for men, not under force, to quit one opinion and embrace another, without thinking of them. But, if there be danger of that; it is moſt likely, the national religion ſhould ſweep, and draw to itſelf, the looſe and unthinking part of men; who without thought, as well as without any conteſt with their corrupt nature, may embrace the profeſſion of the countenanced religion, and join in outward communion with the great and ruling men of the nation. For, he that troubles not his head, at all, about religion, what other can ſo well ſuit him, as the national; with which the cry and preferments go; and where (it being, as you ſay, preſumable, that he makes that his profeſſion, upon conviction, and that he is in earneſt) he is ſure to be orthodox, without the pains of examining, and has the law and government on his ſide, to make it good, that he is in the right?

But ſeducers, if they be tolerated, will be ready at hand, and diligent; and men will hearken to them. Seducers, ſurely, have no force on their ſide, to make people hearken. And if this be ſo, there is a remedy at hand, better than force, if you and your friends will uſe it, which cannot but prevail; and that is, let the miniſters of truth be as diligent, and they bringing truth with them, truth obvious and eaſy to be underſtood (as you ſay, what is neceſſary to ſalvation, is) Page 29. cannot but prevail.

But ſeducers are hearkened to, becauſe they teach opinions favourable to men's luſts. Let the magiſtrate, as is his duty, hinder the practices, which their luſts would carry them to, and the advantage will be ſtill on the ſide of truth,

After all, Sir, if, as the apoſtle tells the Corinthians, (1 Cor. xi. 19.) “There muſt be hereſies amongſt you, that they, which are approved, may be made manifeſt;” which, I beſeech you, is beſt for the ſalvation of men's ſouls;

that they ſhould enquire, hear, examine, conſider, and then have the liberty to profeſs, what they are perſuaded of; or, that having conſidered, they ſhould be forced not to own, nor follow their perſuaſions; or elſe, that being of the national religion, they ſhould go ignorantly on, without any conſideration at all? In one caſe, if your penalties prevail, men are forced to act contrary to their conſciences, which is not the way to ſalvation; and if the penalties prevail not, you have the ſame fruits, ſects and hereſies, as under toleration: in the other, 'tis true, thoſe ignorant, looſe, unthinking conformiſts, do not break company with thoſe, who embrace the truth that will ſave them; but, I fear, can no more be ſaid to have any ſhare in it, than thoſe, who openly diſſent from it. For it is not being in the company, but having on the wedding-garment, that keeps men from being bound hand and foot, and caſt into the dreadful and eternal priſon.

Page 16. YOU tell us, "Force has a proper efficacy, to procure the enlightning of the "underſtanding, and the production of belief," viz. by making men conſider. But your aſcribing men's averſion to examine matters of religion, to the corruption of their nature; force, your way applied, (i. e. ſo that men avoid the penalties, by an outward conformity,) cannot have any proper efficacy to procure conſideration; ſince men may outwardly conform, and retain their corruption, and averſion to conſideration; and upon this account, force your way applied, is abſolutely impertinent.

BUT farther; if force has ſuch a proper efficacy, to procure the production of belief, it will do more harm than good, employed by any, but orthodox magiſtrates. But how to put it only into orthodox hands, is the difficulty. For I think, I have proved that, if orthodox magiſtrates may, and ought to uſe force, for the promoting their religion, all, that think themſelves orthodox, are obliged to uſe it too. And this may ſerve for an anſwer to all you have ſaid, page 16.

I HAVING ſaid, whatever indirect efficacy there be in force, applied by the magiſtrate, your way, it makes againſt you; "Force, uſed by the magiſtrate "to bring men to conſider theſe reaſons and arguments, which are proper and "ſufficient to convince them, but which without being forced, they would not "conſider; may, ſay you, be ſerviceable indirectly and at a diſtance, to make "men embrace the truth, which muſt ſave them." And thus, I ſay, it may "be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood, which will de"ſtroy them." To this you, with great triumph reply, "How, Sir, may "force be uſed by the magiſtrate, to bring men to conſider thoſe reaſons and "arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince them; be ſerviceable "to bring men to embrace falſhood, ſuch falſhood as will deſtroy them? it "ſeems then, there are reaſons and arguments, which are proper and ſufficient, "to convince men of the truth of falſhood, which will deſtroy them. Which "is, certainly, a very extraordinary diſcovery, though ſuch as no man can have "any reaſon to thank you for? (P. 273. Page 25.)

IN the firſt place, let me aſk you, Where did you find, or from what words of mine do you infer that notable propoſition, "That there are reaſons and ar"guments, proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of falſhood?" If a magiſtrate of the true religion may uſe force, to make men conſider reaſons and arguments, proper to convince men of the truth of his religion, may not a prince, of a falſe religion, uſe force, to make men conſider reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them, of what he believes to be true? And may not force, thus, be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace falſhood?

IN the next place, did you, who argue with ſo much ſchool-ſubtilty, as if you drank it in at the very fountain, never hear of ſuch an ill way of arguing, as a conjunctis ad diviſa? there are no arguments proper and ſufficient to bring a man into the belief, of what is, in itſelf, falſe, whilſt he knows, or believes, it to be falſe; therefore there are no arguments proper and ſufficient to bring a man into the belief of what is, in itſelf, falſe, which he neither knows, nor believes, to be ſo. A ſenior ſophiſter would be laughed at for ſuch logick. And yet this is all you ſay in that ſentence, you erect for a trophy, “ to convince “ men of the truth of falſhood;” which, though not my words, but ſuch as you, in your way, ſupply from what I ſaid, you are exceedingly pleaſed with, and think their very repeating a triumph. But, though there are no arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of falſhood, as falſhood; yet I hope you will allow, that there are arguments, proper and ſufficient to make men receive falſhoods for truths; why elſe, do you complain of ſeducers? And thoſe, who embrace falſhoods for truths, do it under the appearance of truth, miſled by thoſe arguments, which make it appear ſo, and ſo convince them. And that magiſtrates, who take their religion to be true, tho' it be not ſo, may, with force, urge ſuch arguments, you will, I think, grant.

BUT you talk, as if nobody could have arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince another, but he that was of your way, or your church. This, indeed, is a new and very extraordinary diſcovery, and ſuch as your brethren, if you can convince them of it, will have reaſon to thank you for. For if any one was ever by arguments and reaſons brought off, or ſeduced from your church, to be a diſſenter, there was then, I think, reaſons and arguments proper and ſufficient to convince him. I will not name to you again Mr. Reynolds, becauſe you have charity enough to queſtion his ſincerity. Though his leaving his country, friends, and acquaintance, may be preſumed as great a mark of his being convinced and in earneſt, as it is for one to write for a national religion, in a country where it is uppermoſt. I will not yet deny, but that, in you, it may be pure zeal for the true religion, which you would have aſſiſted with the magiſtrate's force. And, ſince you ſeem ſo much concerned for your ſincerity, in the argument, it may be granted you deſerve the character of a well-meaning man, who own your ſincerity, in a way, ſo little advantageous to your judgment.

BUT if Mr. Reynolds, in your opinion, was miſled by corrupt ends, or ſecular intereſt; what do you think of a prince now living? Will you doubt his ſincerity, or that he was convinced of the truth of the religion he profeſſed, who ventured three crowns for it? What do you think of Mr. Chillingworth, when he left the church of England for the Romiſh profeſſion? Did he do it, without being convinced that that was the right? Or was he convinced with reaſons and arguments, not proper, or ſufficient to convince him?

BUT certainly this could not be true, becauſe, as you ſay, p. 25, the ſcripture does not teach any thing of it. Or perhaps, thoſe, that leave your communion, do it always without being convinced, and only think they are convinced, when they are not; or are convinced with arguments, not proper and ſufficient to convince them. If nobody can convince another, but he, that has truth on his ſide, you do more honour to the firſt and ſecond letter concerning toleration, than is for the advantage of your cauſe, when you impute to them the increaſe of ſects and hereſies amongſt us. And there are ſome, even of the church of England, have profeſſed themſelves ſo fully ſatisfied, by the reaſons and arguments in the firſt of them, that though I dare not be poſitive to you, whoſe privilege it is, to convince men, that they are convinced; yet I may ſay, it is as preſumable, they are convinced, having owned it, as it is preſumable that all, that are conformiſts, are made ſo upon reaſon and conviction.

THIS, I ſuppoſe may ſerve for an anſwer to your next words, “ That God, Page 25.
“ in his juſt judgment, will ſend ſuch, as receive not the love of truth, that they
“ may be ſaved, but reject it, for the pleaſure they have in unrighteouſneſs,
“ ἐνέργειαν πλάνης, ſtrong deluſion, i. e. ſuch reaſons and arguments, as will
“ prevail with men, ſo diſpoſed, to believe a lie, that they may be damned;
“ this you confeſs the ſcripture plainly teaches us. But that there are any ſuch
“ reaſons, or arguments, as are proper and ſufficient to convince, or ſatisfy any,
“ but ſuch reſolute and obdurate ſinners, of the truth of ſuch falſhood, as will
“ deſtroy them, is a poſition, which you are ſure, the ſcripture doth not teach
“ us; and which you tell me, when I have better conſider'd it, you hope I will
“ not undertake to maintain. And yet, if it be not maintainable, what I ſay,
“ here, is to no purpoſe: for if there be no ſuch reaſons, or arguments, as here

“ we

"we ſpeak of, it is in vain to talk of the magiſtrate's uſing force, to make men "conſider them."

BUT, if you are ſtill of the mind, that no magiſtrate, but thoſe, who are of the true religion, can have arguments, back'd with force, proper and ſufficient to convince; and that, in England, none, but reſolute, obdurate ſinners, ever forſook, or forbore, the communion of the church of England, upon reaſons and arguments, that ſatisfy, or convince them; I ſhall leave you to enjoy ſo charitable an opinion.

BUT, as to the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, I ſhall lay you down again the ſame argument, I uſed before; though in words leſs fitted for your way of reaſoning on them, now I know your talent. If there be any efficacy in force, to bring men to any perſuaſion, it will, your way applied, bring more men to error, than to truth. Your way of uſing it is only to puniſh men, for not being of the national religion; which is the only way you do, or can, apply force, without a toleration. Nonconformity is the fault, that is puniſhed; which fault, when it ceaſes, the puniſhment ceaſes. But yet to make them conſider, is the end, for which they are puniſhed; but whether it be, or be not, intended, to make men conſider, it alters nothing in the caſe. Now, I ſay, that ſince all magiſtrates, who believe their religion to be true, are as much obliged to uſe force, to bring their ſubjects to it, as if it were true; and ſince moſt of the national religions of the world are erroneous; if force, made uſe of, to bring men to the national religion, by puniſhing diſſenters, have any efficacy, (let it be what it will, indirect and at a diſtance, if you pleaſe) it is like to do twenty times more harm, than good; becauſe of the national religions of the world, to ſpeak much within compaſs, there are above twenty wrong, for one that is right.

INDEED, could force be directed, to drive all men indifferently, who are negligent and backward in it, to ſtudy, examine and conſider ſeriouſly, matters of religion, and ſearch out the truth: and, if men were, upon their ſtudy and examination, permitted to follow, what appears to them to be right; you might have ſome pretence for force, as ſerviceable to truth, in making men conſider. But this is impoſſible, but under a toleration. And I doubt whether, even there, force can be ſo applied, as to make men conſider, and impartially examine, what is true, in the profeſſed religions of the world, and to embrace it. This, at leaſt, is certain, that where puniſhments purſue men, like out-lying deer, only to the pale of the national church; and, when once they are within that, leaves them free there, and at eaſe; it can do no ſervice to the true religion, even in a country where the national is the true. For the penalties ceaſing, as ſoon as men are got within the pale and communion of the church, they help not men, at all, againſt that which, you aſſign, as the great hindrance to the true religion, and which therefore, in your opinion, makes force neceſſary to aſſiſt it.

FOR there being no neceſſity that men ſhould leave, either their vices, or corruptions, or ſo much as their ignorance, to get within the pale of the church; force, your way applied, ſerves only to bring men (even in the few chriſtian and orthodox countries) to the profeſſion, not to the knowledge, belief or practice, of the true religion.

YOU ſay, corrupt nature inclines men, from the true religion, to falſe ones; and moderate force is requiſite to make ſuch men conſider. But ſuch men as, out of corrupt nature, and for their eaſe and carnal pleaſures, chuſe an erroneous religion, without conſidering, will again, as ſoon as they can find their choice incommoded by thoſe penalties, conſult the ſame corrupt nature and carnal appetites, and, without conſidering any thing further, conform to that religion, where they can beſt enjoy themſelves. It is only the conſcientious part of diſſenters, ſuch as diſſent not out of indulgence to corrupt nature, but out of perſuaſion, who will not conform, without conſidering as they ought. And therefore your agreement, from corrupt nature, is out of doors. If moderate penalties ſerve only to work on thoſe, who are led by corrupt nature, they are of no uſe but to fill the church with hypocrites; that is, to make thoſe men worſe hypocrites, than they were before, by a new act of hypocriſy, and to corrupt the manners of the reſt of the church, by their converſe with theſe. And, whether this be for the ſalvation of ſouls, as is pretended, or for ſome other end, that the prieſts of all religions have generally ſo earneſtly contended for it, I leave to be conſider'd. For, as for thoſe, who diſſent out of perſuaſion, I ſuſpect your moderate penalties will have little effect upon them. For ſuch men being awed by the fear of hell-fire, if that fear will not make them conſider, better than they have done, moderate penalties will be too weak to work upon them. It is well, if dragooning and martyring can do it.

BUT you add, "May it not be true, nevertheleſs, that force, your way applied, may be ſerviceable indirectly, and at a diſtance, to bring men to embrace the truth, which may ſave them? which is all you are concerned, here to make good." So that if it may, poſſibly, happen, that it ſhould ever bring two men to embrace the truth, you have gained your point, and overthrown toleration, by the uſefulneſs and neceſſity there is of force. For, without being forced, theſe two men would never have conſider'd: which is more yet than you know, unleſs you are of his private council, who only can tell, when the ſeaſon of grace is paſt, and the time come, that preaching, intreaty, inſtruction and perſuaſion ſhall, never after, prevail upon a man. But, whatever you are here concerned to make good, are you not alſo concerned to remember, what you ſay, where, declaring againſt the magiſtrate's having a power to uſe what may, any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, be uſeful, towards the promoting the true religion, you ſay, "Who ſees not that, however ſuch means might chance to hit right, in ſome few caſes, yet, upon the whole matter, they would certainly do a great deal more harm than good: And, in all pleas (making uſe of my words) for any thing, becauſe of its uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay, that it may be ſerviceable, but it muſt be conſidered, not only what it may, but what it is likely to produce; and the greater good or harm, like to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it? Page 26. Page 18.

You proceed and tell me, that I, "not content to ſay, that force, your way applied, (i. e. to bring men to embrace the truth, which muſt ſave them) may be ſerviceable to bring men to embrace falſhood, which will deſtroy them; and ſo is proper to do as much harm as good, (which ſeems ſtrange enough;) I add (to increaſe the wonder) that, in your indirect way, it is much more proper, and likely to make men receive and embrace error, than the truth: and that, 1. Becauſe men, out of the right way, are as apt, and, I think, I may ſay, apter, to uſe force than others;" Which is doubtleſs, an irrefragable demonſtration, that force, uſed by the magiſtrate, to bring men to receive and embrace the truth which muſt ſave them, is much more proper and likely to make men receive error than the truth," And then you aſk me, "How we come to talk here, of what men, out of the right way, are apt to do, to bring others into their (i. e. wrong) way; where we are only enquiring, what may be done, to bring men to the right way, For you muſt put me in mind, you ſay, that this our queſtion is, viz. Whether the magiſtrate has any right to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion?" Whether the magiſtrate has a right to uſe force, in matters of religion, as you more truly ſtate it, p. 78. is the main queſtion between us, I confeſs. But the queſtion here, between us, is about the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied; which being, to puniſh diſſenters as diſſenters, to make them conſider, I ſhewed would do more harm than good. And to this, you were here anſwering. Whereby, I ſuppoſe, it is plain, that the queſtion here, is, about the uſefulneſs of force, ſo applied. And I doubt not but my readers, who are not concern'd, when the queſtion in debate will not ſerve your turn, to have another ſubſtituted, will take this for a regular and natural way of arguing, viz. "That force, your way applied, is more proper and likely to make men embrace error than the truth; becauſe men, out of the right way, are as apt, I think I may ſay apter, to uſe force than others." You need not then aſk as you do, "How we come to talk of men out of the right way?" you ſee, how. If you do not, I know not what help there is for your eyes. And I muſt content myſelf that any other reader, that has eyes, will not miſs it. And I wonder that you ſhould: ſince you know, I have on ſeveral occaſions, argued againſt the uſe of force, in matters of religion, upon a ſuppoſition, that, if any one, then all magiſtrates have a juſt pretence and right to uſe it; which has ſerved you, in ſome places, for matter of great reproof, and in others, of ſport and diverſion. But, becauſe ſo plain a thing, as that, was ſo ſtrange to you, that you thought it a ridiculous paradox to ſay, "That, for all magiſtrates to ſuppoſe the religion, they believed to be "true, was equally juſt and reaſonable?" and becauſe you took no notice of the words adjoined, that proved it, viz. "unleſs we can imagine, every where, "but in England, [or where the national religion is the true] men believe what, "at the ſame time, they think to be a lie," I have taken the pains to prove it to you more at large in another place, and therefore ſhall make bold to uſe it here as an argument againſt force, viz. that if it have any efficacy, it will do more harm than good; becauſe men, out of "the right way, are as apt, or apter "to uſe it; and I ſhall think it a good one until you have anſwered it."

IT is a good and a ſure way, and ſhews a zeal to the cauſe, ſtill to hold faſt the concluſion, and, whatever be in debate, return ſtill to one's old poſition. I A. p. 5. arguing againſt what you ſay, for the uſe of force, viz. "That force uſed not "to convince, by its own proper efficacy, but only to make men conſider, might "indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice, towards the bringing men to em-"brace truth;" after other arguments againſt it, I ſay, that whatever efficacy L. 2. p. 285. there is in force, your way applied, (i. e. "to puniſh all, and none but, diſſenters "from the national church) makes againſt you: and the firſt reaſon I give for L. 2. p. 286. "it, is in theſe words; "becauſe men out of the right way are as apt or apter to "uſe force than others." Which is what you are here anſwering. And what can be done better to anſwer it, than to the words I have above cited, to ſubjoin theſe Page 26. following? "Now, whereas our author ſays, that penalties, or force, is abſo-"lutely impertinent in this caſe, becauſe it is not proper to convince the mind; "to which you anſwer, that though force be not proper to convince the mind, "yet it is not abſolutely impertinent in this caſe, becauſe it may, however, do "ſome ſervice, towards the bringing men to embrace the truth, which muſt ſave "them, by bringing them to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are "proper to convince the mind: and which, without being forced, they would "not conſider." Here I tell you, "No, but it is much more proper, and "likely, to make men receive and embrace error, than truth, becauſe men, out "of the right way, are as apt, and, perhaps, apter to uſe force than others." Which, you tell me, "is as good a proof you believe, as the thing would ad-"mit: for otherwiſe, you ſuppoſe, I would have given you a better." And thus, you have certainly gained the cauſe. For I having proved that force, your way applied, whatever efficacy it had, would do more harm than good, have not ſufficiently proved, that it cannot do ſome ſervice, towards the bringing men to embrace the truth: and therefore it is not abſolutely impertinent. But, ſince you think this not enough, to prove the uſe of force in matters of religion, impertinent, I ſhall further ſhew you, that force, applied your way to make people conſider, and ſo to make them embrace the truth, is impertinent.

YOUR way is, to lay penalties on men, for nonconformity, as you ſay, to make men conſider: now here let me aſk any one, but you, whether it be not utterly impertinent, ſo to lay penalties on men, to make them conſider, when they can avoid thoſe penalties, without conſidering? but, becauſe it is not enough to prove force, your way applied, utterly impertinent, I ſhall ſhew you, in the next place, that were a law made, to puniſh not barely nonconformity, but nonconſideration, thoſe penalties, laid on not conſidering, would be utterly impertinent; becauſe it could never be proved that a man had not conſider'd the arguments offer'd him. And therefore, all law-makers, until you, in all their penal laws about religion, laid all their penalties upon not embracing; and it was againſt that, that our author was arguing, when he ſaid, penalties in this caſe, are abſolutely impertinent; becauſe they are not proper to convince the mind. For, in that caſe, when penalties are laid on men, for not embracing, it is plain they are uſed as a means, to make men embrace: which, ſince thoſe, who are careleſs in matters of religion, can do, without conſidering, and thoſe who are conſcientious, cannot do, without conviction; ſince penalties can, in no wiſe, convince; this uſe of them is abſolutely impertinent, and will always be ſo, until you can ſhew a way, how they can be uſed in religion, not as motives to embrace, but as motives barely to make men conſider. For, if you puniſh them on, when they tell you, they have conſider'd your arguments, but are not convinced by them, and you judge of their having not conſider'd, by nothing but their not embracing, it is plain you uſe penalties, inſtead of arguments, to convince them, ſince, without conviction, thoſe whom our author pleads for, cannot embrace; and thoſe who do embrace, without conviction, it is all one, as if they did not embrace at all, they being not one jot the more in the way of ſalvation; and ſo penalties are abſolutely impertinent. But embracing, in the ſenſe of the law, and yours too, when you ſay, men have not conſider'd, as they ought, as long as they reject, is nothing but outward conformity, or an outward profeſſion of embracing, wherewith the law is ſatisfied, and upon which the penalties ceaſe. Now penalties uſed, to make men, in this ſenſe, embrace, are abſolutely impertinent, to bring men, to embrace, in earneſt, or, as the author calls it, believe: becauſe an outward profeſſion, which in this caſe, is the immediate end, to which penalties are directed, and beyond which, they do not reach, is no proper means to produce, in men, conſideration, conviction, or believing.

WHAT can be more impertinent, than to vex, and diſeaſe people, with the uſe of force, to no purpoſe? and that force muſt needs be to no purpoſe, which is ſo applied, as to leave the end, for which it is pretended to be uſed, without the means, which is acknowledged neceſſary for its attainment. That this is ſo, in your way of uſing force, will eaſily appear, from your hypotheſis. You tell A. p. 6, 12. us at large, in your argument conſider'd, that men's luſts hinder them, from even impartial conſideration and examination of matters in religion: and therefore, Page 6, 8. force is neceſſary, to remove this hindrance. You tell us likewiſe, at large, in your letter, that men's corrupt nature, and beloved luſts hinder them alſo, from embracing the true religion, and that force is neceſſary, likewiſe, to remove this obſtacle. Now in your way of uſing force, wherein penalties are laid on men, until, and no longer than until, they are made outwardly to conform, force is ſo applied, that, notwithſtanding the intention of the law-maker (let it be what it will) neither the obſtacle to impartial examination, ariſing from men's luſts, nor the averſion to the embracing the true religion, ariſing from men's corrupt nature, can be removed: unleſs they can be removed, without that, which, you ſuppoſe, neceſſary to their removal. For, ſince a man may conform, without being under the neceſſity of impartial examining, or embracing, on the one hand, or ſuffering the penalties, on the other; it is unavoidable, that he ſhould neither impartially examine, nor embrace, if penalties are neceſſary to make him do either; becauſe penalties, which are the neceſſary remedies to remove thoſe hindrances, were never applied to them; and ſo thoſe obſtacles not being removed, for want of the neceſſary remedy, muſt continue to hinder both examining and embracing. For penalties cannot be uſed, as a means to any end, or be applied to the procuring any action to be done, which a man, from his luſts or any other cauſe, has an averſion to, but by putting them, as it were, in one ſcale, as a counterbalance to that averſion, and the action, in the other ſcale, and putting a man under the neceſſity of chuſing the one, or the other: where that is not done, the penalty may be avoided, the averſion, or obſtacle, hath nothing to remove it, and ſo the action muſt remain undone. So that, if penalties be neceſſary to make men impartially examine, and really embrace; if penalties are not ſo laid on men, as to make the alternative to be, either ſuffering the penalties, or conforming, it is impoſſible that men, who, without penalties, would not impartially examine, or really embrace the true religion, ſhould ever do either; and then, I beſeech you conſider, whether penalties, your way applied, be impertinent, or no.

THE neceſſity of penalties is, only where there is ſome inclination, or biaſs in a man, whenceſoever ariſing, that keeps him from doing ſomething in his power, which he cannot be brought to, without the inconveniencies of ſome penal infliction. The efficacy of penalties lies in this, that the inconvenience, to be ſuffered by the penalties, overbalances the biaſs, or inclination, which leads the man the other way, and ſo removes the obſtacle; and the application of this remedy lies only, in putting a man under the neceſſary choice, either of doing the action, or ſuffering the penalty: ſo that, in whatever caſe, a man has not been put under that neceſſity, there penalties have never been applied to the procuring that action: for the obſtacle, or averſion to it, has never had its neceſſary remedy.

PERHAPS, you will ſay, it is not abſolutely impertinent, becauſe it may poſſibly "do ſome ſervice, indirectly and at a diſtance," and be the occaſion, that ſome may conſider and embrace. If whatever may, by accident, contribute to any end, may be uſed, not impertinently, as a means to that end, nothing, that I know, can be impertinent; and a penalty of 12d. a time, laid on them, for being drunk, may be ſaid, to be a pertinent means, to make men Carteſians, or conformiſts: becauſe it may, indirectly and at a diſtance, "do "ſome ſervice, by being an occaſion, to make ſome men conſider their miſpending their time; whereby it may happen, that one may betake himſelf to the ſtudy of philoſophy, where he may meet with arguments, proper and fit to convince him of the truth of that philoſophy; as another betaking himſelf to the ſtudy of divinity, may conſider arguments, proper and fit to make him (whether it be in England, Holland, or Denmark) of the national profeſſion, which he was not of before.

JUST thus, and no otherwiſe, does 12d. a ſunday, or any other penalty laid on nonconformity, make men ſtudy and embrace the true religion; and whatever you will call the ſervice, it does, direct or indirect, near or at a diſtance, it is plain, it produces that effect, and conduces to that end, merely by accident; and therefore, muſt be allowed to be impertinent to be uſed, to that purpoſe.

THAT your way of uſing force, in matters of religion, even in a country, where the magiſtrate is of the true religion, is abſolutely impertinent; I ſhall farther ſhew you, from your own poſitions.

HERE, in the entrance, give me leave to obſerve to you, that you confound two things, very different, viz. your way of applying force, and the end, for which, you pretend, you uſe it. And this, perhaps, may be it, which contributes to caſt that miſt before your eyes, that you always return to the ſame place, and ſtick to the ſame groſs miſtake. For here you ſay, "force your "way applied, i. e. to bring men to embrace the truth, which muſt ſave "them:" but, Sir, to bring men to embrace the truth, is not your way of applying force, but the end, for which, you pretend, it is applied. Your way is to puniſh men (as you ſay) moderately, for being diſſenters from the national religion; this is your way of uſing force. Now if, in this way of uſing it, force does ſervice, merely by accident, you will then, I ſuppoſe, allow it to be abſolutely impertinent. For you ſay, "if, by doing ſervice, by accident, I mean "doing it, but ſeldom, and beſide the intention of the agent, you aſſure me, "that it is not the thing you mean, when you ſay, force may, indirectly, and "at a diſtance, do ſome ſervice. For, in that uſe of force, which you defend, "the effect is both intended, by him, that uſes it, and withal, you doubt not, "ſo often attained, as abundantly to manifeſt the uſefulneſs of it." Whereby 'tis plain, the two marks, whereby you diſtinguiſhed your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs, from that which is by accident, are that, that by accident, does ſervice but ſeldom, and beſides the intention of the agent, but yours the contrary.

Page 26.

Page 17.

Ibid. Firſt, As to the intention, you tell us, in the uſe of force, which you defend, "the effect is intended, by him that uſes it;" that is, thoſe, who made laws, to puniſh nonconformiſts, deſigned thoſe penalties to make all men, under their power, "conſider, ſo as to be convinced of, and embrace the truths, that ſhould "ſave them." If one ſhould aſk you, how you know it to be their intention, can you ſay, they ever told you ſo? If they did not, then ſo far you and I know their intentions alike. Did they ever ſay ſo, in thoſe laws? Nor that neither.

ther. Thoſe verſed then, in the interpretation of laws, will tell you, nothing can be known to be the intention of the law-makers, in any law, of which the law is wholly ſilent: that way, then, you cannot know it to have been their intention, if the law ſays nothing of it. Whatever was the intention of former law-makers, if you had read with attention the laſt act of uniformity of Car. 2. printed before the common-prayer-book, I conclude, you would have been better ſatisfied, about the intention of the then law-makers, in that law: for I think, nothing can be plainer, to any one, who will look into that ſtatute, than that their only end, in that law, was, what they have expreſſed, in theſe words: "And, to the end, that uniformity, in the publick worſhip of God (which is "ſo much deſired) may be ſpeedily effected;" which was driven with ſuch ſpeed, that, if all concerned had opportunity to get and peruſe the then eſtabliſhed liturgy, 'tis certain, they had not over-much time ſeriouſly and deliberately to conſider, of all the parts of it, before the day ſet for the uſe of it.

BUT you think, they ought to have intended, and therefore they did: and I think, they neither ought, nor could, in making thoſe laws, intend ſo unpracticable a thing; and therefore, they did not. Which being as certain a way of knowledge, as yours, if you know it, by that way; 'tis poſſible, you and I may, at the ſame time, know contraries.

BUT you know it, by their "having provided ſufficient means of inſtruction, "for all, under their care, in the true religion;" (of this ſufficient means, we have ſomething to ſay, in another place.) Penalties laid expreſsly, on one fault, have no evidence, that they were deſigned to mend another, though there are ſufficient means provided, of mending it, if men would make a ſufficient uſe of them; unleſs thoſe two faults are ſo connected, as one cannot be mended without the other. Now, if men cannot conform, without ſo conſidering, as to be convinced of, and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them, you may know, that penalties, laid on nonconformity, were intended to make men ſo conſider: but, if men may conform, without ſo conſidering, one cannot know, nor conclude, thoſe penalties were intended, to make men ſo conſider, whatever proviſion there is made, of means of inſtruction.

BUT you will ſay, it is evident that penalties on nonconformiſts, were intended to make them uſe theſe means of inſtruction, becauſe they are intended for the bringing men to church, the place of inſtruction. That they are intended to bring men to church, the place of preaching, that I grant; but that thoſe penalties, that are laid on men, for not coming to church, can be known, thereby, to be intended, to make men ſo conſider, as to be convinced and embrace the true religion, that I deny: and it is utterly impoſſible, it ſhould be ſo, if what you ſay be true, where you tell us, that "the magiſtrates concern them- "ſelves for compliance, or conformity, only as the fruit of their conviction." Page 22. If, therefore, the magiſtrates are concerned for men's conformity, only as the fruit of their conviction, and coming to church be that conformity; coming to church cannot be intended, as a means of their conviction: unleſs it be intended, they ſhould be convinced, before they are convinced.

BUT to ſhew you, that you cannot pretend the penalty of laws, for conformity, to proceed from a care of the ſouls of all, under the magiſtrate's power, and ſo to be intended, to make them all conſider, in any ſenſe. Can you, or any one know, or ſuppoſe, that penalties, which are laid, by the law, on nonconformity, are intended to make all men conſider; where it is known, that a great number under the magiſtrate's power, are diſpenſed with, and privileged from thoſe penalties? How many, omitting the Jews, are there for example, in the king of England's dominions, under his care and power, of the Walloon and French church; to whom force is never applied, and they live in ſecurity from it? How many pagans are there, in the plantations, many whereof, born in his dominions, of whom there was never any care taken, that they ſhould ſo much as come to church, or be, in the leaſt, inſtructed in the chriſtian religion? and yet, muſt we believe, or can you pretend, that the magiſtrate's uſe of force againſt nonconformiſts, is to make all his ſubjects conſider, "ſo as to "be convinced of, and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them?" If you ſay, in your way, you mean no ſuch indulgence: I anſwer, the queſtion is not of yours, but the magiſtrate's intention; though what your intention is, who would have the want of conſideration, or knowledge, in conformiſts, exempt from force, is viſible enough.

AGAIN, Thoſe penalties cannot be ſuppoſed, to be intended to make men conſider; which are laid on thoſe, who have, or may have, already conſidered: and ſuch you muſt grant to be, the penalties laid in England, on nonconformiſts; unleſs you will deny, that any nonconformiſt has, or can conſider, ſo as to be convinced, or believe, and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave him. So that you cannot vouch the intention of the magiſtrate, where his laws ſay nothing; much leſs affirm, that force is intended, to produce a certain end, in all his ſubjects, which is not applied to them all, and is applied to ſome, who have attained that end already: unleſs you have a privilege to affirm, againſt all appearance, whatſoever may ſerve your cauſe. But, to learn ſome moderation in this, I ſhall ſend you to my pagans, and mahometans. For, whatever charitable wiſhes magiſtrates may, ſometimes, have in their thoughts, (which I meddle not with;) no body can ſay, that, in making the laws, or in the uſe of force, we are ſpeaking of, they intended to make men conſider and examine, ſo as "to "be convinced of, and heartily to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them," but he that gives himſelf the liberty to ſay any thing.

Page 18. THE ſervice, that force does, indirectly and at a diſtance: you tell us, in the lowing page, is to make people "apply themſelves, to the uſe of thoſe means, "and helps, which are proper to make them, what they are deſigned to be." In the caſe before us, What are men deſigned to be? holy believers of the goſpel, in this world, without which no ſalvation, no ſeeing of God, in the next. Let us ſee now, whether force, your way applied, can be ſuited to ſuch a deſign, and ſo intended for that end.

YOU hold, that all out of the national church, where the religion of the national church is true, ſhould be puniſhed, and ought to have force uſed to them. Page 64. And again, you grant that thoſe, who are in the communion of the national church, ought not to be puniſhed, or be under the ſtroke of force; nor, indeed, in your way, can they. If now, the effect be, to prevail with men, to conſider, as they ought, ſo that they may become, what they are deſigned to be: How can any one think, that you, and they, who uſe force thus, intend, in the uſe of it, that men ſhould really be chriſtians, both in perſuaſion and practice, without which there is no ſalvation; if they leave off force, before they have attained that effect? or how can it be imagined, that they intend any thing, but conformity, by their uſe of force; if they leave off the uſe of it, as ſoon as men conform? unleſs you will ſay, that an outward conformity to the national church, whoſe religion is the true religion, is ſuch an embracing of the truth, as is ſufficient to ſalvation? or that an outward profeſſion of the chriſtian religion is the ſame, with being really a chriſtian; which, poſſibly you will not be very forward to do, when you recollect, what you meet with in the ſermons, and printed diſcourſes of the divines of the church of England, concerning the ignorance and irreligion of conformiſts themſelves. For penalties can never be thought, by any one (but he that can think, againſt common ſenſe, and what he pleaſes) to be intended, for any end, which, by that conſtitution, and law, whereby they are impoſed, are to ceaſe, before that end be attained. And will you ſay, that all, who are conformable, have ſo well conſidered, that they believe, and heartily embrace the truths of the goſpel, that muſt ſave them: when perhaps it will be found, that a great many conformiſts do not ſo much as underſtand them? but the ignorance, or irreligiouſneſs, to be found amongſt conformiſts, which your way of talking forces me, in ſome places, to take notice of, let me here tell you, once for all, I lay not the blame of, upon conformity, but upon your uſe of force, to make men conform. For, whatever the religion be, true or falſe, it is natural for force, and penalty, ſo applied, to bring the irreligious, and thoſe, who are careleſs and unconcerned for the true, into the national profeſſion: but, whether it be fitter for ſuch, to be kept out, rather than, by force, to be driven into the communion of any church, and owned as members of it, thoſe who have a due care and reſpect for truly religious and pious conformiſts, were beſt conſider.

But farther, if, as you ſay, the oppoſition to the true religion lies only in men's luſts, it having light and ſtrength enough (were it not for that) to prevail: and it is upon that account only, that force is neceſſary, there is no neceſſity, at all, to uſe force on men, only 'till they conform, and no farther: ſince I think, you will not deny, but that the corruption of human nature is as great in conformiſts, as in nonconformiſts; in the profeſſors of, as in the diſſenters from, the national religion. And therefore, either force was not neceſſary before, or elſe it is neceſſary ſtill, after men are conformiſts: unleſs you will ſay, that it is harder for a man to be a profeſſor, than a chriſtian, indeed: and that the true religion, by its own light and ſtrength, can, without the help of force, prevail over a man's luſts, and the corruption of his nature; but it has need of the help of force, to make him a conformiſt, and an outward profeſſor. And ſo much for the effect, which is intended by him, that uſes it, in that uſe of force, which you defend.

THE other argument you bring, to ſhew, that your indirect, and at a diſtance uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, is not by accident, is the frequent ſucceſs of it. Which, I think, is not the true mark of what is not by accident: for an effect may not be, by accident, though it has never been produced but once; and is certainly as little by accident, the firſt time, as when it has been produced a thouſand times. That then, by which any thing is excuſed, from being by accident, is not the frequency of the event, but that, whereon the frequency of the event depends, when frequent trials are made; and that is the proper, natural, and direct efficacy of the cauſe, or means, which produces the effect. As, in the caſe before us, penalties are the cauſe, or means, uſed to produce an end; the proper and immediate effect of penalties, is to produce ſome pain, or inconvenience; and the natural effect of that, is to make a man, who naturally flies from all pain, or inconvenience, to endeavour to avoid it; whereby it naturally and directly works upon the will of man, by propoſing to him this unavoidable choice, of doing ſome action, or enduring the pain, or inconvenience, of the penalty annexed to its omiſſion. When the pain of doing the action is outweighed, in the ſenſe of him, that lies under the penalty, the pain, that, by the law, is annexed to the omiſſion, operates upon his will, as naturally, as thirteen ounces in one ſcale, laid againſt twelve ounces in the other, incline the balance, and bring it downon that ſide. And this is, by a direct and natural efficacy, wherein there is nothing of chance.

LET us ſee then, how far this will go, in your indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs. In your method, the action you propoſe to be done, is conſidering, or a ſevere and impartial examining matters of religion, which, you tell us, men, by their great negligence, or averſion, are kept from doing. What, now, is a proper means to produce this? “Penalties, without which, you tell us, it will not be done.” How, now, is it applied in your method? Conformity, and men's neglect, or averſion, to it, is laid in one ſcale, and the penalty joined to the omiſſion of it, laid in the other; and, in that caſe, if the inconvenience of the penalty outweighs the pains of, or averſion to, conformity, it does, by a direct and natural efficacy, produce conformity: but, if it produces a ſevere and impartial examination, that is merely by accident; becauſe the inconvenience of the penalty is not laid againſt men's averſion, or backwardneſs, to examine impartially, as a counterbalance to that, but, againſt their averſion, or backwardneſs, to conform; and ſo, whatever it does, indirectly, and at a diſtance, 'tis certain its making men ſeverely and impartially examine (if ever that happens) is as much by accident, as it would be by accident, if a piece of lead laid in one ſcale, as a counterpoiſe to feathers, in the oppoſite ſcale, ſhould move, or weigh down, gold, that was put in the ſcale of another pair of balances, which had no counterpoiſe laid againſt it. Unleſs you will ſay, there is a neceſſary connexion between conformity, and a ſevere and impartial examination.

BUT you will ſay, perhaps, that, though it be not poſſible, that penalties ſhould produce examination, but by mere accident, becauſe examination has no neceſſary connexion with conformity, or the profeſſion of any religion; yet ſince there are ſome, who will not take up any profeſſion, without a ſevere and impartial examination, penalties for nonconformity will, by a direct and natural A. p. 6, &c. efficacy, produce examination in all ſuch. To which I anſwer, That thoſe are (if we may believe what you ſay) ſo very few, that this your remedy, which you put into the magiſtrate's hands, to bring all his ſubjects to conſider and examine, will not work upon one in a thouſand; nay, it can work on none at all, to make them ſeverely and impartially examine, but merely by accident. For, if they are men, whom a ſlight and partial examination (which upon your principles, you muſt ſay) ſufficed to make nonconformiſts; a ſlight and partial examination will as well ſerve, to make them conformiſts; and ſo penalties, laid on them, to make them conform, can only, by accident, produce a ſevere and impartial examination, in ſuch men, who can take up the profeſſion of any religion, without a ſevere and impartial examination, no more than it can otherwiſe than by accident, produce any examination in thoſe, who, without any examination, can take up the profeſſion of any religion.

AND in thoſe very few, who take not up the profeſſion of any religion, without a ſevere and impartial examination, that penalties can do any ſervice, to bring them, either to the truth, that muſt ſave them, or ſo much as to outward conformity, but merely by accident, that alſo is evident. Becauſe all ſuch, in a country, where they diſſent from the national religion, muſt neceſſarily have ſeverely and impartially examined already, or elſe you deſtroy the ſuppoſition this argument is built on, viz. That they are men, who do ſeverely and impartially examine, before they chuſe. And if you lay, or continue, your penalties on men, that have ſo examined, 'tis plain, you uſe them, inſtead of reaſons and arguments; in which uſe of them, you confeſs, they have no proper efficacy, and therefore, if they do any ſervice, it is merely by accident,

Page 17. BUT now let us ſee the ſucceſs, you boaſt of, and for that you tell us, that you doubt not, but it is "ſo often attained, as abundantly to manifeſt the uſefulneſs of it." You ſpeak here of it, as a thing tried, and ſo known, that you doubt not. Pray tell us, where your moderate (for great ones, you acknowledge to do harm, and to be uſeleſs) penalties have been uſed, with ſuch ſucceſs, that we may be paſt doubt too. If you can ſhew no ſuch place, do you not vouch experience, where you have none? And ſhew a willingneſs not to doubt, where you have no aſſurance? In all countries, where any force is uſed, to bring men to the profeſſion of the national religion, and to outward conformity, it is not to be doubted, but that force, joining with their natural corruption, in bringing them into the way of preferment, countenance, protection, eaſe and impunity, ſhould eaſily draw in all the looſe, and careleſs, in matters of religion, which are, every where, the far greater number: but is it thoſe, you count upon, and will you produce them, as examples, of what force has done, to make men conſider, ſtudy, and embrace the true religion? Did the penalties, laid on nonconformity, make you "conſider, ſo as to ſtudy, be convinced, "and embrace the true religion?" Or, can you give an inſtance, of any one, in whom it produced this effect? If you cannot, you will have ſome reaſon to doubt, of what you have ſaid, and not to be ſo confident, that the effect you talk of, is ſo often attained. Not that I deny, but that God may ſometimes have made theſe puniſhments, the occaſions to men, of ſetting themſelves ſeriouſly on conſidering religion, and thence, they may have come into the national religion, upon a real conviction: but the inſtances of it, I believe to be ſo few, that you will have reaſon to remember your own words, where you ſpeak of ſuch things as, "any way, at any time, upon any perſon, by any accident, Page 18. "may be uſeful towards the promoting of true religion: "If men ſhould thence "take occaſion, to apply ſuch things, generally, who ſees not that, however "they might chance to hit right, in ſome few caſes; yet, upon the whole matter, they would certainly do a great deal nore harm, than good." You and I know a country, wherein, not long ſince, greater ſeverities were uſed, than you pretend to approve of. Were there not, for all that, great numbers, of ſeveral profeſſions, ſtood out, who, by your rule, ought now to have your moderate penalties tried upon them? And, can you think leſs degrees of force can work, and often, as you ſay, prevail, where greater could not? But, perhaps, they might prevail on many of thoſe to return, who, having been brought into the communion of the church, by former penal laws, have now, upon the relaxation, left it again. A manifeſt demonſtration, is it not? That “their compliance was the fruit of their conviction; and that the magiſtrate was concerned for their compliance, only as the fruit of their conviction:” When they, as ſoon as any relaxation of thoſe laws took off the penalties, left again the communion of the national church? For the leſſening the number of conformiſts, is, I ſuppoſe, one of thoſe things, which you ſay your “eyes cannot but ſee, at this time;” and which you, with concern, impute to the late relaxation. A plain evidence, how preſumable it is, even in your own opinion, that thoſe, who conform, do it upon real conviction.

To conclude, theſe proofs, though I do not pretend to bring as good, as the thing will admit, ſerve my turn, to ſhew, that force is impertinent; ſince, by your own confeſſion, it has no direct efficacy to convince men; and, by its being indirect and at a diſtance, uſeful, is not at all diſtinguiſhed from being barely ſo, by accident: ſince you can neither prove it, to be intended for that end, nor frequently to ſucceed, which are the two marks, whereby you put a difference between indirect, and at a diſtance, and by accident: this, I ſay, is enough to ſhew, what the author ſaid, is true, that the uſe of force is wholly impertinent. Which, whatever others do, upon another reaſon, muſt be forced to allow.

YOU profeſs yourſelf of the church of England, and, if I may gueſs, are ſo far of it, as to have ſubſcribed the 39 articles; which, if you have done, and aſſented to what you ſubſcribed, you muſt neceſſarily allow, that all force, uſed for the bringing men to the true religion, is, “abſolutely impertinent;” for that muſt be abſolutely impertinent, to be uſed as a means, which can contribute nothing at all to the end, for which it is uſed. The end here, is to make a man a true chriſtian, that he may be ſaved; and he is then, and then only, a true chriſtian, and in the way of ſalvation, when he believes, and with ſincerity obeys the goſpel. By the 13th article of the church of England, you hold, that WORKS DONE, BEFORE THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AND THE INSPIRATION OF HIS SPIRIT, ARE NOT PLEASING TO GOD; FOR AS MUCH AS THEY SPRING NOT OF FAITH IN JESUS CHRIST, NEITHER DO THEY MAKE MEN MEET TO RECEIVE GRACE, (OR, AS THE SCHOOL AUTHORS SAY) DESERVE GRACE, OF CONGRUITY; YEA RATHER, FOR THAT THEY ARE NOT DONE, AS GOD HAS WILLED AND COMMANDED THEM TO BE DONE, WE DOUBT NOT BUT THEY HAVE THE NATURE OF SIN. Now, if it be impertinent, to uſe force, to make a man to do more than he can, and a man can do nothing to procure grace, unleſs ſin can procure it, and without grace a man cannot believe, or live ſo, as to be a true chriſtian, it is certainly wholly impertinent, to uſe force, to bring a man to be truly a chriſtian. To hear and conſider, is in men's power, you will ſay; and, to that, force may be pertinent; I grant, to make men hear, but not to make them conſider, in your ſenſe, which you tell us, is to “conſider, ſo as to embrace;” if you mean, by embracing any thing but outward conformity: and that, according to your article, contributes nothing to the attaining of grace; becauſe, without grace, your article ſays it is a ſin; and to conform to, and outwardly to profeſs a religion, which a man does not underſtand, and heartily believe, every one, I think, judges to be a ſin, and no fit means to procure the grace of God.

BUT you tell us, “That God denies his grace to none, who ſeriouſly aſk it.” Page 31. If that be ſo, methinks force ſhould moſt properly and pertinently be uſed, to make men ſeriouſly pray to God for grace. But how, I beſeech you, will this ſtand, with your 13th article? For if you mean, by ſeriouſly; ſo as will make his ſeeking, acceptable to God, that cannot be, becauſe he is ſuppoſed yet to want grace, which alone can make it acceptable: and, if his aſking has the nature of ſin, as in the article, you do not doubt, but it has, can you expect, that ſinning ſhould procure the grace of God? You will, I fear, here, without ſome great help, in a very nice diſtinction, from the ſchool-authors, be forced, either to renounce your article, in the plain ſenſe of it, and ſo become a diſſenter from the church of England; or elſe, acknowledge force, to be wholly impertinent, to the buſineſs of true religion and ſalvation.

ANOTHER reaſon, I gave, againſt the uſefulneſs of force, in matters of religion, was, "becauſe the magiſtrates of the world, being few of them, in the "right way, (not one of ten, take which ſide you will) perhaps, not one of "an hundred, being of the true religion; it is likely your indirect way, of uſing "force, would do an hundred, or at leaſt ten times, as much harm, as good." Page 27. To which you reply, "which would have been to the purpoſe, if you had aſ"ſerted, that every magiſtrate may uſe force, your indirect way, (or any way) "to bring men to his own religion, whatever that be. But, if you aſſert no "ſuch thing, (as no man, you think, but an atheiſt will aſſert it) then, this is "quite beſide the buſineſs." I think, I have proved, that if magiſtrates, of the true, may uſe force, to bring men to their religion, every magiſtrate may uſe force, to bring men to his own religion, when he thinks it the true: and then do you look, where the atheiſm will light.

IN the next paragraph, having quoted theſe following words of mine; where I ſay, "under another pretence, you put into the magiſtrate's hands, as much "power, to force men to his religion, as any, the openeſt perſecutors, can pre"tend to. I aſk, what difference is there, between puniſhing them, to bring "them to maſs, and puniſhing them, to bring them to conſider thoſe reaſons "and arguments, which are proper, and ſufficient, to convince them, that they Ibid. "ought to go to maſs?" You reply; "A queſtion, which you ſhall, then, "think yourſelf obliged to anſwer, when I have produced thoſe reaſons and ar"guments, which are proper and ſufficient, to convince men, that they ought "to go to maſs." But, if you had not omitted the three, or four, immediately preceding lines, (an art to ſerve a good cauſe, which puts me in mind of my pagans, and mahometans) the reader would have ſeen, that your reply was nothing at all to my argument: my words are theſe:

"ESPECIALLY, if you conſider, that as the magiſtrate will certainly uſe "it [force] to force men to hearken to the proper miniſters of his religion, let "it be what it will; ſo you, having ſet no time, nor bounds, to this conſidera"tion of arguments and reaſons, ſhort of being convinced, you under another, "&c." My argument is to ſhew of what advantage force, your way applied, is like to be to the true religion, ſince it puts as much force, into the magiſtrate's hands, as the openeſt perſecutors can pretend to, which the magiſtrates, of wrong perſuaſions, may, and will uſe, as well as thoſe of the true; becauſe your way ſets no other bounds, to conſidering, ſhort of complying. And then I aſk, "What difference there is, between puniſhing you, to bring you to "maſs, or puniſhing you, to conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which are "proper and ſufficient to convince you, that you ought to go to maſs?" To which you reply, that it is "a queſtion, you ſhall, then, think yourſelf "obliged to anſwer, when I have produced thoſe reaſons and arguments, that "are proper and ſufficient to convince men, that they ought to go to maſs." Whereas, the objection is the ſame, whether there be, or be not, reaſons and arguments, proper to convince men, that they ought to go to maſs; for men muſt be puniſhed on, until they have ſo conſidered, as to comply: and what difference is there, then, between puniſhing men, to bring them to maſs, and puniſhing them, to make them conſider, ſo as to go to maſs? but, though I pretend not to produce any reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient, to convince you, or all men, that they ought to go to maſs; yet do you think, there are none, proper, and ſufficient, to convince any men? and that all the papiſts, in the world, go to maſs, without believing it their duty? and whoſoever believes it to be his duty, does it upon reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince him (though perhaps not to convince another) that it is ſo, or elſe, I imagine, he would never believe it at all. What think you of thoſe great number of Japaneſes, that reſiſted all ſorts of torments, even to death itſelf, for the Romiſh religion? And had you been in France, ſome years ſince, who knows, but the arguments, the king of France produced, might have been proper and ſufficient, to have convinced you, that you ought to go to maſs? I do not, by this, think you leſs confident of the truth of your religion, than you profeſs to be: but arguments, ſet on with force, have a ſtrange efficacy upon human frailty; and he muſt be well aſſured of his own ſtrength, who can peremptorily affirm, he is ſure he ſhould have ſtood, what above a million of people ſunk under: amongſt which, it is great confidence to ſay, there was not one ſo well perſuaded of the truth of his religion, as you are of yours; though ſome of them gave great proofs of their perſuaſion, in their ſufferings for it. But, what the neceſſary method of force may be able to do, to bring any one, in your ſenſe, to any religion, i. e. to an outward profeſſion of it, he that thinks himſelf ſecure againſt, muſt have a greater aſſurance of himſelf, than the weakneſs of decayed and depraved nature will well allow. If you have any ſpell, againſt the force of arguments, driven with penalties and puniſhments, you will do well to teach it to the world; for it is the hard luck of well-meaning people, to be often miſled by them, and even the confident themſelves have not ſeldom fallen under them, and betrayed their weakneſs.

To my demanding, if you meant "reaſons and arguments proper and ſuffi- Page 27.
"cient to convince men" of the truth, why did you not ſay ſo? You reply, "as if it were poſſible, for any man, that reads your anſwer, to think other- "wiſe. Whoever reads that paſſage in your anſwer, page 5, cannot poſſibly A. p. 5.
think you meant to ſpeak out, and poſſibly, you found ſome difficulty to add any thing to your words (which are theſe, "force uſed to bring men, to con- "ſider reaſons and arguments, proper and ſufficient to convince them") that might determine their ſenſe. For, if you had ſaid, to convince them of the truth; then the magiſtrate muſt have made laws, and uſed force, to make men ſearch after truth in general, and that would not have ſerved your turn: if you had ſaid, to convince them of the truth of the magiſtrate's religion, that would too manifeſtly have put the power, in every magiſtrate's hands, which you tell us, "none but an atheiſt will ſay." If you had ſaid, to convince them of the truth of your religion, that had looked too ridiculous to be owned, though it were the thing you meant; and therefore, in this ſtrait, where nothing you could ſay, would well fit your purpoſe, you wiſely chuſe to leave the ſenſe imperfect, and name nothing they were to be convinced of, but leave it to be collected, by your reader, out of your diſcourſe, rather than add three words, to make it good grammar, as well as intelligible ſenſe.

To my ſaying, "That, if you pretend, it muſt be arguments to convince "men of the truth, it would, in this caſe, do you little ſervice; becauſe the "maſs in France is as much ſuppoſed the truth, as the liturgy here." You reply, "ſo that it ſeems, that, in my opinion, whatſoever is ſuppoſed the truth, is Page 28.
"the truth, for otherwiſe this reaſon of mine is none at all." If, in my opinion, the ſuppoſition of truth authorizes the magiſtrate, to uſe the ſame means, to bring men to it, as if it were true, my argument will hold good, without taking all to be true, which ſome men ſuppoſe true. According to this anſwer of yours, to ſuppoſe, or believe, his religion the true, is not enough to authorize the magiſtrate to uſe force, he muſt know, i. e be infallibly certain, that his is the true religion. We will for once ſuppoſe you our magiſtrate, with force promoting our national religion. I will not aſk you, whether you know, that all required of conformiſts, is neceſſary to ſalvation: but will ſuppoſe one of my pagans aſking you, whether you know chriſtianity to be the true religion? If you ſay, Yes, he will aſk you, how you know it? And no doubt, but you will give the anſwer, whereby our Saviour proved his miſſion, John v. 36. that "the works, which our Saviour did, bear witneſs of him, that the Father ſent "him." The miracles, that Chriſt did, are a proof of his being ſent from God, and ſo his religion the true religion. But then, you will be aſked again, Whether your know, that he did thoſe miracles, as well as thoſe, who ſaw them done? If you anſwer, Yes; then it is plain, that miracles are not yet withdrawn, but do ſtill accompany the chriſtian religion, with all the efficacy and evidence, that they had, upon the eye-witneſſes of them, and then; upon your own grounds,

grounds, there will be no neceſſity of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, miracles ſtill ſupplying the want of it. If you anſwer, that matter of fact, done out of your ſight, at ſuch a diſtance of time and place, cannot be known to you, as certainly, as it was to the eye-witneſſes of it; but that you, upon very good grounds, firmly believe it; you are, then, come to believing, that yours is the true religion, and, if that be ſufficient to authorize you, to uſe force, it will authorize any other magiſtrate, of any other religion, to uſe force alſo. For, whoever believes any thing, takes it to be true, and, as he thinks, upon good grounds; and thoſe, often, who believe on the weakeſt grounds, have the ſtrongeſt confidence: and thus, all magiſtrates, who believe their religion to be true, will be obliged to uſe force, to promote it, as if it were the true.

To my ſaying, that the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, amounts to no more but this, that it is not impoſſible, but that it may be uſeful. You reply, Page 28. "I leave it to be judged, by what has been ſaid;" and I leave it to yourſelf to judge: only, that you may not forget, I ſhall here remind you, in ſhort, of ſome of the reaſons, I have to ſay ſo: 1. You grant, that force has no direct efficacy to bring men to embrace the truth. 2. You diſtinguiſh the indirect, and at a diſtance, uſefulneſs, of your force, from that, which is barely by accident; by theſe two marks, viz. 1ſt, That puniſhment on diſſenters for nonconformity, is by thoſe, that uſe it, intended to make men conſider: and 2d, that your moderate puniſhments, by experience, are found often ſucceſsful; and yours having neither of theſe marks, it muſt be concluded to be uſeful, only by L. 2. p. 279. accident, and ſuch an uſefulneſs, as I ſaid, "one cannot deny to auricular confeſſion, doing of penance, going pilgrimages to ſaints, and what not? yet our church does not think fit to uſe them; though it cannot be denied, but they may have ſome of your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs; that is, perhaps may do ſome ſervice indirectly, and by accident." If the intention of thoſe, that uſe them, and the ſucceſs, they will tell you, they find in the uſe of them, be a proof of doing ſervice, more than by accident; that cannot be denied to them, more than to penalties, your way applied. To which, let me add, that niceneſs and difficulty there is, to hit that juſt degree of force; which, according to your hypotheſis, muſt be neither ſo much as to do harm, nor ſo little, as to be ineffectual; (for you yourſelf cannot determine it) makes it uſefulneſs yet more uncertain and accidental. And, after all, let its efficacy, to work upon men's minds, be what it will, great or little, it being ſure to be employed ten, or poſſibly, an hundred times, to bring men to error, for once that it is employed to bring men to the truth; and where it chances to be employed, on the ſide of truth, it being liable to make an hundred, or perhaps a thouſand, outward conformiſts, for one true and ſincere convert; I leave it alſo to be judged, what uſefulneſs it is like to be of.

To ſhew the uſefulneſs of force, your way applied, I ſaid, "Where the law Page 28. puniſhed diſſenters, without telling them, it is to make them conſider, they may, thro' ignorance and overſight, neglect to do it." Your anſwer is, "But, where the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for all, as well as puniſhment for diſſenters, it is ſo plain to all concerned, that the puniſhment is intended to make them conſider, that you ſee no danger in men's neglecting to do it, thro' ignorance and overſight." I hope you mean, by conſider, ſo to conſider as not only to embrace in an outward profeſſion (for then, all, you ſay, is but a poor fallacy, for ſuch conſidering amounts to no more, but bare, outward conformity;) but ſo to conſider, ſtudy and examine matters of religion, as really to embrace, what one is convinced to be true, with faith and obedience. If it be ſo plain and eaſy to underſtand, that a law, that ſpeaks nothing of it, ſhould be yet intended, to make men conſider, ſearch and ſtudy, to find out the truth, that muſt ſave them; I wiſh you had ſhewed us this plainneſs. For I confeſs many, of all degrees, that I have purpoſely aſked about it, did not ever ſee, or ſo much as dream, that the act of uniformity, or againſt conventicles, or the penalties, in either of them, were ever intended, to make men ſeriouſly ſtudy religion, and make it their buſineſs, to find the truth, which muſt ſave them; but barely, to make men conform. But perhaps, you have met with handicrafts-men, and country-farmers, maid-ſervants, and day-labourers, who have quicker underſtandings, and reaſon better, about the intention of the law; for theſe, as well as others, are concerned. If you have not, 'tis to be fear'd, your ſaying, "it is ſo plain, that you ſee no danger of men's neglecting to do it, "through ignorance, or overſight," is more for its ſerving your purpoſe, than from any experience you have, that it is ſo.

WHEN you will enquire into this matter,you will, I gueſs, find the peeple ſo ignorant, amidſt that great plainneſs, you ſpeak of, that not one of twenty, of any degree, amongſt conformiſts, or nonconformiſts, ever underſtood the penalty of 12 d. a Sunday, or any other, of our penal laws againſt nonconformity, to be intended to ſet men, upon ſtudying the true religion, and impartially examine what is neceſſary to ſalvation. And, if you would come to Hudibras's deciſion, I believe he would have a good wager of it who ſhould give you a guinea, for each one, who had thought ſo, and receive but a ſhilling, for every one, who had not. Indeed, you do not ſay, it is plain every- where, but only, "where the law provides ſufficient means of inſtruction for all, as well as pu-"niſhments for diſſenters." From whence, I think it will follow, that that contributes nothing to make it plain, or elſe, that the law has not provided ſufficient means of inſtruction in England, where ſo very few find this to be ſo plain. If, by this ſufficient proviſion of means of inſtruction for all; you mean, perſons maintained at the publick charge, to preach, and officiate, in the publick exerciſe of the national religion; I ſuppoſe, you needed not this reſtriction, there being few places, which have an eſtabliſhed, national religion, where there is not ſuch means of inſtruction provided: if you intend any other means of inſtruction, I know none the law has provided, in England, but the 39 articles, the liturgy, and the ſcripture; and how either of them, by itſelf, or theſe altogether, with a national clergy, make it plain, that penalties, laid on nonconformity, are intended to make men conſider, ſtudy, and impartially examine matters of religion, you would do well to ſhew. For magiſtrates uſually know (and therefore make their laws accordingly) that the people ſeldom carry either their interpretation, or practice, beyond what the expreſs letter of the law requires of them. You would do well alſo to ſhew, that a ſufficient proviſion of means of inſtruction, cannot but be underſtood to require an effectual uſe of them, which the law, that makes that proviſion, ſays nothing of. But, on the contrary, contents itſelf with ſomething very ſhort of it; for conformity, or coming to church, is, at leaſt, as far from conſidering, ſtudying and impartially examining matters of religion, ſo as to embrace the truth, upon conviction, and with an obedient heart, as being preſent at a diſcourſe, concerning mathematicks, and ſtudying mathematicks, ſo as to become a knowing mathematician, are different one from the other.

PEOPLE generally think, they have done their duties abundantly, if they have been at church, whether they mind any thing done there, or no; this they call ſerving of God, as if it were their whole duty; ſo backward are they to underſtand more, tho' it be plain, the law of God expreſly requires more. But that they have fully ſatisfied the law of the land, nobody doubts; nor is it eaſy to anſwer, what was replied to me on this occaſion, viz. If the magiſtrate intended any thing more, in thoſe laws, but conformity, would he not have ſaid it? To which let me add, if the magiſtrate intended conformity, as the fruit of conviction, would he not have taken ſome care, to have them inſtructed, before they conformed, and examined, when they did? But 'tis preſumable, their ignorance, corruption and luſts, all drop off in the church-porch, and that they become perfectly good chriſtians, as ſoon as they have taken their ſeats in the church.

IF there be any, whom your example, or writing, hath inſpired with acuteneſs enough, to find out this; I ſuſpect the vulgar, who have ſcarce time and thought enough, to make inferences from the law, which ſcarce one of ten of them ever ſo much as reads, or perhaps underſtands, when read, are ſtill, and will be ignorant of it; and thoſe, who have the time and abilities to argue about it, will find reaſon to think, that thoſe penalties were not intended, to make men examine the doctrines and ceremonies of religion; ſince thoſe, who ſhould examine, are prohibited, by thoſe very laws, to follow their own judgments, (which is the very end and uſe of examination) if they, at all, differ from the religion, eſtabliſhed by law. Nor can it appear ſo "plain, to all concerned, that "the puniſhment is intended to make them conſider and examine," when they ſee the puniſhments, you ſay, are to make people conſider, ſpare thoſe, who conſider and examine matters of religion, as little as any of the moſt ignorant and careleſs diſſenters.

To my ſaying, "Some diſſenters may have conſidered already; and then, "force, employed upon them, muſt needs be uſeleſs; unleſs you can think it "uſeful, to puniſh a man, to make him do that, which he has done already. You reply, "No man, who rejects truth, neceſſary to his ſalvation, has conſi- Page 28. "dered already, as he ought to conſider." The words, "as he ought," are not, as I take it, in the queſtion: and ſo your anſwer is, "No man, who rejects the "truth, neceſſary to his ſalvation, hath conſidered, ſtudied or examined mat- "ters of religion." But we will let that go: and yet, with that allowance, your anſwer will be nothing to the purpoſe, unleſs you will dare to ſay, that all diſſenters reject truth, neceſſary to ſalvation. For, without that ſuppoſition, that all diſſenters reject truth, neceſſary to ſalvation, the argument and anſwer will ſtand thus. It may be uſeleſs to puniſh all diſſenters, to make them conſider, becauſe ſome of them may have conſidered already. To which the anſwer is, Yes, ſome of them may have conſidered already, but thoſe, who reject truth, neceſſary to their ſalvation, have not conſidered as they ought.

L. 2. p. 279. I SAID, "The greateſt part of mankind, being not able to diſcern betwixt "truth and falſhood, that depends upon long and many proofs, and remote "conſequences; nor having ability enough to diſcover the falſe grounds, and re- "ſiſt the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men, verſed in controver- "ſies, are ſo much more expoſed, by the force, which is uſed to make them "hearken to the information and inſtruction of men, appointed to it by the "magiſtrate, or thoſe of his religion, to be led into falſhood and error, than "they are likely, this way, to be brought to embrace the truth, which muſt "ſave them: by how much the national religions of the world are, beyond "compariſon, more of them falſe, or erroneous, than ſuch as have God for "their author, and truth for their ſtandard." You reply, "If the firſt part of Page 29. "this be true; then an infallible guide, and implicit faith, are more neceſſary, "than ever you thought them." Whether you conclude from thence, or no, that then there will be a neceſſity of an infallible guide, and an implicit faith, 'tis nevertheleſs true, that the greateſt part of men are unable to diſcern, as I ſaid, between truth and falſhood, depending upon long and many proofs, &c. But, whether that will make an infallible guide, neceſſary, or no, impoſition in matters of religion certainly will: ſince, there can be nothing more abſurd imaginable, than that a man ſhould take upon him to impoſe on others, in matters of their eternal concernment, without being, or ſo much as pretending to be, infallible: for colour it with the name, of conſidering, as much as you pleaſe, as long as it is to make men conſider, as they ought, and conſidering, as they ought, is ſo to conſider, as to embrace; the uſing of force, to make men conſider, and the uſing of force, to make them embrace any doctrine, or opinion, is the ſame thing: and, to ſhew a difference betwixt impoſing an opinion, and uſing force, to make it be embraced, would require ſuch a piece of ſubtilty, as I heard lately from a learned man out of the pulpit, who told us, that though two things, he named, were all one, yet, for diſtinction's ſake, he would divide them. Your reaſon, for the neceſſity of an infallible guide, is, "for if the greateſt part of "mankind be not able to diſcern betwixt truth and falſhood, in matters con- "cerning their ſalvation (as, I muſt mean, if I ſpeak to the purpoſe) their "condition muſt needs be very hazardous, if they have not ſome guide, or "judge, to whoſe determination and direction they may ſecurely reſign them- "ſelves." And, therefore, they muſt reſign themſelves to the determination and direction of the civil magiſtrate, or be puniſhed. Here, it is like you will have ſomething again to ſay, to my modeſty and conſcience, for imputing to you what you no where ſay. I grant it, in direct words; but, in effect, as plainly as may be. The magiſtrate may oppoſe ſound creeds and decent ceremonies, i. e, ſuch as he thinks fit, for what is ſound and decent, he, I hope, muſt be judge; and if he be judge of what is ſound and decent, it amounts to no more, but what he thinks fit: and, if it be not, what he thinks fit, why is one ceremony preferred to another? Why one doctrine of the ſcripture put into the creed and articles, and another, as ſound, left out? they are truths neceſſary to ſalvation. We ſhall ſee that in good time: here only I aſk, does the magiſtrate only believe them to be truths and ceremonies neceſſary to ſalvation, or does he certainly know them to be ſo? if you ſay, he only believes them to be ſo, and that that is enough to authorize him to impoſe them, you, by your own confeſſion, authorize magiſtrates to impoſe what they think neceſſary, for the ſalvation of their ſubjects ſouls; and ſo the king of France did, what he was obliged to, when he ſaid, he would have all his ſubjects ſaved, and ſo fell to dragooning.

IF you ſay, the magiſtrate certainly knows them to be neceſſary to ſalvation, we are luckily come to an infallible guide. Well then, the ſound creeds are agreed on; the confeſſion and liturgy are framed; the ceremonies pitched on; and the terms of communion thus ſet up, you have religion eſtabliſhed by law: and what now, is the ſubject to do? he is to conform. No; he muſt firſt conſider. Who bids him conſider? nobody, he may if he pleaſes, but the law ſays nothing to him of it: conſider, or not conſider, if he conforms, it is well, and he is approved of, and admitted. He does not conſider the beſt he can, but finds ſome things, he does not underſtand, other things he cannot believe, aſſent or conſent to. What, now, is to be done with him? he muſt either be puniſhed on, or reſign himſelf up to the determination and direction of the civil magiſtrate: which, until you can find a better name for it, we will call implicit faith. And thus, you have provided a remedy for the hazardous condition of weak underſtandings, in that, which you ſuppoſe neceſſary in the caſe, viz. an infallible guide and implicit faith, in matters concerning men's ſalvation.

BUT you ſay, "for your part, you know of no ſuch guide of God's appointing." Let that be your rule, and the magiſtrate, with his coactive power, will be left out too. You think there is no need of any ſuch: becauſe, notwithſtanding the long and many proofs and remote conſequences, the falſe grounds, and the captious and fallacious arguments of learned men, verſed in controverſies, "with which I (as well as thoſe of the Roman communion) endeavour to amuſe you; through the goodneſs of God, the truth, which is neceſſary to ſalvation, lies ſo obvious and expoſed to all, that ſincerely and diligently ſeek it, that no ſuch perſon ſhall ever fail of attaining the knowledge of it." This, then, is your anſwer, that "truths neceſſary to ſalvation are obvious;" ſo that, thoſe, who ſeek them ſincerely and diligently, are not in danger to be miſled, or expoſed, in thoſe, to error, by the weakneſs of their underſtandings. This will be a good anſwer to what I objected, from the danger, moſt are in, to be led into error, by the magiſtrate's adding force to the arguments, for their national, eſtabliſhed religions, when you have ſhewn that nothing is wont to be impoſed in national religions, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation; or, which will a little better accommodate your hypotheſis, when you can ſhew, that nothing is impoſed, or required for communion with the church of England, but what is neceſſary to ſalvation; and conſequently, is very eaſy and obvious to be known, and diſtinguiſhed from falſhood. And indeed, beſides what you ſay here, upon your hypotheſis, that force is lawful only, becauſe it is neceſſary to bring men to ſalvation, it cannot be lawful to uſe it, to bring men to any thing, but what is abſolutely neceſſary to ſalvation. For, if the lawfulneſs of force be only, from the need, men have of it, to bring them to ſalvation, it cannot lawfully be uſed, to bring men to that, which they do not need, or is not neceſſary to their ſalvation; for in ſuch an application of it, it is not needful to their ſalvation. Can you, therefore ſay, that there is nothing required to be believed and profeſſed in the church of England, but what lies "ſo obvious and expoſed to all, that ſincerely and diligently ſee it, that no ſuch

Page 29.

Ibid.

" perſon ſhall ever fail of attaining the knowledge of it?" What think you of St. Athanaſius's creed? Is the ſenſe of that ſo obvious and expoſed to every one, who ſeeks it, which ſo many learned men have explained ſo different ways, and which, yet, a great many profeſs, they cannot underſtand? or, is it neceſſary to your, or my ſalvation, that you, or I ſhould believe, or pronounce all thoſe damned, who do not believe that creed, i. e. every propoſition in it? which, I fear, would extend to not a few of the church of England, unleſs we can think that people believe, i. e. aſſent to the truth of propoſitions, they do not at all underſtand. If ever you were acquainted with a country pariſh, you muſt needs have a ſtrange opinion of them, if you think all ploughmen and milkmaids at church, underſtood all the propoſitions in Athanaſius's creed; it is more, truly, than I ſhould be apt to think of any one of them, and yet I cannot hence believe myſelf authorized to judge, or pronounce, them all damned: it is too bold an intrenching on the prerogative of the Almighty; to their own maſter they ſtand or fall.

The doctrine of original ſin, is that which is profeſſed, and muſt be owned by the members of the church of England, as is evident from the thirty nine articles, and ſeveral paſſages in the liturgy: and yet I aſk you, whether this be " ſo obvious and expoſed to all, that diligently and ſincerely ſeek the truth," that one, who is in the communion of the church of England, ſincerely ſeeking the truth, may not raiſe to himſelf ſuch difficulties, concerning the doctrine of original ſin, as may puzzle him, though he be a man of ſtudy; and, whether he may not puſh his enquiries ſo far, as to be ſtaggered in his opinion.

If you grant me this, as I am apt to think you will, then I enquire, whether it be not true, (notwithſtanding what you ſay, concerning the plainneſs and obviouſneſs of truths neceſſary to ſalvation) that a great part of mankind may not be able to diſcern between truth and falſhood, in ſeveral points, which are thought ſo far to concern their ſalvation, as to be made neceſſary parts of the national religion.

If you ſay, it may be ſo, then I have nothing farther to enquire; but ſhall only adviſe you, not to be ſo ſevere, hereafter, in your cenſure of Mr. Reynolds, as you are, where you tell me, that the " famous inſtance I gave, of the two " Reynolds's, is not of any moment, to prove the contrary; unleſs I can under- " take, that he, that erred, was as ſincere in his enquiry after the truth, as I ſup- " poſe him able to examine and judge."

You will, I ſuppoſe, be more charitable another time, when you have conſidered, that neither ſincerity, nor freedom from error, even in the eſtabliſhed doctrines of their own church, is the privilege of thoſe, who join themſelves in outward profeſſion to any national church whatſoever. And it is not impoſſible, that one who has ſubſcribed the thirty nine articles, may yet make it a queſtion, " Whether it may be truly ſaid, that God imputes the firſt ſin of Adam to his " poſterity?" But we are apt to be ſo fond of our own opinion, and almoſt infallibility, that we will not allow them to be ſincere, who quit our communion; while, at the ſame time, we tell the world, it is preſumable, that all, who embrace it, do it ſincerely, and upon conviction; though we cannot but know, many of them, to be but looſe, inconſiderate, and ignorant people. This is all the reaſon, you have, when you ſpeak of the Reynolds's, to ſuſpect one of the brothers, more than the other: and to think, that Mr. Chillingworth had not as much ſincerity, when he quitted, as when he returned to the church of England, is a partiality, which nothing can juſtify, without pretending to infallibility.

Page 34. To ſhew that you do not fancy your force to be uſeful, but that you " judge " ſo upon juſt and ſufficient grounds, you tell us, the ſtrong probability of its " ſucceſs is grounded upon the conſideration of human nature, and the general " temper of mankind, apt to be wrought upon, by the method you ſpeak of, " and upon the indiſputable atteſtation of experience." The conſideration of human nature, and the general temper of mankind, will teach one this, that men are apt, in things within their power, to be wrought upon by force, and the more wrought upon, the greater the force, or puniſhments are: ſo that, where moderate penalties will not work, great ſeverities will. Which conſideration of human nature, if it be a juſt ground to judge any force uſeful, will, I fear, neceſſarily carry you, in your judgment, to ſeverities beyond the moderate penalties, ſo often mentioned in your ſyſtem, upon a ſtrong probability of the ſucceſs of greater puniſhments, where leſs would not prevail.

BUT if, to conſider ſo, as you require, i. e. ſo as to embrace, and believe, be not in their power, then no force at all, great or little, is, or can be, uſeful. You muſt, therefore, (conſider it which way you will) either renounce all force as uſeful, or pull off your maſk, and own all the ſeverities of the cruelleſt perſecutors.

THE other reaſon of your judging force to be uſeful, you ſay, is grounded on the indiſputable atteſtation of experience. Pray tell us, where you have this atteſtation of experience, for your moderate, which is the only uſeful force: name the country where true religion, or ſound chriſtianity, has been nationally received, and eſtabliſhed by moderate penal laws, that the obſerving perſons, you appeal to, may know, where to employ their obſervation: tell us, how long it was tried, and what was the ſucceſs of it? and where there has been the relaxation of ſuch moderate, penal laws, the fruits whereof have continually been Epicuriſm and atheiſm? Until you do this, I fear, that all the world will think, there is a more indiſputable atteſtation of experience for the ſucceſs of dragooning, and the ſeverities you condemn, than of your moderate method; which we ſhall compare with the king of France's, and ſee, which is moſt ſucceſsful, in making proſelytes to church conformity, (for yours, as well as his, reach no farther than that) when you produce your examples: the confident talk whereof, is good to countenance a cauſe, though experience there be none in the caſe.

BUT you "appeal, you ſay, to all obſerving perſons, whether, where-ever "true religion, or ſound chriſtianity, have been nationally received, and eſta"bliſhed by moderate, penal laws, it has not always viſibly loſt ground, by "the relaxation of thoſe laws?" true or falſe religions, ſound or unſound chriſtianity, where-ever eſtabliſhed into national religions, by penal laws, always have loſt, and always will loſe ground, i. e. loſe ſeveral of their conforming profeſſors, upon the relaxation of thoſe laws. But this concerns not the true, more than other religions; nor is any prejudice to it; but only ſhews, that many are, by the penalties of the law, kept in the communion of the national religion, who are not really convinced, or perſuaded of it: and therefore, as ſoon as liberty is given, they own the diſlike, they had made of them before, and out of perſuaſion, curioſity, &c. ſeek out and betake themſelves to ſome other profeſſion. This need not ſtartle the magiſtrates of any religion, much leſs thoſe of the true, ſince they be ſure to retain thoſe, who more mind their ſecular intereſt than the truth of religion, (who are, every-where, the greater number) by the advantages of countenance and preferment: and, if it be the true religion, they will retain thoſe alſo, who are in earneſt of it, by the ſtronger tie of conſcience and conviction. Page 34.

YOU go on, "Whether ſects and hereſies (even the wildeſt and moſt abſurd, "and even Epicuriſm and atheiſm) have not continually thereupon ſpread "themſelves, and whether the very life of chriſtianity has not ſenſibly decayed, "as well as the number of ſound profeſſors of it been daily leſſened upon it?" As to atheiſm and Epicuriſm, whether they more ſpread under toleration, or national religions, eſtabliſhed by moderate, penal laws, when you ſhew us the countries, where fair trial hath been made of both, that we may compare them together, we ſhall better be able to judge. Ibid.

"Epicuriſm and atheiſm, ſay you, are found conſtantly to ſpread themſelves, "upon the relaxation of moderate penal laws." We will ſuppoſe your hiſtory to be full of inſtances of ſuch relaxations, which you will, in good time, communicate to the world, that wants this aſſiſtance from your obſervation. But were this to be juſtified, out of hiſtory, yet would it not be any argument againſt toleration; unleſs your hiſtory can furniſh you, with a new ſort of religion, founded in atheiſm. However, you do well to charge the ſpreading of atheiſm, upon toleration in matters of religion, as an argument againſt thoſe, who deny atheiſm (which takes away all religion) to have any right to toleration at all. But perhaps (as is uſual for thoſe, who think all the world ſhould ſee with their eyes, and receive their ſyſtems for unqueſtionable verities) zeal for your own way makes you call all atheiſm, that agrees not with it. That which makes me doubt of this, are theſe following words; "Not to ſpeak of what, at "this time, our eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving offence: though, I hope, "it will be none to any, that have a juſt concern for truth and piety, to take "notice of the books and pamphlets, which now fly ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of ſects and diviſions, and even "to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion amongſt us. In which number, "you ſay, you ſhall not much need my pardon, if you reckon the firſt and "ſecond letter concerning toleration." Wherein, by a broad inſinuation, you impute the ſpreading of atheiſm among us, to the late relaxation made, in favour of proteſtant diſſenters: and yet, all that you can take notice of, as a proof of this, is, "the books and pamphlets, which now fly ſo thick about this kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of ſects and diviſions, and even "to the promoting of ſcepticiſm, in religion, amongſt us;" and for inſtance, you name the firſt and ſecond letter concerning toleration. If one may gueſs at the others, by theſe, the atheiſm and ſcepticiſm, you accuſe them of, will have but little more in it, than an oppoſition to your hypotheſis; on which, the whole buſineſs of religion muſt ſo turn, that whatever agrees not with your ſyſtem, muſt preſently, by interpretation, be concluded to tend, to the promoting of atheiſm, or ſcepticiſm, in religion. For I challenge you to ſhew, in either of thoſe two letters you mention, one word, tending to Epicuriſm, atheiſm, or ſcepticiſm in religion. Page 35.

BUT, Sir, againſt the next time you are to give an account of books and pamphlets, tending to the promoting ſcepticiſm in religion, amongſt us, I ſhall mind you of your third letter concerning toleration, to be added to the catalogue, which aſſerting and building upon this, that the "true religion may be known "by thoſe, who profeſs it, to be the only true religion," does not a little, towards betraying the chriſtian religion to ſcepticks. For, what greater advantage can be given them, than to teach, that one may know the true religion? Thereby putting into their hands a right to demand it to be demonſtrated to them, that the chriſtian religion is true, and bringing on the profeſſors of it to a neceſſity of doing it. I have heard it complained of, as one great artifice of ſcepticks, to require demonſtrations, where they neither could be had, nor were neceſſary. But, if the true religion may be known to men, to be ſo, a ſceptick may require, and you cannot blame him, if he does not receive your religion, upon the ſtrongeſt probable arguments, without demonſtration. Page 47.

BUT, if one ſhould demand, of you, demonſtration, of the truths of your religion, which, I beſeech you, would you, do? either renounce your aſſertion, that it may be known to be true, or elſe undertake to demonſtrate it to him?

AND as for the decay of the very life and ſpirit of chriſtianity, and the ſpreading of Epicuriſm amongſt us: I aſk, what can tend more to the promoting of them, than this doctrine, which is to be found in the ſame letter, viz. That it is preſumable that thoſe, who conform, do it upon reaſon and conviction? When you can inſtance in any thing, ſo much tending to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion, and Epicuriſm, in the firſt or ſecond letter concerning toleration, we ſhall have reaſon to think, you have ſome ground for what you ſay.

As to Epicuriſm, the ſpreading whereof you likewiſe impute, to the relaxation of your moderate, penal laws; That, ſo far as it is diſtinct from atheiſm, I think regards men's lives, more than their religions, i. e. ſpeculative opinions in religion and ways of worſhip, which is, what we mean by religion, as concerned in toleration. And, for the toleration of corrupt manners, and the debaucheries of life, neither our author, nor I, do plead for it: but ſay, it is properly the magiſtrate's buſineſs, by puniſhments, to reſtrain and ſuppreſs them. I do

not,

not, therefore, blame your zeal againſt atheiſm and epicuriſm; but you diſcover a great zeal againſt ſomething elſe, in charging them on toleration, when it is in the magiſtrate's power to reſtrain and ſuppreſs them by more effectual laws, than thoſe for church-conformity. For there are thoſe, who will tell you, that an outward profeſſion of the national religion, even where it is the true religion, is no more oppoſite to, or inconſiſtent with atheiſm, or epicuriſm, than the owning of another religion, eſpecially any chriſtian profeſſion, that differs from it. And therefore, you, in vain, impute atheiſm, or epicuriſm, to the relaxation of penal laws, that require no more, than an outward conformity to the national church.

As to the ſects and unchriſtian diviſions (for other diviſions there may be, without prejudice to chriſtianity) at whoſe door they chiefly ought to be laid, I have ſhewed you elſewhere.

One thing, I cannot but take notice of, here, that having named "ſects, he-" reſies, epicuriſm, atheiſm, and a decay of the ſpirit and life of chriſtianity," as the fruits of relaxation, for which we had the atteſtation of former experience, you had theſe words, "Not to ſpeak of what our eyes, at this time, cannot Page 34. " but ſee, for fear of giving offence." Whom is it, I beſeech you, you are ſo afraid of offending, if you ſhould ſpeak of the "epicuriſm, atheiſm, and " decay of the ſpirit and life of chriſtianity," amongſt us? But I ſee, he that is ſo moderate, in one part of his letter, that he will not take upon him to teach law-makers and governors, even what they cannot know, without being taught by him, i. e. what he calls moderate penalties, or force; may yet, in another part of the ſame letter, by broad inſinuations, uſe reproaches, wherein it is a hard matter to think law-makers and governors are not meant. But, whoever be meant, it is at leaſt adviſeable, in accuſations, that are eaſier ſuggeſted, than made out, to caſt abroad the ſlander in general, and leave others to apply it, for fear thoſe, who are named, and ſo juſtly offended, with a falſe imputation, ſhould be entitled to aſk, as in this caſe, how it appears, "That ſects and he-" reſies have multiplied, epicuriſm and atheiſm ſpread themſelves, and that the " life and ſpirit of chriſtianity is decayed" more, within theſe two years, than it was before; and that all this miſchief is owing to the late relaxation of the penal laws againſt proteſtant diſſenters.

You go on, "and, if theſe have always been the fruits of relaxation of mo- Page 35. " derate penal laws, made for the preſerving and advancing true religion; you " think this conſideration alone, is abundantly ſufficient to ſhew the uſefulneſs " and benefit of ſuch laws. For, if theſe evils have conſtantly ſprung from " the relaxation of thoſe laws, it is evident, they were prevented before, by thoſe " laws." One would think, by your ſaying, "always been the fruits, and con-" ſtantly ſprung," that moderate, penal laws, for preſerving the true religion, had been the conſtant practice of all chriſtian commonwealths; and that relaxations of them, in favour of a free toleration, had frequently happened; and that there were examples both of the one and the other, as common and known, as of princes, that have perſecuted for religion, and learned men, who have employed their ſkill to make it good. But, until you ſhew us, in what ages, or countries, your moderate eſtabliſhments were in faſhion, and where they were again removed, to make way for our author's toleration, you, to as little purpoſe, talk of the fruits of them, as if you ſhould talk of the fruit of a tree, which no body planted, or was no where ſuffered to grow, until one might ſee, what fruit came from it.

Having laid it down, as one of the conditions, for a fair debate of this controverſy, "That it ſhould be, without ſuppoſing all along your church in L. 2. p. 295. " the right, and your religion the true; I add theſe words: which can no more " be allowed to you, IN THIS CASE, whatever your church, or religion be, " than it can be to a papiſt, or a lutheran, a preſbyterian, or an anabaptiſt; " nay, no more to you, than it can be allowed to a Jew, or mahometan." To which you reply, "No, Sir? not, whatever your church, or religion, be? that Page 47. " ſeems ſomewhat hard. And you think, I might have given you ſome " reaſon, for what I ſay; for, certainly it is not ſo ſelf-evident, as to need no “proof. But you think, it is no hard matter to gueſs at my reaſon, though I did not think fit, expreſsly to own it. For it is obvious enough, there can be no other reaſon, for this aſſertion of mine, but either the equal truth, or at leaſt the equal certainty (or uncertainty) of all religions. For, whoever conſiders my aſſertion, muſt ſee, that, to make it good, I ſhall be obliged to maintain one of theſe two things: either, 1. That no religion is the true religion, in oppoſition to other religions: which makes all religions true, or falſe, and ſo, either way, indifferent. Or, 2. That though ſome one religion be the true religion, yet no man can have any more reaſon, than any man, of another religion, may have, to believe his to be the religion. Which makes all religions equally certain, (or uncertain, whether I pleaſe) and ſo renders it vain and idle, to enquire after the true religion, and only a piece of good luck, if any man be of it, and ſuch good luck, as he can never know, that he has, 'till he come into the other world. Whether of theſe two principles, I will own, you know not. But certainly, one, or other, of them lies at the bottom with me, and is the lurking ſuppoſition, upon which I build all that I ſay.”

CERTAINLY no, Sir, neither of theſe reaſons, you have ſo ingenuouſly and friendly found out for me, lies at the bottom; but this, That whatever privilege, or power, you claim, upon your ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, is equally due to another (who ſuppoſes his to be the true religion) upon the ſame claim: and therefore, that is no more to be allowed to you, than to him. For, whoſe is really the true religion, yours or his, being the matter in conteſt betwixt you, your ſuppoſing can no more determine it on your ſide, than his ſuppoſing on his; unleſs you can think, you have a right to judge, in your own cauſe. You believe yours to be the true religion, ſo does he believe his: You ſay, you are certain of it; ſo ſays he, he is: You think you have “arguments proper and ſufficient” to convince him, if he would conſider them; the ſame thinks he of his. If this claim, which is equally on both ſides, be allowed to either, without any proof; 'tis plain he, in whoſe favour it is allowed, is allowed to be judge, in his own cauſe, which no body can have a right to be, who is not at leaſt infallible. If you come to arguments and proofs, which you muſt do, before it can be determined, whoſe is the true religion, 'tis plain your ſuppoſition is not allowed.

IN our preſent caſe, in uſing puniſhments in religion, you ſuppoſing yours to be the true religion, gives you or your magiſtrate no more advantage over a papiſt, preſbyterian, or mahometan, or more reaſon to puniſh either of them for his religion, than the ſame ſuppoſition, in a papiſt, preſbyterian, or mahometan, gives any of them, or a magiſtrate of their religion, advantage over you, or reaſon to puniſh you for your religion: and therefore, this ſuppoſition, to any purpoſe, or privilege, of uſing force, is no more to be allowed to you, than to any one of any other religion. This the words, IN THIS CASE, which I there uſed, would have ſatisfied any other to have been my meaning: but, whether your charity made you not to take notice of them, or the joy of ſuch an advantage as this, not to underſtand them, this is certain, you were reſolved not to loſe the opportunity, ſuch a place as this afforded you, of ſhewing your gift, in commenting and gueſſing ſhrewdly at a man's reaſons, when he does not think fit expreſsly to own them himſelf.

I MUST own, you have a very lucky hand at it; and, as you do it here, upon the ſame ground, ſo it is juſt with the ſame ſucceſs, as you, in another place, have exerciſed your logick, on my ſaying ſomething to the ſame purpoſe, as I do here. But, Sir, if you will add but one more, to your plentiful ſtock of diſtinctions, and obſerve the difference there is between the ground of any one's ſuppoſing his religion is true, and the privilege, he may pretend to, by ſuppoſing it true, you will never ſtumble at this again; but, you will find, that, though upon the former of theſe accounts, men of all religions cannot be equally allowed to ſuppoſe their religions true, yet, in reference to the latter, the ſuppoſition may, and ought to be, allowed, or denied, equally to all men. And the reaſon of it is plain, viz. Becauſe the aſſurance, wherewith one man ſuppoſes his religion to be true, being no more an argument of its truth to another, than vice verſa; neither of them can claim, by the aſſurance, wherewith he ſuppoſes his religion the true, any prerogative, or power, over the other, which the other has not, by the ſame title, an equal claim to, over him. If this will not ſerve, to ſpare you the pains another time, of any more ſuch reaſonings, as we have twice had, on this ſubject, I think I ſhall be forced to ſend you to my mahometans, or pagans: and I doubt, whether I am not leſs civil to your parts, than I ſhould be, that I do not ſend you to them, now.

Page 47.

You go on, and ſay, “But, as unreaſonable as this condition is, you ſee no need, you have, to decline it, nor any occaſion I had, to impoſe it upon you. For certainly, the making, what I call, your new method, conſiſtent and practicable, does no way oblige me to ſuppoſe, all along, your religion the true, as I imagine.” And, as I imagine it does: for, without that ſuppoſition, I would fain have you ſhew me, how it is, in any one country, practicable, to puniſh men, to bring them to the true religion. For, if you will argue for force, as neceſſary to bring men to the true religion, without ſuppoſing yours to be it, you will find yourſelf under ſome ſuch difficulty as this, that then, it muſt firſt be determined, (and you will require, it ſhould be) which is the true religion, before any one can have a right to uſe force, to bring men to it; which, if every one did not determine for himſelf, by ſuppoſing his own the true, no body, I think, will deſire toleration any longer, than 'till that be ſettled.

Ibid.

You go on: “No, Sir, it is enough for that purpoſe, that there is one, true religion, and but one.” Suppoſe not the national religion eſtabliſhed by law, in England, to be that, and then, even upon your principles, of its being uſeful, and that the magiſtrate has a commiſſion to uſe force, for the promoting the true religion; prove, if you pleaſe, that the magiſtrate has a power to uſe force, to bring men to the national religion in England. For then, you muſt prove the national religion, as eſtabliſhed by law in England, to be that one, true religion, and ſo the true religion; that he rejects the true religion, who diſſents from any part of it; and ſo rejecting the true religion, cannot be ſaved. But of this more, in another place.

Ibid.

Your other two ſuppoſitions, which you join to the foregoing, are, That, “that religion may be known by thoſe, who profeſs it, to be the only true religion; and may alſo be manifeſted to be ſuch, by them, to others, ſo far at leaſt, as to oblige them to receive it, and to leave them without excuſe, if they do not.”

These, you ſay, are ſuppoſitions, “enough for the making your method conſiſtent and practicable. They are, I gueſs, more than enough, for you, upon them, to prove any national religion, in the world, the only true religion. And, 'till you have proved (for you profeſs here to have quitted the ſuppoſition of any one's being true, as neceſſary to your hypotheſis) ſome national religion, to be that only, true religion, I would gladly know, how it is any way practicable, to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion.

You ſuppoſe, “there is one true religion, and but one.” In this we are both agreed: and from hence, I think, it will follow, ſince, whoever is of this true religion ſhall be ſaved, and, without being of it, no man ſhall be ſaved, that, upon your ſecond and third ſuppoſition, it will be hard to ſhew any national religion to be this only true religion. For who is it will ſay, he knows, or that it is knowable, that any national religion (wherein muſt be comprehended all that, by the penal laws, he is required to embrace) is that only true religion; which if men reject, they ſhall, and which, if they embrace, they ſhall not, miſs of ſalvation? Or can you undertake, that any national religion in the world can be manifeſted to be ſuch, i. e. in ſhort, to contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and nothing but what is ſo? For that, and that alone, is the one only true religion, without which, no body can be ſaved; and which is enough for the ſalvation of every one, who embraces it. And therefore, whatever is leſs, or more, than this, is not the one only true religion, or that, which there is a neceſſity, for their ſalvation, men ſhould be forced to embrace.

I do not hereby deny, that there is any national religion, which contains all, that is neceſſary to ſalvation, for ſo doth the Romiſh religion, which is not, for all that, ſo much as a true religion. Nor do I deny, that there are national religions that contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation, and nothing inconſiſtent with it, and ſo may be called true religions. But, ſince they, all of them, join with what is neceſſary to ſalvation, a great deal that is not ſo, and make that, as neceſſary to communion, as what is neceſſary to ſalvation, not ſuffering any one to be of their communion, without taking all together; nor to live amongſt them, free from puniſhment, out of their communion; will you affirm, that any of the national religions of the world, which are impoſed by penal laws, and to which men are driven with force, can be ſaid to be, that one only true religion, which if men embrace, they ſhall be ſaved; and which, if they embrace not, they ſhall be damned? And therefore, your two ſuppoſitions, true or falſe, are not enough to make it impracticable, upon your principles of neceſſity, to uſe force, upon diſſenters from the national religion, though it contain in it nothing but truth, unleſs that, which is required to communion, be all neceſſary to ſalvation. For whatever is not neceſſary to ſalvation, there is no neceſſity any one ſhould embrace. So that, whenever you ſpeak of the true religion, to make it to your purpoſe, you muſt ſpeak only of what is neceſſary to ſalvation; unleſs you will ſay, that, in order to the ſalvation of men's ſouls, it is neceſſary to uſe force, to bring them to embrace ſomething, that is not neceſſary to their ſalvation. I think, that neither you, nor any body elſe, will affirm, that it is neceſſary to uſe force, to bring men to receive all the truths of the chriſtian religion, though they are truths, God has thought fit to reveal. For then, by your own rule, you, who profeſs the chriſtian religion, muſt know them all, and muſt be able to manifeſt them to others; for it is on that, you here ground the neceſſity and reaſonableneſs of penalties, uſed to bring men to embrace the truth. But I ſuſpect, 'tis the good word, religion, (as, in other places, other words) has miſled you, whilſt you content yourſelf with good ſounds, and ſome confuſed notions, that uſually accompany them, without annexing to them any preciſe, determined ſignification. To convince that you 'tis not, without ground, I ſay this, I ſhall deſire you, but to ſet down, what you mean here, by true religion, that we may know what, in your ſenſe, is, and what is not, contained in it. Would you but do this fairly, and define your words, or uſe them in one conſtant, ſettled ſenſe, I think the controverſy between you and me would be at an end, without any farther trouble.

Having ſhewed of what advantage they are like to be, to you, for the making your method practicable, in the next place, let us conſider your ſuppoſitions themſelves. As to the firſt, "there is one true religion, and but one," we are agreed. But what you ſay, in the next place, that "that one, true religion "may be known, by thoſe, who profeſs it," will need a little examination. As firſt, it will be neceſſary to enquire, what you mean by known; whether you mean by it, knowledge, properly ſo call'd, as contra-diſtinguiſh'd to belief, or only the aſſurance of a firm belief? If the latter, I leave you your ſuppoſition, to make your uſe of it, only with this deſire, that, to avoid miſtakes, when you do make uſe of it, you would call it believing. If you mean that the true religion may be known, with the certainty of knowledge, properly ſo called; I aſk you farther, whether that true religion be to be known, by the light of nature, or needed a divine revelation to diſcover it? If you ſay (as I ſuppoſe you will) the latter; then I aſk, whether the making out of that to be a divine revelation, depends not upon particular matters of fact, whereof you were no eye-witneſs; but were done many ages, before you were born? And if ſo, by what principles of ſcience they can be known, to any man now living?

The articles of my religion, and of a great many other ſuch ſhort-ſighted people as I am, are articles of faith, which, we think, there are ſo good grounds to believe, that we are perſuaded to venture our eternal happineſs on that belief: and hope to be of that number, of whom our Saviour ſaid, "bleſſed are they, "that have not ſeen, and yet have believed." But we neither think, that God requires, nor has given us faculties capable of knowing in this world ſeveral of thoſe truths, which are to be believed to ſalvation. If you have a religion, all whoſe general truths are either ſelf-evident, or capable of demonſtration, (for matters of fact are not capable of being any way known, but to the by-ſtanders) you will do well to let it be known, for the ending of controverſies, and baniſhing of error, concerning any of thoſe points, out of the world. For, whatever may be known, beſides matter of fact, is capable of demonſtration; and, when you have demonſtrated, to any one, any point in religion, you ſhall have my conſent to puniſh him, if he do not aſſent to it. But yet, let me tell you, there are many truths, even in the mathematicks, the evidence whereof one man ſeeing is able to demonſtrate to himſelf, and ſo may know them: which evidence yet, he not being able to make another ſee, (which is to demonſtrate to him) he cannot make known to him, though his ſcholar be willing, and, with all his power, applies himſelf to learn it.

BUT granting your ſuppoſition, that "the one true religion may be known, "by thoſe, who profeſs it, to be the only true religion;" will it follow from hence, that, becauſe it is knowable to be the true religion, therefore the magiſtrate, who profeſſes it, actually knows it to be ſo? Without which knowledge, upon your principles, he cannot uſe force to bring men to it. But if you are but at hand, to aſſure him, which is the true religion, for which we ought to uſe force, he is bound to believe you; and that will do, as well as if he examined and knew himſelf, or perhaps better. For you ſeem not well ſatisfied, with what the magiſtrates have lately done, without your leave, concerning religion, in England. And, I confeſs, the eaſieſt way to remove all difficulties in the caſe, is for you to be the magiſtrate's infallible guide, in matters of religion. And therefore, you do well here, alſo, to keep to your ſafe ſtile, leſt, if your ſenſe were clear and determined, it might be more expoſed to exceptions; and therefore, you tell us, the true religion may be known by thoſe, who profeſs it. For not ſaying, by ſome of thoſe, or by all thoſe, the error, of what you ſay, is not ſo eaſily obſerved, and requires the more trouble to come at: which I ſhall ſpare myſelf here, being ſatisfied, that the magiſtrate, who has ſo full an employment of his thoughts, in the cares of the government, has not an overplus of leiſure to attain that knowledge, which you require, and ſo uſually contents himſelf with believing.

YOUR next ſuppoſition is, that "the one true religion may alſo be manifeſted "to be ſuch, by them, to others; ſo far, at leaſt, as to oblige them to receive "it, and leave them without excuſe, if they do not:" That it can be manifeſted to ſome, ſo as to oblige, i. e. cauſe them to receive it, is evident, becauſe it is received. But, becauſe this ſeems to be ſpoken, more, in reference to thoſe, who do not receive it, as appears, by theſe following words of yours: "then 'tis "altogether as plain, that it may be very reaſonable and neceſſary for ſome men, "to change their religion; and that it may be made appear to them to be ſo. "And then, if ſuch men will not conſider, what is offered to convince them, "of the reaſonableſs and neceſſity of doing it; it may be very fit and reaſonable, you tell me, for any thing I have ſaid to the contrary, in order to the "bringing them to conſideration, to require them, under convenient penalties, "to forſake their falſe religions, and to embrace the true." You ſuppoſe, the true religion may be ſo manifeſted, by a man that is of it, to all men, ſo far, as to leave them, if they do not embrace it, without excuſe. Without excuſe; to whom I beſeech you? To God, indeed, but not to the magiſtrate, who can never know, whether it has been ſo manifeſted to any man, that it has been through his fault, that he has not been convinced, and not through the fault of him, to whom the magiſtrate committed the care of convincing him: and, 'tis a ſufficient excuſe to the magiſtrate, for any one to ſay to him, I have not neglected to conſider the arguments, that have been offered me, by thoſe, whom you have employ'd, to manifeſt it to me, but that yours is the only true religion, I am not convinced. Which is ſo direct and ſufficient an excuſe to the magiſtrate, that had he an expreſs commiſſion from heaven, to puniſh all thoſe, who did not conſider, he could not yet juſtly puniſh any one, whom, he could not convince, had not conſidered. But you endeavour to avoid this, by what you in-

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L. p. 48. fer, from this your ſuppoſition, viz. “that, then it may be very fit and reaſonable, for any thing I have ſaid to the contrary, to require men, under convenient penalties, to forſake their falſe religions, to embrace the true, in order to the bringing them to conſideration.” Whether I have ſaid any thing to the contrary, or no, the readers muſt judge, and I need not repeat. But now, I ſay, it is neither juſt, nor reaſonable, to require men, under penalties, to attain one end, in order to bring them to uſe the means, not neceſſary to that, but to another end. For where is it, you can ſay (unleſs you will return to your old ſuppoſition of yours being the true religion; which, you ſay, is not neceſſary to your Page 51. method) that men are, by the law, “required to forſake their falſe religions, and embrace the true?” The utmoſt is this, in all countries, where the national religion is impoſed by law, men are required, under the penalties of thoſe laws, outwardly to conform to it: which you ſay, is in order to make them conſider, So that your puniſhments are for the attaining one end, viz. conformity, in order to make men uſe conſideration, which is a means, not neceſſary to that, but another end, viz. finding out and embracing the one true religion. For, however conſideration may be a neceſſary means to find and embrace, the one true religion, it is not at all a neceſſary means to outward conformity, in the communion of any religion.

To manifeſt the conſiſtency and practicableneſs of your method, to the queſtion, what advantage would it be to the true religion, if magiſtrates did every Page 51. where ſo puniſh? You anſwer, that, “by the magiſtrates puniſhing, if I ſpeak to the purpoſe, I muſt mean their puniſhing men, for rejecting the true religion, (ſo tender’d to them, as has been ſaid) in order to the bringing them to conſider and embrace it. Now, before we can ſuppoſe magiſtrates, every where, ſo to puniſh, we muſt ſuppoſe the true religion to be, every where, the national religion. And, if this were the caſe, you think it is evident enough, what advantage to the true religion it would be, if magiſtrates every where, did ſo puniſh. For then we might reaſonably hope, that all falſe religions would ſoon vaniſh, and the true become, once more, the only religion in the world: whereas, if magiſtrates ſhould not ſo puniſh, it were much to be feared (eſpecially conſidering what has already happen’d) that, on the contrary, falſe religion and atheiſm, as more agreeable to the ſoil, would daily take deeper root, and propagate themſelves, ’till there were no room left for the true religion (which is but a foreign plant) in any corner of the world.”

If you can make it practicable, that the magiſtrate ſhould puniſh men, for rejecting the true religion, without judging, which is the true religion: or, if true religion could appear in perſon, take the magiſtrate’s ſeat, and there judge all that rejected her, ſomething might be done. But, the miſchief of it is, it is a man, that muſt condemn, men muſt puniſh, and men cannot do this, but by judging, who is guilty of the crime, which they puniſh. An oracle, or an interpreter of the law of nature, who ſpeaks as clearly, tells the magiſtrate, he may and ought to puniſh thoſe, “who reject the true religion, tender’d with ſufficient evidence:” the magiſtrate is ſatisfied of his authority, and believes this commiſſion to be good. Now I would know how, poſſibly, he can execute it, without making himſelf the judge. 1. What is the true religion? Unleſs the law of nature, at the ſame time, deliver’d into his hands the thirty-nine articles of the one, only, true religion, and another book, wherein all the ceremonies and outward worſhip of it are contained. But it being certain, that the law of nature has not done this; and as certain, that the articles, ceremonies, and diſcipline of this one, only, true religion, has been often varied, in ſeveral ages and countries, ſince the magiſtrate’s commiſſion, by the law of nature, was firſt given: there is no remedy left, but that the magiſtrate muſt judge, what is the true religion, if he muſt puniſh them, who reject it. Suppoſe the magiſtrate be commiſſioned to puniſh thoſe, who depart from right reaſon, the magiſtrate can yet never puniſh any one, unleſs he be judge, what is right reaſon; and then, judging that murder, theft, adultery, narrow cart-wheels, or want of bows and arrows in a man’s houſe, are againſt right reaſon, he may make laws to puniſh men guilty of thoſe, as rejecting right reaſon.

So, if the magiſtrate, in England, or France, having a commiſſion to puniſh thoſe, who reject the one, only, true religion, judges the religion of his national church to be it, 'tis poſſible for him to lay penalties on thoſe, who reject it, purſuant to that commiſſion; otherwiſe, without judging that to be the one, only, true religion, 'tis wholly impracticable for him, to puniſh thoſe, who embrace it not, as rejecters of the one, only, true religion.

To provide as good a ſalvo, as the thing will bear, you ſay, in the following words, "before we can ſuppoſe magiſtrates, every where, ſo to puniſh, we muſt "ſuppoſe the true religion to be, every where, the national." That is true of actual puniſhment, but not of laying on penalties by law; for that would be to ſuppoſe the national religion makes, or chuſes, the magiſtrate, and not the magiſtrate the national religion. But we ſee the contrary; for let the national religion be, what it will, before, the magiſtrate doth not always fall into it and embrace that; but, if he thinks not that, but ſome other, the true, the firſt opportunity he has, he changes the national religion into that, which he judges the true, and then puniſhes the diſſenters from it; where his judgment, which is the true religion, always neceſſarily precedes, and is that which ultimately does, and muſt, determine, who are rejecters of the true religion, and ſo, obnoxious to puniſhment. This being ſo, I would gladly ſee, how your method can be, any way, practicable to the advantage of the true religion, whereof the magiſtrate, every where, muſt be judge, or elſe he can puniſh no body at all.

You tell me that, whereas I ſay, that, to juſtify puniſhment, it is requiſite Page 54. that it be directly uſeful, for the procuring ſome greater good than that, which it takes away; you "wiſh I had told you, why it muſt needs be directly uſeful "for that purpoſe." However exact you may be, in demanding reaſons of what is ſaid, I thought here you had no cauſe to complain; but you let ſlip out of your memory the foregoing words of this paſſage, which together ſtands thus, "Puniſhment is ſome evil, ſome inconvenience, ſome ſuffering, by taking L. 2. p. 296. "away, or abridging, ſome good thing, which he, who is puniſhed, has other-"wiſe a right to." Now to juſtify the bringing any ſuch evil upon any man, "two things are requiſite; 1. That he, that does it, has a commiſſion ſo to "do. 2. That it be directly uſeful, for the promoting ſome greater good." 'Tis evident, by theſe words, that puniſhment brings direct evil upon a man, and therefore, it ſhould not be uſed, but where it is directly uſeful, for the procuring ſome greater good. In this caſe, the ſignification of the word, directly, carries a manifeſt reaſon in it, to any one, who underſtands what directly means. If the taking away any good, from a man, cannot be juſtified, but, by making it a means, to procure a greater, is it not plain, it muſt be ſo a means, as to have, in the operation of cauſes and effects, a natural tendency to that effect; and then, it is called directly uſeful, to ſuch an end: and this may give you a reaſon, "why puniſhment muſt be directly uſeful, for that purpoſe." I know, you are very tender, of your indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs of force, which I have, in another place ſhew'd to be, in your way, only uſeful by accident; nor will the queſtion, you here ſubjoin, excuſe it from being ſo, viz. "why penalties are Page 54. "not, as directly uſeful, for the bringing men to the true religion, as the rod of "correction is to drive fooliſhneſs from a child, or to work wiſdom in him?" Becauſe the rod works on the will of the child, to obey the reaſon of the father, whilſt under his tuition, and thereby makes it ſupple to the dictates of his own reaſon afterwards, and diſpoſes him to obey the light of that, when, being grown to be a man, that is to be his guide, and this is wiſdom. If your penalties are ſo uſed, I have nothing to ſay to them.

Your way is charged to be impracticable, to thoſe ends, you purpoſe, which you endeavour to clear, p. 63. That there may be fair play on both ſides, the reader ſhall have, in the ſame view, what we both ſay.

L. 2. p. 302. "It remains now to examine, whe-"ther the author's argument will not hold good, even "againſt puniſhments in your way. For, if "the "magiſtrate's authority be, as you here ſay, only to "procure	L. 3. p. 63. But how little to the purpoſe this requeſt of yours is, will quickly appear. For if the

“procure all his ſubjects (mark what you ſay, ALL HIS SUBJECTS) the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure withal, as much as in him lies, that NONE remain ignorant of it, or refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices, as may render them ineffectual.” If this be the magiſtrate's buſineſs, in reference to ALL HIS SUBJECTS; I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me, how this can be done, by the application of force, only to a part of them; unleſs you will ſtill vainly ſuppoſe, ignorance, negligence, or prejudice, only amongſt that part, which, any where, differs from the magiſtrate. If thoſe of the magiſtrate's church may be ignorant of the way of ſalvation; if it be poſſible, there may be, amongſt them, thoſe, who “refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by reaſon of any ſuch prejudices, as may render them ineffectual;” What in this caſe, becomes of the “magiſtrate's authority to procure all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation?” Muſt theſe of his ſubjects be neglected, and left without the means, he has authority to procure them? Or muſt he uſe force upon them, too? And then, pray ſhew me, how this can be done. Shall the magiſtrate puniſh thoſe of his own religion, “to procure them the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation, and to procure, as much as in him lies, that they remain not ignorant of it, or refuſe not to embrace it?” Theſe are ſuch contradictions in practice, this is ſuch condemnation of a man's own religion, as no one can expect from the magiſtrate; and I dare ſay, you deſire not of him. And yet this is, that he muſt do, if his authority be to procure ALL his ſubjects, the means of diſcovering the way to ſalvation.” And if it be ſo needful, as you ſay it is, that he ſhould uſe it; I am ſure, force cannot do that, 'till it be applied wider, and puniſhment be laid upon more, than you would have it. For, if the magiſtrate be, by force, to procure as much as in him lies, that NONE remain ignorant of the way of ſalvation; muſt he not puniſh all thoſe, who are ignorant of the way of ſalvation? And, pray tell me, how is this any way practicable, but by ſuppoſing none, in the national church, ignorant, and all, out of it, ignorant of the way of ſalvation? Which, what is it, but to puniſh men, barely for not being of the magiſtrate's religion? The very thing, you deny, he has authority to do. So that the magiſtrate having, by your own confeſſion, no authority, thus to uſe force; and it being otherways impracticable for the procuring all his ſubjects the means of diſcovering the way of ſalvation: there is an end of force. And ſo force, being laid aſide, either as unlawful, or unpracticable, the author's argument holds good againſt force, even in your way of applying it.”

the magiſtrate provides ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all his ſubjects in the true religion; and then, requires them all, under convenient penalties, to hearken to the teachers and miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it, with one accord, under their direction, in publick aſſemblies: Is there any pretence to ſay, that, in ſo doing, he applies force only to a part of his ſubjects; when the law is general, and excepts none? 'Tis true, the magiſtrate inflicts the penalties, in that caſe, only upon them, that break the law. But is that the thing, you mean, by his “applying force only to a part of his ſubjects?” Would you have him puniſh all, indifferently? Them that obey the laws, as well as them that do not?

As to ignorance, negligence and prejudice, I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me, what better courſe can be taken to cure them, than that, which I have mentioned. For if, after all, that God's miniſters, and the magiſtrate can do, ſome will ſtill remain ignorant, negligent, or prejudiced; I do not take that to be any diſparagement to it: For certainly, that is a very extraordinary remedy, which infallibly cures all diſeaſed perſons, to whom it is applied.

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Page 6, 8.

THE backwardneſs and luſts, that hinder an impartial examination, as you deſcribe it, is general. The corruption of nature, which hinders a real embracing the true religion, that alſo, you tell us here, is univerſal. I aſk a remedy for theſe, in your way. You ſay, the law for conformity is general, excepts none. Very likely, none that do not conform; but puniſhes none, who, conforming, do neither impartially examine, nor really embrace the true religion. From whence I conclude, there is no corruption of nature in thoſe, who are brought up, or join, in outward communion with, the church of England. But " as to ignorance, negligence and prejudice, you ſay you deſire me, or any " man elſe, to tell, what better courſe can be taken to cure them, than that, " which you have mentioned." If your church can find no better way, to cure ignorance and prejudice, and the negligence, that is in men, to examine matters of religion, and heartily embrace the true, than what is impracticable upon conformiſts, then, of all others, conformiſts are in the moſt deplorable eſtate. But, as I remember, you have been told of a better way, which is, the diſcourſing with men, ſeriouſly and friendly, about matters in religion, by thoſe, whoſe profeſſion is the care of ſouls; examining what they do underſtand, and where, either through lazineſs, prejudice, or difficulty, they do ſtick; and applying to their ſeveral diſeaſes, proper cures, which it is as impoſſible to do, by a general harangue, once or twice a week, out of the pulpit, as to fit all men's feet with one ſhoe, or to cure all men's ails with one, though very wholeſome, diet-drink. To be thus " inſtant in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon," ſome men have thought a better way of cure, than a deſire, only to have men driven, by the whip, either in your, or the magiſtrate's hands, into the ſheepfold, where, when they are once, whether they underſtand or no, their miniſters ſermons; whether they are, or can be better for them, or no; whether they are ignorant and hypocritical conformiſts, and, in that way, like to remain ſo, rather than to become knowing and ſincere converts, ſome biſhops have thought, is not ſufficiently enquired; but this no body is to mention, for whoever does ſo, " makes himſelf " an occaſion to ſhew his good will to the clergy."

THIS had not been ſaid by me here, now I ſee how apt you are to be put out of temper, with any thing of this kind, (though it be in every ſerious man's mouth) had not you deſired me, to ſhew you a better way, than force, your way apply'd. And, to uſe your way of arguing, ſince bare preaching, as now uſed, 'tis plain, will not do, there is no other means left, but this, to deal with the corrupt nature of conformiſts; for miracles are now ceaſed, and penalties they are free from; therefore, by your way of concluding, no other being left, this of viſiting at home, conferring and inſtructing, and admoniſhing men there, and the like means, propoſed by the reverend author of the paſtoral care, is neceſſary; and men, whoſe buſineſs is the care of ſouls, are obliged to uſe it: for you " cannot prove, that it cannot do ſome ſervice (I think, I need not ſay) indirect- " ly and at a diſtance." And if this be proper and ſufficient, to bring conformiſts (notwithſtanding the corruption of their nature) " to examine impartially " and really embrace the truth that muſt ſave them," it will remain to ſhew, why it may not do as well, on nonconformiſts (whoſe, I imagine, is the common corruption of nature) to bring them to examine and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them? And, though it be not ſo extraordinary a remedy, as will infallibly cure all diſeaſed perſons, to whom it is apply'd; yet, ſince the corruption of nature, which is the ſame diſeaſe, and hinders the " impartial examina- " tion, and hearty embracing the truth that muſt ſave them," is equally in both, conformiſts and nonconformiſts, 'tis reaſonable to think, it ſhould, in both, have the ſame cure, let that be what it will.

CHAP. X.

Of the neceſſity of force, in matters of religion.

YOU tell us, " you do not ground the lawfulneſs of ſuch force, as you take " to be uſeful, for promoting the true religion, upon the bare uſefulneſs " of ſuch force, but upon the neceſſity, as well as uſefulneſs of it; and therefore Page 30.

“ you declare it to be no fit means to be uſed, either for that purpoſe, or any “ other, where it is not neceſſary, as well as uſeful.”

How uſeful force, in the magiſtrate's hand, for bringing men to the true religion, is like to be, we have ſhewn, in the foregoing chapter, in anſwer to what you have ſaid for it. So that it being proved not uſeful, it is impoſſible it ſhould A. p. 10. be neceſſary. However, we will examine what you ſay, to prove the neceſſity of it. The foundation you build on, for its neceſſity, we have, in your argument conſidered, where having, at large, dilated on men's inconſiderateneſs, in the choice of their religions, and their perſiſting in thoſe, they have once choſen, without due examination, you conclude thus; “ now, if this be the caſe, if men “ are ſo averſe to a due conſideration, if they uſually take up their religion with- “ out examining it, as they ought, what other means is there left?” Wherein you ſuppoſe force neceſſary, inſtead of proving it to be ſo; for preaching and perſuaſion, not prevailing upon all men, you, upon your own authority, think fit ſomething elſe ſhould be done; and, that being reſolved, you readily pitch on force, becauſe, you ſay, you can find nothing elſe; which, in effect, is only to tell us, if the ſalvation of men's ſouls were only left to your diſcretion, how you would order the matter.

Page 7. AND, in your anſwer to me, you very confidently tell us, “ the true reli- “ gion cannot prevail, without the aſſiſtance, either of miracles, or of autho- “ rity.” I ſhall, here, only obſerve one or two things, and then go on to examine, how you make this good.

THE firſt thing, I ſhall obſerve, is, that in your argument conſidered, &c. you ſuppoſe force neceſſary, only to maſter the averſion, there is in men, to conſidering and examination; and here, in your anſwer to me, you make force neceſſary, to conquer the averſion there is in men, to embrace and obey the true religion. Which are ſo very different, that the former juſtifies the uſe of force, only to make men conſider; the other juſtifies the uſe of force, to make men embrace religion. If you meant the ſame thing, when you writ your firſt treatiſe, it was not very ingenuous to expreſs yourſelf, in ſuch words, as were not proper, to give your reader your true meaning; it being a far different thing, to uſe force, to make men conſider, which is an action in their power to do, or omit; and to uſe force, to make them embrace, i. e. believe any religion, which is not a thing, in any one's power, to do, or forbear, as he pleaſes. If you ſay, you meant barely conſidering, in your firſt paper, as the whole current of it would make one believe, then I ſee, your hypotheſis may mend, as we have ſeen, in other parts, and, in time may grow to its full ſtature.

ANOTHER thing, I ſhall remark to you, is, that in your firſt paper, beſides preaching and perſuaſion, and the grace of God, nothing but force was neceſſary. Here, in your ſecond, it is either miracles, or authority, which, how you make good, we will now conſider.

A. p. 2. YOU having ſaid, you had “ no reaſon, from any experiment, to expect L. 2. p. 272. “ that the true religion ſhould be, any way, a gainer, by toleration.” I in- Page 5. ſtanced in the prevailing of the goſpel, by its own beauty, force and reaſonableneſs, in the firſt ages of chriſtianity. You reply, that it has not the ſame beauty, force and reaſonableneſs now, that it had then, unleſs “ I include Page 37. “ miracles” too, which are now ceaſed; and as you tell us, were not with- “ drawn, 'till, by their help, chriſtianity had prevailed, to be received, for the “ religion of the empire, and to be encouraged and ſupported, by the laws of it.”

IF therefore, we will believe you, upon your own word, force being neceſſary (for prove it neceſſary, you never can) you have entered into the counſel of God, and tell us, when force could not be had, miracles were employed to Ibid. ſupply its want. “ I cannot but think, ſay you, it's highly probable, (if we may “ be allowed to gueſs at the counſels of infinite wiſdom) that God was pleaſed “ to continue them,” till then,” i. e. 'till the laws of the empire ſupported chriſtianity, “ not ſo much for any neceſſity there was of them, all that time, for “ the evincing the truth of the chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the “ magiſtrate's aſſiſtance.” You allow yourſelf to gueſs very freely, when you will make God uſe miracles to ſupply a means he, no where, authorized, or appointed. How long miracles continued, we ſhall ſee anon.

SAY you, “ If we may be allowed to gueſs :” this modeſty of yours, where you confeſs you gueſs, is only, concerning the time of the continuing of miracles ; but, as to their ſupplying the want of coactive force, that you are poſitive in, both here and where you tell us, “ why penalties were not neceſſary at firſt, “ to make men to give ear to the goſpel, has already been ſhewn : and a little “ after, the great and wonderful things, which were to be done, for the evi- “ dencing the truth of the goſpel, were abundantly ſufficient to procure atten- “ tion,” &c. How you come to know, ſo undoubtedly, that miracles were made uſe of, to ſupply the magiſtrate's authority, ſince God, no where, tells you ſo, you would have done well to ſhew.

Page 38.

BUT, in your opinion, force was neceſſary, and that could not then be had, and ſo God muſt uſe miracles. For, ſay you, “ our Saviour was no magiſtrate, “ and therefore could not inflict political puniſhments, upon any man, ſo much “ leſs could he impower his apoſtles to do it.” Could not our Saviour impower his apoſtles to denounce, or inflict, puniſhments, on careleſs, or obſtinate unbelievers, to make them hear and conſider ? You pronounce very boldly, methinks, of Chriſt's power, and ſet very narrow limits to what, at another time, you would not deny to be infinite : but it was convenient here for your preſent purpoſe, that it ſhould be ſo limited. But, they not being magiſtrates, “ he could “ not impower his apoſtles to inflict political puniſhments.” How is it of a ſudden, that they muſt be political puniſhments ? You tell us, all that is neceſſary, is to “ lay briars and thorns in men's ways, to trouble and diſeaſe them, “ to make them conſider.” This, I hope, our Saviour had power to do, if he had found it neceſſary, without the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrates ; he could have always done, by his apoſtles and miniſters, if he had ſo thought fit, what he did once, by St. Peter, have dropped thorns and briars into their very minds, that ſhould have pricked, troubled and diſeaſed them ſufficiently. But ſometimes it is briars and thorns only, that you want, ſometimes it muſt be human means : and ſometimes, as here, nothing will ſerve your turn, but political puniſhments ; juſt as will beſt ſuit your occaſion, in the argument you have then before you.

Page 36.

THAT the apoſtles could lay on puniſhments, as troubleſome and as great as any political ones, when they were neceſſary, we ſee in Ananias and Sapphira : and he that had “ all power given him in heaven and in earth,” could, if he had thought fit, have laid briars and thorns in the way of all, that received not his doctrine.

YOU add, “ but as he could not puniſh men to make them hear him, ſo “ neither was there any need that he ſhould. He came as a prophet, ſent from “ God, to reveal a new doctrine to the world ; and therefore to prove his miſ- “ ſion, he was to do ſuch things, as could only be done by a divine power : “ and the works, which he did, were abundantly ſufficient, both to gain him “ a hearing, and to oblige the world to receive his doctrine.” Thus the want of force and puniſhments are ſupplied. How far ? So far as they are ſuppoſed neceſſary to gain a hearing, and ſo far as to oblige the world to receive Chriſt's doctrine ; whereby, as I ſuppoſe, you mean ſufficient to lay an obligation on them, to receive his doctrine, and render them inexcuſable, if they did not : but that they were not ſufficient, to make all, that ſaw them, effectually to receive and embrace the goſpel, I think is evident, and you will not, I imagine, ſay, that all, who ſaw Chriſt's miracles, believed on him. So that miracles were not to ſupply the want of ſuch force, as was to be continued on men, to make them conſider, as they ought, i. e. 'till they embraced the truth that muſt ſave them. For we have little reaſon to think, that our Saviour, or his apoſtles, contended with their neglect, or refuſal, by a conſtant train of miracles, continued on, to thoſe, who were not wrought upon, by the goſpel preached to them. St. Matthew tells us, xiii. 58. that he did not many mighty works in his own country, becauſe of their unbelief ; much leſs were miracles to ſupply the want of force, in that uſe you make of it, where you tell us, it is to puniſh the fault of not being of the true religion : for we do not find any miraculouſly puniſhed, to bring them in to the goſpel. So that the want of force, to either of theſe pur-

Ibid.

Lightfoot's Harm. of the N. T. § 41, and 51.

poſes, not being ſupplied by miracles, the goſpel, 'tis plain, ſubſiſted and ſpread itſelf, without force, ſo made uſe of, and without miracles, to ſupply the want of it; and therefore, it ſo far remains true, that the goſpel, having the ſame beauty, force and reaſonableneſs now, as it had at the beginning, it wants not force to ſupply the defect of miracles, to that, for which miracles were no were made uſe of. And ſo far at leaſt, the experiment is good, and this aſſertion true, that the goſpel is able to prevail, by its own light and truth, without the continuance of force, on the ſame perſon, or puniſhing men, for not being of the true religion.

Page 36. You ſay, "our Saviour being no magiſtrate, could not inflict political puniſh-"ments; much leſs could he impower his apoſtles to do it." I know not what need there is, that it ſhould be political; ſo there was ſo much puniſhment uſed, as you ſay, is ſufficient to make men conſider, it is not neceſſary, it ſhould come from this, or that hand: or, if there be any odds in that, we ſhould be apt to think, it would come beſt, and moſt effectually, from thoſe, who preached the goſpel, and could tell them, it was to make them conſider, than from the magiſtrate, who neither doth, nor according to your ſcheme, can, tell them, it is to make them conſider. And this power, you will not deny, but our Saviour could have given to the apoſtles.

But, if there were ſuch abſolute need of political puniſhments, Titus, or Trajan, might as well have been converted, as Conſtantine. For, how true it is, that miracles ſupplied the want of force, from thoſe days, 'till Conſtantine's, and then ceaſed, we ſhall ſee by and by. I ſay not this to enter boldly into the counſels of God, or to take upon me to cenſure the conduct of the Almighty, or to call his providence to an account; but to anſwer your ſaying, "Our Savi-"our was no magiſtrate, and, therefore could not inflict political puniſhments." For he could have had both magiſtrates and political puniſhments at his ſervice,

Page 37. if he had thought fit, and needed not to have continued miracles longer, "than "there was neceſſity for evincing the truth of the chriſtian religion, as you ima-"gine, to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, by force, which is ne-"ceſſary."

But how come you to know, that force is neceſſary? Has God revealed it in his word? no where. Has it been revealed to you, in particular? that you

A. p. 6. will not ſay. What reaſon have you for it? none at all, but this, That having

——12. ſet down the grounds, upon which men take up and perſiſt in their religion, you conclude, "What means is there left but force?" Force, therefore, you conclude neceſſary, becauſe, without any authority, but from your own imagination, you are peremptory, that other means, beſides preaching and perſuaſion, is to be uſed? and therefore it is neceſſary, becauſe you can think of no other.

When I tell you, there is other means, and that, by your own confeſſion, the grace of God is another means; and, therefore, force is not neceſſary: you

Page 39. reply, "Though the grace of God be another means, and you thought fit to "mention it, to prevent cavils; yet it is none of the means, of which you were "ſpeaking, in the place I refer to; which any one, who reads that paragraph, "will find, to be only human means: and therefore, though the grace of God "be both a proper and ſufficient means, and ſuch as can work by itſelf; and, "without which, neither penalties, nor any other means, can do any thing; "yet, it may be true, however, that, when admonitions and entreaties fail, "there is no human means left, but penalties, to bring prejudiced perſons to "hear and conſider, what may convince them of their errors, and diſcover the "truth to them. And then, penalties will be neceſſary, in reſpect to that end "as an human means."

In which words, if you mean any anſwer to my argument, it is this, that force is neceſſary, becauſe, to bring men into the right way, there is other human means neceſſary, beſides admonitions and perſuaſions. For elſe, what have we to do with human in the caſe? But it is no ſmall advantage one owes to logick, that, where ſenſe and reaſon fall ſhort, a diſtinction, ready at hand, may etch it out. Force, when perſuaſions will not prevail, is neceſſary, ſay you, becauſe it is the only means left. When you are told, it is not the only means left, and

ſo cannot be neceſſary, on that account: you reply, That "when admonitions Page 40.
"and entreaties fail, there is no human means left, but penalties, to bring pre-
"judiced perſons to hear and conſider, what may convince them of their errors,
"and diſcover the truth to them: and then penalties will be neceſſary, in reſpect
"to that end, as an human means."

SUPPOSE it be urged to you, when your moderate lower penalties fail, there is no human means left, but dragooning and ſuch other ſeverities, which, you Page 9.
ſay, you condemn as much as I, "to bring prejudiced perſons to hear, and conſider, what may convince them of their errors, and diſcover the truth to "them." And then dragooning, impriſonment, ſcourging, fining, &c. will be neceſſary in reſpect to that end, as an human means. What can you ſay, but this? that you are empowered to judge what degrees of human means are neceſſary, but others are not. For, without ſuch a confidence in your own judgment, where God has neither ſaid how much, nor that any force is neceſſary, I think this is as good an argument for the higheſt, as yours is for the lower penalties. When "admonitions and entreaties will not prevail, then penalties, "lower penalties, ſome degrees of force, will be neceſſary, ſay you, as an hu-"man means." And when your lower penalties, your ſome degrees of force will not prevail, then higher degrees will be neceſſary, ſay I, as an human means. And my reaſon is the ſame with yours, becauſe there is no other means (i. e. human means) left. Shew me how your argument concludes, for lower puniſhments being neceſſary, and mine not for higher, even to dragooning, "& eris "mihi magnus Appollo."

BUT let us apply this to your ſuccedaneum of miracles, and then it will be much more admirable. You tell us, admonitions and entreaties not prevailing, to bring men into the right way, "force is neceſſary, becauſe there is no other "means left," To that 'tis ſaid, Yes, there is other means left, the grace of God. Ay, but, ſay you, that will not do; becauſe you ſpeak only of human means. So that, according to your way of arguing, ſome other human means is neceſſary: for you yourſelf tell us, that the means, you were ſpeaking of, where you ſay, that when admonitions and entreaties will not do, what other means is there left but force? were human means. Your words are, "Which any one, who "reads that paragraph, will find to be only human means." By this argument then, other human means are neceſſary, beſides preaching and perſuaſion, and thoſe human means, you have found out, to be either force, or miracles: the latter are certainly notable, human means. And your diſtinction of human means ſerves you, to very good purpoſe, having brought miracles to be one of your human means. Preaching and admonitions, ſay you, are not ſufficient, to bring men into the right way, ſomething elſe is neceſſary; yes, the Grace of God; no, ſay you, that will not do, it is not human means: 'tis neceſſary to have other human means, therefore, in the three or four firſt centuries after chriſtianity, the inſufficiency of preaching and admonitions was made up with miracles, and thus the neceſſity of other human means is made good. But to conſider, a little farther, your miracles, as ſupplying the want of force.

THE queſtion between us here, is, whether the chriſtian religion did not prevail in the firſt ages of the church by its own beauty, force and reaſonableneſs, without the aſſiſtance of force? I ſay, it did, and therefore external force is not neceſſary. To this you reply, "that it cannot prevail, by its own light, and Page 7.
"ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance either of miracles, or of authority; and "therefore the chriſtian religion not being ſtill accompanied with miracles, force "is now neceſſary." So that, to make your equivalent, of miracles, correſpond with your neceſſary means of force, you ſeem to require an actual application of miracles, or of force, to prevail with men to receive the goſpel, i. e. men could not be prevailed with, to receive the goſpel, without actually ſeeing of miracles. For, when you tell us, that "you are ſure, I cannot ſay the chri- Page 6.
"ſtian religion is ſtill accompanied with miracles, as it was, at its firſt plant-"ing;" I hope, you do not mean, that the goſpel is not ſtill accompanied with an undoubted teſtimony, that miracles were done, by the firſt publiſhers of it, which was as much of miracles, as I ſuppoſe the greateſt part of thoſe had, with

Page 27. whom the chriſtian religion prevailed, till it was "ſupported and encouraged, "as you tell us, by the laws of the empire:" for I think, you will not ſay, or, if you ſhould, you could not expect to be believed, that all, or the greateſt part of thoſe, that embraced the chriſtian religion, before it was ſupported by the laws of the empire, which was not 'till the fourth century, had actually miracles done before them, to work upon them. And all thoſe, who were not eye-witneſſes of miracles, done in their preſence, 'tis plain, had no other miracles, than we have, that is upon report; and 'tis probable, not ſo many, nor ſo well atteſted, as we have, The greateſt part then, of thoſe, who were converted, at leaſt, in ſome of thoſe ages, before chriſtianity was ſupported by the laws of the empire, I think you muſt allow, were wrought upon, by bare preaching, and ſuch miracles as we ſtill have, miracles at a diſtance, related miracles. In others, and thoſe the greater number, prejudice was not ſo removed, that they were prevailed on to conſider as they ought, i. e. in your language, to conſider, ſo as to embrace. If they had not ſo conſidered, in our days, what, according to your ſcheme, muſt have been done to them, that did not conſider, as they ought? Force muſt have been applied to them. What therefore, in the primitive church was to be done to them? Why! your ſuccedaneum, miracles, actual miracles, ſuch as you deny the chriſtian religion to be ſtill accompanied with, muſt have been done in their preſence, to work upon them. Will you ſay this was ſo, and make a new church-hiſtory for us, and out-do thoſe writers, who have been thought pretty liberal of miracles? If you do not, you muſt confeſs, miracles ſupplied not the place of force, and ſo let fall all your fine contrivance about the neceſſity, either of force or miracles; and, perhaps, you will think it, at laſt, a more becoming modeſty, not to ſet the divine power and providence on work, by rules, and for the ends of your hypotheſis, without having any thing in authentick hiſtory, much leſs in divine and unerring revelation to juſtify you. But force and power deſerve ſomething more than ordinary and allowable arts or arguments, to get and keep them: "Si violandum ſit jus, regnandi causâ violandum eſt."

If the teſtimony of miracles having been done, were ſufficient to make the goſpel prevail, without force, on thoſe, who were not eye-witneſſes of them, we have that ſtill, and ſo, upon that account, need not force, to ſupply the want of it: but, if truth muſt have either the law of the country, or actual miracles to ſupport it, what became of it, after the reign of Conſtantine the great, under all thoſe emperors, that were erroneous, or heretical? It ſupported itſelf in Piedmont, and France, and Turkey, many ages, without force or miracles: and it ſpread itſelf, in divers nations and kingdoms of the north and eaſt, without any force, or other miracles than thoſe, that were done many ages before. So that I think, you will, upon ſecond thoughts, not deny, but that the true religion is able to prevail now, as it did at firſt, and has done ſince, in many places, without aſſiſtance from the powers in being, by its own beauty, force and reaſonableneſs, whereof well-atteſted miracles is a part.

Page 37. BUT the account you give us of miracles, will deſerve to be a little examined; we have it in theſe words, "Conſidering that thoſe extraordinary means "were not withdrawn, 'till by their help, chriſtianity had prevailed to be receiv-"ed for the religion of the empire, and to be ſupported and encouraged by the "laws of it, you cannot, you ſay, but think it highly probable, (If we may be "allowed to gueſs at the counſels of infinite wiſdom) that God was pleaſed to "continue them, 'till then, not ſo much for any neceſſity there was of them, "all that while, for the evincing the truth of the chriſtian religon, as to ſup-"ply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." Miracles then, if what you ſay be true, were continued, till "chriſtianity was received for the religion of the "empire, not ſo much to evince the truth of the chriſtian religion, as to ſupply "the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." But in this, the learned author, whoſe teſtimony you quote, fails you, For he tells you, that the chief uſe of miracles, in the church, after the truth of the chriſtian religion had been ſufficiently confirmed by them, in the world, was to oppoſe the falſe and pretended miracles of hereticks and heathens; and anſwerable hereunto, miracles ceaſed

Dodwell. Diſſertat. in Iræn. Diſſ. 2.

and returned again, as ſuch oppoſitions made them more, or leſs, neceſſary. Accordingly, miracles, which before had abated, in Trajan's and Hadrian's time, which was in the latter end of the firſt, or the beginning of the ſecond century, did again revive, to confound the magical deluſions of the hereticks of that time. And, in the third century, the hereticks uſing no ſuch tricks, and the faith being confirmed, they by degrees ceaſed, of which there then, he ſays, could be no imaginable neceſſity. His words are, "Et quidem eo minus neceſſaria ſunt pro Sect. LXV. "veterum principiis, recentiora illa miracula, quod hereticos (quos appellant) "nullos adverſarios habeant, qui contraria illis dogmata aſtruant miraculis. Sic "enim vidimus, apud veteres, dum nulli eccleſiam exercerent adverſarii, ſeu "heretici, ſeu gentiles; aut ſatis illi præteritis miraculis fuiſſent refutati, aut nul-"las ipſi præſtigias opponerent, quæ veris eſſent miraculis oppugnandæ; ſubduc-"tam deinde paulatim eſſe mirificam illam ſpiritûs virtutem, Ortos ſub Trajano "Hadrianoque hæreticos oſtendimus præſtigiis magicis fuiſſe uſos, & proinde "miraculorum verorum in eccleſia uſum unà REVIXISSE. Ne dicam præſtigia-"tores etiam gentiles, eodem illo ſeculo, ſane frequentiſſimos, Apuleium in Afri-"ca, in Aſia Alexandrum Pſeudomantim, multoſque alios, quorum meminit "Ariſtides. Tertio ſeculo orto, hæretici Hermogenes, Praxeas, Noetus, Theo-"dotus, Sabellius, Novatianus, Artemas, Samoſatenus, nulla, ut videtur, mi-"racula ipſi venditabant, nullis propterea miraculis oppugnandi. Inde vidimus, "apud ipſos etiam catholicos, ſenſim defeciſſe miracula. Et quidem, hæreticis "nulla in contrarium miracula obſtantibus, quæ tandem fingi poteſt miraculo-"rum neceſſitas, traditam ab initio fidem, miraculiſque adeo jamdudum confir-"matam prædicantibus? Nulla certe prorſus pro primævo miraculorum exem-"plo. Nulla denique conſciis verè primævam eſſe fidem, quam novis miraculis "ſuſcipiunt, confirmandam."

THE hiſtory, therefore, you have from him, of miracles, ſerves for his hypotheſis, but not at all for yours. For, if they were continued, to ſupply the want of force, which was to deal with the corruption of depraved, human nature, that being without any great variation in the world, conſtantly the ſame, there could be no reaſon, why they ſhould abate and fail, and then return and revive again. So that there being then, as you ſuppoſe, no neceſſity of miracles, for any other end, but to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, they muſt, to ſuit that end, be conſtant and regularly the ſame, as you would have force to be, which is ſteddily and uninterruptedly to be applied, as a conſtantly neceſſary remedy, to the corrupt nature of mankind.

IF you allow the learned Dodwell's reaſons, for the continuation of miracles, 'till the fourth century, your hypotheſis, that they were continued, to ſupply the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, will be only precarious. For, if there was need of miracles, 'till that time to other purpoſes, the continuation of them in the church, though you could prove them to be, as frequent and certain, as thoſe of our Saviour and the apoſtles, it would not advantage your cauſe; ſince it would be no evidence, that they were uſed for that end, which, as long as there were other viſible uſes of them, you could not, without revelation, aſſure us, were made uſe of, by divine Providence, "to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." You muſt, therefore, confute his hypotheſis, before you can make any advantage of what he ſays, concerning the continuation of miracles, for the eſtabliſhing of yours. For, 'till you can ſhew, that that, which he aſſigns, was not the end, for which they were continued in the church; the utmoſt you can ſay, is, that it may be imagined, that one reaſon of their continuation was to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance: but what you can, without proof, imagine poſſible, I hope, you do not expect ſhould be received, as an unqueſtionable proof, that it was ſo. I can imagine it poſſible, they were not continued for that end, and one imagination will be as good a proof, as another.

To do your modeſty right, therefore, I muſt allow, that you faintly offer at ſome kind of reaſon, to prove that miracles were continued, to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance: and, ſince God has no where declared, that it was for that end, you would perſuade us, in this paragraph, that it was ſo, by two reaſons. One is, that the truth of the chriſtian religion being ſufficiently evinced,

ced, by the miracles, done by our Saviour and his apoſtles, and perhaps their immediate ſucceſſors, there was no other need of miracles to be continued 'till the fourth century; and therefore, they were uſed by God, to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance. This I take to be the meaning of theſe words of yours, "I cannot but think it highly probable, that God was pleaſed to conti-" nue them 'till then, not ſo much for any neceſſity there was of them, all that" while, for the evincing the truth of the chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the" want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance." Whereby, I ſuppoſe, you do not barely intend to tell the world, what is your opinion in the caſe, but uſe this as an argument, to make it probable to others, that this was the end, for which miracles were continued; which, at beſt, will be but a very doubtful probability, to build ſuch a bold aſſertion on, as this of yours is, viz. that "the chriſtian religion is" not able to ſubſiſt and prevail in the world, by its own light and ſtrength," without the aſſiſtance either of force, or actual miracles." And therefore, you muſt either produce a declaration from heaven, that authorizes you to ſay, that miracles were uſed to ſupply the want of force, or ſhew, that there was no other uſe of them, but this. For, if any other uſe can be aſſigned of them, as long as they continued in the church, one may ſafely deny, that they were to ſupply the want of force; and it will lie upon you to prove it, by ſome other way, than by ſaying, you think it highly probable. For I ſuppoſe, you do not expect that your thinking any thing highly probable, ſhould be a ſufficient reaſon for others to acquieſce in. When perhaps, the hiſtory of miracles conſidered, no body could bring himſelf to ſay, he thought it probable, but one, whoſe hypotheſis ſtood in need of ſuch a poor ſupport.

THE other reaſon, you ſeem to build on, is this, That when chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire, miracles ceaſed; becauſe there was then no longer any need of them: which I take to be the argument inſinuated in theſe words, "Conſidering that thoſe extraordinary means were not withdrawn," 'till, by their help, chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of" the empire." If then, you can make it appear that miracles laſted 'till chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire, without any other reaſon for their continuation, but to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance; and that they ceaſed, as ſoon as the magiſtrates became chriſtians; your argument will have ſome kind of probability, that, within the Roman empire, this was the method God uſed, for the propagating the chriſtian religion. But it will not ſerve to make good your poſition, "That the chriſtian religion cannot ſubſiſt and" prevail by its own ſtrength and light, without the aſſiſtance of miracles, or au-" thority," unleſs you can ſhew, that God made uſe of miracles, to introduce and ſupport it, in other parts of the world, not ſubject to the Roman empire, 'till the magiſtrates there alſo became chriſtians. For the corruption of nature being the ſame without, as within the bounds of the Roman empire; miracles, upon your hypotheſis, were as neceſſary to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, in other countries, as in the Roman empire. For, I do not think, you will find the civil ſovereigns were the firſt converted, in all thoſe countries, where the chriſtian religion was planted after Conſtantine's reign: and, in all thoſe, it will be neceſſary for you to ſhew us the aſſiſtance of miracles.

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BUT let us ſee, how much your hypotheſis is favoured by church-hiſtory. If the writings of the fathers of greateſt name and credit are to be believed, miracles were not withdrawn, when "chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the" religion of the empire." Athanaſius, the great defender of the catholick orthodoxy, writ the life of his cotemporary, St. Anthony, full of miracles; which though ſome have queſtioned, yet the learned Dodwell allows to be writ by Athanaſius: and the ſtile evinces it to be his, which is alſo confirmed by other eccleſiaſtical writers.

"PALLADIUS tells us, that Ammon did many miracles: but that particu-" larly St. Athanaſius related, in the life of Anthony, that Ammon going with" ſome monks, Anthony had ſent to him; when they came to the river Lycus," which they were to paſs, was afraid to ſtrip, for fear of ſeeing himſelf naked;" and whilſt he was in diſpute of this matter, he was taken up, and in an extaſy

“ carried over, by an angel, the reſt of the monks ſwimming the river. When “ he came to Anthony, Anthony told him, he had ſent for him, becauſe God “ had revealed many things to him, concerning him, and particularly his tranſ- “ ſlation. And when Ammon died in his retirement, Anthony ſaw his ſoul “ carried into heaven by angels.” Palladius in vita Ammonis.

“ SOCRATES tells us, that Anthony ſaw the ſoul of Ammon taken up, by “ angels, as Athanaſius writes in the life of Anthony?”

L. 4. c. 23.

AND again, ſays he, “ it ſeems ſuperfluous for me to relate the many mira- “ cles, Anthony did; how he fought openly with devils, diſcovering all their “ tricks and cheats: for Athanaſius, biſhop of Alexandria, has prevented me “ on that ſubject, having writ a book particularly of his life.”

Socrat. l. 1. c. 21.

“ ANTHONY was thought worthy of the viſion of God, and led a life per- “ fectly conformable to the laws of Chriſt. This, whoever reads the book, “ wherein is contained the hiſtory of his life, will eaſily know; wherein he “ will alſo ſee prophecy ſhining out; for he propheſied very clearly, of thoſe, “ who were infected with the Arian contagion, and foretold what miſchief from “ them was threatened to the churches, God truly revealing all theſe things to “ him, which is certainly the principal evidence of the catholick faith, no ſuch “ man being to be found among the hereticks. But do not take this upon my “ word, but read and ſtudy the book itſelf.”

THIS account you have from St. Chryſoſtom, whom Mr. Dodwell calls the contemner of fables.

Chryſoſt. Hom. 8. in Matt. 2.

St. HIEROM, in his treatiſe “ de viro perfecto,” ſpeaks of the frequency of miracles done in his time, as a thing paſt queſtion: beſides thoſe, not a few, which he has left upon record, in the lives of Hilarion and Paul, two monks, whoſe lives he writ. And he, that has a mind to ſee the plenty of miracles of this kind, need but read the collection of the lives of the fathers, made by Roſweydus.

RUFFIN tells us, that Athanaſius lodged the bones of St. John Baptiſt in the wall of the church, knowing, by the ſpirit of prophecy, the good they were to do the next generation; and of what efficacy and uſe they were, may be concluded from the church with the golden roof, built to them ſoon after, in the place of the temple of Serapis.

St. AUSTIN tells us, “ that he knew a blind man, reſtored to ſight, by the “ bodies of the Milan Martyrs, and ſome other ſuch things; of which kind, “ there were ſo many done, in that time, that many eſcaped his knowledge; “ and thoſe, which he knew, were more than he could number.” More of this you may ſee epiſt. 137.

Cæcum illuminatum fuiſſe jam noveram. Nec ea, quæ cognoſcimus, enumerare poſſumus. Aug. Retract. l. c. 13. Quæ utiq; mecum ſciunt.

HE farther aſſures us, that, by the ſingle reliques of St. Stephen, “ a blind “ woman receiv'd her ſight. Lucullus was cured of an old fiſtula; Eucharius “ of the ſtone; three gouty men recovered; a lad killed with a cart-wheel go- “ ing over him, reſtored to life ſafe and ſound, as if he had received no hurt: “ a nun lying at the point of death, they ſent her coat to the ſhrine, but ſhe “ dying before it was brought back, was reſtored to life by its being laid on her “ dead body. The like happened at Hippo, to the daughter of BASSUS; and “ two others,” whoſe names he ſets down, were, by the ſame reliques, “ raiſed “ from the dead.”

AFTER theſe and other particulars, there ſet down, of miracles done in his time, by thoſe reliques of St. Stephen, the holy father goes on thus; “ what “ ſhall I do? preſſed by my promiſe of diſpatching this work. I cannot here “ ſet down all: and, without doubt, many, when they ſhall read this, will be “ troubled, that I have omitted ſo many particulars, which they truly know, as “ well as I. For if I ſhould, paſſing by the reſt, write only the miraculous “ cures, which have been wrought, by this moſt glorious martyr Stephen, in “ the colony of Calama, and this of ours, I ſhould fill many books, and yet “ ſhould not take in all of them: but only of thoſe, of which there are collec- “ tions publiſhed, which are read to the people: for this, I took care, ſhould “ be done, when I ſaw that ſigns of divine power, like thoſe of old, were FRE- “ QUENT alſo in our times. It is not two years ſince that ſhrine has been “ at

Libelli dati ſunt. Cum videremus antiquis ſimilia divinarum ſigna virtutum etiam noſtris temporibus frequentari. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. xxii. c. 8.

“ at Hippo: and many of the books (which I certainly know to be ſo) not being publiſhed, thoſe, which are publiſhed, concerning thoſe miraculous operations, amounted to near fifty, when I writ this. But at Calama, where this ſhrine was before, there are more publiſhed, and their number is incomparably greater. At Uzal alſo a colony, and near Utica, we know many famous things to have been done, by the ſame martyr.”

Two of thoſe books he mentions, are printed in the appendix of the tenth tome of St. Auſtin's works of Plantin's edit. One of them contains two miracles; the other, as I remember, about ſeventeen. So that at Hippo alone, in two years time, we may count, beſides thoſe omitted, there were publiſhed above 600 miracles, and, as he ſays, incomparably more at Calama: beſides what were done, by other reliques of the ſame St. Stephen, in other parts of the world, which cannot be ſuppoſed to have had leſs virtue than thoſe, ſent to this part of Africa. For the reliques of St. Stephen, diſcovered by the dream of a monk, were divided and ſent into diſtant countries, and there diſtributed to ſeveral churches.

THESE may ſuffice to ſhew, that, if the fathers of the church, of greateſt name and authority, are to be believed, miracles were not withdrawn, but continued down to the latter end of the fourth century, long after “ chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire.”

BUT, if theſe teſtimonies of Athanaſius, Chryſoſtom, Palladius, Ruffin, St. Hierom, and St. Auſtin, will not ſerve your turn, you may find much more to this purpoſe, in the ſame authors; and, if you pleaſe, you may conſult alſo St. Baſil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyſſen, St. Ambroſe, St. Hilary, Theodoret, and others.

THIS being ſo, you muſt either deny the authority of theſe fathers, or grant that miracles continued in the church, after “ chriſtianity was received for the religion of the empire; and then, they could not be, “ to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance,” unleſs they were to ſupply the want of what was not wanting; and therefore, they were continued for ſome other end. Which end of the continuation of miracles, when you are ſo far inſtructed in, as to be able to aſſure us, that it was different from that, for which God made uſe of them, in the 2d and 3d centuries: when you are ſo far admitted into the ſecrets of divine providence, as to be able to convince the world, that the miracles, between the apoſtles and Conſtantine's time, or any other period, you ſhall pitch on, were to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, and thoſe after, for ſome other purpoſe; what you ſay, may deſerve to be conſidered. 'Till you do this, you will only ſhew the liberty you take, to aſſert, with great confidence, though without any ground, whatever will ſuit your ſyſtem; and that you do not ſtick to make bold with the counſels of infinite wiſdom, to make them ſubſervient to your hypotheſis.

AND ſo I leave you to diſpoſe of the credit of eccleſiaſtical writers, as you ſhall think fit; and, by your authority, to eſtabliſh, or invalidate theirs, as you pleaſe. But this, I think, is evident, that he, who will build his faith, or reaſonings, upon miracles, delivered by church-hiſtorians, will find cauſe to go no farther than the apoſtles time, or elſe not to ſtop at Conſtantine's: ſince the writers, after that period, whoſe word we readily take, as unqueſtionable in other things, ſpeak of miracles in their time with no leſs aſſurance, than the fathers before the 4th century; and a great part of the miracles of the 2d and 3d centuries ſtand upon the credit of the writers of the 4th. So that that ſort of argument, which takes and rejects the teſtimony of the antients, at pleaſure, as may beſt ſuit with it, will not have much force with thoſe, who are not diſpoſed to embrace the hypotheſis, without any arguments at all.

Page 7. YOU grant, “ that the true religion has always light and ſtrength of its own. i. e. without the aſſiſtance of force, or miracles, ſufficient to prevail with all, that conſider it ſeriouſly, and without prejudice:” that, therefore, for which the aſſiſtance of force is wanting, is to make men conſider ſeriouſly, and without prejudice:” Now, whether the miracles, that we have ſtill, miracles, done by Chriſt and his apoſtles, atteſted, as they are, by undeniable hiſtory, be not fitter to deal with men's prejudices, than force, and than force, which requires nothing, but outward conformity, I leave the world to judge. All the aſſiſtance, the true religion needs from authority, is only a liberty for it, to be truly taught; but it has ſeldom had that from the powers in being, in its firſt entry into their dominions, ſince the withdrawing of miracles: and yet I deſire you to tell me, into what country the goſpel, accompanied (as now it is) only with paſt miracles, has been brought by the preaching of men, who have laboured in it after the example of the apoſtles, where it did not ſo prevail over men's prejudices, "that as many as were ordained to eternal life," conſidered and believed it. Which, as you may ſee, Acts xiii. 48. was all the advance it made, even, when aſſiſted with the gift of miracles: for neither then were all, or the majority, wrought on to conſider, and embrace it.

But yet the goſpel cannot prevail, by its own light and ſtrength;" and therefore miracles were to ſupply the place of force. How was force uſed? A law being made, there was a continued application of puniſhment to all thoſe, whom it brought not to embrace the doctrine propoſed. Were miracles ſo uſed, 'till force took place? For this, we ſhall want more new church-hiſtory, and, I think, contrary to what we read, in that part of it, which is unqueſtionable; I mean in the Acts of the apoſtles, where we ſhall find, that the then promulgators of the goſpel, when they had preached, and done what miracles the Spirit of God directed, if they prevailed not, they often left them: "Then Paul and Acts xiii. 46. Barnabas waxed bold, and ſaid, "It was neceſſary that the word of God ſhould firſt have been ſpoken to you: but ſeeing you put it from you, and judge yourſelves unworthy,——we turn to the gentiles." "They ſhook off Ver. 51. the duſt of their feet againſt them, and came unto Iconium. But when divers Acts xix. 9. were hardened, and believed not, but ſpake evil of that way, before the multitude, he departed from them, and ſeparated the diſciples. Paul was preſſed Acts xviii. 5, 6. in ſpirit, and teſtified to the Jews, that Jeſus was Chriſt; and when they oppoſed themſelves, and blaſphemed, he ſhook his raiment, and ſaid unto them your blood be upon you own heads, I am clean, from henceforth I will go unto the gentiles." Did the chriſtian magiſtrate ever do ſo, who thought it neceſſary to ſupport the chriſtian religion, by laws? Did they ever, when they had a while puniſhed thoſe, whom perſuaſions and preaching had not prevailed on, give off, and leave them to themſelves, and make trial of their puniſhment upon others? Or, is this your way of force and puniſhment? If it be not, yours is not what miracles came to ſupply the room of, and ſo is not neceſſary. For you tell us, they are puniſhed to make them conſider, and they can never be ſuppoſed to conſider, "as they ought, while they perſiſt in rejecting;" and there- Page 24, 25. fore, they are juſtly puniſhed to make them ſo conſider: ſo that not ſo conſidering, being the fault, for which they are puniſhed, and the amendment of that fault, the end, which is deſigned to be attained, by puniſhing, the puniſhment muſt continue. But men were not always beat upon with miracles. To this perhaps, you will reply, that the ſeeing of a miracle, or two, or half a dozen, was ſufficient to procure a hearing; but that being puniſhed, once or twice, or half a dozen times, is not; for you tell us, "the power of miracles, commu- Page 36. nicated to the apoſtles, ſerved altogether, as well as puniſhment, to procure them a hearing:" where, if you mean, by hearing, only attention, who doubts but puniſhment may, alſo, procure that? If you mean, by hearing, receiving, and embracing, what is propoſed, that even miracles themſelves did not effect, upon all eye-witneſſes. Why then, I beſeech you, if one be to ſupply the place of the other, is one to be continued on thoſe, who do reject, when the other was never long continued, nor, as I think we may ſafely ſay, often repeated, to thoſe, who perſiſted in their former perſuaſions?

After all, therefore, may not one juſtly doubt, whether miracles ſupplied the place of puniſhment; nay, whether you yourſelf, if you be true to your own principles, can think ſo? You tell us, that not to join "themſelves to the Page 25. true church, where ſufficient evidence is offered, to convince men, that it is ſo is a fault, that it cannot be unjuſt to puniſh." Let me aſk you, now: Did the apoſtles, by their preaching and miracles offer ſufficient evidence to convince

vince men, that the church of Chriſt was the true church; or, which is, in this caſe, the ſame thing, that the doctrine, they preached was the true religion? If they did, were not thoſe, who perſiſted in unbelief, guilty of a fault? And, if ſome of the miracles, done in thoſe days, ſhould now be repeated, and yet men ſhould not embrace the doctrine, or join themſelves to the church, which thoſe miracles accompanied, would you not think them guilty of a fault which the magiſtrate might juſtly, nay, ought to puniſh? if you would anſwer truly and ſincerely to this queſtion, I doubt you would think your beloved puniſhments neceſſary, notwithſtanding miracles, "there being no other human "means left." I do not make this judgment of you, from any ill opinion I have, of your good nature, but it is conſonant to your principles: for, if not profeſſing the true religion, where ſufficient evidence is offered, by bare preaching, be a fault, and a fault juſtly to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, you will certainly think it much more his duty to puniſh a greater fault, as you muſt allow it is, to reject truth propoſed with arguments and miracles, than with bare arguments: since you tell us, that the magiſtrate is "obliged to procure, as much "as in him lies, that every man take care of his own ſoul, i. e. conſider as he "ought; which no man can be ſuppoſed to do, whilſt he perſiſts in rejecting:" as you tell us, pag. 24.

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MIRACLES, ſay you, ſupplied the want of force, "'till, by their help, "Chriſtianity had prevailed to be received for the religion of the empire." Not that the magiſtrates had not as much commiſſion then, from the law of nature, to uſe force, for promoting the true religion, as ſince: but, becauſe the magiſtrates then, not being of the true religion, did not afford it the aſſiſtance of their political power. If this be ſo, and there be a neceſſity, either of force, or miracles, will there not be the ſame reaſon for miracles, ever ſince, even to this day, and ſo on, to the end of the world, in all thoſe countries, where the magiſtrate is not of the true religion? "Unleſs (as you urge it) you will ſay (what, with"out impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign diſpoſer of all things, "has not furniſhed mankind, with competent means, for the promoting his own "honour in the world, and the good of ſouls."

A. p. 16.

BUT to put an end to your pretence to miracles, as ſupplying the place of force. Let me aſk you, whether, ſince the withdrawing of miracles, your moderate degree of force has been made uſe of, for the ſupport of the chriſtian religion? If not, then miracles were not made uſe of, to ſupply the want of force, unleſs it were for the ſupply of ſuch force, as chriſtianity never had, which is for the ſupply of juſt no force at all; or elſe, for the ſupply of the ſeverities, which have been in uſe amongſt chriſtians, which is worſe than none at all. Force, you ſay, is neceſſary: what force? "Not fire and ſword, not loſs of e"ſtates, not maiming with corporal puniſhments, not ſtarving and tormenting "in noiſome priſons:" thoſe you condemn. "Not compulſion: theſe ſeveri"ties, you ſay, are apter to hinder, than promote the true religion; but mo"derate, lower penalties, tolerable inconveniencies, ſuch as ſhould a little di"ſturb and diſeaſe men." This aſſiſtance not being to be had from the magiſtrate, in the firſt ages of chriſtianity, miracles, ſay you, were continued 'till "chriſtianity became the religion of the empire, not ſo much for any neceſ"ſity there was, of them, all that while, for the evincing the truth of the "chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance. For "the true religion, not being able to ſupport itſelf, by its own light, and ſtrength, "without the aſſiſtance either of miracles, or of authority," there was a neceſſity of the one or the other; and therefore, whilſt the powers, in being, aſſiſted not, with neceſſary force, miracles ſupplied that want. Miracles, then, being to ſupply neceſſary force, and neceſſary force being only "lower, moderate penal"ties, ſome inconveniencies, ſuch as only diſturb and diſeaſe a little:" if you cannot ſhew that, in all countries, where the magiſtrates have been chriſtian, they have aſſiſted with ſuch force, 'tis plain that miracles ſupplied not the want of neceſſary force; unleſs, to ſupply the want of your neceſſary force, for a time, were to ſupply the want of an aſſiſtance, which true religion had not, upon the withdrawing of miracles, and I think, I may ſay, was never thought on, by any authority, in any age, or country, 'till you, now, above 1300 years after, made this happy diſcovery. Nay, Sir, ſince the true religion, as you tell us, cannot prevail, or ſubſiſt, without miracles, or authority, i. e. your moderate force; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the chriſtian religion has, in all ages and countries, been accompanied, either with actual miracles, or ſuch force: which, whether it be ſo or no, I leave you, and all ſober men, to conſider. When you can ſhew, that it has been ſo, we ſhall have reaſon to be ſatisfied with your bold aſſertion: That the chriſtian religion, as delivered in the new teſtament, cannot " prevail, by its own light and ſtrength, without the aſſiſtance" of your moderate penalties, or of actual miracles, accompanying it. But if, ever ſince the withdrawing of miracles, in all chriſtian churches, where force has been thought neceſſary by the magiſtrate, to ſupport the national, or (as, every-where, it is called) the true religion, thoſe ſeverities have been made uſe of, which you (for a good reaſon) " condemn, as apter to hinder, than promote the true religion;" tis plain, that miracles ſupplied the want of ſuch an aſſiſtance from the magiſtrate, as was apter to hinder, than promote, the true religion. And your ſubſtituting of miracles, to ſupply the want of moderate force, will ſhew nothing, for your cauſe, but the zeal of a man ſo fond of force, that he will, without any warrant from ſcripture, enter into the counſels of the Almighty; and, without authority from hiſtory, talk of miracles, and political adminiſtrations, as may beſt ſuit his ſyſtem.

Page 8. To my ſaying, a religion that is from God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail; you anſwer, " This is not ſimply, nor al-" ways true. Indeed, when God takes the matter wholly into his own hands, " as he does, at his firſt revealing any religion, there can be no need of any aſ-" ſiſtance of human authority: but when God has once ſufficiently ſettled his " religion, in the world, ſo that if men, from thenceforth, will do what they " may, and ought, in their ſeveral capacities, to preſerve and propagate it, it " may ſubſiſt and prevail, without that extraordinary aſſiſtance from him, which " was neceſſary for its firſt eſtabliſhment. By this rule of yours, how long was there need of miracles to make chriſtianity ſubſiſt and prevail? If you will keep to it, you will find, there was no need of miracles, after the promulgation of the goſpel by Chriſt and his apoſtles; for I aſk you, Was it not, then, ſo " ſufficiently ſettled in the world, that if men would from thenceforth have " done, what they might, and ought, in their ſeveral capacities," it would have ſubſiſted and prevailed, without that extraordinary aſſiſtance of miracles? Unleſs you will, on this occaſion, retract what you ſay, in other places, viz. That it is a fault not to receive the " true religion, where ſufficient evidence is offered to " convince men that it is ſo." If then, from the times of the apoſtles, the chriſtian religion has had ſufficient evidence, that it is the true religion, and if men did their duty, i. e. receive it, it would certainly have ſubſiſted and prevailed, even from the apoſtles times, without that extraordinary aſſiſtance, and then miracles, after that, were not neceſſary.

But, perhaps, you will ſay, that by men, in their ſeveral capacities, you mean the magiſtrates. A pretty way of ſpeaking, proper to you alone: but, even in that ſenſe, it will not ſerve your turn. For then, there will be need of miracles, not only in the time you propoſe, but in all times after. For, if the magiſtrate, who is as much ſubject, as other men, to that corruption of human nature, by which, you tell us, falſe religions prevail againſt the true, ſhould not do, what he may and ought, ſo as to be of the true religion, as 'tis odds he will not; what, then, will become of the true religion, which, according to you, cannot ſubſiſt, or prevail, without either the aſſiſtance of miracles, or authority? Subjects cannot have the aſſiſtance of authority, where the magiſtrate is not of the true religion; and the magiſtrate, wanting the aſſiſtance of authority, to bring him to the true religion, that want muſt be ſtill ſupplied with miracles, or elſe, according to your hypotheſis, all muſt go to wreck; and the true religion, that cannot ſubſiſt by its own ſtrength and light, muſt be loſt in the world. For, I preſume, you are ſcarce yet ſuch an adorer of the powers of the world, as to ſay, that magiſtrates are privileged from that common corruption of mankind, whoſe oppoſition to the true religion, you ſuppoſe cannot be overcome, without the aſſiſtance of miracles, or force. The flock will ſtray, unleſs the bell-weather conduct them right; the bell-weather himſelf will ſtray, unleſs the ſhepherd's crook and ſtaff (which he has as much need of, as any ſheep of the flock) keep him right. Ergo, the whole flock will ſtray, unleſs the bell-weather have that aſſiſtance, which is neceſſary to conduct him right. The caſe is the ſame here. So that, by your own rule, either there was no need of miracles, to ſupply the want of force, after the apoſtles time, or there is need of them ſtill.

Page 8.

BUT your anſwer, when looked into, has ſomething in it more excellent. I ſay, a religion that is of God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority to make it prevail. Your anſwer, “ True, when God takes the matter into his own “ hands. But, when once he has ſufficiently ſettled religion, ſo that, if men “ will but do, what they may, and ought, it may ſubſiſt, without that extraordinary aſſiſtance from heaven; then he leaves it to their care.” Where you ſuppoſe, if men will do their duties, in their ſeveral capacities, true religion, being once eſtabliſhed, may ſubſiſt without miracles. And is it not as true, that if they will, in their ſeveral capacities, do what they may and ought, true religion, will alſo ſubſiſt, without force? But you are ſure, magiſtrates will do what they may, and ought, to preſerve and propagate the true religion, but ſubjects will not. If you are not, you muſt bethink yourſelf how to anſwer that old queſtion,

——“ Sed quis cuſtodiet ipſos
“ Cuſtodes?”——

Page 6.

To my having ſaid, that prevailing, without the aſſiſtance of force, I thought was made uſe of, as an argument for the truth of the chriſtian religion. You reply, that you hope, “ I am miſtaken, for ſure, this is a very bad argument, “ That “ the chriſtian religion, ſo contrary, in the nature of it, as well to fleſh and “ blood, as to the powers of darkneſs, ſhould prevail, as it did, and that not “ only, without any aſſiſtance from authority, but even in ſpight of all the op“ poſition, which authority and a wicked world, joined with thoſe infernal pow“ ers, could make againſt it. This, I acknowledge, has deſervedly been inſiſt“ ed upon by chriſtians, as a very good proof of their religion. But, to ar“ gue the truth of the chriſtian religion, from its mere prevailing in the world, “ without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being; as if, “ whatever religion ſhould ſo prevail, muſt needs be the true religion, (what“ ever may be intended) is really not to defend the chriſtian religion, but to be“ tray it.” How you have mended the argument, by putting in, mere, which is not any where uſed by me, I will not examine. The queſtion is, Whether the chriſtian religion, ſuch as it was then, (for I know not any other chriſtian religion) and is ſtill “ contrary to fleſh and blood, and to the powers of dark“ neſs,” prevailed not, without the aſſiſtance of human force, by thoſe aids it has ſtill? This, I think, you will not deny to be an argument, uſed for its truth, by chriſtians, and ſome of our church. How far any one, in the uſe of this argument, pleaſes, or diſpleaſes you, I am not concerned. All the uſe, I made of it was, to ſhew, that it is confeſſed, that the chriſtian religion did prevail, without that human means of the coactive power of the magiſtrate, which you affirmed to be neceſſary; and this, I think, makes good the experiment I brought. Nor will your ſeeking, your way, a refuge, in miracles, help you to evade it; as I have already ſhewn.

Ibid.

BUT you give a reaſon for what you ſay, in theſe following words; “ For “ neither does the true religion always prevail, without the aſſiſtance of the “ powers in being; nor is that always the true religion, which does ſo ſpread “ and prevail.” Thoſe, who uſe the argument, of its prevailing without force, for the truth of the chriſtian religion, 'tis like, will tell you, that if it be true, as you ſay, that the chriſtian religion (which at other times does) ſometimes does not prevail, without the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, it is becauſe, when it fails, it wants the due aſſiſtance and diligence of the miniſters of it.

“ How ſhall they hear without a preacher?” How ſhall the goſpel be ſpread and prevail, if thoſe, who take on them, to be the miniſters and preachers of it, either neglect to teach it others, as they ought, or confirm it not by their lives? If therefore, you will make this argument of any uſe to you, you muſt ſhew, where it was, that the miniſters of the goſpel, doing their duty, by the purity of their lives, and their uninterrupted labour, in being inſtant in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon, have not been able to make it prevail. An inſtance of this, ’tis believed, you will ſcarce find: and, if this be the caſe, that it fails not to prevail, where thoſe, whoſe charge it is, neglect not to teach and ſpread it, with that care, aſſiduity, and application, which they ought, you may, hereafter, know where to lay the blame; not on the want of ſufficient light and ſtrength, in the goſpel, to prevail (wherein, methinks, you make very bold with it) but on the want of what the apoſtle requires, in the miniſters of it; ſome part whereof you may read in theſe words to Timothy; “ But thou, O man of God, follow after righteouſneſs, godlineſs, faith, love patience, meekneſs: give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine; preach the word, be inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon; reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long ſuffering and doctrine:” and more to this purpoſe, in his epiſtles to Timothy and Titus.

THAT the chriſtian religion, has prevailed, and ſupported itſelf in the world, now, above theſe 1600 years you muſt grant, and that it has not been, by force, is demonſtration. For, where-ever the chriſtian religion prevailed, it did it, as far as we know any thing, of the means of its propagation and ſupport, without the help of that force, moderate force, which, you ſay, is alone uſeful and neceſſary. So that, if the ſeverities you condemn, be, as you confeſs, apter to hinder, than promote the goſpel, and it has, no where had the aſſiſtance of your moderate penalties, it muſt follow, that it prevailed without force, only by its own ſtrength and light, diſplayed and brought home to the underſtandings and hearts of the people, by the preaching, entreaties, and exhortations, of its miniſters. This, at leaſt, you muſt grant, that force can be, by no means neceſſary to make the goſpel prevail, any where, ’till the utmoſt has been tried, that can be done, by argument and exhortations, prayers and entreaties, and all the friendly ways of perſuaſion.

AS to the other part of your aſſertion, “ Nor is that, always the true religion that does ſo ſpread and prevail.” ’Tis like, they will demand inſtances of you, where falſe religions ever prevailed againſt the goſpel, without the aſſiſtance of force, on the one ſide, or the betraying of it, by the negligence and careleſneſs of its teachers, on the other? So that, if the goſpel any where, wants the magiſtrate’s aſſiſtance, it is only to make the miniſters of it do their duty. I have heard of thoſe, and poſſibly, there are inſtances of it now not wanting, who, by their pious lives, peaceable and friendly carriage, and diligent application to the ſeveral conditions and capacities of their pariſhioners, and ſcreening them, as much as they could, from the penalties of the law, have, in a ſhort time, ſcarce left a diſſenter in a pariſh, where, notwithſtanding that force had been before uſed, they ſcarce found any other. But how far this has recommended ſuch miniſters to thoſe, who ought to encourage, or follow, the example, I wiſh, you would inform yourſelf, and then tell me. But who ſees not, that a juſtice of peace’s warrant is a ſhorter, and much eaſier way for the miniſter, than all this ado, of inſtruction, debates, and particular application. Whether it be alſo more chriſtian, or more effectual to make real converts, others may be apt to enquire. This, I am ſure, it is not juſtifiable (even by your very principles) to be uſed, ’till the other has been thoroughly tried.

Vid. Paſtoral Care, p. 181.

HOW far our Saviour is like to approve this method, in thoſe, whom he ſends: what reward he is like to beſtow on miniſters of his word, who are forward to bring their brethren under ſuch correction; thoſe, who call themſelves ſucceſſors of the apoſtes, will do well to conſider, from what he himſelf ſays to them, Luke xii. 42. For that That was ſpoken particularly to the apoſtles and preachers of the goſpel, is evident, not only from the words themſelves, but from St. Peter’s queſtion. Our Saviour, having in the foregoing verſes, declared, in a parable, the neceſſity of being watchful, St. Peter, ver. 41. aſks him, "Lord, ſpeakeſt thou this parable unto us, or even to all?" To this demand, our Saviour replies, in theſe words, "Who, then, is that faithful and wiſe ſteward, whom his Lord ſhall make ruler over his houſhold, to give them their portion of meat, in due ſeaſon? Bleſſed is that ſervant, whom the Lord, when he cometh, ſhall find ſo doing. Of a truth, I ſay unto you, he will make him ruler over all that he hath. But, and if that ſervant ſay in his heart, "my Lord delayeth his coming;" and ſhall begin to beat the men-ſervants, and maidens, and to eat and drink, and to be drunken. The Lord of that ſervant will come, in a day, when he looketh not for him, and at an hour, when he is not aware; and will cut him in ſunder, and will appoint him his portion with unbelievers, or with hypocrites," as it is, Matth. xxiv. 51.

BUT, if there be any thing in the argument for the truth of chriſtianity, (as God forbid there ſhould not) that it has, and conſequently can prevail, without force, I think it can ſcarce be true, in matter of fact, that falſe religions do alſo prevail, againſt the chriſtian religion, when they come, upon equal terms, in competition; and as much diligence and induſtry is uſed, by the teachers of it, as by ſeducers to falſe religions, the magiſtrate uſing his force, on neither ſide. For if, in this caſe, which is the fair trial, chriſtianity can prevail, and falſe religions too, 'tis poſſible, contrarieties may prevail, againſt one another, both together. To make good, therefore, your aſſertion, you muſt ſhew us, where ever any other religion ſo ſpread and prevailed, as to drive chriſtianity out of any country, without force, where the miniſters of it did their duty to teach, adorn and ſupport it.

Page 6. AS to the following words, "nor is that always the true religion, which does ſo ſpread and prevail; as I doubt not, but you will acknowledge with me, when you have but conſidered, within how few generations after the flood, the worſhip of falſe gods prevailed againſt that, which Noah profeſſed, and taught his children, which was undoubtedly the true religion, almoſt to the utter excluſion of it, (though that, at firſt, was the only religion in the world) without any aid from force, or aſſiſtance from the powers in being." This will need ſomething more, than a negative proof, as we ſhall ſee by and by.

L. 2. p. 272. Page 8. WHERE I ſay, "the inventions of men need the force and help of men: a religion, that is from God, wants not the aſſiſtance of human authority." The firſt part of thoſe words, you take no notice of; neither grant, nor deny it to be ſo, though perhaps, it will prove a great part of the controverſy between us.

Ibid. TO my queſtion, "whether, if ſuch a toleration, as is propoſed by the author of the firſt letter, were eſtabliſhed in France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, &c. the true religion would not be a gainer by it?" You anſwer, that the "true religion would be a loſer by it, in thoſe few places, where it is now eſtabliſhed, as the national religion;" and particularly, you name England. It is then, it ſeems, by your way of moderate force, and lower penalties, that, in all countries, where it is national, the true religion hath prevailed and ſubſiſts. For the controverſy is between the author's univerſal toleration, and your new way of force: for greater degrees of force, you condemn, as hurtful. Say then, that in England, and wherever the true religion is national, it has been beholden to your force, for the advantages and ſupport it has had, and I will yield you the cauſe. But, of national religions, and particularly that of England, I have occaſion to ſpeak more, in another place.

Page 9. IN the next place, you anſwer, that you "ſuppoſe, I do not hope, I ſhall perſuade the world to conſent to my toleration." I think, by your logick, a propoſition is not leſs true, or falſe, becauſe the world will, or will not, be perſuaded to conſent to it. And, therefore, though it will not conſent to a general toleration, it may, nevertheleſs, be true, that it would be advantageous to the true religion; and if nobody muſt ſpeak truth, 'till he thinks all the world will be perſuaded by it, you muſt have a very good opinion of your oratory, or elſe, you will have a very good excuſe to turn your parſonage, when you have one, into a ſine-cure. But, though I have not ſo good an opinion, of my gift of perſuaſion, as perhaps, you have of yours; yet I think I may, without any great preſumption hope, that I may as ſoon perſuade England, the world, or any government in it, to conſent to my toleration, as you perſuade it, to content itſelf with moderate penalties.

YOU farther anſwer, if ſuch a toleration, eſtabliſhed there, would permit the doctrine of the church of England to be truly preached, and its worſhip ſet up, in any popiſh, mahometan, or pagan country, you think true religion would be "a gainer by it, for a time; but you think withal, that an univerſal "toleration would ruin it, both there, and every where elſe, in the end." You grant it, then, poſſible, notwithſtanding the corruption of human nature, that the true religion may gain, ſomewhere, and for ſome time, by toleration: it will gain under a new toleration you think, but decay under an old one; would you had told us the reaſon, why you think ſo. "But you think, there is great reaſon to fear, that, without God's extraordinary providence, it would, in a "much ſhorter time, than any one, who does not well conſider the matter "will imagine, be moſt effectually extirpated by it, throughout the world." If you have conſidered right, and the matter be really ſo, it is demonſtration, that the chriſtian religion, ſince Conſtantine's time, as well as the true religion before Moſes's time, muſt needs have been totally extinguiſhed out of the world, and have ſo continued, unleſs, by miracle and immediate revelation, reſtored. For thoſe men, i. e. the magiſtrate (upon whoſe being of the true religion, the preſervation of it, according to you, depends) living, all of them, under a free toleration, muſt needs loſe the true religion, effectually and ſpeedily, from among them; and they quitting the true religion, the aſſiſtance of force, which ſhould ſupport it againſt a general defection, be utterly loſt.

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Page 5.

THE princes of the world are, I ſuppoſe, as well infected with the depraved nature of man, as the reſt of their brethren. Theſe, whether, 100 or 1000, ſuppoſe they lived together in one ſociety, wherein, with the true religion, there were a free toleration, and no coactive power of the magiſtrate employed, about matters of religion, would the true religion be ſoon extirpated amongſt them? If you ſay it would not, you muſt grant toleration not to be ſo deſtructive of the true religion, as you ſay; or you muſt think them of another race, than the reſt of corrupt men, and free from that general taint. If you grant, that the true religion would be quickly extirpated amongſt them, by toleration, living together in one ſociety, the ſame will happen to them, living as princes, where they are free from all coactive power of the magiſtrate, in matters of religion, and have as large a toleration, as can be imagined. Unleſs you will ſay, that depraved human nature works leſs in a prince, than a ſubject; and is moſt tame, moſt mortified, where it has moſt liberty and temptation. Muſt not then if your maxim be true, toleration quickly deprive the few orthodox princes that are in the world (take it, when you will) of the true religion; and with them, take away the aſſiſtance of authority, which is neceſſary to ſupport it, amongſt their ſubjects? Toleration, then, does not, whatever your fears are, make that woful wreck, on true religion, which you talk of.

I SHALL give you another evidence of it, and then come to examine your great reaſon, taken from the corruption of human nature, and the inſtance you ſo often repeat, and build ſo much on, the apoſtaſy after the flood. Toleration, you ſay, would quickly, and effectually extirpate the true religion throughout the world. What, now, is the means to preſerve true religion in the world? If you may be believed, 'tis force, but not all force, great ſeverities, fire, faggot, impriſonment, loſs of eſtate, &c. Theſe will do more harm than good; 'tis only lower and moderate penalties, ſome tolerable inconveniencies, can do the buſineſs. If then, moderate force hath not been all along, no, nor any where, made uſe of, for the preſervation of the true religion, the maintenance and ſupport of the true religion, in the world, has not been owing to what you oppoſe to toleration: and ſo, your argument againſt toleration is out of doors.

YOU give us, in this and the foregoing pages, the grounds of your fear, it is the corruption of human nature, which oppoſes the true religion. You expreſs it thus, "idolatry prevailing againſt it [the true religion] not by its own light "and ſtrength, for it could have nothing of either, but merely by the advantage, it had, in the corruption and pravity of human nature, finding out, to "itſelf, more agreeable religions than the true, For, ſay you, whatever hardſhips ſome falſe religion may impoſe, it will, however, always be eaſier to "carnal and worldly-minded men, to give even their firſt-born for their tranſgreſſions, than to mortify their luſts, from which they ſpring, which no religion, but the true, requires of them." I wonder, ſaying this, how you could any longer miſtake the magiſtrate's duty, in reference to religion, and not ſee, wherein force truly can, and ought to be ſerviceable to it. What you have ſaid, plainly ſhews you, that the aſſiſtance the magiſtrate's authority can give, to the true religion, is in the ſubduing of luſts, and its being directed againſt pride, injuſtice, rapine, luxury and debauchery, and thoſe other immoralities, which come properly under his cogniſance, and may be corrected by puniſhments; and not by the impoſing of creeds and ceremonies, as you tell us. Sound and decent, you might have left out, whereof their fancies, and not the law of God, will always be judge, and conſequently the rule.

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THE caſe between the true and falſe religions, as you have ſtated it, in ſhort ſounds thus "true religion has always light and ſtrength of its own, ſufficient "to prevail with all that ſeriouſly conſider it, and without prejudice. Idolatry, "or falſe religions, have nothing of light, or ſtrength, to prevail with." Why, then, does not the true religion prevail againſt the falſe, having ſo much the advantage in light and ſtrength? The counter-balance of prejudice hinders. And wherein does that conſiſt? The drunkard muſt part with his cups and companions, and the voluptuous man with his pleaſures. The proud and vain muſt lay by all exceſs in apparel, furniture and attendance, and money, the ſupport of all theſe, muſt be got only by the ways of juſtice, honeſty, and fair induſtry: and every one muſt live peaceably, uprightly, and friendly with his neighbour, Here, then, the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance is wanting: here they may, and ought to, interpoſe their power, and by ſeverities againſt drunkenneſs, laſciviouſneſs, and all ſorts of debauchery: by a ſteady and unrelaxed puniſhment of all the ways of fraud and injuſtice, and, by their adminiſtration, countenance, and example, reduce the irregularities of men's manners into order, and bring ſobriety, peaceableneſs, induſtry and honeſty into faſhion. This is their proper buſineſs, every where; and, for this, they have a commiſſion from God, both, by the light of nature, and revelation; and, by this, removing the great counterpoiſe, which lies in ſtrictneſs of life, and is ſo ſtrong a biaſs with the greateſt part, againſt the true religion, they would caſt the balance on that ſide. For, if men were forced, by the magiſtrate, to live ſober, honeſt and ſtrict lives, whatever their religion were, would not the advantage be on the ſide of truth, when the gratifying of their luſts were not to be obtained by forſaking her? In men's lives lies the main obſtacle to right opinions in religion: and, if you will not believe me, yet what a very rational man of the church of England ſays in the caſe, will deſerve to be remembered. "Did religion "beſtow heaven, without any forms and conditions, indifferently, upon all; "if the crown of life was hereditary, and free to good and bad, and not ſettled by covenant upon the elect of God only, ſuch as live ſoberly, righteouſly and godly in this preſent world;" I believe there would be no ſuch "thing as an infidel among us. And without controverſy, 'tis the way "and means of attaining to heaven, that makes profane ſcoffers ſo willing to "let go the expectation of it. Tis not the articles of the creed, but their duty to God and their neighbour, that is ſuch an inconſiſtent, incredible legend. "They will not practiſe the rules of religion, and therefore they cannot believe "the doctrines of it." The ingenious author will pardon me the change of one word, which I doubt not but ſuits his opinion, though it did not ſo well that argument, he was then on.

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Bentley's ſermon of the folly of atheiſm, p. 16.

You grant the true religion has always light, and ſtrength to prevail; falſe religions have neither. Take away the ſatisfaction of men's luſts, and which then, I pray, hath the advantage? Will men, againſt the light of their reaſon, do violence to their underſtandings, and forſake truth, and ſalvation too, gratis? You tell us here, "No religion but the true requires of men the difficult taſk of "mortifying their luſts." This being granted you, what ſervice will this do you, to prove a neceſſity of force to puniſh all diſſenters in England? Do none of their religions require the mortifying of luſts, as well as yours?

AND now, let us conſider your inſtance, whereon you build ſo much, that we hear of it, over and over again. For you tell us, "Idolatry prevailed, but Page 7. "yet not by the help of force, as has been ſufficiently ſhewn. And again, "That truth left to ſhift for herſelf, will not do well enough, has been ſuffici- Page 10. "ently ſhewn." What you have done to ſhew this, is to be ſeen, where you tell us, "Within how few generations after the flood, the worſhip of falſe gods Page 6. "prevailed againſt the religion, which Noah profeſſed, and taught his children, "(which was undoubtedly the true religion) almoſt to the utter excluſion of it, "(tho' that, at firſt, was the only religion in the world) without any aid from "force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, for any thing we find, in the "hiſtory of thoſe times, as we may reaſonably believe, conſidering that it found "an entrance into the world, and entertainment in it, when it could have no "ſuch aid, or aſſiſtance. Of which (beſides the corruption of human nature) "you ſuppoſe there can no other cauſe be aſſigned, or none more probable, "than this, that the powers then in being, did not do what they might, and "ought to, have done, towards the preventing, or checking, that horrible "apoſtaſy." Here you tell us, that the "worſhip of falſe gods, within a very "few generations after the flood, prevailed againſt the true religion almoſt to "the utter excluſion of it." This you ſay, indeed, but without any proofs; and unleſs that be ſhewing, you have not, as you pretend, any way ſhewn it. Out of what records, I beſeech you, have you it, that the true religion was almoſt wholly extirpated out of the world, within a few generations after the flood? The ſcripture, the largeſt hiſtory we have of thoſe times, ſays nothing of it; nor does, as I remember, mention any as guilty of idolatry, within 2 or 300 years after the flood. In Canaan itſelf, I do not think that you can, out of any credible hiſtory, ſhew, that there was any idolatry within ten or twelve generations after Noah; much leſs that it had ſo overſpread the world, and extirpated the true religion, out of that part of it, where the ſcene lay, of thoſe actions, recorded in the hiſtory of the bible. In Abraham's time, Melchiſedeck, who was king of Salem, was alſo the prieſt of the moſt High God. We read that God, with an immediate hand, puniſhed miraculouſly, firſt mankind, at the confuſion of Babel, and afterwards Sodom, and four other cities; but, in neither of theſe places, is there any the leaſt mention of idolatry, by which they provoked God, and drew down vengeance on themſelves. So that truly, you have ſhewn nothing at all, and what the ſcripture ſhews is againſt you: for beſides, that it is plain by Melchiſedeck, the king of Salem, and prieſt of the moſt high God, to whom Abraham paid tithes, that all the land of Ca- Page 6. naan was not yet overſpread with idolatry, tho' afterwards, in the time of Joſhua, by the forfeiture which was therefore made to the Iſraelites, one may have reaſon to ſuſpect, it were more defiled with it, than any part of the world. Beſides Salem, I ſay, he that reads the ſtory of Abimelech, will have reaſon to Gen. xx. think, that he has alſo, and his kingdom, tho' Philiſtines, were not then infected 11, 12. with idolatry.

You think they, and almoſt all mankind, were idolaters, but you may be miſtaken; and that which may ſerve to ſhew it, is the example of Elijah the prophet, who was, at leaſt, as infallible a gueſſer as you, and was as well inſtructed in the ſtate and hiſtory of his own country, and time, as you can be in the ſtate of the whole world, three or four thouſand years ago. Elijah thought idolatry had wholly extirpated the true religion out of Iſrael, and complains thus to God. "The children of Iſrael have forſaken thy covenant, thrown down 1 Kings xix, "thy altars, and ſlain thy prophets with the ſword; and I, even I alone, am 10.

"left, and they ſeek my life to take it away." And he is ſo fully perſuaded of it, that he repeats it again: and yet God tells him, that he had there yet 1 Kings xix. 14. 7000 knees that had not bowed to Baal, 7000 that were not idolaters: though this was in the reign of Ahab, a king zealous for idolatry: and in a kingdom ſet up in an idolatrous worſhip, which had continued the national religion, eſtabliſhed and promoted by the continual ſucceſſion of ſeveral idolatrous princes. And though the national religions, ſoon after the flood, were falſe, which you are far enough from proving; how does it thence follow that the true religion was near extirpated? which it muſt needs quite have been, before St. Peter's Page 9. time, if there were ſo great reaſon to fear, as you tell us, that the true religion without the aſſiſtance of force, "would in a much ſhorter time, than any one, "that does not well conſider the matter, would imagine, be moſt effectually "extirpated throughout the world." For, about 2000 years after Noah's time, Acts x. 35. St. Peter tells us, "that in every nation, he that feareth God, and worketh "righteouſneſs, is accepted by him." By which words, and the occaſion, on which they were ſpoken, it is manifeſt, that, in countries where, for 2000 years together, no force had been uſed, for the ſupport of Noah's true religion, it was not yet wholly extirpated. But that you may not think, it was ſo near, that there was but one left, only Cornelius, if you will look into Acts xvii. 4. you will find a great multitude of them at Theſſalonica, "and of the devout "Greeks a great multitude believed, and conſorted with Paul and Silas." And again more of them in Athens, a city wholly given to idolatry. For that thoſe Ver. 17. *σεϐόμηνοι*, which we tranſlate devout, and whereof many are mentioned in the Acts, were gentiles, who worſhipped the true God, and kept the precepts of Noah, Mr. Mede has abundantly proved. So that, whatſoever you, "who "have well conſidered the matter," may imagine, of the ſhortneſs of time, wherein Noah's religion would be effectually extirpated throughout the world," without the aſſiſtance of force, we find it at Athens, at Philippi, at Corinth, amongſt the Romans, in Antioch of Piſidia, in Theſſalonica, above 2000 years after, and that not ſo near being extinguiſh'd, but that, in ſome of thoſe places, the profeſſors of it were numerous: at Theſſalonica, they are call'd a great multitude: at Antioch, many: and how many of them there were, in other parts of the world, whereof there was no occaſion to make mention, in that ſhort hiſtory of the acts of the apoſtles, who knows? If they anſwer'd, in other places, to what were found in theſe, as what reaſon is there to ſuppoſe, they ſhould not? I think, we may imagine them to be as many, as there were effectually of the true religion, chriſtians in Europe, a little before the reformation, notwithſtanding the aſſiſtance the chriſtian religion had from authority, after the withdrawing of miracles.

BUT you have a ſalvo, for you write warily, and endeavour to ſave yourſelf, on all hands: you ſay, "there is great reaſon to fear, that without God's EX-Page 9. "TRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, it would, in a much ſhorter time, than "any one, who does not well conſider the matter, would imagine, be moſt "effectually extirpated by it, throughout the world." 'Tis without doubt, the providence of God, which governs the affairs both of the world and his church; and, to that, whether you call it ordinary, or extraordinary, you may truſt the preſervation of his church, without the uſe of ſuch means, as he has, no where, appointed, or authorized. You fancy force neceſſary, to preſerve the true religion, and hence you conclude the magiſtrate authorized, without any farther commiſſion from God, to uſe it, "if there be no other means left;" and therefore, that muſt be uſed: if religion ſhould be preſerved without it, it is by the extraordinary providence of God; where, extraordinary, ſignifies nothing, but begging the thing in queſtion. The true religion has been preſerved, many ages, in the church, without force. Ay, ſay you, that was by the "extraordinary "providence of God." His providence, which over-rules all events, we eaſily grant it: but why extraordinary providence? becauſe force was neceſſary to preſerve it. And why was force neceſſary? becauſe otherwiſe, without "extraordinary providence," it cannot be preſerved. In ſuch circles, covered under good words, but miſapplied, one might ſhew you taking many a turn, in your anſwer,

ſwer, if it were fit to waſte others time, to trace your wanderings. God has appointed preaching, teaching, perſuaſion, inſtruction, as a means to continue and propagate his true religion in the world; and, if it were any where preſerv'd and propagated, without that, we might call it his "extraordinary providence:" but the means, he has appointed, being uſed, we may conclude, that men have done their duties, and ſo may leave it to his providence, however we will call it, to preſerve the little flock (which he bids not to fear) to the end of the world.

BUT let us return again, to what you ſay, to make good this hypotheſis of yours, that idolatry enter'd firſt into the world by the contrivance, and ſpread itſelf by the endeavours, of private men, without the aſſiſtance of the magiſtrates, and thoſe in power. To prove this, you tell us, "that it found entrance into the world, and entertainment in it, when it could have no ſuch "aid or aſſiſtance." Page 6. When was this, I beſeech you, that idolatry found this entrance into the world? Under what king's reign was it, that you are ſo poſitive, it could have no ſuch aid, or aſſiſtance? If you had named the time, the thing (though of no great moment to you) had been ſure. But now we may very juſtly queſtion this bare aſſertion of yours. For ſince we find, as far back as we have any hiſtory of it, that the great men of the world were always forward to ſet up, and promote, idolatry, and falſe religions, you ought to have given us ſome reaſon why, without authority from hiſtory, you affirm that idolatry, at its entrance into the world, had not that aſſiſtance from men in power, which it never fail'd of afterwards. Who they were, that made Iſrael to ſin, the ſcripture tells us. Their kings were ſo zealous promoters of idolatry, that there is ſcarce any one of them, that has not that brand left upon him, in holy writ.

ONE of the firſt falſe religions, whoſe riſe and way of propagating, we have an account of, in ſacred hiſtory, was by an ambitious uſurper, who having rebelled againſt his maſter, with a falſe title, ſet up a falſe religion, to ſecure his power and dominion. Why this might not have been done before Jeroboam's days, and idols ſet up at other places, as well as at Dan and Bethel, to ſerve politick ends, will need ſome other proof, than barely ſaying, it could not be ſo at firſt. The devil, unleſs much more ignorant, was not leſs buſy, in thoſe days, to engage princes in his favour, and to weave religion into affairs of ſtate, the better to introduce his worſhip, and ſupport idolatry, by accommodating it to the ambition, vanity, or ſuperſtition, of men in power: and therefore, you may as well ſay, that the corruption of human nature, as that the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, did not in thoſe days, help forward falſe religions; becauſe your reading has furniſhed you with no particular mention of it out of hiſtory. But you need but ſay, that the "worſhip of falſe gods prevailed, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, for any thing "we find in the hiſtory of thoſe times," Page 6. and then you have ſufficiently ſhewn, what? even that you have juſt nothing to ſhew for your aſſertion.

BUT whatever that, any thing, is which you find in hiſtory, you may meet with men (whoſe reading, yet, I will not compare with yours) who think they have found in hiſtory, that princes, and thoſe in power, firſt corrupted the true religion, by ſetting up the images and ſymbols of their predeceſſors, in their temples: which, by their influence, and the ready obedience of the prieſts they appointed, were, in ſucceſſion of time, propoſed to the people, as objects of their worſhip. Thus they think, they find in hiſtory that Iſis, queen of Egypt, with her counſellor Thoth, inſtituted the funeral rites of king Oſiris, by the honour done to the ſacred ox. They think, they find alſo in hiſtory, that the ſame Thoth, who was alſo king of Egypt in his turn, invented the figures of the firſt Egyptian gods, Saturn, Dagon, Jupiter Hammon, and the reſt: that is, the figures of their ſtatues, or idols; and that he inſtituted the worſhip and ſacrifices of theſe gods: and his inſtitutions were ſo well aſſiſted, by thoſe in authority, and obſerved by the prieſts, they ſet up, that the worſhip of thoſe gods ſoon became the religion of that, and a pattern to other nations. And here we may perhaps, with good reaſon, place the riſe and original of idolatry after the flood, there being nothing of this kind more ancient. So ready was the ambition, vanity, or ſuperſtition of princes, to introduce their predeceſſors into the divine worſhip of the people, to ſecure to themſelves the greater veneration from their ſubjects, as deſcended from the gods; or to erect ſuch a worſhip, and ſuch a prieſthood, as might awe the blinded and ſeduced people into that obedience they deſired. Thus Ham, by the authority of his ſucceſſors, the rulers of Egypt, is firſt brought for the honour of his name and memory into their temples, and never left, 'till he is erected into a god, and made Jupiter Hammon, &c. which faſhion took, afterwards, with the princes of other countries.

WAS not the great god of the eaſtern nations, Baal, or Jupiter Belus, one of the firſt kings of Aſſyria? And which, I pray, is the more likely, that courts, by their inſtruments, the prieſts, ſhould thus advance the honour of kings, amongſt the people, for the ends of ambition and power; or the people find out theſe refined ways of doing it, and introduce them into courts, for the enſlaving themſelves? What idolatry does your hiſtory tell you of, amongſt the Greeks before Phoroneus and Danaus, kings of the Argives, and Cecrops and Theſeus kings of Attica, and Cadmus, king of Thebes, introduced? An art of rule, 'tis probable, they borrowed from the Egyptians. So that, if you had not vouched the ſilence of hiſtory, without conſulting it, you would poſſibly, have found that, in the firſt ages, princes, by their influence and aid, by the help and artifice of the prieſts they employ'd, their fables of their gods, their myſteries and oracles, and all the aſſiſtance they could give it, by their authority, did ſo much againſt the truth, before direct force was grown into faſhion, and appear'd openly, that there would be little reaſon of putting the guard and propagation of the true religion into their hands now, and arming them, with force, to promote it.

THAT this was the original of idolatry in the world, and that it was borrowed, by other magiſtrates, from the Egyptians, is farther evident, in that this worſhip was ſettled in Egypt, and grown the national religion there, before the gods of Greece, and ſeveral other idolatrous countries were born. For, though they took their pattern of deifying their deceaſed princes, from the Egyptians, and kept, as near as they could, to the number and genealogies of the Egyptian gods; yet they took the names ſtill of ſome great men of their own, which they accommodated to the mythology of the Egyptians. Thus, by the aſſiſtance of the powers in being, idolatry enter'd into the world, after the flood. Whereof, if there were not ſo clear footſteps in hiſtory, why yet ſhould you not imagine princes and magiſtrates, engaged in falſe religions, as ready to employ their power, for the maintaining and promoting their falſe religions, in thoſe days, as we find them now? And therefore, what you ſay, in the next words, of the Page 6. entrance of idolatry into the world, and the entertainment it found in it, will not paſs for ſo very evident, without proof, though you tell us never ſo confidently, that you "ſuppoſe, beſides the corruption of human nature, there can no other cauſe be aſſigned of it, or none more probable than this, That the powers, then in being, did not what they might, and ought to, have done," (i. e. if you mean it to your purpoſe, uſe force your way, to make men conſider, or to impoſe creeds and ways of worſhip) "towards the preventing, or checking, that horrible apoſtaſy."

I GRANT, that the entrance and growth of idolatry, might be owing to the negligence of the powers in being, in that they did not do what they might, and ought to, have done, in uſing their authority, to ſuppreſs the enormities of men's manners, and correct the irregularity of their lives. But this not all the aſſiſtance they gave, to that horrible apoſtaſy: they were, as far as hiſtory gives us any light, the promoters of it, and leaders in it, and did what they ought not to have done, by ſetting up falſe religions, and uſing their authority to eſtabliſh them, to ſerve their corrupt and ambitious deſigns.

NATIONAL religions, eſtabliſhed by authority, and enforced by the powers in being, we hear of, every where, as far back as we have any account of the riſe and growth of the religions of the world. Shew me any place, within thoſe few generations, wherein you ſay, that apoſtaſy prevailed after the flood, where the magiſtrates, being of the true religion, the ſubjects, by the liberty of toleration, were led into falſe religions, and then you will produce ſomething againſt liberty of conſcience. But to talk of that great apoſtaſy, as wholly owing to toleration,

leration, when you cannot produce one inſtance of toleration, then, in the world, is to ſay what you pleaſe.

THAT the majority of mankind were then, and always have been, by the corruption and pravity of human nature, led away, and kept from embracing the true religion, is paſt doubt. But, whether this be owing to toleration, in matters of religion, is the queſtion. David deſcribes an horrible corruption and apoſtaſy in his time, ſo as to ſay, "There is none that doth good, no not one;" and yet, I do not think, you will ſay, a toleration then, in that kingdom, was the cauſe of it. If the greateſt part cannot be ill, without a toleration, I am afraid you muſt be fain to find out a toleration, in every country, and in all ages of the world. For, I think, it is true, of all times and places, that the broad way, that leadeth to deſtruction, has had moſt travellers. I would be glad to know, where it was that force, your way applied, i. e. with puniſhments only upon nonconformiſts, ever prevailed to bring the greater number into the narrow way, that leads unto life; which, our Saviour tells us, there are few that find. Pſal. xiv.

THE corruption of human nature, you ſay, oppoſes the true religion. I grant it you. There was alſo, ſay you, an horrible apoſtaſy after the flood; let this alſo be granted you: and yet, from hence, it will not follow, that the true religion cannot ſubſiſt and prevail in the world, without the aſſiſtance of force, your way applied, 'till you have ſhewn, that the falſe religions, which were the inventions of men, grew up under toleration, and not by the encouragement and aſſiſtance of the powers in being.

How near ſoever, therefore, the true religion was to be extinguiſhed, within a few generations after the flood, (which, whether more in danger then, than in moſt ages ſince, is more than you can ſhew) this will be ſtill the queſtion, whether the liberty of toleration, or the authority of the powers in being, contributed moſt to it? And, whether there can be no other, nor more probable cauſe aſſigned, than the want of force, your way applied, I ſhall leave the reader to judge. This I am ſure, whatever cauſes, any one elſe ſhall aſſign, are as well proved as yours, if they offer them, only as their conjectures.

NOT but that I think, men could run into falſe and fooliſh ways of worſhip, without the inſtigation, or aſſiſtance, of human authority; but the powers of the world, as far as we have any hiſtory, having been always forward enough (true religion as little ſerving princes, as private men's, luſts) to take up wrong religions, and as forward to employ their authority, to impoſe the religion, good or bad, which they had once taken up; I can ſee no reaſon, why the not uſing of force, by the princes of the world, ſhould be aſſigned, as the ſole, or ſo much as the moſt probable, cauſe of propagating the falſe religions of the world, or extirpating the true; or how you can ſo poſitively ſay, idolatry prevailed, without any aſſiſtance from the powers in being.

SINCE, therefore, hiſtory leads us to the magiſtrates, as the authors and promoters of idolatry in the world, to which, we may ſuppoſe, their not ſuppreſſing of vice, joined as another cauſe of the ſpreading of falſe religions, you were beſt conſider, whether you can ſtill ſuppoſe, there can no other cauſe be aſſigned, of the prevailing of the worſhip of falſe gods, but the magiſtrate's not interpoſing his authority, in matters of religion. For that that cannot, with any probability at all be aſſigned, as any cauſe, I ſhall give you this farther reaſon. You impute the prevailing of falſe religions to "the corruption and pravity of human nature, "left to itſelf, unbridled by authority." Now if force, your way applied, does not at all bridle the corruption and pravity of human nature, the magiſtrate's not ſo interpoſing his authority, cannot be aſſigned, as any cauſe, at all, of that apoſtaſy. So that, let that apoſtaſy have what riſe, and ſpread as far, as you pleaſe, it will not make one jot for force, your way applied, or ſhew, that that can receive any aſſiſtance, your way, from authority. For your uſe of authority and force, being only to bring men to an outward conformity to the national religion, it leaves the corruption and pravity of human nature, as unbridled as before; as I have ſhewn elſewhere.

YOU tell us, "That it is not true, that the true religion will prevail by its "own light and ſtrength, without miracles, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in "being Page 7.

" being, becauſe of the corruption of human nature." And, for this, you give us an inſtance, in the apoſtaſy, preſently after the flood. And you tell us, That, without the aſſiſtance of force, it would preſently be extirpated out of the world. If the corruption of human nature be ſo univerſal, and ſo ſtrong, that, without the help of force, the true religion is too weak to ſtand it, and cannot at all prevail, without miracles, or force, how come men ever to be converted, in countries, where the national religion is falſe? If you ſay, by extraordinary providence, what that amounts to, has been ſhewn. If you ſay, this corruption is ſo potent in all men, as to oppoſe and prevail againſt the goſpel, not aſſiſted by force, or miracles, that is not true. If in moſt men, ſo it is ſtill, even where force is uſed. For I deſire you to name me a country, where the greateſt part are really and truly chriſtians, ſuch as you confidently believe Chriſt, at the laſt day, will own to be ſo. In England having, as you do, excluded all the diſſenters, (or elſe, why would you have them puniſhed, to bring them to embrace the true religion?) you muſt, I fear, allow yourſelf a great latitude in thinking, if you think that the corruption of human nature, does not ſo far prevail, even amongſt conformiſts, as to make the ignorance, and lives, of great numbers amongſt them, ſuch as ſuits not, at all, with the ſpirit of true chriſtianity. How great their ignorance may be, in the more ſpiritual and elevated parts of the chriſtian religion, may be gueſſed, by what the reverend biſhop, before cited, ſays of it, in reference to a rite of the church; the moſt eaſy and obvious to be inſtructed in, and underſtood. His words are; " In the common management of that " holy rite [confirmation] it is but too viſible, that, of thoſe multitudes, that " crowd to it, the far greater part come merely, as if they were to receive the " biſhop's bleſſing, without any ſenſe of the vow, made by them, and of their " renewing their baptiſmal engagements in it." And, if Origen were now alive, might he not find many in our church, to whom theſe words of his might be applied, " Whoſe faith ſignifies only thus much, and goes no farther than this, " viz. that they come duly to the church, and bow their heads to the prieſts," &c. For it ſeems it was then the faſhion, to bow to the prieſt, as it is now to the altar. If, therefore, you ſay, force is neceſſary, becauſe, without it, no men will ſo conſider, as to embrace the true religion, for the ſalvation of their ſouls, that, I think, is manifeſtly falſe. If you ſay it is neceſſary to uſe ſuch means as will make the greateſt part ſo embrace it, you muſt uſe ſome other means, than force, your way applied, for that does not ſo far work on the majority. If you ſay, it is neceſſary, becauſe poſſibly it may work on ſome, which bare preaching, and perſuaſion, will not: I anſwer, if poſſibly, your moderate puniſhments may work on ſome, and therefore, they are neceſſary, 'tis as poſſible, that greater puniſhments may work on others, and therefore, they are neceſſary, and ſo on, to the utmoſt ſeverities.

Paſtoral care, p. 168.

Orig. hom. in Joſ. IX.

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THAT the corruption of human nature is every where ſpread, and that it works powerfully in the children of diſobedience, " who received not the love " of the truth, but had pleaſure in unrighteouſneſs;" and therefore, God gives them up to believe a lie, nobody, I think, will deny. But that this corruption of human nature works equally in all men, or in all ages; and ſo, that God will, or ever did, give up all men, not reſtrained by force, your way modified and applied, to believe a lie, (as all falſe religions are) that I yet ſee no reaſon to grant. Nor will this inſtance of Noah's religion, you ſo much rely on, ever perſuade, 'till you have proved, that from thoſe eight men, which brought the true religion with them into the new world, there were not eight thouſand, or eighty thouſand, which retained it in the world, in the worſt times of the apoſtaſy. And ſecondly, 'till you have proved, that the falſe religions of the world prevailed, without any aid from force, or the aſſiſtance of the powers in being. And thirdly, that the decay of the true religion was for want of force, your moderate force, neither of which you have at all proved, as, I think it manifeſt.

ONE conſideration more touching Noah and his religion, give me leave to ſuggeſt, and that is; if force were ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of the true religion, as you make it, 'tis ſtrange, God, who gave him precepts about other things, ſhould never reveal this to him, nor any body elſe, that I know. To this, you, who have confeſſed the “ſcripture not to have given the magiſtrate “this commiſſion,” muſt ſay, that it is plain enough in the commiſſion, that he has, from the law of nature, and ſo needed not any revelation, to inſtruct the magiſtrate, in the right he has, to uſe force. I confeſs the magiſtrates have uſed force, in matters of religion, and have been as confidently and conſtantly put upon it, by their prieſts, as if they had as clear a commiſſion from heaven, as St. Peter had, to preach the goſpel to the gentiles. But yet 'tis plain, notwithſtanding that commiſſion from the law of nature, there needs ſome farther inſtruction from revelation, ſince it does not appear, that they have found out the right uſe of force, ſuch as the true religion requires, for its preſervation; and though you have, after ſeveral thouſands of years, at laſt diſcovered it, yet it is very imperfectly, you not being able to tell, if a law were now to be made, againſt thoſe, who have not conſidered as they ought, what are thoſe moderate penalties, which are to be employed againſt them, though yet, without that, all the reſt ſignifies nothing. But, however doubtful you are in this, I am glad to find you ſo direct, in putting men's rejecting the true religion, upon the difficulty they have, “to mortify their luſts, which the true religion requires of “them,” and I deſire you to remember it, in other places, where I have occaſion to remind you of it.

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To conclude, That we may ſee the great advantage your cauſe will receive from that inſtance, you ſo much rely on, of the apoſtaſy after the flood; I ſhall oppoſe another to it. You ſay, that “idolatry prevailed in the world, in a few “generations, almoſt to the utter excluſion of the true religion, without any “aid from force, or aſſiſtance of the powers in being, by reaſon of toleration. “And therefore, you think there is great reaſon to fear, that the true religion “would, by toleration, quickly be moſt effectually extirpated, throughout the “world.” And I ſay, that, after chriſtianity was received, for the religion of the empire, and whilſt political laws, and force, interpoſed in it, an horrible apoſtaſy prevailed, to almoſt the utter excluſion of true religion, and a general introducing of idolatry. And therefore, I think, there is great reaſon to fear more harm than good, from the uſe of force in religion.

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Mede's Diſc. 30. p. 145. & Apoſt. of the latter times.

This I think as good an argument againſt, as yours for force, and ſomething better; ſince what you build on, is only preſumed by you, not proved from hiſtory: whereas, the matter of fact here is well known, nor will you deny it, when you conſider the ſtate of religion in Chriſtendom, under the aſſiſtance of that force, which, you tell us, ſucceeded and ſupplied the place of withdrawn miracles, which, in your opinion, are ſo neceſſary, in the abſence of force, that you make that the reaſon of their continuance; and tell us, they “were continued, 'till force could be had; not ſo much for evincing the truth of the “chriſtian religion, as to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance.” So that, whenever force failed, there, according to your hypotheſis, are miracles to ſupply its want: for, without one of them, the true religion (if we may believe you) will ſoon be utterly extirpated; and what force, in the abſence of miracles, produced in Chriſtendom, ſeveral ages before the reformation, is ſo well known, that it will be hard to find what ſervice, your way of arguing will do any, but the Romiſh religion.

Page 37.

But, to take your argument in its full latitude, you ſay, but you ſay it without book, that there was once a toleration in the world, to the almoſt utter extirpation of the true religion; and I ſay to you, that as far as records authorize either opinion, we may ſay, force has been always uſed in matters of religion, to the great prejudice of the true religion, and the profeſſors of it. And there not being an age, wherein you can ſhew me, upon a fair trial of an eſtabliſhed, national toleration, that the true religion was extirpated, or endangered, ſo much as you pretend by it, (whereas there is no age, whereof we have ſufficient hiſtory to judge of this matter, wherein it will not be eaſy to find, that the true religion, and its followers, ſuffered by force) you will in vain endeavour, by inſtances, to prove the ill effects, or uſefulneſs of toleration, ſuch as the author propoſed, which I challenge you to ſhew me, was ever ſet up in the world, or that the true religion ſuffered by it; and 'tis to the want of it, the reſtraints and diſadvantages the true religion has laboured under, and its ſo little ſpreading in the world, will juſtly be imputed; until, from better experiments, you have ſomething to ſay againſt it.

Our Saviour has promiſed, that he will build his church on this fundamental truth, that he is “ Chriſt the ſon of God;” ſo that “ the gates of hell ſhall “ not prevail againſt it,” and this I believe, though you tell us the true religion is not able to ſubſiſt, without the aſſiſtance of force, when miracles ceaſe. I do not remember, that our Saviour, any where, promiſes any other aſſiſtance, but that of his Spirit, or gives his little flock any encouragement to expect much countenance, or help, from the great men of the world, or the coercive power of the magiſtrates, nor, any where, authorizes them to uſe it, for the ſupport 1 Cor. i. 26. of his church; “ not many wiſe men after the fleſh; not many mighty, not “ many noble,” is the ſtile of the goſpel; and I believe will be found to belong to all ages of the church militant, paſt and to come, as well as to the firſt: for God, as St. Paul tells us, “ has choſen the fooliſh things of the world to confound the wiſe, and the weak things of the world to confound the mighty;” and this not only, 'till miracles ceaſed, but ever ſince. “ To be hated for “ Chriſt's name ſake, and by much tribulation to enter into the kingdom of “ heaven,” has been the general and conſtant lot of the people of God, as well as it ſeems to be the current ſtrain of the new teſtament; which promiſes nothing of ſecular power, or greatneſs; ſays nothing of “ kings being nurſing fathers, and queens nurſing mothers:” which prophecy, whatever meaning it have, 'tis like our Saviour would not have omitted, to ſupport his church with ſome hopes and aſſurance of ſuch aſſiſtance, if it were to have any accompliſhment, before his ſecond coming; when Iſrael ſhall come in again, and with the Gentiles make up the fulneſs of his glorious kingdom. But the tenor of the new teſtament is, “ all, that will live godly in Jeſus Chriſt, ſhall ſuffer perſecution,” 2 Tim. iii. 12.

A. p. 7. In your argument conſider'd, you tell us, “ that no man can fail of finding “ the way of ſalvation, that ſeeks it, as he ought.” In my anſwer, I take notice to you, that the places of ſcripture you cite, to prove it, point out this way of ſeeking, as we ought, to be a good life; as particularly that of St. John, “ If any one will do his will, he ſhall know of the doctrine, whether it be of L. 2. p. 273. “ God:” upon which I uſe theſe words. “ So that theſe places, if they prove, “ what you cite them for, that no man can fail of finding the way of ſalvation, “ who ſeeks it as he ought;” they do alſo prove, that a good life is the only “ way to ſeek, as we ought; and that, therefore the magiſtrates, if they would “ put men upon ſeeking the way of ſalvation, as they ought, ſhould, by their “ laws and penalties, force them to a good life; a good converſation being the “ ſureſt and readieſt way to a right underſtanding. And that if magiſtrates will “ ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt vice, in whomſoever it is found, “ true religion will be ſpread wider—than ever hitherto it has been, by the impoſitions Page 13. of creeds and ceremonies.” To this you reply, “ whether the magiſtrates ſetting themſelves ſeverely and impartially againſt what, you ſuppoſe, “ I call vice, or the impoſition of ſound creeds and decent ceremonies, does “ more conduce to the ſpreading the true religion, and rendering it fruitful, in “ the lives of its profeſſors, we need not examine; you confeſs, you think, both “ together do beſt; and this, you think, is as much as needs be ſaid, to that “ paragraph.” If it had been put to you, whether a good living, or a good prebend would more conduce to the enlarging your fortune, I think it would be allowed you, as no improper, or unlikely, anſwer, what you ſay here, “ I think “ both together would be beſt;” but here, the caſe is otherwiſe, your thinking determines not the point: and other people, of equal authority, may, and I will anſwer for it, do think otherwiſe: but, becauſe I pretend to no authority, I will give you a reaſon, why your thinking is inſufficient. You tell us, that Page 30. “ force is not a fit means, where it is not neceſſary, as well as uſeful;” and you prove it to be neceſſary, becauſe there is no other means left. Now, if the ſeverity of the magiſtrate, againſt what I call vice, will, as you will not

deny, promote a good life, and that be the right way to ſeek the truths of religion,
here is another means, beſides impoſing of creeds and ceremonies, to promote
true religion; and therefore, your argument for its neceſſity, becauſe of
no other means left, being gone, you cannot ſay, “ both together are beſt,”
when one of them being not neceſſary, is therefore, by your own confeſſion,
not to be uſed.

I HAVING ſaid, that if ſuch an indirect and at a diſtance uſefulneſs were ſufficient,
to juſtify the uſe of force, the magiſtrate might make his ſubjects eunuchs
for the kingdom of heaven: you reply, that you “ ſuppoſe, I will not ſay, caſtration Page 31.
“ is neceſſary, becauſe you hope, I acknowledge, that marriage, and that
“ grace, which God denies to none, who ſeriouſly aſk it, are ſufficient for that
“ purpoſe.” And I hope, you acknowledge, that preaching, admonitions and
inſtructions, and that grace, which God denies to none, who ſeriouſly aſk it, are
ſufficient for ſalvation. So that, by this anſwer of yours, there being no more
neceſſity of force, to make men of the true religion, than there is of caſtration,
to make men chaſte, it will ſtill remain, that the magiſtrate, when he thinks fit,
may, upon your principles, as well caſtrate men, to make them chaſte, as uſe
force, to make them embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them.

IF caſtration be not neceſſary, “ becauſe marriage and the grace of God is Page 34.
“ ſufficient,” without it; nor will force be neceſſary, becauſe preaching, and the
grace of God is ſufficient without it; and this I think, by your own rule, where
you tell us, “ Where there are many uſeful means, and ſome of them are ſufficient,
“ without the reſt, there is no neceſſity of uſing them all.” So that you
muſt either quit your neceſſity of force, or take in caſtration too; which, however,
it may not go down with the untractable and deſperately perverſe and obſtinate
people, in theſe weſtern countries, yet is a doctrine, you may hope, may
meet with a better reception in the Ottoman empire, and recommend you to
ſome of my mahometans.

TO my ſaying, “ If what we are apt to think uſeful, were thence to be concluded L. 2. p. 281.
“ ſo, we might be in danger to be obliged to believe the pretended miracles
“ of the church of Rome, by your way of reaſoning; “ unleſs we will
“ ſay (that which, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign
“ Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, does not uſe all uſeful means, for promoting
“ his honour in the world, and the good of ſouls.” This, I think,
will conclude as much for miracles, as for force: you reply, “ You think it will
“ not; for in the place I intend, you ſpeak not of uſeful, but of competent,
“ i. e. ſufficient means. Now competent, or ſufficient means are neceſſary; but, Page 33.
“ you think, no man will ſay, that all uſeful means are ſo: and therefore tho',
“ as you affirm, it cannot be ſaid, without impiety, that the wiſe and benign
“ Diſpoſer and Governor of all things has not furniſhed mankind, with competent
“ means, for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of
“ ſouls; yet it is very agreeable with piety, and with truth too, to ſay, that he
“ does not uſe all uſeful means: becauſe as none of his attributes oblige him to
“ uſe more than ſufficient means; ſo he may uſe ſufficient means, without uſing
“ all uſeful means. For, where there are many uſeful means, and ſome of
“ them are ſufficient without the reſt, there is no neceſſity of uſing them all.
“ So that, from God's not uſing miracles now, to promote the true religion, I
“ cannot conclude that he does not think them uſeful now, but only that he
“ does not think them neceſſary. And therefore, though what we are apt to
“ think uſeful, were thence to be concluded ſo; yet, if whatever is uſeful, be
“ not likewiſe to be concluded neceſſary, there is no reaſon to fear, that we
“ ſhould be obliged to believe the miracles, pretended to by the church of
“ Rome. For, if miracles be not now neceſſary, there is no inconvenience, in
“ thinking the miracles pretended to, by the church of Rome, to be but pretended
“ miracles.” To which I anſwer, Put it how you will, for competent
means, or uſeful means, it will conclude for miracles ſtill, as much as for force.
Your words are theſe, “ If ſuch a degree of outward force, as has been mentioned, A. p. 26.
“ be really of great and neceſſary uſe, for the advancing theſe ends, as
“ taking the world as we find it, you ſay, you think it appears to be; then it

" muſt be acknowledged, there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it for the advancing " thoſe ends; unleſs we will ſay (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that " the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer of all things, has not furniſhed mankind " with competent means, for the promoting his own honour in the world, and " the good of ſouls," What, I beſeech you, now is the ſum of this argument, but this, " Force is of great and neceſſary uſe; therefore, the wiſe " and benign Diſpoſer of all things, who will not leave mankind unfurniſhed " (which it would be impiety to ſay) of competent means, for the promoting " his honour in the world, and the good of ſouls, has given ſomewhere a right " to uſe it?"

LET us try it now, whether it will not do as well for miracles. " Miracles " are of great and neceſſary uſe," (as great and neceſſary at leaſt as force) therefore " the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer of all things, who will not leave mankind " unfurniſhed (which it would be impiety to ſay) of competent means, for the " promoting his honour in the world, and the good of ſouls," has given ſomewhere a power of miracles. I aſk you, when I, in the ſecond letter, uſed your own words, applied to miracles, inſtead of force, would they not conclude then, as well for miracles as for force. For you muſt remember, there was not then, in all your ſcheme, one word of miracles, to ſupply the place of force. Force alone was mentioned, force alone was neceſſary, all was laid on force. Nor was it eaſy to divine, that miracles ſhould be taken in, to mend the defects of your hypotheſis, which, in your anſwer to me, you now have done, and I eaſily allow it, without holding you to any thing you have ſaid, and ſhall always do ſo. For ſeeking truth, and not triumph, as you frequently ſuggeſt, I ſhall always take your hypotheſis, as you pleaſe, to reform it, and either embrace it, or ſhew you why I do not.

LET us ſee, therefore, whether this argument will do any better, now your ſcheme is mended, and you make force, or miracles neceſſary. If force, or miracles, are " of great and neceſſary uſe, for promoting true religion, and the " ſalvation of ſouls, then it muſt be acknowledged, that there is ſomewhere a " right to uſe the one, or a power to do the other, for the advancing thoſe ends; " unleſs we will ſay (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe, " benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things had not furniſhed mankind, with " competent means, for the promoting his own honour, and the good of ſouls." From whence it will follow, if your argument be good, that, where men have not a right to uſe force, there ſtill we are to expect miracles, unleſs we will ſay, &c. Now, where the magiſtrates are not of the true religion, there, by this part of your ſcheme, there is a right in nobody to uſe force; for, if there were, what need of miracles (as you tell us, there was) in the firſt ages of chriſtianity, to ſupply that want? Since the magiſtrates, who were of falſe religions then, were furniſhed with as much right, if that were enough, as they are now. So that, where the magiſtrates are of falſe religions, there you muſt, upon your principles, affirm miracles are ſtill to ſupply the want of force; " unleſs you will " ſay (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer " and Governor of all things, hath not furniſhed mankind, with competent " means, for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls." Now, how far this will favour the pretences, of the church of Rome, to miracles, in the Eaſt and Weſt-Indies, and other parts not under popiſh governments, you were beſt conſider. This is evident, that in all countries, where the true religion is not received for the religion of the ſtate, and ſupported and encouraged by the laws of it, you muſt allow miracles to be as neceſſary now, as ever they were, any where, in the world, for the ſupply of the want of force, before the magiſtrates were chriſtians. And then, what advantage your doctrine gives to the church of Rome, is very viſible. For they, like you, ſuppoſing theirs the one, only, true religion, are ſupplied by you, with this argument for Page 7. it, viz. that the " true religion will not prevail, by its own light and ſtrength, " without the aſſiſtance of miracles, or authority. Which are the competent " means, which, without impiety, it cannot be ſaid, that the wiſe and benign " Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, has not furniſhed mankind with." From whence they will not think it hard to draw this conſequence; that, therefore, the wiſe and benign Governor of all things, has continued, in their church, the power of miracles (which yours does not ſo much as pretend to) to ſupply the want of the magiſtrate's aſſiſtance, where that cannot be had, to make the true religion prevail. And, if a papiſt ſhould preſs you with this argument, I would gladly know, what you would reply to him.

THOUGH this be enough to make good what I ſaid, yet ſince I ſeek truth, more than my own juſtification, let us examine a little, what 'tis you here ſay, of "competent means. Competent means, you ſay, are neceſſary; but, you "think, no man will ſay, all uſeful means are ſo." If you think, you ſpeak plain, clear, determined ſenſe, when you uſed this good Engliſh word, competent, I pity you: if you did it, with ſkill, I ſend you to my pagans and mahometans. But this ſafe way of talking, though it be not altogether ſo clear, yet it ſo often occurs in you, that it is hard to judge, whether it be art, or nature. Page 25.
Now pray, what do you mean, by "mankind's being furniſhed with compe-"tent means?" If it be ſuch means, as any are prevailed on by, to embrace the truth that muſt ſave them, preaching is a competent means; for, by preaching alone, without force, many are prevailed on, and become truly chriſtians; and then, your force, by your own confeſſion, is not neceſſary. If, by competent, you underſtand ſuch means, by which all men are prevailed on, or the majority, to become truly chriſtians, I fear, your force is no competent means.

WHICH ever way you put it, you muſt acknowledge mankind to be deſtitute of competent means, or your moderate force, not to be that neceſſary, competent means, ſince, whatever right the magiſtrates may have had, any where, to uſe it, wherever it has not been uſed, (let the cauſe be what it will, that kept this means from being uſed) there the people have been deſtitute of that means.

BUT, you will think there is little reaſon to complain of obſcurity, you having abundantly explained what you mean, by competent, in ſaying, competent, i. e, ſufficient means. So that we have nothing to do, but to find out, what you mean, by ſufficient: and the meaning of that word, in your uſe of it, you happily give us, in theſe following, "what does any man mean, by ſuffi- Page 51.
"cient evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent, where-ever it is duly "conſidered?" Apply this to your means, and then tell me, whether your force be ſuch competent, i. e. ſufficient means, that it certainly produced embracing the truth, where-ever it was duly, i. e. your way applied; if it did not, 'tis plain, it is not your competent, ſufficient means, and ſo the world, without any ſuch imputation to the divine wiſdom and benignity, might be without it. If you will ſay, it was ſufficient, and did produce that end, where-ever it was applied, I deſire you then, to tell me, whether mankind hath been always furniſhed with competent means. You have it now, in your choice, either to talk impiouſly, or renounce force, and diſown it to be competent means; one of the two, I do not ſee how, by your own argument, you can avoid.

BUT to lay by your competent and ſufficient means, and to eaſe you of the uncertainty and difficulty, you will be in, to determine what is ſo, in reſpect of mankind; I ſuppoſe, it will be little leſs "impious to ſay, that the wiſe and "benign Diſpoſer and Governor hath not furniſhed mankind with neceſſary "means, as to ſay he hath not furniſhed them with competent means." Now, Sir, if your moderate penalties, and nothing elſe, be, ſince the withdrawing of miracles, this neceſſary means, what will be left you to ſay, by your argument, of the wiſdom and benignity of God, in all thoſe countries, where moderate penalties are not made uſe of? where men are not furniſhed with this means, to bring them to the true religion? For unleſs you ſay, that your moderate penalties have been conſtantly made uſe of, in the world, for the ſupport and encouragement of the true religion, and to bring men to it, ever ſince the withdrawing of miracles, you muſt confeſs, that not only ſome countries, (which yet were enough againſt you) but mankind in general, have been unfurniſhed of the "neceſſary means for the promoting the honour of God in the world, and the ſalvation of men's ſouls." This argument, out of your own mouth (were there no other) is ſufficient to ſhew the weakneſs and unreaſonableneſs of your ſcheme; and, I hope, the due conſideration of it will make you cautious another time, how you entitle the wiſdom and benignity of God, to the ſupport of what you once fancy, to be of great and neceſſary uſe.

L. 2. p. 281. I HAVING thereupon ſaid, “ let us not therefore be more wiſe than our Maker, in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural work of our ſalvation. The ſcripture, &c.

Page 35. YOU reply, “ though the work of our ſalvation be, as I juſtly call it, ſtupendous and ſupernatural; yet, you ſuppoſe, no ſober man doubts, but it both admits, and ordinarily requires, the uſe of natural and human means, in ſubordination to that grace which works it.”

IF you had taken notice of theſe immediately following words of mine, “ The ſcripture, that reveals it to us, contains all, that we can know, or do, in order to it; and where that is ſilent, ’tis preſumption in us to direct;” you would not have thought, what you here ſay, a ſufficient anſwer: for, though God does make uſe of natural and human means, in ſubordination to grace, yet it is not for man to make uſe of any means in ſubordination to his grace, which God has not appointed, out of a conceit it may do ſome ſervice, indirectly, and at a diſtance.

THE whole covenant and work of grace, is the contrivance of God’s infinite wiſdom. What it is, and by what means he will diſpenſe his grace, is known to us, by revelation only; which is ſo little ſuited to human wiſdom, that the apoſtle calls it, “ the fooliſhneſs of preaching.” In the ſcripture, is contained all that revelation, and all things neceſſary for that work, all the means of grace: there, God has declared all, what he would have done, for the ſalvation of ſouls; and if he had thought force neceſſary, to be joined with the fooliſhneſs of preaching, no doubt but he would, ſomewhere or other, have revealed it, and not left it to the wiſdom of man: which, how diſproportioned and oppoſite it is, to the ways and wiſdom of God, in the goſpel, and how unfit to be truſted in the buſineſs of ſalvation, you may ſee, 1 Cor. i. from ver. 17, to the end.

Ibid. “ THE work of grace admits, and ordinarily requires, the uſe of natural and human means.” I deny it not: let us now hear your inference; “ Therefore, ’till I have ſhewn, that no penal laws, that can be made, can do any ſervice towards the ſalvation of men’s ſouls, in ſubordination to God’s grace, or that God has forbidden the magiſtrate” to uſe force, (for ſo you ought to put it) but you rather chuſe (according to your ordinary way) to uſe general and doubtful words; and therefore you ſay, “ To ſerve him, in that great work, with the authority which he has given him, there will be no occaſion for the caution I have given,” not to be wiſer than our Maker, in that ſtupendous work of our ſalvation. By which way of arguing, any thing that I cannot ſhew, cannot, poſſibly, cannot, indirectly and at a diſtance, or by accident, do any ſervice, or any thing, that God has not forbidden, may be made uſe of, for the ſalvation of ſouls. I ſuppoſe you mean, expreſly forbidden, for elſe I might think theſe words, “ [Who has required this at your hands?”] a ſufficient prohibition of it. The ſum of your argument is, “ What cannot be ſhewed not to do any ſervice, may be uſed, as an human means, in ſubordination to grace, in the work of ſalvation.” To which I reply, That what may, through the grace of God, ſometimes do ſome ſervice, cannot without a farther warrant from revelation, than uſefulneſs, be required, or made uſe of, as a ſubordinate means to grace. For if ſo, then auricular confeſſion, penance, pilgrimages, proceſſions, &c, which no body can ſhew, do not ever do any ſervice, at leaſt, indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the ſalvation of ſouls, may all be juſtified.

’TIS not enough, that it cannot be ſhewn, that it cannot do any ſervice, to juſtify its uſefulneſs; for what is there, that may not, indirectly and at a diſtance, or by accident, do ſome ſervice? To ſhew, that it is an human means, that God has no where appointed, in ſubordination to grace, in the ſupernatural work of ſalvation, is enough to prove it an unwarranable boldneſs to uſe it: and much more ſo, in the preſent caſe, of force, which, if put into the magiſtrate's hands, with power to uſe it, in matters of religion, will do more harm than good; as, I think, I have ſufficiently ſhewn.

AND therefore, ſince, according to you, the magiſtrate's commiſſion, to uſe force for the ſalvation of ſouls, is from the law of nature; which commiſſion reaches to none, ſince the revelation of the goſpel, but chriſtian magiſtrates; 'tis more natural to conclude, (were there nothing elſe, in the caſe, but the ſilence of ſcripture) that the chriſtian magiſtrate has no ſuch power, becauſe he has no ſuch commiſſion, any where, in the goſpel, wherein all things are appointed neceſſary to ſalvation; than that there was ſo clear a commiſſion, given to all magiſtrates by the law of nature, that it is neceſſary to ſhew a prohibition from revelation, if one will deny chriſtian magiſtrates to have that power. Since the commiſſion of the law of nature to magiſtrates, being only that general one, of doing good, according to the beſt of their judgments: if that extends to the uſe of force, in matters of religion, it will abundantly more oppoſe, than promote, the true religion, if force, in the caſe, has any efficacy at all, and ſo do more harm than good: which, though it ſhews not, (what you here demand) that it cannot do any ſervice, towards the ſalvation of men's ſouls, for that cannot be ſhewn of any thing; yet it ſhews the diſſervice it does, is ſo much more, than any ſervice, which can be expected from it, that it can never be proved, that God has given power to magiſtrates to uſe it, by the commiſſion they have, of doing good, from the law of nature. Page 30.

BUT whilſt you tell me, "till I have ſhewn that force and penalties cannot, "do any ſervice, towards the ſalvation of ſouls, there will be no occaſion for "the caution I gave you," not to be wiſer than our Maker, in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural work, you have forgot your own confeſſion, That it is not enough to authorize the uſe of force, that it may be uſeful, if it be not alſo neceſſary. And, when you can prove ſuch means neceſſary, which, though it cannot be ſhewn, never upon any occaſion, to do any ſervice; yet it may be, and is abundantly ſhewn to do ſo little ſervice, and ſo uncertainly, that if it be uſed, it will, if it has any efficacy, do more harm than good: if you can, I ſay, prove ſuch a means as that neceſſary, I think I may yield you the cauſe. But the uſe of it has ſo much certain harm, and ſo little and uncertain good in it, that it can never be ſuppoſed included, or intended, in the general commiſſion to the magiſtrates, of doing good: which may ſerve for an anſwer to your next paragraph.

ONLY let me take notice, that you here make this commiſſion of the law of Page 35. nature to extend the uſe of force, only to "induce thoſe, who would not other- "wiſe, to hear what may, and ought to, move them to embrace the truth." They have heard all that is offered to move them to embrace, i. e. believe, but are not moved: Is the magiſtrate by the law of nature, commiſſioned to puniſh them, for what is not in their power? for faith is the gift of God, and not in a man's power: or is the magiſtrate commiſſioned, by the law of nature, which impowers him in general, only to do them good? Is he, I ſay, commiſſioned to make them lie, and profeſs that, which they do not believe? And is this for their good? If he puniſh them, 'till they embrace, i. e. believe, he puniſhes them for what is not in their power; if 'till they embrace, i. e barely profeſs, he puniſhes them for what is not for their good; to neither of which can he be commiſſioned by the law of nature.

TO my ſaying, "Till you can ſhew us a commiſſion in ſcripture, it will be "fit for us to obey that precept of the goſpel, Mark iv. 24. which bids us, take "heed what we hear." You reply, That this "you ſuppoſe is only intended Page 36. "for the vulgar reader; for it ought to be rendered, Attend to what you hear;" which you prove out of Grotius. What if I, or my readers, are not ſo learned, as to underſtand either the Greek original, or Grotius Latin comment? Or, if we did, are we to be blamed for underſtanding the ſcripture in that ſenſe, which the national, i, e. (as you ſay) the true religion authorizes, and which you tell us, would be a fault in us, if we did not believe?

FOR if, as you ſuppoſe, there be ſufficient proviſion made in England, for Page 20. inſtructing all men in the truth, we cannot, then, but take the words in this ſenſe, it being that, which the publick authority has given them; for, if we are not to follow the ſenſe, as it is given us in the tranſlation, authorized by our governors, and uſed by our worſhip eſtabliſhed by law, but muſt ſeek it elſewhere, 'twill be hard to find, how there is any other proviſion made, for inſtructing men in the ſenſe of the ſcripture, which is the truth, that muſt ſave them, but to leave them to their own enquiry and judgment, and to themſelves, to take, whom they think beſt for interpreters and expounders of ſcripture, and to quit that of the true church, which ſhe has given in her tranſlation. This is the liberty you take, to differ from the true church, when you think fit, and it will ſerve your purpoſe. “She ſays, Take heed what you hear; but you ſay, the “true ſenſe is, Attend to what you hear.” Methinks you ſhould not be at ſuch variance with diſſenters; for after all, nothing is ſo like a nonconformiſt, as a conformiſt. Though it be certainly every one's right to underſtand the ſcripture, in that ſenſe, which appears trueſt to him; yet I do not ſee how you, upon your principles, can depart from that, which the church of England has given it: but you, I find, when you think fit, take that liberty; and ſo much liberty as that, would, I think, ſatisfy all the diſſenters in England.

As to your other place of ſcripture; if St. Paul, as it ſeems to me, in that xth to the Romans, were ſhewing that the gentiles were provided with all things neceſſary to ſalvation, as well as the Jews; and that by having men ſent to them Page 37. to preach the goſpel, that proviſion was made, what you ſay, in the two next paragraphs, will ſhew us, that you underſtand, that the Greek word ἀκοὴ ſignifies both hearing and report, but does no more anſwer the force of thoſe two verſes, againſt you, than if you had ſpared all you ſaid, with your Greek criti- Rom. x. 14, 17. ciſm. The words of St. Paul are theſe; “How then, ſhall they call on him “on whom they have not believed? And how ſhall they believe in him, of “whom they have not heard? And how ſhall they hear, without a preacher? “And how ſhall they preach, except they be ſent? So then faith cometh by “hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” In this deduction of the means of propagating the goſpel, we may well ſuppoſe, St. Paul would have put in miracles, or penalties, if, as you ſay, one of them had been neceſſary. But, whether, or no, every reader will think St. Paul ſet down, in that place, all neceſſary means, I know not; but this I am confident, he will think, that the new teſtament does; and then I aſk, Whether there be in it one word of force, to be uſed, to bring men to be chriſtians, or to hearken to the good tidings of ſalvation, offered in the goſpel?

To my aſking, “What if God, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, would not Page 38. “have men compelled?” your anſwer, “If he would not have them compelled, now miracles are ceaſed, as far as moderate penalties compel, (other“wiſe you are not concerned in the demand) he would have told us ſo.” Concerning miracles ſupplying the want of force, I ſhall need to ſay nothing more here; but to your anſwer, that “God would have told us ſo.” I ſhall, in few words, ſtate the matter to you. You firſt ſuppoſe force neceſſary to compel men to hear, and thereupon ſuppoſe the magiſtrate inveſted with a power, to compel them to hear, and from thence, peremptorily declare, that, if God would not have force uſed, he would have told us ſo. You ſuppoſe alſo, that it muſt be only moderate force. Now, may we not aſk one, that is ſo far of the council of the Almighty, that he can poſitively ſay, what he would, or would not have, to tell us, whether it be not as probable, that God, who knows the temper of man, that he has made, who knows how apt he is, not to ſpare any degree of force, when he believes he has a commiſſion, to compel men, to do any thing in their power, and who knows alſo, how prone man is to think it reaſonable to do ſo; whether, I ſay, it is not as probable that God, if he would have the magiſtrate to uſe none but moderate force to compel men to hear, would alſo have told us ſo? Fathers are not more apt, than magiſtrates, to ſtrain their power, beyond what is convenient for the education of their children; and yet it has pleaſed God to tell them, in the new teſtament, of this moderation, by a precept, more than once repeated.

To my demanding, "What, if God would have men left to their freedom, in this point; if they will hear, or if they will forbear, will you conſtrain them? Thus we are ſure he did with his own people, &c." You anſwer, Page 38. "but thoſe words, "whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear," which we find thrice uſed by the prophet Ezekiel, are nothing at all to my purpoſe. For by hearing, there, no man underſtands the bare giving an ear to what was to be preached, nor yet the conſidering it only; but the complying with it, and obeying it, according to the paraphraſe, which Grotius gives of the words." Methinks, for this once, you might have allowed me to have hit upon ſomething to the purpoſe, you have denied me it, in ſo many other places, if it were but for pity, and one other reaſon; which is, that all you have to ſay againſt it is, that "by hearing there, no man underſtands the bare giving an ear to what was to be preached, nor yet the conſidering of it, but the complying with it, and obeying it." If I miſremember not, your hypotheſis pretends the uſe of force to be not barely to make men give an ear, nor yet to conſider, but to make them conſider, as they ought, i. e. ſo as not to reject; and therefore, though this text, out of Ezekiel, be nothing to the purpoſe, againſt bare giving an ear, yet, if you pleaſe, let it ſtand, as if it were to the purpoſe againſt your hypotheſis, 'till you can find ſome other anſwer to it.

If you will give yourſelf the pains to turn to Acts xxviii. 24,——28. you will read theſe words, "and ſome believed the things, that were ſpoken, and ſome believed not. And, when they agreed not among themſelves, they departed, after that Paul had ſpoken one word: well ſpake the Holy Ghoſt, by Eſaias the prophet, unto our fathers, ſaying, "Go unto this people, and ſay, hearing, ye ſhall hear, and ſhall not underſtand; and ſeeing, ye ſhall ſee, and not perceive. For the heart of this people is waxed groſs, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they cloſed; leſt they ſhould ſee with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and underſtand with their heart, and ſhould be converted, and I ſhould heal them." Be it known, therefore, unto you, that the ſalvation of God is ſent unto the gentiles, and that they will hear it."

If one ſhould come now, and out of your treatiſe, called, "the argument A. p. 7, &c. of the letter concerning toleration conſidered and anſwered," reaſon thus, "It is evident, that theſe Jews have not ſought the truth, in this matter, with that application of mind, and freedom of judgment, which was requiſite, whilſt they ſuffered their luſts and paſſions to ſit in judgment, and manage the enquiry. The impreſſions of education, the reverence and admiration of perſons, worldly reſpects, and the like incompetent motives, have determined them. Now, if this be the caſe; if theſe men are averſe to a due conſideration of things, where they are moſt concerned to uſe it, WHAT MEANS IS THERE LEFT (beſides the grace of God) to reduce them out of the wrong way, they are in, but to lay thorns and briars in it?" Would you not think this a good argument, to ſhew the neceſſity of uſing force and penalties upon theſe men in the acts, who refuſed to be brought to embrace the true religion, upon the preaching of St. Paul? "For, what other means was left, what human method could be uſed, to bring them to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but laying ſuch penalties upon them, as might balance the weight of ſuch prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way, before the true?" Tell me, I beſeech you, would you not (had you been a Page 11. chriſtian magiſtrate, in thoſe days) have thought yourſelf obliged to try, by force, "to over-balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which inclined them to prefer a falſe way to the true?" For there was no other human means left; and if that be not enough, to prove the neceſſity of uſing it, you have no proof of any neceſſity of force at all.

If you would have laid penalties upon them, I aſk you, What, if God, for reaſons, beſt known to himſelf, thought it not neceſſary to uſe any other human means, but preaching and perſuaſion? You have a ready anſwer, there is no other human means, but force, and ſome other human means, beſides preaching, is neceſſary, i. e. in your opinion: and is it not fit, your authority ſhould carry it? For, as to miracles, whether you think fit to rank them among human means, or no; or whether or no there were any ſhewed to theſe unbelieving Jews, to ſupply the want of force, I gueſs, in this caſe, you will not be much helped, which ever you ſuppoſe: though to one unbiaſſed, who reads that chapter, it will, I imagine, appear moſt probable, that St. Paul, when he thus parted with them, had done no miracles amongſt them.

BUT you have, in the cloſe of the paragraph before us, provided a ſalvo for all, in telling us, "however, the penalties you defend, are not ſuch, as can, "any way, be pretended, to take away men's freedom, in this point." The queſtion is, Whether there be a neceſſity of uſing other human means, but preaching, for the bringing men to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them; and whether force be it? God himſelf ſeems, in the places quoted, and others, to teach us, that he would have men left to their freedom from any conſtraint of force, in that point; and you anſwer, "the penalties, you defend, are not ſuch "as can, any ways, be pretended, to take away men's freedom, in this point." Tell us, what you mean, by theſe words of yours, "take away men's freedom, "in this point;" and then apply it. I think it pretty hard, to uſe penalties and force, to any man, without taking away his freedom from penalties and force. Farther, the penalties you think neceſſary, if we may believe you youſelf, are to "be ſuch, as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which incline men "to prefer a falſe way, before a true." Whether theſe be ſuch, as you will defend, is another queſtion. This, I think, is to be made plain, that you muſt go beyond the lower degrees of force, and moderate penalties, to balance theſe prejudices.

L. 2. p. 282. To my ſaying, "That the method of the goſpel is to pray and beſeech, and "that, if God had thought it neceſſary to have men puniſh'd, to make them "give ear, he could have called magiſtrates to be ſpreaders of the goſpel, as well "as poor fiſhermen, or Paul a perſecutor, who yet wanted not power to puniſh "Ananias and Sapphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian." You reply, "Though Page 38. "it be the method of the goſpel, for the miniſters of it, to pray and beſeech "men; yet it appears, from my own words, here, both that puniſhments may "be ſometimes neceſſary; and that puniſhing, and that even by thoſe, who are "to pray and beſeech, is conſiſtent with that method." I fear, Sir, you ſo greedily lay hold upon any examples of puniſhment, when, on any account, they come in your way, that you give yourſelf not liberty to conſider, whether they are for your purpoſe, or no; or elſe, you would ſcarce infer, as you do, from my words, that, in your caſe, "puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary." Ananias and Sapphira were puniſhed; "therefore it appears, ſay you, that puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary." For what, I beſeech you? For the only end, you ſay, puniſhments are uſeful in religion, i. e. to make men conſider. So that Ananias and Sapphira were ſtruck dead: for what end? To make them conſider. If you had given yourſelf the leiſure to have reflected on this, and the other inſtance of the inceſtuous Corinthian, 'tis poſſible you would have found neither of them, to have ſerved very well, to ſhew puniſhment neceſſary, to bring men to embrace the true religion; for both theſe were puniſhments, laid on thoſe, who had already embraced the true religion, and were in the communion of the true church, and ſo can only ſhew (if you will infer any thing, concerning the neceſſity of puniſhments, from them) that puniſhments may be ſometimes neceſſary for thoſe, who are in the communion of the true church. And of that, you may make your advantage.

As to your other inferences from my words, viz. "That puniſhing, and that "even by thoſe, who are, as ambaſſadors, to pray and beſeech, is conſiſtent "with that method." When they can do it, as the apoſtles did, by the immediate direction and aſſiſtance of the ſpirit of God, I ſhall eaſily allow it to be conſiſtent with the method of the goſpel. If that will not content you, 'tis plain, you have an itch to be handling the ſecular ſword; and ſince Chriſt has not given you the power you deſire, you would be executing the magiſtrate's pretended commiſſion, from the law of nature. One thing more let me mind you of, and that is, that if, from the puniſhments of Ananias and Sapphira, and the inceſtuous Corinthian, you can infer a neceſſity of puniſhment, to make men conſider, it will follow, that there was a neceſſity of puniſhment, to make men conſider, notwithſtanding miracles; which cannot, therefore, be ſuppoſed, to ſupply the want of puniſhments.

TO my aſking, "What, if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the hands "of men, as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error, as the "reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means to bring men into the "right way?" You reply, "but, if there be any thing of an argument in this, "it proves that there ought to be no civil government in the world; and ſo, "proving too much, proves nothing at all." This you ſay; but you being one of thoſe mortals, which is liable to error, as well as your brethren, you cannot expect it ſhould be received for infallible truth, 'till you have proved it; and that you will never do, 'till you can ſhew, that there is as abſolute a neceſſity of force, in the magiſtrate's hand, for the ſalvation of ſouls, as there is of force, in the magiſtrate's hands, for the preſervation of civil ſociety; and next, 'till you have proved that force, in the hands of men, as paſſionate, and humourſome, or liable to prejudice and error, as their brethren, would contribute as much, to the bringing men, and keeping them in the right way to ſalvation, as it does, to the ſupport of civil ſociety, and the keeping men at peace in it. L. 2. p. 282. Page 39.

WHERE men cannot live together, without mutual injuries, not to be avoided, without force, reaſon has taught them to ſeek a remedy in government, which always places power, ſomewhere in the ſociety, to reſtrain and puniſh ſuch injuries; which power, whether placed in the community itſelf, or ſome choſen, by the community, to govern it, muſt ſtill be in the hands of men; and where (as in the ſocieties of civilized and ſettled nations) the form of the government places this power out of the community itſelf, it is unavoidable, that out of men (ſuch as they are) ſome ſhould be made magiſtrates, and have coercive power, or force, put into their hands, to govern and direct the ſociety for the publick good; without which force, ſo placed in the hands of men, there could be no civil ſociety, nor the ends, for which it was inſtituted, to any degree attained. And thus government is the will of God.

'TIS the will of God alſo, that men ſhould be ſaved; but to this it is not neceſſary that force, or coactive power, ſhould be put into men's hands; becauſe God can, and hath provided other means to bring men to ſalvation: to which, you indeed ſuppoſe, but can never prove force neceſſary.

THE paſſions, humours, liableneſs to prejudices and errors, common to magiſtrates with other men, do not render force in their hands ſo dangerous and uneſeful, to the ends of ſociety, which is the publick peace, as to the ends of religion, which is the ſalvation of men's ſouls. For though men of all ranks could be content to have their own humours, paſſions and prejudices ſatisfied, yet, when they come to make laws, which are to direct their force in civil matters, they are driven to oppoſe their laws to the humours, paſſions and prejudices of men, in general, whereby their own come to be reſtrain'd; for if law-makers, in making of laws, did not direct them, againſt the irregular humours, prejudices and paſſions of men, which are apt to miſlead them: if they did not endeavour with their beſt judgment, to bring men from their humours and paſſions, to the obedience and practice of right reaſon, the ſociety could not ſubſiſt, and ſo they themſelves would be in danger to loſe their ſtation in it, and be expoſed to the unreſtrained humours, paſſions, and violence of others. And hence it comes, that, be men as humourſome, paſſionate, and prejudiced as they will, they are ſtill, by their own intereſt, obliged to make uſe of their beſt ſkill, and, with their moſt unprejudiced and ſedateſt thoughts, take care of the government, and endeavour to preſerve the commonwealth; and therefore notwithſtanding their humours and paſſions, their liableneſs to error and prejudice, they do provide pretty well for the ſupport of ſociety, and the power in their hands is of uſe to the maintenance of it.

BUT, in matters of religion, it is quite otherwiſe; you had told us, about the latter end of your argument C. how liable men were, in chuſing their religion,

ligion, to be miſled by humour, paſſion and prejudice; and therefore, it was not fit that, in a buſineſs of ſuch concernment, they ſhould be left to themſelves: and hence, in this matter of religion, you would have them ſubjected to the coactive power of the magiſtrate. But this contrivance is viſibly of no advantage to the true religion, nor can ſerve at all to ſecure men from a wrong choice. For the magiſtrates, by their humours, prejudices and paſſions, (which they are born to, like other men) being as liable, and likely to be miſled, in the choice of their religion, as any of their brethren, as conſtant experience hath always ſhewn, what advantage could it be to mankind, for the ſalvation of their ſouls, that the magiſtrates of the world ſhould have power to uſe force, to bring men to that religion, which they, each of them, by whatſoever humour, paſſion or prejudice influenced, had choſen to themſelves, as the true? For whatſoever you did, I think with reverence we may ſay, that God foreſaw, that whatever commiſſion, one magiſtrate had, by the law of nature, all magiſtrates had: and that commiſſion, if there were any ſuch, could be only to uſe their coactive power, to bring men to the religion, they believed to be true, whether it were really the true, or no; and therefore I ſhall, without taking away government out of the world, or ſo much as queſtioning it, ſtill think this a reaſonable queſtion; "What, if God, foreſeeing this force would be in the "hands of men, as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to prejudice and error "as the reſt of their brethren, did not think it a proper means, in ſuch hands, "to bring men into the right way?" And that it needs a better anſwer, than you have given to it: and therefore you might have ſpared the pains, you have taken in this paragraph, to prove that the magiſtrate's being liable, as much, as other men, to humour, prejudice, paſſion and error, makes not force, in his hand, wholly unſerviceable to the adminiſtration of civil government. Which is, what no body denies: and you would have better employ'd it to prove, that, if the magiſtrate's being as liable to paſſion, humour, prejudice and error, as other men, made force, in his hands, improper to bring men to the true religion, this would take away government out of the world: which is a conſequence, I think, I may deny.

To which let me now add, what God foreſaw, that if force, of any kind or degree whatſoever, were allow'd in behalf of truth, it would be uſed by erring, paſſionate, prejudiced men, to the reſtraint and ruin of truth, as conſtant experience in all ages has ſhewn, and therefore commanded that the tares ſhould be ſuffered to grow with the wheat, 'till the harveſt, when the infallible judge ſhall ſever them. That parable of our Saviour's plainly tells us, if force were once permitted, even in favour of the true religion, what miſchief it was like to do, in the miſapplication of it, by forward, buſy, miſtaken men, and therefore, he wholly forbid it; and yet, I hope, this does not take away civil government out of the world?

To my demanding, "What if there be other means? and ſaying, "Then "yours ceaſes to be neceſſary upon that account, that there is no other means Page 39. "left; for the grace of God is another means." You anſwer, That, "though "the grace of God be another means, yet it is none of the means, of which "you were ſpeaking, in the place I refer to, which any one, who reads that "paragraph, will find to be only human means." In that place, you were endeavouring to prove force neceſſary, to bring men to the true religion, as appears; and there having dilated, for four or five pages together, upon "the careleſs- A. p. 6. "neſs, prejudices, paſſions, luſts, impreſſions of education, worldly reſpects," and other the like cauſes, which you think miſlead and keep men from the true religion, you at laſt conclude force neceſſary, to bring men to it, becauſe admonitions and intreaties not prevailing, there is no other means left. To this, grace being inſtanced in, as another means, you tell us here you mean no other human means left, ſo that to prove force neceſſary, you muſt prove that God would have other means uſed, beſides, praying, preaching, perſuaſion and inſtruction; and for this you will need to bring a plain direction, from revelation, for your moderate puniſhments: unleſs you will pretend to know, by your own Rom. viii. 29. natural wiſdom, what means God has made neceſſary; without which, thoſe, whom he hath foreknown and predeſtinated, and will in his good time call, by ſuch means, as he thinks fit, according to his purpoſe, cannot be brought into the way of ſalvation. Perhaps you have ſome warrant, we know not of, to enter thus boldly into the counſel of God; without which, in another man, a modeſt chriſtian would be apt to think it preſumption.

YOU ſay, there are many, who are not prevailed on, by prayers, entreaties, and exhortations, to embrace the true religion. What, then, is to be done? “Some degrees of force are neceſſary to be uſed.” Why? Becauſe there is no other human means left. Many are not prevailed on, by your moderate force; What then is to be done? Greater degrees of force are neceſſary, becauſe there is no other human means left. No, ſay you, God has made moderate force neceſſary, becauſe there is no other human means left, where preaching and entreaties will not prevail: but he has not made greater degrees of force neceſſary becauſe there is no other human means left, where moderate force will not prevail. So that your rule changing, where the reaſon continues the ſame, we muſt conclude, you have ſome way of judging, concerning the purpoſes and ways of the Almighty, in the work of ſalvation, which every one underſtands not. You would not elſe, upon ſo ſlight ground, as you have yet produced for it, which is nothing, but your own imagination, make force, your moderate force, ſo neceſſary, that you bring in queſtion the wiſdom and bounty of the diſpoſer and governor of all things, as if he “had not furniſhed mankind with competent A. p. 16. “means, for the promoting his own honour in the world, and the good of ſouls,” if your moderate force were wanting, to bring them to the true religion; whereas you know, that moſt of the nations of the world, always, were deſtitute of this human means, to bring them to the true religion. And, I imagine, you would be put to it, to name me one now, that is furniſhed with it.

BESIDES, if you pleaſe to remember what you ſay, in the next words. Page 39. “And therefore, tho' the grace of God be both a proper and ſufficient means, “and ſuch as can work by itſelf, and, without which, neither penalties, nor any “other means, can do any thing?” and by conſequence, can make any means effectual: how can you ſay, any human means, in this ſupernatural work, unleſs what God has declared to be ſo, is neceſſary? Preaching and inſtruction, and exhortation, are human means, that he has appointed: theſe, therefore, men may, and ought to, uſe; they have a commiſſion from God, and may expect his bleſſing and the aſſiſtance of his grace; but to ſuppoſe, when they are uſed, and prevail not, that force is neceſſary, becauſe theſe are not ſufficient, is to exclude grace, and aſcribe this work to human means: as, in effect, you do, when you call force “competent and ſufficient means,” as you have done. For if bare preaching, by the aſſiſtance of grace, can, and will, certainly prevail; and moderate penalties, as you confeſs, or any kind of force, without the aſſiſtance of grace, can do nothing, how can you ſay, that force is, in any caſe, a more neceſſary, or a more competent, or ſufficient means, than bare preaching and inſtruction? Unleſs you can ſhew us, that God hath promiſed the co-operation and aſſiſtance of his grace to force, and not to preaching? The contrary whereof, has more of appearance. Preaching and perſuaſion are not competent means, you ſay; why? becauſe, without the co-operation of grace, they can do nothing: but, by the aſſiſtance of grace, they can prevail, even without force. Force too, without grace, you acknowledge, can do nothing: but joined with preaching and grace, it can prevail. Why then, I pray, is it a more competent means than preaching, or why neceſſary, where preaching prevails not? Since it can do nothing, without that, which, if joined to preaching. can make preaching effectual without it.

YOU go on, “yet it may be true, however, that when admonitions and entreaties Page 40. fail, there is no HUMAN means left but penalties, to bring prejudiced perſons to hear and conſider, what may convince them of their errors, “and diſcover the truth to them: and then, penalties will be neceſſary, in reſpect to that end, as an HUMAN means.” Let it be true, or not true, that, when entreaties, &c. fail, there is no HUMAN means left, but penalties: your inference I deny, that then penalties will be neceſſary, as an HUMAN means.

For I aſk you, ſince you lay ſo much ſtreſs, to ſo little purpoſe, on HUMAN means, is ſome human means neceſſary? If that be your meaning, you have human means in the caſe, viz. admonitions, entreaties, being inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon. I aſk you again, are penalties neceſſary, becauſe the end could not be obtain'd by preaching, without them? That you cannot ſay, for grace co-operating with preaching will prevail: are penalties then, neceſſary, as ſure to produce that end? Nor ſo, are they neceſſary; for without the aſſiſtance of grace, you confeſs, they can do nothing. So that penalties, neither as human means, nor as any means, are at all neceſſary. And now, you may underſtand, what I intend, by ſaying, that the grace of God is the only means; which is the enquiry of your next paragraph, viz. this I intend, that it is the only efficacious means, without which all human means is ineffectual. You tell me, if by it, "I intend that it does, either always, or ordinarily, exclude all other "means: you ſee no ground I have to ſay it." And I ſee no ground you have to think, I intended, that it excludes any other means, that God, in his goodneſs, will be pleaſed to make uſe of: but this I intend by it, and this, I think, I have ground to ſay, that it excludes all the human means, of force, from being neceſſary, or ſo much as lawful, to be uſed, unleſs God hath required it, by ſome more authentick declaration, than your bare ſaying, or imagining, it is neceſſary. And you muſt have more than human confidence, if you continue to mix this poor and human contrivance of yours, with the wiſdom and counſel of God, in the work of ſalvation; ſince he, having declared the means and methods to be uſed, for the ſaving men's ſouls, has, in the revelation of the goſpel, by your own confeſſion, preſcribed no ſuch human means.

Page 40.

Ibid.

To my ſaying, God alone can open the ear, that it may hear, and open the heart, that it may underſtand. You reply, "but, by your favour, this does "not prove, that he makes uſe of no means, in doing of it." Nor needs it: it is enough for me, if it proves that, if preaching and inſtruction do not open the ear, or the heart, 'tis not neceſſary any one ſhould try his ſtrength, with an hammer, or an auger. Man is not in this buſineſs, (where no means can be effectual, without the aſſiſtance and co-operation of his grace) to make uſe of any means, which God hath not preſcribed. You here ſet up a way of propagating chriſtianity, according to your fancy, and tell us, how you would have the work of the goſpel carried on: you commiſſion the magiſtrate, by arguments of congruity; you ſhall find an efficacy in puniſhment, towards the converting of men: you limit the force, to be uſed, to low and moderate degrees; and to countries, where ſufficient means of inſtruction are provided by the law. And, where the magiſtrate's religion is the true, i. e. where it pleaſes you; and all this, without any direction from God, or any authority, ſo much as pretended from the goſpel; and, without its being truly for the propagation of chriſtianity, but only ſo much of it, as you think fit, and what elſe you are pleaſed to join to it. Why elſe, in the religion you are content to have eſtabliſhed by law, and promoted by penalties, is any thing more or leſs required, than is expreſly contained in the New Teſtament?

Ibid.

This, indeed is well ſuited to any one, who would have a power of puniſhing thoſe, who differ from his opinion, and would have men compelled to conformity in England. But, in this your fair contrivance, what becomes of the reſt of mankind, left to wander in darkneſs out of this Goſhen, who neither have, nor (according to your ſcheme) can have, your neceſſary means, of force and penalties, to bring them to embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them: for, if that be neceſſary, they cannot, without a miracle, either prince, or people, be wrought on, without it. If a papiſt at Rome, a Lutheran at Stockholm, or a Calviniſt at Geneva, ſhould argue thus for his church, would you not ſay, that ſuch as theſe looked like the thoughts of a poor, prejudiced, narrow mind? But they may miſtake, and you cannot; they may be prejudiced, but you cannot. Say too, if you pleaſe, you are confident you are in the right, but they cannot be confident, that they are ſo. This I am ſure, God's thoughts are not as man's thoughts, nor his ways as man's ways, Iſa. lv. 8. And, it may abate any one's confidence, of the neceſſity, or uſe, of puniſhments, for not receiving our Saviour, or his religion, when thoſe, who had the power of miracles, were told, that "they knew not what manner of ſpirit they were of," when they would have commanded down fire from heaven. Luke ix. 55. But you do well to take care, to have the church, you are of, ſupported by force and penalties, whatever becomes of the propagation of the goſpel, or the ſalvation of men's ſouls, in other parts of the world, as not coming within your hypotheſis.

In your next paragraph, to prove that God does bleſs the uſe of force, you ſay, you ſuppoſe, I mean, by the words you there cite, that the "magiſtrate Page 40. "has no ground to hope, that God will bleſs any penalties that he may uſe, "to bring men to hear and conſider the doctrine of ſalvation; or (which is the "ſame thing) that God does not (at leaſt not ordinarily) afford his grace and "aſſiſtance to them, who are brought, by ſuch penalties, to hear and conſider "that doctrine, to enable them to hear and conſider it, as they ought, i. e. ſo as "to be moved heartily to embrace it" You tell me, "if this be my meaning; "then to let me ſee, that it is not true, you ſhall only deſire me to tell you, "whether they, that are ſo brought, to hear and conſider, are bound to believe "the goſpel, or not? If I ſay, they are; (and you ſuppoſe, I dare not ſay other "wiſe;) then it evidently follows, that God does afford them that grace, which "is requiſite to enable them, to believe the goſpel: becauſe, without that grace, "it is impoſſible for them to believe it; and they cannot be bound to believe, "what it is impoſſible for them to believe." To which, I ſhall only anſwer, that, by this irrefragable argument, it is evident, that, where-ever due penalties have been uſed (for thoſe, you tell us, are ſufficient and competent means) to make men hear and conſider, as they ought, there all men were brought to believe the goſpel; which, whether you will reſolve with yourſelf, to be true, or falſe, will be to me indifferent, and, on either hand, equally advantage your cauſe. Had you appealed to experience, for the ſucceſs of the uſe of force, by the magiſtrate, your argument had not ſhewn half ſo much depth of theological learning: but the miſchief is, that if you will not make it all of a piece, ſcholaſtick, and by arguing that all, whom the magiſtrates uſe force upon, "are "brought to conſider, as they ought, and to all, that are ſo wrought upon, "God does afford that grace which is requiſite;" and ſo roundly conclude for a greater ſucceſs of force, to make men believe the goſpel, than ever our Saviour and the apoſtles had, by their preaching and miracles, (for that wrought not on all) your unanſwerable argument comes to nothing. And in truth, as you have, in this paragraph, ordered the matter, by being too ſparing of your abſtract, metaphyſical reaſoning, and employing it but by halves, we are fain, after all, to come to the dull way of experience; and muſt be forced to count, as the parſon does his communicants, by his Eaſter-book, how many thoſe are, that are ſo brought to hear and conſider, to know how far God bleſſes penalties. Indeed, were it to be meaſured by conforming, the Eaſter-book would be a good regiſter to determine it. But ſince you put it, upon believing, that will be of ſomewhat a harder diſquiſition.

To my ſaying, (upon that place out of Iſaiah vi. 10. "Make the heart of "this people fat, leſt they underſtand, and convert, and be healed:) "will all "the force, you can uſe, be a means to make ſuch people hear and underſtand, "and be converted?" You reply, "No, Sir, it will not. But what then? Page 41. "What, if God declares, that he will not heal thoſe, who have long reſiſted "all his ordinary methods, and made themſelves, morally ſpeaking, incurable "by them? (which is the utmoſt, you ſay, I can make of the words I quote.) "Will it follow from thence, that no good can be done, by penalties, upon "others, who are not ſo far gone in wickedneſs and obſtinacy? If it will not, "as it is evident it will not, to what purpoſe is this ſaid?" It is ſaid to this purpoſe, viz. to ſhew that force ought not to be uſed at all. Thoſe ordinary methods which, reſiſted, are puniſhed with a reprobate ſenſe, are the ordinary methods of inſtruction, without force; as is evident by this place and many others, particularly Rom. i. From whence I argue; that what ſtate ſoever you will ſuppoſe men in, either as paſt, or yet not come to, the day of grace, nobody can be juſtified, in uſing force, to work upon them. For, till the ordinary methods

thods of inſtruction and perſuaſion can do no more, force is not neceſſary, (for you cannot ſay, what other means is there left?) and ſo, by your own rule, not lawful. For 'till God hath pronounced this ſentence here, on any one, "make his heart fat, &c." the ordinary means of inſtruction and perſuaſion, may, by the aſſiſtance of God's grace, prevail. And, when this ſentence is once paſſed upon them, and "God will not afford them his grace to heal them:" (I take it, you confeſs, in this place) I am ſure, you muſt confeſs your force to be wholly uſeleſs, and ſo utterly impertinent, unleſs that can be pertinent to be uſed, which, you own, can do nothing. So that, whether it will follow, or no, from men's being given up to a reprobate mind, for having reſiſted the preaching of ſalvation, "that no good can be done, by penalties, upon others;" this will follow, that not knowing, whether preaching may not, by the grace of God, yet work upon them; or whether the day of grace be paſt with them: neither you, nor any body elſe, can ſay that force is neceſſary; and, if it be not neceſſary, you yourſelf tell us it is not to be uſed.

Page 41. IN your next paragraph, you complain of me, as miſrepreſenting your argument, as you ſay, "I commonly do, as if you allowed any magiſtrate, of what "religion ſoever, to lay penalties upon all, that diſſent from him." Unhappy magiſtrates, that have not your allowance! But to conſole them, I imagine, they will find that they are all under the ſame obligation, one as another, to propagate the religion, they believe to be the true, whether you allow it them, or no. For to go no farther than the firſt words of your argument, which you complain I have miſrepreſented, and which, you tell me, run thus, "when "men fly from the means of right information;" I aſk you here, who ſhall be judge of thoſe means of right information, the magiſtrate, who joins force with them, to make them be hearkened to or no? When you have anſwered that, you will have reſolved a great part of the queſtion, What magiſtrates are to uſe force?

BUT, that you may not complain again, of my miſrepreſenting, I muſt beg my reader's leave, to ſet down your argument at large, in your own words, A. p. 11. and all you ſay upon it. "When men fly from the means of a right informa- "tion, and will not ſo much as conſider, how reaſonable it is, thoroughly and "impartially to examine a religion, which they embraced, upon ſuch induce- "ments, as ought to have no ſway at all, in the matter, and therefore, with "little, or no, examination of the proper grounds of it: what human method "can be uſed, to bring them to act like men, in an affair of ſuch conſequence, "and to make a wiſer and more rational choice, but that of laying ſuch penal- "ties upon them, as may balance the weight of thoſe prejudices, which inclin- "ed them to prefer a falſe way before the true,"&c. Now this argument, you Page 41. tell me, I pretend to retort in this manner: "and I ſay, I ſee no other means "left (taking the world, as we now find it, wherein the magiſtrate never lays "penalties, for matters of religion, upon thoſe of his own church, nor is it to "be expected they ever ſhould) to make men of the national church, any "where, thoroughly and impartially examine a religion, which they embraced "upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all, in the matter, and "therefore, with little or no, examination of the proper grounds of it: and "therefore I conclude the uſe of force, by diſſenters, upon conformiſts neceſſary. "I appeal to all the world, whether this be not as juſt and natural a concluſion "as yours?" And you ſay, you are "well content the world ſhould judge. "And, when it determines, that there is the ſame reaſon to ſay, That to bring "thoſe, who conform to the national church, to examine their religion, it is "neceſſary for diſſenters (who cannot, poſſibly, have the coactive power, be- "cauſe the national church has that on its ſide, and cannot be national, with- "out it) to uſe force upon conformiſts, as there is to ſay, that, where the na- "tional church is the true church, there to bring diſſenters (as I call them) to "examine their religion, it is neceſſary for the magiſtrate (who has the coac- "tive power) to lay moderate penalties upon them for diſſenting: you ſay, "when the world determines thus, you will never pretend any more to judge "what is reaſonable, in any caſe whatſoever. For you doubt not but you may

" ſafely preſume, that the world will eaſily admit theſe two things. 1. That, " though it be very fit and deſirable, that all, that are of the true religion, " ſhould underſtand the true grounds of it; that ſo they may be the better able, " both to defend themſelves againſt the aſſaults of ſeducers, and to reduce ſuch, " as are out of the way; yet this is not ſtrictly neceſſary to their ſalvation: be- " cauſe experience ſhews (as far as men are capable to judge of ſuch matters) " that many do heartily believe and profeſs the true religion, and conſcientiouſly " practiſe the duties of it, who yet do not underſtand the true grounds, upon " which it challenges their belief: and no man doubts, but whoſoever does ſo " believe, profeſs, and practiſe the true religion, if he perſeveres to the end, " ſhall certainly attain ſalvation by it. 2. That how much ſoever it concerns " thoſe, who reject the true religion (whom I may call diſſenters, if I pleaſe) Page 39. " to examine and conſider, why they do ſo; and how needful ſoever penalties " may be, to bring them to this; it is, however, utterly unreaſonable, that " ſuch as have not the coactive power, ſhould take upon them to inflict penal- " ties for that purpoſe: becauſe, as that is not conſiſtent with order and go- A. p. 6. " vernment, which cannot ſtand, where private perſons are permitted to uſurp " the coactive power; ſo there is nothing more manifeſt, than that the preju- " dice, which is done to religion, and to the intereſt of men's ſouls, by de- " ſtroying government, does infinitely outweigh any good, that can poſſibly be " done, by that which deſtroys it. And, whoever admits and conſiders theſe things, " you ſay, you are very ſecure, will be far enough from admitting, that there " is any parity of reaſon, in the caſes, we here ſpeak of, or that " mine is as " juſt and natural a concluſion as yours."

THE ſum of what you ſay amounts to thus much. Men being apt to take up their religion, upon inducements, that ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and ſo, with little, or no, examination of the grounds of it; therefore penalties are neceſſary to be laid on them, to make them thoroughly and impartially examine. But yet penalties need not be laid on conformiſts, in England, to make them examine; becauſe they, and you, believe yours to be the true religion: though it muſt be laid on preſbyterians and independents, &c. to make them examine, though they believe theirs to be the true religion; becauſe you believe it not to be ſo. But you give another very ſubſtantial reaſon, why penalties cannot be laid on conformiſts, to make them examine; and that is, " becauſe the national church has the coactive power on its ſide," and therefore, they have no need of penalties, to make them examine. The national church of France too, has the coactive power on its ſide, and therefore, they, who are of it, have no need of penalties, any of them, to make them examine.

IF your argument be good, that men take up their religion upon wrong inducements, and without due examination of the proper grounds of it; and that, therefore, they have need of penalties to be laid on them, to make them examine, as they ought, the grounds of their religion: you muſt confeſs, there are ſome in the church of England, to whom penalties are neceſſary: unleſs you will affirm, that all, who are in the communion of the church of England, have ſo examined: but that, I think, you will not do; however you endeavour to palliate their ignorance and negligence in this matter. There being, therefore, a need of penalties, I ſay, 'tis as neceſſary that preſbyterians ſhould lay penalties on the conformiſts of the church of England, to make them examine, as for the church of England to lay penalties on the preſbyterians, to make them do ſo: for they, each, equally believe their religion to be true; and we ſuppoſe, on both ſides, there are thoſe, who have not duly examined. But here, you think, you have a ſure advantage, by ſaying, " it is not conſiſtent with the or- " der of government, and ſo is impracticable." I eaſily grant it. But is yours more practicable? When you can make your way practicable, for the end, for which you pretend it neceſſary, (viz.) to make " all, who have taken up their " religion upon ſuch inducements, as ought to have no ſway at all, in the matter " to examine, thoroughly and impartially, the proper grounds of it;" When, I ſay, you can ſhew your way practicable, to this end, you will have cleared it A. p. 11.

of one main objection, and convinced the world, that yours is a more juſt and natural concluſion, than mine.

IF your cauſe were capable of any other defence, I ſuppoſe, we ſhould not have had ſo long and elaborate an anſwer, as you have given us, in this paragraph, which, at laſt, bottoms only on theſe two things: 1. That there is in you, or thoſe of your church, ſome approaches towards infallibility, in your belief that your religion is true, which is not to be allowed thoſe of other churches, in the belief of theirs. 2. That it is enough, if any one does but conform to it, and remain in the communion of your church: or elſe, one would think, there ſhould be as much need for conformiſts too, of your church, to examine the grounds of their religion, as for any others.

Page 42. "To underſtand the true grounds of the true religion, is not, you ſay, ſtrictly "neceſſary to ſalvation." Yet, I think, you will not deny, but it is as ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation, as it is to conform to a national church, in all thoſe things it impoſes: ſome whereof, are not neceſſary to ſalvation; ſome whereof, are acknowledged by all to be indifferent; and ſome whereof, to ſome conſcientious men, who thereupon decline communion, appear unſound, or unlawful. If not being ſtrictly neceſſary to ſalvation, will excuſe from penalties, in the one caſe, why will it not in the other? And now, I ſhall excuſe the world, from determining my concluſion, to be as natural as yours: for 'tis pity, ſo reaſonable a diſputant, as you are, ſhould take ſo deſperate a reſolution as "never to pretend "any more, to judge what is reaſonable, in any caſe whatſoever."

WHETHER you have proved that force, uſed by the magiſtrate, be a means preſcribed by God, to procure the gift of faith from him, (which is all you ſay, in the next paragraph,) others muſt judge.

IN that following, you quote theſe words of mine. "If all the means God "has appointed, to make men hear and conſider, be exhortation in ſeaſon and "out of ſeaſon, &c. together with prayer for them, and the example of meek"neſs, and a good life; this is all ought to be done, whether they will hear, or
Page 43. "whether they will forbear." To which you thus reply, "But if theſe be not "all the means God has appointed, then theſe things are not all that ought to "be done." But, if I aſk you, how do you know, that this is not all God has appointed; you have nothing to anſwer, (to bring it to your preſent purpoſe) but that you know it by the light of nature. For all, you ſay, is but this; that, by the light of nature, you know force to be uſeful and neceſſary, to bring men into the way of ſalvation, by the light of nature, you know the magiſtrate has a commiſſion to uſe force for that purpoſe; and by the ſame light of nature, you know that miracles were appointed, to ſupply the want of force, 'till the magiſtrates were chriſtians. I imagine, Sir, you would ſcarce have thought this a reaſonable anſwer, if you had taken notice of my words, in the ſame paragraph, immediately preceding thoſe you have cited, which (that you may ſee the ſcope of my argument) I will here trouble you with again; and they are
L. 2. p. 282. theſe: "It is not for you and me, out of an imagination, that they may be uſe"ful, or are neceſſary, to preſcribe means, in the great, myſterious work of "ſalvation, other than what God himſelf has directed. God has appointed "force as uſeful and neceſſary, and therefore it is to be uſed, is a way of argu"ing becoming the ignorance and humility of poor creatures. But I think "force uſeful or neceſſary, and therefore 'tis to be uſed, has methinks a little "too much preſumption in it. You aſk, what means is there left? None, ſay "I, to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in the ſcriptures, "wherein are contained all the means and methods of ſalvation. Faith is the "gift of God. And we are not to uſe any other means to procure this gift to "any one, but what God himſelf has preſcribed. If he has there appointed, "that any ſhould be forced to hear thoſe, who tell them they have miſtaken "their way, and offer to ſhew them the right;" and that they ſhould be pu"niſhed by the magiſtrate, if they did not; 'twill be paſt doubt, it is to be "made uſe of. But, 'till that can be done, 'twill be in vain to ſay, what other "means is there left?"

My argument here lies plainly in this; that all the means and methods of ſalvation are contained in the ſcripture: which either you were to have denied, or elſe have ſhewn, where it was, in ſcripture, that force was appointed. But, inſtead of that, you tell us, that God appointed miracles, in the beginning of the goſpel. And though, when theſe ceaſed, the means, I mention, were all the miniſters had left, yet this proves not that the magiſtrate was not to uſe force. Your words are, "as to the firſt ſpreaders of the goſpel, it has already been "ſhewn, that God appointed other means, beſides theſe, for them to uſe, to "induce men to hear and conſider: and though, when thoſe extraordinary "means ceaſed, theſe means, which I mention (viz. preaching, &c.) were the "only means left to the miniſters of the goſpel; yet that is no proof, that the "magiſtrate, when he became chriſtian, could not lawfully uſe ſuch means, as "his ſtation enabled him to uſe, when they became needful." I ſaid, in expreſs words, "no means was to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in the ſcripture. And you anſwer, this is no proof, that the chriſtian magiſtrate may not uſe force. Perhaps, when they ſo peremptorily interpoſe their deciſive degrees, in the buſineſs of ſalvation, eſtabliſh religions by laws and penalties, with what articles, creeds, ceremonies, and diſcipline, they think fit; (for this we ſee done, almoſt in all countries) when they force men to hear thoſe, and thoſe, only, who, by their authority, are choſen and allowed to tell men, they have miſtaken their way, and offer to ſhew them the right; it may be thought neceſſary to prove magiſtrates to be men. If that needs no proof, what I ſaid needs ſome other anſwer. Page 43.

But, let us examine a little the parts of what you here ſay. "As to the firſt "ſpreaders of the goſpel, ſay you, it has already been ſhewn, that God ap"pointed other means, beſides exhortation in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, prayer "and the example of a good life, for them to uſe, to induce men to hear and "conſider." What were thoſe other means? To that you readily anſwer, miracles. Ergo, men are directed now, by ſcripture, to uſe miracles. Or elſe, what anſwer do you make to my argument, which I gave you in theſe words, "no means is to be uſed by man, but what God himſelf has directed in the "ſcriptures, wherein are contained all the means and methods of ſalvation." No, they cannot uſe miracles now, as a means, ſay you, for they have them not. What then? Therefore the magiſtrate, who has it, muſt uſe force, to ſupply the want of thoſe extraordinary means, which are now ceaſed. This, indeed, is an inference of yours, but not of the ſcripture's. Does the ſcripture ſay any thing of this? Not a word: not ſo much as the leaſt intimation towards it, in all the new teſtament. Be it then, true, or falſe, that force is a means to be uſed by men, in the abſence of miracles, this is yet no anſwer to my argument; this is no proof, that 'tis appointed in ſcripture; which is the thing my argument turns on.

Revelation, then, fails you. Let us ſee now how reaſon and common ſenſe, that common light of nature, will help you out.

You then reaſon thus: bare preaching, &c. will not prevail on men, to hear and conſider; and therefore, ſome other means is neceſſary to make them do ſo. Pray what do you mean, by men, or any other of thoſe indefinite terms, you have always uſed, in this caſe? Is it, that bare preaching will prevail on no man? does reaſon (under which I comprehend experience too, and all the ways of knowledge, contradiſtinguiſhed to revelation) diſcover any ſuch thing to you? I imagine you will not ſay that; or pretend that no body was ever brought, by preaching and perſuaſion, to hear and conſider the truths of the goſpel (mean, by conſidering, what you will) without other means, uſed by thoſe, who applied themſelves to the care of converting them. To ſuch, therefore, as may be brought to hear and conſider, without other means, you will not ſay, that other means are neceſſary.

In the next place, therefore, when you ſay, bare preaching will not prevail on men, do you mean that 'twill not prevail on all men, and therefore, 'tis neceſſary that men ſhould uſe other means? Neither, I think, will reaſon authorize you to draw ſuch a conſequence; becauſe, neither will preaching alone, nor preaching, aſſiſted with force, or any other means, man can uſe, prevail on all men. And therefore, no other means can be pretended to be neceſſary, to be uſed by man, to do what men, by thoſe means, never did, nor never can do.

THAT ſome men ſhall be ſaved, and not all, is, I think, paſt queſtion, to all that are chriſtians: and thoſe that ſhall be ſaved, 'tis plain, are the elect. If you think not this plain enough in ſcripture, I deſire you to turn to the ſeventeenth of the 39 articles of the church of England, where you will read theſe words: "predeſtination to life is the everlaſting purpoſe of God, whereby (be-"fore the foundations of the world were laid,) he hath conſtantly decreed, by "his counſel, ſecret to us, to deliver from curſe and damnation, thoſe, whom "he has choſen in Chriſt, out of mankind, and to bring them, by Chriſt, to "everlaſting ſalvation, as veſſels made to honour. Wherefore, they, which be "endued with ſo excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's pur-"poſe, by his ſpirit, working in due ſeaſon: they, through grace, obey the cal-"ling; they be juſtified freely; they be made the ſons of God, by adoption; "they be made like the image of his only begotten ſon, Jeſus Chriſt; they walk "religiouſly in good works; and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to ever-"laſting felicity." Now, pray tell me, whether bare preaching will not prevail on all the elect, to hear and conſider, without other means, to be uſed by men, If you ſay, it will; the neceſſity of your other means, I think, is out of doors. If you ſay, it will not; I deſire you to tell me, how you do know it, without revelation? And whether, by your own reaſon, you can tell us, whether any, and what, means God has made neceſſary, beſides what he has appointed in ſcripture, for the calling his elect? When you can do this, we ſhall think you no ordinary divine, nor a ſtranger to the ſecret counſels of the infinitely wiſe God. But 'till then, your mixing your opinion with the divine wiſdom, in the great work of ſalvation, and, from arguments of congruity, taking upon you to declare the neceſſity, or uſefulneſs, of means, which God has not expreſly directed, for the gathering in of his elect, will ſcarce authorize the magiſtrate, to uſe his coactive power, for the edifying and compleating the body of Chriſt, which is his church. "Thoſe, whom God hath choſen, in Chriſt, "out of mankind, before the foundations of the world, are called, according "to God's purpoſe, by his ſpirit, working in due ſeaſon, and, through grace, "obey the calling;" ſay you, in your article. The outward means, that God has appointed for this, is preaching. Ay, but preaching is not enough; that is not ſufficient means, ſay you. And I aſk you, how you know it; ſince the ſcripture, which declares all, that we can know, in this matter, ſays nothing of the inſufficiency of it, or of the neceſſity of any other? Nor can there be a neceſſity of any other means, than what God, expreſly appoints, in a matter, wherein no means can operate effectually, without the aſſiſtance of his grace; and where the aſſiſtance of his grace can make any outward means, he appoints, effectual.

I MUST deſire you here, to take notice, that, by preaching, which I uſe for ſhortneſs, I mean exhortation, inſtruction, entreaty, praying for, and in fine, any outward means of perſuaſion, in the power of man, ſeparate from force.

Page 43. YOU tell us here, "as to the firſt ſpreaders of the goſpel, God appointed o-"ther means, viz. miracles, for them to uſe, to induce men to hear and conſi-"der." If, by the firſt preaders of the goſpel, you mean the twelve apoſtles and ſeventy diſciples, whom Chriſt himſelf ſent to preach the goſpel; they indeed, were appointed, by his immediate command, to ſhew miracles, by the power which he had beſtowed upon them. But will you ſay, all the miniſters and preachers of the goſpel had ſuch a commiſſion, and ſuch a power, all along, from the apoſtles time; and that they, every one, did actually ſhew miracles, to induce men to hear and conſider, quite down, 'till chriſtianity was ſupported by the law of the empire? Unleſs you could ſhew this, though you could produce ſome well-atteſted miracles, done by ſome men, in every age, 'till that time, yet it would not be ſufficient to prove, that miracles were appointed to be conſtantly uſed, to induce men to hear and conſider; and ſo, by your reaſoning,

ſoning, to ſupply the want of force, 'till that neceſſary aſſiſtance could be had, from the authority of the magiſtrate become chriſtian. For, ſince it is what you built upon, that men will not hear and conſider upon bare preaching, (and I think, you will forwardly enough agree, that 'till chriſtianity was made the religion of the empire, there were thoſe, every-where, that heard the preachers of it ſo little, or ſo little conſidered, what they ſaid, that they rejected the goſpel;) and that, therefore, miracles, or force, are neceſſary means, to make them hear and conſider, you muſt own that thoſe, who preached without the power of miracles, or the coactive power of the magiſtrate accompanying them, were unfurniſhed of competent and ſufficient means, to make men hear and conſider; and ſo, to bring them to the true religion. If you will ſay, the miracles, done by others, were enough to accompany their preaching, to make it be heard and conſidered, the preaching of the miniſters, at this day, is ſo accompanied, and ſo will need no aſſiſtance of force from the magiſtrate. If the report of miracles, done by one miniſter of the goſpel, ſome time before, and in another place, were ſufficient to make the preaching of ten, or a thouſand others, be heard and conſidered, why is it not ſo now? For the credibility and atteſtation of the report is all, that is of moment; when miracles done by others, in other places, are the argument that prevails. But this, I fear, will not ſerve your turn, in the buſineſs of penalties; and whatever might ſatisfy you, in the caſe of miracles, I doubt, you would not think the ſalvation of ſouls, ſufficiently provided for, if the report of the force of penalties, uſed ſome time ſince, on one ſide of the Tweed, were all that ſhould aſſiſt the preachers of the true religion on the other, to make men hear and conſider.

St. Paul, in his epiſtle to Titus, inſtructs him what he and the preſbyters he ſhould ordain, in the cities of Crete, were to do, for the propagating of the goſpel, and bringing men heartily to embrace it His directions are, that they ſhould be "blameleſs, not rioters, not ſelf-willed, not ſoon angry, not given to "wine, nor filthy lucre, not ſtrikers, not unruly; lovers of hoſpitality, and of "good men; ſober, juſt, holy, temperate; to be able, by ſound doctrine, both "to exhort and convince gainſayers; in all things, to be a pattern of good "works; in doctrine, ſhewing uncorruptneſs, gravity, ſincerity, ſound ſpeech, "that cannot be condemned, that he, that is of the contrary part, may be aſhamed, having no evil to ſay of you. Theſe things ſpeak, and exhort, and "rebuke with all authority. Avoid fooliſh queſtions, and genealogies, and "contentions. A man that is an heretick, after the firſt and ſecond admoni-"tion, reject." To repay you the favour of your Greek, it is παραιτȣ̃; which if I may take the liberty of receding from our tranſlation, I would read "avoid."

The Cretans, by the account St. Paul gives of them, were a people that would require all the means, that were needful to prevail, with any ſtrangers to the goſpel, to hear and conſider. But yet, we find nothing directed, for the ſupport and propagation of the goſpel, in this iſland, but preaching, exhortation reproof, &c. with the example of a good life. In this epiſtle, writ on purpoſe, to inſtruct the preachers of the goſpel, in the means they were to uſe, among the Cretans, for their converſion, not a word about miracles, their power, or uſe: which one would think ſtrange, if they were the means appointed, and neceſſary to make men hear and conſider, and without which, they would not do it. Preaching, admonition, exhortation, entreaties, inſtruction, by the common light of reaſon, were known and natural to be uſed, to perſuade men. There needed not be much ſaid, to convince men of it. But if miracles were a neceſſary means, it was a means wholly new and unexpected, and out of the power of other teachers. And therefore, one would think, if they were appointed, for the ends you propoſe, one ſhould hear ſomething of that appointment: ſince that they were to be uſed; or how; and when; was farther from common apprehenſion, and ſeems to need ſome particular direction.

If you ſay, the ſame ſpirit, that gave them the power of miracles, would alſo give them the knowledge, both that they had it, and how to uſe it; I am far enough from limiting the operations of that infinitely wiſe Spirit, who will not fail to bring all the elect of God, into the obedience of truth, by thoſe means and in that manner, he ſhall think it neceſſary. But yet, our Saviour, when he ſent abroad his diſciples, with the power of miracles, not only put it in their commiſſion, whereby they were informed, that they had that extraordinary gift, but added inſtructions to them, in the uſe of it. "Freely you have received, "freely give;" a caution, as neceſſary to the Cretan elders, in the uſe of miracles, if they had that power; there being nothing more liable to be turned to the advantage of filthy lucre.

I DO not queſtion, but the ſpirit of God might give the power, and ſtir up the mind of the firſt ſpreaders of the goſpel, to do miracles, on ſome extraordinary occaſion. But, if they were a neceſſary means, to make men hear and conſider, what was preached to them, 'till force ſupplied their place, and ſo were ordinarily to accompany the preaching of the goſpel, (unleſs it ſhould be preached, without the means appointed, and neceſſary to make it prevail) I think, in that caſe, we may expect, it ſhould expreſly have made a part of the preacher's commiſſion; it making a neceſſary part of the effectual execution of his function.

BUT the apoſtle, it ſeems, thought fit to lay the ſtreſs upon inſtructing others, and living well themſelves; upon "being inſtant in ſeaſon, and out of ſeaſon;" and therefore, directs all his advices, for the ordering the Cretan church, and propagating the goſpel there, to make them attend to thoſe neceſſary things of life and doctrine, without ſo much as mentioning the appointment, need, or uſe of miracles.

L. 2. p. 283. I SAID, "but whatever neglect, or averſion, there is in ſome men, impartially and thoroughly to be inſtructed; there will, upon a due examination "(I fear) be found no leſs, a neglect, and averſion, in others, impartially and "thoroughly to inſtruct them. 'Tis not the talking, even general truths, in plain "and clear language; much leſs a man's own fancies, in ſcholaſtical, or uncommon, ways of ſpeaking, an hour or two, once a week, in publick; that is "enough to inſtruct even willing hearers, in the way of ſalvation, and the "grounds of their religion:" and that politick diſcourſes and invectives from the pulpit, inſtead of friendly and chriſtian debates with people, at their houſes were not the proper means to inform men, in the foundations of religion: and that, if there were not a neglect, in this part, I thought, there would be little need of any other means. To this, you tell me, in the next paragraph, "you "do not ſee, how pertinent my diſcourſe, about this matter, is to the preſent "queſtion." If the ſhewing the neglects, obſervable in the uſe of, what is agreed to be, neceſſary means, will not be allowed by you, to be pertinent, in a debate about neceſſary means; when, poſſibly, thoſe very neglects may ſerve to make other means ſeem requiſite, which really are not ſo: yet, if you are not of thoſe, who will never think any ſuch diſcourſe pertinent, you will allow me to mind you of it again, as not impertinent, in anſwer to your laſt letter, wherein you ſo often tell us, of the ſufficient proviſion made for inſtruction. For, where-ever the neglect be, it can ſcarce be ſaid, there is ſufficient proviſion made for inſtruction, in a chriſtian country; where great numbers of thoſe, who are in the communion of the national church, are groſly ignorant of the grounds of the chriſtian religion. And I aſk you, whether it be in reſpect of ſuch conformiſts, you ſay, as you do, in the ſame paragraph, that "when the beſt proviſion "is made, that can be, for the inſtruction of the people, you fear a great part "of them will ſtill need ſome moderate penalties, to bring them to hear and "receive inſtruction?"

Page 43.

Ibid.

BUT what, if all means, that can, be not uſed for their inſtruction: that there are neglects of this kind, you will, I ſuppoſe, take the word of a reverend prelate of our church, who thought he could not better ſhew his good will to the clergy, than, by a ſeaſonable diſcourſe of the paſtoral care, to cure that neglect for the future. There he tells you, that "miniſters ſhould watch over and "feed their flock, and not enjoy their benefices as farms, &c. Which reproach, "ſays he, (whatever we may be) our church is free of, which he proves by the "ſtipulation and covenant, they make with Chriſt, that they will never ceaſe

Paſtoral Care, p. 94, 100.

“their labour, care and diligence, ’till they have done all, that lieth in them, according to their bounden duty, towards all ſuch as are, or ſhall be commit- to their care, to bring them to a ripeneſs of age in Chriſt.” And a page or two after, having repeated part of the promiſe, made by thoſe, who take orders, he adds, “in this is expreſſed the ſo much NEGLECTED, but ſo neceſſary duty, which incumbents owe their flock, in a private way; viſiting, inſtructing and admoniſhing; which is one of the moſt uſeful and important parts of their duty, how generally ſoever it may be diſuſed, or forgotten. P. 166. He ſays, every prieſt that minds his duty will find, that no part of it is ſo uſeful, as catechiſtical diſcourſes; by means whereof his people will underſtand all his ſermons the better, when they had once a clear notion of all thoſe terms, that muſt run through them; for thoſe not being underſtood, renders them all unintelligible. Another part of the prieſt’s duty, he tells you, is with relation to them that are without, who are of the ſide of the church of Rome, or among the diſſenters. Other churches and bodies are noted for their zeal, in making proſelytes; for their reſtleſs endeavours, as well as their unlawful methods in it: they reckoning, perhaps, that all will be ſanctified, by the increaſing their PARTY; which is the true name of making converts, except they become, at the ſame time, good men, as well as votaries to a ſide, or cauſe. We are certainly very REMISS in this, of both hands. Little pains is taken to gain, either upon papiſts, or nonconformiſts: the LAW HAS BEEN SO MUCH TRUSTED TO, that that method only was thought ſure; it was much valued, and others, at the ſame time, as much NEGLECTED. And whereas, at firſt, WITHOUT FORCE OR VIOLENCE, in forty years time, popery, from being the prevailing religion, was reduced to a handful, we have now, in above twice that number of years, made very little progreſs,” &c.

Paſtoral Care, p. 179.

PERHAPS, here again, you will tell me, you “do not ſee how this is pertinent to the preſent queſtion;” which, that you may ſee, give me leave to put you in mind, that neither you, nor any body elſe, can pretend force neceſſary, ’till all the means of perſuaſion have been uſed, and nothing neglected, that can be done, by all the ſofter ways of application. And, ſince it is your own doctrine, that force is not lawful, unleſs where it is neceſſary; the magiſtrate, upon your principles, can neither lawfully uſe force, nor the miniſters of any national church plead for it, any where, but where they themſelves have firſt done their duties: a draught whereof, adapted to our preſent circumſtances, we have, in the newly publiſhed diſcourſe of the paſtoral care. And he, that ſhall preſs the uſe of force, as neceſſary, before he can anſwer it to himſelf and the world, that thoſe, who have taken on them the care of ſouls, have performed their duties, were beſt conſider, whether he does not draw up an accuſation againſt the men of that holy order, or againſt the magiſtrate, who ſuffers them to neglect any part of their duty, For, whilſt what that learned biſhop, in the paſſages above-cited, and in other places, mentions, is neglected, it cannot be ſaid, that no other means, but force, is left; thoſe, which are, on all hands, acknowledged neceſſary and uſeful means, not having yet been made uſe of.

To vindicate your method from novelty, you tell me, ’tis as old as St. Auſtin. Whatever he ſays, in the place you quote, it ſhews only his opinion, but not that it was ever uſed. Therefore, to ſhew it not to be new in practice, you add, that you “think it has been made uſe of, by all thoſe magiſtrates, who having made all requiſite proviſions, for the inſtructing their people in the truth, have likewiſe required them, under convenient penalties, to embrace it.” Which is, as much as to ſay, that thoſe magiſtrates, who uſed your method, did uſe your method. And that, certainly, you may think ſafely, and without fear of being gain-ſaid.

Page 43.

BUT now I will tell you what I think, in my turn: and that is, if you could have found any magiſtrates, who made uſe of your method, as well as you think, you have found a divine, that approves of it, you would have named thoſe magiſtrates, as forwardly as you do St. Auſtin. If I think amiſs, pray correct me yet, and name them.

L. 2. p. 284. That, which makes me imagine, you will hardly find any examples of it, is what I there ſaid in theſe words: "All other law-makers have conſtantly taken this method; that, where any thing was to be amended, the fault was firſt declared, and then, penalties denounced againſt all thoſe, who, after a time ſet, ſhould be found guilty of it. This the common ſenſe of mankind, and the very reaſon of laws (which are intended, not for puniſhment, but correction) has made ſo plain, that the ſubtileſt and moſt refined law-makers have not gone out of this courſe, nor have the moſt ignorant and barbarous nations miſſed it. But, you have out-done Solon and Lycurgus, Moſes and our Saviour, and are reſolved to be a law-maker of a way, by yourſelf. 'Tis an old and obſolete way, and will not ſerve your turn, to begin with warnings and threats of penalties, to be inflicted on thoſe who do not reform, but continue to do that, which, you think, they fail in. To allow of impunity to the innocent, or the opportunity of amendment to thoſe, who would avoid the penalties, are formalities, not worth your notice, You are for a ſhorter and ſurer way. Take a whole tribe, and puniſh them at all adventures, whether guilty, or no, of the miſcarriage, which you would have amended; or, without ſo much as telling them what it is you would have them do, but leaving them to find it out, if they can. All theſe abſurdities are contained, in your way of proceeding, and are impoſſible to be avoided, by any one, who will puniſh diſſenters, and only diſſenters, to make them "conſider and weigh the grounds of their religion, and impartially examine whether it be true or no, and upon what grounds they took it up; that ſo they may find and embrace the truth, that muſt ſave them." Theſe abſurdities, I fear, muſt be removed, before any magiſtrates will find your method practicable.

I having ſaid, "your method is not altogether unlike the plea, made uſe of, to excuſe the late barbarous uſage of the proteſtants in France, from being a perſecution for religion, viz. that it was not a puniſhment for religion, but for diſobeying the king's laws, which required them to come to maſs: ſo, by your rule, diſſenters muſt be puniſhed, not for the religion, they have embraced, but the religion, they have rejected." Page 44. In anſwer to this, in the next paragraph, you take abundance of pains to prove, that the king of France's laws, that require going to maſs, are no laws. You were beſt to ſay ſo, on the other ſide of the water. 'Tis ſure the puniſhments were puniſhments, and the dragooning was dragooning. And if you think, that plea excuſed them not, I am of your mind. But neverthleſs am of opinion, as I was, that it will prove as Ibid. good a plea, as yours. Which is what you argue againſt, in your next paragraph, in the words following, wherein you examine the likeneſs of your new method to this plea. You tell me, "I ſay, by your rule, the diſſenters (from the true religion, for you ſpeak of no other) muſt be puniſhed (or, if I pleaſe, ſubjected to moderate penalties, ſuch as ſhall make them uneaſy, but neither deſtroy, or undo, them:) for what? Indeed, I thought, by your firſt book you meant, not for their religion, but to make them conſider; but here you aſk me, "where it is you ſay, that diſſenters from the true religion, are not to be puniſhed for their religion?" So then, it ſeems, in your opinion now, diſſenters from the true religion are to be puniſhed," or (as you are pleaſe to mollify the expreſſion, for the thing is the ſame) "ſubjected to moderate penalties, for their religion." I think, I ſhall not need to prove, to any one, but one of your nice ſtile, that the execution of penal laws, let the penalties be great, or ſmall, are puniſhments.

If therefore, the religion of diſſenters from the true, be a fault to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate; who is to judge, who are guilty of that fault? Muſt it be the magiſtrate, every where, or the magiſtrate in ſome countries, and not in others, or the magiſtrate, no where? If the magiſtrate, no where, is to be judge, who are diſſenters from the true religion, he can no where puniſh them. If he be to be every where judge, then the king of France, or the great Turk, muſt puniſh thoſe, whom they judge diſſenters from the true religion, as well as other potentates. If ſome magiſtrates have a right to judge, and others not; that yet, I fear, (how abſurd ſoever it be) ſhould I grant it, will not do your buſineſs. For beſides, that, they will hardly agree, to make you their infallible umpire, in the caſe, to determine who of them have, and who have not, this right to judge, which is the true religion: or, if they ſhould, and you ſhould declare the king of England had that right, (viz. whilſt he complied to ſupport the orthodoxy, eccleſiaſtical polity, and thoſe ceremonies, which you approve of;) but that the king of France, and the great Turk, had it not, and ſo could have no right, to uſe force on thoſe, they have judged diſſenters from the true religion; you ought to bethink yourſelf what you will reply, to one, that ſhould uſe your own words; "if ſuch a degree of outward force, as has been mentioned, be really of great and even neceſſary uſe, for the advancing of the true religion, and ſalvation of ſouls, then it muſt be acknowledged, that in France and Turky, &c. there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it, for the advancing thoſe ends; unleſs we will ſay (what, without impiety, cannot be ſaid) that the wiſe and benign Diſpoſer and Governor of all things, has not, in France and Turky, furniſhed mankind, with competent means, for the promoting his own honour and the good of ſouls." A. p. 16.

You go on, and tell us, they are to be puniſhed, not for following the light of their own reaſon, nor for obeying the dictates of their own conſciences, but "rather for the contrary. For the light of their own reaſon, and the dictates of their own conſcience (if their reaſon and their conſciences were not perverted and abuſed) would undoubtedly lead them to the ſame thing, to which the method, you ſpeak of, is deſigned to bring them;" i. e. to the ſame thing, to which your reaſon and your conſcience leads you. For, if you were to argue with a papiſt, or a preſbyterian, in the caſe, what privilege have you to tell him, that his reaſon and conſcience is perverted, more than he has to tell you, that yours is ſo? Unleſs it be this inſupportable preſumption, that your reaſon and conſcience ought to be the meaſure of all reaſon and conſcience, in all others, which how you can claim, without pretending to infallibility, is not eaſily to diſcern. Page 44.

THE diverſion you give yourſelf, about the likeneſs and unlikeneſs of thoſe two pleas, I ſhall not trouble myſelf with; ſince when your fit of mirth was over, you were forced to confeſs, that "as I have made your plea for you, you think there is no conſiderable difference, as to the fairneſs of them, excepting what ariſes from the different degrees of puniſhment, in the French diſcipline, and your method. But if the French plea be not true; and that, which I make to be yours, be not yours;"—I muſt beg your pardon, Sir, I did not think, it was your opinion, (nor do I yet remember, that you, any where, ſaid in your A. &c.) that men were to be puniſhed for their religion; but that it was purely to make men "examine the religion, they had embraced, and the religion that they had rejected." And, if that were of moment, I ſhould think myſelf ſufficiently juſtified, for this my miſtake, by what you ſay, in your argument, &c. from p. 6. to 12. But, ſince you explain yourſelf, otherwiſe, here, I am not unwilling to take your hypotheſis, as you, from time to time, ſhall pleaſe to reform it. You anſwer then, that "to make them examine, is, indeed, the next end for which they are to be puniſhed. But, what is that to my queſtion? Which, if it be pertinent, demands for what fault, not for what end, they are to be puniſhed: as appears, even by my next words," "So that they are puniſhed, not for having offended againſt a law, (i. e. not for any fault;) for there is no law in England that requires them to examine." This I muſt confeſs, was to ſhew, that here, as in France, whatever was pretended, yet the true reaſon, why people were puniſhed, was their religion. And it was for this agreement, that, in both places, religion was meant, though ſomething elſe was talked of, that I ſaid, your plea was like that, made uſe of, in France. But I ſee, I might have ſpared my pains, to prove that you puniſh diſſenters for their religion, ſince you here own it. Page 45. Ibid.

YOU tell me, in the ſame place, I was impertinent in my queſtion (which was this, "for what then are they to be puniſhed?") that I demanded, for what end, and not for what fault they are to be puniſhed. In good earneſt, Sir, I was not ſo ſubtile, as to diſtinguiſh them. I always thought, that the end of all laws was to amend thoſe faults, which were forbidden; and that, when any one was puniſhed, the fault, for which he was puniſhed, was the tranſgreſſion of the law, in that particular, which was, by the law commanded, or forbidden; and the end of the puniſhment, was the amendment of that fault, for the future. For example; if the law commanded to hear, not hearing was the fault puniſhed; and the end of that puniſhment, was to make the offenders hear. If the law commanded to examine, the fault puniſhed, when that law was put in execution, was not examining; and the end of the puniſhment, to make the offenders examine. If the law commanded conformity, the fault was nonconformity, and the end of it to make men conform.

THIS was my apprehenſion, concerning laws, and ends of puniſhments. And I muſt own myſelf ſtill ſo dull, as not to diſtinguiſh otherwiſe, between "the fault, for which men are to be puniſhed, and the end, for which they are to be puniſhed;" but only, as the one is paſt, the other future. The tranſgreſſion, or fault, is an omiſſion, or action, that a man is already guilty of; the end of the puniſhment, that it be not again repeated. So that, if a man be puniſhed, for the religion he profeſſes, I can ſee no other end, for which he is puniſhed, but to make him quit that religion. No other immediate end, I mean; for other remote ends, to which this is ſubordinate, it may have. So that, if not examining the religion, which men have embraced, and the religion, they have rejected, be not the fault, for which men are puniſhed: I would be glad, you would ſhew me, how it can be the next end, as you ſay it is, of their being puniſhed. And that you may not think, my dulneſs gives you a labour, without ground, I will tell you the reaſon, why I cannot find any other next end of puniſhment, but the amendment of the fault forbidden; and that is, becauſe that ſeems to me to be the end, the next end of any action; which when obtained, the action is to ceaſe, and not ceaſe 'till it be attained. And thus, I think, it is, in puniſhments, ordained by the law. When the fault forbidden is amended, the puniſhment is to ceaſe, and not 'till then. This is the only way, I have, to know the end, or final cauſe, for which any action is done. If you have any other, you will do me a kindneſs to inſtruct me. This 'tis, which makes me conclude, (and I think, with me, all thoſe, who have not had the leiſure and happineſs to attain the utmoſt refining of the ſchools) that, if their religion be the fault, for which diſſenters are puniſhed, examining is not the end, for which they are puniſhed, but the change of their religion: though examining may, perhaps, in ſome men, precede their change, and help to it. But that is not neceſſary. A man may change his religion, without it: and, when he has changed, let the motive be what it will, the end the law aims at, is obtained, and the puniſhment ceaſes. So, on the other ſide, if not hearing, not examining, be the fault, for which men are puniſhed, conformity is not the next end, for which they are puniſhed, though it may, perhaps, in ſome, be a conſequence of it; but hearing and examining muſt be underſtood to be the ends, for which they are puniſhed. If they are not the ends, why does the puniſhment ceaſe, when thoſe ends are attained? And thus you have my thoughts, concerning this matter, which, perhaps, will not be very pertinent (as mine have not the good luck, always, to be to you) to a man of nicer diſtinctions.

BUT let us conſider your hypotheſis, as it now ſtands, and ſee what advantage you have got to your cauſe, by this new explication. "Diſſenters from the true religion are to be puniſhed, ſay you, for their religion." Why? Becauſe 'tis a fault. Againſt whom? Againſt God. Thence it follows, indeed, that God, if he pleaſes, may puniſh it. But how will you prove, that God has given the magiſtrates of the earth, a power to puniſh all faults againſt himſelf? Covetouſneſs, or not loving our neighbour as ourſelves, are faults, or ſins, againſt God. Ought the magiſtrate to puniſh theſe? But I ſhall not need to trouble you much with that queſtion. This matter, I think, will be decided between us, without going ſo far.

IF the magiſtrate may puniſh any one, for not being of the true religion, muſt the magiſtrate judge, what is that true religion, or no? If he muſt not, what muſt guide him, in the puniſhing of ſome, and not of others? For ſo it is, in all places, where there is a national religion, eſtabliſh'd by penal laws. If the magiſtrate be commiſſioned by the ſame law of nature (for that is all the commiſſion, you pretend to) to judge, what is the true religion, by which he is authorized to puniſh thoſe, who diſſent from it; muſt not all magiſtrates judge, and accordingly puniſh thoſe, who diſſent from that, which they judge the true religion, i. e. in effect, thoſe, who diſſent from theirs? And, if all magiſtrates have a power to puniſh thoſe, who are not of their religion, I aſk you, whether it be of more uſe, or diſadvantage, to the promoting true religion, and ſalvation of ſouls? And, when you have reſolv'd that queſtion, you will, then, be able to tell me, whether the uſefulneſs of it (which muſt be determined by the greater good, or harm, it is like to do) is ſuch, as to juſtify your doctrine about it, or the magiſtrate's uſe of it.

Besides, your making the diſſenting from the true religion a fault, to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate, puts an end to your pretence to moderate puniſhments; which, in this place, you make uſe of, to diſtinguiſh yours from the French method; ſaying, that " your method puniſhes men, with puniſhments, " which do not deſerve to be called ſo, when compared with thoſe of the French " diſcipline." But if the diſſenting from the true religion, be a fault, that the magiſtrate is to puniſh, and a fault of that conſequence, that it draws, with it, the loſs of a man's ſoul; I do not ſee, how other magiſtrates, whoſe duty it is to puniſh faults, under their cognizance, and, by puniſhing, to amend them, can be more remiſs, than the king of France has been, and forbear declaring, that they will have all their people ſaved, and endeavour, by ſuch ways, as he has done, to effect it: eſpecially, ſince you tell us, that " God now leaves reli- Page 8.
" gion to the care of men, under his ordinary providence, to try, whether they " will do their duties, in their ſeveral capacities, or not, leaving them anſwer- " able for all, that may follow, from their neglect." In the correcting of faults, " malo nodo malus cuneus," is not only what is juſtifiable, but what is requiſite. But of this more fully in another place.

In the next place, I do not ſee how, by your method, as you explain it here, the magiſtrate can puniſh any one, for not being of the true religion, (though we ſhould grant him, to have a power to do it) whilſt you tell us, that " your " method puniſhes men for rejecting the true religion, propoſed to them, with Page 45.
" ſufficient evidence, which certainly is a fault." By this part of your ſcheme, it is plain, that you allow the magiſtrate to puniſh none, but thoſe, to whom the true religion is propoſed with ſufficient evidence; and ſufficient evidence, you tell us, " is ſuch as will certainly win aſſent, where-ever it is duly conſider- Page 53.
" ed." Now, by this rule, there will be very few, that the magiſtrate will have right to puniſh; ſince he cannot know, whether thoſe, who diſſent, do it, for want of due conſideration in them, or want of ſufficient evidence in what is propoſed; unleſs you mean, by due conſideration, ſuch conſideration, that always does bring men actually to aſſent; which is, in effect, to ſay nothing at all. For then, your rule amounts to thus much, " that ſufficient evidence is ſuch as will " certainly win aſſent, where-ever it is conſider'd duly," i. e. ſo, as to win aſ- " ſent. This being like ſome of thoſe other rules, we have met with, and ending in a circle, which after you have traced, you at laſt find yourſelf, juſt where you were, at ſetting out; I leave it to you to own, as you think fit; and tell you, if, by duly conſidering, you mean conſidering to his utmoſt; that then, that, which is propoſed to one, with ſufficient evidence, to win aſſent, may not be ſo to another.

There are propoſitions, extant in geometry, with their demonſtrations annexed, and that, with ſuch ſufficient evidence, to ſome men, of deep thought and penetration, as to make them ſee the demonſtration, and give aſſent to the truth: whilſt there are many others, and thoſe no novices in mathematicks, who, with all the conſideration and attention they can uſe, are never able to attain unto it. 'Tis ſo in other parts of truth. That, which hath evidence enough, to make one man certain, has not enough to make another ſo much as gueſs it to be true, though he has ſpared no endeavour, or application, in examining it. And therefore, if the magiſtrate be to puniſh none but thoſe, who reject the true religion,

gion, when it has been offer'd with ſufficient evidence, I imagine, he will not have many to puniſh, if he will, as he ought, diſtinguiſh between the innocent and the guilty.

UPON your forwardneſs to encourage the magiſtrate's uſe of force, in matters of religion, by its uſefulneſs, even ſo far, as to pretend advantages, from what L. 2. p. 306. yourſelf acknowledge the miſapplication of it, I ſay that “ſo, inſtead of diſheartening from, you give encouragement, to the miſchief; which, upon your principle, joined to the natural thirſt in man, after arbitrary power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretence of right.” To which Page 73. your reply is, that you “ſpeak no where, but of the uſe and neceſſity of force.” What think you, in the place mentioned, of the gain, that you tell the ſufferers, they ſhall make, by the magiſtrate's puniſhing them, to bring them to a wrong religion? You do not, as I remember, there ſay, that force is neceſſary, in that caſe; though they gaining, as you ſay, by it this advantage, “that they know better, than they did before, where the truth does lie,” you cannot but allow, that ſuch a miſapplication of force may do ſome ſervice, indirectly and at a diſtance, towards the ſalvation of ſouls.

BUT that you may not think, whilſt I had under conſideration, the dangerous encouragement you gave, to men in power, to be very buſy with their force, in matters of religion, by all the ſorts of uſefulneſs, you could imagine of it, however applied, right or wrong, that I declined mentioning the neceſſity, you pretend, of force, becauſe it would not as well ſerve to the purpoſe, for which I mention its uſefulneſs; I ſhall here take it ſo, that the reader may ſee, what reaſon you had to complain, of my not doing it before.

THUS, then, ſtands your ſyſtem. “The procuring and advancing, any way, of the ſpiritual and eternal intereſts of men, is one of the ends of civil ſociety.” And force is put into the magiſtrate's hands, as neceſſary for the attaining thoſe ends, where no other means are left. “Who then, upon your grounds, may quickly find reaſon, where it ſuits his inclination, or ſerves his turn, to puniſh men directly, to bring them to his religion.” For, if he may uſe force, becauſe it is neceſſary, as being the only means left, to make men conſider thoſe reaſons and arguments, which otherwiſe they would not conſider, why may he not, by the ſame rule of force, as the only means left to procure men degrees of glory, which, otherwiſe they would not attain, and ſo to advance their eternal intereſts? For St. Paul aſſures us, that “the afflictions of this life work for us a far more exceeding weight of glory.” So that whether the magiſtrate may not, when it may ſerve his turn, argue thus from your principles, judge you: diſſenters from my religion muſt be puniſhed, if in the wrong, to bring them into the right way; if in the right, to make them, by their ſufferings, gainers of a far more exceeding weigt of glory.

Page 73. BUT you ſay, “unleſs it be as neceſſary for men, to attain any greater degree of glory, as it is to attain glory, it will not follow, that, if the magiſtrate, may uſe force, becauſe it may be indirectly, &c. uſeful, toward the procuring any degree of glory, he may, by the ſame rule, uſe it, where it may be in that manner uſeful, towards the procuring a greater degree of glory. But, that there is the ſame neceſſity, of men's attaining a greater degree of glory, as there is of their attaining glory, no man will affirm. For, without attaining glory, they cannot eſcape the damnation of hell, which yet they may eſcape without any greater degree of glory.” One of the ends of a commonwealth is ſay you, the advancing men's eternal intereſts. The procuring greater degrees of glory, is the advancing a man's eternal intereſts. The uſe of force to make men ſuffer for the truth, what, otherwiſe, they would not ſuffer, is as neceſſary for the attaining an higher degree of glory, as uſing force to make them conſider, what otherwiſe they would not conſider, is neceſſary for the attaining any degree of glory. But you will ſay, “attaining glory is abſolutely Ibid. neceſſary, but the attaining any greater degree of glory, however deſireable, is not ſo neceſſary. Now, if there be not the ſame neceſſity of the one of theſe, as there is of the other, there can be no pretence to ſay, that whatever is lawful, in reſpect of one of them, is likewiſe ſo, in reſpect of the other.” But there will always be a juſt pretence to ſay, if advancing the eternal intereſts of men be one of the ends of a commonwealth, and that the force, in the magiſtrate's hands, be neceſſary to the attaining that end; that then, the magiſtrate is obliged to uſe it; whether you will think that end abſolutely neceſſary, or as neceſſary as another, or no, I ſhall not here trouble you again, with your miſtake, about what is abſolutely neceſſary, having taken notice of it, in another place. Only, I ſhall deſire you to ſhew me, that the attaining of glory is abſolutely neceſſary, when, next time, you have occaſion to affirm it. Attaining of glory is neceſſary, in order to happineſs: and attaining a greater degree of glory, is neceſſary in order to greater happineſs: but neither of them is abſolutely neceſſary, but in order to their reſpective ends.

AND now, though, as you ſay, "you do not think yourſelf bound to take "notice of all, that may be done, with ſome pretence of right:" yet, I ſuppoſe, upon cooler thoughts, when you have conſidered of what dangerous conſequence, an argument, managed, as yours is, may be to the true religion, and the ſincere profeſſors of it; and what occaſion, or encouragement, it may give to men in power, warmed with zeal, and excited by the proper miniſters of their own religion, to make a wrong and exorbitant uſe of force, in matters of religion, you will, another time, think yourſelf bound, not to let it go abroad again, without ſome caution to the magiſtrate, in the uſe of it; without one word of advice at leaſt, that, ſince it is given him, as you ſay, only for promoting the true religion, he ſhould take care, and examine impartially, whether, what he employs it for, be the one, only, true religion. It being your opinion, whenever he makes uſe of force, in matters of religion, for the promoting any thing but that, he goes beyond his commiſſion, injures his ſubjects, and endangers his own ſoul.

BY this time, Sir, I ſuppoſe you ſee, upon what grounds I think, you have not cleared thoſe difficulties, which were charged by me, on your method: and my reader will ſee, what reaſon there was, for thoſe imputations, which, with ſo loud an outcry, you laid upon me, of unfair dealing; ſince there is not one of them, which cannot be made good to be contained, either in your book, or in your hypotheſis; and that ſo clearly, that I could not imagine, that a man, who had ſo far conſider'd government, as to engage in print, in ſuch a controverſy as this, could miſs ſeeing it, as ſoon as mentioned to him. One of them, which very much offends you, and makes you ſo often tell me, what I ſay is impertinent, and nothing to the purpoſe; and, ſometimes, to uſe warmer expreſſions, is, that I argue againſt a power in the magiſtrate, to bring men to his own religion: for I could not imagine that, to a man of any thought, it could need proving, that, if there were a commiſſion given, to all magiſtrates, by the law of nature, which obliged them to uſe force, to bring men to the true religion, it was not poſſible for them, to put this commiſſion in execution, without being judges, what was the true religion; and then, there needed no great quickneſs to perceive, that every magiſtrate, when your commiſſion came to be put in execution, would, one as well as another, find himſelf obliged to uſe force, to bring men to that, which he believed to be the true religion. But ſince this was ſo hard for you to ſee, I now have been at the pains to prove it, and thereby to clear all thoſe imputations. I ſhall not inſtance in any other: they are all of a like kind. Only, where you complain, I have not cited your words fairly, if you can ſhew that I have done it, any were, in this, or the ſecond letter, to the advantage of my cauſe; or to avoid any argument in them, not anſwered; if you pleaſe to ſhew it me, I ſhall either let you ſee your miſtake, or acknowledge mine.

AND now, whether you ſhall think what I have ſaid, worth that conſideration you promiſe, or take it all for cavils and impertinencies, to me is very indifferent. Enjoy, if you pleaſe, that ſhort and eaſy way of anſwering. But if the party, you write for, be, as you ſay, God, and the ſouls of men, it will require you ſeriouſly to weigh your ſcheme, examine and put together the parts of it, obſerve its tendency and conſequences; and, in a word, conſider things, and not words. For the party of God and ſouls needs not any help from obſcurity, or uncertainty, Page 78.

uncertainty, of general and equivocal terms, but may be ſpoke out, clearly and diſtinctly; needs no retreat, in the round of equivalent, or the uncertainty of miſapplied expreſſions, that may ſerve to amuſe and deceive the unwary, but inſtruct no body; and laſtly, needs no leave, nor allowance, from men of art, to direct both ſubjects and magiſtrates, to the examination of the ſcriptures, wherein God has revealed, to the world, the ways and means of ſalvation. In doing of this, in a treatiſe, where you profeſs "the ſubject of your enquiry is only, Page 68. "what method is to be uſed, to bring men to the true religion," the party, you profeſs to write for, would have juſtified you, againſt the rules of any lawful art; and no chriſtian man, of what art ſoever, would have denied you that liberty; and, if I miſtake not, the party, you ſay, you write for, demands it of you.

If you find, upon a review of the whole, that you have managed your cauſe, for God, and the ſouls of men, with that ſincerity and clearneſs, that ſatisfies your own reaſon, and, you think, may ſatisfy that of other men, I ſhall congratulate to you ſo happy a conſtitution. But if all your magnified and neceſſary means of force, in the way you contend for, reaches no farther, than to bring men to a bare, outward conformity to the church of England, wherein you can ſedately affirm, that it is preſumable that all, that are of it, are ſo, upon reaſon and conviction; I ſuppoſe, there needs no more to be ſaid, to convince the world, what party you write for.

The party, you write for, is God, you ſay. But if all, you have ſaid, aims or amounts, to nothing more, than that the church of England, as now eſtabliſhed by law, in its doctrines, ceremonies and diſcipline, ſhould be ſupported by the power of the magiſtrate, and men, by force, be driven into it; I fear, the world will think, you have very narrow thoughts of God; or that that is not the party you write for. 'Tis true, you all along ſpeak, of bringing men to the true religion. But to evidence to you, that, by the only true religion, you mean only that of the church of England, I tell you, that upon your principles, you cannot name any other church, now in the world, (and I again demand of you, to do it) for the promoting whereof, or puniſhing diſſenters from it, the magiſtrate has not the ſame right, to uſe force, as you pretend he has, here in England. 'Till you, therefore, name ſome ſuch other true church and true religion, beſides that of England, your ſaying, that God is the party, you write for, will rather ſhew that you make bold with his name, than that you do not write for another party.

You ſay too, you write not for any party, but the ſouls of men. You write, indeed, and contend earneſtly, that men ſhould be brought into an outward conformity to the church of England. But that they embrace that profeſſion, upon reaſon and conviction, you are content to have it preſumable, without any farther enquiry or examination. And thoſe, who are once in the outward communion of the national church, however ignorant, or irreligious, they are, you leave there unaſſiſted, by your only competent means, force; without which, you tell us, the true religion, by its own light and ſtrength, is not able to prevail againſt men's luſts, and the corruption of nature, ſo as to be conſidered, as it ought, and heartily embraced. And this dropped not from your pen, by chance; but you profeſſedly make excuſes for thoſe of the national religion, who are ignorant of the grounds of it, and give us reaſons, why force cannot be uſed to thoſe, who outwardly conform, to make them conſider ſo, as ſincerely to embrace, believe Page 179. and obey the truth, that muſt ſave them. But the reverend author of the paſtoral care tells you, "PARTY is the true name of making converts, except "they become, at the ſame time, good men."

If the uſe of force be neceſſary, for the ſalvation of ſouls, and men's ſouls be the party, you write for; you will be ſuſpected to have betrayed your party, if your method and neceſſary means of ſalvation reach no farther, than to bring men to outward conformity, tho' to the true church; and, after that, abandon them to their luſts and depraved nature, deſtitute of the help of force, your neceſſary and competent means of ſalvation.

THIS way of managing the matter, whatever you intend, ſeems rather, in the fitneſs of it, to be for another party. But ſince you aſſure us, you write for nothing, but God and men's ſouls, it can only be ſaid, you had a good intention, but ill luck; ſince your ſcheme, put into the language of the country, will fit any national church and clergy, in the world, that can but ſuppoſe itſelf the true; and that I preſume none of them will fail to do.

YOU were more than ordinary reſerved and gracious, when you tell me, that "what party I write for, you will not undertake to ſay." But having told me, Page 79. that my letter tends to the promoting of ſcepticiſm in religion, you thought ('tis like) that was ſufficient to ſhew the party, I write for; and ſo you might ſafely end your letter, with words that looked like civil. But, that you may, another time, be a little better informed, what party I write for, I will tell you. They are thoſe who, in every nation, fear God, work righteouſneſs, and are accepted with him; and not thoſe, who in every nation, are zealous for human conſtitutions, cry up nothing ſo much, as outward conformity to the national religion, and are accepted by thoſe, who are the promoters of it. Thoſe, that I write for, are thoſe, who, according to the light of their own conſciences, are, every where, in earneſt, in matters of their own ſalvation, without any deſire to impoſe on others; a party, ſo ſeldom favoured by any of the powers, or ſects of the world; a party, that has ſo few preferments to beſtow; ſo few benefices, to reward the endeavour of any one, who appears for it, that I conclude, I ſhall eaſily be believed, when I ſay, that neither hopes of preferment, nor any deſign to recommend myſelf to thoſe, I live amongſt, has biaſſed my underſtanding, or miſled me in my undertaking. So much truth, as ſerves the turn of any particular church, and can be accommodated to the narrow intereſt of ſome human conſtitution, is, indeed, often received with applauſe, and the publiſher finds his account in it. But I think, I may ſay, (truth in its full latitude, of thoſe generous principles of the goſpel, which ſo much recommend, and inculcate, univerſal charity, and a freedom from the inventions and impoſitions of men, in the things of God,) has ſo ſeldom had a fair and favourable hearing, any where, that he muſt be very ignorant of the hiſtory and nature of man, however dignified and diſtinguiſhed, who propoſes to himſelf any ſecular advantage, by writing for her, at that rate.

AS to your requeſt, in the cloſe of your letter, I hope, this will ſatisfy you, that you might have ſpared it; and you, with the reſt of the world, will ſee, that all I writ, in my former, was ſo true, that you need not have given me any caution for the future. As to the pertinence of what I ſay, I doubt, whether I ſhall pleaſe you: becauſe I find, by your laſt letter, that what is brought, by me, to ſhew the weakneſs, abſurdities, or inſignificancy of what you write, you are very apt to call impertinent, and nothing to the purpoſe. You muſt pardon me, therefore, if I have endeavoured more to pleaſe other readers, than you, in that point. I hope, they will find, in what I have ſaid, not much beſides the matter. But to a man who, ſuppoſing himſelf in the right, builds all upon that ſuppoſition, and takes it for an injury, to have that privilege denied him; to a man who would ſovereignly decide, for all the world, what is the true religion, and thereby impower, what magiſtrates he thinks fit, and what not, to uſe force; to ſuch a man, not to ſeem impertinent, would be really to be ſo. This makes me pleaſed with your reply, to ſo many paſſages in my letter, that they were nothing to the purpoſe: and 'tis in your choice, whether, in your opinion, any thing in this ſhall be ſo.

BUT, ſince this depends upon your keeping ſteadily to clear and ſettled notions of things, ſeparate from words and expreſſions, uſed in doubtful and undetermined ſignification, wherewith men of art often amuſe themſelves and Page 78. others; I ſhall not be ſo unreaſonable, as to expect, whatever you promiſe, that you ſhould lay by your learning, to embrace truth, and own what will not, perhaps, ſuit very well with your circumſtances and intereſt.

I SEE, my deſign, not to omit any thing that you might think, looks like an argument in yours, has made mine grow beyond the ſize of a letter. But an anſwer to any one being very little different from a letter, I ſhall let it go under that title. I have in it alſo endeavour'd to bring the ſcatter'd parts of your ſcheme, into ſome method, under diſtinct heads, to give a fuller and more diſtinct view of them. Wherein, if any of the arguments, which gives ſupport to your hypotheſis, have eſcaped me unawares, be pleaſed to ſhew them me; and I ſhall either acknowledge their force, or endeavour to ſhew their weakneſs. I am,

SIR,

June 20,
1692.

Your moſt humble ſervant,

Philanthropus.

THE

REASONABLENESS

OF

CHRISTIANITY,

As delivered in the

SCRIPTURES.

THE

PREFACE.

THE little ſatisfaction and conſiſtency is to be found, in moſt of the ſyſtems of divinity I have met with, made me betake myſelf to the ſole reading of the ſcriptures (to which they all appeal) for the underſtanding the Chriſtian religion. What from thence, by an attentive and unbiaſſed ſearch, I have received, Reader, I here deliver to thee. If by this my labour thou receiveſt any light, or confirmation in the truth, join with me in thanks to the Father of lights, for his condeſcenſion to our underſtandings. If, upon a fair and unprejudiced examination, thou findeſt I have miſtaken the ſenſe and tenor of the goſpel, I beſeech thee, as a true Chriſtian, in the ſpirit of the goſpel, (which is that of charity) and in the words of ſobriety, ſet me right, in the doctrine of ſalvation.

THE
REASONABLENESS
OF
CHRISTIANITY,
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SCRIPTURES.

IT is obvious to any one, who reads the new teſtament, that the doctrine of redemption, and conſequently of the goſpel, is founded upon the ſuppoſition of Adam's fall. To underſtand therefore, what we are reſtored to by Jeſus Chriſt, we muſt conſider what the ſcripture ſhew we loſt by Adam. This I thought worthy of a diligent and unbiaſſed ſearch: ſince I found the two extremes, that men run into on this point, either on the one hand ſhook the foundations of all religion, or, on the other, made chriſtianity almoſt nothing: for whilſt ſome men would have all Adam's poſterity doomed to eternal, infinite puniſhment, for the tranſgreſſion of Adam, whom millions never heard of, and no one had authoriſed to tranſact for him, or be his repreſentative; this ſeemed to others ſo little conſiſtent with the juſtice or goodneſs of the great and infinite God, that they thought there was no redemption neceſſary, and conſequently, that there was none, rather than admit of it upon a ſuppoſition, ſo derogatory to the honour and attributes of that infinite Being; and ſo made Jeſus Chriſt nothing but the reſtorer and preacher of pure natural religion; thereby doing violence to the whole tenor of the new teſtament. And, indeed, both ſides will be ſuſpected to have treſpaſſed this way, againſt the written word of God, by any one, who does but take it to be a collection of writings, deſigned by God, for the inſtruction of the illiterate bulk of mankind, in the way to ſalvation; and therefore, generally, and in neceſſary points, to be underſtood in the plain direct meaning of the words and phraſes, ſuch as they may be ſuppoſed to have had in the mouths of the ſpeakers, who uſed them according to the language of that time and country wherein they lived; without ſuch learned, artificial, and forced ſenſes of them, as are ſought out, and put upon them, in moſt of the ſyſtems of divinity, according to the notions that each one has been bred up in.

To one that, thus unbiaſſed, reads the ſcripture, what Adam fell from, is viſible, was the ſtate of perfect obedience, which is called juſtice in the new teſtament, though the word, which in the original ſignifies juſtice, be tranſlated righteouſneſs: and, by this fall, he loſt paradiſe, wherein was tranquillity and the tree of life, i. e. he loſt bliſs and immortality. The penalty annexed to the breach of the law, with the ſentence pronounced by God upon it, ſhew this. The penalty ſtands thus, Gen. ii. 17. "In the day, that thou eateſt thereof, thou ſhalt ſurely die." How was this executed; He did eat: but, in the day he did eat, he did not actually die; but was turned out of paradiſe from the tree of life, and ſhut out for ever from it, leſt he ſhould take thereof, and live for ever. This ſhews, that the ſtate of paradiſe was a ſtate of immortality, of life without end, which he loſt that very day that he eat: his life began from thence to ſhorten, and waſte, and to have an end; and from thence, to his actual death, was but like the time of a priſoner, between the ſentence paſſed and the execution, which was in view, and certain. Death then entered, and ſhewed his face, which before was ſhut out, and not known, So St. Paul, Rom. v. 12. " By one man ſin entered into the world, and death by ſin ;" i. e. a ſtate of death and mortality : and, 1 Cor. xv, 22. " In Adam all die ;" i. e. by reaſon of his tranſgreſſion, all men are mortal, and come to die.

THIS is ſo clear in theſe cited places, and ſo much the current of the new teſtament, that no body can deny, but that the doctrine of the goſpel is, that death came on all men by Adam's ſin ; only they differ about the ſignification of the word death : for ſome will have it to be a ſtate of guilt, wherein not only he, but all his poſterity was ſo involved, that every one deſcended of him deſerved endleſs torment, in hell-fire. I ſhall ſay nothing more here, how far, in the apprehenſions of men, this conſiſts with the juſtice and goodneſs of God, having mentioned it above : but it ſeems a ſtrange way of underſtanding a law, which requires the plaineſt and directeſt words, that by death ſhould be meant eternal life in miſery. Could any one be ſuppoſed, by a law, that ſays, " For felony " thou ſhalt die," not that he ſhould loſe his life, but kept alive in perpetual, exquiſite torments ? And would any one think himſelf fairly dealt with, that was ſo uſed,

To this, they would have it be alſo a ſtate of neceſſary ſinning, and provoking God, in every action that men do : a yet harder ſenſe of the word death than the other. God ſays, that " in the day, thou eateſt of the forbidden fruit, " thou ſhalt die," i. e. thou and thy poſterity ſhall be, ever after, uncapable of doing any thing, but what ſhall be ſinful and provoking to me, and ſhall juſtly deſerve my wrath and indignation. Could a worthy man be ſuppoſed to put ſuch terms upon the obedience of his ſubjects ? Much leſs can the righteous God be ſuppoſed, as a puniſhment of one ſin, wherewith he is diſpleaſed, to put man under the neceſſity of ſinning continually, and ſo multiplying the provocation. The reaſon of this ſtrange interpretation, we ſhall perhaps find, in ſome miſtaken places of the new teſtament. I muſt confeſs, by death here, I underſtand nothing but a ceaſing to be, the loſing of all actions of life and ſenſe. Such a death came on Adam, and all his poſterity, by his firſt diſobedience in paradiſe ; under which death they ſhould have lain for ever, had it not been for the redemption by Jeſus Chriſt. If by death, threatened to Adam, were meant the corruption of human nature in his poſterity, 'tis ſtrange, that the new teſtament ſhould not any-where take notice of it, and tell us, that corruption ſeized on all, becauſe of Adam's tranſgreſſion, as well as it tells us ſo of death. But, as I remember, every one's ſin is charged upon himſelf only.

ANOTHER part of the ſentence was, " Curſed is the ground for thy ſake : " in ſorrow ſhalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life ; in the ſweat of thy " face ſhalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground : for out of it waſt " thou taken ; duſt thou art, and to duſt ſhalt thou return," Gen. iii. 17,--19. This ſhews, that paradiſe was a place of bliſs, as well as immortality, without drudgery, and without ſorrow. But, when man was turned out, he was expoſed to the toil, anxiety, and frailties of this mortal life, which ſhould end in the duſt, out of which he was made, and to which he ſhould return, and then have no more life or ſenſe, than the duſt had, out of which he was made.

As Adam was turned out of paradiſe, ſo all his poſterity were born out of it, out of the reach of the tree of life ; all, like their father Adam, in a ſtate of mortality, void of the tranquillity and bliſs of paradiſe. Rom. v. 12. " By " one man ſin entered into the world, and death by ſin." But here will occur the common objection, that ſo many ſtumble at ; " How doth it conſiſt " with the juſtneſs and goodneſs of God, that the poſterity of Adam ſhould ſuf" fer for his ſin ; the innocent be puniſhed for the guilty ?" Very well, if keeping one from what he has no right to be called a puniſhment ; the ſtate of immortality, in paradiſe, is not due to the poſterity of Adam, more than to any other creature. Nay, if God afford them a temporary, mortal life, 'tis his gift they owe it to his bounty, they could not claim it as their right, nor does he injure them when he takes it from them. Had he taken from mankind any thing that was their right, or did he put men in a ſtate of miſery, worſe than not being, without any fault, or demerit of their own; this, indeed, would be hard to reconcile with the notion we have of juſtice; and much more with the goodneſs, and other attributes of the ſupreme Being, which he has declared of himſelf, and reaſon, as well as revelation, muſt acknowledge to be in him; unleſs we will confound good and evil, God and Satan. That ſuch a ſtate of extreme, irremediable torment is worſe than no being at all; if every one's own ſenſe did not determine againſt the vain philoſophy, and fooliſh metaphyſicks of ſome men; yet our Saviour's peremptory deciſion, Matth. xxvi. 24. has put it paſt doubt, that one may be in ſuch an eſtate, that it may be better for him not to have been born. But that ſuch a temporary life, as we now have, with all its frailties and miſeries, is better than no being, is evident, by the high value we put upon it ourſelves. And therefore, though all die in Adam, yet none are truly puniſhed, but for their own deeds. Rom. ii. 6. "God will render to "every one; how? According to his deeds. To thoſe that obey unrighteouſ-"neſs, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguiſh, upon every ſoul of man "that doth evil." ver. 9. 2 Cor. v. 10. "We muſt appear before the judgment-"ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the things done in his body, ac-"cording to that he has done, whether it be good, or bad." And Chriſt himſelf, who knew for what he ſhould condemn men at the laſt day, aſſures us, in the two places, where he deſcribes his proceeding at the great judgment, that the ſentence of condemnation paſſes only upon the workers of iniquity, ſuch as neglected to fulfil the law in acts of charity, Matth. vii. 23. Luke viii. 27. Matth. xxv. 42. "And again, John v. 29. our Saviour tells the Jews, that "All ſhall come forth of their graves, they that have done good, to the reſur-"rection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the reſurrection of dam-"nation." But here is no condemnation of any one, for what his forefather Adam had done; which 'tis not likely, ſhould have been omitted, if that ſhould have been a cauſe, why any one was adjudged to the fire, with the devil and his angels. And he tells his diſciples, that when he comes again with his angels, in the glory of his Father, That then he will render to every one according to his works, Matth. xvi. 27.

ADAM being thus turned out of paradiſe, and all his poſterity born out of it, the conſequence of it was, that all men ſhould die, and remain under death for ever, and ſo be utterly loſt.

FROM this eſtate of death, Jeſus Chriſt reſtores all mankind to life; 1 Cor. xv. 22. "As in Adam all die, ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive." How this ſhall be, the ſame apoſtle tells us in the foregoing, ver. 21. "By man death "came, by man alſo came the reſurrection from the dead." Whereby it appears, that the life, which Jeſus Chriſt reſtores to all men, is that life, which they receive again at the reſurrection. Then they recovered from death, which otherwiſe all mankind ſhould have continued under, loſt for ever, as appears by St. Paul's arguing, 1 Cor. xv. concerning the reſurrection.

AND thus men are, by the ſecond Adam, reſtored to life again; that ſo by Adam's ſin, they may none of them loſe any thing, which, by their own righteouſneſs, they might have a title to: for righteouſneſs, or an exact obedience to the law, ſeems, by the ſcripture, to have a claim of right to eternal life, Rom. iv. 4. "To him that worketh, i. e. does the works of the law, is the re-"ward not reckoned, of grace, but OF DEBT." And Rev. xxii. 14. "Bleſſed "are they who do his commandments, that they may HAVE RIGHT to the "tree of life, which is in the paradiſe of God. If any of the poſterity of Adam were juſt, they ſhall not loſe the reward of it, eternal life and bliſs, by being his mortal iſſue: Chriſt will bring them all to life again; and then they ſhall be put every one upon his own trial, and receive judgment, as he is found to be righteous, or not. And the righteous, as our Saviour ſays, Matth. xxv. 46. ſhall go into eternal life. Nor ſhall any one miſs it, who has done what our Saviour directed the lawyer, who aſked, Luke x. 35. What he ſhould do to inherit eternal life? Do this, i. e. what is required by the law, and thou ſhalt live.

On the other ſide, it ſeems the unalterable purpoſe of the divine juſtice, that no unrighteous perſon, no one that is guilty of any breach of the law, ſhould be in paradiſe: but that the wages of ſin ſhould be to every man, as it was to Adam, an excluſion of him out of that happy ſtate of immortality, and bring death upon him. And this is ſo conformable to the eternal and eſtabliſhed law of right and wrong, that it is ſpoke of too, as if it could not be otherwiſe. St. James ſays, chap. i. 15. "Sin, when it is finiſhed, bringeth forth death," as it were, by a natural and neceſſary production. "Sin entered into the world, and "death by ſin," ſays St. Paul, Rom. v. 12. and vi. 23. "The wages of ſin is death." Death is the purchaſe of any, of every ſin. Gal. iii. 10. "Curſed is "every one, who continueth not in all things, which are written in the book "of the law to do them." And of this St. James gives a reaſon, chap. ii. 10, 11. "Whoſoever ſhall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is "guilty of all: for he that ſaid, Do not commit adultery, ſaid alſo, Do not "kill: i. e. he that offends in any one point, ſins againſt the authority which "eſtabliſhed the law.

Here then we have the ſtanding and fixed meaſures of life and death; immortality and bliſs belong to the righteous; thoſe who have lived in an exact conformity to the law of God, are out of the reach of death: but an excluſion from paradiſe, and loſs of immortality, is the portion of ſinners, of all thoſe, who have any way broke that law, and failed of a complete obedience to it, by the guilt of any one tranſgreſſion. And thus mankind, by the law, are put upon the iſſues of life or death, as they are righteous or unrighteous, juſt or unjuſt; i. e. exact performers or tranſgreſſors of the law.

But yet, "all having ſinned, Rom. iii. 23. and come ſhort of the glory of "God," i. e. the kingdom of God in heaven, which is often called his glory, both Jews and Gentiles, ver. 22. ſo that, by the deeds of the law, no one could be juſtified, ver. 20. it follows, that no one could then have eternal life and bliſs.

Perhaps, it will be demanded, "Why did God give ſo hard a law to man-"kind, that to the apoſtle's time, no one of Adam's iſſue had kept it? As appears "by Rom. iii. and Gal. iii. 21, 22."

Anſw. It was ſuch a law, as the purity of God's nature required, and muſt be the law of ſuch a creature as man, unleſs God would have made him a rational creature, and not have required him to have lived by the law of reaſon; but would have countenanced in him, irregularity and diſobedience to that light which he had, and that rule which was ſuitable to his nature; which would have been, to have authorized diſorder, confuſion and wickedneſs in his creatures: for, that this law was the law of reaſon, or, as it is called, of nature, we ſhall ſee by and by: and if rational creatures will not live up to the rule of their reaſon, who ſhall excuſe them? If you will admit them to forſake reaſon in one point, why not in another? Where will you ſtop? To diſobey God in any part of his commands, (and 'tis he that commands what reaſon does) is direct rebellion; which, if diſpenſed with in any point, government and order are at an end; and there can be no bounds ſet to the lawleſs exorbitancy of unconfined man. The law therefore was, as St. Paul tells us, Rom. vii. 12. Holy, juſt, and good, and ſuch as it ought, and could not otherwiſe be.

This then being the caſe, that whoever is guilty of any ſin, ſhould certainly die, and ceaſe to be, the benefit of life, reſtored by Chriſt at the reſurrection, would have been no great advantage, (for as much as, here again, death muſt have ſeized upon all mankind, becauſe all had ſinned; for the wages of ſin is every-where death, as well after, as before the reſurrection) if God had not found out a way to juſtify ſome, i. e. ſo many as obeyed another law, which God gave, which in the new teſtament is called the law of faith, Rom. iii. 27. and is oppoſed to the law of works. And therefore, the puniſhment of thoſe, who would not follow him, was to loſe their ſouls, i. e. their lives, Mark viii. 35,——38. as is plain, conſidering the occaſion it was ſpoke on.

The better to underſtand the law of faith, it will be convenient, in the firſt place, to conſider the law of works. The law of works then, in ſhort, is that law, which requires perfect obedience, without any remiſſion or abatement; ſo that, by that law, a man cannot be juſt, or juſtified, without an exact performance of every tittle. Such a perfect obedience, in the new teſtament, is termed δικαιοσύνη, which we tranſlate righteouſneſs.

THE language of this law is, "Do this and live, tranſgreſs and die." Lev. xviii. 5. "Ye ſhall keep my ſtatutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he "ſhall live in them. Ezek. xx. 11. I gave them my ſtatutes, and ſhewed them "my judgments, which if a man do, he ſhall even live in them. Moſes, ſays "St. Paul, Rom. x. 5. deſcribeth the righteouſneſs, which is of the law, that "the man, which doth thoſe things, ſhall live in them. Gal. iii. 12. The law "is not of faith, but that man, that doth them, ſhall live in them." On the other ſide, tranſgreſs and die; no diſpenſation, no atonement. Ver. 10. "Curſed "is every one, that continueth not in all things, which are written in the book "of the law, to do them."

WHERE this law of works was to be found, the new teſtament tells us, viz. in the law delivered by Moſes. John i. 17. "The law was given by Moſes, "but grace and truth came by Jeſus Chriſt. Chap. vii. 19. "Did not Moſes "give you the law? ſays our Saviour, and yet none of you keep the law." And this is the law, which he ſpeaks of, where he aſks the lawyer, Luke x. 26. "What is written in the law? How readeſt thou? Ver. 28. This do, and thou "ſhalt live." This is that which St. Paul ſo often ſtyles the law, without any other diſtinction, Rom. ii. 13. "Not the hearers of the law are juſt before "God, but the doers of the law are juſtified." 'Tis needleſs to quote any more places; his epiſtles are all full of it, eſpecially this to the Romans.

"BUT the law, given by Moſes, being not given to all mankind, how are "all men ſinners, ſince, without a law, there is no tranſgreſſion?" To this the apoſtle, ver. 14. anſwers, "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, "do, (i. e. find it reaſonable to do) by nature the things contained in the law, "theſe, having not the law, are a law unto themſelves: which ſhew the work "of the law written in their hearts, their conſciences alſo bearing witneſs, and "among one another their thoughts accuſing, or excuſing," By which, and other places in the following chapter, 'tis plain, that, under the law of works, is comprehended alſo, "the law of nature, knowable by reaſon," as well as the law given by Moſes. For, ſays St. Paul, Rom. iii. 9, 23. "We have proved "both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under ſin: For all have ſinned, "and come ſhort of the glory of God:" which they could not do, without a law.

NAY, whatever God requires any where to be done, without making any allowance for faith, that is a part of the law of works: ſo that forbidding Adam to eat of the tree of knowledge, was part of the law of works. Only we muſt take notice here, that ſome of God's poſitive commands, being for peculiar ends, and ſuited to particular circumſtances of times, places and perſons, have a limited, and only temporary obligation, by virtue of God's poſitive injunction; ſuch as was that part of Moſes's law, which concerned the outward worſhip, or political conſtitution of the Jews, and is called the ceremonial and judicial law, in contradiſtinction to the moral part of it; which, being conformable to the eternal law of right, is of eternal obligation; and therefore remains in force ſtill, under the goſpel; nor is abrogated by the law of faith, as St. Paul found ſome ready to infer, Rom. iii. 31. "Do we then make void the law, "through faith? God forbid; yea, we eſtabliſh the law."

NOR can it be otherwiſe: for, were there no law of works, there could be no law of faith. For there could be no need of faith, which ſhould be counted to men for righteouſneſs, if there were no law, to be the rule and meaſure of righteouſneſs, which men failed in their obedience to. Where there is no law, there is no ſin; all are righteous equally, with or without faith.

THE rule, therefore, of right is the ſame, that ever it was; the obligation to obſerve it is, alſo, the ſame: the difference between the law of works, and the law of faith, is only this; that the law of works makes no allowance for failing on any occaſion. Thoſe that obey are righteous; thoſe that in any part diſobey, are unrighteous, and muſt not expect life, the reward of righteouſneſs.

But, by the law of faith, faith is allowed to ſupply the defect of full obedience; and ſo the believers are admitted to life and immortality, as if they were righteous. Only here we muſt take notice, that when St. Paul ſays, that the goſpel eſtabliſhes the law, he means the moral part of the law of Moſes; for that he could not mean the ceremonial, or political part of it, is evident, by what I quoted out of him juſt now, where he ſays, That the Gentiles do, by nature, the things contained in the law, their conſciences bearing witneſs. For the Gentiles neither did, nor thought of, the judicial and ceremonial inſtitutions of Moſes; 'twas only the moral part, their conſciences were concerned in. As for the reſt, St. Paul tells the Galatians, chap. iv. they are not under that part of the law, which, ver. 3. he calls elements of the world; and ver. 9. weak and beggarly elements. And our Saviour himſelf, in his goſpel-ſermon on the mount, tells them, Matth. v. 17. That, whatever they might think, he was not come to diſſolve the law, but to make it more full and ſtrict: for, that that is meant by πληρῶσαι, is evident from the following part of that chapter, where he gives the precepts in a ſtricter ſenſe, than they were received in before. But they are all precepts of the moral law, which he reinforces. What ſhould become of the ritual law, he tells the woman of Samaria, in theſe words, John iv. 21, 23. "The hour cometh, when you ſhall, neither in this mountain, nor yet "at Jeruſalem, worſhip the Father. But the true worſhippers ſhall worſhip "the Father in ſpirit and in truth; for the Father ſeeketh ſuch to worſhip "him."

THUS then, as to the law, in ſhort: the civil and ritual part of the law, delivered by Moſes, obliges not chriſtians, though, to the Jews, it were a part of the law of works; it being a part of the law of nature, that man ought to obey every poſitive law of God, whenever he ſhall pleaſe to make any ſuch addition to the law of his nature. But the moral part of Moſes's law, or the moral law, (which is every where the ſame, the eternal rule of right) obliges chriſtians, and all men, every where, and is to all men the ſtanding law of works. But chriſtian believers have the privilege to be under the law of faith too; which is that law, whereby God juſtifies a man for believing, though by his works he be not juſt or righteous, i. e. though he come ſhort of perfect obedience to the law of works. God alone does, or can juſtify, or make juſt, thoſe who by their works are not ſo: which he doth, by counting their faith for righteouſneſs, i. e. for a complete performance of the law. Rom. iv. 3. Abraham be-"lieved God, and it was counted to him for righteouſneſs," Ver 5. "To him "that believeth on him that juſtifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righ-"teouſneſs. Ver. 6. "Even as David alſo deſcribeth the bleſſedneſs of the man "unto whom God imputeth righteouſneſs without works;" i. e. without a full meaſure of works, which is exact obedience. Ver. 7. "Saying, Bleſſed are they, "whoſe iniquities are forgiven, and whoſe ſins are covered." Ver. 8. "Bleſſed "is the man, to whom the Lord will not impute ſin."

THIS faith, for which God juſtified Abraham, what was it? It was the believing God, when he engaged his promiſe in the covenant he made with him. This will be plain to any one, who conſiders theſe places together, Gen. xv. 6. He believed in the Lord, or believed the Lord. For that the Hebrew phraſe, "believing in," ſignifies no more but believing, is plain from St, Paul's citation of this place, Rom. iv. 3. where he repeats it thus: "Abraham believed God," which he thus explains, ver. 18,--22, "Who againſt hope believed in hope, that "he might become the father of many nations: according to that which was "ſpoken, So ſhall thy ſeed be. And, being not weak in faith, he conſidered "not his own body now dead, when he was about an hundred years old, nor "yet the deadneſs of Sarah's womb. He ſtaggered not at the promiſe of God, "though unbelief; but was ſtrong in faith, giving glory to God, And being "fully perſuaded, that what he had promiſed, he was alſo able to perform. "And therefore it was imputed to him for righteouſneſs." By which it is clear, that the faith which God counted to Abraham for righteouſneſs, was nothing but a firm belief of what God declared to him, and a ſtedfaſt relying on him, for the accompliſhment of what he had promiſed.

" Now this, ſays St. Paul, ver. 23, 24. was not writ for his [Abraham's] " ſake alone, but for us alſo;" teaching us, that as Abraham was juſtified for his faith, ſo alſo ours ſhall be accounted to us for righteouſneſs; if we believe God, as Abraham believed him. Whereby, 'tis plain, is meant the firmneſs of our faith, without ſtaggering, and not the believing the ſame propoſitions that Abraham believed, viz. that though he and Sarah were old, and paſt the time and hopes of children, yet he ſhould have a ſon by her, and by him become the father of a great people, which ſhould poſſeſs the land of Canaan. This was what Abraham believed, and was counted to him for righteouſneſs. But no body, I think, will ſay, that any one's believing this now, ſhall be imputed to him for righteouſneſs. The law of faith then, in ſhort, is for every one to believe what God requires him to believe, as a condition of the covenant he makes with him; and not to doubt of the performance of his promiſes. This the apoſtle intimates in the cloſe here, ver. 24. " But for us alſo, to whom it ſhall " be imputed, if we believe on him that raiſed up Jeſus our Lord from the " dead." We muſt, therefore, examine and ſee what God requires us to believe now, under the revelation of the goſpel; for the belief of one inviſible, eternal, omnipotent God, maker of heaven and earth, &c. was required before, as well as now.

WHAT we are now required to believe to obtain eternal life, is plainly ſet down in the goſpel. St. John tells us, John iii. 36. " He that believeth on the " Son, hath eternal life; and he that believeth not the Son, ſhall not ſee life." What this believing on him is, we are alſo told in the next chapter. " The wo- " man ſaith unto him, I know that the Meſſiah cometh: when he is come, he " will tell us all things. Jeſus ſaid unto her, I that ſpeak unto thee, am he. " The woman then went into the city, and ſaith to the men, come ſee a man " that hath told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Meſſiah? And " many of the Samaritans believed on him for the ſaying of the woman, who " teſtified, He told me all that ever I did. So when the Samaritans were come " unto him, many more believed becauſe of his words, and ſaid to the woman, " We believe not any longer, becauſe of thy ſaying; for we have heard our- " ſelves, and we know, that this man is truly the Saviour of the world, the " Meſſiah," John iv. 25, 26, 29, 39, 40, 41, 42.

BY which place it is plain, that believing on the Son, is the believing that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; giving credit to the miracles he did, and the profeſſion he made of himſelf. For thoſe who were ſaid to BELIEVE ON HIM, for the ſaying of the woman, ver. 39. tell the woman, that they now believed not any longer, becauſe of her ſaying; but that having heard him themſelves, they knew, i. e. BELIEVED, paſt doubt, THAT HE WAS THE MESSIAH.

THIS was the great propoſition that was then controverted, concerning Jeſus of Nazareth, " Whether he was the Meſſiah or no?" And the aſſent to that, was that which diſtinguiſhed believers from unbelievers. When many of his diſciples had forſaken him, upon his declaring that he was the bread of life, which came down from heaven, " He ſaid to the apoſtles, Will ye alſo go " away? Then Simon Peter anſwer'd him; Lord, to whom ſhall we go? Thou " haſt the words of eternal life. And we believe, and are ſure, that thou art " the Meſſiah, the Son of the living God," John vi. 69. This was the faith which diſtinguiſhed them from apoſtates and unbelievers, and was ſufficient to continue them in the rank of apoſtles: and it was upon the ſame propoſition, " That Jeſus was the Meſſiah, the Son of the living God," owned by St. Peter, that our Saviour ſaid, he would build his church, Matt. xvi. 16—18.

To convince men of this, he did his miracles: and their aſſent to, or not aſſenting to this, made them to be, or not to be of his church; believers, or not believers. " The Jews came round about him, and ſaid unto him, How long " doſt thou make us doubt? If thou be the Meſſiah, tell us plainly. Jeſus an- " ſwered them; I told you, and ye believed not: the work, that I do in my " Father's name, they bare witneſs of me. But ye believe not, becauſe ye are " not of my ſheep," John x. 24,--26. Conformable hereunto, St. John tells us, " That many deceivers are enter'd into the world, who confeſs not that Jeſus, "the Meſſiah, is come in the fleſh. This is a deceiver, and an antichriſt; who-"ſoever abideth not in the doctrine of the Meſſiah, has not God. He that "abideth in the doctrine of the Meſſiah, i. e. that Jeſus is he, hath both the "Father and the Son," 2 John 7, 9, 10. That this is the meaning of the place, is plain from what he ſays in the foregoing epiſtle, "Whoſoever believeth that "Jeſus is the Meſſiah, is born of God," 1 John v. 1. And therefore, drawing to a cloſe of his goſpel, and ſhewing the end for which he writ it, he has theſe Words: "Many other ſigns truly did Jeſus in the preſence of his diſciples, "which are not written in this book; but theſe are written, that ye may be-"lieve that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, the Son of God; and that, believing, ye might "have life through his name," John xx. 30, 31. Whereby it is plain, that the goſpel was writ to induce men into a belief of this propoſition, "That Jeſus of "Nazareth was the Meſſiah;" which if they believed, they ſhould have life.

ACCORDINGLY the great queſtion among the Jews was, Whether he were the Meſſiah, or no? And the great point inſiſted on and promulgated in the goſpel, was, that he was the Meſſiah. The firſt glad tidings of his birth, brought to the ſhepherds by an angel, was in theſe words: "Fear not; for, behold, I "bring you good tidings of great joy, which ſhall be to all people: for to you is "born this day, in the city of David, a Saviour, who is the Meſſiah, the Lord," Luke ii. 11. Our Saviour diſcourſing with Martha about the means of attaining eternal life, ſaith to her, John xi. 27. "Whoſoever believeth in me, ſhall never "die. Believeſt thou this? She ſaith unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that thou "art the Meſſiah, the Son of God, which ſhould come into the world." This anſwer of hers ſheweth, what it is to believe in Jeſus Chriſt, ſo as to have eternal life, viz. to believe that he is the Meſſiah, the Son of God, whoſe coming was foretold by the prophets. And thus Andrew and Philip expreſs it: "Andrew ſays to his brother Simon, we have found the Meſſiah, which is, being "interpreted, the Chriſt. Philip ſaith to Nathanael, we have found him, of "whom Moſes in the law, and the prophets did write, Jeſus of Nazareth, the "Son of Joſeph," John i. 41, 45. According to what the evangeliſt ſays in this place, I have, for the clear underſtanding of the ſcripture, all along, put Meſſiah for Chriſt: Chriſt being but the Greek name for the Hebrew Meſſiah, and both ſignifying, the anointed.

AND that he was the Meſſiah, was the great truth he took pains to convince his diciples and apoſtles of; appearing to them after his reſurrection: as may be ſeen, Luke xxiv, which we ſhall more particularly conſider in another place. There we read what goſpel our Saviour preach'd to his diſciples and apoſtles; and that, as ſoon as he was riſen from the dead, twice, the very day of his reſurrection.

AND, if we may gather what was to be believed by all nations, from what was preached unto them; we may certainly know what they were commanded, Matt. ult. to teach all nations, by what they actually did teach all nations. We may obſerve, that the preaching of the apoſtles, every-where in the Acts, tended to this one point, to prove that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. Indeed, now after his death, his reſurrection was alſo commonly required to be believed, as a neceſſary article, and ſometimes ſolely inſiſted on: it being a mark and undoubted evidence of his being the Meſſiah, and neceſſary now to be believed by thoſe who would receive him as the Meſſiah. For, ſince the Meſſiah was to be a Saviour and a king, and to give life and a kingdom to thoſe who received him, as we ſhall ſee by and by; there could have been no pretence, to have given him out for the Meſſiah, and to require men to believe him to be ſo, who thought him under the power of death, and corruption of the grave. And therefore, thoſe who believed him to be the Meſſiah, muſt believe that he was riſen from the dead: and thoſe who believed him to be riſen from the dead, could not doubt of his being the Meſſiah. But of this more in another place.

LET us ſee therefore, how the apoſtles preached Chriſt, and what they propoſed to their hearers to believe. St. Peter at Jeruſalem, Acts ii. by his firſt ſermon, converted three thouſand ſouls. What was his word, which, as we are told, ver. 41. "they gladly received, and thereupon were baptized?" That may be ſeen from ver. 22, to 36. In ſhort, this; which is the concluſion, drawn from all that he had ſaid, and which he preſſes on them, as the thing they were to believe, viz. "Therefore let all the houſe of Iſrael know aſſuredly, that God "hath made that ſame Jeſus, whom ye have crucified, Lord and Meſſiah," ver. 36.

To the ſame purpoſe was his diſcourſe to the Jews, in the temple, Acts iii. the deſign whereof you have, ver. 18. "But thoſe things that God before had "ſhewed, by the mouth of all his prophets, that the Meſſiah ſhould ſuffer, he hath ſo fulfilled."

In the next chapter, Acts iv. Peter and John being examined, about the miracle on the lame man, profeſs it to have been done in the name of Jeſus of Nazareth, who was the Meſſiah, in whom alone there was ſalvation, ver. 10,--12. The ſame thing they confirm to them again, Acts v. 29,--32. "And daily in "the temple, and in every houſe, they ceaſed not to teach and preach Jeſus "the Meſſiah," ver. 42.

WHAT was Stephen's ſpeech to the council, Acts vii. but a reprehenſion to them, that they were the betrayers and murderers of the Juſt One? Which is the title, by which he plainly deſigns the Meſſiah, whoſe coming was foreſhewn by the prophets, ver. 51, 52. And that the Meſſiah was to be without ſin, (which is the import of the word Juſt) was the opinion of the Jews, appears from John ix. ver. 22. compared with 24.

ACTS viii. Philip carries the goſpel to Samaria. "Then Philip went down to "Samaria, and preached to them." What was it he preached? You have an account of it in this one word, "The Meſſiah," ver. 5. This being that alone which was required of them, to believe that Jeſus was the Meſſiah: which when they believed, they were baptized. "And when they believed Philip's "preaching the goſpel of the kingdom of God, and the name of Jeſus the "Meſſiah, they were baptized, both men and women," ver. 12.

PHILIP being ſent from thence, by a ſpecial call of the Spirit, to make an eminent convert, out of Iſaiah preaches to him Jeſus, ver. 35. And what it was he preached concerning Jeſus, we may know, by the profeſſion of faith the eunuch made, upon which he was admitted to baptiſm, ver. 37. "I believe "that Jeſus Chriſt is the Son of God:" which is as much as to ſay, I believe that he, whom you call Jeſus Chriſt, is really and truly the Meſſiah, that was promiſed. For, that believing him to be the Son of God, and to be the Meſſiah, was the ſame thing, may appear, by comparing John i. 45. with ver. 49. where Nathanael owns Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, in theſe terms: "Thou art the "Son of God; thou art the king of Iſrael." So the Jews, Luke xxii. 70. aſking Chriſt, whether he were the Son of God, plainly demand of him, whether he were the Meſſiah? Which is evident, by comparing that with the three preceding verſes, They aſk him, ver. 67. Whether he were the Meſſiah? He anſwers, "If I tell you, you will not believe;" But withal, tells them, that from thenceforth he ſhould be in poſſeſſion of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, expreſſed in theſe words, ver. 69. "Hereafter ſhall the Son of man ſit on the right hand "of the power of God:" which made them all cry out, "Art thou then the Son "of God?" i. e. Doſt thou then own thyſelf to be the Meſſiah? To which he replies, "Ye ſay that I am." That the Son of God was the known title of the Meſſiah at that time, amongſt the Jews, we may ſee alſo, from what the Jews ſay to Pilate, John xix. 7. "We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, "becauſe he made himſelf THE SON OF GOD;" i. e. by making himſelf the Meſſiah, the prophet which was to come, but falſly; and therefore he deſerves to die by the law, Deut. xviii. 20. That this was the common ſignification of the Son of God, is farther evident, from what the chief prieſts, mocking him, ſaid, when he was on the croſs, Matt. xxvii. 42. "He ſaved others, himſelf he "cannot ſave: if he be the king of Iſrael, let him now come down from the "croſs, and we will believe him. He truſted in God, let him deliver him now, "if he will have him; for he ſaid, I am the SON OF GOD;" i. e. He ſaid, he was the Meſſiah: but 'tis plainly falſe; for if he were, God would deliver him: for the Meſſiah is to be king of Iſrael, the Saviour of others; but this man cannot ſave himſelf. The chief prieſts mention here the two titles, then in uſe, whereby the Jews commonly deſigned the Meſſiah, viz. "Son of God, and "king of Iſrael." That of Son of God, was ſo familiar a compellation of the Meſſiah, who was then ſo much expected and talked of, that the Romans, it ſeems, who lived amongſt them, had learned it, as appears from ver. 54. "Now "when the centurion, and they that were with him, watching Jeſus, ſaw the "earthquake, and thoſe things that were done, they feared greatly, ſaying, "Truly this was the SON OF GOD;" this was that extraordinary perſon that was looked for.

ACTS ix. St. Paul exerciſing the commiſſion to preach the goſpel, which he had received in a miraculous way, ver. 20. "Straitway preached Chriſt in the "ſynagogues, that he is the Son of God;" i. e. that Jeſus was the Meſſiah: for Chriſt, in this place, is evidently a proper name. And that this was it, which Paul preached, appears from ver. 22. "Saul increaſed the more in "ſtrength, and confounded the Jews, who dwelt in Damaſcus, proving that "this is the very Chriſt," i. e. the Meſſiah.

PETER, when he came to Cornelius at Ceſarea, who, by a viſion, was ordered to ſend for him, as St. Peter on the other ſide, was by a viſion commanded to go to him; what does he teach him? His whole diſcourſe, Acts x. tends to ſhew what, he ſays, God commanded the apoſtles, "To preach unto the people, and to teſtify, that it is he [Jeſus,] which was ordained of God to be "the Judge of the quick and the dead. And that it was to him, that all the "prophets give witneſs, that, through his name, whoſoever believeth in him "ſhall have remiſſion of ſins," ver. 42, 43. "This is the Word, which God "ſent to the children of Iſrael; that WORD, which was publiſhed throughout "all Judea, and began from Galilee, after the baptiſm which John preached," ver. 36, 37. And theſe are the words, which had been promiſed to Cornelius, Acts xi. 14. "Whereby he and all his houſe ſhould be ſaved:" which words amount only to thus much, That Jeſus was the Meſſiah, the Saviour that was promiſed. Upon their receiving of this, (for this was all was taught them) the Holy Ghoſt fell on them, and they were baptized. 'Tis obſervable here, that the Holy Ghoſt fell on them, before they were baptized, which, in other places, converts received not 'till after baptiſm. The reaſon whereof ſeems to be this; that God, by beſtowing on them the Holy Ghoſt, did thus declare from heaven, that the Gentiles, upon believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, ought to be admitted into the church by baptiſm, as well as the Jews. Whoever reads St. Peter's defence, Acts xi. when he was accuſed by thoſe of the circumciſion, that he had not kept that diſtance, which he ought, with the uncircumciſed, will be of this opinion, and ſee by what he ſays, ver. 15, 16, 17. that this was the ground, and an irreſiſtible authority to him for doing ſo ſtrange a thing, as it appeared to the Jews, (who alone yet were members of the chriſtian church) to admit Gentiles into their communion, upon their believing. And therefore, St. Peter, in the foregoing chapter, Acts x. before he would baptize them, propoſes this queſtion "to thoſe of the circumciſion, which came with him, and were aſtoniſhed, becauſe that on the Gentiles alſo, was poured out the gift of the holy "Ghoſt: Can any one forbid water, that theſe ſhould not be baptized, who "have received the Holy Ghoſt as well as we?" ver. 47. And when ſome of the ſect of the Phariſees, who believed, thought "it needful that the converted "Gentiles ſhould be circumciſed, and keep the law of Moſes," Acts xv. "Peter roſe up and ſaid unto them, men and brethren, you know that a good "while ago God made choice amongſt us, that the Gentiles," viz. Cornelius, and thoſe here converted with him, "by my mouth ſhould hear the goſpel, and "believe. And God, who knoweth the hearts, bare them witneſs, giving them "the Holy Ghoſt, even as he did unto us, and put no difference between us "and them, purifying their hearts by faith," ver. 7,--9. So that both Jews and Gentiles, who believed Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, received thereupon the ſeal of baptiſm; whereby they were owned to be his, and diſtinguiſhed from unbelievers. From what is above ſaid, we may obſerve, that this preaching Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, is called the word, and the word of God; and believing it, "receiving the word of God." Vid. Acts x. 36, 37. and xi. 1, 19, 20. and "the word of the goſpel, Acts xv. 7. And ſo, likewiſe, in the hiſtory of the goſpel, what St. Mark, chap. iv. 14, 15. calls ſimply "the word," St. Luke calls, "the word of God," Luke viii. 11. And St. Matt. chap. xiii. 19. "the word of the kingdom;" which were, it ſeems, in the goſpel-writers, ſynonymous terms, and are ſo to be underſtood by us.

BUT, to go on: Acts xiii. Paul preaches in the ſynagogue at Antioch, where he makes it his buſineſs to convince the Jews, that "God, according to his promiſe, had, of the ſeed of David, raiſed to Iſrael a Saviour, Jeſus," ver. 24. That he was He, of whom the prophets writ, ver. 25,--29. i. e. the Meſſiah: and that, as a demonſtration of his being ſo, God had raiſed him from the dead, ver. 30. From whence he argues thus, ver. 32, 33. "We evangelize to you," or bring you this goſpel, "how that the promiſe, which was made to our fathers, God hath fulfilled the ſame unto us, in that he hath raiſed up Jeſus again; as it is alſo written in the ſecond pſalm, Thou art my ſon, this day have I begotten thee." And having gone on to prove him to be the Meſſiah, by his reſurrection from the dead, he makes this concluſion, ver. 38, 39. "Be it known unto you, therefore men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you forgiveneſs of ſins; and by him, all who believe, are juſtified from all things, from which they could not be juſtified by the law of Moſes. This is in this chapter called "the word of God," over and over again; compare ver. 42, with 44, 46, 48, 49. And chap. xii. ver. 24.

ACTS xvii. 2,--4. "At Theſſalonica, Paul, as his manner was, went into the ſynagogue, and three ſabbath-days reaſoned with the Jews out of the ſcriptures; opening and alledging, that the Meſſiah muſt needs have ſuffered, and riſen again from the dead; and that this Jeſus, whom I preach unto you, is the Meſſiah. And ſome of them believed, and conſorted with Paul and Silas: but the Jews which believed not, ſet the city in an uproar." Can there be any thing plainer, than that the aſſenting to this propoſition, that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah," was that which diſtinguiſhed the believers from the unbelievers? For this is that alone, which three ſabbaths, Paul endeavoured to convince them of, as the text tells in direct words.

FROM thence he went to Berœa, and preached the ſame thing: and the Berœans are commended, ver. 11. for ſearching the ſcriptures, whether thoſe things, i. e. which he had ſaid, ver. 2, 3. concerning Jeſus his being the Meſſiah, were true or no.

THE ſame doctrine we find him preaching at Corinth, Acts xviii. 4--6. "And he reaſoned in the ſynagogue every ſabbath, and perſuaded the Jews and the Greek. And when Silas and Timotheus were come from Macedonia, Paul was preſſed in ſpirit, and teſtified to the Jews, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. And when they oppoſed themſelves, and blaſphemed, he ſhook his raiment, and ſaid unto them, Your blood be upon your own heads; I am clean: from henceforth I will go unto the Greeks."

UPON the like occaſion he tells the Jews at Antioch, Acts xiii. 46. "It was neceſſary, that the word of God ſhould firſt have been ſpoken to you; but ſeeing you put it off from you, we turn to the Gentiles." 'Tis plain here, St. Paul's charging their blood on their own heads, is for oppoſing the ſingle truth that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, that ſalvation, or perdition, depends upon believing or rejecting this one propoſition: I mean, this is all that is required to be believed, by thoſe who acknowledge but one eternal and inviſible God, the Maker of heaven and earth, as the Jews did. For that there is ſomething more required to ſalvation, beſides believing, we ſhall ſee hereafter. In the mean time, it is fit here, on this occaſion, to take notice, that though the apoſtles, in their preaching to the Jews, and the Devout, (as we tranſlate the word σεβόμενοι, who were proſelytes of the gate, and the worſhippers of one eternal and inviſible God) ſaid nothing of the believing in this one true God, the Maker of heaven and earth; becauſe it was needleſs to preſs this to thoſe, who believed and profeſſed it already (for to ſuch, 'tis plain, were moſt of their diſcourſes hitherto); yet when they had to do with idolatrous heathens, who were not yet come to the knowledge of the one, only, true God; they began with that, as neceſſary to be believed; it being the foundation on which the other was built, and without which it could ſignify nothing.

THUS Paul, ſpeaking to the idolatrous Lyſtrians, who would have ſacrificed to him and Barnabas, ſays, Acts xiv. 15. "We preach unto you, that you "ſhould turn from theſe vanities unto the living God, who made heaven and "earth, and the ſea, and all things that are therein. Who in times paſt ſuffer-"ed all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheleſs he left not himſelf "without a witneſs, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and "fruitful ſeaſons, filling our hearts with food and gladneſs."

THUS alſo he proceeded with the idolatrous Athenians, Acts xvii. telling them, upon occaſion of the altar dedicated to the unknown God, "Whom ye "ignorantly worſhip, him declare I unto you; God who made the world, and "all things therein, ſeeing that he is the Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not "in temples made with hands.——Foraſmuch then as we are the off-ſpring of "God, we ought not to think, that the Godhead is like unto gold, or ſilver, "or ſtone, graven by art, and man's device. And the times of this ignorance "God winked at; but now commandeth all men every-where to repent: be-"cauſe he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteouſ-"neſs, by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given aſſurance "unto all men, in that he hath raiſed him from the dead." So that we ſee, where any thing more was neceſſary to be propoſed to be believed, as there was to the heathen idolaters, there the apoſtles were careful not to omit it.

ACTS xviii. 4. "Paul at Corinth reaſoned in the ſynagogue every ſabbath-"day, and teſtified to the Jews, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah." Ver. 11. "And "he continued there a year and ſix months, teaching the word of God amongſt "them;" i. e. the good news, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; as we have already ſhewn, is meant by "the word of God."

APOLLOS, another preacher of the goſpel, when he was inſtructed in the way of God more perfectly, what did he teach but this ſame doctrine? As we may ſee in this account of him, Acts xviii. 27. "That when he was come into "Achaia, he helped the brethren much, who had believed through grace. For "he mightily convinced the Jews, and that publickly, ſhewing by the ſcrip-"tures, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah."

ST. PAUL, in the account he gives of himſelf before Feſtus and Agrippa, profeſſes this alone to be the doctrine he taught, after his converſion: for, ſays he, Acts xxvi. 22. "Having obtained help of God, I continue unto this day, "witneſſing both to ſmall and great, ſaying none other things than thoſe, which "the prophets and Moſes did ſay ſhould come: that the Meſſiah ſhould ſuffer, "and that he ſhould be the firſt, that ſhould ariſe from the dead, and ſhould "ſhew light unto the people, and to the Gentiles." Which was no more, than to prove that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. This is that, which, as we have obſerved, is called, "The word of God." Acts xi. 1. compared with the foregoing chapter, from ver. 34, to the end. And xiii. 42. compared with 44, 46, 48, 49. and xvii. 13. compared with ver. 11, 3. It is alſo called, "The word "of the goſpel," Acts xv. 7. And this is that word of God, and that goſpel, which, where-ever their diſcourſes are ſet down, we find the apoſtles preached; and was that faith, which made both Jews and Gentiles believers and members of the church of Chriſt; purifying their hearts, Acts xv. 9. and carrying with it remiſſion of ſins, Acts x. 43. So that all that was to be believed for juſtification, was no more but this ſingle propoſition; that "Jeſus of Nazareth "was the Chriſt, or the Meſſiah." All, I ſay, that was to be believed for juſtification: for that it was not all that was required to be done for juſtification, we ſhall ſee hereafter.

THOUGH we have ſeen above, from what our Saviour has pronounced himſelf, John iii. 36. "That he that believeth on the Son, hath everlaſting life; "and he that believeth not the Son, ſhall not ſee life, but the wrath of God "abideth on him;" and are taught from John iv. 39. compared with ver. 42. "That believing on him, is believing that he is the Meſſiah, the Saviour of the "world;"

"world;" and the confeſſion made by St. Peter, Matth. xvi. 16. That he is "The Meſſiah, the Son of the living God," being the rock, on which our Saviour has promiſed to build his church; though this, I ſay, and what elſe we have already taken notice of, be enough to convince us what it is we are in the goſpel required to believe to eternal life, without adding what we have obſerved from the preaching of the apoſtles; yet it may not be amiſs, for the farther clearing this matter, to obſerve what the evangeliſts deliver concerning the ſame thing, though in different words; which therefore, perhaps, are not ſo generally taken notice of to this purpoſe.

We have above obſerved, from the words of Andrew and Philip compared, "That the Meſſiah, and him, of whom Moſes in the law and the prophets did write," ſignify the ſame thing. We ſhall now conſider that place, John i. a little farther: Ver. 41. "Andrew ſays to Simon, We have found the Meſſiah." Philip, on the ſame occaſion, ver. 45. ſays to Nathanael, "We have found him, of whom Moſes in the law and the prophets did write, Jeſus of Nazareth, the ſon of Joſeph." Nathanael, who diſbelieved this, when, upon Chriſt's ſpeaking to him, he was convinced of it, declares his aſſent to it in theſe words; "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the king of Iſrael." From which it is evident, that to believe him to be "Him, of whom Moſes and the prophets did write," or to be the "Son of God, or to be "the king of Iſrael," was in effect the ſame as to believe him to be the Meſſiah: and an aſſent to that, was what our Saviour received for believing. For, upon Nathanael's making a confeſſion in theſe words, "Thou art the Son of God, thou art the king of Iſrael; Jeſus anſwered and ſaid to him, Becauſe I ſaid to thee, I ſaw thee under the fig-tree, doſt thou BELIEVE? Thou ſhalt ſee greater things than theſe," ver 51. I deſire any one to read the latter part of the firſt of John, from ver. 25. with attention, and tell me, whether it be not plain, that this phraſe, The Son of God, is an expreſſion uſed for the Meſſiah. To which let him add Martha's declaration of her faith, John xi. 27. in theſe words; "I believe that thou art the Meſſiah, THE SON OF GOD, who ſhould come into the world; and that paſſage of St. John xx. 31. "That ye might believe that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, THE SON OF GOD; and that, believing, ye might have life through his name:" and then tell me whether he can doubt that Meſſiah, and Son of God, were ſynonymous terms, at that time, amongſt the Jews.

The prophecy of Daniel, chap. ix. when he is called "Meſſiah the Prince;" and the mention of his government and kingdom, and the deliverance by him, in Iſaiah, Daniel, and other prophecies, underſtood of the Meſſiah, were ſo well known to the Jews, and had ſo raiſed their hopes of him about this time, which, by their account, was to be the time of his coming, to reſtore the kingdom to Iſrael; that Herod no ſooner heard of the magi's enquiry after "Him that was born king of the Jews," Matth. ii. but he forthwith "demanded of the chief prieſts and ſcribes, where the Meſſiah ſhould be born," ver. 4. Not doubting, but if there were any king born to the Jews, it was the Meſſiah: whoſe coming was now the general expectation, as appears, Luke iii. 15. "The people being in expectation, and all men muſing in their hearts, of John, whether he were the Meſſiah or not." And when the prieſts and levites ſent to aſk him, who he was; he, underſtanding their meaning, anſwers, John i. 20. "That he was not the Meſſiah; but he, bears witneſs, that Jeſus "is the Son of God," i. e. the Meſſiah, ver. 34.

This looking for the Meſſiah, at this time, we ſee alſo in Simeon; who is ſaid to be "waiting for the conſolation of Iſrael," Luke ii. 21. And having the child Jeſus in his arms, he ſays, he had "ſeen the ſalvation of the Lord," ver. 30. And, "Anna coming at the ſame inſtant into the temple, ſhe gave thanks alſo unto the Lord, and ſpake of him to all them that looked for redemption in Iſrael," ver. 38. And of Joſeph of Arimathea, it is ſaid, Mark xv. 43. "That he alſo expected the kingdom of God:" by all which was meant the coming of the Meſſiah; and Luke xix. 11. it is ſaid, "They thought the kingdom of God ſhould immediately appear."

THIS being premiſed, let us ſee what it was that John the Baptiſt preached, when he firſt entered upon his miniſtry. That St. Matthew tell us, chap. iii. 1, 2. "In thoſe days came John the Baptiſt preaching in the wilderneſs of Judea, ſaying, Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." This was a declaration of the coming of the Meſſiah: the kingdom of heaven, and the kingdom of God, being the ſame, as is clear out of ſeveral places of the evangeliſts; and both ſignifying the kingdom of the Meſſiah. The profeſſion, which John the Baptiſt made, when ſent to the Jews, John i. 19. was, That "he was not the Meſſiah;" but that Jeſus was. This will appear to any one, who will compare ver. 26,——34, with John iii. 27, 30. The Jews being very inquiſitive to know, whether John were the Meſſiah; he poſitively denies it; but tells them, he was only his fore-runner; and that there ſtood one amongſt them, who would follow him, whoſe ſhoe-latchet he was not worthy to untie. The next day, ſeeing Jeſus, he ſays, he was the man; and that his own baptizing in water, was only that Jeſus might be manifeſted to the world; and that he knew him not, till he ſaw the Holy Ghoſt deſcend upon him, he that ſent him to baptize, having told him, that he on whom he ſhould ſee the Spirit deſcend, and reſt upon, he it was that ſhould baptize with the Holy Ghoſt; and that therefore he witneſſed, That "this was the Son of God," ver. 34. i. e. the Meſſiah; and, chap. iii. 26, &c. they came to John the Baptiſt, and tell him, that Jeſus baptized, and that all men went to him. John anſwers, He has his authority from heaven; you know I never ſaid, I was the Meſſiah, but that I was ſent before him. He muſt increaſe, but I muſt decreaſe; for God hath ſent him, and he ſpeaks the words of God; and God hath given all things into the hands of his ſon, "And he that believes on the Son, hath eternal life;" the ſame doctrine, and nothing elſe, but what was preached by the apoſtles afterwards: as we have ſeen all through the Acts, v. g. that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. And thus it was, that John bears witneſs of our Saviour, as Jeſus himſelf ſays, John v. 33.

THIS alſo was the declaration was given of him at his baptiſm, by a voice from heaven; "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleaſed," Mat. iii. 17. Which was a declaration of him to be the Meſſiah, the Son of God being (as we have ſhewed) underſtood to ſignify the Meſſiah. To which we may add the firſt mention of him after his conception, in the words of the angel to Joſeph; Matth. i. 21. "Thou ſhalt call his name Jeſus," or Saviour; "for he ſhall ſave his people from their ſins." It was a received doctrine in the Jewiſh nation, that at the coming of the Meſſiah, all their ſins ſhould be forgiven them. Theſe words, therefore, of the angel, we may look upon as a declaration, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; whereof theſe words, "his people," are a farther mark; which ſuppoſe him to have a people, and conſequently to be a king.

AFTER his baptiſm, Jeſus himſelf enters upon his miniſtry. But, before we examine what it was he propoſed to be believed, we muſt obſerve, that there is a threefold declaration of the Meſſiah:

1. BY miracles. The ſpirit of prophecy had now for many ages forſaken the Jews: and, though their commonwealth were not quite diſſolved, but that they lived under their own laws, yet they were under a foreign dominion, ſubject to the Romans. In this ſtate, their account of the time being up, they were in expectation of the Meſſiah, and of deliverance by him in a kingdom he was to ſet up, according to their ancient prophecies of him: which gave them hopes of an extraordinary man yet to come from God, who, with an extraordinary and divine power, and miracles, ſhould evidence his miſſion, and work their deliverance. And, of any ſuch extraordinary perſon, who ſhould have the power of doing miracles, they had no other expectation, but only of their Meſſiah. One great prophet and worker of miracles, and only one more, they expected; who was to be the Meſſiah. And therefore we ſee the people juſtified their believing in him, i. e. their believing him to be the Meſſiah, becauſe of the miracles he did; John vii. 31. "And many of the people believed in him, and ſaid, When the Meſſiah cometh, will he do more miracles, than this

“ man hath done?” And when the Jews, at the feaſt of dedication, John. x. 24, 25. coming about him, ſaid unto him, “ How long doſt thou make us “ doubt? If thou be the Meſſiah, tell us plainly; Jeſus anſwered them, I told “ you, and ye believed not; the works that I do in my Father's name, bear “ witneſs of me.” And, John v. 36. he ſays, “ I have a greater witneſs than “ that of John; for the works, which the Father hath given me to do, the “ ſame works that I do, bear witneſs of me, that the Father hath ſent me.” Where, by the way, we may obſerve, that his being “ ſent by the Father,” is but another way of expreſſing the Meſſiah; which is evident from this place here, Jon v. compared with that of John x. laſt quoted. For there he ſays, that his works bear witneſs of him: And what was that witneſs? viz. “ That “ he was the Meſſiah.” Here again he ſays, that his works bear witneſs of “ him: And what is that witneſs? viz. “ That the Father ſent him.” By which we are taught, that to be ſent by the Father, and to be the Meſſiah, was the ſame thing, in his way of declaring himſelf. And accordingly we find, John iv. 53. and xi. 45. and elſewhere, many hearkened and aſſented to his teſtimony, and believed on him, ſeeing the things that he did.

2. ANOTHER way of declaring the coming of the Meſſiah, was by phraſes and circumlocutions, that did ſignify or intimate his coming; though not in direct words pointing out the perſon. The moſt uſual of theſe were, “ The “ kingdom of God, and of heaven;” becauſe it was that which was often ſpoken of the Meſſiah, in the old teſtament, in very plain words: and a kingdom was that, which the Jews moſt looked after, and wiſhed for. In that known place, Iſa. ix. “ The GOVERNMENT ſhall be upon his ſhoulders; he “ ſhall be called the PRINCE of peace: of the increaſe of his GOVERNMENT “ and peace there ſhall be no end; upon the THRONE of David, and upon his “ KINGDOM, to order it, and to eſtabliſh it with judgment, and with juſtice, “ from henceforth even for ever.” Micah v. 2. “ But thou, Bethlehem Ephra- “ tah, though thou be little among the thouſands of Judah, yet out of thee “ ſhall he come forth unto me, that is to be the RULER in Iſrael.” And Daniel, beſides that he calls him, “ Meſſiah the PRINCE,” chap. ix. 25. in the account of his viſion “ of the Son of man,” chap. vii. 13, 14. ſays, “ There “ was given him dominion, glory, and a KINGDOM, that all people, nations, “ and languages, ſhould ſerve him: his dominion is an everlaſting dominion, “ which ſhall not paſs away; and his KINGDOM that which ſhall not be de- “ ſtroyed.” So that the kingdom of God, and the kingdom of heaven, were common phraſes, amongſt the Jews, to ſignify the times of the Meſſiah. Luke xiv. 15. “ One of the Jews that ſat at meat with him, ſaid unto him, Bleſſed “ is he that ſhall eat bread in the kingdom of God.” chap. xvii. 20. The Phariſees demanded, “ when the kingdom of God ſhould come?” And St. John Baptiſt “ came, ſaying, Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand;” a phraſe he would not have uſed in preaching, had it not been underſtood.

THERE are other expreſſions that ſignified the Meſſiah, and his coming, which we ſhall take notice of, as they come in our way.

3. BY plain and direct words, declaring the doctrine of the Meſſiah, ſpeaking out that Jeſus was he; as we ſee the apoſtles did, when they went about preaching the goſpel, after our Saviour's reſurrection. This was the open clear way, and that which one would think the Meſſiah himſelf, when he came, ſhould have taken; eſpecially, if it were of that moment, that upon men's believing him to be the Meſſiah, depended the forgiveneſs of their ſins. And yet we ſee, that our Saviour did not: but on the contrary, for the moſt part, made no other diſcovery of himſelf, at leaſt in Judea, and at the beginning of his miniſtry, but in the two former ways, which were more obſcure; not declaring himſelf to be the Meſſiah, any otherwiſe than as it might be gathered from the miracles he did, and the conformity of his life and actions, with the prophecies of the old teſtament concerning him; and from ſome general diſcourſes of the kingdom of the Meſſiah being come, under the name of the “ kingdom of God, and of “ heaven.” Nay, ſo far was he from publickly owning himſelf to be the Meſſiah, that he forbid the doing of it: Mark viii. 27,—30. “ He aſked his diſ-

“ciples, Whom do men ſay that I am? And they anſwered, John the Baptiſt; but ſome ſay Elias; and others, one of the prophets.” (So that it is evident, that even thoſe, who believed him an extraordinary perſon, knew not yet who he was, or that he gave himſelf out for the Meſſiah; though this was in the third year of his miniſtry, and not a year before his death.) “And he ſaith unto them, But whom ſay ye that I am? And Peter anſwered, and ſaid unto him, Thou art the Meſſiah. And he charged them, that they ſhould tell no man of him,” Luke iv. 41. “And devils came out of many, crying, Thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of God: and he rebuking them, ſuffered them not to ſpeak, that they knew him to be the Meſſiah.” Mark iii. 11, 12. “Unclean ſpirits, when they ſaw him, fell down before him, and cried, ſaying, Thou art the Son of God: and he ſtraitly charged them, that they ſhould not make him known. Here again we may obſerve, from the comparing of the two texts, that, “Thou art the Son of God;” or, “Thou art the Meſſiah,” were indifferently uſed for the ſame thing. But to return to the matter in hand:

THIS concealment of himſelf will ſeem ſtrange, in one who was come to bring light into the world, and was to ſuffer death for the teſtimony of the truth. This reſervedneſs will be thought to look, as if he had a mind to conceal himſelf, and not to be known to the world for the Meſſiah, nor to be believed on as ſuch. But we ſhall be of another mind, and conclude this proceeding of his according to divine wiſdom, and ſuited to a fuller manifeſtation and evidence of his being the Meſſiah; when we conſider, that he was to fill out the time foretold of his miniſtry; and, after a life illuſtrious in miracles and good works, attended with humility, meekneſs, patience, and ſufferings, and every way conformable to the prophecies of him, ſhould be led as a ſheep to the ſlaughter, and with all quiet and ſubmiſſion be brought to the croſs, though there were no guilt, nor fault found in him. This could not have been, if, as ſoon as he appeared in publick, and began to preach, he had preſently profeſſed himſelf to have been the Meſſiah; the king that owned that kingdom, he publiſhed to be at hand. For the ſanhedrim would then have laid hold on it, to have got him into their power, and thereby have taken away his life; at leaſt, they would have diſturbed his miniſtry, and hindered the work he was about. That this made him cautious, and avoid, as much as he could, the occaſions of provoking them, and falling into their hands, is plain from John vii. 1. “After theſe things Jeſus walked in Galilee;” out of the way of the chief prieſts and rulers; “for he would not walk in Jewry, becauſe the Jews ſought to kill him.” Thus, making good what he foretold them at Jeruſalem, when, at the firſt paſſover after his beginning to preach the goſpel, upon his curing the man at the pool of Betheſda, they ſought to kill him, John v. 16. “Ye have not,” ſays he, ver. 38. “his word abiding amongſt you; for whom he hath ſent, him ye believe not.” This was ſpoken more particularly to the Jews of Jeruſalem, who were the forward men, zealous to take away his life: and it imports, that becauſe of their unbelief and oppoſition to him, the word of God, i. e. the preaching of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, which is often called, “the word of God,” did not ſtay amongſt them, he could not ſtay amongſt them, preach and explain to them the kingdom of the Meſſiah.

THAT the word of God, here, ſignifies “the word of God” that ſhould make Jeſus known to them to be the Meſſiah, is evident from the context: and this meaning of this place is made good by the event. For, after this, we hear no more of Jeſus at Jeruſalem, ’till the pentecoſt come twelve-month, tho’ ’tis not to be doubted, but that he was there the next paſſover, and other feaſts between, but privately. And now at Jeruſalem, at the feaſt of pentecoſt, near fifteen months after, he ſays little of any thing, and not a word of the kingdom of heaven being come, nor at hand; nor did he any miracle there. And returning to Jeruſalem at the feaſt of tabernacles, it is plain, that from this time ’till then, which was a year and a half, he had not taught them at Jeruſalem.

For, 1. It is ſaid, John vii. 2, 15. That, he teaching in the temple at the feaſt of tabernacles, "the Jews marvelled, ſaying, How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?" A ſign they had not been uſed to his preaching: for, if they had, they would not now have marvelled.

2. Ver. 19. He ſays thus to them: "Did not Moſes give you the law, and yet none of you keep the law? Why do you go about to kill me? One work, or miracle, I did here amongſt you, and ye all marvel. Moſes, therefore gave unto you circumciſion, and ye on the ſabbath-day circumciſe a man: If a man on the ſabbath-day receive circumciſion, that the law of Moſes ſhould not be broken, are ye angry with me, becauſe I have made a man every way whole on the ſabbath-day?" Which is a direct defence of what he did at Jeruſalem, a year and a half before the work he here ſpeaks of. We find he had not preached to them there, from that time to this; but had made good what he had told them, ver. 38. "Ye have not the word of God remaining among you, becauſe whom he hath ſent ye believe not." Whereby, I think, he ſignifies his not ſtaying, and being frequent amongſt them at Jeruſalem, preaching the goſpel of the kingdom; becauſe their great unbelief, oppoſition, and malice to him, would not permit it.

This was manifeſtly ſo in fact: for the firſt miracle he did at Jeruſalem, which was at the ſecond paſſover after his baptiſm, brought him in danger of his life. Hereupon we find he forbore preaching again, there, 'till the feaſt of tabernacles, immediately preceding his laſt paſſover: ſo that 'till half a year before his paſſion, he did but one miracle, and preached but once publickly at Jeruſalem. Theſe trials he made there; but found their unbelief ſuch, that if he had ſtaid and perſiſted to preach the good tidings of the kingdom, and to ſhew himſelf by miracles among them, he could not have had time and freedom to do thoſe works which his Father had given him to finiſh, as he ſays, ver. 36. of this fifth of St. John.

When, upon the curing of the withered hand on the ſabbath-day, "The Phariſees took counſel with the Herodians, how they might deſtroy him, Jeſus withdrew himſelf, with his diſciples, to the ſea: and a great multitude from Galilee followed him, and from Judea, and from Jeruſalem, and from Idumea, and from beyond Jordan, and they about Tyre and Sidon, a great multitude, when they had heard what great things he did, came unto him, and he healed them all, and CHARGED THEM, THAT THEY SHOULD NOT MAKE HIM KNOWN: that it might be fulfilled which was ſpoken by the prophet Iſaiah, ſaying, Behold, my ſervant, whom I have choſen; my beloved, in whom my ſoul is well pleaſed: I will put my ſpirit upon him, and he ſhall ſhew judgment to the Gentiles. He ſhall not ſtrive, nor cry, neither ſhall any man hear his voice in the ſtreets," Matt. xii. Mark iii.

And John xi. 47. upon the news of our Saviour's raiſing Lazarus from the dead, "The chief prieſts and Phariſees convened the ſanhedrim, and ſaid, What do we? For this man does many miracles." Ver. 53. "Then from that day forth, they took counſel together for to put him to death." Ver. 54. "Jeſus therefore walked no more openly amongſt the Jews." His miracles had now ſo much declared him to be the Meſſiah, that the Jews could no longer bear him, nor he truſt himſelf amongſt them; "But went thence unto a country near to the wilderneſs, into a city called Ephraim, and there continued with his diſciples." This was but a little before his laſt paſſover, as appears by the following words, ver. 55. "And the Jews paſſover was nigh at hand:" and he could not, now his miracles had made him ſo well known, have been ſecure, the little time that remained, 'till his hour was fully come, if he had not, with his wonted and neceſſary caution, withdrawn; "And walked no more openly amongſt the Jews," 'till his time (at the next paſſover) was fully come; and then again he appeared amongſt them openly.

Nor would the Romans have ſuffered him, if he had gone about preaching, that he was the King whom the Jews expected. Such an accuſation would have been forwardly brought againſt him by the Jews, if they could have heard it out of his own mouth; and that had been his publick doctrine to his followers, which was openly preached by his apoſtles after his death, when he appeared no more. And of this they were accuſed, Acts xvii. 5—9. "But the Jews, "which believed not, moved with envy, took unto them certain lewd fellows "of the baſer ſort, and gathered a company, and ſet all the city in an uproar, "and aſſaulted the houſe of Jaſon, and ſought to bring them out to the people. "And when they found them [Paul and Silas] not, they drew Jaſon, and cer"tain brethren, unto the rulers of the city, crying, Theſe that have turned "the world upſide down, are come hither alſo, whom Jaſon hath received: "and theſe all do contrary to the decrees of Cæſar, ſaying, That there is another "King, one Jeſus. And they troubled the people, and the rulers of the city, "when they heard theſe things: and when they had taken ſecurity of Jaſon "and the other, they let them go."

THO' the magiſtrates of the world had no great regard to the talk of a King who had ſuffered death, and appeared no longer any where; yet, if our Saviour had openly declared this of himſelf in his life-time, with a train of diſciples and followers every where owning and crying him up for their King, the Roman governor of Judea could not have forborn to have taken notice of it, and have made uſe of their force againſt him. This the Jews were not miſtaken in; and therefore made uſe of it as the ſtrongeſt accuſation, and likelieſt to prevail with Pilate againſt him, for the taking away his life; it being treaſon, and an unpardonable offence, which could not 'ſcape death from a Roman deputy, without the forfeiture of his own life. Thus then they accuſe him to Pilate, Luke xxiii. 2. We found the fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to "give tribute to Cæſar, ſaying, that he himſelf is a King," or rather, "the "Meſſiah, the King."

OUR Saviour, indeed, now that his time was come, (and he in cuſtody, and forſaken of all the world, and ſo out of all danger of raiſing any ſedition or diſturbance) owns himſelf to Pilate, to be a King; after having firſt told Pilate, John xviii. 36. "That his kingdom was not of this world:" and, for a kingdom in another world, Pilate knew that his maſter at Rome concerned not himſelf. But had there been any the leaſt appearance of truth in the allegations of the Jews, that he had perverted the nation, forbidding to pay tribute to Cæſar, or drawing the people after him, as their King; Pilate would not ſo readily have pronounced him innocent. But we ſee what he ſaid to his accuſers, Luke xxiii. 13, 14. Pilate, when he had called together the chief prieſts and "the rulers of the people, ſaid unto them, you have brought this man unto "me, as one that perverteth the people; and behold, I, having examined him "before you, have found no fault in this man, touching thoſe things whereof "you accuſe him: no, nor yet Herod, for I ſent you to him; and, lo, nothing "worthy of death is done by him." And therefore, finding a man of that mean condition, and innocent life, (no mover of ſeditions, or diſturber of the publick peace) without a friend or a follower, he would have diſmiſſed him, as a King of no conſequence; as an innocent man, falſely and maliciouſly accuſed by the Jews.

How neceſſary this caution was in our Saviour, to ſay or do nothing that might juſtly offend, or render him ſuſpected to the Roman governor; and how glad the Jews would have been to have any ſuch thing againſt him; we may ſee, Luke xx. 20. The chief prieſts and the ſcribes "watched him, and ſent "forth ſpies, who ſhould feign themſelves juſt men, that might take hold of "his words, that ſo they might deliver him unto the power and authority of the "governor." And the very thing wherein they hoped to entrap him in this place, was paying tribute to Cæſar, which they afterwards falſly accuſed him of. And what would they have done, if he had before them profeſſed himſelf to have been the Meſſiah, their King and Deliverer?

AND here we may obſerve the wonderful providence of God, who had ſo ordered the ſtate of the Jews, at the time when his ſon was to come into the world, that though neither the civil conſtitution, nor religious worſhip were diſſolved, yet the power of life and death was taken from them; whereby he had an opportunity to publiſh the kingdom of the Meſſiah; that is, his own royalty, under the name of "the kingdom of God, and of heaven;" which the Jews well enough underſtood, and would certainly have put him to death for, had the power been in their own hands. But this being no matter of accuſation to the Romans, hindered him not from ſpeaking of the "kingdom of heaven," as he did, ſometimes in reference to his appearing in the world, and being believed on by particular perſons; ſometimes in reference to the power ſhould be given him by the Father at his reſurrection; and ſometimes in reference to his coming to judge the world at the laſt day, in the full glory and completion of his kingdom. Theſe were ways of declaring himſelf, which the Jews could lay no hold on, to bring him in danger with Pontius Pilate, and get him ſeized and put to death.

ANOTHER reaſon there was, that hindered him, as much as the former, from profeſſing himſelf, in expreſs words, to be the Meſſiah; and that was, that the whole nation of the Jews, expecting at this time their Meſſiah, and deliverance by him, from the ſubjection they were in to a foreign yoke, the body of the people would certainly, upon his declaring himſelf to be the Meſſiah, their king, have roſe up in rebellion, and ſet him at the head of them. And indeed, the miracles that he did, ſo much diſpoſed them to think him to be the Meſſiah, that, though ſhrouded under the obſcurity of a mean condition, and a very private ſimple life; though he paſſed for a Galilean, (his birth at Bethlehem being then concealed) and aſſumed not to himſelf any power or authority, or ſo much as the name of the Meſſiah; yet he could hardly avoid being ſet up by a tumult, and proclaimed their king. So John tells us, chap. vi. 14, 15. "Then thoſe men, when they had ſeen the miracles that Jeſus did, "ſaid, This is of a truth that prophet that ſhould come into the world. When "therefore Jeſus perceived that they would come to take him by force to make "him king, he departed again into a mountain, himſelf alone." This was upon his feeding of five thouſand with five barley loaves and two fiſhes. So hard was it for him, doing thoſe miracles which were neceſſary to teſtify his miſſion, and which often drew great multitudes after him, Matt. iv. 25. to keep the heady and haſty multitude from ſuch diſorder, as would have involved him in it; and have diſturbed the courſe, and cut ſhort the time of his miniſtry; and drawn on him the reputation and death of a turbulent, ſeditious malefactor: contrary to the deſign of his coming, which was to be offered up a lamb blameleſs, and void of offence; his innocence appearing to all the world, even to him that delivered him up to be crucified. This it would have been impoſſible to have avoided, if, in his preaching every where, he had openly aſſumed to himſelf the title of their Meſſiah; which was all was wanting to ſet the people in a flame; who, drawn by his miracles, and the hopes of finding a Deliverer in ſo extraordinary a man, followed him in great numbers. We read every where of multitudes, and in Luke xii. 1. of myriads that were gathered about him. This conflux of people, thus diſpoſed, would not have failed, upon his declaring himſelf to be the Meſſiah, to have made a commotion, and with force ſet him up for their king. It is plain therefore, from theſe two reaſons, why (though he came to preach the goſpel, and convert the world to a belief of his being the Meſſiah; and though he ſays ſo much of his kingdom, under the title of the kingdom of God, and the kingdom of heaven) yet he makes it not his buſineſs to perſuade them, that he himſelf is the Meſſiah, nor does, in his publick preaching, declare himſelf to be him. He inculcates to the people, on all occaſions, that the kingdom of God is come: he ſhews the way of admittance into this kingdom, viz. repentance and baptiſm; and teaches the laws of it, viz. good life, according to the ſtricteſt rules of virtue and morality. But who the king was of this kingdom, he leaves to his miracles to point out, to thoſe who would conſider what he did, and make the right uſe of it, now; or to witneſs to thoſe who ſhould hearken to the apoſtles hereafter, when they preached it in plain words, and called upon them to believe it, after his reſurrection, when there ſhould be no longer room to fear, that it ſhould cauſe any diſturbance in civil ſocieties, and the governments of the world. But he could not declare himſelf to be the Meſſiah, without manifeſt danger of tumult and ſedition: and the miracles he did, declared it ſo much, that he was fain often to hide himſelf, and withdraw from the concourſe of the people. The leper that he cured, Mark i. though forbid to ſay any thing, yet "blazed it ſo abroad, that Jeſus could no more openly enter into the city, but was without in deſart places," living in retirement, as appears from Luke v. 16. and there "they came to him from every quarter." And thus he did more than once.

This being premiſed, let us take a view of the promulgation of the goſpel by our Saviour himſelf, and ſee what it was he taught the world, and required men to believe.

The firſt beginning of his miniſtry, whereby he ſhewed himſelf, ſeems to be at Cana in Galilee, ſoon after his baptiſm; where he turned water into wine: of which St. John, chap. ii. 11. ſays thus; "This beginning of miracles Jeſus made, and manifeſted his glory, and his diſciples believed in him." His diſciples here believed in him, but we hear not of any other preaching to them, but by this miracle, whereby he, "manifeſted his glory," i. e. of being the Meſſiah, the Prince. So Nathanael, without any other preaching, but only our Saviour's diſcovering to him, that he knew him after an extraordinary manner, preſently acknowledges him to be the Meſſiah; crying, "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God; thou art the king of Iſrael."

From hence, ſtaying a few days at Capernaum, he goes to Jeruſalem to the paſſover, and there he drives the traders out of the temple, John ii 12,--15. ſaying' "Make not my Father's houſe a houſe of merchandize." Where we ſee, he uſes a phraſe, which, by interpretation, ſignifies that he was the "Son of God," though at that time unregarded. Ver. 16. Hereupon the Jews demand, "What ſign doſt thou ſhew us, ſince thou doeſt theſe things? Jeſus anſwered, Deſtroy ye this temple, and in three days I will raiſe it again." This is an Inſtance of what way Jeſus took to declare himſelf: for 'tis plain, by their reply, the Jews underſtood him not, nor his diſciples neither; for 'tis ſaid, ver. 22. "When, therefore, he was riſen from the dead, his diſciples remembered, that he ſaid this to them: and they believed the ſcripture, and the ſaying of Jeſus to them."

This, therefore, we may look on, in the beginning, as a pattern of Chriſt's preaching, and ſhewing himſelf to the Jews, which he generally followed afterwards; viz. ſuch a manifeſtation of himſelf, as every one at preſent could not underſtand; but yet carried ſuch an evidence with it, to thoſe who were well-diſpoſed now, or would reflect on it when the whole courſe of his miniſtry was over, as was ſufficient clearly to convince them, that he was the Meſſiah.

The reaſon of this method uſed by our Saviour, the ſcripture gives us here, at this his firſt appearing in publick, after this entrance upon his miniſtry, to be a rule and light to us in the whole courſe of it: for the next verſe taking notice, that many believed on him, "becauſe of his miracles," (which was all the preaching they had) 'tis ſaid, ver. 24. "But Jeſus did not commit himſelf unto them, becauſe he knew all men;" i. e. he declared not himſelf ſo openly to be the Meſſiah, their king, as to put himſelf into the power of the Jews, by laying himſelf open to their malice; who, he knew, would be ſo ready to lay hold on it to accuſe him; for, as the next verſe 25. ſhews, he knew well enough what was in them. We may here farther obſerve, that "believing in his name," ſignifies believing him to be the Meſſiah. Ver. 22. tells us, That "many at the paſſover believed in his name, when they ſaw the miracles that he did." What other faith could theſe miracles produce in them who ſaw them, but that this was he of whom the ſcripture ſpoke, who was to be their Deliverer?

Whilst he was now at Jeruſalem, Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews, comes to him, John iii. 1,--21. to whom he preaches eternal life by faith in the Meſſiah, ver. 15, and 17. but in general terms, without naming himſelf to be that Meſſiah, though his whole diſcourſe tends to it. This is all we hear of our Saviour the firſt year of his miniſtry, but only his baptiſm, faſting, and temptation in the beginning of it, and ſpending the reſt of it after the paſſover, in Judea with his diſciples, baptizing there. But "when he knew that the Phariſees "reported, that he made and baptized more diſciples than John, he left Judea, and got out of their way again into Galilee, John iv. i, 3.

IN his way back, by the well of Sichar, he diſcourſes with the Samaritan woman; and after having opened to her the true and ſpiritual worſhip which was at hand, which the woman preſently underſtands of the times of the Meſſiah, who was then looked for; thus ſhe anſwers, ver. 25. "I know that the Meſſiah "cometh: when he is come, he will tell us all things." Whereupon our Saviour, though we hear no ſuch thing from him in Jeruſalem or Judea, or to Nicodemus, yet here, to this Samaritan woman, he in plain direct words owns and declares, that he himſelf, who talked with her, was the Meſſiah, ver. 26.

THIS would ſeem very ſtrange, that he ſhould be more free and open to a Samaritan, than he was to the Jews, were not the reaſon plain, from what we have obſerved above. He was now out of Judea, among a people with whom the Jews had no commerce; ver. 9. who were not diſpoſed, out of envy, as the Jews were, to ſeek his life, or to accuſe him to the Roman governor, or to make an inſurrection, to ſet a Jew up for their king. What the conſequence was of his diſcourſe with this Samaritan woman, we have an account ver. 28, 39,--42. "She left her water-pot, and went her way into the city, and ſaith to the men, "Come, ſee a man who told me all things that ever I did: Is not this the Meſſiah? And many of the Samaritans of that city BELIEVED ON HIM for the "ſaying of the woman, which teſtified, He told me all that ever I did. So "when the Samaritans were come unto him, they beſought him, that he would "tarry with them: and he abode there two days. And many more believed "becauſe of his own word; and ſaid unto the woman, Now we believe not be-"cauſe of thy ſaying; for we have heard him ourſelves; and we know," (i. e. are fully perſuaded) "that it is indeed the Meſſiah, the Saviour of the world." By comparing ver. 39, with 41 and 42, it is plain, that "believing on him" ſignifies no more than believing him to be the Meſſiah.

FROM Sichar Jeſus goes to Nazareth, the place he was bred up in; and there reading in the ſynagogue a prophecy concerning the Meſſiah, out of the lxi. of Iſaiah, he tells them, Luke iv. 21. "This day is this ſcripture fulfilled "in your ears."

BUT being in danger of his life at Nazareth, he leaves it for Capernaum: and then, as St. Matthew informs us, chap. iv. 17. "He began to preach and ſay, "Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Or, as St. Mark has it, chap. i. 14, 15. "Preaching the goſpel of the kingdom of God, and ſaying, "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and "believe in the goſpel;" i. e. believe this good news. This removing to Capernaum, and ſeating himſelf there in the borders of Zabulon and Naphtali, was, as St. Matthew obſerves, chap. iv. 13,--16. that a prophecy of Iſaiah might be fulfilled. Thus the actions and circumſtances of his life anſwered the prophecies, and declared him to be the Meſſiah. And by what St. Mark ſays in this place, it is manifeſt, that the goſpel which he preached and required them to believe, was no other but the good tidings of the coming of the Meſſiah, and of his kingdom, the time being now fulfilled.

IN his way to Capernaum, being come to Cana, a nobleman of Capernaum came to him, ver. 47. "And beſought him that he would come down and heal "his ſon; for he was at the point of death." Ver. 48. "Then ſaid Jeſus unto "him, Except ye ſee ſigns and wonders, ye will not believe." Then he returning homewards, and finding that his ſon began to "mend at the ſame hour "which Jeſus ſaid unto him, Thy ſon liveth; he himſelf believed, and his "whole houſe," ver. 53.

HERE this nobleman is by the apoſtle pronounced to be a believer. And what does he believe? Even that which Jeſus complains, ver. 48. "they would "not BELIEVE," except they ſaw ſigns and wonders; which could be nothing but what thoſe of Samaria, in the ſame chapter believed, viz. that he was the Meſſiah. For we no where in the goſpel hear of any thing elſe, that had been propoſed to be believed by them.

HAVING done miracles, and cured all their ſick at Capernaum, he ſays, "Let "us go the adjoining towns, that I may preach there alſo; for therefore came "I forth," Mark i. 38. Or, as St. Luke has it, chap. iv. 43. he tells the multitude, who would have kept him, that he might not go from them, "I muſt "evangelize," or tell the good tidings of "the kingdom to other cities alſo; for "therefore am I ſent." And St. Matthew, chap. iv. 23. tells us how he executed this commiſſion he was ſent on: "And Jeſus went about all Galilee, teach-"ing in their ſynagogues, and preaching the goſpel of the kingdom, and curing "all diſeaſes." This then was what he was ſent to preach every where, viz. the goſpel of the kingdom of the Meſſiah; and by the miracles and good he did, let them know who was the Meſſiah.

HENCE he goes up to Jeruſalem, to the ſecond paſſover, ſince the beginning of his miniſtry. And here, diſcourſing to the Jews, who ſought to kill him, upon occaſion of the man whom he had cured, carrying his bed on the ſabbath-day, and for making God his Father, he tells them, that he wrought theſe things by the power of God, and that he ſhall do greater things; for that the dead ſhall, at his ſummons, be raiſed; and that he, by a power committed to him from his Father, ſhall judge them; and that he is ſent by his Father; and that whoever ſhall hear his word, and believe in him that ſent him, has eternal life. This though a clear deſcription of the Meſſiah, yet we may obſerve, that here, to the angry Jews, who ſought to kill him, he ſays not a word of his kingdom, nor ſo much as names the Meſſiah; but yet that he is the Son of God, and ſent from God, he refers them to the teſtimony of John the Baptiſt, to the teſtimony of his own miracles, and of God himſelf in the voice from heaven, and of the ſcriptures, and of Moſes. He leaves them to learn from theſe, the truth they were to believe, viz. that he was the Meſſiah ſent from God. This you may read more at large, John v. 1,--47.

THE next place where we find him preaching, was on the mount, Matt. v. and Luke vi. This is by much the longeſt ſermon we have of his, any where; and, in all likelihood, to the greateſt auditory: for it appears to have been to the people gathered to him from Galilee, and Judea, and Jeruſalem, and from beyond Jordan, and that came out of Idumea, and from Tyre and Sidon, mentioned Mark iii. 7, 8. and Luke vi. 17. But in this whole ſermon of his, we do not find one word of believing, and therefore no mention of the Meſſiah, or any intimation to the people who himſelf was, The reaſon whereof we may gather from Matt. xii. 16. where "Chriſt forbids them to make him known;" which ſuppoſes them to know already who he was. For that this 12th chapter of St. Matthew ought to precede the ſermon in the mount, is plain, by comparing it with Mark ii. beginning at ver. 13. to Mark iii. 8. and comparing thoſe chapters of St. Mark with Luke vi. And I deſire my reader, once for all, here to take notice, that I have all along obſerved the order of time in our Saviour's preaching, and have not, as I think, paſſed by any of his diſcourſes. In this ſermon, our Saviour only teaches them what were the laws of his kingdom, and what they muſt do who were admitted into it, of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in another place, being at preſent only inquiring what our Saviour propoſed as matter of faith, to be believed.

AFTER this, John the Baptiſt ſends to him this meſſage, Luke vii. 19. aſking, "Art thou he that ſhould come, or do we expect another?" That is, in ſhort, Art thou the Meſſiah? And if thou art, why doſt thou let me, thy forerunner, languiſh in priſon? Muſt I expect deliverance from any other? To which Jeſus returns this anſwer, ver. 22, 23. "Tell John what ye have ſeen and heard; "the blind ſee, the lame walk, the lepers are cleanſed, the deaf hear, the dead "are raiſed, to the poor the goſpel is preached; and bleſſed is he who is not of-"fended in me." What it is to be "offended, or ſcandalized in him," we may ſee by comparing Matt. xiii. 28. and Mark iv. 17. with Luke viii. 13. For what the two firſt call "ſcandalized," the laſt call "ſtanding off from, or forſaking," i. e. not receiving him as the Meſſiah, (vid. Mark vi. 1,--6.) or revolting from him. Here Jeſus refers John, as he did the Jews before, to the teſtimony of his miracles, to know who he was; and this was generally his preaching, whereby he declared himſelf to be the Meſſiah; who was the only prophet to come, whom the Jews had any expectation of; nor did they look for any other perſon to be ſent to them with the power of miracles, but only the Meſſiah. His miracles, we ſee by his anſwer to John the Baptiſt, he thought a ſufficient declaration amongſt them, that he was the Meſſiah. And therefore, upon his curing the poſſeſſed of the devil, the dumb, and blind, Matt. xii. the people, who ſaw the miracle, ſaid, ver. 23. "Is not this the ſon of David?" As much as to ſay, Is not this the Meſſiah? Whereat the Phariſees being offended, ſaid, "He caſt "out devils by Beelzebub." Jeſus, ſhewing the falſhood and vanity of their blaſphemy, juſtifies the concluſion the people made from this miracle, ſaying, ver. 28. That his caſting out devils by the Spirit of God, was an evidence that the kingdom of the Meſſiah was come.

ONE thing more there was in the miracles done by his diſciples, which ſhewed him to be the Meſſiah; that they were done in his name. "In the name "of Jeſus of Nazareth, riſe up and walk," ſays St. Peter to the lame man, whom he cured in the temple, Acts. iii. 6. And how far the power of that name reached, they themſelves ſeem to wonder, Luke x. 17. "And the ſeventy re"turned again with joy, ſaying, Lord, even the devils are ſubject to us in thy "name."

FROM this meſſage from John the Baptiſt, he takes occaſion to tell the people, that John was the forerunner of the Meſſiah; that from the time of John the Baptiſt the kingdom of the Meſſiah began; to which time all the prophets and the law pointed, Luke vii. and Matt. xi.

LUKE viii. 1. "Afterwards he went through every city and village, preach"ing and ſhewing the good tidings of the kingdom of God." Here we ſee, as every-where, what his preaching was, and conſequently, what was to be believed.

SOON after, he preaches from a boat to the people on the ſhore. His ſermon at large we may read Matt. xiii. Mark iv. and Luke viii. But this is very obſervable, that this ſecond ſermon of his, here, is quite different from his former in the mount: for that was all ſo plain and intelligible, that nothing could be more ſo; whereas this is all ſo involved in parables, that even the apoſtles themſelves did not underſtand it. If we inquire into the reaſon of this, we ſhall poſſibly have ſome light, from the different ſubjects of theſe two ſermons, There he preached to the people only morality; clearing the precepts of the law from the falſe gloſſes which were received in thoſe days, and ſetting forth the duties of a good life, in their full obligation and extent, beyond what the judiciary laws of the Iſraelites did, or the civil laws of any country could preſcribe, or take notice of. But here, in this ſermon by the ſea-ſide, he ſpeaks of nothing but the kingdom of the Meſſiah, which he does all in parables. One reaſon whereof St. Matthew gives us, chap. xiii. 35. "That it might be fulfilled which was ſpoken by the prophet, ſaying, "I will open my mouth in parables, I will utter "things that have been kept ſecret from the foundation of the world." Another reaſon our Saviour himſelf gives of it, ver. 11. 12. "Becauſe to you it is "given to know the myſteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is "not given. For whoſoever hath, to him ſhall be given, and he ſhall have "more abundantly; but whoſoever hath not," i. e. improves not the talents that he hath, "from him ſhall be taken away even that he hath."

ONE thing it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that our Saviour here, in the explication of the firſt of theſe parables to his apoſtles, calls the preaching of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, ſimply, "The word;" and Luke viii. 21. "The "word of God:" from whence St, Luke, in the Acts, often mentions it under the name of the "word," and "the word of God," as we have elſewhere obſerved. To which, I ſhall here add that of Acts viii. 4. "Therefore they "that were ſcattered abroad, went every-where preaching the word;" which word, as we have found by examining what they preached all through their hiſtory, was nothing but this, that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah:" I mean, this was all the doctrine they propoſed to be believed: for what they taught, as well as our Saviour, contained a great deal more; but that concerned practice, and not belief.

lief. And therefore our Saviour ſays, in the place before quoted, Luke viii. 21. “ They are my mother and my brethren, who hear the word of God, and do “ it:” obeying the law of the Meſſiah their king, being no leſs required, than their believing that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, the king and deliverer that was promiſed them.

MATT. ix. 13. we have an account again of his preaching; what it was, and how: “ And Jeſus went about all the cities and villages, teaching in their ſynagogues, and preaching the goſpel of the kingdom, and healing every ſickneſs “ and every diſeaſe amongſt the people.” He acquainted them, that the kingdom of the Meſſiah was come, and left it to his miracles to inſtruct and convince them, that he was the Meſſiah.

MATT. x. when he ſent his apoſtles abroad, their commiſſion to preach we have, ver. 7. 8. in theſe words: “ As ye go, preach ſaying, The kingdom of “ heaven is at hand: heal the ſick, &c.” All that they had to preach was, that the kingdom of the Meſſiah was come. Whoſoever ſhould not receive them, the meſſengers of this good tidings, nor hearken to their meſſage, incurred a heavier doom than Sodom and Gomorrah, at the day of judgment, ver. 14, 15. But, ver. 32, “ Whoſoever ſhall confeſs me before men, I will confeſs “ him before my Father who is in heaven.” What this confeſſing of Chriſt is, we may ſee by comparing John xii. 42. with ix. 22. “ Nevertheleſs, among the “ chief rulers alſo many believed on him; but becauſe of the Phariſees they did “ not CONFESS HIM, leſt they ſhould be put out of the ſynagogue.” And chap. ix. 22. “ Theſe words ſpake his parents, becauſe they feared the Jews: for the “ Jews had agreed already, that if any man did CONFESS THAT HE WAS THE “ MESSIAH, he ſhould be put out of the ſynagogue.” By which places it is evident, that to confeſs him, was to confeſs that he was the Meſſiah. From which, give me leave to obſerve alſo, (what I have cleared from other places, but cannot be too often remarked, becauſe of the different ſenſe has been put upon that phraſe) viz. “ that believing on, or in him,” for (εἰς αυτὸν is rendered either way by the Engliſh tranſlation) ſignifies believing that he was the Meſſiah. For many of the rulers (the text ſays) “ believed on him;” but they durſt not “ confeſs what they believed, “ for fear they ſhould be put out of the ſynagogue.” Now the offence for which it was agreed that any one ſhould be put out of the ſynagogue, was, if he “ did confeſs, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah.” Hence we may have a clear underſtanding of that paſſage of St. Paul to the Romans, where he tells them poſitively, what is the faith he preaches, Rom. x. 8, 9. “ That is the word of faith which we preach, that if thou ſhalt confeſs “ with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and believe in thine heart, that God hath raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved:” And that alſo of 1 John iv. 15. “ We have ſeen, and do teſtify, that the Father ſent the Son to be the Saviour “ of the world: whoſoever ſhall confeſs, that Jeſus is the Son of God, God “ dwelleth in him, and he in God.” Where confeſſing Jeſus to be the Son of God, is the ſame with confeſſing him to be the Meſſiah; thoſe two expreſſions being underſtood amongſt the Jews to ſignify the ſame thing, as we have ſhewn already.

How calling him the Son of God, came to ſignify that he was the Meſſiah, would not be hard to ſhew. But it is enough, that it appears plainly, that it was ſo uſed, and had that import among the Jews at that time; which if any one deſires to have further evidenced to him, he may add Matt. xxvi. 63. John vi. 69. and xi. 27. and xx. 31. to thoſe places before occaſionally taken notice of,

As was the apoſtles commiſſion, ſuch was their performance; as we read, Luke xi. 6. “ They departed and went through the towns, preaching the goſpel, and healing every-where.” Jeſus bid them preach, “ ſaying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand.” And St, Luke tells us, they went through the towns preaching the goſpel; a word which in Saxon anſwers well the Greek ευαγγέλιον, and ſignifies, as that does, “ good news.” So that what the inſpired writers call the goſpel, is nothing but the good tidings, that the Meſſiah and his kingdom was come; and ſo it is to be underſtood in the new teſtament, and ſo the angel calls it, "good tidings of great joy," Luke ii. 10. bringing the firſt news of our Saviour's birth. And this ſeems to be all that his diſciples were at that time ſent to preach.

SO, Luke ix. 59, 60. to him that would have excuſed his preſent attendance, becauſe of burying his father; "Jeſus ſaid unto him, Let the dead bury their "dead, but go thou and preach the kingdom of God." When I ſay, this was all they were to preach, I muſt be underſtood, that this was the faith they preached? but with it they joined obedience to the Meſſiah, whom they received for their king. So likewiſe, when he ſent out the ſeventy, Luke x. their commiſſion was in theſe words, ver. 9. "Heal the ſick, and ſay unto them, The king"dom of God is come nigh unto you."

AFTER the return of his apoſtles to him, he ſits down with them on a mountain; and a great multitude being gathered about them, St. Luke tells us, chap. ix. 11. "The people followed him, and he received them, and ſpake unto them "of the kingdom of God, and healed them that had need of healing." This was his preaching to this aſſembly, which conſiſted of five thouſand men, beſides women and children: all which great multitude he fed with five loaves and two fiſhes, Matt. xiv. 21. And what this miracle wrought upon them, St. John tells us, chap. vi. 14, 15. "Then theſe men, when they had ſeen the miracle "that Jeſus did, ſaid, This is of a truth, that prophet that ſhould come into "the world," i. e. the Meſſiah. For the Meſſiah was the only perſon that they expected from God, and this the time they looked for him. And hence John the Baptiſt, Matt. xi. 3. ſtyles him, "He that ſhould come;" as in other places, "come from God, or "ſent from God," are phraſes uſed for the Meſſiah,

HERE we ſee our Saviour keeps to his uſual method of preaching: he ſpeaks to them of the kingdom of God, and does miracles; by which they might underſtand him to be the Meſſiah, whoſe kingdom he ſpake of. And here we have the reaſon alſo, why he ſo much concealed himſelf, and forbore to own his being the Meſſiah. For what the conſequence was, of the multitude's but thinking him ſo, when they were got together, St. John tells us in the very next words: "When Jeſus then perceived, that they would come and take him by "force to make him a king, he departed again into a mountain himſelf alone." If they were ſo ready to ſet him up for their king, only becauſe they gathered from his miracles, that he was the Meſſiah, whilſt he himſelf ſaid nothing of it; what would not the people have done, and what would not the ſcribes and Phariſees have had an opportunity to accuſe him of, if he had openly profeſſed himſelf to have been the Meſſiah, that king they looked for? But this we have taken notice of already.

FROM hence going to Capernaum, whither he was followed by a great part of the people, whom he had the day before ſo miraculouſly fed; he, upon the occaſion of their following him for the loaves, bid them ſeek for the meat that endureth to eternal life: and thereupon, John vi. 22--69. declares to them his being ſent from the father; and that thoſe who believed in him, ſhould be raiſed to eternal life: but all this very much involved in a mixture of allegorical terms of eating, and of bread, bread of life, which came down from heaven, &c. Which is all comprehended and expounded in theſe ſhort and plain words, ver. 47. and 45. "Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, he that believeth on me, hath everlaſting life, and I will raiſe him up at the laſt day," The ſum of all which diſcourſe is, that he was the Meſſiah ſent from God; and that thoſe who believed him to be ſo, ſhould be raiſed from the dead at the laſt day, to eternal life. Theſe whom he ſpoke to here, were of thoſe who the day before, would by force have made him king; and therefore, it is no wonder he ſhould ſpeak to them of himſelf, and his kingdom and ſubjects, in obſcure and myſtical terms; and ſuch as ſhould offend thoſe who looked for nothing but the grandeur of a temporal kingdom in this world, and the protection and proſperity they had promiſed themſelves under it. The hopes of ſuch a kingdom, now that they had found a man that did miracles, and therefore concluded to be the Deliverer they expected, had the day before almoſt drawn them into an open inſurrection, and involved our Saviour in it. This he thought fit to put a ſtop to; they ſtill following him, 'tis like, with the ſame deſign. And therefore, though he here ſpeaks to them of his kingdom, it was in a way that ſo plainly balked their expectation, and ſhocked them, that when they found themſelves diſappointed of thoſe vain hopes, and that he talked of their eating his fleſh, and drinking his blood, that they might have life, the Jews ſaid, ver, 52. "How can this man give us his "fleſh to eat? And many, even of his diſciples, ſaid, It was an hard ſaying: "Who can bear it? And ſo were ſcandalized in him, and forſook him, ver. 60, 66. But what the true meaning of this diſcourſe of our Saviour was, the confeſſion of St. Peter, who underſtood it better, and anſwered for the reſt of the apoſtles, ſhews: when Jeſus aſked him, ver. 67. "Will you alſo go away? "Then Simon Peter anſwered him, Lord, to whom ſhall we go? Thou haſt "the words of eternal life:" i. e. thou teacheſt us the way to attain eternal life; and accordingly, "we believe, and are ſure, that thou art the Meſſiah, the Son "of the living God," This was the eating his fleſh and drinking his blood, whereby thoſe who did ſo, had eternal life.

SOMETIME after this, he inquires of his diſciples, Mark viii. 27. who the people took him for? They telling him, "for John the Baptiſt," or one of the old prophets riſen from the dead; he aſked, What they themſelves thought? And here again, Peter anſwers in theſe words, Mark viii. 29. "Thou art the "Meſſiah." Luke ix. 20. "The Meſſiah of God. And, Matth. xvi. 16. "Thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of the living God:" Which expreſſions, we may hence gather, amount to the ſame thing. Whereupon our Saviour tells Peter, Matth. xvi. 17, 18. That this was ſuch a truth "as fleſh and blood could "not reveal to him, but only his Father who was in heaven;" and that this was the foundation, on which he was "to build his church;" By all the parts of which paſſage it is more than probable, that he had never yet told his apoſtles in direct words, that he was the Meſſiah; but that they had gathered it from his life and miracles. For which we may imagine to ourſelves this probable reaſon; becauſe that, if he had familiarly, and in direct terms, talked to his apoſtles in private, that he was the Meſſiah the Prince, of whoſe kingdom he preached ſo much in publick every-where; Judas, whom he knew falſe and treacherous, would have been readily made uſe of, to teſtify againſt him, in a matter that would have been really criminal to the Roman governor. This, perhaps, may help to clear to us that ſeemingly abrupt reply of our Saviour to his apoſtles, John vi. 70. when they confeſſed him to be the Meſſiah: I will, for the better explaining of it, ſet down the paſſage at large. Peter having ſaid, "We believe, and are ſure that thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of the living "God; Jeſus anſwered them, Have not I choſen you twelve, and one of you "is διάβολος?" This is a reply, ſeeming at firſt ſight, nothing to the purpoſe; when yet it is ſure, all our Saviour's diſcourſes were wiſe and pertinent. It ſeems therefore to me, to carry this ſenſe, to be underſtood afterwards by the eleven (as that of deſtroying the temple, and raiſing it again in three days was) when they ſhould reflect on it, after his being betrayed by Judas: You have confeſſed, and believe the truth concerning me; I am the Meſſiah your king: but do not wonder at it, that I have never openly declared it to you; for amongſt you twelve, whom I have choſen to be with me, there is one who is an informer, or falſe accuſer, (for ſo the Greek word ſignifies, and may, poſſibly, here be ſo tranſlated, rather than devil) who, if I had owned myſelf in plain words to have been the "Meſſiah, the King of Iſrael," would have betrayed me, and informed againſt me.

THAT he was yet cautious of owning himſelf to his apoſtles, poſitively, to be the Meſſiah, appears farther from the manner wherein he tells Peter, ver. 18. that he will build his church upon that confeſſion of his, that he was the Meſſiah. I ſay unto thee, "Thou art Cephas," or a rock, "and upon this rock "I will build my church, and the gates of hell ſhall not prevail againſt it." Words too doubtful to be laid hold on againſt him, as a teſtimony that he profeſſed himſelf to be the Meſſiah; eſpecially if we join with them the following words, ver. 19. "And I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, "and what thou ſhalt bind on earth, ſhall be bound in heaven; and what thou

" ſhalt looſe on earth, ſhall be looſed in heaven." Which being ſaid perſonally to Peter, render the foregoing words of our Saviour, (wherein he declares the fundamental article of his church, to be the believing him to be the Meſſiah) the more obſcure and doubtful, and leſs liable to be made uſe of againſt him; but yet ſuch as might afterwards be underſtood. And for the ſame reaſon, he yet, here again, forbids the apoſtles to ſay that he was the Meſſiah, ver. 20.

From this time (ſay the evangeliſts) " Jeſus began to ſhew his diſciples," i. e. his apoſtles, (who are often called diſciples) " that he muſt go to Jeruſa-" lem, and ſuffer many things from the elders, chief prieſts, and ſcribes; and " be killed, and be raiſed again the third day," Matth. xvi. 21. Theſe, tho' all marks of the Meſſiah, yet how little underſtood by the apoſtles, or ſuited to their expectation of the Meſſiah, appears from Peter's rebuking him for it in the following words, Matth. xvi. 22. Peter had twice before owned him to be the Meſſiah, and yet he cannot here bear that he ſhould ſuffer, and be put to death, and be raiſed again. Whereby we may perceive, how little yet Jeſus had explained to the apoſtles, what perſonally concerned himſelf. They had been a good while witneſſes of his life and miracles; and thereby being grown into a belief that he was the Meſſiah, were, in ſome degree, prepared to receive the particulars that were to fill up that character, and anſwer the prophecies concerning him. This, from henceforth, he began to open to them (tho' in a way, which the Jews could not form an accuſation out of;) the time of the accompliſhment of all, in his ſufferings, death, and reſurrection, now drawing on. For this was in the laſt year of his life; he being to meet the Jews at Jeruſalem but once more at the paſſover, and then they ſhould have their will upon him: and, therefore, he might now begin to be a little more open, concerning himſelf: though yet ſo, as to keep himſelf out of the reach of any accuſation, that might appear juſt or weighty to the Roman deputy.

After his reprimand to Peter, telling him, " That he ſavoured not the things of God, but of man, Mark viii. 34. he calls the people to him, and prepares thoſe, who would be his diſciples, for ſuffering, telling them, ver. 38. " Whoever ſhall be aſhamed of me and my words in this adulterous and ſinful " generation, of him alſo ſhall the Son of man be aſhamed, when he cometh " in the glory of his Father, with the holy angels:" and then ſubjoins, Matth. xvi. 27, 28. two great and ſolemn acts, wherein he would ſhew himſelf to be the Meſſiah, the king: " For the Son of man ſhall come in the glory of his " Father, with his angels; and then he ſhall render to every man according to " his works." This is evidently meant of the glorious appearance of his kingdom, when he ſhall come to judge the world at the laſt day; deſcribed more at large, Matt. xxv. " When the Son of man ſhall come in his glory, and all " the holy angels with him, then ſhall he ſit upon the THRONE of his glory. " Then ſhall the King ſay to them on his right hand," &c.

But what follows in the place above quoted, Matth, xvi. 28. " Verily, ve-" rily, there be ſome ſtanding here, who ſhall not taſte of death, till they ſee " the Son of man coming in his kingdom;" importing that dominion, which ſome there ſhould ſee him exerciſe over the nation of the Jews, was ſo covered, by being annexed to the preaching, ver. 27. (where he ſpoke of the manifeſtation and glory of his kingdom, at the day of judgment) that though his plain meaning here in ver. 28. be, that the appearance and viſible exerciſe of his kingly power in his kingdom, was ſo near, that ſome there ſhould live to ſee it; yet, if the foregoing words had not caſt a ſhadow over theſe latter, but they had been left plainly to be underſtood, as they plainly ſignified, that he ſhould be a King, and that it was ſo near, that ſome there ſhould ſee him in his kingdom; this might have been laid hold on, and made the matter of a plauſible, and ſeemingly juſt accuſation againſt him, by the Jews before Pilate. This ſeems to be the reaſon of our Saviour's inverting here the order of the two ſolemn manifeſtations to the world, of his rule and power; thereby perplexing at preſent his meaning, and ſecuring himſelf, as was neceſſary, from the malice of the Jews, which always lay at catch to intrap him, and accuſe him to the Roman governor; and would no doubt, have been ready to have alledged theſe words, "Some here ſhall not taſte of death, till they ſee the Son of man coming in his kingdom," againſt him, as criminal, had not their meaning been, by the former verſe, perplexed, and the ſenſe at that time rendered unintelligible, and not applicable by any of his auditors, to a ſenſe that might have been prejudicial to him before Pontius Pilate. For how well the chief of the Jews were diſpoſed towards him, St. Luke tells us, chap. xi. 54. "Laying wait for "him, and ſeeking to catch ſomething out of his mouth, that they might accuſe him:" which may be a reaſon to ſatisfy us of the ſeemingly doubtful and obſcure way of ſpeaking, uſed by our Saviour in other places; his circumſtances being ſuch, that without ſuch a prudent carriage and reſervedneſs, he could not have gone through the work which he came to do; nor have performed all the parts of it, in a way correſpondent to the deſcriptions given of the Meſſiah, and which would be afterwards fully underſtood to belong to him, when he had left the world.

After this, Matth. xvii. 10, &c. he, without ſaying it in direct words, begins, as it were, to own himſelf to his apoſtles to be the Meſſiah; by aſſuring them, that as the Scribes, according to the prophecy of Malachi, chap. iv, 5. rightly ſaid, that Elias was to uſher in the Meſſiah; ſo indeed, Elias was already come, though the Jews knew him not, and treated him ill: whereby "they "underſtood that he ſpoke to them of John the Baptiſt." ver. 13. And a little after, he ſomewhat more plainly intimates, that he is the Meſſiah, Mark ix. 41. in theſe words: "Whoſoever ſhall give you a cup of water to drink in my "name, becauſe ye belong to the Meſſiah." This, as I remember, is the firſt place where our Saviour ever mentioned the name of the Meſſiah; and the firſt time that he went ſo far towards the owning, to any of the Jewiſh nation, himſelf to be him.

In his way to Jeruſalem, bidding one follow him, Luke ix. 59. who would firſt bury his father, ver. 60. "Jeſus ſaid unto him, Let the dead bury their "dead; but go thou and preach the kingdom of God." And Luke x. 1. ſending out the ſeventy diſciples, he ſays to them, ver. 9. "Heal the ſick, and ſay, "The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you." He had nothing elſe for theſe, or for his apoſtles, or any one, it ſeems, to preach, but the good news of the coming of the kingdom of the Meſſiah. And if any city would not receive them, he bids them, ver. 10. "Go into the ſtreets of the ſame, and "ſay, Even the very duſt of your city, which cleaveth on us, do we wipe off "againſt you: notwithſtanding, be ye ſure of this, that the kingdom of God "is come nigh unto you." This they were to take notice of, as that which they ſhould dearly anſwer for; viz. that they had not with faith received the good tidings of the kingdom of the Meſſiah.

After this, his brethren ſay unto him, John vii, 2, 3, 4. (the feaſt of tabernacles being near) "Depart hence, and go into Judea, that thy diſciples alſo "may ſee the works that thou doeſt: for there is no man that does any thing "in ſecret, and he himſelf ſeeketh to be known openly. If thou do theſe "things, ſhew thy ſelf to the world." Here his brethren, which, the next verſe tells us, "did not believe him," ſeem to upbraid him with the inconſiſtency of his carriage; as if he deſigned to be received for the Meſſiah, and yet was afraid to ſhew himſelf: to whom he juſtified his condnſt, (mentioned, ver. 1.) in the following verſes, by telling them, "That the world," (meaning the Jews eſpecially) "hated him, becauſe he teſtified of it, that the works thereof "are evil; and that his time was not yet fully come," wherein to quit his reſerve, and abandon himſelf freely to their malice and fury. Therefore, though he "went up unto the feaſt," it was "not openly, but, as it were, in ſecret." ver. 10. And here coming into the temple about the middle of the feaſt, he juſtifies his being ſent from God; and that he had not done any thing againſt the law, in curing the man at the pool of Betheſda, John v. 1,——16. on the ſabbath-day; which, though done above a year and a half before, they made uſe of, as a pretence to deſtroy him. But what was the true reaſon of ſeeking his life, appears from what we have in this viith chapter, ver. 25,—34. "Then

“ ſaid ſome of them at Jeruſalem, Is not this he whom they ſeek to kill? But “ lo, he ſpeaketh boldly, and they ſay nothing unto him. Do the rulers know “ indeed, that this is the very MESSIAH? Howbeit, we know this man “ whence he is; but when the Meſſiah cometh, no man knoweth whence he “ is. Then cried Jeſus in the temple, as he taught, Ye both know me, and “ ye know whence I am: and I am not come of myſelf, but he that ſent me is “ true, whom ye know not. But I know him; for I am from him, and he “ hath ſent me. Then they ſought [an occaſion] to take him, but no man laid “ hands on him, becauſe his hour was not yet come. And many of the people “ believed on him, and ſaid, When the Meſſiah cometh, will he do more miracles than theſe, which this man hath done? The Phariſees heard that the “ people murmured ſuch things concerning him; and the Phariſees and chief “ prieſts ſent officers to take him. Then ſaid Jeſus unto them, Yet a little “ while am I with you, and then I go to him that ſent me: ye ſhall ſeek me, “ and not find me; and where I am, there you cannot come. Then ſaid the “ Jews among themſelves, Whither will he go, that we ſhall not find him? Here we find that the great fault in our Saviour, and the great provocation to the Jews, was his being taken for the Meſſiah; and doing ſuch things as made the people “ believe in him;” i. e. believe that he was the Meſſiah. Here alſo our Saviour declares, in words very eaſy to be underſtood, at leaſt after his reſurrection, that he was the Meſſiah: for, if he were “ ſent from God,” and did his miracles by the Spirit of God, there could be no doubt but he was the Meſſiah. But yet this declaration was in a way, that the Phariſees and prieſts could not lay hold on, to make an accuſation of, to the diſturbance of his miniſtry, or the ſeizure of his perſon, how much ſoever they deſired it: for his time was not yet come. The officers they had ſent to apprehend him, charmed with his diſcourſe, returned without laying hands on him, ver. 45, 46. And when the chief prieſts aſked them, “ Why they brought him not?” They anſwered, “ Never man ſpake like this man.” Whereupon the Phariſees reply, “ Are ye alſo deceived? Have any of the rulers of the Phariſees believed on “ him? But this people, who know not the law, are curſed.” This ſhews what was meant by “ believing on him,” viz. believing that he was the Meſſiah. For, ſay they, have any of the rulers, who are ſkilled in the law, or of the devout and learned Phariſees, acknowledged him to be the Meſſiah? For as for thoſe, who in the diviſion among the people concerning him, ſay, “ That he “ is the Meſſiah,” they are ignorant and vile wretches, know nothing of the ſcripture, and being accurſed, are given up by God, to be deceived by this impoſtor, and to take him for the Meſſiah. Therefore, notwithſtanding their deſire to lay hold on him, he goes on; and ver. 37, 38. “ In the laſt and great “ day of the feaſt, Jeſus ſtood and cried, ſaying, If any man thirſt, let him “ come unto me and drink: he that believeth on me, as the ſcripture hath ſaid, “ out of his belly ſhall flow rivers of living water.” And thus he here again declares himſelf to be the Meſſiah; but in the prophetick ſtyle, as we may ſee by the next verſe of this chapter, and thoſe places in the old teſtament, that theſe words of our Saviour refer to.

IN the next chapter, John viii. all that he ſays concerning himſelf, and what they were to believe, tends to this, viz. that he was ſent from God his Father, and that, if they did not believe that he was the Meſſiah, they ſhould die in their ſins: but this, in a way, as St. John obſerves, ver. 27. that they did not well underſtand. But our Saviour himſelf tells them, ver. 28. “ When ye have “ lift up the Son of man, then ſhall ye know that I am he.”

GOING from them, he cures the man born blind, whom meeting with again, after the Jews had queſtioned him, and caſt him out, John ix. 35,---38. “ Jeſus ſaid to him, Doſt thou believe on the Son of God? He anſwered, Who “ is he, Lord, that I might believe on him? And Jeſus ſaid unto him, Thou “ haſt both ſeen him, and it is he that talketh with thee. And he ſaid, Lord, “ I believe.” Here we ſee this man pronounced a believer, when all that was propoſed to him to believe, was, that Jeſus was “ the Son of God;” which was, as we have already ſhewn, to believe that he was the Meſſiah.

In the next chapter, John x. 1,--21. he declares the laying down of his life for both Jews and Gentiles; but in a parable which they underſtood not, ver. 6,--20.

As he was going to the feaſt of the dedication, the Phariſees aſk him, Luke xvii. 20. "When the kingdom of God," i. e. of the Meſſiah, "ſhould come?" He anſwers, That it ſhould not come with pomp and obſervation, and great concourſe; but that it was already begun amongſt them. If he had ſtopt here, the ſenſe had been ſo plain, that they could hardly have miſtaken him; or have doubted, but that he meant, that the Meſſiah was already come, and amongſt them; and ſo might have been prone to infer, that Jeſus took upon him to be him. But here, as in the place before taken notice of, ſubjoining to this future revelation of himſelf, both in his coming to execute vengeance on the Jews, and in his coming to judgment, mixed together, he ſo involved his ſenſe, that it was not eaſy to underſtand him. And therefore, the Jews came to him again in the temple, John x. 23. and ſaid, "How long doſt thou make us "doubt? If thou be the Chriſt, tell us plainly. Jeſus anſwered, I told you, "and ye BELIEVED not: the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear "witneſs of me. But ye BELIEVED not, becauſe ye are not of my ſheep, as "I told you." The BELIEVING here, which he accuſes them of not doing, is plainly, their not BELIEVING him to be the Meſſiah, as the foregoing words evince; and in the ſame ſenſe it is evidently meant in the following verſes of this chapter.

From hence Jeſus going to Bethabara, and thence returning into Bethany; upon Lazarus's death, John xi. 25,---17. Jeſus ſaid to Martha, "I am the re-"ſurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet he "ſhall live; and whoſoever liveth and believeth in me ſhall not die for ever." So I underſtand ἀποθάνῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, anſwerable to ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, of the ſeptuagint, Gen. iii. 22. or John vi. 51. which we read right in our Engliſh tranſlation, "live for ever." But whether this ſaying of our Saviour here, can with truth be tranſlated, "He that liveth and believeth in me ſhall never die," will be apt to be queſtioned. But to go on, "Believeſt thou this? She ſaid "unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of God, "which ſhould come into the world." This ſhe gives as a full anſwer to our Saviour's demands; this being that faith, which whoever had, wanted no more to make them believers.

We may obſerve farther, in this ſame ſtory of the raiſing of Lazarus, what faith it was our Saviour expected, by what he ſays, ver. 41, 42. "Father, I "thank thee, that thou haſt heard me; and I know that thou heareſt me al-"ways. But becauſe of the people who ſtand by, I ſaid it, that they may be-"lieve, that thou haſt ſent me." And what the conſequence of it was, we may ſee, ver. 45. "Then many of the Jews who came to Mary, and had ſeen the "things which Jeſus did, believed on him:" which belief was, that he was "ſent from the Father;" which, in other words, was, that he was the Meſſiah. That this is the meaning, in the evangeliſts, of the phraſe of "believing "on him," we have a demonſtration in the following words, ver. 47, 48. "Then "gathered the chief prieſts and Phariſees a council, and ſaid, What do we? "For this man does many miracles; and if we let him alone, all men will "BELIEVE ON HIM." Thoſe who here ſay, all men would BELIEVE ON HIM, were the chief prieſts and Phariſees, his enemies, who ſought his life; and therefore could have no other ſenſe, nor thought of this faith in him, which they ſpake of, but only the believing him to be the Meſſiah: and that that was their meaning, the adjoining words ſhew; "If we let him alone, all the world "will believe on him;" i. e. believe him to be the Meſſiah. "And the Ro-"mans will come and take away both our place and nation." Which reaſoning of theirs was thus grounded: If we ſtand ſtill, and let the people "believe "on him," i. e. receive him for the Meſſiah: they will thereby take him and ſet him up for their King, and expect deliverance by him; which will draw the Roman arms upon us, to the deſtruction of us and our country. The Romans could not be thought to be at all concerned in any other belief whatſoever,

ever, that the people might have on him. It is therefore plain, that "believing "on him," was by the writers of the goſpel, underſtood to mean, the believing "him to be the Meſſiah." The ſanhedrim therefore, ver. 53, 54. from that day forth conſulted to put him to death. "Jeſus therefore walked not yet" (for ſo the word ἔτι ſignifies, and ſo I think it ought here to be tranſlated) "boldly," or open faced, "among the Jews," i. e. of Jeruſalem. Ἔτι cannot well here be tranſlated "no more," becauſe, within a very ſhort time after, he appeared openly at the paſſover, and by his miracles and ſpeech declared himſelf more freely than ever he had done; and all the week before his paſſion, taught daily in the temple, Matt. xx. 17. Mark x. 32. Luke xviii. 31, &c. The meaning of this place ſeems therefore to be this: that his time being not yet come, he durſt not yet ſhew himſelf openly and confidently before the ſcribes and Phariſees, and thoſe of the ſanhedrim at Jeruſalem, who were full of malice againſt him, and had reſolved his death: "But went thence into a country near the "wilderneſs, into a city called Ephraim, and there continued with his diſciples," to keep himſelf out of the way 'till the paſſover, "which was nigh at hand," ver. 55. In his return thither, he takes the twelve aſide, and tells them beforehand, what ſhould happen to him at Jeruſalem, whither they were now going; and that all things that are written by the prophets, concerning the Son of man, ſhould be accompliſhed; that he ſhould be betray'd to the chief prieſts and ſcribes; and that they ſhould condemn him to death, and deliver him to the Gentiles; that he ſhould be mocked, and ſpit on, and ſcourged, and put to death; and the third day he ſhould riſe again. But St. Luke tells us, chap. xviii. 34, That the apoſtles "underſtood none of theſe things, and this ſaying "was hid from them; neither knew they the things which were ſpoken." They believed him to be the Son of God, the Meſſiah ſent from the Father; but their notion of the Meſſiah was the ſame with the reſt of the Jews; that he ſhould be a temporal prince and deliverer: Accordingly we ſee, Mark x. 35. that, even in this their laſt journey with him to Jeruſalem, two of them, James and John, coming to him, and falling at his feet, ſaid, "Grant unto us, that "we may ſit, one on the right hand, and the other on thy left hand, in thy "glory:" or, as St. Matthew has it, chap. xx. 21. "in thy kingdom." That which diſtinguiſhed them from the unbelieving Jews, was, that they believed Jeſus to be the very Meſſiah, and ſo received him as their King and Lord.

AND now, the hour being come that the Son of man ſhould be glorified, he, without his uſual reſerve, makes his publick entry into Jeruſalem, riding on a young aſs! "As it is written, Fear not, daughter of Sion; behold, thy "King cometh, ſitting on an aſs's colt." But "theſe things," ſays St. John, chap. xii. 16. "his diſciples underſtood not, at the firſt; but when Jeſus was "glorified, then remembered they that theſe things were written of him, and "that they had done theſe things unto him." Though the apoſtles believed him to be the Meſſiah, yet there were many occurrences of his life, which they underſtood not (at the time when they happened) to be foretold of the Meſſiah; which, after his aſcenſion, they found exactly to quadrate. Thus, according to what was foretold of him, he rode into the city, "all the people crying, "Hoſanna, bleſſed is the King of Iſrael, that cometh in the name of the Lord." This was ſo open a declaration of his being the Meſſiah, that Luke xix. 39. "Some of the Phariſees from among the multitude ſaid unto him, Maſter, re"buke thy diſciples." But he was ſo far now from ſtopping them, or diſowning this their acknowledgment of his being the Meſſiah, that he ſaid unto them, "I tell you, that if theſe ſhould hold their peace, the ſtones would immediate"ly cry out." And again upon the like occaſion of their crying, "Hoſanna "to the Son of David," in the temple, Matt. xxi. 15, 16. "When the chief "prieſts and ſcribes were ſore diſpleaſed, and ſaid unto him, Heareſt thou "what they ſay? Jeſus ſaid unto them, Yea; Have ye never read, Out of the "mouths of babes and ſucklings thou haſt perfected praiſe?" And now, ver. 14, 15. "He cures the blind and the lame openly in the temple, And when "the chief prieſts and ſcribes ſaw the wonderful things that he did, and the "children crying in the temple, Hoſanna, they were enraged." One would not think, that after the multitude of miracles, that our Saviour had now been doing for above three years together, the curing the lame and blind ſhould ſo much move them. But we muſt remember, that though his miniſtry had abounded with miracles, yet the moſt of them had been done about Galilee, and in parts remote from Jeruſalem. There is but one left upon record, hitherto done in that city; and that had ſo ill a reception, that they ſought his life for it; as we may read, John v. 16. And therefore we hear not of his being at the next paſſover, becauſe he was there only privately, as an ordinary Jew: the reaſon thereof we may read, John vii. 1. " " After theſe things Jeſus walked in Galilee; for he would not walk in Jewry, becauſe the Jews ſought to kill him."

HENCE we may gueſs the reaſon why St. John omitted the mention of his being at Jeruſalem, at the third paſſover after his baptiſm; probably, becauſe he did nothing memorable there. Indeed, when he was at the feaſt of tabernacles, immediately preceding this his laſt paſſover, he cured the man born blind: but it appears not to have been done in Jeruſalem itſelf, but in the way, as he retired to the Mount of Olives; for there ſeems to have been no body by, when he did it, but his apoſtles. Compare ver. 2. with ver. 8, 10. of John ix. This, at leaſt, is remarkable; that neither the cure of this blind man, nor that of the other infirm man, at the paſſover, above a twelve-month before, at Jeruſalem, was done in the ſight of the ſcribes, Phariſees, chief prieſts, or rulers. Nor was it without reaſon, that, in the former part of his miniſtry, he was cautious of ſhewing himſelf to them to be the Meſſiah. But now, that he was come to the laſt ſcene of his life, and that the paſſover was come, the appointed time, wherein he was to complete the work he came for, in his death and reſurrection, he does many things in Jeruſalem itſelf, before the face of the ſcribes, Phariſees, and whole body of the Jewiſh nation, to manifeſt himſelf to be the Meſſiah. And, as St. Luke ſays, chap. xix. 47, 48. "He taught daily in the temple: but the chief prieſts, and the ſcribes, and the chief of the people, ſought to deſtroy him; and could not find what they might do; for all the people were very attentive to hear him." What he taught we are not left to gueſs, by what we have found him conſtantly preaching elſewhere: but St. Luke tells us, chap. xx. 1. "He taught in the temple, and evangelized;" or, as we tranſlate it, "preached the goſpel:" which, as we have ſhewed, was the making known to them the good news of the kingdom of the Meſſiah. And this we ſhall find he did, in what now remains of his hiſtory.

IN the firſt diſcourſe of his, which we find upon record, after this, John xii. 20, &c. he foretels his crucifixion, and the belief of all ſorts, both Jews and Gentiles, on him after that. Whereupon the people ſay to him, ver. 34. "We have heard out of the law, that the Meſſiah abideth for ever; and how ſayeſt thou, that the Son of man muſt be lifted up? Who is this Son of man?" In his anſwer, he plainly deſigns himſelf under the name of Light; which was what he had declared himſelf to them to be, the laſt time that they had ſeen him in Jeruſalem. For then, at the feaſt of tabernacles, but ſix months before, he tells them in the very place where he now is, viz. in the temple, "I am the Light of the world; whoſoever follows me, ſhall not walk in darkneſs, but ſhall have the light of life; as we may read, John viii. 12. and ix. 5. He ſays, "As long as I am in the world, I am the LIGHT of the world." But neither here, nor any where elſe, does he, even in theſe four or five laſt days of his life, (tho' he knew his hour was come, and was prepared to his death, ver. 27. and ſcrupled not to manifeſt himſelf to the rulers of the Jews to be the Meſſiah, by doing miracles before them in the temple) ever once in direct words own himſelf to the Jews to be the Meſſiah; though by miracles and other ways, he did every where make it known unto them, ſo that it might be underſtood. This could not be without ſome reaſon: and the preſervation of his life, which he came now to Jeruſalem on purpoſe to lay down, could not be it. What other could it then be, but the ſame which had made him uſe caution in the former part of his miniſtry; ſo to conduct himſelf, that he might do the work which he came for, and in all parts anſwer the character given of the Meſſiah, in the law and the prophets? He had fulfilled the time of his miniſtry; and now taught, and did miracles openly in the temple, before the rulers and the people, not fearing to be ſeized. But he would not be ſeized for any thing, that might make him a criminal to the government: and therefore he avoided giving thoſe, who, in the diviſion that was about him, inclined towards him, occaſion of tumult for his ſake: or to the Jews, his enemies, matter of juſt accuſation againſt him, out of his own mouth, by profeſſing himſelf to be the Meſſiah, the King of Iſrael, in direct words. It was enough, that by words and deeds he declared it ſo to them, that they could not but underſtand him; which 'tis plain they did, Luke xx. 16, 19. Matt. xxi. 45. But yet, neither his actions, which were only doing of good; nor words, which were myſtical and parabolical (as we may ſee, Matt. xxi. and xxii. and the parallel places of Matthew and Luke;) nor any of his ways of making himſelf known to be the Meſſiah, could be brought in teſtimony, or urged againſt him, as oppoſite or dangerous to the government. This preſerved him from being condemned as a malefactor; and procured him a teſtimony from the Roman governor, his judge, that he was an innocent man, ſacrificed to the envy of the Jewiſh nation. So that he avoided ſaying, that he was the Meſſiah, that to thoſe who would call to mind his life and death, after his reſurrection, he might the more clearly appear to be ſo. It is farther to be remark'd, that tho' he often appeals to the teſtimonies of his miracles, who he is, yet he never tells the Jews, that he was born at Bethlehem, to remove the prejudice that lay againſt him, whilſt he paſſed for a Galilean, and which was urged as a proof that he was not the Meſſiah, John vii. 41, 42. The healing of the ſick, and doing good miraculouſly, could be no crime in him, nor accuſation againſt him. But the naming of Bethlehem for his birth-place might have wrought as much upon the mind of Pilate, as it did on Herod's; and have raiſed a ſuſpicion in Pilate, as prejudicial to our Saviour's innocence, as Herod's was to the children born there. His pretending to be born at Bethlehem, as it was liable to be explained by the Jews, could not have failed to have met with a ſiniſter interpretation in the Roman governor, and have rendered Jeſus ſuſpected of ſome criminal deſign againſt the government. And hence we ſee, that when Pilate aſked him, John xix. 9. "Whence art thou? Jeſus gave him no anſwer."

WHETHER our Saviour had not an eye to this ſtreightneſs, this narrow room that was left to his conduct, between the new converts and the captious Jews, when he ſays, Luke xii. 50. "I have a baptiſm to be baptized with, and πῶς "συνέχομαι, how am I ſtreightened, 'till it be accompliſhed!" I leave to be conſidered. "I am come to ſend fire on the earth," ſays our Saviour, "and "what if it be already kindled?" i. e. There begin already to be diviſions about me, John vii. 12, 43. and ix. 16. and x. 19. And I have not the freedom, the latitude, to declare myſelf openly to be the Meſſiah; though I am he, that muſt not be ſpoken on, 'till after my death. My way to my throne is cloſely hedged in on every ſide, and much ſtreightened; within which I muſt keep, 'till it bring me to my croſs in its due time and manner; ſo that it do not cut ſhort the time, nor croſs the end of my miniſtry.

AND therefore, to keep up this inoffenſive character, and not let it come within the reach of accident or calumny, he withdrew, with his apoſtles, out of the town, every evening; and kept himſelf retired out of the way, Luke xxi. 37. "And in the day-time he was teaching in the temple, and every night he "went out and abode in the mount, that is called the Mount of Olives," that he might avoid all concourſe to him in the night, and give no occaſion of diſturbance, or ſuſpicion of himſelf, in that great conflux of the whole nation of the Jews, now aſſembled in Jeruſalem at the paſſover.

BUT to return to his preaching in the temple: He bids them, John xii. 36. "To believe in the Light, whilſt they have it." And he tells them, ver. 46. "I am the Light come into the world, that every one who believes in me, "ſhould not remain in darkneſs;" which believing in him, was the believing him to be the Meſſiah, as I have elſewhere ſhewed.

THE next day, Matt. xxi. he rebukes them for not having believed John the Baptiſt, who had teſtified that he was the Meſſiah. And then, in a parable, declares himſelf to be the "Son of God," whom they ſhould deſtroy; and that for it God ſhould take away the kingdom of the Meſſiah from them, and give it to the Gentiles. That they underſtood him thus, is plain from Luke xx. 16. "And when they heard it, they ſaid, God forbid." And ver. 19. "For they "knew that he had ſpoken this parable againſt them."

MUCH to the ſame purpoſe was his next parable, concerning "the kingdom of heaven, Matt. xxi. 1,--10. That the Jews not accepting of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, to whom it was firſt offered, others ſhould be brought in.

THE ſcribes and Phariſees, and chief prieſts, not able to bear the declaration he made of himſelf to be the Meſſiah, (by his diſcourſes and miracles before them, ἔμπροθεν αὐτῶν, John xii. 37. which he had never done before) impatient of his preaching and miracles, and being not able otherwiſe to ſtop the increaſe of his followers, (for, "ſaid the Phariſees among themſelves, Perceive "ye how ye prevail nothing? Behold, the world is gone after him,") John xii. 19. So that "the chief prieſts, and the ſcribes, and the chief of the people "ſought to deſtroy him," the firſt day of his entrance into Jeruſalem, Luke xix. 47. The next day, again, they were intent upon the ſame thing, Mark xi. 17, 18. "And he taught in the temple; and the ſcribes and the chief prieſts "heard it, and ſought how they might deſtroy him; for they feared him, be-"cauſe all the people were aſtoniſhed at his doctrine."

THE next day but one, upon his telling them the kingdom of the Meſſiah ſhould be taken from them, "The chief prieſts and ſcribes ſought to lay hands "on him the ſame hour, and they feared the people," Luke xx. 19. If they had ſo great a deſire to lay hold on him, why did they not? They were the chief prieſts and the rulers, the men of power. The reaſon St. Luke plainly tells us, in the next verſe: "And they watched him, and ſent forth ſpies, who would "feign themſelves juſt men, that they might take hold of his words; that ſo "they might deliver him into the power and authority of the governor." They wanted matter of accuſation againſt him, to the power they were under. That they watched for, and that they would have been glad of, if they could have "entangled him in his talk;" as St. Matthew expreſſes it, chap. xxii. 15. If they could have laid hold of any word, that had dropt from him, that they might have rendered him guilty, or ſuſpected to the Roman governor; that would have ſerved their turn, to have laid hold upon him, with hopes to deſtroy him. For their power not anſwering their malice, they could not put him to death by their own authority, without the permiſſion and aſſiſtance of the governor; as they confeſs, John xviii. 31. "It is not lawful for us to put any man "to death." This made them ſo earneſt for a declaration in direct words, from his own mouth, that he was the Meſſiah. 'Twas not that they would more have believed in him, for ſuch a declaration of himſelf, than they did for his miracles, or other ways of making himſelf known, which it appears they underſtood well enough. But they wanted plain direct words, ſuch as might ſupport an accuſation, and be of weight before an heathen judge. This was the reaſon, why they preſſed him to ſpeak out, John x. 24. "Then came the Jews round "about him, and ſaid unto him, How long doſt thou hold us in ſuſpenſe? If "thou be the Meſſiah, tell us PLAINLY, παῤῥησία;" i. e. in direct words: for that St. John uſes it in that ſenſe we may ſee, chap. xi. 11,--14. "Jeſus ſaith "to them, Lazarus ſleepeth. His diſciples ſaid, If he ſleeps, he ſhall do well. "Howbeit, Jeſus ſpake of his death; but they thought he had ſpoken of taking "reſt in ſleep. Then ſaid Jeſus to them plainly, παῤῥησία, Lazarus is dead." Here we ſee what is meant by παῤῥησία, PLAIN, direct words, ſuch as expreſs the ſame thing without a figure; and ſo they would have had Jeſus pronounce himſelf to be the Meſſiah. And the ſame thing they preſs again, Matt. xvi. 63. the high prieſt adjuring him by the living God, to tell them whether he were the Meſſiah, the Son of God; as we ſhall have occaſion to take notice by-and-by.

THIS we may obſerve in the whole management of their deſign againſt his life. It turned upon this, that they wanted and wiſhed for a declaration from him in direct words, that he was the Meſſiah; ſomething from his own mouth, that might offend the Roman power, and render him criminal to Pilate. In the 21ſt verſe of this xxth of Luke, " They aſked him, ſaying, Maſter, we know " that thou ſayeſt and teacheſt rightly; neither accepteſt thou the perſon of any, " but teacheſt the way of God truly. Is it lawful for us to give tribute to Cæſar, or no?" By this captious queſtion they hoped to catch him, which way ſoever he anſwered. For if he had ſaid, they ought to pay tribute to Cæſar, 'twould be plain he allowed their ſubjection to the Romans; and ſo in effect diſowned himſelf to be their King and Deliverer; whereby he would have contradicted what his carriage and doctrine ſeemed to aim at, the opinion that was ſpread amongſt the people, that he was the Meſſiah. This would have quaſh'd the hopes, and deſtroyed the faith of thoſe who believed on him; and have turned the ears and hearts of the people from him. If on the other ſide, he anſwered, No, it is not lawful to pay tribute to Cæſar; they had had out of his own mouth wherewithal to condemn him before Pontius Pilate. But St. Luke tells us, ver;" 23. " He perceived their craftineſs, and ſaid unto them, Why tempt ye me?" i. e. Why do ye lay ſnares for me? " Ye hypocrites, ſhew me the tribute-money;" ſo it is, Matt. xxii. 19. " Whoſe image and inſcription has it? They ſaid, Cæſar's. He ſaid unto them, Render therefore to Cæſar the things that are " Cæſar's, and to God the things that are God's." By the wiſdom and caution of which unexpected anſwer, he defeated their whole deſign. " And they could " not take hold of his words before the people; and they marvelled at his anſwer, and held their peace," Luke xx. 26. " And leaving him, they departed." Matt. xxii. 22.

HE having, by this reply, (and what he anſwered to the Sadducees, concerning the reſurrection, and to the lawyer, about the firſt commandment, Mark xii.) anſwered ſo little to their ſatisfaction or advantage, they durſt aſk him no more queſtions, any of them. And now, their mouths being ſtopp'd, he himſelf begins to queſtion them about the Meſſiah; aſking the Phariſees, Matt. xxii. 41. " What ye think of the Meſſiah? whoſe Son is he? They ſay unto him, The " Son of David." Wherein though they anſwered right, yet he ſhews them in the following words, that, however they pretended to be ſtudiers and teachers of the law, yet they underſtood not clearly the ſcriptures concerning the Meſſiah; and thereupon, he ſharply rebukes their hypocriſy, vanity, pride, malice, covetouſneſs, and ignorance; and particularly tells them, ver. 13. " Ye ſhut up the " kingdom of heaven againſt men: for ye neither go in yourſelves, nor ſuffer " ye them that are entering, to go in." Whereby he plainly declares to them, that the Meſſiah was come, and his kingdom begun; but that they refuſed to believe in him themſelves, and did all they could to hinder others from believing in him; as is manifeſt throughout the new teſtament: the hiſtory whereof ſufficiently explains what is meant here by " the kingdom of heaven," which the ſcribes and Phariſees would neither go into themſelves, nor ſuffer others to enter into. And they could not chuſe but underſtand him, though he named not himſelf in the caſe.

PROVOKED anew by his rebukes, they get preſently to council, Matt. xxvi. 3, 4. " Then aſſembled together the chief prieſts, and the ſcribes, and the elders of " the people, unto the palace of the high prieſt, who was called Caiaphas, and " conſulted that they might take Jeſus by ſubtilty, and kill him. But they ſaid, " Not on the feaſt-day, leſt there be an uproar among the people. For they " feared the people," ſays St Luke, chap. xxii. 2.

HAVING in the night got Jeſus into their hands, by the treachery of Judas, they preſently led him away bound to Annas, the father-in-law of Caiaphas. Annas, probably, having examined him, and getting nothing out of him for his purpoſe, ſends him away to Caiaphas, John xviii. 24. where the chief prieſts, the ſcribes, and the elders were aſſembled. Matt. xxvi. 57. John xviii. 13. 19. " The high-prieſt then aſked Jeſus of his diſciples, and of his doctrine. " Jeſus anſwered him, I ſpake openly to the world: I ever taught in the ſyna-

“ gogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always reſort, and in ſecret have “ I ſaid nothing.” A proof that he had not in private, to his diſciples, declared himſelf in expreſs words to be the Meſſiah, the Prince. But he goes on: “ Why “ aſkeſt thou me?” Aſk Judas, who has been always with me. “ Aſk them “ who heard me, what I have ſaid unto them; behold, they know what I ſaid.” Our Saviour, we ſee here, warily declines, for the reaſons above-mentioned, all diſcourſe of his doctrine. The ſanhedrim, Matt. xxvi. 59. “ ſought falſe wit- “ neſs againſt him:” but when “ they found none that were ſufficient,” or came up to the point they deſired; which was to have ſomething againſt him to take away his life, (for ſo, I think, the words ἶσαι and ἴησ mean, Mark. xiv. 56, 59.) they try again what they can get out of him himſelf, concerning his being the Meſſiah; which if he owned in expreſs words, they thought they ſhould have enough againſt him at the tribunal of the Roman governor, to make him “ læſæ “ majeſtatis reum,” and ſo to take away his life. They therefore ſay to him, Luke xxii. 67. “ If thou be the Meſſiah, tell us.” Nay, as St. Matthew hath it, the high-prieſt adjures him by the living God, to tell them whether he were the Meſſiah. To which our Saviour replies, “ If I tell you, ye will not believe; “ and if I alſo aſk you, ye will not anſwer me, nor let me go.” If I tell you, and prove to you, by the teſtimony given me from heaven, and by the works that I have done among you, you will not believe in me, that I am the Meſſiah. Or if I ſhould aſk where the Meſſiah is to be born, and what ſtate he ſhould come in; how he ſhould appear, and other things that you think in me are not reconcileable with the Meſſiah; you will not anſwer me, and let me go, as one that has no pretence to be the Meſſiah, and you are not afraid ſhould be received for ſuch. But yet I tell you, “ Hereafter ſhall the Son of man ſit on the right “ hand of the power of God,” ver. 70. “ Then ſay they all, Art thou then “ the Son of God? And he ſaid unto them, Ye ſay that I am.” By which diſcourſe with them, related at large here by St. Luke, it is plain, that the anſwer of our Saviour, ſet down by St. Matthew, chap. xxvi. 64. in theſe words, “ Thou haſt ſaid;” and by St. Mark, chap. xiv. 62. in theſe, “ I am;” is an anſwer only to this queſtion, “ Art thou then the Son of God?” And not to that other, “ Art thou the Meſſiah? which preceded, and he had anſwered to before: though Matthew and Mark, contracting the ſtory, ſet them down together, as if making but one queſtion, omitting all the intervening diſcourſe; whereas 'tis plain out of St. Luke, that they were two diſtinct queſtions, to which Jeſus gave two diſtinct anſwers. In the firſt whereof, he, according to his uſual caution, declined ſaying in plain expreſs words, that he was the Meſſiah; though in the latter, he owned himſelf to be “ the Son of God.” Which, though they “ being Jews, underſtood to ſignify the Meſſiah, yet he knew could be no legal “ or weighty accuſation againſt him, before a heathen; and ſo it proved. For upon his anſwering to their queſtion, “ Art thou then the Son of God? Ye ſay “ that I am;” they cry out, Luke xxii. 71. “ What need we any further wit- “ neſſes? For we ourſelves have heard out of his own mouth.” And ſo thinking they had enough againſt him, they hurry him away to Pilate. Pilate aſking them, John xviii. 29,--32. “ What accuſation bring you againſt this man? They anſwered and ſaid, If he were not a malefactor, we would not have deli- “ vered him up unto thee.” Then ſaid Pilate unto them, “ Take ye him, and “ judge him according to your law.” But this would not ſerve their turn, who aimed at his life, and would be ſatisfied with nothing elſe. “ The Jews there- “ fore ſaid unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death.” And this was alſo, “ That the ſaying of Jeſus might be fulfilled, which he ſpake, ſigni- “ fying what death he ſhould die.” Purſuing therefore their deſign of making him appear, to Pontius Pilate, guilty of treaſon againſt Cæſar, Luke xxiii. 2 “ They began to accuſe him, ſaying, We found this fellow perverting the na- “ tion, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæſar; ſaying, that he himſelf is the “ Meſſiah, the King:” all which were inferences of theirs, from his ſaying, he was “ the Son of God:” which Pontius Pilate finding, (for 'tis conſonant that he examined them to the preciſe words he had ſaid) their accuſation had no weight with him. However, the name of King being ſuggeſted againſt Jeſus, he thought himſelf concerned to ſearch it to the bottom, John xviii. 33,--37. "Then Pilate entered again into the judgment-hall, and called Jeſus, and ſaid unto him, Art thou the King of the Jews? Jeſus anſwered him, Sayeſt thou this of thyſelf, or did others tell it thee of me? Pilate anſwered, Am I a Jew? Thine own nation and the chief prieſts have delivered thee unto me: What haſt thou done? Jeſus anſwered, My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my ſervants fight, that I ſhould not be delivered to the Jews; but now my kingdom is not from hence. Pilate therefore ſaid unto him, Art thou a King then? Jeſus anſwered, Thou ſayeſt that I am a King. For this end was I born, and for this cauſe came I into the world, that I ſhould bear witneſs to the truth: every one that is of the truth heareth my voice." In this dialogue between our Saviour and Pilate, we may obſerve, That being aſked, Whether he were "the King of the Jews?" He anſwers ſo, that tho' he deny it not, yet he avoided giving the leaſt umbrage, that he had any deſign upon the government. For, though he allows himſelf to be a King, yet, to obviate any ſuſpicion, he tells Pilate, "his kingdom is not of this world;" and evidences it by this, that if he had pretended to any title to that country, his followers, which were not a few, and were forward enough to believe him their King, would have fought for him; if he had had a mind to ſet himſelf up by force, or his kingdom were ſo to be erected. "But my kingdom," ſays he, "is not from hence," is not of this faſhion, or of this place.

2. PILATE being, by his words and circumſtances, ſatisfied that he laid no claim to his province, or meant any diſturbance of the government, was yet a little ſurprized, to hear a man in that poor garb, without retinue, or ſo much as a ſervant, or a friend, own himſelf to be a King; and therefore aſks him, with ſome kind of wonder, "Art thou a King then?"

3. THAT our Saviour declares, that his great buſineſs into the world was, to teſtify and make good this great truth, that he was a King; i. e. in other words, that he was the Meſſiah.

4. THAT whoever were followers of the truth, and got into the way of truth and happineſs, received this doctrine concerning him, viz. That he was the Meſſiah, their King.

PILATE being thus ſatisfied, that he neither meant, nor could there ariſe, any harm from his pretence, whatever it was, to be a King, tells the Jews, ver. 38. "I find no fault in this man." But the Jews were the more fierce, Luke xxiii. 5. ſaying, "He ſtirreth up the people to ſedition, by his preaching through all Jewry, beginning from Galilee to this place." And then Pilate, learning that he was of Galilee, Herod's juriſdiction, ſent him to Herod; to whom alſo "the chief prieſts and ſcribes," ver. 10. "vehemently accuſed him." Herod, finding all their accuſations either falſe or frivolous, thought our Saviour a bare object of contempt; and ſo, turning him only into ridicule, ſent him back to Pilate: who, calling unto him the chief prieſts, and the rulers, and the people, ver. 14. "Said unto them, Ye have brought this man unto me, as one that perverteth the people; and behold, I having examined him before you, have found no fault in this man, touching theſe things whereof ye accuſe him; no, nor yet Herod; for I ſent you to him: and lo, nothing worthy of death is done by him." And therefore he would have releaſed him: "For he knew the chief prieſts had delivered him through envy," Mark xv. 10. And when they demanded Barabbas to be releaſed, but as for Jeſus, cried, "Crucify him;" Luke xxiii. 22. "Pilate ſaid unto them the third time, Why? What evil hath he done? I have found no cauſe of death in him; I will, therefore, chaſtiſe him, and let him go."

WE may obſerve, in all this whole proſecution of the Jews, that they would fain have got it out of Jeſus's own mouth, in expreſs words, that he was the Meſſiah: which not being able to do, with all their art and endeavour; all the reſt that they could alledge againſt him, not amounting to a proof before Pilate, that he claimed to be King of the Jews; or that he had cauſed, or done any thing towards a mutiny or inſurrection among the people (for upon theſe two, as we ſee, their whole charge turned); Pilate again and again pronounced him innocent: for ſo he did a fourth, and a fifth time; bringing him out to them, after he had whipped him, John xix. 4, 6. And after all, "When Pilate ſaw "that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took "water, and waſhed his hands before the multitude, ſaying, I am innocent of "the blood of this juſt man: ſee you to it," Matt. xxvii. 24. Which gives us a clear reaſon of the cautious and wary conduct of our Saviour, in not declaring himſelf, in the whole courſe of his miniſtry, ſo much as to his diſciples, much leſs to the multitude, or to the rulers of the Jews, in expreſs words, to be the Meſſiah the King; and why he kept himſelf always in prophetical, or parabolical terms (he and his diſciples preaching only the kingdom of God, i. e. of the Meſſiah, to be come); and left to his miracles to declare who he was; though this was the truth, which he came into the world, as he ſays himſelf, John xviii. 37. to teſtify, and which his diſciples were to believe.

When Pilate, ſatisfied of his innocence, would have releaſed him; and the Jews perſiſted to cry out, "Crucify him, crucify him," John xix. 6. "Pilate "ſays to them, Take ye him yourſelves, and crucify him: for I do not find any "fault in him." The Jews then, ſince they could not make him a ſtate-criminal, by alledging his ſaying, that he was "the Son of God," ſay, by their law it was a capital crime, ver. 7. "The Jews anſwered to Pilate, We have a law, "and by our law he ought to die; becauſe he made himſelf the Son of God," i. e. becauſe, by ſaying "he is the Son of God," he has made himſelf the Meſſiah, the Prophet, which was to come. For we find no other law but that againſt falſe prophets, Deut. xviii. 20. whereby "making himſelf the Son of "God," deſerved death. After this, Pilate was the more deſirous to releaſe him, ver. 12, 13. "But the Jews cried out, ſaying, If thou let this man go, thou art "not Cæſar's friend: whoſoever maketh himſelf a King, ſpeaketh againſt Cæ"ſar." Here we ſee the ſtreſs of their charge againſt Jeſus; whereby they hoped to take away his life, viz. that he "made himſelf King." We ſee alſo upon what they grounded this accuſation, viz. Becauſe he had owned himſelf to be "the Son of God." For he had, in their hearing, never made or profeſſed himſelf to be a King. We ſee here, likewiſe, the reaſon why they were ſo deſirous to draw, from his own mouth, a confeſſion in expreſs words, that he was the Meſſiah, viz. That they might have what might be a clear proof that he did ſo. And, laſt of all, we ſee the reaſon why, though in expreſſions which they underſtood, he owned himſelf to them to be the Meſſiah; yet he avoided declaring it to them, in ſuch words, as might look criminal at Pilate's tribunal. He owned himſelf to be the Meſſiah plainly, to the underſtanding of the Jews; but in ways that could not, to the underſtanding of Pilate, make it appear that he had laid claim to the kingdom of Judea, or went about to make himſelf King of that country. But whether his ſaying, that he was "the Son of God," was criminal by their law, that Pilate troubled not himſelf about.

He that conſiders what Tacitus, Suetonius, Seneca de benef. l. 3. c. 26. ſay of Tiberius and his reign, will find how neceſſary it was for our Saviour, if he would not die as a criminal and a traitor, to take great heed to his words and actions; that he did or ſaid not any thing that might be offenſive, or give the leaſt umbrage to the Roman government. It behoved an innocent man, who was taken notice of, for ſomething extraordinary in him, to be very wary under a jealous and cruel prince, who encouraged informations, and filled his reign with executions for treaſon; under whom, words ſpoken innocently, or in jeſt, if they could be miſconſtrued, were made treaſon, and proſecuted with a rigour, that made it always the ſame thing to be accuſed and condemned. And therefore we ſee, that when the Jews told Pilate, John xix. 12. that he ſhould not be a friend to Cæſar, if he let Jeſus go (for that whoever made himſelf king, was a rebel againſt Cæſar); he aſks them no more, whether they would take Barabbas, and ſpare Jeſus; but (though againſt his conſcience) gives him up to death, to ſecure his own head.

One thing more there is, that gives us light into this wiſe and neceſſarily cautious management of himſelf, which manifeſtly agrees with it, and makes a part of it: and that is, the choice of his apoſtles; exactly ſuited to the deſign and foreſight of the neceſſity of keeping the declaration of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, which was now expected, within certain general terms, during his miniſtry. It was not fit to open himſelf too plainly or forwardly, to the heady Jews, that he himſelf was the Meſſiah: that was to be left to the obſervation of thoſe, who would attend to the purity of his life, the teſtimony of his miracles, and the conformity of all, with the predictions concerning him; by theſe marks, thoſe he lived amongſt were to find it out, without an expreſs promulgation that he was the Meſſiah, 'till after his death. His kingdom was to be opened to them by degrees, as well to prepare them to receive it, as to enable him to be long enough amongſt them, to perform what was the work of the Meſſiah, to be done; and fulfil all thoſe ſeveral parts of what was foretold of him in the old teſtament, and we ſee applied to him in the new.

THE Jews had no other thoughts of their Meſſiah, but of a mighty temporal prince, that ſhould raiſe their nation into an higher degree of power, dominion and proſperity, than ever it had enjoyed. They were filled with the expectation of a glorious earthly kingdom. It was not, therefore, for a poor man, the ſon of a carpenter, and (as they thought) born in Galilee, to pretend to it. None of the Jews, no, not his diſciples could have borne this, if he had expreſly avowed this at firſt, and began his preaching, and the opening of his kingdom this way, eſpecially if he had added to it, that in a year or two, he ſhould die an ignominious death upon the croſs. They are therefore prepared for the truth by degrees. Firſt, John the Baptiſt tells them, "The kingdom of God (a name, "by which the Jews called the kingdom of the Meſſiah) is at hand." Then our Saviour comes, and he tells them "of the kingdom of God;" ſometimes that it is at hand, and upon ſome occaſions, that it is come; but ſays, in his publick preaching, little or nothing of himſelf. Then come the apoſtles and evangeliſts, after his death, and they, in expreſs words, teach what his birth, life, and doctrine had done before, and had prepared the well-diſpoſed to receive, viz. That "Jeſus is the Meſſiah."

To this deſign and method of publiſhing the goſpel, was the choice of the apoſtles exactly adjuſted; a company of poor, ignorant, illiterate men; who, as Chriſt himſelf tells us, Matt. xi. 25. and Luke x. 21. were not of the "wiſe "and prudent" men of the world: they were, in that reſpect, but mere children. Theſe, convinced by the miracles they ſaw him daily do, and the unblameable life he led, might be diſpoſed to believe him to be the Meſſiah: and tho' they, with others, expected a temporal kingdom on earth, might yet reſt ſatisfied in the truth of their Maſter, (who had honoured them with being near his perſon) that it would come, without being too inquiſitive after the time, manner, or ſeat of his kingdom, as men of letters, more ſtudied in their rabbins, or men of buſineſs, more verſed in the world, would have been forward to have been. Men great, or wiſe, in knowledge, or ways of the world, would hardly have been kept from prying more narrowly into his deſign and conduct; or from queſtioning him about the ways and meaſures he would take, for aſcending the throne; and what means were to be uſed towards it, and when they ſhould in earneſt ſet about it. Abler men, of higher births or thoughts, would hardly have been hindered from whiſpering, at leaſt to their friends and relations, that their Maſter was the Meſſiah; and that, though he concealed himſelf to a fit opportunity, and 'till things were ripe for it, yet they ſhould, ere long, ſee him break out of his obſcurity, caſt off the cloud, and declare himſelf, as he was, King of Iſrael. But the ignorance and lowneſs of theſe good, poor men, made them of another temper. They went along, in an implicit truſt on him, punctually keeping to his commands, and not exceeding his commiſſion. When he ſent them to preach the goſpel, he bid them preach "the kingdom of God" to be at hand; and that they did, without being more particular than he had ordered, or mixing their own prudence with his commands, to promote the kingdom of the Meſſiah. They preached it, without giving, or ſo much as intimating, that their Maſter was he: which men of another condition, and an higher education, would ſcarce have forborn to have done. When he aſked them, who they thought him to be; and Peter anſwered, "The Meſſiah, the "Son of God," Matt. xvi. 16. he plainly ſhews by the following words, that he himſelf had not told them ſo; and at the ſame time, ver. 20. forbids them to tell this their opinion of him to any body. How obedient they were to him in this, we may not only conclude from the ſilence of the evangeliſts concerning any ſuch thing, publiſhed by them any where before his death; but from the exact obedience three of them paid to a like command of his. He takes Peter, James and John, into a mountain; and there Moſes and Elias coming to him, he is transfigured before them, Matt. xvii. 9. He charges them, ſaying, "See that ye tell no man what ye have ſeen, 'till the Son of man ſhall be riſen "from the dead." And St. Luke tells us, what punctual obſervers they were of his orders in this caſe, chap. ix. 36. "They kept it cloſe, and told no man, in "thoſe days, any of thoſe things which they had ſeen."

WHETHER twelve other men, of quicker parts, and of a ſtation or breeding, which might have given them any opinion of themſelves, or their own abilities, would have been ſo eaſily kept from meddling, beyond juſt what was preſcribed them, in a matter they had ſo much intereſt in; and have ſaid nothing of what they might, in human prudence, have thought would have contributed to their maſter's reputation, and made way for his advancement to his kingdom, I leave to be conſidered. And it may ſuggeſt matter of meditation, whether St. Paul was not for this reaſon, by his learning, parts, and warmer temper, better fitted for an apoſtle after, than during our Saviour's miniſtry: and therefore, though a choſen veſſel, was not by the divine wiſdom called 'till after Chriſt's reſurrection.

I OFFER this only as a ſubject of magnifying the admirable contrivance of the divine wiſdom, in the whole work of our redemption, as far we are able to trace it, by the footſteps which God hath made viſible to human reaſon. For, though it be as eaſy to omnipotent power to do all things by an immediate over-ruling will, and ſo to make any inſtruments work, even contrary to their own nature, in ſubſerviency to his ends; yet his wiſdom is not uſually at the expence of miracles, (if I may ſo ſay) but only in caſes that require them, for the evidencing of ſome revelation or miſſion, to be from him. He does conſtantly (unleſs where the confirmation of ſome truth requires it otherwiſe) bring about his purpoſes by means operating according to their natures. If it were not ſo, the courſe and evidence of things would be confounded, miracles would loſe their name and force; and there could be no diſtinction between natural and ſupernatural.

THERE had been no room left to ſee and admire the wiſdom, as well as innocence of our Saviour, if he had raſhly every where expoſed himſelf to the fury of the Jews, and had always been preſerved by a miraculous ſuſpenſion of their malice, or a miraculous reſcuing him out of their hands. It was enough for him once to eſcape from the men of Nazareth, who were going to throw him down a precipice, for him never to preach to them again. Our Saviour had multitudes that followed him for the loaves; who barely ſeeing the miracles that he did, would have made him King. If to the miracles he did, he had openly added, in expreſs words, that he was the Meſſiah, and the King, they expected to deliver them, he would have had more followers, and warmer in the cauſe, and readier to ſet him up at the head of a tumult. Theſe indeed God, by a miraculous influence, might have hindered from any ſuch attempt: but then poſterity could not have believed, that the nation of the Jews did, at that time, expect the Meſſiah, their King and Deliverer; or that Jeſus, who declared himſelf to be that King and Deliverer, ſhewed any miracles amongſt them, to convince them of it, or did any thing worthy to make him be credited or received. If he had gone about preaching to the multitude, which he drew after him, that he was the "Meſſiah, the King of Iſrael," and this had been evidenced to Pilate; God could indeed, by a ſupernatural influence upon his mind, have made Pilate pronounce him innocent, and not condemn him as a malefactor, who had openly, for three years together, preached ſedition to the people, and endeavoured to perſuade them, that he was "the Meſſiah, their

"King," of the blood royal of David, come to deliver them. But then I aſk, "Whether poſterity would not either have ſuſpected the ſtory, or that ſome art "had been uſed to gain that teſtimony from Pilate?" Becauſe he could not (for nothing) have been ſo favourable to Jeſus, as to be willing to releaſe ſo turbulent and ſeditious a man; to declare him innocent, and to caſt the blame and guilt of his death, as unjuſt, upon the envy of the Jews.

BUT now, the malice of the chief prieſts, ſcribes and Phariſees; the headineſs of the mob, animated with hopes, and raiſed with miracles; Judas's treachery, and Pilate's care of his government, and of the peace of his province, all working naturally as they ſhould; Jeſus, by the admirable warineſs of his carriage, and an extraordinary wiſdom, viſible in his whole conduct, weathers all theſe difficulties, does the work he comes for, uninterruptedly goes about preaching his full appointed time, ſufficiently manifeſts himſelf to be the Meſſiah, in all the particulars the ſcriptures had foretold of him; and when his hour is come, ſuffers death: but is acknowledged, both by Judas that betrayed, and Pilate that condemned him, to die innocent. For, to uſe his own words, Luke xxiv. 46. "Thus it is written, and thus it behoved the Meſſiah to ſuf-"fer." And of his whole conduct, we have a reaſon and clear reſolution in thoſe words to St. Peter, Matt. xxvi. 53. "Thinkeſt thou that I cannot now "pray to my father, and he ſhall preſently give me more than twelve legions "of angels? But how then ſhall the ſcripture be fulfilled, that thus it muſt "be?"

HAVING this clew to guide us, let us now obſerve, how our Saviour's preaching and conduct comported with it in the laſt ſcene of his life. How cautious he had been in the former part of his miniſtry, we have already obſerved. We never find him to uſe the name of the Meſſiah but once, 'till he now came to Jeruſalem, this laſt paſſover. Before this, his preaching and miracles were leſs at Jeruſalem, (where he uſed to make but very ſhort ſtays) than any where elſe. But now he comes ſix days before the feaſt, and is every day in the temple teaching; and there publickly heals the blind and the lame, in the preſence of the ſcribes, Phariſees, and chief prieſts. The time of his miniſtry drawing to an end, and his hour coming, he cared not how much the chief prieſts, elders, rulers, and the ſanhedrim, were provoked againſt him by his doctrine and miracles: he was as open and bold in his preaching, and doing the works of the Meſſiah now at Jeruſalem, and in the ſight of the rulers, and of all the people, as he had been before cautious and reſerved there, and careful to be little taken notice of in that place, and not to come in their way more than needs. All that he now took care of, was not what they ſhould think of him, or deſign againſt him, (for he knew they would ſeize him) but to ſay or do nothing that might be a juſt matter of accuſation againſt him, to render him criminal to the governor. But, as for the grandees of the Jewiſh nation, he ſpares them not, but ſharply now reprehends their miſcarriages publickly in the temple; where he calls them, more than once, "hypocrites;" as is to be ſeen, Matt. xxiii. And concludes all with no ſofter a compellation than "ſerpents," and "generation of vipers."

AFTER this ſevere reproof of the ſcribes and Phariſees, being retired with his diſciples into the "Mount of Olives," over-againſt the temple, and there foretelling the deſtruction of it; his diſciples aſk him, Matth. xxiv. 3, &c. "When it ſhould be, and what ſhould be the ſigns of his coming?" He ſays, to them, "Take heed that no man deceive you: for many ſhall come in my "name," i. e. taking on them the name and dignity of the Meſſiah, which is only mine, ſaying, "I am the Meſſiah, and ſhall deceive many." But be not you by them miſled, nor by perſecution driven away from this fundamental truth, that I am the Meſſiah; "for many ſhall be ſcandalized," and apoſtatize; "but he that endures to the end, the ſame ſhall be ſaved: and this goſpel "of the kingdom ſhall be preached in all the world;" i. e. the good news of me, the Meſſiah, and my kingdom, ſhall be ſpread through the world. This was the great and only point of belief they were warned to ſtick to; and this is inculcated again, ver. 23,--26. and Mark xiii. 21,--23. with this emphatical application to them, in both theſe evangeliſts," "Behold, I have told you before-"hand; remember, you are forewarned."

THIS was in his anſwer to the apoſtles enquiry, concerning his "coming, "and the end of the world," ver. 3, For ſo we tranſlate τῆς συντελείας τȣ͂ αἰῶνος. We muſt underſtand the diſciples here to put their queſtion, according to the notion and way of ſpeaking of the Jews. For they had two worlds, as we tranſlate it, ὁ νῦν αἰὼν, ϗ ὁ μέλλων αἰὼν; "the preſent world," and the "world to "come." The kingdom of God, as they called it, or the time of the Meſſiah, they called ὁ μέλλων αἰών, "the world to come," which they believed was to put an end to "this world;" and that then the juſt ſhould be raiſed from the dead, to enjoy, in that "new world," a happy eternity, with thoſe of the Jewiſh nation, who ſhould be then living.

THESE two things, viz. the viſible and powerful appearance of his kingdom, and the end of the world, being confounded in the apoſtles queſtion, our Saviour does not ſeparate them, nor diſtinctly reply to them apart; but, leaving the inquirers in the common opinion, anſwers at once concerning his coming to take vengeance on the Jewiſh nation, and put an end to their church, worſhip and commonwealth; which was their ὁ νῦν αἰὼν, "preſent world," which they counted ſhould laſt till the Meſſiah came; and ſo it did, and then had an end put to it. And to this he joins his laſt coming to judgment, in the glory of his Father, to put a final end to this world, and all the diſpenſation belonging to the poſterity of Adam, upon earth. This joining them together, made his anſwer obſcure, and hard to be underſtand by them then; nor was it ſafe for him to ſpeak plainer of his kingdom, and the deſtruction of Jeruſalem, unleſs he had a mind to be accuſed for having deſigns againſt the government. For Judas was amongſt them: and whether no other but his apoſtles, were comprehended under the name of "his diſciples," who were with him at this time, one cannot determine. Our Saviour, therefore, ſpeaks of his kingdom in no other ſtyle, but that which he had along hitherto uſed, viz. "the kingdom of God," Luke xxi. 31. "When you ſee theſe things come to paſs, know ye, "that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand." And continuing on his diſcourſe with them, he has the ſame expreſſion, Matth. xxv. 1. "Then the kingdom of "heaven ſhall be like unto ten virgins." At the end of the following parable of the talents, he adds, ver. 31. "When the Son of man ſhall come in his glory, "and all the holy angels with him, then ſhall he ſit upon the throne of his glory, "And before him ſhall be gathered all the nations. And he ſhall ſet the ſheep "on his right hand, and the goats on his left. Then ſhall the KING ſay, &c." Here he deſcribes to his diſciples, the appearance of his kingdom, wherein he will ſhew himſelf a King in glory upon his throne; but this in ſuch a way, and ſo remote, and ſo unintelligible to an heathen magiſtrate; that, if it had been alledged againſt him, it would have ſeemed rather the dream of a crazy brain, than the contrivance of an ambitious or dangerous man, deſigning againſt the government; the way of expreſſing what he meant, being in the prophetick ſtyle, which is ſeldom ſo plain as to be underſtood, till accompliſhed. 'Tis plain, that his diſciples themſelves comprehended not what the kingdom he here ſpoke of, from their queſtion to him after his reſurrection, "Wilt thou at this "time reſtore again the kingdom unto Iſrael?"

HAVING finiſhed theſe diſcourſes, he takes order for the paſſover, and eats it with his diſciples; and at ſupper tells them, that one of them ſhould betray him; and adds, John xiii. 19. "I tell it you now, before it come, that when "it is come to paſs, you may know that I am." He does not ſay out, "the "Meſſiah;" Judas ſhould not have that to ſay againſt him, if he would; though that be the ſenſe in which he uſes this expreſſion, ἐγὼ εἰμι, "I am," more than once. And that this is the meaning of it, is clear from Mark xii. 6. Luke xxi. 8. In both which evangeliſts the words are, "For many ſhall come in my name, ſaying, ἐγὼ εἰμι, I am:" the meaning whereof we ſhall find explained in the parallel place of St. Matthew, chap. xxiv. 5. "For many ſhall come in my name, ſaying, ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ Χριςος, "I am the Meſſiah." Here, in this place of John xiii. Jeſus foretells what ſhould happen to him, viz. that he ſhould be be-

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trayed by Judas; adding this prediction, to the many other particulars of his death and ſuffering, which he had at other times foretold to them. And here he tells them the reaſon of theſe his predictions, viz. that afterwards they might be a confirmation to their faith. And what was it that he would have them believe, and be confirmed in the belief of? Nothing but this, ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, that "he "was the Meſſiah." The ſame reaſon he gives, John xiii. 28. "You have "heard, how I ſaid unto you, I go away, and come again unto you: and now "I have told you, before it come to paſs, that when it is come to paſs, ye might "believe."

WHEN Judas had left them, and was gone out, he talks a little freer to them of his glory and his kingdom, than ever he had done before. For now he ſpeaks plainly of himſelf, and of his kingdom, John xiii. 31. "Therefore "when he [Judas] was gone out, Jeſus ſaid, Now is the Son of man glorified, "and God is alſo glorified in him. And, if God be glorified in him, God ſhall "alſo glorify him in himſelf, and ſhall ſtraitway glorify him." And Luke xxii. 29. "And I will appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed "unto me; that ye may eat and drink with me at my table, in my kingdom." Though he has every where, all along through his miniſtry, preached the "goſpel of the kingdom;" and nothing elſe but that and repentance, and the duties of a good life; yet it has been always "the kingdom of God," and "the kingdom of heaven:" and I do not remember, that any-where, till now, he uſes any ſuch expreſſion, as, "my kingdom;" But here now he ſpeaks in the firſt perſon, "" I will appoint you a kingdom;" and, "in my kingdom:" and this we ſee is only to the eleven, now Judas was gone from them.

WITH theſe eleven, whom he was now juſt leaving, he has a long diſcourſe to comfort them for the loſs of him; and to prepare them for the perſecution of the world; and to exhort them to keep his commandments, and to love one another. And here one may expect all the articles of faith ſhould be laid down plainly; if any thing elſe were required of them to believe, but what he had taught them, and they believed already, viz. "That he was the Meſſiah," John xiv. 1. "Ye believe in God, believe alſo in me." Ver. 29. "I have told "you before it come to paſs, that when it is come to paſs, ye may believe." It is believing on him, without any thing elſe, John xvi. 31. "Jeſus anſwered "them, Do ye now believe?" This was in anſwer to their profeſſion, ver. 30. "Now are we ſure, that thou knoweſt all things, and needeſt not that any man "ſhould aſk thee: by this we believe that thou cameſt forth from God."

JOHN xvii. 20. "Neither pray I for theſe alone, but for them alſo which "ſhall believe on me through their word." All that is ſpoke of believing, in this laſt ſermon to them, is only "believing on him," or believing that "he "came from God;" which was no other than believing him to be the Meſſiah.

INDEED, John xiv. 9. Our Saviour tells Philip, "He that hath ſeen me, "hath ſeen the Father." And adds, ver. 10. "Believeſt thou not that I am "in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I ſpeak unto you, I "ſpeak not of myſelf: but the Father, that dwelleth in me, he doth the "works." Which being in anſwer to Philip's words, ver. 9. "Shew us the "Father," ſeem to import thus much: "No man hath ſeen God at any time," he is known only by his works. And that he is my Father, and I the Son of God, i. e. the Meſſiah, you may know by the works I have done; which it is impoſſible I could do of myſelf, but by the union I have with God my Father. For that by being "in God," and "God in him," he ſignifies ſuch an union with God, that God operates in and by him, appears not only by the words above-cited out of ver 10. (which can ſcarce otherwiſe be made coherent ſenſe) but alſo from the ſame phraſe, uſed again by our Saviour preſently after, ver. 20, "At that day," viz. after his reſurrection, when they ſhould ſee him again, "ye ſhall know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you;" i. e. by the works that I ſhall enable you to do, through a power I have received from the Father: which whoſoever ſees me do, muſt acknowledge the Father to be in me; and whoſoever ſees you do, muſt acknowledge me to be in you. And therefore he ſays, ver. 12. "Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, he that

" believeth on me, the works that I do ſhall he alſo do, becauſe I go unto my " Father." Though I go away, yet I ſhall be in you, who believe in me; and ye ſhall be enabled to do miracles alſo, for the carrying on of my kingdom, as I have done; that it may be manifeſted by others, that you are ſent by me, as I have evidenced to you, that I am ſent by the Father. And hence it is that he ſays, in the immediately preceding ver. 11. " Believe me, that I am in the " Father, and the Father in me; if not, believe me for the ſake of the works " themſelves." Let the works that I have done convince you, that I am ſent by the Father; that he is with me, and that I do nothing but by his will, and by virtue of the union I have with him; and that conſequently I am the Meſſiah, who am anointed, ſanctified, and ſeparated by the Father, to the work for which he ſent me.

To confirm them in this faith, and to enable them to do ſuch works as he had done, he promiſes them the Holy Ghoſt, John xiv. 25, 26. " Theſe things " I have ſaid unto you, being yet preſent with you." But when I am gone, " The Holy Ghoſt, the Paraclet," (which may ſignify Monitor, as well as Comforter, or Advocate) " which the Father ſhall ſend you in my name, he " ſhall ſhew you all things, and bring to your remembrance all things which I " have ſaid." So that, conſidering all that I have ſaid, and laying it together, and comparing it with what you ſhall ſee come to paſs, you may be more abundantly aſſured, that I am the Meſſiah; and fully comprehend, that I have done and ſuffered all things foretold of the Meſſiah, and that were to be accompliſhed and fulfilled in him, according to the ſcriptures. But be not filled with grief, that I leave you, John xvi. 7. " It is expedient for you, that I go away; " for if I go not away, the Paraclet will not come unto you." One reaſon why, if he went not away, the Holy Ghoſt could not come, we may gather from what has been obſerved, concerning the prudent and wary carriage of our Saviour all through his miniſtry that he might not incur death with the leaſt ſuſpicion of a malefactor. And therefore, though his diſciples believed him to be the Meſſiah, yet they neither underſtood it ſo well, nor were ſo well confirmed in the belief of it, as after that, he being crucified and riſen again, they had received the Holy Ghoſt; and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a fuller and clearer evidence and knowledge that he was the Meſſiah. They then were enlightened to ſee how his kingdom was ſuch as the ſcriptures foretold, though not ſuch as they, till then, had expected. And now this knowledge and aſſurance, received from the Holy Ghoſt, was of uſe to him after his reſurrection; when they could now boldly go about, and openly preach, as they did, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; confirming that doctrine by the miracles which the Holy Ghoſt empowered them to do. But till he was dead and gone, they could not do this. Their going about openly preaching, as they did after his reſurrection, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; and doing miracles every-where, to make it good, would not have conſiſted with that character of humility, peace and innocence, which the Meſſiah was to ſuſtain, if they had done it before his crucifixion. For this would have drawn upon him the condemnation of a malefactor, either as a ſtirrer of ſedition againſt the publick peace, or as a pretender to the kingdom of Iſrael. Hence we ſee, that they, who before his death preached only the " goſpel of the kingdom;" that " the kingdom of God was at hand;" as ſoon as they had received the Holy Ghoſt, after his reſurrection, changed their ſtyle, and every-where in expreſs words declare, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, that King which was to come. This, the following words here in St. John xvi. 8,--14. confirm, where he goes on to tell them, " And when he is come, he will " convince the world of ſin; becauſe they believed not on me." Your preaching then, accompanied with miracles, by the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt, ſhall be a conviction to the world, that the Jews ſinned in not beliving me to be the Meſſiah. " Of righteouſneſs," or juſtice: " becauſe I go to my Father, and ye " ſee me no more." By the ſame preaching and miracles you ſhall confirm the doctrine of my aſcenſion; and thereby convince the world, that I was that juſt one, who am, therefore, aſcended to the Father into heaven, where no unjuſt perſon ſhall enter. " Of judgment; becauſe the prince of this world is judged."

And by the ſame aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt, ye ſhall convince the world, that the devil is judged or condemned, by your caſting of him out, and deſtroying his kingdom, and his worſhip, where-ever you preach. Our Saviour adds, "I have "yet many things to ſay unto you, but you cannot bear them now." They were yet ſo full of a temporal kingdom, that they could not bear the diſcovery of what kind of kingdom his was, nor what a King he was to be: and therefore he leaves them to the coming of the Holy Ghoſt, for a farther and fuller diſcovery of himſelf, and the kingdom of the Meſſiah; for fear they ſhould be ſcandalized in him, and give up the hopes they now had in him, and forſake him. This he tells them, ver. 1. of this xvith chapter: "Theſe things "I have ſaid unto you, that you may not be ſcandalized." The laſt thing he had told them, before his ſaying this to them, we find in the laſt verſes of the precedent chapter: "When the Paraclet is come, the Spirit of truth, he ſhall "witneſs concerning me." He ſhall ſhew you who I am, and witneſs it to the world; and then, "Ye alſo ſhall bear witneſs, becauſe ye have been with me "from the beginning." He ſhall call to your mind, what I have ſaid and done, that ye may underſtand it, and know, and bear witneſs concerning me. And again here, John xvi. after he had told them, they could not bear what he had more to ſay, he adds, ver. 13. "Howbeit, when the Spirit of truth is come, he "will guide you into all truth; and he will ſhew you things to come: he ſhall "glorify me." By the Spirit, when he comes, ye ſhall be fully inſtructed concerning me; and though you cannot yet, from what I have ſaid to you, clearly comprehend my kingdom and glory, yet he ſhall make it known to you wherein it conſiſts: and though I am now in a mean ſtate, and ready to be given up to contempt, torment, and death, ſo that ye know not what to think of it; yet the Spirit, when he comes, "ſhall glorify me," and fully ſatisfy you of my power and kingdom; and that I ſit on the right hand of God, to order all things for the good and increaſe of it, till I come again at the laſt day, in the fulneſs of glory.

ACCORDINGLY, the apoſtles had a full and clear ſight and perſuaſion of this, after they had received the Holy Ghoſt; and they preached it every-where boldly and openly, without the leaſt remainder of doubt or uncertainty. But that, even ſo late as this, they underſtood not his death and reſurrection, is evident from ver. 17, 18. "Then ſaid ſome of his diſciples among themſelves, "What is this that he ſaith unto us; A little while, and ye ſhall not ſee me; "and again, a little while, and ye ſhall ſee me; and becauſe I go to the Father? They ſaid therefore, What is this that he ſaith, A little while? We "know not what he ſaith." Upon which he goes on to diſcourſe to them of his death and reſurrection, and of the power they ſhould have of doing miracles. But all this he declares to them in a myſtical and involved way of ſpeaking: as he tells them himſelf, ver. 25. "Theſe things have I ſpoken to you in "proverbs;" i. e. in general, obſcure, ænigmatical, or figurative terms (all which, as well as alluſive apologues, the Jews called proverbs or parables.) Hitherto my declaring of myſelf to you hath been obſcure, and with reſerve; and I have not ſpoken of myſelf to you in plain and direct words, becauſe ye "could not bear it." A Meſſiah, and not a King, you could not underſtand: and a King, living in poverty and perſecution, and dying the death of a ſlave and malefactor upon a croſs, you could not put together. And had I told you in plain words, that I was the Meſſiah, and given you a direct commiſſion to preach to others, that I profeſſedly owned myſelf to be the Meſſiah, you and they would have been ready to have made a commotion, to have ſet me upon the throne of my father David, and fight for me; and that your Meſſiah, your King, in whom are your hopes of a kingdom, ſhould not be delivered up into the hands of his enemies, to be put to death; and of this, Peter will inſtantly give you a proof. But "the time cometh, when I ſhall no more ſpeak unto "you in parables; but I ſhall ſhew unto you plainly of the Father." My death and reſurrection, and the coming of the Holy Ghoſt, will ſpeedily enlighten you, and then I ſhall make you know the will and deſign of the Father; what a kingdom I am to have, and by what means, and to what end, ver. 27. And this the Father himſelf will ſhew unto you; "For he loveth you, becauſe ye "have loved me, and have believed that I came out from the Father." Becauſe ye have believed that I am "the Son of God, the Meſſiah;" that he hath anointed and ſent me; though it hath not been yet fully diſcovered to you, what kind of kingdom it ſhall be, nor by what means brought about. And then our Saviour, without being aſked, explaining to them what he had ſaid, and making them underſtand better, what before they ſtuck at, and complained ſecretly among themſelves that they underſtood not; they thereupon declare, ver. 30. "Now are we ſure that thou knoweſt all things, and needeſt not that any "man ſhould aſk thee." 'Tis plain, thou knoweſt men's thoughts and doubts before they aſk. "By this we believe that thou cameſt forth from God. Jeſus anſwered, Do ye now believe?" Notwithſtanding that you now believe, that I came from God, and am the Meſſiah, ſent by him; "Behold, the hour "cometh, yea, is now come, that ye ſhall be ſcattered;" and as it is, Matth. xxvi. 31. and "ſhall all be ſcandalized in me." What it is to be ſcandalized in him, we may ſee by what followed hereupon, if that which he ſays to St. Peter, Mark xiv. did not ſufficiently explain it.

THIS I have been the more particular in; that it may be ſeen, that in this laſt diſcourſe to his diſciples (where he opened himſelf more than he had hitherto done; and where, if any thing more was required to make them believers, than what they already believed, we might have expected they ſhould have heard of it) there were no new articles propoſed to them, but what they believed before, viz. that he was the Meſſiah, the Son of God, ſent from the Father; though of his manner of proceeding, and his ſudden leaving of the world, and ſome few particulars, he made them underſtand ſomething more, than they did before. But as to the main deſign of the goſpel, viz. that he had a kingdom, that he ſhould be put to death, and riſe again, and aſcend into heaven to his Father, and come again in glory to judge the world; this he had told them: and ſo had acquainted them with the great counſel of God, in ſending him the Meſſiah, and omitted nothing that was neceſſary to be known or believed in it. And ſo he tells them himſelf, John xv. 15. "Henceforth I call ye not ſervants; "for the ſervant knoweth not what his Lord does: but I have called ye friends; "for ALL THINGS I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you;" though perhaps ye do not ſo fully comprehend them, as you will ſhortly, when I am riſen and aſcended.

TO conclude all, in his prayer, which ſhuts up this diſcourſe, he tells the Father what he had made known to his apoſtles; the reſult whereof we have, John xvii. 8. "I have given unto them the words which thou gaveſt me, and "they have received them, and THEY HAVE BELIEVED THAT THOU DIDST SEND ME. Which is, in effect, that he was the Meſſiah promiſed and ſent by God. And then he prays for them, and adds, ver. 20, 21. "Neither pray I for theſe alone, but for them alſo, who ſhall believe on me through "their word." What that word was, through which others ſhould believe in him, we have ſeen in the preaching of the apoſtles, all through the hiſtory of the Acts, viz. this one great point, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. The apoſtles, he ſays, ver. 25. "know that thou haſt ſent me;" i. e. are aſſured that I am the Meſſiah. And in ver. 21. and 23. he prays, "That the world may believe" (which ver. 23. is called knowing) "that thou haſt ſent me." So that what Chriſt would have believed by his diſciples, we may ſee by this his laſt prayer for them, when he was leaving the world, as well as by what he preached whilſt he was in it.

AND, as a teſtimony of this, one of his laſt actions, even when he was upon the croſs, was to confirm his doctrine, by giving ſalvation to one of the thieves that was crucified with him, upon his declaration, that he believed him to be the Meſſiah: for ſo much the words of his requeſt imported, when he ſaid, "Remember me, Lord, when thou comeſt into thy kingdom," Luke xxiii. 42. To which Jeſus replied, ver. 43. "Verily, I ſay unto thee, To-day ſhalt "thou be with me in paradiſe." An expreſſion very remarkable: for as Adam, by ſin, loſt paradiſe, i. e. a ſtate of happy immortality; here the believing thief, through his faith in Jeſus the Meſſiah, is promiſed to be put in paradiſe, and ſo reinſtated in an happy immortality.

THUS our Saviour ended his life. And what he did after his reſurrection, St. Luke tells us, Acts i. 3. That he ſhewed himſelf to the apoſtles, " forty " days, ſpeaking" things " concerning the kingdom of God." This was what our Saviour preached in the whole courſe of his miniſtry, before his paſſion: and no other myſteries of faith does he now diſcover to them after his reſurrection. All he ſays, is concerning the kingdom of God; and what it was he ſaid concerning that, we ſhall ſee preſently out of the other evangeliſts; having firſt only taken notice, that when now they aſked him, ver. 6. " Lord, wilt " thou at this time reſtore again the kingdom to Iſrael? He ſaid unto them, " ver. 7. It is not for you to know the times and the ſeaſons, which the Father " hath put in his own power: but ye ſhall receive power, after that the Holy " Ghoſt is come upon you; and ye ſhall be witneſſes unto me, unto the utmoſt " parts of the earth." Their buſineſs was to be witneſſes to Jeſus, of his life, death, reſurrection, and aſcenſion; which, put together, were undeniable proofs of his being the Meſſiah. This was what they were to preach, and what he ſaid to them, concerning the kingdom of God, as will appear by what is recorded of it in the other evangeliſts.

WHEN on the day of his reſurrection, he appeared to the two going to Emmans, Luke xxiv. they declare, ver. 21. what his diſciples faith in him was: " But we truſted that it had been he that ſhould have redeemed Iſrael;" i. e. we believed that he was the Meſſiah, come to deliver the nation of the Jews. Upon this, Jeſus tells them, they ought to believe him to be the Meſſiah, notwithſtanding what had happened; nay, they ought, by his ſuffering and death, to be confirmed in that faith, that he was the Meſſiah. And ver. 26, 27. " Beginning at Moſes and all the prophets, he expounded unto them, in all the " ſcriptures, the things concerning himſelf," how, " that the Meſſiah ought " to have ſuffered theſe things, and to have entered into his glory." Now he applies the prophecies of the Meſſiah to himſelf which we read not, that he did ever do before his paſſion. And afterwards appearing to the eleven, Luke xxiv. 36. he ſaid unto them, ver. 44,--47. " The words, which I ſpoke unto you, " while I was yet with you, that all things muſt be fulfilled which are written " in the law of Moſes, and in the prophets, and in the pſalms concerning me, " Then opened he their underſtandings, that they might underſtand the ſcripture, and ſaid unto them; Thus it is written, and thus it behoved the Meſſiah " to ſuffer, and to riſe from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remiſſion of ſins ſhould be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at " Jeruſalem." Here we ſee what it was he had preached to them, though not in ſo plain open words, before his crucifixion; and what it is he now makes them underſtand; and what it was that was to be preached to all nations, viz. That he was the Meſſiah, that had ſuffered, and roſe from the dead the third day, and fulfilled all things that were written in the old teſtament concerning the Meſſiah; and that thoſe who believed this, and repented, ſhould receive remiſſion of their ſins, through this faith in him. Or, as St. Mark has it, chap. xvi. 15. " Go into all the world, and preach the goſpel to every creature; he " that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved; but he that believeth not, " ſhall be damned, ver. 16. What the " goſpel," or " good news," was, we have ſhewed already, viz. The happy tidings of the Meſſiah being come. Ver. 20. And " they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with " them, and confirming the word with ſigns following." What the " word" was which they preached, and the Lord confirmed with miracles, we have ſeen already, out of the hiſtory of their Acts. I have already given an account of their preaching every where, as it is recorded in the Acts, except ſome few places, where the kingdom of " the Meſſiah" is mentioned under the name of " the kingdom of God;" which I forbore to ſet down, till I had made it plain out of the evangeliſts, that that was no other but the kingdom of the Meſſiah.

IT may be ſeaſonable therefore, now, to add to thoſe ſermons we have formerly ſeen of St. Paul, (wherein he preached no other article of faith, but that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah," the King, who being riſen from the dead, now reigneth, and ſhall more publickly manifeſt his kingdom, in judging the world at the laſt day) what farther is left upon record of his preaching. Acts xix. 8. at Epheſus, "Paul went into the ſynagogues, and ſpake boldly for the ſpace "of three months; diſputing and perſuading concerning the kingdom of God." And, Acts xx. 25. at Miletus he thus takes leave of the elders of Epheſus: "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching "the kingdom of God, ſhall ſee my face no more." What this preaching the kingdom of God was, he tells you, ver. 20, 21. "I have kept nothing back "from you, which was profitable unto you; but have ſhewed you, and have "taught you publickly, and from houſe to houſe; teſtifying both to the Jews, "and to the Greeks, repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jeſus Chriſt." And ſo again, Acts xxviii. 23, 24. "When they [the Jews at "Rome] had appointed him [Paul] a day, there came many to him into his "lodging; to whom he expounded and teſtified the kingdom of God; perſuading them concerning Jeſus, both out of the law of Moſes, and out of "the prophets, from morning to evening. And ſome believed the things which "were ſpoken, and ſome believed not." And the hiſtory of the Acts is concluded with this account of St. Paul's preaching: And Paul dwelt two whole "years in his own hired houſe, and received all that came in unto him, preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching thoſe things, which concern the Lord "Jeſus the Meſſiah." We may therefore here apply the ſame concluſion to the hiſtory of our Saviour, writ by the evangeliſts, and to the hiſtory of the apoſtles, writ in the Acts, which St. John does in his own goſpel, chap. xx. 30, 31. "Many other ſigns did Jeſus before his diſciples;" and in many other places the apoſtles preached the ſame doctrine, "which are not written" in theſe books; "but theſe are written that you may believe that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, "the Son of God; and that, believing, you may have life in his name."

WHAT St. John thought neceſſary and ſufficient to be believed, for the attaining eternal life, he here tells us. And this, not in the firſt dawning of the goſpel; when, perhaps, ſome will be apt to think leſs was required to be believed, than after the doctrine of faith, and myſtery of ſalvation, was more fully explained, in the epiſtles writ by the apoſtles. For it is to be remembered, that St. John ſays this, not as ſoon as Chriſt was aſcended; for theſe words, with the reſt of St. John's goſpel, were not written till many years after, not only the other goſpels, and St. Luke's hiſtory of the Acts, but in all appearance, after all the epiſtles writ by the other apoſtles. So that above threeſcore years after our Saviour's paſſion (for ſo long after, both Epiphanius and St. Jerom aſſure us this goſpel was written) St. John knew nothing elſe required to be believed, for the attaining of life, but that "Jeſus is the Meſſiah, the Son of "God."

To this, 'tis likely, it will be objected by ſome, that to believe only that Jeſus of Nazareth is the Meſſiah, is but an hiſtorical, and not a juſtifying, or ſaving faith.

To which I anſwer, That I allow to the makers of ſyſtems and their followers, to invent and uſe what diſtinctions they pleaſe, and to call things by what names they think fit. But I cannot allow to them, or to any man, an authority to make a religion for me, or to alter that which God hath revealed. And, if they pleaſe to call the believing that which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, and propoſed alone to be believed, an hiſtorical faith; they have their liberty. But they muſt have a care, how they deny it to be a juſtifying or ſaving faith, when our Saviour and his apoſtles have declared it ſo to be, and taught no other which men ſhould receive, and whereby they ſhould be made believers unto eternal life; unleſs they can ſo far make bold with our Saviour, for the ſake of this beloved ſyſtems, as to ſay, that he forgot what he came into the world for; and that he and his apoſtles did not inſtruct people right in the way and myſteries of ſalvation. For that this is the ſole doctrine preſſed and required to be believed, in-

in the whole tenour of our Saviour's and his apoſtle's preaching, we have ſhewed through the whole hiſtory of the evangeliſts and the Acts. And I challenge them to ſhew, that there was any other doctrine, upon their aſſent to which, or diſbelief of it, men were pronounced believers or unbelievers; and accordingly received into the church of Chriſt, as members of his body, as far as mere believing could make them ſo, or elſe keep out of it. This was the only goſpel-article of faith which was preached to them. And if nothing elſe was preached every where, the apoſtle's argument will hold againſt any other articles of faith to be believed under the goſpel, Rom. x. 14. "How ſhall they believe that whereof they "have not heard?" For, to preach any other doctrines neceſſary to be believed, we do not find that any body was ſent.

PERHAPS it will farther be urged, that this is not a "ſaving faith;" becauſe ſuch a faith as this the devils may have, and 'twas plain they had; for they believed and declared "Jeſus to be the Meſſiah." And St. James, ch. ii. 19. tells us, "The devils believe and tremble;" and yet they ſhall not be ſaved. To which I anſwer, 1. That they could not be ſaved by any faith, to whom it was not propoſed as a means of ſalvation, nor ever promiſed to be counted for righteouſneſs. This was an act of grace ſhewn only to mankind. God dealt ſo favourably with the poſterity of Adam, that if they would believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, the promiſed King and Saviour, and perform what other conditions were required of them by the covenant of grace; God would juſtify them, becauſe of this belief. He would account this faith to them for righteouſneſs, and look on it as making up the defects of their obedience; which being thus ſupplied, by what was taken inſtead of it, they were looked on as juſt or righteous; and ſo inherited eternal life. But this favour ſhewn to mankind, was never offered to the fallen angels. They had no ſuch propoſals made to them: and therefore, whatever of this kind was propoſed to men, it availed not devils, whatever they performed of it. This covenant of grace was never offered to them.

2. I ANSWER; that though the devils believed, yet they could not be ſaved by the covenant of grace; becauſe they performed not the other condition required in it, altogether as neceſſary to be performed as this of believing: and that is repentance. Repentance is as abſolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith; and as neceſſary to be performed as that. John the Baptiſt, who was to prepare the way for the Meſſiah, "Preached the baptiſm of repentance for "the remiſſion of ſins," Mark i. 4.

As John began his preaching with "Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is "at hand," Matt. iii. 2. So did our Saviour begin his, Matt. iv. 17. "From "that time began Jeſus to preach, and to ſay, Repent; for the kingdom of hea-"ven is at hand." Or, as St. Mark has it in that parallel place, Mark i. 14, 15. "Now, after that John was put in priſon, Jeſus came into Galilee, preaching "the goſpel of the kingdom of God, and ſaying, The time is fulfilled, and the "kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the goſpel." This was not only the beginning of his preaching, but the ſum of all that he did preach, viz. that men ſhould repent, and believe the good tidings which he brought them; that "the time was fulfilled" for the coming of the Meſſiah. And this was what his apoſtles preached, when he ſent him out, Mark vi. 12. "And "they, going out, preached that men ſhould repent." Believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and repenting, were ſo neceſſary and fundamental parts of the covenant of grace, that one of them alone is often put for both. For here St. Mark mentions nothing but their preaching repentance; as St. Luke, in the parallel place, chap. ix. 6. mentions nothing but their evangelizing, or preaching the good news of the kingdom of the Meſſiah: and St. Paul often, in his epiſtles, puts faith for the whole duty of a chriſtian. But yet the tenour of the goſpel is what Chriſt declares, Luke xii. 3, 5. "Unleſs ye repent, ye ſhall all likewiſe "periſh." And in the parable of the rich man in hell, delivered by our Saviour, Luke xvi. repentance alone is the means propoſed, of avoiding that place of torment, ver. 30, 31. And what the tenour of the doctrine, which ſhould be preached to the world, ſhould be, he tells his apoſtles, after his reſurrection, Luke xxiv. 27. viz. "That repentance and remiſſion of ſins ſhould be preached

“ in his name,” who was the Meſſiah. And accordingly, believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and repenting, was what the apoſtles preached. So Peter began, Acts ii. 38. “ Repent, and be baptized.” Theſe two things were required for the remiſſion of ſins, viz. entering themſelves in the kingdom of God; and owning and profeſſing themſelves the ſubjects of Jeſus, whom they believed to be the Meſſiah, and received for their Lord and King; for that was to be “ baptized in his name:” baptiſm being an initiating ceremony, known to the Jews, whereby thoſe, who leaving heatheniſm, and profeſſing a ſubmiſſion to the law of Moſes, were received into the commonwealth of Iſrael. And ſo it was made uſe of by our Saviour, to be that ſolemn viſible act, whereby thoſe who believed him to be the Meſſiah, received him as their King, and profeſſed obedience to him, were admitted as ſubjects into his kingdom: which in the goſpels, is called, “ the kingdom of God;” and in the Acts and epiſtles, often by another name, viz. the “ Church.”

THE ſame St. Peter preaches again to the Jews, Acts iii. 19. “ Repent, and be converted, that your ſins may be blotted out.”

WHAT this repentance was, which the new covenant required, as one of the conditions to be performed by all thoſe, who ſhould receive the benefits of that covenant, is plain in the ſcripture, to be not only a ſorrow for ſins paſt, but (what is a natural conſequence of ſuch ſorrow, if it be real) a turning from them into a new and contrary life. And ſo they are joined together, Acts iii. 19. “ Repent and turn to God.”

AND ſometimes “ turning about” is put alone to ſignify repentance, Matt. xiii. 15. Luke xxii. 32. which in other words is well expreſſed, by “ newneſs of life.” For it being certain that he, who is really ſorry for his ſins, and abhors them, will turn from them, and forſake them; either of theſe acts, which have ſo natural a connection one with the other, may be, and is often put for both together. Repentance is an hearty ſorrow for our paſt miſdeeds, and a ſincere reſolution and endeavour, to the utmoſt of our power, to conform all our actions to the law of God. So that repentance does not conſiſt in one ſingle act of ſorrow, (though that, being the firſt and leading act, gives denomination to the whole) but in “ doing works meet for repentance,” in a ſincere obedience to the law of Chriſt, the remainder of our lives. This was called for by John the Baptiſt, the preacher of repentance, Matt. iii. 8. “ Bring forth fruits meet for repentance.” And by St. Paul here, Acts xxvi. 20. “ Repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance.” There are works to follow belonging to repentance, as well as ſorrow for what is paſt.

THESE two, faith and repentance, i. e. believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and a good life, are the indiſpenſable conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all thoſe who would obtain eternal life. The reaſonableneſs, or rather neceſſity of which, that we may the better comprehend, we muſt a little look back to what was ſaid in the beginning.

ADAM being the ſon of God, and ſo St. Luke calls him, chap. iii. 38. had this part alſo of the likeneſs and image of his Father, viz. that he was immortal. But Adam, tranſgreſſing the command given him by his heavenly Father, incurred the penalty, forfeited that ſtate of immortality, and became mortal. After this, Adam begot children: but they were “ in his own likeneſs, after his own image;” mortal, like their father.

GOD neverthelesſ, out of his infinite mercy, willing to beſtow eternal life on mortal men, ſends Jeſus Chriſt into the world; who being conceived in the womb of a virgin (that had not known man) by the immediate power of God, was properly the Son of God; according to what the angel declared to his mother, Luke i. 30,--35. “ The Holy Ghoſt ſhall come upon thee, and the power of the Higheſt ſhall overſhadow thee: therefore alſo that holy thing, which ſhall be born of thee, ſhall be called THE SON OF GOD.” So that being the Son of God, he was, like his Father, immortal; as he tells us, John v. 26. “ As the Father hath life in himſelf, ſo hath he given to the Son to have life in himſelf.”

AND that immortality is a part of that image, wherein thoſe (who were the immediate ſons of God, ſo as to have no other father) were made like their Father, appears probable, not only from the places in Geneſis concerning Adam, above taken notice of, but ſeems to me alſo to be intimated in ſome expreſſions, concerning Jeſus the Son of God, in the new teſtament. Col. i. 15. he is called "the image of the inviſible God." Inviſible ſeems put in, to obviate any groſs imagination, that he (as images uſed to do) repreſented God in any corporeal or viſible reſemblance. And there is farther ſubjoined, to lead us into the meaning of it, "The firſt-born of every creature;" which is farther explained, ver. 18. where he is termed, "The firſt-born from the dead:" thereby making out, and ſhewing himſelf to be the image of the inviſible; that death hath no power over him; but being the Son of God, and not having forfeited that ſonſhip by any tranſgreſſion, was the heir of eternal life, as Adam ſhould have been, had he continued in his filial duty. In the ſame ſenſe the apoſtle ſeems to uſe the word image, in other places, viz. Rom. viii. 29. "Whom he did foreknow, he alſo did pre-"deſtinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firſt-"born among many brethren." This image, to which they were conformed, ſeems to be immortality and eternal life: for 'tis remarkable, that in both theſe places, St. Paul ſpeaks of the reſurrection; and that Chriſt was "The firſt-born "among many brethren;" he being by birth the Son of God, and the others only by adoption, as we ſee in this ſame chapter, ver. 15--17. "Ye have re-"ceived the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father; the Spirit it-"ſelf bearing witneſs with our Spirits, that we are the children of God. And "if children, then heirs, and joint-heirs with Chriſt; if ſo be that we ſuffer "with him, that we may alſo be glorified together." And hence we ſee, that our Saviour vouchſafes to call thoſe, who at the day of Judgment are, through him, entering into eternal life, his brethren; Matt xxv. 40. "Inaſmuch as ye "have done it unto one of the leaſt of theſe, my brethren." May we not in this find a reaſon, why God ſo frequently in the new teſtament, and ſo ſeldom if at all, in the old, is mentioned under the ſingle title of THE FATHER? And therefore, our Saviour ſays, Matt. xi. "No man knoweth the Father ſave the "Son, and he to whomſoever the Son will reveal him." God has now a Son again in the world, the firſt-born of many brethren, who all now, by the Spirit of adoption, can ſay, Abba, Father. And we by adoption, being for his ſake made his brethren, and the ſons of God, come to ſhare in that inheritance, which was his natural right; he being by birth the Son of God: which inheritance is eternal life. And again, ver. 23. "We groan within ourſelves, waiting "for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body;" whereby is plainly meant, the change of theſe frail mortal bodies, into the ſpiritual immortal bodies at the reſurrection; "When this mortal ſhall have put on immortality," 1 Cor. xv. 54. Which in that chapter, ver. 42,--44. he farther expreſſes thus; "So alſo is the reſurrection of the dead. It is ſown in corruption, it is raiſed "in incorruption; it is ſown in diſhonour, it is raiſed in glory; it is ſown in "weakneſs, it is raiſed in power; it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a ſpiri-"tual body, &c." To which he ſubjoins. ver. 49. "As we have borne the "image of the earthy," (i. e. as we have been mortal, like earthy Adam, our father, from whom we are deſcended, when he was turned out of paradiſe) "We ſhall alſo bear the image of the heavenly;" into whoſe ſonſhip and inheritance being adopted, we ſhall, at the reſurrection, receive that adoption we expect, "Even the redemption of our bodies;" and after his image, which is the image of the Father, become immortal. Here what he ſays himſelf, Luke xx. 35, 36. "They who ſhall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the "reſurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage. Neither "can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels, and are the SONS "OF GOD, being the ſons of the reſurrection." And he that ſhall read St. Paul's arguing, Acts xii. 32, 33. will find that the great evidence that Jeſus was the "Son of God," was his reſurrection. Then the image of his Father appeared in him, when he viſibly entered into the ſtate of immortality. For thus the apoſtle reaſons, "We preach to you, how that the promiſe which was made to "our fathers. God hath fulfilled the ſame unto us, in that he hath raiſed up "Jeſus again; as it is alſo written in the ſecond pſalm, Thou art my Son, this "day have I begotten thee."

THIS may ſerve a little to explain the immortality of the ſons of God, who are in this like their Father, made after his image and likeneſs. But that our Saviour was ſo, he himſelf farther declares, John x. 18. where, ſpeaking of his life, he ſays, "No one taketh it from me, but I lay it down myſelf: I have "power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again." Which he could not have had, if he had been a mortal man, the ſon of a man, of the ſeed of Adam; or elſe had by any tranſgreſſion forfeited his life. For "the wages of "ſin is death:" and he that hath incurred death for his own tranſgreſſion, cannot lay down his life for another, as our Saviour profeſſes he did. For he was the juſt one, Acts vii. 57. and xii. 14. "Who knew no ſin," 2 Cor. v. 21. "Who "did no ſin, neither was guile found in his mouth." And thus, "As by man "came death, ſo by man came the reſurrection of the dead. For as in Adam "all die, ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive."

FOR this laying down his life for others, our Saviour tells us, John x. 17. "Therefore does my Father love me, becauſe I lay down my life, that I might "take it again." And this obedience and ſuffering was rewarded with a kingdom: which, he tells us, Luke xxii. "His Father had appointed unto him;" and which, 'tis evident out of the epiſtle to the Hebrews, chap. xii. 2. he had a regard to in his ſufferings: "Who for the joy that was ſet before him, endured "the croſs, deſpiſing the ſhame, and is ſet down at the right hand of the throne "of God." Which kingdom, given him upon this account of his obedience, ſuffering and death, he himſelf takes notice of, in theſe words, John xvii, 1,--4. "Jeſus lift up his eyes to heaven, and ſaid, Father, the hour is come: glorify "thy Son, that thy Son alſo may glorify thee: as thou haſt given him power "over all fleſh, that he ſhould give eternal life to as many as thou haſt given "him. And this is life eternal, that they may know thee the only true God, "and Jeſus, the Meſſiah, whom thou haſt ſent. I have glorified thee on earth: "I have finiſhed the work which thou gaveſt me to do." And St. Paul, in his epiſtle to the Philippians, chap. ii. 8, 11. "He humbled himſelf, and became "obedient unto death, even the death of the croſs. Wherefore God alſo hath "highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name; that at "the name of Jeſus every knee ſhall bow, of things in heaven, and things in "earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue ſhould confeſs, that "Jeſus Chriſt is Lord."

THUS God, we ſee, deſigned his Son Chriſt Jeſus a kingdom, an everlaſting kingdom in heaven. But though "as in Adam all die, ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be "be made alive;" and all men ſhall return to life again at the laſt day; yet all men having ſinned, and thereby "come ſhort of the glory of God," as St. Paul aſſures us, Rom. iii. 23. (i. e. not attaining to the heavenly kingdom of the Meſſiah, which is often called the glory of God; as may be ſeen, Rom. v. 2. and xv. 7. and ii. 7. Matth xvi. 27. Mark viii. 38. For no one who is unrighteous, i. e. comes ſhort of perfect righteouſneſs, ſhall be admitted into the eternal life of that kingdom; as is declared, 1 Cor. vi. 9, "The unrighteous "ſhall not inherit the kingdom of God;") and death, the wages of ſin, being the portion of all thoſe who had tranſgreſſed the righteous law of God; the Son of God would in vain have come into the world, to lay the foundations of a kingdom, and gather together a ſelect people out of the world, if, (they being found guilty, at their appearance before the judgment-ſeat of the righteous Judge of all men, at the laſt day) inſtead of entrance into eternal life in the kingdom he had prepared for them, they ſhould receive death, the juſt reward of ſin which every one of them was guilty of: this ſecond death would have left him no ſubjects; and inſtead of thoſe ten thouſand times ten thouſand, and thouſands of thouſands, there would not have been one left him to ſing praiſes unto his name, ſaying, "Bleſſing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that "ſitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever." God therefore, out of his mercy to mankind, and for the erecting of the kingdom of his

Son, and furniſhing it with ſubjects out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation, propoſed to the children of men, that as many of them as would believe Jeſus his Son (whom he ſent into the world) to be the Meſſiah, the promiſed Deliverer; and would receive him for their King and Ruler; ſhould have all their paſt ſins, diſobedience, and rebellion forgiven them: and if for the future they lived in a ſincere obedience to his law, to the utmoſt of their power; the ſins of human frailty for the time to come, as well as all thoſe of their paſt lives, ſhould, for his Son's ſake, becauſe they gave themſelves up to him, to be his ſubjects, be forgiven them; and ſo their faith, which made them be baptized into his name, (i. e. enrol themſelves in the kingdom of Jeſus the Meſſiah, and profeſs themſelves his ſubjects, and conſequently live by the laws of his kingdom) ſhould be accounted to them for righteouſneſs; i. e. ſhould ſupply the defects of a ſcanty obedience in the ſight of God; who, counting this faith to them for righteouſneſs, or complete obedience, did thus juſtify, or make them juſt, and thereby capable of eternal life.

NOW, that this is the faith for which God of his free grace juſtifies ſinful man, (for "tis God alone that juſtifieth," Rom. viii. 33. Rom. iii. 26.) we have already ſhewed, by obſerving through all the hiſtory of our Saviour and the apoſtles, recorded in the evangeliſts, and in the Acts, what he and his apoſtles preached, and propoſed to be believed. We ſhall ſhew now, that beſides believing him to be the Meſſiah their King, it was farther required, that thoſe who would have the privilege, advantage and deliverance of his kingdom, ſhould enter themſelves into it; and by baptiſm being made denizons, and ſolemnly incorporated into that kingdom, live as became ſubjects obedient to the laws of it. For if they believed him to be the Meſſiah, their King, but would not obey his laws, and would not have him to reign over them, they were but the greater rebels; and God would not juſtify them for a faith that did but increaſe their guilt, and oppoſe diametrically the kingdom and deſign of the Meſſiah; "Who gave himſelf for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and "purify unto himſelf a peculiar people, zealous of good works," Titus ii. 14. And therefore St. Paul tells the Galatians, That that which availeth is faith; but "faith working by love." And that faith without works, i. e. the works of ſincere obedience to the law and will of Chriſt, is not ſufficient for our juſtification, St. James ſhews at large, chap. ii.

NEITHER, indeed, could it be otherwiſe; for life, eternal life being the reward of juſtice or righteouſneſs only, appointed by the righteous God (who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity) to thoſe only who had no taint or infection of ſin upon them, it is impoſſible that he ſhould juſtify thoſe who had no regard to juſtice at all, whatever they believed. This would have been to encourage iniquity, contrary to the purity of his nature; and to have condemned that eternal law of right, which is holy, juſt, and good; of which no one precept or rule is abrogated or repealed; nor indeed can be, whilſt God is an holy, juſt, and righteous God, and man a rational creature. The duties of that law, ariſing from the conſtitution of his very nature, are of eternal obligation; nor can it be taken away or diſpenſed with, without changing the nature of things, overturning the meaſures of right and wrong, and thereby introducing and authorizing irregularity, confuſion, and diſorder in the world. Chriſt's coming into the world was not for ſuch an end as that; but on the contrary, to reform the corrupt ſtate of degenerate man; and out of thoſe who would mend their lives, and bring forth fruit meet for repentance, erect a new kingdom.

THIS is the law of that kingdom, as well as of all mankind; and that law, by which all men ſhall be judged at the laſt day. Only thoſe who have believed Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and have taken him to be their King, with a ſincere endeavour after righteouſneſs, in obeying his law, ſhall have their paſt ſins not imputed to them; and ſhall have that faith taken inſtead of obedience, where frailty and weakneſs made them tranſgreſs, and ſin prevailed after converſion, in thoſe who hunger and thirſt after righteouſneſs, (or perfect obedience) and do not allow themſelves in acts of diſobedience and rebellion, againſt the laws of that kingdom they are entered into.

He did not expect, 'tis true, a perfect obedience, void of ſlips and falls: he knew our make, and the weakneſs of our conſtitution too well, and was ſent with a ſupply for that defect. Beſides, perfect obedience was the righteouſneſs of the law of works; and then the reward would be of debt, and not of grace; and to ſuch there was no need of faith to be imputed to them for righteouſneſs. They ſtood upon their own legs, were juſt already, and needed no allowance to be made them for believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, taking him for their King, and becoming his ſubjects. But that Chriſt does require obedience, ſincere obedience, is evident from the laws he himſelf delivers, (unleſs he can be ſuppoſed to give and inculcate laws, only to have them diſobeyed) and from the ſentence he will paſs, when he comes to judge.

The faith required was, to believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, the Anointed; who had been promiſed by God to the world. Amongſt the Jews (to whom the promiſes and prophecies of the Meſſiah were more immediately delivered) anointing was uſed to three ſorts of perſons, at their inauguration; whereby they were ſet apart to three great offices, viz. of prieſts, prophets, and kings. Through theſe three offices be in holy writ attributed to our Saviour, yet I do not remember that he any-where aſſumes to himſelf the title of a prieſt, or mentions any thing relating to his prieſthood; nor does he ſpeak of his being a prophet but very ſparingly, and only once or twice, as it were, by the by: but the goſpel, or the good news of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, is what he preaches every where, and makes it his great buſineſs to publiſh to the world. This he did, not only as moſt agreeable to the expectation of the Jews, who looked for their Meſſiah, chiefly as coming in power to be their King and Deliverer; but as it beſt anſwered the chief end of his coming, which was to be a King, and as ſuch, to be received by thoſe who would be his ſubjects in the kingdom which he come to erect. And though he took not directly on himſelf the title of King, 'till he was in cuſtody, and in the hands of Pilate; yet 'tis plain, "King," and "King of Iſrael," were the familiar and received titles of the Meſſiah. See John i. 50. Luke xix. 38. compared with Matth. xxi. 9. and Mark xi. 9. John xii. 13. Matth. xxi. 5. Luke xxiii. 2. compared with Matth. xxvii. 11. and John xviii. 33,—37. Mark xv. 12. compared with Matth. xvii. 22. Matth. xxvii. 42.

What thoſe were to do, who believed him to be the Meſſiah, and received him for their King, that they might be admitted to be partakers with him of his kingdom in glory, we ſhall beſt know by the laws he gives them, and requires them to obey; and by the ſentence which he himſelf will give, when, ſitting on his throne, they ſhall all appear at his tribunal, to receive every one his doom from the mouth of this righteous Judge of all men.

What he propoſed to his followers to be believed, we have already ſeen, by examining his, and his apoſtles preaching, ſtep by ſtep, all through the hiſtory of the four evangeliſts, and the Acts of the apoſtles. The ſame method will beſt and plaineſt ſhew us, whether he required of thoſe who believed him to be the Meſſiah, any thing beſides that faith, and what it was. For, he being a King, we ſhall ſee by his commands what he expects from his ſubjects: for, if he did not expect obedience to them, his commands would be but mere mockery; and if there were no puniſhment for the tranſgreſſors of them, his laws would not be the laws of a king, that had authority to command, and power to chaſtiſe the diſobedient; but empty talk, without force, and without influence.

We ſhall therefore from his injunctions (if any ſuch there be) ſee what he has made neceſſary to be performed, by all thoſe who ſhall be received into eternal life, in his kingdom prepared in the heavens. And in this we cannot be deceived. What we have from his own mouth, eſpecially if repeated over and over again, in different places and expreſſions, will be paſt doubt and controverſy. I ſhall paſs by all that is ſaid by St. John Baptiſt, or any other before our Saviour's entry upon his miniſtry, and publick promulgation of the laws of his kingdom.

He began his preaching with a command to repent, as St. Matthew tells us, iv. 17. "From that time Jeſus began to preach, ſaying, Repent; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." And Luke v. 32. he tells the ſcribes and Phariſees, "I come not to call the righteous;" (thoſe who were truly ſo, needed no help, they had a right to the tree of Life,) "but ſinners to repentance."

In his ſermon, as 'tis called, in the mount, Luke vi. and Matth. v. &c. he commands they ſhould be exemplary in good works: "Let your light ſo ſhine amongſt men, that they may ſee your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven," Matth. v. 15. And that they might know what he came for, and what he expected of them, he tells them, ver. 17,--20. "Think not that I am come to diſſolve," or looſen, "the law, or the prophets: I am not come to diſſolve," or looſen, "but to make it full," or complete; by giving it you in its true and ſtrict ſenſe. Here we ſee he confirms, and at once reinforces all the moral precepts in the old teſtament. "For verily I ſay to you, Till heaven and earth paſs, one jot, or one tittle, ſhall in no wiſe paſs from the law, till all be done. Whoſoever therefore ſhall break one of theſe leaſt commandments, and ſhall teach men ſo, he ſhall be called the leaſt (i. e. as it is interpreted, ſhall not be at all) in the kingdom of heaven." Ver. 21. "I ſay unto you, That except your righteouſneſs," i. e. your performance of the eternal law of right, "ſhall exceed the righteouſneſs of the ſcribes and Phariſees, ye ſhall in no caſe enter into the kingdom of heaven." And then he goes on to make good what he ſaid, ver. 17. viz. "That he was come to complete the law," viz. by giving its full and clear ſenſe, free from the corrupt and looſening gloſſes of the ſcribes and Phariſees, ver. 22,---26. He tells them, That not only murder, but cauſeleſs anger, and ſo much as words of contempt, were forbidden. He commands them to be reconciled and kind towards their adverſaries; and that upon pain of condemnation. In the following part of his ſermon, which is to be read Luke vi. and more at large, Matth. v, vi, vii. he not only forbids actual uncleanneſs, but all irregular deſires, upon pain of hell-fire; cauſeleſs divorces; ſwearing in converſation, as well as forſwearing in judgment; revenge; retaliation; oſtentation of charity, of devotion, and of faſting; repetitions in prayer, covetouſneſs, worldly care, cenſoriouſneſs: and on the other ſide, commands loving our enemies, doing good to thoſe that hate us, praying for thoſe that deſpitefully uſe us; patience and meekneſs under injuries, forgiveneſs, liberality, compaſſion: and cloſes all his particular injunctions, with this general golden rule, Matth. vii. 12. "All things whatſoever ye would that men ſhould do to you, do ye even ſo to them: for this is the law and the prophets." And to ſhew how much he is in earneſt, and expects obedience to theſe laws; he tell them, Luke vi. 35. That if they obey, "Great ſhall be their REWARD;" they "ſhall be called, The ſons of the Higheſt." And to all this, in the concluſion, he adds the ſolemn ſanction; "Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I ſay?" 'Tis in vain for you to take me for the Meſſiah your King, unleſs you obey me. "Not every one who calls me Lord, Lord, ſhall enter into the kingdom of heaven, or be the ſons of God; "But he that doth the will of my father which is in heaven." To ſuch diſobedient ſubjects, though they have propheſied and done miracles in my name, I ſhall ſay at the day of judgment; "Depart from me, ye workers of iniquity; I know you not."

When, Matth. xii. he was told, that his mother and brethren ſought to ſpeak with him, ver. 49. "Stretching out his hands to his diſciples, he ſaid, Behold my mother and my brethren; for whoſoever ſhall do the will of my Father, who is in heaven, he is my brother, and ſiſter, and mother." They could not be children of the adoption, and fellow-heirs with him of eternal life, who did not do the will of his heavenly Father.

Matth. xv. and Mark vi. the Phariſees finding fault, that his diſciples eat with unclean hands, he makes this declaration to his apoſtles: "Do ye not perceive, that whatſoever from without entereth into a man, cannot defile him, becauſe it entereth not into his heart, but his belly? That which cometh out of the man, that defileth the man; for from within, out of the heart of "men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, falſe "witneſſes, covetouſneſs, wickedneſs, deceit, laſciviouſneſs, an evil eye, blaſphemy, pride, fooliſhneſs. All theſe ill things come from within, and defile "a man."

HE commands ſelf-denial, and the expoſing ourſelves to ſuffering and danger, rather than to deny or diſown him: and this upon pain of loſing our ſouls; which are of more worth than all the world. This we may read, Matth. xvi. 24,--27. and the parallel places, Matth. viii. and Luke ix.

THE apoſtles diſputing amongſt them, who ſhould be greateſt in the kingdom of the Meſſiah, Matth. xviii. 1. he thus determines the controverſy: Mark ix. 35. "If any one will be firſt, let him be laſt of all, and ſervant of all;" and ſetting a child before them, adds, Matth. xviii. 3. Verily, I ſay unto you, "Unleſs ye turn, and become as children, ye ſhall not enter into the kingdom "of heaven."

MATTH. xviii. 15. "If thy brother ſhall treſpaſs againſt thee, go and tell "him his fault between thee and him alone: if he ſhall hear thee, thou haſt "gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one "or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witneſſes every word may be "eſtabliſhed. And if he ſhall neglect to hear them, tell it to the church: but "if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen and "publican. Ver. 21. "Peter ſaid, Lord, how often ſhall my brother ſin againſt "me, and I forgive him? Till ſeven times? Jeſus ſaid unto him, I ſay not unto thee, till ſeven times; but until ſeventy times ſeven." And then ends the parable of the ſervant, who being himſelf forgiven, was rigorous to his fellow-ſervant, with theſe words; ver. 34. "And his Lord was wroth, and delivered "him to the tormentors, till he ſhould pay all that was due unto him. So "likewiſe ſhall my heavenly Father do alſo unto you, if you from your hearts "forgive not every one his brother their treſpaſſes."

LUKE x. 25. to the lawyer, aſking him, "What ſhall I do to inherit eternal life? He ſaid, What is written in the law? How readeſt thou?" He anſwered, "Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all "thy ſoul, and with all thy ſtrength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyſelf." Jeſus ſaid, "This do, and thou ſhalt live." And when the lawyer, upon our Saviour's parable of the good Samaritan, was forced to confeſs, that he that ſhewed mercy, was his neighbour; Jeſus diſmiſſed him with this charge, ver. 37. "Go, and do thou likewiſe."

LUKE xi. 41. "Give alms of ſuch things as ye have: behold, all things are "clean unto you."

LUKE xii. 15. "Take heed, and beware of covetouſneſs." Ver. 22. "Be "not ſolicitous what ye ſhall eat, or what ye ſhall drink, nor what ye ſhall put "on;" be not fearful, or apprehenſive of want; "for it is your Father's pleaſure "to give you a kingdom. Sell that you have, and give alms: and provide "yourſelves bags that wax not old, and treaſure in the heavens that faileth not: "for where your treaſure is, there will your heart be alſo. Let your loins be "girded, and your lights burning; and ye yourſelves like unto men that wait "for the Lord, when he will return. Bleſſed are thoſe ſervants, whom the "Lord, when he cometh, ſhall find watching. Bleſſed is that ſervant, whom "the Lord having made ruler of his houſhold, to give them their portion of "meat in due ſeaſon, the Lord, when he cometh, ſhall find ſo doing. Of a "truth I ſay unto you, that he will make him ruler over all that he hath. But "if that ſervant ſay in his heart, My Lord delayeth his coming; and ſhall begin to beat the men-ſervants, and maidens, and to eat and drink, and to be "drunken; the lord of that ſervant will come in a day when he looketh not for "him, and at an hour when he is not aware; and will cut him in ſunder, and "will appoint him his portion with unbelievers. And that ſervant who knew "his lord's will, and prepared not himſelf, neither did according to his will, "ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes. For he that knew not, and did commit "things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes. For unto whomſoever much is given, of him ſhall much be required: and to whom men have "committed much, of him they will aſk the more."

LUKE xiv. 11. “ Whoſoever exalteth himſelf, ſhall be abaſed: and he that “ humbleth himſelf, ſhall be exalted.”

VER. 12. “ When thou makeſt a dinner, or ſupper, call not thy friends, or “ thy brethren, neither thy kinſmen, nor thy neighbours; leſt they alſo bid “ thee again, and a recompence be made thee. But when thou makeſt a feaſt, “ call the poor and maimed, the lame and the blind; and thou ſhalt be bleſſed: “ for they cannot recompenſe thee; for thou ſhalt be recompenſed at the reſur-“ rection of the juſt.”

VER. 33. “ So likewiſe, whoſoever he be of you, that is not ready to forego “ all that he hath, he cannot be my diſciple.”

LUKE xvi. 9. “ I ſay unto you, make to yourſelves friends of the mammon “ of unrighteouſneſs; that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlaſting “ habitations. If ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who “ will commit to your truſt the true riches? And if ye have not been faithful “ in that which is another man’s, who ſhall give you that which is your “ own?”

LUKE xvii. 3. “ If thy brother treſpaſs againſt thee, rebuke him; and if he “ repent, forgive him. And if he treſpaſs againſt thee ſeven times in a day, “ and ſeven times in a day turn again to thee, ſaying, I repent; thou ſhalt for-“ give him.”

LUKE xviii. 1. “ He ſpoke a parable to them, to this end, that men ought “ always to pray, and not to faint.”

VER. 18. “ One comes to him, and aſks him, ſaying, maſter, what ſhall I “ do to inherit eternal life? Jeſus ſaid unto him, if thou wilt enter into life, “ keep the commandments. He ſays, Which? Jeſus ſaid, Thou knoweſt the “ commandments: Thou ſhalt not kill; thou ſhalt not commit adultery; thou “ ſhalt not ſteal; thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſs; defraud not; honour thy “ father and thy mother; and thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf. He “ ſaid, all theſe I have obſerved from my youth. Jeſus hearing this, loved “ him; and ſaid unto him, Yet lackeſt thou one thing: ſell all that thou haſt, “ and give it to the poor, and thou ſhalt have treaſure in heaven; and come, “ follow me.” To underſtand this right, we muſt take notice, that this young man aſks our Saviour, what he muſt do, to be admitted effectually into the kingdom of the Meſſiah? The Jews believed, that when the Meſſiah came, thoſe of their nation that received him, ſhould not die; but that they, with thoſe who, being dead, ſhould then be raiſed again by him, ſhould enjoy eternal life with him. Our Saviour, in anſwer to this demand, tells the young man, that to obtain the eternal life of the kingdom of the Meſſiah, he muſt keep the commandments. And then enumerating ſeveral of the precepts of the law, the young man ſays, he had obſerved theſe from his childhood. For which, the text tells us, Jeſus loved him. But our Saviour, to try whether in earneſt he believed him to be the Meſſiah, and reſolved to take him to be his King, and to obey him as ſuch, bids him give all that he has to the poor, and come, and follow him; and he ſhould have treaſure in heaven. This I look on to be the meaning of the place; this, of ſelling all he had, and giving it to the poor, not being a ſtanding law of his kingdom; but a probationary command to this young man; to try whether he truly believed him to be the Meſſiah, and was ready to obey his commands, and relinquiſh all to follow him, when he, his Prince required it.

AND therefore we ſee, Luke xix. 14. where our Saviour takes notice of the Jews not receiving him as the Meſſiah, he expreſſes it thus; “ We will not have “ this man to reign over us.” ’Tis not enough to believe him to be the Meſſiah, unleſs we alſo obey his laws, and take him to be our King, to reign over us.

MATTH. xxii. 11,--13. he that had not on the wedding-garment, though he accepted of the invitation, and came to the wedding, was caſt into utter darkneſs. By the wedding-garment, ’tis evident good works are meant here; that wedding-garment of fine linen, clean and white, which we are told, Rev, xix. 8. is the δικαιώματα, “ righteous acts of the ſaints;” or, as St. Paul calls it, Epheſ. iv. 1. “The walking worthy of the vocation wherewith we are called.” This appears from the parable itſelf: “The kingdom of heaven,” ſays our Saviour, ver. 2. “is like unto a king, who made a marriage for his ſon.” And here he diſtinguiſhes thoſe who were invited, into three ſorts: 1. Thoſe who were invited, and came not; i. e. thoſe who had the goſpel, the good news of the kingdom of God propoſed to them, but believed not. 2. Thoſe who came, but had not on a wedding-garment; i. e. believed Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, but were not new clad (as I may ſo ſay) with a true repentance, and amendment of life: nor adorned with thoſe virtues, which the apoſtle, Col. iii. requires to be put on. 3. Thoſe who were invited did come, and had on the “wedding-garment; i. e. heard the goſpel, believed Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and ſincerely obeyed his laws. Theſe three ſorts are plainly deſigned here; whereof the laſt only were the bleſſed, who were to enjoy the kingdom prepared for them.

MATTH. xxiii. “Be not ye called Rabbi; for one is your maſter, even the “Meſſiah, and ye all are brethren. And call no man your father upon the earth: “for one is your Father which is in heaven. Neither be ye called maſters: for “one is your maſter, even the Meſſiah. But he that is greateſt amongſt you, “ſhall be your ſervant. And whoſoever ſhall exalt himſelf, ſhall be abaſed; “and he that ſhall humble himſelf, ſhall be exalted.”

LUKE xxi. 34. “Take heed to yourſelves, leſt your hearts be at any time “overcharged with ſurfeiting and drunkenneſs, and cares of this life.”

LUKE xxii. 25. “He ſaid unto them, The kings of the Gentiles exerciſe “lordſhip over them; and they that exerciſe authority upon them, are called “benefactors. But ye ſhall not be ſo. But he that is greateſt among you, let “him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth ſerve.”

JOHN xiii. 34. “A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one “another: as I have loved you, that ye alſo love one another. By this ſhall all “men know that ye are my diſciples, if ye love one another,” This command, of loving one another, is repeated again, chap. xv. 12, and 17.

JOHN xiv. 15. “If ye love me, keep my commandments.” Ver. 21. “He “that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: “and he that loveth me, ſhall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and “manifeſt myſelf to him.” Ver. 23. “If a man loveth me, he will keep my “words.” Ver. 23. “He that loveth me not, keepeth not my ſayings.”

JOHN xv. “In this is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; ſo ſhall “ye be my diſciples.” Ver. 14. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatſoever I command you.”

THUS we ſee our Saviour not only confirmed the moral law; and clearing it from the corrupt gloſſes of the ſcribes and Phariſees, ſhewed the ſtrictneſs, as well as obligation of its injunctions; but moreover, upon occaſion, requires the obedience of his diſciples to ſeveral of the commands he afreſh lays upon them; with the inforcement of unſpeakable rewards and puniſhments in another world, according to their obedience or diſobedience. There is not, I think, any of the duties of morality, which he has not, ſomewhere or other, by himſelf and his apoſtles, inculcated over and over again to his followers in expreſs terms. And is it for nothing that he is ſo inſtant with 'em to bring forth fruit? Does he, their King, command, and is it an indifferent thing? Or will their happineſs or miſery not at all depend upon it, whether they obey or no? They were required to believe him to be the Meſſiah; which faith is of grace promiſed to be reckoned to them, for the compleating of their righteouſneſs, wherein it was defective: but righteouſneſs, or obedience to the law of God, was their great buſineſs, which if they could have attained by their own performances, there would have been no need of this gracious allowance, in reward of their faith: but eternal life, after the reſurrection, had been their due by a former covenant, even that of works; the rule whereof was never aboliſhed, tho' the rigour were abated. The duties injoined in it were duties ſtill. Their obligations had never ceaſed; nor a wilful neglect of them was ever diſpenſed with. But their paſt tranſgreſſions were pardoned, to thoſe who received Jeſus, the promiſed Meſſiah, for their King; and their future ſlips covered, if renouncing their former iniquities, they entered into his kingdom, and continued his ſubjects, with a ſteady reſolution and endeavour to obey his laws. This righteouſneſs therefore, a complete obedience and freedom from ſin, are ſtill ſincerely to be endeavoured after. And 'tis no where promiſed, that thoſe who perſiſt in a wilful diſobedience to his laws, ſhall be received into the eternal bliſs of his kingdom, how much ſoever they believe in him.

A SINCERE obedience, how can any one doubt to be, or ſcruple to call, a condition of the new covenant, as well as faith; whoever read our Saviour's ſermon in the mount, to omit all the reſt? Can any thing be more expreſs than theſe words of our Lord? Matt. vi. 14. " If you forgive men their treſpaſſes, " your heavenly Father will alſo forgive you: but if ye forgive not men their " treſpaſſes, neither will your Father forgive your treſpaſſes." And John xiii. 17. " If ye know theſe things, happy are ye if you do them." This is ſo indiſpenſable a condition of the new covenant, that believing, without it, will not do, nor be accepted; if our Saviour knew the terms, on which he would admit men into life. " Why call ye me Lord, Lord," ſays he, Luke vi. 46. " and " do not the things which I ſay?" It is not enough to believe him to be the Meſſiah, the Lord, without obeying him. For that theſe he ſpeaks to here, were believers, is evident from the parallel place, Matt. vii. 21,--23. where it is thus recorded: " Not every one who ſays, Lord, Lord, ſhall enter into the " kingdom of heaven; but he that doth the will of my Father, which is in " heaven." No rebels, or refractory, diſobedient, ſhall be admitted there, tho' they have ſo far believed in Jeſus, as to be able to do miracles in his name; as is plain out of the following words: " Many will ſay to me in that day. Have " we not propheſied in thy name, and in thy name have caſt out devils, and " in thy name have done many wonderful works? And then will I profeſs un" to them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye workers of iniquity."

THIS part of the new covenant, the apoſtles alſo, in their preaching the goſpel of the Meſſiah, ordinarily joined with the doctrine of faith.

St. PETER in his firſt ſermon, Acts ii. when they were pricked in heart, and aſked, " What ſhall we do?" ſays, ver. 38. " REPENT, and be bap" tized, every one of you, in the name of Jeſus Chriſt, for the remiſſion of " ſins. The ſame he ſays to them again in his next ſpeech, Acts iv. 26. " Un" to you firſt, God having raiſed up his Son Jeſus, ſent him to bleſs you." How was this done? " IN TURNING AWAY EVERY ONE FROM YOUR " INIQUITIES."

THE ſame doctrine they preach to the high prieſt and rulers, Acts v. 30. " The God of our fathers raiſed up Jeſus, whom ye ſlew, and hanged on a " tree. Him hath God exalted with his right hand, to be a Prince and a Sa" viour, for to give REPENTANCE to Iſrael, and forgiveneſs of ſins; and we " are witneſſes of theſe things, and ſo is alſo the Holy Ghoſt, whom God hath " given to them that obey him."

ACTS xvii. 30. St. Paul tells the Athenians, That now under the goſpel, " God commandeth all men every where to REPENT."

ACTS xx. 21. St. Paul, in his laſt conference with the elders of Epheſus, profeſſes to have taught them the whole doctrine neceſſary to ſalvation. " I " have," ſays he, " kept back nothing that was profitable unto you; but have " ſhewed you, and have taught you publickly, and from houſe to houſe; teſti" fying both to the Jews and to the Greeks:" and then gives an account what his preaching had been, viz. REPENTANCE towards God, and faith to" wards our Lord Jeſus the Meſſiah." This was the ſum and ſubſtance of the goſpel which St. Paul preach'd, and was all that he knew neceſſary to ſalvation; viz. " Repentance, and believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah:" and ſo takes his laſt farewel of them, whom he ſhould never ſee again, ver. 32. in theſe words, " And now, brethren, I commend you to God, and to the word of his grace, " which is able to build you up, and to give you an inheritance among all " them that are ſanctified." There is an inheritance conveyed by the word and covenant of grace; but it is only to thoſe who are ſanctified.

ACTS xxiv. 24. "When Felix ſent for Paul," that he and his wife Druſilla might hear him, "concerning the faith in Chriſt;" Paul reaſoned of righteouſneſs, or juſtice, and temperance; the duties we owe to others, and to ourſelves; and of the judgment to come; 'till he made Felix to tremble. Whereby it appears, that "temperance and juſtice" were fundamental parts of the religion that Paul profeſſed, and were contained in the faith which he preached. And if we find the duties of the moral law not preſſed by him every where; we muſt remember, that moſt of his ſermons left upon record, were preached in their ſynagogues to the Jews, who acknowledged their obedience due to all the precepts of the law; and would have taken it amiſs to have been ſuſpected, not to have been more zealous for the law than he. And therefore it was with reaſon that his diſcourſes were directed chiefly to what they yet wanted, and were averſe to; the knowledge and embracing of Jeſus, their promiſed Meſſiah. But what his preaching generally was, if we will believe him himſelf, we may ſee Acts xxvi. where giving an account to king Agrippa, of his life and doctrine, he tells him, ver. 20. "I ſhewed unto them of Damaſcus, and at Jeruſalem, and throughout all the coaſts of Judea, and then to the Gentiles, "that they ſhould repent, and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance."

THUS we ſee, by the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, that he required of thoſe who believed him to be the Meſſiah, and received him for their Lord and Deliverer, that they ſhould live by his laws: and that (though in conſideration of their becoming his ſubjects, by faith in him, whereby they believed and took him to be the Meſſiah, their former ſins ſhould be forgiven) yet he would own none to be his, nor receive them as true denizons of the new Jeruſalem, into the inheritance of eternal life; but leave them to the condemnation of the unrighteous; who renounced not their former miſcarriages, and lived in a ſincere obedience to his commands. What he expects from his followers, he has ſufficiently declared as a Legiſlator: and that they may not be deceived, by miſtaking the doctrine of faith, grace, free-grace, and the pardon and forgiveneſs of ſins, and ſalvation by him, (which was the great end of his coming) he more than once declares to them, for what omiſſions and miſcarriages he ſhall judge and condemn to death, even thoſe who have owned him, and done miracles in his name: when he comes at laſt to render to every one according to what he had DONE in the fleſh, ſitting upon his great and glorious tribunal, at the end of the world.

THE firſt place where we find our Saviour to have mentioned the day of judgment, is John v. 28, 29. in theſe words; "The hour is coming, in "which all that are in their graves ſhall hear his [i. e. the Son of God's] "voice, "and ſhall come forth; they that have DONE GOOD, unto the reſurrection "of life; and they that have DONE EVIL, unto the reſurrection of damnation." That which puts the diſtinction, if we will believe our Saviour, is the having "done good or evil." And he gives a reaſon of the neceſſity of his judging or condemning thoſe "who have done evil," in the following words, ver. 30. "I can of my ownſelf do nothing. As I hear, I judge; and my "judgment is juſt; becauſe I ſeek not my own will, but the will of my Father, "who hath ſent me." He could not judge of himſelf; he had but a delegated power of judging from the Father, whoſe will he obeyed in it, and who was of purer eyes than to admit any unjuſt perſon into the kingdom of heaven.

MATT. vii. 22, 23. ſpeaking again of that day, he tells what his ſentence will be, "Depart from me, ye WORKERS of iniquity." Faith, in the penitent and ſincerely obedient, ſupplies the defect of their performances; and ſo by grace they are made juſt. But we may obſerve, none are ſentenced or puniſhed for unbelief, but only for their miſdeeds. "They are workers of iniquity" on whom the ſentence is pronounced.

MATT. xiii. 14. "At the end of the world, the Son of man ſhall ſend forth "his angels; and they ſhall gather out of his kingdom all ſcandals, and them "which DO INIQUITY; and caſt them into a furnace of fire; there ſhall "be wailing and gnaſhing of teeth." And again, ver. 49. "The angels ſhall “ſever the WICKED from among the JUST; and ſhall caſt them into the furnace of fire.”

MATT. xvi. 24. “For the Son of man ſhall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels: and then he ſhall reward every man according to his WORKS.

LUKE xiii. 26. “Then ſhall ye begin to ſay, We have eaten and drank in thy preſence, and thou haſt taught in our ſtreets. But he ſhall ſay, I tell you, I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity.”

MATT. xxv. 24,--26. “When the Son of man ſhall come in his glory; and before him ſhall be gathered all nations; he ſhall ſet the ſheep on his right hand, and the goats on his left. Then ſhall the King ſay to them on his right hand, Come, ye bleſſed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat; I was thirſty, and ye gave me drink; I was a ſtranger, and ye took me in; naked, and ye cloathed me; I was ſick, and ye viſited me; I was in priſon, and ye came unto me. Then ſhall the righteous anſwer him, ſaying, Lord, when ſaw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? &c. And the King ſhall anſwer, and ſay unto them, Verily, I ſay unto you, Inaſmuch as ye have done it unto one of the leaſt of theſe my brethren, ye have done it unto me. Then ſhall he ſay unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye curſed, into everlaſting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat; I was thirſty, and ye gave me no drink; I was a ſtranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye cloathed me not; ſick and in priſon, and ye viſited me not. Inſomuch that ye did it not to one of theſe, ye did it not to me. And theſe ſhall go into everlaſting puniſhment: but the righteous into life eternal.”

THESE, I think, are all the places where our Saviour mentions the laſt judgment, or deſcribes his way of proceeding in that great day; wherein, as we have obſerved, it is remarkable, that every where the ſentence follows, doing or not doing; without any mention of believing, or not believing. Not that any, to whom the goſpel hath been preached, ſhall be ſaved, without believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah: for all being ſinners, and tranſgreſſors of the law, and ſo unjuſt, all are liable to condemnation; unleſs they believe, and ſo through grace are juſtified by God, for this faith, which ſhall be accounted to them for righteouſneſs. But the reſt wanting this cover, this allowance for their tranſgreſſions, muſt anſwer for all their actions; and being found tranſgreſſors of the law, ſhall, by the letter, and ſanction of that law, be condemned, for not having paid a full obedience to that law, and not for want of faith. That is not the guilt, on which the puniſhment is laid; though it be the want of faith, which lays open their guilt uncovered; and expoſes them to the ſentence of the law, againſt all that are unrighteous.

THE common objection here, is; If all ſinners ſhall be condemned, but ſuch as have a gracious allowance made them; and ſo are juſtified by God, for believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and ſo taking him for their King, whom they are reſolved to obey, to the utmoſt of their power; “What ſhall become of all mankind, who lived before our Saviour's time; who never heard of his name, and conſequently could not believe in him?” To this the anſwer is ſo obvious and natural, that one would wonder how any reaſonable man ſhould think it worth the urging. No body was, or can be, required to believe, what was never propoſed to him to believe. Before the fulneſs of time, which God from the counſel of his own wiſdom had appointed to ſend his Son in, he had, at ſeveral times, and in different manners, promiſed to the people of Iſrael, an extraordinary perſon to come; who, raiſed from amongſt themſelves, ſhould be their Ruler and Deliverer. The time, and other circumſtances of his birth, life, and perſon, he had in ſundry prophecies ſo particularly deſcribed, and ſo plainly foretold, that he was well known, and expected by the Jews, under the name of the Meſſiah, or Anointed, given him in ſome of theſe prophecies. All then that was required, before his appearing in the world, was to believe what God had revealed, and to rely with a full aſſurance on God, for the performance of his promiſe; and believe,

lieve, that in due time he would ſend them the Meſſiah, this anointed King, this promiſed Saviour and Deliverer, according to his word. This faith in the promiſes of God, this relying and acquieſcing in his word and faithfulneſs, the Almighty takes well at our hands, as a great mark of homage, paid by us poor frail creatures, to his goodneſs and truth, as well as to his power and wiſdom; and accepts it as an acknowledgment of his peculiar providence, and benignity to us. And therefore, our Saviour tells us, John xii. 44. "He that believes on "me, believes not on me, but on him that ſent me." The works of nature ſhew his wiſdom and power: but 'tis his peculiar care of mankind, moſt eminently diſcovered in his promiſes to them, that ſhews his bounty and goodneſs; and conſequently engages their hearts in love and affection to him. This oblation of an heart, fixed with dependence on, and affection to him, is the moſt acceptable tribute we can pay him, the foundation of true devotion, and life of all religion. What a value he puts on this depending on his word, and reſting ſatisfied in his promiſes, we have an example in Abraham; whoſe faith "was "counted to him for righteouſneſs," as we have before remarked out of Rom. iv. And his relying firmly on the promiſe of God, without any doubt of its performance, gave him the name of the father of the faithful; and gained him ſo much favour with the Almighty, that he was called the "friend of God;" the higheſt and moſt glorious title can be beſtowed on a creature. The thing promiſed was no more, but a ſon by his wife Sarah; and a numerous poſterity by him, which ſhould poſſeſs the land of Canaan. Theſe were but temporal bleſſings, and (except the birth of a ſon) very remote, ſuch as he ſhould never live to ſee, nor in his own perſon have the benefit of. But becauſe he queſtioned not the performance of it; but reſted fully ſatisfied in the goodneſs, truth, and faithfulneſs of God, who had promiſed; it was counted to him for righteouſneſs. Let us ſee how St. Paul expreſſes it; Rom. iv. 18,--22. "Who, againſt hope, be-"lieved in hope, that he might become the father of many nations; according "to that which was ſpoken, So ſhall thy ſeed be. And being not weak in his "faith, he conſidered not his own body now dead, when he was above an hun-"dred years old, neither yet the deadneſs of Sarah's womb. He ſtaggered not "at the promiſe of God through unbelief, but was ſtrong in faith; giving glo-"ry to God, and being fully perſuaded, that what he had promiſed, he was "able to perform. And THEREFORE, it was imputed to him for righteouſ-"neſs." St. Paul having here emphatically deſcribed the ſtrength and firmneſs of Abraham's faith, informs us, that he hereby "gave glory to God;" and therefore it was "accounted to him for righteouſneſs." This is the way that God deals with poor frail mortals. He is graciouſly pleaſed to take it well of them, and give it the place of righteouſneſs, and a kind of merit in his ſight; if they believe his promiſes, and have a ſtedfaſt relying on his veracity and goodneſs. St. Paul, Heb. xi. 6. tells us; "Without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God: but at the ſame time tell us what faith that is. "For," ſays he, "he that "cometh to God, muſt believe that he is; and that he is a rewarder of them "that diligently ſeek him." He muſt be perſuaded of God's mercy and good will to thoſe who ſeek to obey him; and reſt aſſured of his rewarding thoſe who rely on him, for whatever, either by the light of nature, or particular promiſes, he has revealed to them of his tender mercies, and taught them to expect from his bounty. This deſcription of faith, (that we might not miſtake what he means by that faith, without which we cannot pleaſe God, and which recommended the ſaints of old) St. Paul places in the middle of the liſt of thoſe, who were eminent for their faith; and whom he ſets as patterns to the converted Hebrews, under perſecution, to encourage them to perſiſt in their confidence of deliverance by the coming of Jeſus Chriſt, and in their belief of the promiſes they now had under the goſpel. By thoſe examples he exhorts them not to "draw "back" from the hope that was ſet before them, nor apoſtatize from the profeſſion of the chriſtian religion. This is plain from ver. 35,-38. of the precedent chapter: "Caſt not away therefore your confidence, which hath great recompence of reward. For ye have great need of perſiſting or perſeverance;" (for ſo the Greek word ſignifies here, which our tranſlation renders "patience." Vide

Luke viii. 15.) "that after ye have done the will of God, ye might receive the "promiſe. For yet a little while, and he that ſhall come will come, and will "not tarry. Now the juſt ſhall live by faith. But if any man draw back, my "ſoul ſhall have no pleaſure in him."

THE examples of faith, which St. Paul enumerates and propoſes in the following words, chap. xi. plainly ſhew, that the faith, whereby thoſe believers of old pleaſed God, was nothing but a ſtedfaſt reliance on the goodneſs and faithfulneſs of God, for thoſe good things, which either the light of nature, or particular promiſes, had given them grounds to hope for. Of what avail this faith was with God, we may ſee, ver. 4. "By faith Abel offered unto God a more "excellent ſacrifice than Cain; by which he obtained witneſs that he was righ-"teous." Ver. 5. "By faith Enoch was tranſlated, that he ſhould not ſee "death: for before his tranſlation he had this teſtimony, that he pleaſed God." Ver. 7. "Noah, being warned of God of things not ſeen as yet;" being wary, "by faith prepared an ark, to the ſaving of his houſe; by the which he con-"demned the world, and became heir of the righteouſneſs which is by faith." And what it was that God ſo graciouſly accepted and rewarded, we are told, ver. 11. "Through faith alſo Sarah herſelf received ſtrength to conceive ſeed, "and was delivered of a child, when ſhe was paſt age." How ſhe came to obtain this grace from God, the apoſtle tells us; "Becauſe ſhe judged him "faithful who had promiſed." Thoſe therefore, who pleaſed God, and were accepted by him, before the coming of Chriſt, did it only by believing the promiſes, and relying on the goodneſs of God, as far as he had revealed it to them. For the apoſtle, in the following words, tells us, ver. 13. "Theſe all died in "faith, not having received (the accompliſhment of) the promiſes; but hav-"ing ſeen them afar off: and were perſuaded of them, and embraced them." This was all that was required of them; to be perſuaded of, and embrace the promiſes which they had. They could be "perſuaded of" no more than was propoſed to them; "embrace" no more than was revealed, according to the promiſes they had received and the diſpenſations they were under. And if the faith of things "ſeen afar off;" if their truſting in God for the promiſes he then gave them; if a belief of the Meſſiah to come, were ſufficient to render thoſe who lived in the ages before Chriſt, acceptable to God, and righteous before him: I deſire thoſe who tell us, that God will not (nay, ſome go ſo far as to ſay, cannot accept) any, who do not believe every article of their particular creeds and ſyſtems, to conſider, why God, out of his infinite mercy, cannot as well juſtify man now, for believing Jeſus of Nazareth to be the promiſed Meſſiah, the king and Deliverer, as thoſe heretofore, who believed only that God would, according to his promiſe, in due time ſend the Meſſiah, to be a King and Deliverer.

THERE is another difficulty often to be met with, which ſeems to have ſomething of more weight in it: and that is, that "though the faith of thoſe be-"fore Chriſt, (believing that God would ſend the Meſſiah, to be a Prince, and a "Saviour to his people, as he had promiſed) and the faith of thoſe ſince his "time, (believing Jeſus to be that Meſſiah, promiſed and ſent by God) ſhall be "accounted to them for righteouſneſs; yet what ſhall become of all the reſt of "mankind, who, having never heard of the promiſe or news of a Saviour, not a "word of a Meſſiah to be ſent, or that was come, have had no thought or belief "concerning him?"

To this I anſwer; that God will require of every man, "according to what "a man hath, and not according to what he hath not." He will not expect the improvement of ten talents, where he gave but one; nor require any one ſhould believe a promiſe, of which he has never heard. The apoſtle's reaſoning, Rom. x. 14. is very juſt: "How ſhall they believe in him, of whom they "have not heard?" But though there be many, who being ſtrangers to the commonwealth of Iſrael, were alſo ſtrangers to the oracles of God, committed to that people; many, to whom the promiſe of the Meſſiah never came, and ſo were never in a capacity to believe or reject that revelation: yet God had, by the light of reaſon, revealed to all mankind, who would make uſe of that light,

that

that he was good and merciful. The ſame ſpark of the divine nature and knowledge in man, which, making him a man, ſhewed him the law he was under, as a man; ſhewed him alſo the way of atoning the merciful, kind, compaſſionate Author and Father of him and his being, when he had tranſgreſſed that law. He that made uſe of this candle of the Lord, ſo far as to find what was his duty, could not miſs to find alſo the way to reconciliation and forgiveneſs, when he had failed of his duty: though, if he uſed not his reaſon this way, if he put out or neglected this light, he might, perhaps, ſee neither.

THE law is the eternal, immutable ſtandard of right. And a part of that law is, that a man ſhould forgive, not only his children, but his enemies, upon their repentance, aſking pardon, and amendment. And therefore he could not doubt that the author of this law, and God of patience and conſolation, who is rich in mercy, would forgive his frail off-ſpring, if they acknowledged their faults, diſapproved the iniquity of their tranſgreſſions, begged his pardon, and reſolved in earneſt, for the future, to conform their actions to this rule, which they owned to be juſt and right. This way of reconciliation, this hope of atonement, the light of nature revealed to them: and the revelation of the goſpel, having ſaid nothing to the contrary, leaves them to ſtand and fall to their own Father and Maſter, whoſe goodneſs and mercy is over all his works.

I KNOW ſome are forward to urge that place of the Acts, chap. iv. as contrary to this. The words, ver. 10. and 12. ſtand thus: "Be it known unto you "all, and to all the people of Iſrael, that by the name of Jeſus Chriſt of Na"zareth, whom ye crucified, whom God raiſed from the dead, even by him, "doth this man" [i. e. the lame man reſtored by Peter] "ſtand here before "you whole. This is the ſtone which is ſet at nought by you builders, which "is become the head of the corner. Neither is there ſalvation in any other: "for there is none other name under heaven, given among men, in which we "muſt be ſaved." Which, in ſhort, is, that Jeſus is the only true Meſſiah, neither is there any other perſon, but he, given to be a mediator between God and man, in whoſe name we may aſk, and hope for ſalvation.

IT will here poſſibly be aſked, "Quorſum perditio hæc?" What need was there of a Saviour? What advantage have we by Jeſus Chriſt?

IT is enough to juſtify the fitneſs of any thing to be done, by reſolving it into the "wiſdom of God," who has done it; though our ſhort views, and narrow underſtandings, may utterly incapacitate us to ſee that wiſdom, and to judge rightly of it. We know little of this viſible, and nothing at all of the ſtate of that intellectual world, wherein are infinite numbers and degrees of ſpirits out of the reach of our ken, or gueſs; and therefore, know not what tranſactions there were between God and our Saviour, in reference to his kingdom. We know not what need there was to ſet up an head and a chieftain, in oppoſition to "the prince of this world, the prince of the power of the air," &c. whereof there are more than obſcure intimations in ſcripture. And we ſhall take too much upon us, if we ſhall call God's wiſdom, or providence to account, and pertly condemn for needleſs, all that our weak, and perhaps, biaſſed underſtanding, cannot account for.

THOUGH this general anſwer be reply enough to the forementioned demand, and ſuch as a rational man, or fair ſearcher after truth, will acquieſce in; yet in this particular caſe, the wiſdom and goodneſs of God has ſhewn himſelf ſo viſibly to common apprehenſions, that it hath furniſhed us abundantly wherewithal to ſatisfy the curious and inquiſitive, who will not take a bleſſing, unleſs they be inſtructed what need they had of it, and why it was beſtowed upon them. The great and many advantages we receive by the coming of Jeſus the Meſſiah, will ſhew, that it was not without need, that he was ſent into the world.

THE evidence of our Saviour's miſſion from heaven is ſo great, in the multitude of miracles he did, before all ſorts of people, that what he delivered cannot but be received as the oracles of God, and unqueſtionable verity. For the miracles he did were ſo ordered by the divine providence and wiſdom, that they never were, nor could be denied by any of the enemies, or oppoſers of chriſtianity.

THOUGH the works of nature, in every part of them, ſufficiently evidence a Deity; yet the world made ſo little uſe of their reaſon, that they ſaw him not, where, even by the impreſſions of himſelf, he was eaſy to be found. Senſe and luſt blinded their minds in ſome, and a careleſs inadvertency in others, and fearful apprehenſions in moſt (who either believed there were, or could not but ſuſpect there might be, ſuperior, unknown beings) gave them up into the hands of their prieſts, to fill their heads with falſe notions of the Deity, and their worſhip with fooliſh rites, as they pleaſed: and what dread or craft once began, devotion ſoon made ſacred, and religion immutable. In this ſtate of darkneſs and ignorance of the true God, vice and ſuperſtition held the world. Nor could any help be had, or hoped for from reaſon; which could not be heard, and was judged to have nothing to do in the caſe; the prieſts, every-where, to ſecure their empire, having excluded reaſon from having any thing to do in religion. And in the crowd of wrong notions, and invented rites, the world had almoſt loſt the ſight of the one only true God, The rational and thinking part of mankind, 'tis true, when they ſought after him, found the one ſupreme, inviſible God; but if they acknowledged and worſhipped him, it was only in their own minds. They kept this truth locked up in their own breaſts as a ſecret, nor ever durſt venture it amongſt the people, much leſs amongſt the prieſts, thoſe wary guardians of their own creeds and profitable inventions. Hence we ſee, that reaſon, ſpeaking never ſo clearly to the wiſe and virtuous, had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude, and to perſuade the ſocieties of men, that there was but one God, that alone was to be owned and worſhipped. The belief and worſhip of one God, was the national religion of the Iſraelites alone: and if we will conſider it, it was introduced and ſupported amongſt the people by revelation. They were in Goſhen, and had light, whilſt the reſt of the world were in almoſt Egyptian darkneſs, "without God in the world." There was no part of mankind, who had quicker parts, or improved them more; that had a greater light of reaſon, or followed it farther in all ſorts of ſpeculations, than the Athenians: and yet we find but one Socrates amongſt them, that oppoſed and laughed at their polytheiſm, and wrong opinions of the Deity; and we ſee how they rewarded him for it. Whatſoever Plato, and the ſobereſt of the philoſophers thought, of the nature and being of the one God, they were fain in their outward profeſſions and worſhip, to go with the herd, and keep to the religion eſtabliſhed by law: which what it was, and how it had diſpoſed the minds of theſe knowing and quick-ſighted Grecians, St. Paul tells us, Acts xvii. 22,--29. "Ye men of Athens," ſays he, "I perceive, that in all things ye are too ſuperſtitious. For as I paſſed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar "with this inſcription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worſhip, him declare I unto you. God that made the world, and all "things therein, ſeeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in "temples made with hands: neither is worſhipped with men's hands, as though "he needed any thing, ſeeing he giveth unto all life, and breath, and all things; "and hath made of one blood all the nations of men, for to dwell on the face "of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds "of their habitations; that they ſhould ſeek the Lord, if haply they might "feel him out, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us." Here he tells the Athenians, that they, and the reſt of the world (given up to ſuperſtition) whatever light there was, in the works of creation and providence, to lead them to the true God, yet they few of them found him. He was every-where near them; yet they were but like people groping and feeling for ſomething in the dark, and did not ſee him with a full and clear day-light; "But thought the Godhead like to gold and ſilver, and ſtone, graven by art "and man's device."

IN this ſtate of darkneſs and error, in reference to the "true God," our Saviour found the world. But the clear revelation he brought with him, diſſipated this darkneſs; made the "one inviſible true God" known to the world: and that with ſuch evidence and energy, that polytheiſm and idolatry hath no where been able to withſtand it: but where-ever the preaching of the truth he delivered, and the light of the goſpel hath come, thoſe miſts have been diſpelled. And in effect, we ſee that ſince our Saviour's time, the "belief of one God" has prevailed and ſpread itſelf over the face of the earth. For even to the light that the Meſſiah brought into the world with him, we muſt aſcribe the owning, and profeſſion of one God, which the Mahometan religion hath derived and borrowed from it. So that in this ſenſe it is certainly and manifeſtly true of our Saviour, what St. John ſays of him; 1 John iii. 8. "For this purpoſe the Son "of God was manifeſted, that he might deſtroy the works of the devil." This light the world needed, and this light it received from him: that there is but "one God," and he "eternal, inviſible;" nor like to any viſible objects, nor to be repreſented by them.

If it be aſked, whether the revelation to the patriarchs by Moſes, did not teach this, and why that was not enough? The anſwer is obvious; that however clearly the knowledge of one inviſible God, maker of heaven and earth, was revealed to them; yet that revelation was ſhut up in a little corner of the world; amongſt a people, by that very law, which they received with it, excluded from a commerce and communication with the reſt of mankind. The Gentile world, in our Saviour's time, and ſeveral ages before, could have no atteſtation of the miracles on which the Hebrews built their faith, but from the Jews themſelves, a people not known to the greateſt part of mankind; contemned and thought vilely of, by thoſe nations that did know them; and therefore very unfit and unable to propagate the doctrine of one God in the world, and diffuſe it through the nations of the earth, by the ſtrength and force of that ancient revelation, upon which they had received it. But our Saviour, when he came, threw down this wall of partition; and did not confine his miracles or meſſage to the land of Canaan, or the worſhippers at Jeruſalem. But he himſelf preached at Samaria, and did miracles in the borders of Tyre and Sidon, and before multitudes of people gathered from all quarters. And after his reſurrection, ſent his apoſtles amongſt the nations, accompanied with miracles; which were done in all parts ſo frequently, and before ſo many witneſſes of all ſorts, in broad day-light, that, as I have before obſerved, the enemies of Chriſtianity have never dared to deny them; no, not Julian himſelf: who neither wanted ſkill nor power to enquire into the truth; nor would have failed to have proclaimed and expoſed it, if he could have detected any falſhood in the hiſtory of the goſpel; or found the leaſt ground to queſtion the matter of fact publiſhed of Chriſt, and his apoſtles. The number and evidence of the miracles done by our Saviour and his followers, by the power and force of truth, bore down this mighty and accompliſhed emperor, and all his parts, in his own dominions. He durſt not deny ſo plain matter of fact, which being granted, the truth of our Saviour's doctrine and miſſion unavoidably follows; notwithſtanding whatſoever artful ſuggeſtions his wit could invent, or malice ſhould offer, to the contrary.

2. Next to the knowledge of one God; maker of all things; a clear "knowledge of their duty" was wanting to mankind". This part of knowledge, though cultivated with ſome care, by ſome of the heathen philoſophers; yet got little footing among the people. All men, indeed, under pain of diſpleaſing the gods, were to frequent the temples: every one went to their ſacrifices and ſervices: but the prieſts made it not their buſineſs to teach them virtue. If they were diligent in their obſervations and ceremonies; punctual in their feaſts and ſolemnities, and the tricks of religion; the holy tribe aſſured them, the gods were pleaſed; and they looked no farther. Few went to the ſchools of the philoſophers, to be inſtructed in their duties; and to know what was good and evil in their actions. The prieſts ſold the better pennyworths, and therefore had all their cuſtom. Luſtrations and proceſſions were much eaſier than a clean conſcience, and a ſteady courſe of virtue; and an expiatory ſacrifice, that atoned for the want of it, was much more convenient, than a ſtrict

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and holy life. No wonder then, that religion was every-where diſtinguiſhed from, and preferred to virtue; and that it was dangerous hereſy and profaneneſs to think the contrary. So much virtue as was neceſſary to hold ſocieties together; and to contribute to the quiet of governments, the civil laws of commonwealths taught, and forced upon men that lived under magiſtrates. But theſe laws, being for the moſt part made by ſuch, who had no other aims but their own power, reached no farther than thoſe things, that would ſerve to tie men together in ſubjection; or at moſt, were directly to conduce to the proſperity and temporal happineſs of any people. But natural religion, in its full extent, was no where, that I know, taken care of, by the force of natural reaſon. It ſhould ſeem, by the little that has hitherto been done in it, that 'tis too hard a taſk for unaſſiſted reaſon, to eſtabliſh morality in all its parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and convincing light. And 'tis at leaſt a ſurer and ſhorter way, to the apprehenſions of the vulgar, and maſs of mankind, that one manifeſtly ſent from God, and coming with viſible authority from him, ſhould as a King and Law-maker, tell them their duties; and require their obedience; than leave it to the long, and ſometimes intricate deductions of reaſon, to be made out to them. Such trains of reaſonings the greateſt part of mankind have neither leiſure to weigh; nor, for want of education and uſe, ſkill to judge of. We ſee how unſucceſsful in this, the attempts of philoſophers were before our Saviour's time. How ſhort their ſeveral ſyſtems came, of the perfection of a true and complete morality, is very viſible. And if ſince that, the chriſtian philoſophers have much out-done them; yet we may obſerve, that the firſt knowledge of the truths they have added, are owing to revelation: though as ſoon as they are heard and conſidered, they are found to be agreeable to reaſon; and ſuch as can by no means be contradicted. Every one may obſerve a great many truths, which he receives at firſt from others, and readily aſſents to, as conſonant to reaſon, which he would have found it hard, and perhaps beyond his ſtrength, to have diſcovered himſelf. Native and original truth is not ſo eaſily wrought out of the mine, as we, who have it delivered, ready dug and faſhioned into our hands, are apt to imagine. And how often at fifty or threeſcore years old are thinking men told, what they wonder how they could miſs thinking of? Which yet their own contemplations did not, and poſſibly never would have helped them to. Experience ſhews, that the knowledge of morality, by meer natural light, (how agreeable ſoever it be to it) makes but a ſlow progreſs, and little advance in the world. And the reaſon of it is not hard to be found in men's neceſſities, paſſions, vices, and miſtaken intereſts, which turn their thoughts another way: and the deſigning leaders, as well as following herd, find it not to their purpoſe to employ much of their meditations this way. Or whatever elſe was the cauſe, 'tis plain in fact, that human reaſon unaſſiſted, failed men in its great and proper buſineſs of morality. It never from unqueſtionable principles, by clear deductions, made out an intire body of the "law of nature." And he that ſhall collect all the moral rules of the philoſophers, and compare them with thoſe contained in the new teſtament, will find them to come ſhort of the morality delivered by our Saviour, and taught by his apoſtles; a college made up, for the moſt part, of ignorant, but inſpired fiſhermen.

THOUGH yet, if any one ſhould think, that out of the ſayings of the wiſe heathens, before our Saviour's time, there might be a collection made of all thoſe rules of morality, which are to be found in the chriſtian religion; yet this would not at all hinder, but that the world, nevertheleſs, ſtood as much in need of our Saviour, and the morality delivered by him. Let it be granted (tho' not true) that all the moral precepts of the goſpel were known by ſome-body or other, amongſt mankind, before. But where, or how, or of what uſe, is not conſidered. Suppoſe they may be picked up here and there; ſome from Solon and Bias in Greece, others from Tully in Italy: and to complete the work, let Confucius, as far as China, be conſulted; and Anacarſis the Scythian, contribute his ſhare. What will all this do, to give the world a complete morality, that may be to mankind, the unqueſtionable rule of life and manners? I will not here urge the impoſſibility of collecting from men, ſo far diſtant from one another, in time, and place, and languages. I will ſuppoſe there was a Stobeus in thoſe times, who had gathered the moral ſayings from all the ſages of the world. What would this amount to, towards being a ſteady rule; a certain tranſcript of a law, that we are under? Did the ſayings of Ariſtippus, or Confucius, give it an authority? Was Zeno a law-giver to mankind? If not, what he or any other philoſopher delivered, was but a ſaying of his. Mankind might hearken to it, or reject it, as they pleaſed; or as it ſuited their intereſt, paſſions, principles or humours. They were under no obligation; the opinion of this or that philoſopher, was of no authority. And if it were, you muſt take all he ſaid under the ſame character. All his dictates muſt go for law, certain and true; or none of them. And then, if you will take any of the moral ſayings of Epicurus (many whereof Seneca quotes with eſteem and approbation) for precepts of the law of nature; you muſt take all the reſt of his doctrine for ſuch too; or elſe his authority ceaſes: and ſo no more is to be received from him, or any of the ſages of old, for parts of the law of nature, as carrying with it an obligation to be obeyed, but what they prove to be ſo. But ſuch a body of ethicks, proved to be the law of nature, from principles of reaſon, and teaching all the duties of life; I think nobody will ſay the world had before our Saviour's time. 'Tis not enough, that there were up and down ſcattered ſayings of wiſe men, conformable to right reaſon. The law of nature, is the law of convenience too: and 'tis no wonder, that thoſe men of parts, and ſtudious of virtue (who had occaſion to think on any particular part of it,) ſhould, by meditation, light on the right, even from the obſervable convenience and beauty of it; without making out its obligation from the true principles of the law of nature, and foundations of morality. But theſe incoherent apophthegms of philoſophers, and wiſe men, however excellent in themſelves, and well intended by them, could never make a morality, whereof the world could be convinced; could never riſe to the force of a law, that mankind could with certainty depend on. Whatſoever ſhould thus be univerſally uſeful, as a ſtandard to which men ſhould conform their manners, muſt have its authority, either from reaſon or revelation. 'Tis not every writer of morals, or compiler of it from others, that can thereby be erected into a law-giver to mankind; and a dictator of rules, which are therefore valid, becauſe they are to be found in his books; under the authority of this or that philoſopher. He, that any one will pretend to ſet up in this kind, and have his rules paſs for authentick directions, muſt ſhew, that either he builds his doctrine upon principles of reaſon, ſelf-evident in themſelves; and that he deduces all the parts of it from thence, by clear and evident demonſtration: or muſt ſhew his commiſſion from heaven, that he comes with authority from God, to deliver his will and commands to the world. In the former way, nobody that I know, before our Saviour's time, ever did, or went about to give us a morality. 'Tis true, there is a law of nature: but who is there that ever did, or undertook to give it us all entire, as a law; no more, nor no leſs, than what was contained in, and had the obligation of that law? Who ever made out all the parts of it, put them together, and ſhewed the world their obligation? Where was there any ſuch code, that mankind might have recourſe to, as their unerring rule, before our Saviour's time? If there was not, 'tis plain, there was need of one to give us ſuch a morality; ſuch a law, which might be the ſure guide of thoſe who had a deſire to go right; and if they had a mind, need not miſtake their duty, but might be certain when they had performed, when failed in it. Such a law of morality Jeſus Chriſt hath given us in the new teſtament; but by the latter of theſe ways, by revelation. We have from him a full and ſufficient rule for our direction, and conformable to that of reaſon. But the truth and obligation of its precepts have their force, and are put paſt doubt to us, by the evidence of his miſſion. He was ſent by God: his miracles ſhew it; and the authority of God in his precepts cannot be queſtioned. Here morality has a ſure ſtandard, that revelation vouches, and reaſon cannot gainſay, nor queſtion; but both together witneſs to come from God the great law-maker. And ſuch an one as this, out of the new teſtament, I think the world never had, nor can any one ſay, is any where elſe to be found. Let me aſk any one, who is forward to think that the doctrine of morality was full and clear in the world, at our Saviour's birth; whither would he have directed Brutus and Caſſius, (both men of parts and virtue, the one whereof believed, and the other diſbelieved a future being) to be ſatisfied in the rules and obligations of all the parts of their duties; if they ſhould have aſked him, Where they might find the law they were to live by, and by which they ſhould be charged, or acquitted, as guilty, or innocent? If to the ſayings of the wiſe, and the declarations of philoſophers, he ſends them into a wild wood of uncertainty, to an endleſs maze, from which they ſhould never get out: if to the religions of the world, yet worſe: and if to their own reaſon, he refers them to that which had ſome light and certainty; but yet had hitherto failed all mankind in a perfect rule; and we ſee, reſolved not the doubts that had riſen amongſt the ſtudious and thinking philoſophers; nor had yet been able to convince the civilized parts of the world, that they had not given, nor could, without a crime, take away, the lives of their children, by expoſing them.

If any one ſhall think to excuſe human nature, by laying blame on men's negligence, that they did not carry morality to an higher pitch; and make it out entire in every part, with that clearneſs of demonſtration which ſome think it capable of; he helps not the matter. Be the cauſe what it will, our Saviour found mankind under a corruption of manners and principles, which ages after ages had prevailed, and muſt be confeſſed, was not in a way or tendency to be mended. The rules of morality were in different countries and ſects, different. And natural reaſon no where had, nor was like to cure the defects and errors in them. Thoſe juſt meaſures of right and wrong, which neceſſity had any where introduced, the civil laws preſcribed, or philoſophy recommended, ſtood not on their true foundations. They were looked on as bonds of ſociety, and conveniencies of common life, and laudable practices. But where was it that their obligation was thoroughly known and allowed, and they received as precepts of a law; of the higheſt law, the law of nature? That could not be, without a clear knowledge and acknowledgment of the law-maker, and the great rewards and puniſhments, for thoſe that would, or would not obey him. But the religion of the heathens, as was before obſerved, little concerned itſelf in their morals. The prieſts, that delivered the oracles of heaven, and pretended to ſpeak from the gods, ſpoke little of virtue and a good life. And on the other ſide, the philoſophers, who ſpoke from reaſon, made not much mention of the Deity in their ethicks. They depended on reaſon and her oracles, which contain nothing but truth: but yet ſome parts of that truth lie too deep for our natural powers eaſily to reach, and make plain and viſible to mankind, without ſome light from above to direct them. When truths are once known to us, though by tradition, we are apt to be favourable to our own parts; and aſcribe to our own underſtandings the diſcovery of what, in reality, we borrowed from others: or, at leaſt, finding we can prove, what at firſt we learn from others, we are forward to conclude it an obvious truth, which, if we had ſought, we could not have miſſed. Nothing ſeems hard to our underſtandings, that is once known: and becauſe what we ſee, we ſee with our own eyes; we are apt to overlook, or forget, the help we had from others, who ſhewed it us, and firſt made us ſee it, as if we were not at all beholden to them, for thoſe truths they opened the way to, and led us into. For knowledge being only of truths that are perceived to be ſo, we are favourable enough to our own faculties; to conclude, that they of their own ſtrength would have attained thoſe diſcoveries, without any foreign aſſiſtance; and that we know thoſe truths, by the ſtrength and native light of our own minds, as they did from whom we received them by theirs, only they had the luck to be before us. Thus the whole ſtock of human knowledge is claimed by every one, as his private poſſeſſion, as ſoon as he (profiting by others diſcoveries) has got it into his own mind: and ſo it is; but not properly by his own ſingle induſtry, nor of his own acquiſition. He ſtudies, 'tis true, and takes pains to make a progreſs in what others have delivered: but their pains were of another ſort, who firſt brought thoſe truths to light, which he afterwards derives from them. He that travels the roads now, applauds his own ſtrength and legs, that have carried him ſo far in ſuch a ſcantling of time; and aſcribes all to his own vigour, little conſidering how much he owes to their pains, who cleared the woods, drained the bogs, built the bridges, and made the ways paſſable; without which he might have toiled much with little progreſs. A great many things which we have been bred up in the belief of, from our cradles, (and are notions grown familiar, and, as it were, natural to us, under the goſp[illegible]) we take for unqueſtionable obvious truths, and eaſily demonſtrable; without conſidering how long we might have been in doubt or ignorance of them, had revelation been ſilent. And many are beholden to revelation, who do not acknowledge it. 'Tis no diminiſhing to revelation, that reaſon gives its ſuffrage too, to the truths revelation has diſcovered. But 'tis our miſtake to think, that becauſe reaſon confirms them to us, we had the firſt certain knowledge of them from thence, and in that clear evidence we now poſſeſs them. The contrary is manifeſt, in the "defective morality of the Gentiles," before our Saviour's time; and the want of reformation in the principles and meaſures of it, as well as practice. Philoſophy ſeemed to have ſpent its ſtrength, and done its utmoſt: or if it ſhould have gone farther, as we ſee it did not; and from undeniable principles given us ethicks in a ſcience like mathematicks, in every part demonſtrable, this yet would not have been ſo effectual to man in this imperfect ſtate, nor proper for the cure. The greateſt part of mankind want leiſure or capacity for demonſtration; nor can carry a train of proofs, which in that way they muſt always depend upon for conviction, and cannot be required to aſſent to, 'till they ſee the demonſtration. Wherever they ſtick, the teachers are always put upon proof, and muſt clear the doubt, by a thread of coherent deductions from the firſt principle, how long, or how intricate ſoever that be. And you may as ſoon hope to have all the day-labourers and tradeſmen, the ſpinſters and dairy-maids, perfect mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethicks this way. Hearing plain commands, is the ſure and only courſe to bring them to obedience and practice. The greateſt part cannot know, and therefore they muſt believe. And I aſk, whether one coming from heaven in the power of God, in full and clear evidence and demonſtration of miracles, giving plain and direct rules of morality and obedience, be not likelier to enlighten the bulk of mankind, and ſet them right in their duties, and bring them to do them, than by reaſoning with them from general notions and principles of human reaſon? And were all the duties of human life clearly demonſtrated; yet I conclude, when well conſidered, that method of teaching men their duties, would be thought proper only for a few, who had much leiſure, improved underſtandings, and were uſed to abſtract reaſonings. But the inſtruction of the people were beſt ſtill to be left to the precepts and principles of the goſpel. The healing of the ſick, the reſtoring ſight to the blind by a word, the raiſing, and being raiſed from the dead, are matters of fact, which they can without difficulty conceive, and that he who does ſuch things, muſt do them by the aſſiſtance of a divine power. Theſe things lie level to the ordinarieſt apprehenſion: he that can diſtinguiſh between ſick and well, lame and ſound, dead and alive, is capable of this doctrine, To one who is once perſuaded that Jeſus Chriſt was ſent by God to be a King; and a Saviour of thoſe who do believe in him, all his commands become principles; there needs no other proof for the truth of what he ſays, but that he ſaid it. And then there needs no more, but to read the inſpired books, to be inſtructed: all the duties of morality lie there clear, and plain, and eaſy to be underſtood. And here I appeal, whether this be not the ſureſt, the ſafeſt, and moſt effectual way of teaching: eſpecially if we add this farther conſideration; that as it ſuits the loweſt capacities of reaſonable creatures, ſo it reaches and ſatisfies, nay, enlightens the higheſt. The moſt elevated underſtandings cannot but ſubmit to the authority of this doctrine as divine; which coming from the mouths of a company of illiterate men, hath not only the atteſtation of miracles, but reaſon to confirm it: ſince they delivered no precepts but ſuch, as though reaſon of itſelf had not clearly made it out, yet it could not but aſſent to, when thus diſcovered, and think itſelf indebted for the diſcovery. The credit and authority our Saviour and his apoſtles had over the minds of men, by the miracles they did, tempted them not to mix (as we find in that of all the ſects and philoſophers, and other religions) any conceits, any wrong rules, any thing tending to their own by-intereſt, or that of a party, in their morality. No tang of prepoſſeſſion or fancy; no footſteps of pride or vanity; no touch of oſtentation or ambition, appears to have a hand in it. It is all pure, all ſincere; nothing too much, nothing wanting; but ſuch a complete rule of life, as the wiſeſt men muſt acknowledge, tends entirely to the good of mankind, and that all would be happy. if all would practiſe it.

3. THE outward forms of "worſhipping the Deity," wanted a reformation. Stately buildings, coſtly ornaments, peculiar and uncouth habits, and a numerous huddle of pompous, fantaſtical, cumberſome ceremonies, every where attended divine worſhip. This, as it had the peculiar name, ſo it was thought the principal part, if not the whole of religion. Nor could this, poſſibly, be amended, whilſt the Jewiſh ritual ſtood; and there was ſo much of it mixed with the worſhip of the true God. To this alſo our Saviour, with the knowledge of the infinite, inviſible, ſupreme ſpirit, brought a remedy, in a plain ſpiritual, and ſuitable worſhip. Jeſus ſays to the woman of Samaria, "The hour "cometh, when ye ſhall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jeruſalem, wor-"ſhip the Father. But the true worſhippers, ſhall worſhip the Father, both "in ſpirit and in truth; for the Father ſeeketh ſuch to worſhip him." To be worſhipped in ſpirit and in truth, with application of mind, and ſincerity of heart, was what God henceforth only required. Magnificent temples, and confinement to certain places, were now no longer neceſſary for his worſhip, which by a pure heart might be performed any where. The ſplendor and diſtinction of habits, and pomp of ceremonies, and all outſide performances, might now be ſpared. God, who was a ſpirit, and made known to be ſo, required none of thoſe, but the ſpirit only; and that in public aſſemblies, (where ſome actions muſt lie open to the view of the world) all that could appear and be ſeen, ſhould be done decently, and in order, and to edification. Decency, order, and edification, were to regulate all their publick acts of worſhip, and beyond what theſe required, the outward appearance (which was of little value in the eyes of God) was not to go. Having ſhut indecency and confuſion out of their aſſemblies, they need not be ſolicitous about uſeleſs ceremonies. Praiſes and prayer, humbly offered up to the Deity, was the worſhip he now demanded; and in theſe every one was to look after his own heart, and to know that it was that alone which God had regard to, and accepted.

4. ANOTHER great advantage received by our Saviour, is the great encouragement he brought to a virtuous and pious life: Great enough to ſurmount the difficulties and obſtacles that lie in the way to it, and reward the pains and hardſhips of thoſe who ſtuck firm to their duties, and ſuffered for the teſtimony of a good conſcience. The portion of the righteous has been in all ages taken notice of, to be pretty ſcanty in this world. Virtue and proſperity do not often accompany one another; and therefore virtue ſeldom had many followers. And 'tis no wonder ſhe prevailed not much in a ſtate, where the inconveniencies that attend her were viſible, and at hand, and the rewards, doubtful, and at a diſtance. Mankind, who are and muſt be allowed to purſue their happineſs, nay, cannot be hindered, could not but think themſelves excuſed from a ſtrict obſervation of rules, which appeared ſo little to conſiſt with their chief end, happineſs; whilſt they kept them from the enjoyment of this life; and they had little evidence and ſecurity of another. 'Tis true they might have argued the other way, and concluded, That, becauſe the good were moſt of them ill treated here, there was another place where they ſhould meet with better uſage; but 'tis plain they did not: their thoughts of another life were at beſt obſcure, and their expectations uncertain. Of manes, and ghoſts, and the ſhades of departed men, there was ſome talk; but little certain, and leſs minded. They had the names of Styx and Acheron, of Elyſian fields and ſeats of the bleſſed: but they had them generally from their poets, mixed with their fables. And ſo they looked more like the inventions of wit, and ornaments of poetry, than the ſerious perſuaſions of the grave and the ſober. They came to them bundled up

amongſt their tales, and for tales they took them. And that which rendered them more ſuſpected, and leſs uſeful to virtue, was, that the philoſophers ſeldom ſet their rules on men's minds and practices, by conſideration of another life. The chief of their arguments were from the excellency of virtue; and the higheſt they generally went, was the exalting of human nature, whoſe perfection lay in virtue. And if the prieſt at any time talked of the ghoſts below, and a life after this, it was only to keep men to their ſuperſtitious and idolatrous rites, whereby the uſe of this doctrine was loſt to the credulous multitude, and its belief to the quicker-ſighted, who ſuſpected it preſently of prieſtcraft. Before our Saviour's time, the doctrine of a future ſtate, though it were not wholly hid, yet it was not clearly known in the world. 'Twas an imperfect view of reaſon, or, perhaps, the decayed remains of an ancient tradition, which rather ſeemed to float on men's fancies, than ſink deep into their hearts. It was ſomething, they knew not what, between being and not being. Something in man they imagined might eſcape the grave; but a perfect complete life, of an eternal duration, after this, was what entered little into their thought, and leſs into their perſuaſions. And they were ſo far from being clear herein, that we ſee no nation of the world publickly profeſſed it, and built upon it: no religion taught it, and 'twas no where made an article of faith, and principle of religion 'till Jeſus Chriſt came; of whom it is truly ſaid, that he, at his appearing, "brought life and immortality to light." And that not only in the clear revelation of it, and in inſtances ſhewn, of men raiſed from the dead; but he has given us an unqueſtionable aſſurance and pledge of it, in his own reſurrection and aſcenſion into heaven. How hath this one truth changed the nature of things in the world, and given the advantage to piety over all that could tempt, or deter men from it? The philoſophers, indeed, ſhewed the beauty of virtue; they ſet her off ſo, as drew men's eyes and approbation to her; but leaving her unendowed, very few were willing to eſpouſe her. The generality could not refuſe her their eſteem and commendation, but ſtill turned their backs on her, and forſook her, as a match not for their turn. But now there being put into the ſcales on her ſide, "an exceeding and immortal weight of glory;" intereſt is come about to her, and virtue now is viſibly the moſt enriching purchaſe, and by much the beſt bargain. That ſhe is the perfection and excellency of our nature; that ſhe is herſelf a reward, and will recommend our names to future ages, is not all that can now be ſaid for her. 'Tis not ſtrange that the learned heathens ſatisfied not many with ſuch airy commendations. It has another reliſh and efficacy, to perſuade men, that if they live well here, they ſhall be happy hereafter. Open the eyes upon the endleſs, unſpeakable joys of another life, and their hearts will find ſomething ſolid and powerful to move them. The view of heaven and hell will caſt a ſlight upon the ſhort pleaſures and pains of this preſent ſtate, and give attractions and encouragements to virtue, which reaſon and intereſt, and the care of ourſelves, cannot but allow and prefer. Upon this foundation, and upon this only, morality ſtands firm, and may defy all competition. This makes it more than a name, a ſubſtantial good, worth all our aims and endeavours; and thus the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt has delivered it to us.

5. To theſe I muſt add one advantage more by Jeſus Chriſt, and that is the promiſe of aſſiſtance. If we do what we can, he will give us his ſpirit to help us to do what, and how we ſhould. 'Twill be idle for us, who know not how our own ſpirits move and act us, to aſk in what manner the Spirit of God ſhall work upon us. The wiſdom, that accompanies that Spirit, knows better than we, how we are made, and how to work upon us. If a wiſe man knows how to prevail on his child, to bring him to what he deſires, can we ſuſpect, that the ſpirit and wiſdom of God ſhould fail in it, though we perceive or comprehend not the ways of his operation? Chriſt has promiſed it, who is faithful and juſt; and we cannot doubt of the performance. 'Tis not requiſite on this occaſion, for the inhancing of this benefit, to enlarge on the frailty of our minds, and weakneſs of our conſtitutions; how liable to miſtakes, how apt to go aſtray, and how eaſily to be turned out of the paths of virtue. If any one needs go beyond himſelf, and the teſtimony of his own conſcience in this point; if he feels not his

own errors and paſſions always tempting, and often prevailing, againſt the ſtrict rules of his duty, he need but look abroad into any age of the world to be convinced. To a man under the difficulties of his nature, beſet with temptations, and hedged in with prevailing cuſtom; 'tis no ſmall encouragement to ſet himſelf ſeriouſly on the courſes of virtue, and practice of true religion, that he is from a ſure hand, and an Almighty arm, promiſed aſſiſtance to ſupport and carry him through.

THERE remains yet ſomething to be ſaid to thoſe, who will be ready to object, "If the belief of Jeſus of Nazareth to be the Meſſiah, together with thoſe "concomitant articles of his reſurrection, rule, and coming again to judge the "world, be all the faith required, as neceſſary to juſtification, to what purpoſe "were the epiſtles written; I ſay, if the belief of thoſe many doctrines contain'd "in them, be not alſo neceſſary to ſalvation; And if what is there delivered, a "Chriſtian may believe or diſbelieve, and yet, nevertheleſs, be a member of "Chriſt's church, and one of the faithful?"

To this, I anſwer, That the epiſtles were written upon ſeveral ocaſions: and he that will read them as he ought, muſt obſerve what 'tis in them, is principally aimed at; find what is the argument in hand, and how managed; if he will underſtand them right, and profit by them. The obſerving of this will beſt help us to the true meaning and mind of the writer: for that is the truth which is to be received and believed; and not ſcattered ſentences in ſcripture-language, accommodatated to our notions and prejudices. We muſt look into the drift of the diſcourſe, obſerve the coherence and connection of the parts, and ſee how it is conſiſtent with itſelf, and other parts of ſcripture; if we will conceive it right. We muſt not cull out, as beſt ſuits our ſyſtem, here and there a period or verſe; as if they were all diſtinct and independent aphoriſms; and make theſe the fundamental articles of the Chriſtian faith, and neceſſary to ſalvation, unleſs God has made them ſo. There be many truths in the bible, which a good Chriſtian may be wholly ignorant of, and ſo not believe; which, perhaps, ſome lay great ſtreſs on and call fundamental articles, becauſe they are the diſtinguiſhing points of their communion. The epiſtles, moſt of them, carry on a thread of argument, which in the ſtile they are writ, cannot every-where be obſerved without great attention. And to conſider the texts, as they ſtand and bear a part in that, is to view them in their due light, and the way to get the true ſenſe of them. They were writ to thoſe who were in the faith, and true Chriſtians already: and ſo could not be deſigned to teach them the fundamental articles and points neceſſary to ſalvation. The epiſtle to the Romans was writ to all "that were at Rome, beloved of God, called to be ſaints, whoſe faith was ſpoken of through the world," chap. i. 7, 8. To whom St. Paul's firſt epiſtle to the Corinthians was, he ſhews, chap. i. 2. 4, &c. "Unto the church of God which is at Corinth, to them that "are ſanctified in Chriſt Jeſus, called to be ſaints; with all them that in every "place call upon the name of Jeſus Chriſt our Lord, both theirs and ours. I "thank my God always on your behalf, for the grace of God which is given "you by Jeſus Chriſt; that in every thing ye are enriched by him in all utterance, and in all knowledge: even as the teſtimony of Chriſt was confirmed "in you. So that ye come behind in no gift; waiting for the coming of the "Lord Jeſus Chriſt." And ſo likewiſe the ſecond was, "To the church of "God at Corinth, with all the ſaints in Achaia," chap. i. 1. His next is to the churches of Galatia. That to the Epheſians was, "To the ſaints that were at "Epheſus, and to the faithful in Chriſt Jeſus." So likewiſe, "To the ſaints "and faithful brethren in Chriſt at Coloſſe, who had faith in Chriſt Jeſus, and "love to the ſaints. To the church of the Theſſalonians. To Timothy his ſon "in the faith. To Titus his own ſon after the common faith. To Philemon "his dearly beloved, and fellow-labourer." And the author to the Hebrews calls thoſe he writes to, "Holy brethren, partakers of the heavenly calling," chap. iii. 1. From whence it is evident, that all thoſe, whom St. Paul writ to, were brethren, ſaints, faithful in the church, and ſo Chriſtians already; and, therefore, wanted not the fundamental articles of the Chriſtian religion; without a belief of which they could not be ſaved; nor can it be ſuppoſed, that the ſending

ing of ſuch fundamentals was the reaſon of the apoſtle's writing to any of them. To ſuch alſo St. Peter writes, as is plain from the firſt chapter of each of his epiſtles. Nor is it hard to obſerve the like in St. James, and St. John's epiſtles. And St. Jude directs his thus: “ To them that are ſanctified by God the Father, and “ preſerved in Jeſus Chriſt, and called.” The epiſtles, therefore, being all written to thoſe who were already believers and Chriſtians, the occaſion and end of writing them, could not be to inſtruct them in that which was neceſſary to make them Chriſtians. This, 'tis plain, they knew and believed already; or elſe they could not have been Chriſtians and believers. And they were writ upon particular occaſions; and without thoſe occaſions, had not been writ; and ſo cannot be thought neceſſary to ſalvation: Though they reſolving doubts, and reforming miſtakes, are of great advantage to our knowledge and practice. I do not deny, but the great doctrines of the Chriſtian faith are dropt here and there, and ſcattered up and down in moſt of them. But 'tis not in the epiſtles we are to learn what are the fundamental articles of faith, where they are promiſcuouſly, and without diſtinction mixed with other truths, in diſcourſes that were (though for edification, indeed, yet) only occaſional. We ſhall find and diſcern thoſe great and neceſſary points beſt, in the preaching of our Saviour and the apoſtles, to thoſe who were yet ſtrangers, and ignorant of the faith, to bring them in, and convert them to it. And what that was, we have ſeen already, out of the hiſtory of the evangeliſts, and the Acts; where they are plainly laid down, ſo that no-body can miſtake them. The epiſtles to particular churches, beſides the main argument of each of them, (which was ſome preſent concernment of that particular church, to which they ſeverally were addreſs'd) do in many places explain the fundamentals of the Chriſtian religion, and that wiſely; by proper accommodations to the apprehenſions of thoſe they were writ to, the better to make them imbibe the Chriſtian doctrine, and the more eaſily to comprehend the method, reaſons, and grounds of the great work of ſalvation. Thus we ſee, in the epiſtle to the Romans, adoption (a cuſtom well known amongſt thoſe of Rome) is much made uſe of, to explain to them the grace and favour of God, in giving them eternal life; to help them to conceive how they became the children of God, and to aſſure them of a ſhare in the kingdom of heaven, as heirs to an inheritance. Whereas he ſetting out, and confirming the chriſtian faith to the Hebrews, in the epiſtle to them, is by alluſions and arguments, from the ceremonies, ſacrifices, and oeconomy of the Jews, and references to the records of the old teſtament. And as for the general epiſtles, they, we may ſee, regard the ſtate and exigencies, and ſome peculiarities of thoſe times. Theſe holy writers, inſpired from above, writ nothing but truth; and in moſt places, very weighty truths to us now; for the expounding, clearing, and confirming of the chriſtian doctrine, and eſtabliſhing thoſe in it who had embraced it. But yet every ſentence of theirs muſt not be taken up, and looked on as a fundamental article, neceſſary to ſalvation; without an explicit belief whereof, no-body could be a member of Chriſt's church here, nor be admitted into his eternal kingdom hereafter. If all, or moſt of the truths declared in the epiſtles, were to be received and believed as fundamental articles, what then became of thoſe chriſtians who were fallen aſleep (as St. Paul witneſſes in his firſt to the Corinthians, many were) before theſe things in the epiſtles were revealed to them? Moſt of the epiſtles not being written till above twenty years after our Saviour's aſcenſion, and ſome after thirty.

BUT farther, therefore, to thoſe who will be ready to ſay, “ May thoſe truths “ delivered in the epiſtles, which are not contained in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, and are therefore, by this account, not neceſſary to ſalvation, be believed, or diſbelieved without any danger? May a chriſtian ſafely queſtion or doubt of them?”

TO this I anſwer, That the law of faith, being a covenant of free grace, God alone can appoint what ſhall be neceſſarily believed by every one whom he will juſtify. What is the faith which he will accept and account for righteouſneſs, depends wholly on his good pleaſure. For 'tis of grace, and not of right, that this faith is accepted. And therefore he alone can ſet the meaſures of it: and what he has ſo appointed and declared, is alone neceſſary. Nobody can add to theſe fundamental articles of faith; nor make any other neceſſary, but what God himſelf hath made, and declared to be ſo. And what theſe are which God requires of thoſe who will enter into, and receive the benefits of the new covenant, has already been ſhewn. An explicit belief of theſe is abſolutely required, of all thoſe, to whom the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt is preached, and ſalvation through his Name propoſed.

THE other parts of divine revelation are objects of faith, and are ſo to be received. They are truths, whereof no one can be rejected; none that is once known to be ſuch, may, or ought to be diſbelieved. For to acknowledge any propoſition to be of divine revelation and authority, and yet to deny, or diſbelieve it, is to offend againſt this fundamental article and ground of faith, that God is true. But yet a great many of the truths revealed in the goſpel, every one does, and muſt confeſs, a man may be ignorant of; nay, diſbelieve, without danger to his ſalvation: as is evident in thoſe, who, allowing the authority, differ in the interpretation and meaning of ſeveral texts of ſcripture, not thought fundamental: in all which, 'tis plain, the contending parties on one ſide or the other, are ignorant of, nay, diſbelieve the truths delivered in holy writ; unleſs contrarieties and contradictions can be contained in the ſame words, and divine revelation can mean contrary to itſelf.

THOUGH all divine revelation requires the obedience of faith; yet every truth of inſpired ſcriptures is not one of thoſe, that by the law of faith is required to be explicitly believed to juſtification. What thoſe are, we have ſeen by what our Saviour and his apoſtles propoſed to, and required in thoſe whom they converted to the faith. Thoſe are fundamentals, which 'tis not enough not to diſbelieve: every one is required actually to aſſent to them. But any other propoſition contained in the ſcripture, which God has not thus made a neceſſary part of the law of faith, (without an actual aſſent to which, he will not allow any one to be a believer) a man may be ignorant of, without hazarding his ſalvation by a defect in his faith. He believes all that God has made neceſſary for him to believe, and aſſent to: and as for the reſt of divine truths, there is nothing more required of him, but that he receive all the parts of divine revelation, with a docility and diſpoſition prepared to embrace, and aſſent to all truths coming from God; and ſubmit his mind to whatſoever ſhall appear to him to bear that character. Where he, upon fair endeavours, underſtands it not; how can he avoid being ignorant? And when he cannot put ſeveral texts, and make them conſiſt together; what remedy? He muſt either interpret one by the other, or ſuſpend his opinion. He that thinks that more is, or can be required, of poor frail man, in matters of faith, will do well to conſider what abſurdities he will run into. God, out of the infiniteneſs of his mercy, has dealt with man, as a compaſſionate and tender Father. He gave him reaſon, and with it a law: that could not be otherwiſe than what reaſon ſhould dictate; unleſs we ſhould think, that a reaſonable creature ſhould have an unreaſonable law. But, conſidering the frailty of man, apt to run into corruption and miſery, he promiſed a Deliverer, whom in his good time he ſent; and then declared to all mankind, That whoever would believe him to be the Saviour promiſed, and take him now raiſed from the dead, and conſtituted the Lord, and Judge of all men, to be their King and Ruler, ſhould be ſaved. This is a plain intelligible propoſition; and the all-merciful God ſeems herein to have conſulted the poor of this world, and the bulk of mankind. Theſe are articles that the labouring and illiterate man may comprehend. This is a religion ſuited to vulgar capacities; and the ſtate of mankind in this world, deſtined to labour and travel. The writers and wranglers in religion fill it with niceties, and dreſs it up with notions, which they make neceſſary and fundamental parts of it; as if there were no way into the church, but through the academy or lyceum. The greateſt part of mankind have not leiſure for learning and logick, and ſuperfine diſtinctions of the ſchools. Where the hand is uſed to the plough and the ſpade, the head is ſeldom elevated to ſublime notions, or exerciſed in myſterious reaſoning. 'Tis well if men of that rank (to ſay nothing of the other ſex) can comprehend plain propoſitions, and a ſhort reaſoning about things familiar to their minds, and nearly allied to their daily experience. Go beyond this, and you amaze the greateſt part of mankind: and may as well talk Arabick to a poor day-labourer, as the notions and language that the books and diſputes of religion are filled with; and as ſoon you will be underſtood. The diſſenting congregations are ſuppoſed, by their teachers, to be more accurately inſtructed in matters of faith, and better to underſtand the chriſtian religion, than the vulgar conformiſts, who are charged with great ignorance; how truly, I will not here determine. But I aſk them to tell me ſeriouſly, "Whether half their people have leiſure to ſtudy? Nay, Whether one "in ten, of thoſe who come to their meetings in the country, if they had time "to ſtudy them, do or can underſtand, the controverſies at this time ſo warmly "managed amongſt them, about "juſtification," the ſubject of this preſent "treatiſe?" I have talked with ſome of their teachers, who confeſs themſelves not to underſtand the difference in debate between them. And yet the points they ſtand on, are reckoned of ſo great weight, ſo material, ſo fundamental in religion, that they divide communion, and ſeparate upon them. Had God intended that none but the learned ſcribe, the diſputer, or wiſe of this world, ſhould be chriſtians, or be ſaved, thus religion ſhould have been prepared for them, filled with ſpeculations and niceties, obſcure terms, and abſtract notions. But men of that expectation, men furniſhed with ſuch acquiſitions, the apoſtle, tells us, 1 Cor. i. are rather ſhut out from the ſimplicity of the goſpel; to make way for thoſe poor, ignorant, illiterate, who heard and believed promiſes of a Deliverer, and believed Jeſus to be him; who could conceive a man dead and made alive again, and believe that he ſhould, at the end of the world, come again and paſs ſentence on all men, according to their deeds. That the poor had the goſpel preached to them; Chriſt makes a mark, as well as buſineſs of his miſſion, Matt. xi. 5. And if the poor had the goſpel preached to them, it was, without doubt, ſuch a goſpel as the poor could underſtand, plain and intelligible: and ſo it was, as we have ſeen, in the preachings of Chriſt and his apoſtles.

A
VINDICATION
OF THE
REASONABLENESS
OF
CHRISTIANITY, &c.
From Mr. Edwards's
REFLECTIONS.

A
VINDICATION
OF THE
REASONABLENESS
OF
CHRISTIANITY, &c.

MY Book had not been long out, before it fell under the correction of the author of a treatiſe, intituled, “Some thoughts concerning the ſeveral cauſes and occaſions of atheiſm, eſpecially in the preſent age.” No contemptible adverſary, I'll aſſure you; ſince, as it ſeems, he has got the faculty to heighten every thing that diſpleaſes him, into the capital crime of Atheiſm; and breaths againſt thoſe, who come in his way, a peſtilential air, whereby every the leaſt diſtemper is turned into the plague, and becomes mortal. For whoever does not juſt ſay after Mr. Edwards, cannot, 'tis evident, eſcape being an atheiſt, or a promoter of atheiſm. I cannot but approve of any one's zeal, to guard and ſecure that great and fundamental article of all religion and morality, “That there is a God:” but atheiſm being a crime, which, for its madneſs as well as guilt, ought to ſhut a man out of all ſober and civil ſociety, ſhould be very warily charged on any one, by deductions and conſequences, which he himſelf does not own, or, at leaſt, do not manifeſtly and unavoidably flow from what he aſſerts. This caution, charity, I think, obliges us to: and our author would poſſibly think himſelf hardly dealt with, if, for neglecting ſome of thoſe rules he himſelf gives, p. 31, and 34, againſt atheiſm, he ſhould be pronounced a promoter of it: as rational a charge, I imagine, as ſome of thoſe he makes; and as fitly put together, as “the treatiſe of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c.” brought in among the cauſes of atheiſm. However I ſhall not much complain of him, ſince he joins me, p. 104. with no worſe company, than two eminently pious and learned * prelates of our church, whom he makes favourers of the ſame conceit, as he calls it. But what has that conceit to do with atheiſm? Very much. That conceit is of kin to ſocinianiſm, and ſocinianiſm to atheiſm. Let us hear Mr. Edwards himſelf. He ſays, 113. I am “all over ſocinianized:” and therefore, my book, fit to be placed among the cauſes of atheiſm. For in the 64th, and following pages, he endeavours to ſhew That “a ſocinian is an atheiſt; or, leſt that ſhould ſeem harſh, one that favours the cauſe of atheiſm,” p. 75. For ſo he has been pleaſed to mollify, now it is publiſhed as a treatiſe, what was much more harſh, and much more confident in it, when it was preached as a ſermon. In this abatement, he ſeems a little to comply with his own advice, againſt his fourth cauſe of atheiſm; which we have in theſe words, pag. 34. “Wherefore, that we may effectually prevent this folly in ourſelves, let us baniſh preſumption, confidence, and ſelf-conceit; let us extirpate all pride and arrogance; let us not liſt ourſelves in the number of capricious opiniators.”

I SHALL leave the ſocinians themſelves to anſwer his charge againſt them, and ſhall examine his proof of my being a ſocinian. It ſtands thus. pag. 112.

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* Bp. Taylor, and the author of the naked truth.

"When he" [the author of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c.] "proceeds "to mention the advantages and benefits of Chriſt's coming into the world, and "appearing in the fleſh, he hath not one ſyllable of his ſatisfying for us; or, by "his death, purchaſing life or ſalvation, or any thing that ſounds like it. This, "and ſeveral other things, ſhew, that he is all over ſocinianized." Which in effect is, that becauſe I have not ſet down all that this author perhaps would have done, therefore I am a ſocinian. But what if I ſhould ſay, I ſet down as much as my argument required, and yet am no ſocinian? Would he, from my ſilence and omiſſion, give me the lie, and ſay, I am one? Surmiſes that may be overturned by a ſingle denial, are poor arguments, and ſuch as ſome men would be aſhamed of: at leaſt, if they are to be permitted to men of this gentleman's ſkill and zeal, who knows how to make a good uſe of conjectures, ſuſpicions, and uncharitable cenſures in the cauſe of God; yet even there too (if the cauſe of God can need ſuch arts) they require a good memory to keep them from recoiling upon the author. He might have taken notice of theſe words in my book, (p. 513 of this Vol.) "From this eſtate of death, JESUS CHRIST RESTORES all mankind to life." And a little lower. "The life which Jeſus "Chriſt reſtores to all men." And p. 562. "He that hath incurred death "for his own tranſgreſſion, cannot LAY DOWN HIS LIFE FOR ANOTHER, "as our Saviour profeſſes he did." This methinks, SOUNDS SOMETHING LIKE "Chriſt's purchaſing life for us by his death. But this reverend gentleman has an anſwer ready; it was not in the place he would have had it in, it was not where I mention the advantages and benefits of Chriſt's coming. And therefore, I not having one ſyllable of Chriſt's purchaſing life and ſalvation for us by his death, or any thing that ſounds like it: this, and ſeveral other things, that might be offered, ſhew that I am "all over ſocinianized." A very clear and ingenuous proof, and let him enjoy it.

BUT what will become of me, that I have not mentioned ſatisfaction!

POSSIBLY, this reverend gentleman would have had charity enough for a known writer of the brotherhood, to have found it by an "inuendo," in thoſe words above quoted, of laying down his life for another. But every thing is to be ſtrained here the other way. For the author of "the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, &c." is of neceſſity to be repreſented as a ſocinian; or elſe his book may be read, and the truths in it, which Mr. Edwards likes not, be received, and people put upon examining. Thus one, as full of happy conjectures and ſuſpicions as this gentleman, might be apt to argue. But what if the author deſigned his treatiſe, as the title ſhews, chiefly for thoſe who were not yet thoroughly, or firmly, chriſtians, propoſing to work on thoſe, who either wholly diſbelieved, or doubted of the truth of the chriſtian religion? Would any one blame his prudence, if he mentioned only thoſe advantages, which all chriſtians are agreed in? Might he not remember and obſerve that command of the apoſtle, Rom. xiv. 1. "Him that is weak in the faith, receive ye, but not to doubt"ful diſputations;" without being a ſocinian? Did he amiſs, that he offered to the belief of thoſe who ſtood off, that, and only that, which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, for the reducing the unconverted world: and would any one think he in earneſt went about to perſuade men to be chriſtians, who ſhould uſe that as an argument to recommend the goſpel, which he has obſerved men to lay hold on, as an objection againſt it? To urge ſuch points of controverſy, as neceſſary articles of faith, when we ſee our Saviour and the apoſtles, in their preaching, urged them not as neceſſary to be believed, to make men chriſtians, is (by our own authority) to add prejudices to prejudices, and to block up our own way to thoſe men, whom we would have acceſs to, and prevail upon. But ſome men had rather you ſhould write booty, and croſs your own deſign of removing men's prejudices to chriſtianity, than leave out one tittle of what they put into their ſyſtems. To ſuch, I ſay, convince but men of the miſſion of Jeſus Chriſt, make them but ſee the truth, ſimplicity and reaſonableneſs, of what he himſelf taught, and required to be believed by his followers; and you need not doubt, but, being once fully perſuaded of his doctrine, and the advantages which all chriſtians agree, are received by him, ſuch converts will not lay by the ſcriptures, but by a conſtant reading and ſtudy of them, get all the light they can from this divine revelation, and nouriſh themſelves up in the words of faith, and of good doctrine, as St. Paul ſpeaks to Timothy. But ſome men will not bear it, that any one ſhould ſpeak of religion, but according to the model that they themſelves have made of it. Nay, though he propoſes it upon the very terms, and in the very words which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached it in, yet he ſhall not eſcape cenſures and the ſevereſt inſinuations. To deviate in the leaſt, or to omit any thing contained in their articles, is hereſy, under the moſt invidious names in faſhion, and 'tis well, if he eſcapes being a downright atheiſt. Whether this be the way for teachers to make themſelves hearkened to, as men in earneſt in religion, and really concerned for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, I leave them to conſider. What ſucceſs it has had, towards perſuading men of the truth of chriſtianity, their own complaints of the prevalency of atheiſm, on the one hand, and the number of deiſts on the other, ſufficiently ſhew.

ANOTHER thing laid to my charge, p. 105, and 107, is my "Forgetting, "or rather, wilful omitting, ſome plain and obvious paſſages," and ſome "famous teſtimonies in the evangeliſts;" namely, Matth. xxviii. 19. Go, teach "all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and "of the Holy Ghoſt." And John i. 1. "In the beginning was the Word, "and the word was with God, and the word was God." And verſe 14. "And "the word was made fleſh." Mine, it ſeems, in this book, are all ſins of omiſſion. And yet, when it came out, the buz, and flutter, and noiſe which was made, and the reports which were raiſed, would have perſuaded the world, that it ſubverted all morality, and was deſigned againſt the chriſtian religion. I muſt confeſs, diſcourſes of this kind, which I met with, ſpread up and down, at firſt amazed me; knowing the ſincerity of thoſe thoughts, which perſuaded me to publiſh it (not without ſome hope of doing ſome ſervice to decaying piety, and miſtaken and ſlandered chriſtianity.) I ſatisfied myſelf againſt thoſe heats, with this aſſurance, that if there was any thing in my book, againſt what any one called religion, it was not againſt the religion contained in the goſpel. And for that, I appeal to all mankind.

BUT to return to Mr. Edwards, in particular, I muſt take leave to tell him, that if "omitting plain and obvious paſſages, and famous teſtimonies in the evangeliſts," be a fault in me, I wonder why he, among ſo many of this kind that I am guilty of, mentions ſo few. For I muſt acknowledge I have omitted more, nay, many more, that are "plain and obvious paſſages, and famous teſtimonies in the evangeliſts," than thoſe he takes notice of. But if I have left out none of thoſe "paſſages or teſtimonies," which contain what our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, and required aſſent to, to make men believers, I ſhall think my omiſſions (let them be what they will) no faults in the preſent caſe. Whatever doctines Mr. Edwards would have to be believed, if they are ſuch as our Saviour and his apoſtles required to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian, he will be ſure to find them in thoſe preachings and "famous teſtimonies," of our Saviour and his apoſtles, that I have quoted. And if they are not there, he may reſt ſatisfied, that they were not propoſed by our Saviour and his apoſtles, as neceſſary to be believed, to make men Chriſt's diſciples.

IF the omiſſion of other texts in the evangeliſts (which are all true alſo, and no one of them to be diſbelieved) be a fault, it might have been expected that Mr. Edwards ſhould have accuſed me for leaving out Matth. i. 18, to 23. and Matth xxvii. 24, 35, 50, 60. for theſe are "plain and obvious paſſages and famous teſtimonies in the evangeliſts;" and ſuch, whereon theſe articles of the apoſtles creed, viz. "born of the virgin Mary, ſuffered under Pontius Pilate, "was crucified, dead and buried," are founded. Theſe being articles of the apoſtles creed, are looked upon as "fundamental doctrines:" and one would wonder, why Mr. Edwards ſo quietly paſſes by their omiſſion; did it not appear, that he was ſo intent on fixing his imputation of ſocinianiſm upon me, that, rather than miſs that, he was content to drop the other articles of his creed.

For I muſt obſerve to him, that if he had blamed me for the omiſſion of the places laſt quoted out of St. Matthew, (as he had as much reaſon as for any other) it would plainly have appeared, how idle and ill-grounded his charging ſocinianiſm on me was. But, at any rate, he was to give the book an ill name; not becauſe it was ſocinian; for he has no more reaſon to charge it with ſocinianiſm for the omiſſions he mentions, than the apoſtles creed. 'Tis therefore, well for the compilers of that creed, that they lived not in Mr. Edwards's days: for he would, no doubt, have found them "all over ſocinianized," for omitting the texts he quotes, and the doctrines he collects out of John i. and John xiv. p. 107. 108. Socinianiſm then is not the fault of the book, whatever elſe it be. For I repeat it again, there is not one word of ſocinianiſm in it. I, that am not ſo good at conjectures as Mr. Edwards, ſhall leave it to him to ſay, or to thoſe who can bear the plainneſs and ſimplicity of the goſpel, to gueſs, what its fault is.

SOME men are ſhrewd gueſſers, and others would be thought to be ſo: but he muſt be carried far by his forward inclination, who does not take notice, that the world is apt to think him a diviner, for any thing rather than for the ſake of truth, who ſets up his own ſuſpicions againſt the direct evidence of things; and pretends to know other men's thoughts and reaſons, better than they themſelves. I had ſaid, that the epiſtles being writ to thoſe who were already believers, could not be ſuppoſed to be writ to them to teach them fundamentals, without which they could not be believers.

AND the reaſon I gave, why I had not gone through the writings in the epiſtles, to collect the fundamental articles of faith, as I had through the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, was, becauſe thoſe fundamental articles were in thoſe epiſtles promiſcuouſly, and without diſtinction, mixed with other truths. And, therefore, we ſhall find and diſcern thoſe great and neceſſary points beſt in the preachings of our Saviour and the apoſtles, to thoſe who were yet ignorant of the faith, and unconverted. This, as far as I know my own thoughts, was the reaſon why I did (as Mr. Edwards complains, p. 109.) "not "proceed to the epiſtles, and not give an account of them, as I had done of "the goſpels and acts." This, I imagined, I had in the cloſe of my book ſo fully and clearly expreſſed, particularly p. 583. of this Vol. that I ſuppoſe no body, how willing ſoever, could have miſtaken me. But this gentleman is ſo much better acquainted with me, than I am with myſelf; ſees ſo deeply into my heart, and knows ſo perfectly every thing that paſſes there; that he, with aſſurance tells the world, p. 109. "That I purpoſely omitted the epiſtolary writ-"ings of the apoſtles, becauſe they are fraught with other fundamental doc-"trines, beſides that one which I mention." And then he goes on to enume-"rate thoſe fundamental articles, p. 110, 111, viz. "The corruption and de-"generacy of human nature, with the true original of it (the defection of our "firſt parents) the propagation of ſin and mortality, our reſtoration and reconci-"liation by Chriſt's blood, the eminency and excellency of his prieſthood, the "efficacy of his death, the full ſatisfaction made, thereby, to divine juſtice, and "his being made an all-ſufficient ſacrifice for ſin. Chriſt's righteouſneſs, our "juſtification by it, election, adoption, ſanctification, ſaving faith, the nature of "the goſpel, the new covenant, the riches of God's mercy in the way of ſalva-"tion, by Jeſus Chriſt, the certainty of the reſurrection of human bodies, and of "the future glory."

GIVE me leave now to aſk you ſeriouſly, whether theſe, which you have here ſet down under the title of "fundamental doctrines," are ſuch (when reduced to propoſitions) that every one of them is required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and ſuch, as without the actual belief thereof, he cannot be ſaved. If they are not ſo, every one of them, you may call them "fundamen-"tal doctrines," as much as you pleaſe, they are not of thoſe doctrines of faith I was ſpeaking of, which are only ſuch, as are required to be actually believed to make a man a chriſtian. If you ſay, ſome of them are ſuch neceſſary points of faith, and others not, you, by this ſpecious liſt of well-ſounding, but unexplained terms, arbitrarily collected, only make good what I have ſaid, viz.

that the neceſſary articles of faith, are in the epiſtles, promiſcuouſly delivered with other truths, and, therefore, they cannot be diſtinguiſhed but by ſome other mark, than being barely found in the epiſtles. If you ſay, that they are all of them neceſſary articles of faith, I ſhall then deſire you to reduce them to ſo many plain doctrines, and then prove them to be every one of them required to be believed by every Chriſtian man, to make him a member of the Chriſtian church. For, to begin with the firſt, 'tis not enough to tell us, as you do, that "the "corruption and degeneracy of human nature, with the true original of it, (the "defection of our firſt parents) the propagation of ſin and mortality, is one of the "great heads of Chriſtian divinity." But you are to tell us, what are the propoſitions we are required to believe concerning this matter: for nothing can be an article of faith, but ſome propoſition; and then it will remain to be proved, that theſe articles are neceſſary to be believed to ſalvation. The apoſtle's creed was taken, in the firſt ages of the church, to contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation; I mean, neceſſary to be believed: but you have now better thought on it, and are pleaſed to enlarge it, and we, no doubt, are bound to ſubmit to your Orthodoxy.

THE liſt of materials for his creed (for the articles are not yet formed) Mr. Edwards cloſes, p. 111. with theſe words, "Theſe are the matters of faith "contained in the epiſtles, and they are eſſential and integral parts of the goſpel "itſelf." What, juſt theſe? Neither more nor leſs? If you are ſure of it, pray let us have them ſpeedily, for the reconciling of differences in the Chriſtian church, which has been ſo cruelly torn, about the articles of the Chriſtian faith, to the great reproach of Chriſtian charity, and ſcandal of our true religion.

Mr. EDWARDS, having thus, with two learned terms of eſſential and integral parts, ſufficiently proved the matter in queſtion, viz. That all thoſe, he has ſet down, are articles of faith neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian, he grows warm at my omiſſion of them. This I cannot complain of as unnatural: the ſpirit of creed-making always ariſing from an heat of zeal for our own opinions, and warm endeavours, by all ways poſſible, to decry and bear down thoſe who differ in a tittle from us. What then could I expect more gentle and candid, than what Mr. Edwards has ſubjoined in theſe words? "And there-"fore, it is no wonder that our author, being ſenſible of this" (viz. That the points he has named, were eſſential and integral parts of the goſpel) "would "not vouchſafe to give us an abſtract of thoſe inſpired writings [the epiſtles]; "but paſſes them by with ſome contempt." Sir, when your angry fit is over, and the abatement of your paſſion has given way to the return of your ſincerity, I ſhall beg you to read this paſſage in pag. 584. of this vol. "Theſe holy wri-"ters (viz. the pen-men of the ſcriptures) INSPIRED from above, writ no-"thing but truth, and, in moſt places, very weighty truths to us now, for the "expounding, clearing, and confirming of the Chriſtian doctrine; and eſta-"bliſhing thoſe in it who had embraced it." And again, p, 585, &c. "The "other parts of DIVINE REVELATION are objects of faith, and are ſo to be re-"ceived. They are truths, of which none that is once known to be ſuch, i. e. "revealed, may or ought to be diſbelieved." And if this does not ſatisfy you, that I have as high a veneration for the epiſtles, as you or any one can have, I require you to publiſh to the world thoſe paſſages, which ſhew my contempt of them. In the mean time, I ſhall deſire my reader to examine what I have writ concerning the epiſtles, which is all contained between p. 582, and 584. of this vol. and then to judge, whether I have made bold with the epiſtles in what I have ſaid of them, or this gentleman made bold with truth in what he has writ of me. Human frailty will not, I ſee, eaſily quit his hold; what it loſes in one part, it will be ready to regain in another; and not be hindered from taking repriſals, even on the moſt privileged ſort of men. Mr. Edwards, who is entrenched in orthodoxy, and ſo is as ſafe in matters of faith, almoſt as infallibility itſelf, is yet as apt to err as others in matters of fact.

BUT he has not yet done with me about the epiſtles: all his fine draught, of my ſlighting that part of the ſcripture, will be loſt, unleſs the laſt ſtrokes complete it into ſocinianiſm. In his following words you have the concluſion of the whole matter. His words are theſe: “ And more eſpecially, if I may conjec- “ ture,” (by all means, ſir, conjecturing is your proper talent; you have hitherto done nothing elſe; and I will ſay that for you, you have a lucky hand at it.) “ He “ doth this, (i. e. paſs by the epiſtles with contempt) becauſe he knew that there “ are ſo many and frequent, and thoſe ſo illuſtrious and eminent atteſtations to “ the doctrine of the ever to be adored Trinity, in theſe epiſtles.” Truly, ſir, if you will permit me to know what I know, as well as you do allow yourſelf to conjecture what you pleaſe, you are out for this once. The reaſon why I went not through the epiſtles, as I did the goſpels and the Acts, was that very reaſon I printed, and that will be found ſo ſufficient a one to all conſiderate readers, that I believe, they will think you need not ſtrain your conjectures for another. And, if you think it be ſo eaſy to diſtinguiſh fundamentals from not-fundamentals in the epiſtles, I deſire you to try your ſkill again, in giving the world a perfect collection of propoſitions out of the epiſtles, that contain all that is required, and no more than what is abſolutely required to be believed by all Chriſtians, without which faith they cannot be of Chriſt's church. For I tell you, notwithſtanding the ſhew you have made, you have not yet done it, nor will you affirm that you have.

His next page, viz. 112. is made up of the ſame, which he calls, not uncharitable conjectures. “ I expound, “ he ſays, “ John xiv. 9, &c. after the “ antitrinitarian mode:” and I make “ Chriſt and Adam to be Sons of God, “ in the ſame ſenſe, and by their birth, as the Racovians generally do.” I know not but it may be true, that the Antitrinitarians and Racovians underſtand thoſe places as I do: but 'tis more than I know, that they do ſo. I took not my ſenſe of thoſe texts from thoſe writers, but from the ſcripture itſelf, giving light to its own meaning, by one place compared with another: what in this way appears to me its true meaning, I ſhall not decline, becauſe I am told, that it is ſo underſtood by the Racovians, whom I never yet read; nor embrace the contrary, though “ the generality of divines” I more converſe with, ſhould declare for it, If the ſenſe, wherein I underſtand thoſe texts, be a miſtake, I ſhall be beholden to you, if you will ſet me right. But they are not popular authorities, or frightful names, whereby I judge of truth or falſeſhood, You will now, no doubt, applaud your conjectures; the point is gained, and I am openly a ſocinian, ſince I will not diſown, that I think the Son of God was a phraſe that, among the Jews, in our Saviour's time, was uſed for the Meſſiah, though the ſocinians underſtand it in the ſame ſenſe; and therefore I muſt certainly be of their perſuaſion in every thing elſe. I admire the acuteneſs, force, and fairneſs of your reaſoning, and ſo I leave you to triumph in your conjectures. Only I muſt deſire you to take notice, that that ornament of our church, and every way eminent prelate, the late archbiſhop of Canterbury, underſtood that phraſe in the ſame ſenſe that I do, without being a ſocinian. You may read what he ſays concerning Nathanael, in his firſt “ ſermon of ſincerity,” publiſhed this year: his words are theſe, p. 4. “ And being ſatisfied that he [our Saviour] was the Meſſiah, he “ preſently owned him for ſuch, calling him the SON of GOD, and the King of “ Iſrael.”

THOUGH this gentleman know my thoughts as perfectly as if he had for ſeveral years paſt lain in my boſom, yet he is mightily at a loſs about my perſon: as if it at all concerned the truth contained in my book, what hand it came from. However, the gentleman is mightily perplexed about the author. Why, ſir? What if it were writ by a ſcribler of Bartholomew-fair drolls, with all that flouriſh of declamatory rhetorick, and all that ſmartneſs of wit and jeſt about Captain Tom. unitarians, units, and cyphers, &c. which are to be found between 115, and 123 pages of a book, that came out during the merry time of rope dancing, and puppet plays? What is truth, would, I hope, neverthеleſs be truth in it, however odly ſpruced up by ſuch an author: though, perhaps, 'tis likely ſome would be apt to ſay, ſuch merriment became not the gravity of my ſubject, and that I writ not in the ſtile of a graduate in divinity. I confeſs, (as Mr. Edwards rightly ſays) my fault lies on the other ſide, in a want of “ vivacity and “ elevation:” and I cannot wonder, that one of his character and palate, ſhould find out and complain of my flatneſs, which has ſo over-charged my book with plain and direct texts of ſcripture, in a matter capable of no other proofs. But yet I muſt acknowledge his exceſs of civility to me; he ſhews me more kindneſs than I could expect or wiſh, ſince he prefers what I ſay to him myſelf, to what is offer'd to him from the word of God; and makes me this compliment, that I begin to mend, about the cloſe, i. e. when I leave off quoting of ſcripture: and the dull work was done, of "going through the hiſtory of the Evan-"gelists and Acts," which he computes, p. 105. to take up three quarters of my book. Does not all this deſerve, at leaſt, that I ſhould, in return, take ſome care of his credit? Which I know not how better to do, than by entreating him, that when he takes next in hand ſuch a ſubject as this, wherein the ſalvation of ſouls is concerned, he would treat it a little more ſeriouſly, and with a little more candor; leſt men ſhould find, in his writings, another cauſe of atheiſm, which, in this treatiſe, he has not thought fit to mention. "Oſtenta-"tion of wit" in general, he has made a "cauſe of atheiſm," p. 28. But the world will tell him, that frothy light diſcourſes concerning the ſerious matters of religion; and oſtentation of trifling and miſbecoming wit in thoſe, who come as ambaſſadors from God, under the title of ſucceſſors of the apoſtles, in the great commiſſion of the goſpel, is none of the leaſt cauſes of atheiſm.

SOME men have ſo peculiar a way of arguing, that one may ſee it influences them in the repeating another man's reaſoning, and ſeldom fails to make it their own. In the next paragraph I find theſe words: "what makes him contend "for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all the reſt? He pretends it is "this, that all men ought to underſtand their religion." This, I confeſs, is a reaſoning I did not think of; nor would it hardly, I fear, have been uſed, but by one, who had firſt took up his opinion from the recommendation of faſhion or intereſt, and then ſought topicks to make it good. Perhaps the deference due to your character, excuſed you from the trouble of quoting the page, where I pretend, as you ſay; and it is ſo little like my way of reaſoning, that I ſhall not look for it in a book, where I remember nothing of it, and where, without your direction, I fear the reader will ſcarce find it. Though I have not "that vivacity of thought, that elevation of mind," which Mr. Edwards demands, yet common ſenſe would have kept me from contending that there is but one article, becauſe all men ought to underſtand their religion. Numbers of propoſitions may be harder to be remember'd, but 'tis the abſtruſeneſs of the notions, or obſcurity, inconſiſtency, or doubtfulneſs of the terms or expreſſions that makes them hard to be underſtood: and one ſingle propoſition may more perplex the underſtanding than twenty other. But where did you find "I con-"tended for one ſingle article, ſo as to exclude all the reſt?" You might have remember'd, that I ſay, p. 517. That the article of the one only true God, was alſo neceſſary to be believed. This might have ſatisfied you, that I did not ſo contend for one article of faith, as to be at defiance with more than one. However, you inſiſt on the word one, with great vigour, from p. 108, to 121. And you did well, you had elſe loſt all the force of that killing ſtroke, reſerved for the cloſe, in that ſharp jeſt of unitarians, and a clinch or two more of great moment.

HAVING found, by a careful peruſal of the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, that the religion they propoſed, conſiſted in that ſhort, plain, eaſy and intelligible ſummary which I ſet down, p. 585, in theſe words: "Believing "Jeſus to be the Saviour promiſed, and taking him, now raiſed from the dead, "and conſtituted the Lord and Judge of men, to be their King and Ruler." I could not forbear magnifying the wiſdom and goodneſs of God (which infinitely exceeds the thoughts of ignorant, vain, and narrow-minded man) in theſe following words: "The All-merciful God ſeems herein to have conſulted the "poor of this world, and the bulk of mankind: THESE ARE ARTICLES "that the labouring and illiterate man may comprehend." Having thus plainly mention'd more than one article, I might have taken it amiſs, that Mr. Edwards ſhould be at ſo much pains as he is, to blame me, for "contending for "one" article; becauſe I thought more than one could not be underſtood;

had he not had many fine things to ſay in his declamation upon one article, which affords him ſo much matter, that leſs than ſeven pages could not hold it. Only here and there, as men of oratory often do, he miſtakes the buſineſs, as p. 115, where he ſays, “I urge, that there muſt be nothing in chriſtianity, “that is not plain and exactly levelled to all men's mother-wit.” I deſire to know whether I ſaid ſo, or that “the very manner of every thing in chriſtianity “muſt be clear and intelligible, every thing muſt be preſently comprehended, “by the weakeſt noddle, or elſe it's no part of religion, eſpecially of chriſtianity;” as he has it, p. 119. I am ſure it is not in p. 574, 582, 583, of my book: theſe therefore, to convince him that I am of another opinion, I ſhall deſire ſomebody to read to Mr. Edwards: for he himſelf reads my book with ſuch ſpectacles, as make him find meanings and words in it, neither of which I put there. He ſhould have remember'd, that I ſpeak not of all the doctrines of chriſtianity, nor all that is publiſhed to the world in it; but of thoſe truths only, which are abſolutely required to be believed to make any one a chriſtian. And theſe, I find, are ſo plain and eaſy, that I ſee no reaſon why every-body, with me, ſhould not magnify the goodneſs and condeſcenſion of the Almighty; who having, out of his free grace, propoſed a new law of faith to ſinful and loſt man; hath, by that law, required no harder terms, nothing as abſolutely neceſſary to be believed, but what is ſuited to vulgar capacities, and the comprehenſion of illiterate men.

You are a little out again, p. 118. where you ironically ſay, as if it were my ſenſe, “Let us have but one article, though it be with defiance to all the reſt.” Jeſting apart, ſir, This is a ſerious truth, that what our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, and admitted men into the church for believing, is all that is abſolutely required to make a man a chriſtian. But this is, without any “defiance of all “the reſt,” taught in the word of God. This excludes not the belief of any of thoſe many other truths contained in the ſcriptures of the old and new teſtaments, which it is the duty of every chriſtian to ſtudy, and thereby build himſelf up in our moſt holy faith; receiving with ſtedfaſt belief, and ready obedience, all thoſe things which the ſpirit of truth hath therein revealed. But that all the reſt of the inſpired writings, or, if you pleaſe, “articles, are of equal neceſſity” to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, with what was preached by our Saviour and his apoſtles, that I deny. A man, as I have ſhewn, may be a chriſtian and a believer, without actually believing them, becauſe thoſe whom our Saviour and his apoſtles, by their preaching and diſcourſes, converted to the faith, were made chriſtians and believers, barely upon the receiving what they preached to them.

I hope it is no derogation to the chriſtian religion, to ſay, that the fundamentals of it, i. e. all that is neceſſary to be believed in it, by all men, is eaſy to be underſtood by all men. This I thought myſelf authorized to ſay, by the very eaſy, and very intelligible articles, inſiſted on by our Saviour and his apoſtles, which contain nothing but what could be underſtood by the bulk of mankind; a term which, I know not why, Mr. Edwards, p. 117, is offended at; and thereupon is, after his faſhion, ſharp upon me about captain Tom and his myrmidons, for whom, he tells me, I am “going to make a religion.” The making of religions and creeds I leave to others. I only ſet down the chriſtian religion, as I find our Saviour and his apoſtles preached it, and preached it to, and left it for, the “ignorant and unlearned multitude.” For I hope you do not think, how contemptibly ſoever you ſpeak of the “venerable mob,” as you are pleaſed to dignify them, p. 117. that the bulk of mankind, or, in your phraſe, the “rabble, are not concerned in religion, or ought to underſtand it, in order to their ſalvation. Nor are you, I hope, acquainted with any, who are of that Muſcovite divine's mind, who, to one that was talking to him about religion, and the other world, replied, That for the Czar, indeed, and Bojars, they might be permitted to raiſe their hopes to heaven; but that, for ſuch poor wretches as he, they were not to think of ſalvation.

I remember the Phariſees treated the common people with contempt, and ſaid, “Have any of the rulers, or of the Phariſees, believed in him? But this "people, who knoweth not the law, are curſed." But yet theſe, who, in the cenſure of the Phariſees, were curſed, were ſome of the poor, or, if you pleaſe to have it ſo, the mob, to whom the "goſpel was preached" by our Saviour, as he tells John's diſciples, Matt. xi. 5.

PARDON me, ſir, that I have here laid theſe examples and conſiderations before you; a little to prevail with you, not to let looſe ſuch a torrent of wit and eloquence, againſt the "bulk of mankind," another time, and that for a meer fancy of your own: for I do not ſee how they here came in your way; but that you were reſolved to ſet up ſomething to have a fling at, and ſhew your parts, in what you call your "different ſtrain," though beſides the purpoſe. I know nobody was going to "aſk the mob, What you muſt believe?" And as for me, I ſuppoſe you will take my word for it, that I think no mob, (no, not your "venerable mob") is to be aſked, what I am to believe; nor that "Articles of faith" are to be "received by the vote of club-men," or any other ſort of men, you will name inſtead of them. Preface.

IN the following words, p. 115. you aſk, "Whether a man may not underſtand thoſe articles of faith, which you mentioned out of the goſpels and epiſtles, if they be explained to him, as well as that one, I ſpeak of?" 'Tis as the articles are, and as they are explained. There are articles that have been ſome hundreds of years explaining; which there are many, and thoſe not of the moſt illiterate, who profeſs they do not yet underſtand. And to inſtance in no other, but "He deſcended into hell," the learned are not yet agreed in the ſenſe of it, though great pains have been taken to explain it.

NEXT, I aſk, Who are to explain your articles? The papiſts will explain ſome of them one way, and the reformed another. The remonſtrants, and anti-remonſtrants, give them different ſenſes. And probably, the trinitarians and unitarians will profeſs, that they underſtand not each others explications. And at laſt, I think it may be doubted, whether any articles, which need men's explications, can be ſo clearly and certainly underſtood, as one, which is made ſo very plain by the ſcripture itſelf, as not to need any explication at all. Such is this, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah. For though you learnedly tell us, that Meſſiah is a Hebrew word, and no better underſtood by the vulgar, than Arabick; yet I gueſs it is ſo fully explained in the new teſtament, and in thoſe places I have quoted out of it, that nobody, who can underſtand any ordinary ſentence in the ſcripture, can be at a loſs about it. And 'tis plain, it needs no other explication, than what our Saviour and the apoſtles gave it in their preaching; for, as they preached it, men received it, and that ſufficed to make them believers.

To conclude, when I heard that this learned gentleman, who had a name for his ſtudy of the ſcriptures, and writings on them, had done me the honour to conſider my treatiſe, I promiſed myſelf, that his degree, calling, and fame in the world, would have ſecured to me ſomething of weight in his remarks, which might have convinced me of my miſtakes; and, if he had found any in it, juſtified my quitting of them. But having examined what, in his, concerns my book, I, to my wonder, find, that he has only taken pains to give it an ill name, without ſo much as attempting to refute any one poſition in it, how much ſoever he is pleaſed to make a noiſe againſt ſeveral propoſitions, which he might be free with, becauſe they are his own: and I have no reaſon to take it amiſs, if he has ſhewn his zeal and ſkill againſt them. He has been ſo favourable to what is mine, as not to uſe any one argument againſt any paſſage in my book. This, which I take for a publick teſtimony of his approbation, I ſhall return him my thanks for, when I know whether I owe it to his miſtake, conviction, or kindneſs. But if he writ only for his bookſeller's ſake, he alone ought to thank him.

AFTER the foregoing papers were ſent to the preſs, the "witneſſes to chriſtianity," of the reverend and learned Dr. Patrick, now lord biſhop of Ely, fell into my hands. I regretted the not having ſeen it, before I writ my treatiſe of the "Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, &c." I ſhould then, poſſibly, by the light given me by ſo good a guide, and ſo great a man, with more confidence directly have fallen into the knowledge of chriſtianity; which, in the way I ſought it, in its ſource, required the comparing of texts with texts, and the more than once reading over the Evangeliſts and Acts, beſides other parts of ſcripture. But I had the ill-luck not to ſee that treatiſe, 'till ſo few hours ſince, that I have had time only to read as far as the end of the introduction, or firſt chapter: and there Mr. Edwards may find, that this pious biſhop (whoſe writings ſhew his ſtudies, as well as his life, that he believes the ſcriptures) owns what Mr. Edwards is pleaſed to call, "a plauſible conceit," which, he ſays, "I give over and over again in theſe formal words, viz. That nothing " is required to be believed by any chriſtian man, but this, That Jeſus is the " Meſſiah."

THE liberty Mr. Edwards takes, in other places, deſerves not it ſhould be taken upon his word, "That theſe formal words" are to be found "over and " over again" in my book, unleſs he had quoted the pages. But I will ſet him down the "formal words," which are to be found in this reverend prelate's book, p. 14. "To be the Son of God, and to be Chriſt, being but different " expreſſions of the ſame thing." And, p. 10. "It is the very ſame thing to " believe, that Jeſus is the Chriſt, and to believe, that Jeſus is the Son of God; " expreſs it how you pleaſe. This ALONE is the faith, which can regenerate " a man, and put a divine ſpirit into him; that is, makes him a conqueror over " the world, as Jeſus was." I have quoted only theſe few words; but Mr. Edwards, if he pleaſes, or any body elſe, may, in this firſt chapter, ſatisfy himſelf more fully, that the deſign of it is to ſhew, that in our Saviour's time, "Son " of God," was a known and received name and appellation of the Meſſiah, and ſo uſed in the holy writers. And that the faith that was to make men chriſtians, was only the believing, "that Jeſus is the Meſſiah." 'Tis to the truth of this propoſition that he "examines his witneſſes," as he ſpeaks, p. 21. And this, if I miſtake not, in his epiſtle dedicatory, he calls "chriſtianity." Fol. A. 3. where he calls them "witneſſes to chriſtianity." But theſe two propoſitions, viz. That "SON of God," in the goſpel, ſtands for Meſſiah; and that the faith, which alone makes men chriſtians, is the believing "Jeſus to be the " Meſſiah," diſpleaſes Mr. Edwards ſo much in my book, that he thinks himſelf authorized from them, to charge me with ſocinianiſm, and want of ſincerity. How he will be pleaſed to treat this reverend prelate, whilſt he is alive (for the dead may, with good manners, be made bold with) muſt be left to his deciſive authority. This, I am ſure, which way ſoever he determine, he muſt, for the future, either afford me more good company, or fairer quarter.

A SECOND
VINDICATION
OF THE
REASONABLENESS
OF
CHRISTIANITY, &c.

PREFACE

TO THE

READER.

It hath pleaſed Mr. Edwards, *in anſwer to* the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, *&c. and its* vindication, *to turn one of the moſt weighty and important points that can come in queſtion, (even no leſs, than the very fundamentals of the chriſtian religion) into a meer quarrel againſt the author; as every one, with Mr.* Bold, *may obſerve. In my reply to him, I have endeavoured, as much as his objections would allow me, to bring him to the ſubject matter of my book, and the merits of the cauſe; though his peculiar way of writing controverſy has made it neceſſary for me, in following him ſtep by ſtep, to wipe off the dirt he has thrown on me, and clear myſelf from thoſe falſhoods he has filled his book with. This I could not but do, in dealing with ſuch an antagoniſt; that, by the untruths I have proved upon him, the reader may judge of thoſe other allegations of his, whereof the proof lying on his ſide, the bare denial is enough on mine, and, indeed, are wholly nothing to the truth or falſhood of what is contained in my* reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, *&c. To which, I ſhall deſire the reader to add this farther conſideration from his way of writing, not againſt my book, but againſt me, for writing it, that if he had had a real concern for truth and religion in this diſpute, he would have treated it after another manner; and we ſhould have had from him more argument, reaſoning and clearneſs, and leſs boaſting, declamation and railing. It has been unavoidable for me to take notice of a great deal of this ſort of ſtuff, in anſwering a writer, who has very little elſe to ſay in the controverſy, and places his ſtrength in things beſide the queſtion: but yet I have been ſo careful, to take all occaſions to explain the doctrine of my book, that I hope the reader will not think his pains wholly loſt labour, in peruſing this reply; wherein he will find ſome farther, and, I hope, ſatisfying account, concerning the writings of the* new teſtament, *and the* chriſtian religion *contained in it.*

Mr. Edwards's *ill language, which I thought perſonally to me, (though I know not how I had provoked a man whom I had never had to do with) I am now ſatisfied, by his rude and ſcurrilous treating of Mr.* Bold, *is his way and ſtrength in management of controverſy; and therefore requires a little more conſideration in this diſputant, than otherwiſe it would deſerve. Mr.* Bold, *with the calmneſs of a chriſtian, the gravity of a divine, the clearneſs of a man of parts, and the civility of a well-bred man, made ſome* animadverſions *on his* ſocinianiſm unmaſk'd; *which, with a ſermon preached on the ſame ſubject with my* reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, *he publiſhed: and how he has been uſed by Mr.* Edwards, *let the world judge.*

I was *extremely ſurprized with Mr.* Bold's *book, at a time when there was ſo great an outcry againſt mine, on all hands. But, it ſeems, he is a man that does not take up things upon hearſay; nor is afraid to own truth, whatever clamour or calumny it may lie under. Mr.* Edwards *confidently tells the world, that Mr.* Bold *has been drawn in to eſpouſe this cauſe, upon baſe and mean conſiderations. Whoſe picture of the two, ſuch a deſcription is moſt likely to give us, I ſhall leave to the reader to judge, from what he will find in their writings on this ſubject. For as to the perſons themſelves, I am equally a ſtranger to them both: I know not the face of either of them: and having hitherto never had any communication with Mr.* Bold, *I ſhall begin with him, as I did with Mr.* Edwards *in print; and here publickly return him this following acknowledgment, for what he has printed in this controverſy.*

To Mr. Bold.

SIR,

THOUGH I do not think I ought to return thanks to any one, for being of my opinion, any more than to fall out with him, for differing from me; yet I cannot but own to all the world, the eſteem, that I think is due to you, for that proof you have given, of a mind and temper becoming a true miniſter of the goſpel, in appearing, as you have done, in the defence of a point, a great point of chriſtianity, which it is evident you could have no other temptation to declare for, but the love of truth. It has fared with you herein, no better than with me. For Mr. Edwards not being able to anſwer your arguments, has found out already, that you are a mercenary, defending a cauſe againſt your perſuaſion, for hire; and that you "are ſailing to Racovia by a ſide-wind:" ſuch inconſiſtencies can one (whoſe buſineſs it is to rail, for a cauſe he cannot defend) put together to make a noiſe with: and he tells you plainly, what you muſt expect, if you write any more on this argument, viz. to be pronounced a downright apoſtate and renegado.

As ſoon as I ſaw your ſermon and animadverſions, I wondered what ſcarecrow Mr. Edwards would ſet up, wherewith he might hope to deter men of more caution than ſenſe, from reading of them: ſince ſocinianiſm, from which you were known to be as remote as he, I concluded would not do. The unknown author of the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," he might make a ſocinian, mahometan, atheiſt, or what ſort of raw-head and bloody-bones he pleaſed. But I imagined he had had more ſenſe than to venture any ſuch aſperſions, on a man whom, tho' I have not yet the happineſs perſonally to know; yet, I know, hath juſtly a great and ſettled reputation amongſt worthy men: and I thought that that coat, which you had worn with ſo much reputation, might have preſerved you from the beſpatterings of Mr. Edwards's dunghil. But what is to be expected from a warrior that hath no other ammunition, and yet aſcribes to himſelf victory from hence, and, with this artillery, imagines he carries all before him? And ſo Skimmington rides in triumph, driving all before him, by the ordures that he beſtows on thoſe that come in his way. And, were not chriſtianity concerned in the caſe, a man would ſcarce excuſe to himſelf the ridiculouſneſs of entering into the liſt with ſuch a combatant. I do not, therefore, wonder that this mighty boaſter, having no other way to anſwer the books of his opponents, but by popular calumnies, is fain to have recourſe to his only refuge, and lay out his natural talent in villifying and ſlandering the authors. But I ſee, by what you have already writ, how much you are above that; and, as you take not up your opinions from faſhion or intereſt, ſo you quit them not, to avoid the malicious reports of thoſe that do: out of which number, they can hardly be left, who (unprovoked) mix with the management of their cauſe, injuries and ill-language, to thoſe they differ from. This, at leaſt, I am ſure, zeal or love for truth can never permit falſhood to be uſed in the defence of it.

Your mind, I ſee, prepared for truth, by reſignation of itſelf, not to the traditions of men, but the doctrine of the goſpel, has made you more readily, entertain, and more eaſily enter into the meaning of my book, than moſt I have heard ſpeak of it, And ſince you ſeem to me to comprehend, what I have laid together, with the ſame diſpoſition of mind, and in the ſame ſenſe that I received it, from the holy ſcriptures, I ſhall, as a mark of my reſpect to you, give you a particular account of the occaſion of it.

The beginning of the year in which it was publiſhed, the controverſy that made ſo much noiſe and heat amongſt ſome of the diſſenters, coming one day accidentally into my mind, drew me by degrees, into a ſtricter and more thorough enquiry into the queſtion about juſtification. The ſcripture was direct and plain; and 'twas faith that juſtified: The next queſtion then, was, What faith that was that juſtified; what it was which, if a man believed, it ſhould be imputed to him for righteouſneſs. To find out this, I thought the right way was, to ſearch the ſcriptures; and thereupon betook myſelf ſeriouſly to the reading of the new teſtament, only to that purpoſe. What that produced, you and the world have ſeen.

The firſt view I had of it ſeemed mightily to ſatisfy my mind, in the reaſonableneſs and plainneſs of this doctrine; but yet the general ſilence I had, in my little reading, met with, concerning any ſuch thing, awed me with the apprehenſion of ſingularity; 'till going on in the goſpel hiſtory, the whole tenor of it made ſo clear and viſible, that I more wondered, that every body did not ſee and embrace it; than that I ſhould aſſent to what was ſo plainly laid down, and ſo frequently inculcated in holy writ, though ſyſtems of divinity ſaid nothing of it. That, which added to my ſatisfaction, was, that it led me into a diſcovery of the marvellous and divine wiſdom of our Saviour's conduct, in all the circumſtances of his promulgating this doctrine; as well as of the neceſſity, that ſuch a law-giver ſhould be ſent from God, for the reforming the morality of the world; two points, that I muſt confeſs, I had not found ſo fully and advantageouſly explained in the books of divinity I had met with, as the hiſtory of the goſpel ſeemed to me, upon an attentive peruſal, to give occaſion and matter for. But the neceſſity and wiſdom of our Saviour's opening the doctrine (which he came to publiſh) as he did in parables and figurative ways of ſpeaking, carries ſuch a thread of evidence through the whole hiſtory of the evangeliſts, as I think, is impoſſible to be reſiſted; and makes it a demonſtration, that the ſacred hiſtorians did not write by concert, as advocates for a bad cauſe, or to give colour and credit to an impoſture, they would uſher into the world; ſince they, every one of them, in ſome place or other, omit ſome paſſages of our Saviour's life, or circumſtances of his actions; which ſhew the wiſdom and warineſs of his conduct; and which, even thoſe of the evangeliſts, who have recorded, do barely and tranſiently mention, without laying any ſtreſs on them, or making the leaſt remark of what conſequence they are, to give our Saviour's true character, and to prove the truth of their hiſtory. Theſe are evidences of truth and ſincerity, which reſult alone from the nature of things, and cannot be produced by any art or contrivance.

How much I was pleaſed with the growing diſcovery, every day, whilſt I was employed in this ſearch, I need not ſay. The wonderful harmony, that the farther I went, diſcloſed itſelf, tending to the ſame points, in all the parts of the ſacred hiſtory of the goſpel, was of no ſmall weight with me and another perſon, who every day, from the beginning to the end of my ſearch, ſaw the progreſs of it, and knew, at my firſt ſetting out, that I was ignorant, whither it would lead me; and therefore, every day, aſked me, What more the ſcripture had taught me? So far was I from the thoughts of ſocinianiſm, or an intention to write for that, or any other party, or to publiſh any thing at all. But, when I had gone through the whole, and ſaw what a plain, ſimple, reaſonable thing chriſtianity was, ſuited to all conditions and capacities; and in the morality of it now, with divine authority, eſtabliſhed into a legible law, ſo far ſurpaſſing all that philoſophy and human reaſon had attained to, or could poſſibly make effectual to all degrees of mankind; I was flattered to think it might be of ſome uſe in the world; eſpecially to thoſe, who thought either that there was no need of revelation at all, or that the revelation of our Saviour required the belief of ſuch articles for ſalvation, which the ſettled notions, and their way of reaſoning in ſome, and want of underſtanding in others, made impoſſible to them. Upon theſe two topicks, the objections ſeemed to turn, which were with moſt aſſurance, made by deiſts, againſt chriſtianity; but againſt chriſtianity miſunderſtood. It ſeemed to me, that there needed no more to ſhew them the weakneſs of their exceptions, but to lay plainly before them the doctrine of our Saviour and his apoſtles, as delivered in the ſcriptures, and not as taught by the ſeveral ſects of chriſtians.

This tempted me to publiſh it, not thinking it deſerved an oppoſition from any miniſter of the goſpel; and leaſt of all, from any one in the communion of the church of England. But ſo it is, that Mr. Edwards's zeal, for he knows not what (for he does not yet know his own creed, nor what is required to make him a chriſtian) could not brook ſo plain, ſimple, and intelligible a religion: but yet, not knowing what to ſay againſt it, and the evidence it has from the word of God, he thought fit to let the book alone, and fall upon the author. What great matter he has done in it, I need not tell you, who have ſeen and ſhewed the weakneſs of his wranglings. You have here, Sir, the true hiſtory of the birth of my "Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, as delivered in the ſcriptures," and my deſign in publiſhing it, &c. What it contains, and how much it tends to peace and union among chriſtians, if they would receive chriſtianity as it is, you have diſcovered. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble Servant,

A. B.

My *readers will pardon me, that in my preface to them, I make this particular addreſs to Mr.* Bold. *He hath thought it worth his while to defend my book. How well he has done it, I am too much a party to ſay: I think it ſo ſufficient to Mr.* Edwards, *that I needed not have troubled myſelf any farther about him, on the account of any argument that remains in his book to be anſwered. But a great part of the world judging of the conteſts about truth, as they do of popular elections, that the ſide carries it where the greateſt noiſe is; 'twas neceſſary that they ſhould be undeceived, and be let ſee, that ſometimes ſuch writers may be let alone, not becauſe they cannot, but becauſe they deſerve not to be anſwered.*

This *farther I ought to acknowledge to Mr.* Bold, *and own to the world, that he hath entered into the true ſenſe of my treatiſe, and his notions do ſo perfectly agree with mine, that I ſhall not be afraid, by thoughts and expreſſions very like his, in this my ſecond vindication, to give Mr.* Edwards *(who is exceedingly quick-ſighted, and poſitive in ſuch matters) a handle to tell the world, that either I borrowed this my* vindication *from Mr.* Bold, *or writ his* animadverſions *for him. The former of theſe I ſhall count no diſcredit, if Mr.* Edwards *think fit to charge me with it; and the latter, Mr.* Bold's *character is anſwer enough to. Though the impartial reader, I doubt not, will find, that the ſame uniform truth, conſidered by us, ſuggeſted the ſame thoughts to us both, without any other communication.*

There *is another author, who, in a civiler ſtile, hath made it neceſſary for me to vindicate my book from a reflection or two of his, wherein he ſeems to come ſhort of that candor he profeſſes. All that I ſhall ſay on this occaſion here, is, that it is a wonder to me, that having publiſhed what I thought the ſcripture told me was the faith that made a chriſtian, and deſired, that if I was miſtaken, any one that thought ſo, would have the goodneſs to inform me better; ſo many with their tongues, and ſome in print, ſhould intemperately find fault with a poor man out of his way, who deſires to be ſet right; and no one, who blames his faith, as coming ſhort, will tell him what that faith is, which is required to make him a chriſtian. But, I hope, that amongſt ſo many cenſures, I ſhall at laſt find one, who knowing himſelf to be a chriſtian upon other grounds than I am, will have ſo much chriſtian charity, as to ſhew me what more is abſolutely neceſſary to be believed, by me, and every man, to make him a chriſtian.*

A SE-

A SECOND
VINDICATION
OF THE
REASONABLENESS
OF
CHRISTIANITY, &c.

A Cauſe that ſtands in need of falſhoods to ſupport it, and an adverſary that will make uſe of them, deſerve nothing but contempt; which I doubt not, but every conſiderate reader thought anſwer enough to “ Mr. “ Edward's Socinianiſm unmaſk'd. “ But, ſince in his late “ Socinian “ creed,” he ſays, “ I would have anſwered him if I could,” that the intereſt of chriſtianity may not ſuffer by my ſilence, nor the contemptibleneſs of his treatiſe afford him matter of triumph amongſt thoſe who lay any weight on ſuch boaſting, 'tis fit it ſhould be ſhewn what an arguer he is, and how well he deſerves for his performance, to be dubb'd, by himſelf, “ irrefragable.”

Those, who like Mr. Edwards, dare to publiſh inventions of their own, for matters of fact, deſerve a name ſo abhorred, that it finds not room in civil converſation. This ſecures him from the proper anſwer, due to his imputations to me, in print, of matters of fact utterly falſe, which, without any reply of mine, fix upon him that name (which, without a profligate mind, a man cannot expoſe himſelf to) till he hath proved them. Till then, he muſt wear what he has put upon himſelf. This being a rule, which common juſtice hath preſcribed to the private judgments of mankind, as well as to the publick judicatures of courts, that all allegations of fact brought by contending parties, ſhould be preſumed to be falſe, 'till they are proved.

There are two ways of making a book unanſwerable. The one is by the clearneſs, ſtrength and fairneſs of the argumentation. Men, who know how to write thus, are above bragging what they have done, or boaſting to the world that their adverſaries are baffled. Another way to make a book unanſwerable, is to lay ſtreſs on matters of fact foreign to the queſtion, as well as to truth; and to ſtuff it with ſcurrility and fiction. This hath been always ſo evident to common ſenſe, that no man, who had any regard to truth, or ingenuity, ever thought matters of fact beſides the argument, and ſtories made at pleaſure, the way of managing controverſies. Which ſhewing only the want of ſenſe and argument, could, if uſed on both ſides, end in nothing but downright railing: and he muſt always have the better of the cauſe, who has lying and impudence on his ſide.

The unmaſker, in the entrance of his book, ſets a great difference between his and my way of writing. I am not ſorry that mine differs ſo much as it does, from his. If it were like his, I ſhould think, like his, it wanted the author's commendations. For, in his firſt paragraph, which is all laid out in his own teſtimony of his own book, he ſo earneſtly beſpeaks an opinion of maſtery in politeneſs, order, coherence, pertinence, ſtrength, ſeriouſneſs, temper, and all the good qualities requiſite in controverſy, that I think, ſince he pleaſes himſelf ſo much with his own good opinion, one, in pity, ought not to go about to rob him of ſo conſiderable an admirer. I ſhall not, therefore, conteſt any of thoſe excellencies he aſcribes himſelf, or faults he blames in me, in the management of the diſpute between us, any farther than as particular paſſages of his book, as I come to examine them, ſhall ſuggeſt unavoidable remarks to me. I think the world does not ſo much concern itſelf about him, or me, that it need be told, in that inventory, he has given of his own good parts, in his firſt paragraph, which of us two has the better hand at "flouriſhes, jeſting, and common places;" if I am, as he ſays, p. 2. troubled with "angry fits, and paſſionate ferments, which, though I ſtrive to palliate, are eaſily diſcernable, &c." and he be more laudably ingenuous in the openneſs of that temper, which he ſhews in every leaf, I ſhall leave to him the entire glory of boaſting of it. Whatever we brag of our performances, they will be juſt as they are, however he may think to add to his, by his own encomiums of them. The difference in ſtyle, order, coherence, good breeding (for all thoſe, amongſt others, the unmaſker mentions) the reader will obſerve, whatever I ſay of them; and at beſt they are nothing to the queſtion in hand. For though I am a "tool, pert, childiſh, ſtarch'd, impertinent, incoherent, trifling, weak, paſſionate, &c." commendations I meet with, before I get to the 4th page, beſides what follows, as, "upſtart Racovian," p. 24. "Flouriſhing ſcribler," p. 41. "Diſſembler," 106. "Pedantick," 107. I ſay, although I am all this, and what elſe he liberally beſtows on me in the reſt of his book, I may have truth on my ſide, and that, in the preſent caſe ſerves my turn.

HAVING thus placed the laurels upon his own head, and ſung applauſe to his own performance, he, p. 4. enters, as he thinks, upon his buſineſs, which ought to be, as he confeſſes, p. 3. to make good his former charges." The firſt whereof he ſets down in theſe words. That "I unwarrantably crouded all the neceſſary articles of faith into one, with a deſign of favouring ſocinianiſm."

IF it may be permitted to the ſubdued, to be ſo bold with one, who is already conqueror, I deſire to know, where that propoſition is laid down in theſe terms, as laid to my charge. Whether it be true, or falſe, ſhall, if he pleaſes be hereafter examined: but it is not, at preſent, the matter in queſtion. There are certain propoſitions, which he having affirmed, and I denied, are under debate between us: and that the diſpute may not run into an endleſs ramble, by multiplying of new, before the points in conteſt are decided, theſe ought firſt to be brought to an iſſue.

TO go on, therefore, in the order of his "Socinianiſm unmaſked," (for p. 3. he has out of the Miſhna, taught me good breeding, "to anſwer the firſt firſt, and ſo in order") the next thing he has againſt me, is p. 5. which, that the reader may underſtand the force of, I muſt inform him, that in p. 105. of his "Thoughts, concerning the cauſes of atheiſm" he ſaid, that I "give this plauſible conceit," as he calls it, "over and over again, in theſe formal words," viz. "That nothing is required to be believed by any chriſtian man, but this, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah." This I denied. To make it good, "Socinianiſm unmaſked," p. 5. he thus argues. Firſt, "It is obſervable, that this guilty man would be ſhifting off the indictment, by excepting againſt the formality of words, as if ſuch were not to be found in his book: But when doth he do this? In the cloſe of it, when his matter was exhauſted, and he had nothing elſe to ſay," Vind. p. 597. "then he bethinks himſelf of his ſalvo, &c." Anſw. As if a falſhood were ever the leſs a falſhood, becauſe it was not oppoſed, or would grow into a truth, if it were not taken notice of, before the 38th page of the anſwer. I deſire him to ſhew me theſe "formal words over and over again," in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity:" nor let him hope to evade, by ſaying, I would be "ſhifting, by excepting againſt the formality of the words."

To ſay, that "I have, over and over again, thoſe formal words," in my book, is an aſſertion of a matter of fact; let him produce the words, and juſtify his allegation, or confeſs, that this is an untruth publiſhed to the world: and ſince he makes ſo bold with truth, in a matter viſible to every body, let the world be judge, what credit is to be given to his allegations of matters of fact, in things foreign to what I have printed; and that are not capable of a negative proof. A ſample whereof the reader has at the entrance, in his introduction, p. A. 4. and the three or four following pages. Where he affirms to the world, not only what I know to be falſe; but what every one muſt ſee, he could not know to be true. For he pretends to know and deliver my thoughts. And what the character is of one that confidently affirms, what he does not know, no body need to be told.

BUT he adds, "I had before pleaded to the indictment, and thereby owned "it to be true." This is to make good his promiſe, p. 3. to keep at a diſtance from my "feeble ſtrugglings." Here this ſtrong arguer muſt prove, that what is not anſwered or denied, in the very beginning of a reply, or before the 11th page, "is owned to be true." In the mean time, 'till he does that, I ſhall deſire ſuch of my readers, as think the unmaſker's veracity worth examining, to ſee in my vindication, from p. 595, &c. wherein is contained, what I have ſaid about one article, whether I have owned what he charged me with, on that ſubject.

THIS propoſition then remains upon him ſtill to be proved, viz.

I. "THAT I have, over and over again, theſe formal words, in my reaſon-"ableneſs of chriſtianity, viz. That nothing is required to be believed by "any chriſtian man, but this, That Jeſus is the Meſſiah."

HE goes on, pag. 5. "And indeed, he could do no other; for it was the "main work he ſet himſelf about, to find but one article of faith in all the "chapters of the four evangeliſts, and the Acts of the apoſtles," This is to make good his promiſe, pag. 3. "To clear his book from thoſe ſorry objections and "cavils, I had raiſed againſt it. Several of my "ſorry objections and cavils," were to repreſent to the reader, that a great part of what he ſaid, was nothing but ſuſpicions and conjectures; and ſuch he could not but then own them to be. But now he has rid himſelf of all his conjectures; and has raiſed them up into direct, poſitive affirmations, which, being ſaid with confidence without proof, who can deny, but he has cleared, thoroughly cleared that part from my "ſorry objections and cavils?" He ſays, "it was the main work I ſet my "ſelf about, to find but one article of faith." This I muſt take the liberty to deny: and I deſire him to prove it. A man may "ſet himſelf to find two," or as many as there be, and yet find but one: or a man may "ſet himſelf to find "but one," and yet find two more. It is no argument, from what a man has found, to prove what was his main work to find, unleſs where his aim was only to find what there was, whether more or leſs. For a writer may find the reputation of a poor contemptible railer; nay, of a downright, impudent liar, and yet no body will think it was his main work to find that. Therefore, Sir, if you will not find what 'tis like you did not ſeek, you muſt prove thoſe many confident aſſertions, you have publiſhed, which I ſhall give you in tale, whereof this is the ſecond, viz.

II. THAT "the main buſineſs I ſet myſelf about, was to find but one article "of faith."

IN the following part of this ſentence, he quotes my own words, with the pages where they are to be found; the firſt time, that, in either of his two books againſt me, he has vouchſafed to do ſo, concerning one article, wherewith he has made ſo much noiſe. My words in (p. 559. of) my "reaſonable-"neſs of chriſtianity," ſtand thus: "For that this is the ſole doctrine preſſed "and required to be believed, in the whole tenor of our Saviour's and his apo-"ſtles preaching, we have ſhewed, through the whole hiſtory of the Evange-"liſts and Acts, and I challenge them to ſhew, that there was any other doc-"trine upon their aſſent to which, or diſbelief of it, men were pronounced be-

“ lievers, or unbelievers, and accordingly received into the church of Chriſt, as “ members of his body, as far as meer believing could make them ſo; or elſe “ kept out. This was the only goſpel article of faith, which was preached to “ them,” Out of this paſſage, the unmaſker ſets down theſe words, “ This is “ the SOLE doctrine preſſed and required to be believed, in the whole tenor of “ our Saviour's and his apoſtles preaching,” p. 129. “ this was the ONLY goſ- “ pel article of faith, which was preached to them.”

I SHALL paſs by all other obſervations, that this way of citing theſe words would ſuggeſt, and only remark, that, if he brought theſe words, to prove the immediately preceding aſſertion of his, viz. That “ to find out but one article of “ faith was the main work I ſet myſelf about.” This argument, reduced into form, will ſtand thus:

HE who ſays, that this is the ſole doctrine preſſed and required to be believed, in the whole tenor of our Saviour's and his apoſtles preaching, upon their aſſent to which, or diſbelief of it, men were pronounced believers, or unbelievers; and accordingly received into the church of Chriſt, as members of his body, as far as meer believing could make them ſo, or elſe kept out, ſets himſelf to find out but one article of faith, as his main work. But the Vindicator did ſo: “ ergo.”

IF this were the uſe he would make of thoſe words of mine cited, I muſt deſire him to prove the major. But he talks ſo freely, and without book, every where, that I ſuppoſe he thought himſelf, by the privilege of a declaimer, exempt from being called ſtrictly to an account, for what he ſo looſely ſays, and from proving what he ſhould be called to account for. Rail luſtily, is a good rule, ſomething of it will ſtick, true or falſe, proved or not proved.

IF he alledges theſe words of mine, to anſwer my demand, vind. p. 595. where he found that “ I contended for one ſingle article of faith, with the ex- “ cluſion and defiance of all the reſt,” which he had charged me with. I ſay, it proves this as little as the former. For to ſay, “ That I had ſhewed through “ the whole hiſtory of the Evangeliſts, and the Acts, that this is the ſole “ doctrine, or only goſpel-article preſſed and required to be believed in the “ whole tenor of our Saviour and his apoſtles preaching; upon their aſſent to “ which, or diſbelieving of it, men were pronounced believers or unbelievers, “ and accordingly received into the church of Chriſt, or kept out;” is the ſimple aſſertion of a poſitive matter of fact, and ſo carries in it no defiance, no, nor excluſion of any other doctrinal, or hiſtorical truth, contained in the ſcripture: and therefore, it remains ſtill on the unmaſker to ſhew, where 'tis I expreſs any defiance of any other truth contained in the word of God; or where I exclude any one doctrine of the ſcriptures. So that, if it be true, that “ I con- “ tend for one article,” my contention may be without any defiance, or ſo much as excluſion of any of the reſt, notwithſtanding any thing contained in theſe words. Nay, if it ſhould happen that I am in a miſtake, and that this was not the ſole doctrine, which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, and, upon their aſſent to which, men were admitted into the church: yet the unmaſker's accuſation would be never the truer for that, unleſs it be neceſſary, that he that miſtakes in one matter of fact, ſhould be at defiance with all other truths; or, that he who erroneouſly ſays, that our Saviour and his apoſtles admitted men into the church, upon the believing him to be the Meſſiah, does thereby exclude all other truths publiſhed to the Jews before, or to chriſtian believers afterwards.

IF theſe words be brought to prove, that I contended for “ one article,” barely “ one article,” without any defiance, or excluſion annexed to that contention; I ſay, neither do they prove that, as is manifeſt from the words themſelves, as well as from what I ſaid elſewhere, concerning the article of one God. For here, I ſay, this is the only goſpel-article, &c. upon which men were pronounced believers; which plainly intimates ſome other article, known and believed in the world before, and without the preaching of the goſpel.

TO this the unmaſker thinks he has provided a ſalvo, in theſe words, “ So- “ cinianiſm unmaſked,” p. 6. “ And when I told him of this one article, he "knew well enough, that I did not exclude the article of the Deity, for that is "a principle of natural religion." If it be fit for an unmaſker to perceive what is in debate, he would know, that the queſtion is not, what he excluded, or excluded not; but what articles he charged me to have excluded.

TAKING it, therefore, to be his meaning (which it muſt be, if he meant any thing to the purpoſe,) viz. That when he charged me ſo often and poſitively, for conteſting for "one article," viz. that "Jeſus was the the Meſſiah," he did not intend to accuſe me for excluding "the article of the Deity." To prove that he did not ſo intend it, he tells me, that "I knew that he did not."

ANSW. How ſhould I know it? He never told me ſo, either in his book, or otherwiſe. This I know, that he ſaid, p. 115. That "I contended for one article, with the excluſion of all the reſt." If then, the belief of the Deity, be an article of faith, and be not the article of Jeſus being the Meſſiah, it is one "of the reſt;" and if "all the reſt" were excluded, certainly that being one of "all the reſt," muſt be excluded. How then he could ſay, "I knew that he "excluded it not," i. e. meant not that I excluded it, when he poſitively ſays, I did "exclude it," I cannot tell, unleſs he thought that I knew him ſo well, that when he ſaid one thing, I knew that he meant another, and that the quite contrary.

HE now, it ſeems, acknowledges that I affirmed, that the belief of the Deity, as well as of Jeſus being the Meſſiah, was required to make a man a believer. The believing in "one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven "and earth," is one article; and in "Jeſus Chriſt, his only Son our Lord," is another article. Theſe, therefore, being "two articles," and both aſſerted by me, to be required to make a man a chriſtian, let us ſee with what truth or ingenuity, the unmaſker could apply, beſides that abovementioned, theſe following expreſſions to me, as he does without any exception. "Why then muſt there be One "article, and no more?" p. 115. "Going to make a religion for his myrmi-"dons, he contracts all into one article, and will trouble them with no more," p. 117. "Away with ſyſtems, away with creeds, let us have but one article, "though it be with defiance of all the reſt." p. 118. "Thus we ſee, why he "reduces all belief to that one article before rehearſed," p. 120. And all this, without any the leaſt exception of the article of a Deity," as he now pretends. Nor could he, indeed, as is evident from his own words, p. 121, 122. "To "conclude, this gentleman and his fellows are reſolved to be unitarians; they "are for One article of faith, as well as One perſon in the Godhead: —— But "if theſe learned men were not prejudiced, —— they would perceive, that, "when the catholick faith is thus brought down to one ſingle article, it will "ſoon be reduced to none, the unit will dwindle into a cypher." By which the reader may ſee, that his intention was, to perſuade the world, that I reduced ALL BELIEF, the CATHOLICK FAITH, (they are his own words) "to "one ſingle article, and no more." For, if he had given but the leaſt hint, that I allowed of Two, all the wit and ſtrength of argument, contained in unitarians, unit and cypher, with which he winds up all, had been utterly loſt, and dwindled into palpable nonſenſe.

TO demonſtrate that this was the ſenſe he would be underſtood in, we are but to obſerve, what he ſays again, p. 50. of his "Socinianiſm unmaſked," where he tells his readers, that "I and my friends, have new modelled the apoſtles creed; yea, indeed, have preſented them with ONE article, inſtead "of TWELVE" And hence we may ſee, what ſincerity there is, in the reaſon he brings, to prove that he did not exclude the "article of the Deity." "For, "ſays he, p. 6. that is a principle of natural religion."

ANSW. "Ergo," he did not in poſitive words, without any exception, ſay, I reduced "all belief, the catholick faith, to one ſingle article, and no more." But to make good his promiſe, "not to reſemble me in the little artifices of "evading," he wipes his mouth, and ſays at the bottom of this page, "But the "readers ſee his [the vindicator's] ſhuffling." Whilſt the article of "One God," is a part of "ALL belief, a part of the catholick faith," ALL which he affirmed, I excluded, but the one article concerning the Meſſiah; every one will ſee

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where the ſhuffling is: and, if it be not clear enough from thoſe words themſelves, let thoſe above quoted, out of p. 50. of his "Socinianiſm unmaſked," where he ſays, That "I have new modelled the apoſtles creed, and preſented the world with ONE article inſtead of TWELVE," be an interpretation of them. For, if the article of "one eternal God, maker of heaven and earth," be one of the articles of the apoſtles creed, and the one article I preſented them with, be not that, 'tis plain, he did, and would be underſtood to mean, that by my one article, I excluded that of the one eternal God, which branch ſoever of religion, either natural, or revealed, it belongs to.

I DO not endeavour to "perſuade the reader," as he ſays, p. 6. "that he "miſunderſtood me;" but yet every body will ſee, that he miſrepreſented me. And I challenge him to ſay, that thoſe expreſſions above quoted out of him, concerning "one article," in the obvious ſenſe of the words, as they ſtand in his accuſation of me, were true.

THIS flies ſo directly in his face, that he labours mightily to get it off, and therefore adds theſe words, "My diſcourſe did not treat (neither doth his book "run that way) of principles of natural religion, but of the revealed, and parti- "cularly the chriſtian: accordingly, this was it which I taxed him with, That, "of all the principles and articles of chriſtianity, he choſe out but one, as ne- "ceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian."

ANSW. His book was of——atheiſm, which one may think, ſhould make his "diſcourſe treat of natural religion." But I paſs by that, and bid him tell me, where he taxed me, "That of all the principles and articles of chriſtianity, "I choſe out but one:" let him ſhew, in all his diſcourſe, but ſuch a word, or any thing ſaid, like "one article of chriſtianity, and I will grant that he meant particularly, but ſpoke generally; miſled his reader, and left himſelf a ſubterfuge. But, if there be no expreſſion to be found in him, tending that way, all this is but the covering of one falſhood with another, which thereby only becomes the groſſer. Though if he had in expreſs words, taxed me, "That of all the principles and articles of the chriſtian religion, I choſe out but one, "that would not at all help him, till he farther declares, that the belief of one God is not an "article of the chriſtian religion." For, of "ALL the articles of the "chriſtian religion," he ſays, "I choſe but one;" which not being that of a Deity, his words plainly import, that that was left out amongſt the reſt, unleſs it be poſſible for a man to chuſe but one article of the chriſtian religion, viz. That "Jeſus is the Meſſiah;" and, at the ſame time, to chuſe two articles of the chriſtian religion, viz. That there is one, eternal God, and that Jeſus is the Meſſiah. If he had ſpoken clearly, and like a fair man, he ſhould have ſaid, That he taxed me with chuſing but one article of revealed religion. This had been plain and direct to his purpoſe: but then he knew the falſhood of it would be too obvious: for, in the ſeven pages, wherein he taxes me ſo much with One article, chriſtianity is ſeveral times named, though not once to the purpoſe he here pretends. But revelation is not ſo much as once mentioned in them, nor, as I remember, in any of the pages he beſtows upon me.

To conclude, the ſeveral paſſages above quoted out of him, concerning one ſole article, are all in general terms, without any the leaſt limitation or reſtriction; and, as they ſtand in him, fit to perſuade the reader, that I excluded all other articles whatſoever, but that one, of "Jeſus the Meſſiah:" and if, in that ſenſe, they are not true, they are ſo many falſhoods of his, repeated there, to miſlead others into a wrong opinion of me. For if he had had a mind his readers ſhould have been rightly informed, why was it not as eaſy once to explain himſelf, as ſo often to affirm it in general and unreſtrained terms? This, all the boaſted ſtrength of the unmaſker, will not be able to get him out of. This very well becomes one, who ſo loudly charges me with ſhuffling. Having repeated the ſame thing over and over again, in as general terms as was poſſible, without any the leaſt limitation, in the whole diſcourſe, to have nothing elſe to plead when required to prove it, but that it was meant in a limited ſenſe, in an unmaſker, is not ſhuffling. For, by this way, he may have the convenience to ſay, and unſay, what he pleaſes; to vent what ſtuff he thinks for his turn; and,

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when he is called to account for it, reply, He meant no ſuch thing. Should any one publiſh, that the unmaſker had but " one article of faith, and no more;" viz. That the doctrines in faſhion, and likely to procure preferment, are alone to be received; that all his belief was compriſed in this " one ſingle article:" and, when ſuch a talker was demanded to prove his aſſertion, ſhould he ſay, he meant to except his belief of the apoſtles creed: Would he not, notwithſtanding ſuch a plea, be thought a ſhuffling liar? And, if the unmaſker can no otherwiſe prove thoſe univerſal propoſitions above-cited, but by ſaying, he meant them with a tacit reſtriction, (for none is expreſſed) they will ſtill, and for ever remain to be accounted for, by his veracity.

WHAT he ſays in the next paragraph, p. 7. of my " ſplitting one article into two," is juſt of the ſame force, and with the ſame ingenuity. I had ſaid, That the belief of one God was neceſſary; which is not denied: I had alſo ſaid, " That the belief of Jeſus of Nazareth to be the Meſſiah, together with thoſe " concomitant articles of his reſurrection, rule, and coming again to judge the " world, was neceſſary, p. 583. And again, p. 585. That God had declar- " ed, whoever would believe Jeſus to be the Saviour promiſed, and take him, " now raiſed from the dead, and conſtituted the Lord and Judge of all men, to " be their King and Ruler, ſhould be ſaved." This made me ſay, " Theſe, " and thoſe articles" (in words of the plural number) more than once; evidence enough to any but a caviller, that I " contended not for one ſingle article, and " no more." And to mind him of it, I, in my vindication, reprinted one of thoſe places, where I had done ſo; and, that he might not, according to his manner, overlook what does not pleaſe him, the words, THESE ARE ARTICLES, were printed in great characters. Whereupon he makes this remark, p. 7. " And though ſince he has tried to ſplit this one into two," p. 28. " yet " he labours in vain: for to believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, amounts to the " ſame with believing him to be King and Ruler; his being Anointed i. e. " being the Meſſiah) including that in it: yet he has the vanity to add in great cha- " racters, THESE ARE ARTICLES; as if the putting them into theſe great " letters, would make one article two."

ANSW. Though no letters will make one article two; yet that there is one God, and Jeſus Chriſt his only Son our Lord, who roſe again from the dead, aſcended into heaven, and ſitteth on the right hand of God, ſhall come to judge the quick and the dead, are, in the apoſtles creed, ſet down as more than one article, and therefore may, very properly be called THESE ARTICLES, without ſplitting one into two.

WHAT, in my " reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," I have ſaid of one article, I ſhall always own; and in what ſenſe I ſaid it, is eaſy to be underſtood; and with a man of the leaſt candor, whoſe aim was truth, and not wrangling, it would not have occaſioned one word of diſpute. But as for this unmaſker, who makes it is buſineſs, not to convince me of any miſtakes in my opinion, but barely to miſrepreſent me; my buſineſs at preſent with him, is to ſhew the world, that what he has captiouſly and ſcurrilouſly ſaid of me, relating to One article, is falſe; and that he neither has, nor can prove one of thoſe aſſertions concerning it, above-cited out of him, in his own words. Nor let him pretend a meaning againſt his direct words: ſuch a caviller as he, who would ſhelter himſelf under the pretence of a meaning, whereof there are no footſteps, whoſe diſputes are only calumnies directed againſt the author, without examining the truth or falſhood of what I had publiſhed, is not to expect the allowances one would make to a fair and ingenuous adverſary, who ſhewed ſo much concern for truth, that he treated of it with a ſeriouſneſs due to the weightineſs of the matter, and uſed other arguments, beſides obloquy, clamour and falſhoods, againſt what he thought error. And therefore I again poſitively demand of him to prove theſe words of his to be true, or confeſs that he cannot; viz.

III. " That I contend for one article of faith, with the excluſion and defiance " of all the reſt," Two other inſtances of this ſort of arguments, I gave in the 596th page, of my vindication, out of the 115th and 119th pages of his "thoughts, concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," and I here demand of him again to ſhew, ſince he has not thought fit hitherto to give any anſwer to it;

IV. "Where I urge, that there muſt be nothing in chriſtianity, that is not "plain, and exactly levelled to all men's mother-wit, and every common "apprehenſion."

Or, where he finds, in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," this other propoſition:

V. "That the very manner of every thing in chriſtianity, muſt be clear "and intelligible; every thing muſt immediately be comprehended, by "the weakeſt noddle; or elſe it is no part of religion, eſpecially of chriſtianity."

These things he muſt prove, that I have ſaid: I put it again upon him to ſhew, where I ſaid them, or elſe to confeſs the forgery: for till he does one or t'other, he ſhall be ſure to have theſe, with a large catalogue of other falſhoods, laid before him.

Pag. 26. of his "Socinianiſm unmaſked," he endeavours to make good his ſaying, that "I ſet up one article, with defiance of all the reſt," in theſe words; "for what is excluding them wholly, but defying them? Wherefore, ſeeing "he utterly excludes all the reſt, by repreſenting them as useless, to the "making a man a chriſtian, which is the deſign of his whole undertaking, it is "manifeſt that he defies them."

Answ. This at leaſt is manifeſt from hence, that the unmaſker knows not, or cares not what he ſays. For whoever, but he, thought that a bare excluſion, or paſſing by, was defiance? If he underſtands it ſo, I would adviſe him not to ſeek preferment. For excluſions will happen; and if every excluſion be defiance, a man had need be well aſſured of his own good temper, who ſhall not think his peace and charity in danger, amongſt ſo many enemies, that are at defiance with him? Defiance, if, with any propriety, it can be ſpoken of an article of faith, muſt ſignify a profeſſed enmity to it. For, in its proper uſe, which is to perſons, it ſignifies an open and declared enmity, raiſed to that height, that he, in whom it is, challenges the party defied to battle, that he may there wreak his hatred on his enemy, in his deſtruction. So that "my defiance of all "the reſt," remains ſtill to be proved.

But, ſecondly, There is another thing manifeſt from theſe words of his, viz. that notwithſtanding his great brags in his firſt paragraph, his main ſkill lies, in fancying what would be for his turn, and then confidently fathering it upon me. It never entered into my thoughts, nor, I think, into any body's elſe, (I muſt always except the acute unmaſker, who makes no difference between uſeful and neceſſary) that all but the fundamental articles of the chriſtian faith, were uſeleſs to make a man a chriſtian; though, if it be true, that the belief of the fundamentals alone (be they few, or many) is all that is neceſſary to his being made a chriſtian, all that may any way perſuade him to believe them, may certainly be uſeful, towards the making him a chriſtian: and therefore, here again, I muſt propoſe to him, and leave it with him to be ſhewed where it is,

VI. "I have repreſented all the reſt as uſeleſs, to the making a man a "chriſtian?" And how it appears, "that this is the deſign of my whole "undertaking?"

In his "thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," he ſays, pag. 115. "What makes him contend for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all the "reſt? He pretends it is this, that all men ought to underſtand their religion."

This reaſoning I diſowned, p. 595. of my vindication, and intimated, that he ſhould have quoted the page where I ſo pretended. To this, p. 26. he tells me, with great confidence, and in abundance of words, as we ſhall ſee by and by, that I had done ſo; as if repetition were a proof. He had done better to have quoted one place, where I ſo pretend. Indeed, p. 27. for want of ſomething better, he quotes theſe words of mine out of p. 585. of the reaſonableneſs of "Chriſtianity." The all-merciful God ſeems herein to have conſulted the poor "of this world, and the bulk of mankind. THESE ARE ARTICLES that the labouring and illiterate man may comprehend." I aſk, Whether it be poſſible for one to bring any thing more direct againſt himſelf? The thing he was to prove, was, that "I contended for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all "the reſt, becauſe I pretended, that all men ought to underſtand their religion," i. e. the reaſon I gave, why there was to be "but one ſingle article in religion, "with the excluſion of all the reſt," was, becauſe men ought to underſtand their religion. And the place, he brings, to prove my contending upon that ground, "for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all the reſt," is a paſſage, wherein I ſpeak of more than one article, and ſay, "theſe articles." Whether I ſaid "theſe articles," properly, or improperly, it matters not, in the preſent caſe (and that we have examined in another place) 'tis plain, I meant more than one article, when I ſaid "theſe articles;" and did not think, that the labouring and illiterate man could not underſtand them, if they were more than one: and therefore, I pretend not, that there muſt be but one, becauſe by illiterate men, more than one could not be underſtood. The reſt of this paragraph is nothing but a repetition of the ſame aſſertion, without proof, which, with the unmaſker, often paſſes for a way of proving, but with no-body elſe.

BUT, that I may keep that diſtance, which he boaſts, there is betwixt his and my way of writing, I ſhall not ſay this without proofs. One inſtance of his repetition, of which there is ſuch plenty in his book, pray take here. His buſineſs, p. 26. is to prove, that "I pretended that I contended for one ſingle "article, with the excluſion of all the reſt, becauſe all men ought to underſtand "their religion," pag. 596. of my vindication, I denied that I had ſo pretended. To convince me that I had, thus he proceeds.

UNMASKER. "He founds his conceit" of one article, "partly upon this, "that a multitude of doctrines is obſcure, and hard to be underſtood."

ANSWER. You ſay it, and had ſaid it before: but I aſk you, as I did before, Where I did ſo?

UNM. "And therefore he truſſes up all in one article, that the poor people, "and bulk of mankind may bear it."

ANSW. I deſire again to know, where I made that inference, and argued ſo, for "one article?"

UNM. "This is the ſcope of a great part of his book."

ANSW. This is ſaying again, ſhew it once.

UNM. "But his memory does not keep pace with his invention, and thence "he ſays, he remembers nothing of this in his book," vind. p. 596.

ANSW. This is to ſay that it is in my book. You have ſaid it more than once already; I demand of you to ſhew me where.

UNM. "This worthy writer does not know his own reaſoning, that he uſes."

ANSW. I aſk, Where does he uſe that reaſoning?

UNM. "As particularly thus, that he troubles chriſtian men with no more, "but one article: BECAUSE that is intelligible, and all people, high and low, "may comprehend it."

ANSW. We have heard it affirm'd by you, over and over again, but the queſtion ſtill is, "Where is that way of arguing to be found in my book?"

UNM. "For he has choſen out, as he thinks, a plain and eaſy article. Whereas the others, which are commonly propounded, are not generally agreed on "(he ſaith) and are dubious and uncertain. But the believing that Jeſus is the "Meſſiah, has nothing of doubtfulneſs or obſcurity in it."

Answ. The word For, in the beginning of this ſentence, makes it ſtand for one of your reaſons; though it be but a repetition of the ſame thing in other words.

Unm. “ This the reader will find to be the drift and deſign of ſeveral of his “ pages.”

Answ. This muſt ſignify, “ that I trouble men with no more but one article, “ becauſe one only is intelligible,” and then it is but a repetition. If any thing elſe be meant by the word This, it is nothing to the purpoſe. For that I ſaid, that all things neceſſary to be believed are plain in ſcripture, and eaſy to be underſtood, I never denied; and ſhould be very ſorry, and recant it, if I had.

Unm. “ And the reaſon why I did not quote any ſingle one of them, was, “ becauſe he inſiſts on it, ſo long together; and ſpins it out after this way, in “ p. 585. of his” reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, “ where he ſets down the” ſhort “ plain, eaſy, and intelligible ſummary (as he calls it) of religion,” couch'd “ in a ſingle article, he immediately adds; “ the All-merciful God ſeems herein “ to have conſulted the poor of this world, and the bulk of mankind: theſe “ are articles” (whereas he had ſet down but one) “ that the labouring and “ illiterate man may comprehend.”

Answ. If “ my inſiſting on it ſo long together” was the cauſe why, in your “ thoughts of the cauſes of atheiſm,” you did not quote any ſingle paſſage; methinks here, in your “ ſocinianiſm unmaſk'd,” where you knew it was expected of you, my “ inſiſting on it,” as you ſay, “ ſo long together,” might have afforded, at leaſt, one quotation to your purpoſe.

Unm. “ He aſſigns this, as a ground, why it was God's pleaſure, that there “ ſhould be but ONE POINT of faith, BECAUSE thereby religion may be un- “ derſtood the better? the generality of the people may comprehend it.”

Answ. I hear you ſay it again, but want a proof ſtill, and aſk, where I “ aſſign that ground?”

Unm. “ This he repreſents, as a great kindneſs, done by God to man; where- “ as the variety of articles would be hard to be underſtood.”

Answ. Again the ſame cabbage; an affirmation, but no proof.

Unm. “ This he inlarges upon, and flouriſhes it over, after his faſhion: and yet he deſires to know, When he ſaid ſo?” p. 596. vindic.

Answ. And if I did, let the world take here a ſample of the unmaſker's ability, or truth, who ſpends above two whole pages, 26, 27. in repetitions of the ſame aſſertion, without the producing any but one place for proof; and that too againſt him, as I have ſhewn. But he has not yet done with confounding me by dint of repetition; he goes on,

Unm. “ Good ſir, let me be permitted to acquaint you, that your memory “ is as defective as your judgment.”

Answ. I thank you for the regard you have had to it; for often repetition is a good help to a bad memory. In requital, I adviſe you to have ſome eye to your own memory and judgment too. For one, or both of them, ſeem a little to blame, in the reaſon you ſubjoin to the foregoing words, viz.

Unm. “ For in the very vindication, you attribute it to the goodneſs and “ condeſcenſion of the Almighty, that he requires nothing, as abſolutely neceſ- “ ſary to be believed, but what is ſuited to vulgar capacities, and the compre- “ henſion of illiterate men.”

Answ. I will, for the unmaſker's ſake, put this argument of his into a ſyllogiſm. If the vindicator, in his vindication, attributes it to the goodneſs and condeſcenſion of the Almighty, that he requires nothing to be believed, but what is ſuited to vulgar capacities, and the comprehenſion of illiterate men; then he did, in his “ reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity,” pretend, that the reaſon, why he contended for One article, with the excluſion of all the reſt, was becauſe all men ought to underſtand their religion.

But the vindicator, in his vindication, attributes it to the goodneſs and condeſcenſion of Almighty God, that he requires nothing to be believed, but what is ſuited to vulgar capacities, and the comprehenſion of illiterate men, "ERGO," in his "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," he pretended, that the reaſon why he contended for one article, with the excluſion of all the reſt, was, becauſe all men ought to underſtand their religion.

THIS was the propoſition to be proved, and which, as he confeſſes here, p. 26. I denied to remember, to be in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity." Who can but admire his logick!

BUT, beſides the ſtrength of judgment, which you have ſhewed in this clear and cogent reaſoning, Does not your memory too, deſerve its due applauſe? You tell me, in your "ſocinianiſm unmaſked," that in p. 22. i. e. in this edition, p. 596. of my vindication, I deſired to know, when I ſaid ſo. To which deſire of mine, you reply in theſe words before cited; "Good ſir, let "me be permitted to acquaint you, that your memory is as defective as your "judgment; for, in the very vindication, you attribute it to the goodneſs and "condeſcenſion of the Almighty, that he requires nothing, as abſolutely neceſ-"ſary to be believed, but what is ſuited to vulgar capacities, and the compre-"henſion of illiterate men," p. 30.

SURE the unmaſker thinks himſelf at croſs queſtions. I aſk him, in the 29th page of my vindication, WHEN I had ſaid ſo? And he anſwers, that I had ſaid ſo in the 30th page of my vindication; i. e. when I writ the 29th page, I aſked the queſtion, When I had ſaid, what he charged me with ſaying? And I am anſwered, I had ſaid it in the 30th page; which was not yet written: i. e. I aſked the queſtion to-day, WHEN I had ſaid ſo? And I am anſwered, I had ſaid it to-morrow. As appoſite and convincing an anſwer, to make good his charge, as if he had ſaid, To-morrow I found a horſe-ſhoe. But perhaps this judicious diſputant will eaſe himſelf of this difficulty, by looking again into the 29th, or 596 page of my vindication, out of which he cites theſe words for mine; "I deſire to know, WHEN I ſaid ſo?" But my words in that place are, "I deſire to know, WHERE I ſaid ſo?" A mark of his exactneſs in quoting, when he vouchſafes to do it. For unmaſkers, when they turn diſputants, think it the beſt way to talk at large, and charge home in generals: but do not often find it convenient to quote pages, ſet down words, and come to particulars. But, if he had quoted my words right; his anſwer had been juſt as pertinent. For I aſk him, "WHERE, in my reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," I had ſaid ſo? And he anſwers, I had ſaid ſo in my vindication. For, where, in my queſtion, refers to my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," which the unmaſker had ſeen, and charged with this ſaying; and could not refer to my vindication, which he had not yet ſeen, nor to a paſſage in it, which was not then written. But this is nothing with an unmaſker; therefore, what is yet worſe, thoſe words of mine, vindication, p. 29, or 596. relate not to the paſſage he is here proving, I had ſaid, but to another different from it; as different as it is to ſay, "That be-"cauſe all men are to underſtand their religion, therefore there is to be but one "article in it;" and to ſay, "that there muſt be nothing in chriſtianity, that is "not plain, and exactly levelled to all men's mother-wit:" both which he falſly charges on me; but 'tis only to the latter of them, that my words, "I deſire to "know, where I ſaid ſo?" are applied.

PERHAPS the well-meaning man ſees no difference between theſe two propoſitions, yet I ſhall take the liberty to aſk him again, Where I ſaid either of them, as if they were two? Although he ſhould accuſe me again, of "except-"ing againſt the formality of words," and doing ſo fooliſh a thing, as to expect, that a diſputing unmaſker ſhould account for his words, or any propoſition he advances. 'Tis his privilege to plead, he did not mean as his words import, and without any more ado he is aſſoiled; and he is the ſame unmaſker he was before. But let us hear him out, on the argument he was upon, for his repetitions on it are not yet done, His next words are,

UNM. "It is clear then, that you found your ONE article on this, that it "is ſuited to the vulgar capacities: whereas the other articles, mentioned by "me, are obſcure and ambiguous, and therefore ſurpaſs the comprehenſion of "the illiterate."

Answ. The latter part, indeed, is now the firſt time imputed to me; but all the reſt is nothing but an unproved repetition, though uſhered in with "it is "clear then;" words that ſhould have a proof going before them.

Unm. "But yet you pretend, that you have forgot that any ſuch thing was "ſaid by you."

Answ. I have indeed forgot, and, notwithſtanding all your pains, by ſo many repetitions, to beat it into my head, I fear I ſhall never remember it.

Unm. "Which ſhews that you are careleſs of your words, and that you for"get what you write."

Answ. So you told me before, and this repeating of it does no more convince me, than that did.

Unm. "What ſhall we ſay to ſuch an oblivious author?"

Answ. Shew it him in his book, or elſe he will never be able to remember, that it is there, nor any body elſe be able to find it.

Unm. "He takes no notice of what falls from his own pen."

Answ. So you have told him more than once. Try him once, with ſhewing it him, amongſt other things, which fell from his own pen, and ſee what then he will ſay: that perhaps may refreſh his own memory.

Unm. "And therefore, within a page or two, he confutes himſelf, and "gives himſelf the lye."

Answ. 'Tis a fault, he deſerves to be told of, over and over again. But he ſays, he ſhall not be able to find the two pages, wherein he "gives himſelf the "lye," unleſs you ſet down their numbers, and the words in them, which confute, and which are confuted.

I beg my reader's pardon, for laying before him ſo large a pattern of our unmaſker's new-faſhioned ſtuff; his fine tiſſue of argumentation not eaſily to be matched, but by the ſame hand. But it lay altogether in p. 26, 27, 28. and it was fit the reader ſhould have this one inſtance, of the excellencies he promiſes in his firſt paragraph, in oppoſition to my "impertinencies, incoherencies, weak "and feeble ſtruglings." Other excellencies he there promiſed, upon the ſame ground, which I ſhall give my reader a taſte of in fit places: not but that the whole is of a piece, and one cannot miſs ſome of them in every page; but to tranſcribe them all, would be more than they are worth. If any one deſires more plenty, I ſend him to his book itſelf. But ſaying a thouſand times, not being proving once, it remains upon him ſtill to ſhew,

VII. Where, in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, I pretend that I con"tend for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all the reſt, becauſe all "men ought to underſtand their religion."

And in the next place, where it is that I ſay,

VIII. "That there muſt be nothing in chriſtianity that is not plain and "exactly level to all men's mother-wit."

Let us now return to his 8th page: for the bundling together, as was fit, all that he has ſaid, in diſtant places, upon the ſubject of One article, has made me treſpaſs a little, againſt the Jewiſh character of a well-bred man, recommended by him to me, out of the Miſhna. Though I propoſe to myſelf to follow him, as near as I can, ſtep by ſtep, as he proceeds.

In the 110th and 111th pages, of his "thoughts concerning the cauſes of "atheiſm," he gave us a liſt of his "fundamental articles:" upon which, I thus applied myſelf to him, vind. p. 592, &c. "Give me leave now to aſk "you ſeriouſly, Whether theſe you have here ſet down under the title of "funda"mental doctrines," are ſuch (when reduced to propoſitions) that every one of "them is required, to make a man a chriſtian, and ſuch as, without the actual "belief thereof, he cannot be ſaved? If they are not ſo, every one of them, "you may call them "fundamental doctrines," as much as you pleaſe, they "are not of thoſe doctrines of faith, I was ſpeaking of; which are only ſuch

" as are required to be actually believed, to make a man a chriſtian." And " again, vindic. p. 593. " I aſk him, Whether juſt theſe, neither more nor leſs," were thoſe neceſſary articles?

TO which we have his anſwer, " ſocinianiſm unmaſk'd" p. 8, &c. From p. 8. to 20. he has quoted near forty texts of ſcripture, of which he ſaith, p. 21. " Thus I have briefly ſet before the reader, thoſe evangelical truths, thoſe chriſtian principles, which belong to the very eſſence of chriſtianity: I have " proved them to be ſuch, and I have reduced moſt of them to certain propoſitions, which is a thing the vindicator called for."

ANSW. Yes: but that was not all the vindicator called for, and had reaſon to expect. For I aſk'd, " Whether thoſe the unmaſker gave us, in his thoughts " concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," were the fundamental doctrines, " without " an actual belief whereof, a man could not be a chriſtian; juſt all, neither " more nor leſs?" This I had reaſon to demand from him, or from any one, who queſtions that part of my book, and I ſhall inſiſt upon it, 'till he does it, or confeſſes he cannot. For having ſet down the articles, which the ſcripture, upon a diligent ſearch, ſeem'd to me to require as neceſſary, and only neceſſary; I ſhall not loſe my time in examining, what another ſays againſt thoſe fundamentals, which I have gathered out of the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, 'till he gives me a liſt of his fundamentals, which he will abide by; that ſo, by comparing them together, I may ſee which is the true catalogue of neceſſaries. For, after ſo ſerious and diligent a ſearch, which has given me light and ſatisfaction in this great point, I ſhall not quit it, and ſet myſelf on float again, at the demand of any one, who would have me be of his faith, without telling me what it is. Thoſe fundamentals, the ſcripture has ſo plainly given, and ſo evidently determined, that it would be the greateſt folly imaginable, to part with this rule for aſking; and give up myſelf blindly to the conduct of one, who either knows not, or will not tell me, what are the points neceſſary to be believed to make me a chriſtian. He that ſhall find fault with my collection of fundamentals, only to unſettle me, and not to give me a better of his own, I ſhall not think worth minding, 'till, like a fair man, he puts himſelf upon equal terms, and makes up the defects of mine, by a complete one of his own. For a deficiency, or error, in one neceſſary, is as fatal, and as certainly excludes a man from being a chriſtian, as in an hundred. When any one offers me a complete catalogue of his fundamentals, he does not unreaſonably demand me to quit mine for nothing: I have then one, that being ſet by mine, I may compare them; and ſo be able to chuſe the true and perfect one, and relinquiſh the other.

HE that does not do this, plainly declares, that (without ſhewing me the certain way to ſalvation) he expects, that I ſhould depend on him with an implicit faith, whilſt he reſerves to himſelf the liberty, to require of me to believe, what he ſhall think fit, as he ſees occaſion; and in effect, ſays thus, " Diſtruſt thoſe " fundamentals, which the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, have " ſhewed to be all that is neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian; and, though I cannot tell you, what are thoſe other articles which are " neceſſary and ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian, yet take me for your guide, " and that is as good, as if I made up, in a compleat liſt, the defects of your " fundamentals." To which this is a ſufficient anſwer, " Si quid noviſti rectius, imperti, ſi non, his utere mecum."

THE unmaſker, of his own accord, p. 110. of his " thoughts, concerning " the cauſes of atheiſm," ſets down ſeveral, which he calls " fundamental doctrines." I aſk him, whether thoſe be all? For anſwer, he adds more to them in his " ſocinianiſm unmask'd: but in a great pet, refuſes to tell me, whether this ſecond liſt of fundamentals be complete: and, inſtead of anſwering ſo reaſonable a demand, pays me with ill language, in theſe words, p. 22. ſubjoin'd to thoſe laſt quoted, " If what I have ſaid will not content him, I am ſure I can " do nothing that will; and, therefore, if he ſhould capriciouſly require any " thing more, it would be as great folly in me to comply with it, as it is in him " to move it." If I did aſk a queſtion, which troubles you, be not ſo angry, you yourſelf were the occaſion of it. I propoſed my collection of fundamentals, which I had, with great care, ſought; and thought I had found clear in the ſcripture; you tell me no, it is imperfect, and offer me one of your own. I aſk, whether that be perfect? Thereupon you grow into choler, and tell me 'tis a fooliſh queſtion. Why! then I think it was not very wiſe in you ſo forwardly to offer one, unleſs you had had one ready, not liable to the ſame exception. Would you have me ſo fooliſh, to take a liſt of fundamentals from you, who have not yet one for yourſelf; nor are yet reſolved with yourſelf, what doctrines are to be put in, or left out of it? Farther, pray tell me, if you had a ſettled collection of fundamentals, that you would ſtand to, why ſhould I take them from you, upon your word, rather than from an Anabaptiſt, or a Quaker, or an Arminian, or a Socinian, or a Lutheran, or a Papiſt; who, I think, are not perfectly agreed with you, or one another in fundamentals? And yet, there is none amongſt them, that I have not as much reaſon to believe, upon his bare word, as an unmaſker, who, to my certain knowledge, will make bold with truth. If you ſet up for infallibility, you may have ſome claim to have your bare word taken, before any other but the pope. But yet, if you demand to be an unqueſtionable propoſer, of what is abſolutely neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian, you muſt perform it a little better, than hitherto you have done. For it is not enough, ſometimes to give us texts of ſcripture; ſometimes propoſitions of your own framing, and ſometimes texts of ſcripture, out of which they are to be framed; as page 14. you ſay, "Theſe and the like "places afford us ſuch fundamental and neceſſary doctrines as theſe:" and again, p. 16. after the naming ſeveral other texts of ſcripture, you add, "which places yield us ſuch propoſitions as theſe;" and then in both places ſet down what you think fit to draw out of them' And page 15. you have theſe words: "and "here, likewiſe, it were eaſy to ſhew, that adoption, juſtification, pardon of "ſins, &c. which are privileges and benefits beſtowed upon us by the Meſſiah, "are neceſſary matters of our belief." By all which, as well as the whole frame, wherein you make ſhew, of giving us your fundamental articles, it is plain, that what you have given us there, is nothing leſs, than a complete collection of fundamentals, even in your own opinion of it.

But, good Sir, Why is it a fooliſh queſtion in me? You have found fault with my ſummary for being ſhort: the defect in my collection of neceſſary articles, has raiſed your zeal into ſo ſevere cenſures, and drawn upon me, from you, ſo heavy a condemnation, that if half you have ſaid of me, be true, I am in a very ill caſe, for having ſo curtailed the fundamental doctrines of chriſtianity. Is it folly, then, for me to aſk from you a complete creed? If it be ſo dangerous (as certainly it is) to fail in any neceſſary article of faith, Why is it folly in me, to be inſtant with you, to give me them all? Or why is it folly in you, to grant ſo reaſonable a demand? A ſhort faith, defective in neceſſaries, is no more tolerable in you, than in me; nay, much more inexcuſable, if it were for no other reaſon but this, that you reſt in it yourſelf, and would impoſe it on others; and yet do not yourſelf know, or believe it to be complete. For if you do, why dare you not ſay ſo, and give it us all entire, in plain propoſitions; and not, as you have in great meaſure done here, give only the texts of ſcripture, from whence, you ſay, neceſſary articles are to be drawn? Which is too great an uncertainty for doctrines, abſolutely neceſſary. For, poſſibly all men do not underſtand thoſe texts alike, and ſome may draw articles out of them, quite different from your ſyſtem; and ſo though they agree in the ſame texts, may not agree in the ſame fundamentals: and, till you have ſet down plainly and diſtinctly your articles; that you think contained in them, cannot tell whether you will allow them to be chriſtians, or no. For you know, Sir, ſeveral inferences are often drawn from the ſame text; and the different ſyſtems of diſſenting (I was going to ſay chriſtians, but that none muſt be ſo, but thoſe who receive your collection of fundamentals, when you pleaſe to give it them) profeſſors, are all founded on the ſcripture.

Why, I beſeech you, is mine a fooliſh queſtion to aſk "What are the ne"ceſſary articles of faith?" 'Tis of no leſs conſequence than, nor much different from the jaylor's queſtion in the ſixteenth of the Acts, "What ſhall I do "to be ſaved?" And that was not, that ever I heard, counted by any one a fooliſh queſtion. You grant, there are articles neceſſary to be believed for ſalvation: Would it not, then, be wiſdom to know them? Nay, is it not our duty to know and believe them? If not, Why do you, with ſo much outcry, reprehend me, for not knowing them? Why do you fill your books with ſuch variety of invectives, as if you could never ſay enough, nor bad enough, againſt me, for having left out ſome of them? And, if it be ſo dangerous, ſo criminal to miſs any of them, Why is it a folly in me, to move you, to give me a complete liſt?

If fundamentals are to be known, eaſy to be known, (as, without doubt, they are) then a catalogue may be given of them. But, if they are not, if it cannot certainly be determined, which are they; but the doubtful knowledge of them depends upon gueſſes, Why may not I be permitted to follow my gueſſes, as well as you yours? Or why, of all others, muſt you preſcribe your gueſſes to me, when there are ſo many, that are as ready to preſcribe as you, and of as good authority? The pretence, indeed, and clamour is religion, and the ſaving of ſouls: but your buſineſs, 'tis plain, is nothing, but to over-rule and preſcribe, and be hearkened to as a dictator; and not to inform, teach, and inſtruct, in the ſure way to ſalvation. Why elſe do you ſo ſtart and fling, when I deſire to know of you, what is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, when this is the only material thing in controverſy between us; and my miſtake in it has made you begin a quarrel with me, and let looſe your pen againſt me, in no ordinary way of reprehenſion?

Besides, in this way which you take, you will be in no better a caſe than I. For, another having as good a claim to have his gueſſes give the rule, as you yours; or to have his ſyſtem received, as well as you yours; he will complain of you as well, and upon as good grounds, as you do of me; and (if he have but as much zeal for his orthodoxy, as you ſhew for yours) in as civil, well-bred, and chriſtian-like language.

In the next place, pray tell me, Why would it be folly in you, to comply with what I require of you? Would it not be uſeful to me, to be ſet right in this matter? If ſo, Why is it folly in you to ſet me right? Conſider me, if you pleaſe, as one of your pariſhioners, who (after you have reſolved which catalogue of fundamentals to give him, either that in your "thoughts of the cauſes "of atheiſm," or this other here, in your "Socinianiſm unmaſked;" for they are not both the ſame, nor either of them perfect) aſked you, "Are theſe all fundamental articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; and are there no more but theſe?" Would you anſwer him, that it was folly in you to comply with him, in what he deſired? Is it of no moment to know, what is required of men to be believed; without a belief of which, they are not chriſtians, nor can be ſaved? And is it folly in a miniſter of the goſpel, to inform one, committed to his inſtruction, in ſo material a point as this, which diſtinguiſhes believers from unbelievers? Is it folly in one, whoſe buſineſs it is to bring men to be chriſtians, and to ſalvation, to reſolve a queſtion, by which they may know, whether they are chriſtians or no; and, without a reſolution of which, they cannot certainly know their condition, and the ſtate they are in? Is it beſides your commiſſion and buſineſs, and therefore a folly, to extend your care of ſouls ſo far as this, to thoſe who are committed to your charge;

Sir, I have a title to demand this of you, as if I were your pariſhioner: you have forced yourſelf upon me for a teacher, in this very point, as if you wanted a pariſhioner to inſtruct: and therefore I demand it of you, and ſhall inſiſt upon it, till you either do it, or confeſs you cannot. Nor ſhall it excuſe you, to ſay it is capriciouſly required. For this is no otherwiſe capricious, than all queſtions are capricious to a man, that cannot anſwer them; and ſuch an one, I think, this is to you. For, if you could anſwer it, no-body can doubt, but that you would, and that with confidence: for no-body will ſuſpect 'tis the want of that makes you ſo reſerved. This is, indeed, a frequent way of anſwering queſtions, by men, that cannot otherwiſe cover the abſurdities of their opinions, and their inſolence of expecting to be believed upon their bare words, by ſaying they are capriciouſly aſked, and deſerve no other anſwer.

BUT how far ſoever capriciouſneſs (when proved, for ſaying is not enough) may excuſe, from anſwering a material queſtion, yet your own words here will clear this from being a capricious queſtion in me. For that thoſe texts of ſcripture which you have ſet down, do not, upon your own grounds, contain all the fundamental doctrines of religion, all that is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; what you ſay a little lower, in this very page, as well as in other places, does demonſtrate. Your words are, " I think I have ſufficiently " proved, that there are other doctrines beſides that [Jeſus is the Meſſiah] which " are required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; Why did the apoſtles " write theſe doctrines? Was it not, that thoſe they writ to, might give their " aſſent to them?" This argument, for the neceſſity of believing the texts you cite, from their being ſet down in the " new teſtament," you urged thus, p. 9. " Is this ſet down to no purpoſe in theſe inſpired epiſtles? Is it not requiſite that " we ſhould know it and believe?" And again, p. 29. " they are in our bibles " to that very purpoſe, to be believed." If then it be neceſſary to know and believe thoſe texts of ſcripture you have collected, becauſe the apoſtles writ them, and they were not " ſet down to no purpoſe: and they are ſet down in our bibles, on purpoſe to be believed." I have reaſon to demand of you other texts, beſides thoſe you have enumerated, as containing points neceſſary to be believed; becauſe there are other texts which the apoſtles writ, and were not " ſet down to no purpoſe, and are in our bibles, on purpoſe to be believed," as well as thoſe which you have cited.

ANOTHER reaſon of doubting, and conſequently of demanding, whether thoſe propoſitions you have ſet down for fundamental doctrines, be every one of them neceſſary to be believed, and all that are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, I have from your next argument; which, joined to the former, ſtands thus, p. 22. " Why did the apoſtles write theſe doctrines? Was it not, " that thoſe they writ to, might give their aſſent to them? Nay, did they not " require aſſent to them? Yes, verily; for this is to be proved from the nature " of the things contained in theſe doctrines, which are ſuch as had immediate " reſpect to the occaſion, author, way, means and iſſue, of their redemption " and ſalvation." If therefore, all " things, which have an immediate reſpect to " the occaſion, author, way, means and iſſue of men's redemption and ſalvation." are thoſe, and thoſe only, which are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; may a man not juſtly doubt, whether thoſe propoſitions, which the unmaſker has ſet down, contain all thoſe things, and whether there be not other things contained in other texts of ſcripture, or in ſome of thoſe cited by him, but otherwiſe underſtood, that have as immediate a " reſpect to the occaſion, " author, way, means and iſſue, of men's redemption and ſalvation," as thoſe he has ſet down? And therefore, I have reaſon to demand a compleater liſt. For at beſt, to tell us, that " all things that have an immediate reſpect to the " occaſion, author, way, means and iſſue, of mens redemption and ſalvation," is but a general deſcription of fundamentals, with which ſome may think ſome articles agree, and others, others: and the terms, " immediate reſpect," may give ground enough for difference about them, to thoſe, who agree that the reſt of your deſcription is right. My demand, therefore, is not a general deſcription of fundamentals, but, for the reaſons above mentioned, the particular articles themſelves, which are neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian.

IT is not my buſineſs at preſent, to examine the validity of theſe arguments of his, to prove all the propoſitions to be neceſſary to be believed, which he has here, in his " Socinianiſm unmaſked," ſet down as ſuch. The uſe I make of them now, is to ſhew the reaſon they afford me to doubt, that thoſe propoſitions, which he has given us, for doctrines neceſſary to be believed, are either not all ſuch, or more than all, by his own rule: and therefore, I muſt deſire him to give us a compleater creed, that we may know, what, in his ſenſe, is neceſſary, and enough to make a man a chriſtian.

NOR will it be ſufficient, in this caſe, to do, what he tells us he has done, in theſe words, p. 21. "I have briefly ſet before the reader theſe evangelical truths, thoſe chriſtian principles, which belong to the very eſſence of chriſtianity;"——and "I have reduced moſt of them to certain propoſitions, which is a thing the vindicator called for," p. 16. With ſubmiſſion, I think, he miſtakes the vindicator. What I called for was, not that "moſt of them ſhould be reduced to certain propoſitions, but that all of them ſhould: and the reaſon of my demanding that, was plain, that then, having the unmaſker's creed in clear and diſtinct propoſitions, I might be able to examine, whether it was, what God in the ſcriptures indiſpenſably required of every man to make him a chriſtian, that ſo I might thereby correct the errors or defects, of what I at preſent apprehended the ſcripture taught me in the caſe.

THE unmaſker endeavours to excuſe himſelf from anſwering my queſtion by another exception againſt it, p. 24. in theſe words; "Surely none, but this upſtart Racovian, will have the confidence to deny, that theſe articles of faith are ſuch as are neceſſary to conſtitute a chriſtian, as to the intellectual and doctrinal part of chriſtianity; ſuch as muſt, IN SOME MEASURE, be known and aſſented to by him. Not that a man is ſuppoſed, every moment, actually to exert his aſſent and belief; for none of the moral virtues, none of the evangelical graces are exerted thus always. Wherefore that queſtion," in p. 16. "(though he ſays he aſks it" ſeriouſly) "might have been ſpared," "Whether every one of theſe fundamentals is required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and ſuch as, without the actual belief thereof, he cannot be ſaved?" "Here is ſeriouſneſs pretended when there is none; for the deſign is only to cavil, and (if he can) to expoſe my aſſertion. But he is not able to do it; for all his critical demands are anſwered in theſe few words, viz. That the intellectual (as well as moral endowments) are never ſuppoſed to be always in act: they are exerted upon occaſion, not all of them at a time. And, therefore, he miſtakes, if he thinks, or rather as he objects without thinking, that theſe doctrines, if they be fundamental and neceſſary, muſt be always actually believed," "No man, beſides himſelf, ever ſtarted ſuch a thing."

THIS terrible long combat has the unmaſker managed with his own ſhadow, to confound the ſeriouſneſs of my queſtion; and, as he ſays himſelf, is come off, not only ſafe and ſound, but triumphant. But, for all that, Sir, may not a man's queſtion be ſerious, though he ſhould chance to expreſs it ill? I think you and I were not beſt to ſet up for criticks in language, and nicety of expreſſion, for fear we ſhould ſet the world a laughing. Yet, for this once, I ſhall take the liberty to defend mine here. For I demand, in what expreſſion of mine, I ſaid, or ſuppoſed, that a man ſhould, every moment, actually exert his aſſent to any propoſition required to be believed? Cannot a man ſay, that the unmaſker cannot be admitted to any preferment in the church of England, without an actual aſſent to, or ſubſcribing of the thirty-nine articles; unleſs it be ſuppoſed, that he muſt every moment, from the time he firſt read, aſſented to, and ſubſcribed thoſe articles, 'till he received inſtitution and induction, "actually exert his aſſent" to every one of them, and repeat his ſubſcription? In the ſame ſenſe it is literally true, that a man cannot be admitted into the church of Chriſt, or into heaven, without actually believing all the articles neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian, without ſuppoſing, that he muſt "actually exert that aſſent every moment," from the time that he firſt gave it, 'till the moment that he is admitted into heaven. He may eat, drink, make bargains, ſtudy Euclid, and think of other things between; nay, ſometimes ſleep, and neither think of thoſe articles, nor any thing elſe; and yet it be true, that he ſhall not be admitted into the church, or heaven, without an actual aſſent to them: that condition of an actual aſſent, he has performed, and until he recal that aſſent, by actual unbelief, it ſtands good; and though a lunacy, or lethargy, ſhould ſeize on him preſently after, and he ſhould never think of it again as long as he lived, yet it is literally true, he is not ſaved without an actual aſſent. You might, therefore, have ſpared your pains, in ſaying, "That none of the moral virtues, none of "the evangelical graces, are exerted THUS always," 'till you had met with ſome-body who ſaid THUS. That I did ſo, I think, would have entered into no-body's thoughts but yours, it being evident from p. 584. of my book, that by actual, I meant explicit. You ſhould rather have given a direct anſwer to my queſtion, which I here again ſeriouſly aſk you, viz. Whether,

IX. THOSE you called "fundamental doctrines," in your thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," or thoſe "chriſtian principles, which "belong to the very eſſence of chriſtianity," ſo many as you have given us of them, in your "Socinianiſm unmaſked," (for you may take which of your two creeds you pleaſe) are juſt thoſe, neither more nor leſs, that are every one of them required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and ſuch as, without the actual, or (ſince that word diſpleaſes you) the explicit belief whereof, he cannot be ſaved?

WHEN you have anſwered this queſtion, we ſhall then ſee, which of us two is neareſt the right: but, if you ſhall forbear railing, which, I fear, you take for arguing, againſt that ſummary of faith, which our Saviour and his apoſtles taught, and which only they propoſed to their hearers to be believed, to make them chriſtians, 'till you have found another perfect creed, of only neceſſary articles, that you dare own for ſuch; you are like to have a large time of ſilence. Before I leave the paſſage above-cited, I muſt deſire the reader to take notice of what he ſays, concerning his liſt of fundamentals, viz. That "theſe his articles of faith, neceſſary to conſtitute a chriſtian, are ſuch as muſt, IN SOME MEASURE, bbe known and aſſented to by him:" a very wary expreſſion concerning fundamentals! The queſtion is, about articles neceſſary to be explicitly believed to make a man a chriſtian. Theſe, in his liſt, the unmaſker tells us, are "neceſſary to conſtitute a chriſtian, and muſt, IN SOME MEASURE, be "known and aſſented to." I would now fain know of the reader, Whether he underſtands hereby, that the unmaſker means, that theſe his neceſſary articles muſt be explicitly believed or not? If he means an explicit knowledge and belief, why does he puzzle his reader, by ſo improper a way of ſpeaking? For what is as complete and perfect as it ought to be, cannot properly be ſaid to be, "in ſome meaſure." If his, "in ſome meaſure," falls ſhort, of explicitly knowing and believing his fundamentals, his neceſſary articles are ſuch, as a man may be a chriſtian, without explicitly knowing and believing, i. e. are no fundamentals, no neceſſary articles at all. Thus men, uncertain what to ſay, betray themſelves by their great caution.

HAVING pronounced it folly in himſelf, to make up the defects of my ſhort, and therefore ſo much blamed collection of fundamentals, by a full one of his own, though his attempt ſhews he would if he could, he goes on thus, p. 22. "From what I [the unmaſker] have ſaid, it is evident, that the vindi-"cator is groſly miſtaken, when he ſaith," "Whatever doctrine the apoſtles re-"quired to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, are to be found in thoſe "places of ſcripture which he has quoted in his book." And a little lower, "I think I have ſufficiently proved, that there are other doctrines beſides that, "which are required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian."

ANSW. Whatever you have proved, or (as you never fail to do) boaſt you have proved, will ſignify nothing, 'till you have proved one of theſe propoſitions; and have ſhewn either,

X. THAT what our Saviour and his apoſtles preached, and admitted men into the church for believing, is not all that is abſolutely required to make a man a chriſtian. Or,

THAT the believing him to be the Meſſiah, was not the only article they inſiſted on, to thoſe who acknowledged one God; and, upon the belief whereof, they admitted converts into the church, in any one of thoſe many places quoted by me out of the hiſtory of the "new teſtament."

I SAY, any one: for though it be evident throughout the whole goſpel, and the Acts, that this was the one doctrine of faith, which, in all their preachings every where, they principally drive at: yet, if it were not ſo, but that in other places they taught other things, that would not prove, that thoſe other things were articles of faith, abſolutely, neceſſarily required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, unleſs it had been ſo ſaid. Becauſe, if it appears, that ever any one was admitted into the church, by our Saviour or his apoſtles, without having that article explicitly laid before him, and without his explicit aſſent to it, you muſt grant, that an explicit aſſent to that article, is not neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian: unleſs you will ſay, that our Saviour and his apoſtles admitted men into the church, that were not qualified with ſuch a faith, as was abſolutely neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian; which is as much as to ſay, that they allowed and pronounced men to be chriſtians, who were not chriſtians. For he that wants what is neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian, can no more be a chriſtian, than he that wants what is neceſſary to make him a man, can be a man. For what is neceſſary to the being of any thing, is eſſential to its being; and any thing may be as well without its eſſence, as without any thing that is neceſſary to its being; and ſo a man be a man, without being a man; and a chriſtian a chriſtian, without being a chriſtian; and an unmaſker may prove this, without proving it. You may, therefore, ſet up, by your unqueſtionable authority, what articles you pleaſe, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian: if our Saviour and his apoſtles admitted converts into the church, without preaching thoſe your articles to them, or requiring an explicit aſſent to what they did not preach and explicitly lay down, I ſhall prefer their authority to yours, and think it was rather by them, than by you, that God promulgated the law of faith, and manifeſted what that faith was, upon which he would receive penitent converts.

AND though, by his apoſtles, our Saviour taught a great many other truths, for the explaining this fundamental article of the law of faith, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah; ſome whereof have a nearer, and ſome a more remote connection with it, and ſo cannot be denied by any chriſtian, who ſees that connection, or knows they are ſo taught: yet an explicit belief of any one of them, is no more neceſſarily required to make a man a chriſtian, than an explicit belief of all thoſe truths, which have a connection with the Being of a God, or are revealed by him, is neceſſarily required to make a man not to be an atheiſt: tho' none of them can be denied by any one, who ſees that connection, or acknowledges that revelation, without his being an atheiſt. All theſe truths, taught us from God, either by reaſon or revelation, are of great uſe, to enlighten our minds, confirm our faith, ſtir up our affections, &c. And the more we ſee of them, the more we ſhall ſee, admire, and magnify the wiſdom, goodneſs, mercy, and love of God, in the work of our redemption. This will oblige us to ſearch and ſtudy the ſcripture, wherein it is contained and laid open to us.

ALL that we find in the revelation of the "new teſtament," being the declared will and mind of our Lord and Maſter, the Meſſiah, whom we have taken to be our king, we are bound to receive as right and truth, or elſe we are not his ſubjects, we do not believe him to be the Meſſiah, our King, but caſt him off, and with the Jews ſay, "We will not have this man reign over us." But it is ſtill what we find in the ſcripture, not in this or that ſyſtem; what we, ſincerely ſeeking to know the will of our Lord, diſcover to be his mind. Where it is ſpoken plainly, we cannot miſs it; and it is evident he requires our aſſent: where there is obſcurity, either in the expreſſions themſelves, or by reaſon of the ſeeming contrariety of other paſſages, there a fair endeavour, as much as our circumſtances will permit, ſecures us from a guilty diſobedience to his will, or a ſinful error in faith, which way ſoever our enquiry reſolves the doubt, or perhaps, leaves it unreſolved. If he had required more of us, in thoſe points, he would have declared his will plainer to us, and diſcovered the truth contained in thoſe obſcure, or ſeemingly contradictory places, as clearly, and as uniformly as he did that fundamental article, that we were to believe him to be the Meſſiah, our King.

As men, we have God for our King, and are under the law of reaſon: as chriſtians, we have Jeſus the Meſſiah for our King, and are under the law revealed by him in the goſpel. And though every chriſtian, both as a deiſt and a chriſtian, be obliged to ſtudy both the law of nature and the revealed law, that in them he may know the will of God, and of Jeſus Chriſt, whom he hath ſent; yet, in neither of theſe laws, is there to be found a ſelect ſet of fundamentals, diſtinct from the reſt, which are to make him a deiſt, or a chriſtian. But he that believes one eternal, inviſible God, his Lord and King, ceaſes thereby to be an atheiſt; and he that believes Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, his King, ordained by God, thereby becomes a chriſtian, is deliver'd from the power of darkneſs, and is tranſlated into the kingdom of the Son of God, is actually within the covenant of grace, and has that faith, which ſhall be imputed to him for righteouſneſs; and, if he continues in his allegiance to this his King, ſhall receive the reward, eternal life.

He that conſiders this, will not be ſo hot as the unmaſker, to contend for a number of fundamental articles, all neceſſary, every one of them to be explicitly believed, by every one, for ſalvation, without knowing them himſelf, or being able to enumerate them to another. Can there be any thing more abſurd, than to ſay, there are ſeveral fundamental articles, each of which every man muſt explicitly believe, upon pain of damnation, and yet not be able to ſay, which they be? The unmaſker has ſet down no ſmall number; but yet dares not ſay, theſe are all. On the contrary, he has plainly confeſſed there are more; but will not, i. e. cannot tell what they are, that remain behind: Nay, has given a general deſcription of his fundamental articles, by which it is not evident, but there may be ten times as many as thoſe he had named; and amongſt them (if he durſt, or could name them) probably ſeveral, that many a good chriſtian, who died in the faith, and is now in heaven, never once thought of; and others, which many, of as good authority as he, would, from their different ſyſtems, certainly deny and contradict.

This, as great an abſurdity as it is, cannot be otherwiſe, whilſt men will take upon them to alter the terms of the goſpel; and when it is evident, that our Saviour and his apoſtles received men into the church, and pronounced them believers, for taking him to be the Meſſiah, their King and Deliverer, ſent by God, have the boldneſs to ſay, "this is not enough." But, when you would know of them, what then is enough, they cannot tell you: the reaſon whereof is viſible, viz. becauſe, they being able to produce no other reaſon for their collection of fundamental articles, to prove them neceſſary to be believed, but becauſe they are of divine authority, and contained in the holy ſcriptures; and are, as the unmaſker ſays, "writ there on purpoſe to be believed," they know not where to ſtop, when they have once begun: thoſe texts that they leave out, or from which they deduce none of their fundamentals, being of the ſame divine authority, and ſo upon that account equally fundamental, with what they cull'd out, though not ſo well ſuited to their particular ſyſtems.

Hence come thoſe endleſs and unreaſonable contentions about fundamentals, whilſt each cenſures the defect, redundancy, or falſhood of what others require, as neceſſary to be believed: and yet he himſelf gives not a catalogue of his own fundamentals, which he will ſay is ſufficient and compleat. Nor is it to be wondered; ſince, in this way, it is impoſſible to ſtop ſhort of putting every propoſition, divinely revealed, into the liſt of fundamentals; all of them being of divine, and ſo of equal authority; and, upon that account, equally neceſſary to be believed, by every one, that is a chriſtian, though they are not all neceſſary to be believed, to make any one a chriſtian. For the new teſtament, containing the laws of the Meſſiah's kingdom, in regard of all the actions, both of mind and body, of all his ſubjects; every chriſtian is bound, by his allegiance to him, to believe all that he ſays in it to be true; as well as to aſſent, that all he commands in it is juſt and good: and what negligence, perverſeneſs, or guilt there is, in his miſtaking in the one, or failing in his obedience to the other, that this righteous judge of all men, who cannot be deceived, will at the laſt day lay open, and reward accordingly.

'TIS no wonder, therefore, there have been ſuch fierce conteſts, and ſuch cruel havock made amongſt chriſtians about fundamentals; whilſt every one would ſet up his ſyſtem, upon pain of fire and faggot in this, and hell-fire in the other world. Though, at the ſame time, whilſt he is exerciſing the utmoſt barbarities againſt others, to prove himſelf a true chriſtian, he profeſſes himſelf ſo ignorant, that he cannot tell, or ſo uncharitable, that he will not tell, what articles are abſolutely neceſſary and ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian. If there be any ſuch fundamentals, as 'tis certain there are, 'tis as certain they muſt be very plain. Why then, does every one urge and make a ſtir about fundamentals, and nobody give a liſt of them? But becauſe (as I have ſaid) upon the uſual grounds, they cannot: for I will be bold to ſay, that every one, who conſiders the matter, will ſee, that either only the article of his being the Meſſiah their King, which alone our Saviour and his apoſtles preached to the unconverted world, and received thoſe that believed it into the church, is the only neceſſary article to be believed by a theiſt, to make him a chriſtian; or elſe, that all the truths, contained in the new teſtament, are neceſſary articles to be believed to make a man a chriſtian: and that between theſe two, it is impoſſible any where to ſtand; the reaſon whereof is plain. Becauſe, either the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, i. e. the taking him to be our King, makes us ſubjects and denizons of his kingdom, that is, chriſtians: or elſe an explicit knowledge of, and actual obedience to the laws of his kingdom, is what is required to make us ſubjects; which, I think, is what was never ſaid of any other kingdom. For a man muſt be a ſubject, before he is bound to obey.

LET us ſuppoſe, it will be ſaid here, that an obedience to the laws of Chriſt's kingdom, is what is neceſſary to make us ſubjects of it, without which we cannot be admitted into it, i. e. be chriſtians: and if ſo, this obedience muſt be univerſal; I mean, it muſt be the ſame ſort of obedience to all the laws of this kingdom: which, ſince nobody ſays is, in any one ſuch, as is wholly free from error, or frailty, this obedience can only lie in a ſincere diſpoſition and purpoſe of mind, to obey every one of the laws of the Meſſiah, delivered in the new teſtament, to the utmoſt of our power. Now, believing right being one part of that obedience, as well as acting right, is the other part, the obedience of aſſent muſt be implicitly to all that is delivered there, that it is true. But, foraſmuch as the particular acts of an explicit aſſent, cannot go any farther than his underſtanding, who is to aſſent; what he underſtands to be the truth, delivered by our Saviour, or the apoſtles commiſſioned by him, and aſſiſted by his Spirit, that he muſt neceſſarily believe: it becomes a fundamental article to him, and he cannot refuſe his aſſent to it, without renouncing his allegiance. For he that denies any of the doctrines that Chriſt has delivered, to be true, denies him to be ſent from God, and conſequently to be the Meſſiah; and ſo ceaſes to be a chriſtian. From whence it is evident, that if any more be neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, than the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and thereby taking him for our King, it cannot be any ſet bundle of fundamentals, culled out of the ſcripture, with an omiſſion of the reſt, according as beſt ſuits any one's fancy, ſyſtem, or intereſt: but it muſt be an explicit belief of all thoſe propoſitions, which he, according to the beſt of his underſtanding, really apprehends to be contained, and meant in the ſcripture; and an implicit belief of all the reſt, which he is ready to believe, as ſoon as it ſhall pleaſe God, upon his uſe of the means, to enlighten him, and make them clear to his underſtanding. So that in effect, almoſt every particular man in this ſenſe has, or may have a diſtinct catologue of fundamentals, each whereof it is neceſſary for him explicitly to believe, now that he is a chriſtian; whereof, if he ſhould diſbelieve, or deny any one, he would caſt off his allegiance, disfranchiſe himſelf, and be no longer a ſubject of Chriſt's kingdom. But, in this ſenſe, nobody can tell what is fundamental to another, what is neceſſary for another man to believe. This catalogue of fundamentals, every one alone can make for himſelf: nobody can fix it for him; nobody can collect or preſcribe it to another: but this is, according as God has dealt, to every one, the meaſure of light and faith; and has opened each man's underſtanding, that he may underſtand the ſcriptures. Whoever has uſed what means he is capable of, for the informing of himſelf, with a readineſs to believe and obey what ſhall be taught and preſcribed by Jeſus, his Lord and King, is a true and faithful ſubject of Chriſt's kingdom; and cannot be thought to fail in any thing neceſſary to ſalvation.

Supposing a man and his wife, barely by ſeeing the wonderful things that Moſes did, ſhould have been perſuaded to put themſelves under his government; or by reading his law, and liking it; or by any other motive, had been prevailed on, ſincerely to take him for their ruler and law-giver; and accordingly (renouncing their former idolatry and heatheniſh pollutions) in token thereof had, by baptiſm and circumciſion, the initiating ceremonies, ſolemnly entered themſelves into that communion, under the law of Moſes: had they not, thereby, been made denizons of the commonwealth of Iſrael, and inveſted with all the privileges and prerogatives of true children of Abraham, leaving to their poſterity, a right to their ſhare in the promiſed land, though they had died before they had performed any other act of obedience to that law; nay, though they had not known whoſe ſon Moſes was, nor how he had delivered the children of Iſrael out of Egypt, nor whither he was leading them? I do not ſay, it is likely they ſhould be ſo far ignorant. But, whether they were, or no, 'twas enough, that they took him for their prince and ruler, with a purpoſe to obey him, to ſubmit themſelves entirely to his commands and conduct; and did nothing afterwards, whereby they diſowned or rejected his authority over them. In that reſpect, none of his laws were greater or more neceſſary to be ſubmitted to, one than another, though the matter of one might be of much greater conſequence, than of another. But a diſobedience to any law of the leaſt conſequence, if it carry with it a diſowning of the authority that made it, forfeits all, and cuts off ſuch an offender from that commonwealth, and all the privileges of it.

This is the caſe, in reſpect of other matters of faith, to thoſe who believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and take him to be their King, ſent from God, and ſo are already chriſtians. 'Tis not the opinion, that any one may have, of the weightineſs of the matter, (if they are, without their own fault, ignorant that our Saviour had revealed it) that ſhall disfranchiſe them, and make them forfeit their intereſt in his kingdom: they may ſtill be good ſubjects, though they do not believe a great many things, which creed-makers may think neceſſary to be believed. That which is required of them, is a ſincere endeavour to know his mind, declared in the goſpel, and an explicit belief of all, that they underſtand to be ſo. Not to believe what he has revealed, whether in a lighter, or more weighty matter, calls his veracity in queſtion, deſtroys his miſſion, denies his authority, and is a flat diſowning him to be the Meſſiah, and ſo overturns that fundamental and neceſſary article whereby a man is a chriſtian. But this cannot be done by a man's ignorance, or unwilful miſtake of any of the truths publiſhed by our Saviour himſelf, or his authorized and inſpired miniſters, in the new teſtament, Whilſt a man knows not that it was his will or meaning, his allegiance is ſafe, though he believe the contrary.

If this were not ſo, it is impoſſible that any one ſhould be a chriſtian. For, in ſome things we are ignorant, and err all, not knowing the ſcriptures. For the holy inſpired writings, being all of the ſame divine authority, muſt all equally in every article be fundamental, and neceſſary to be believed; if that be a reaſon, that makes any one propoſition in it, neceſſary to be believed. But the law of faith, the covenant of the goſpel, being a covenant of grace, and not of natural right, or debt; nothing can be abſolutely neceſſary to be believed, but what, by this new law of faith, God of his good pleaſure hath made to be ſo. And this, 'tis plain, by the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, to all that believed not already in him, was only the believing the only true God, and Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, whom he hath ſent. The performance of this puts a man within the covenant, and is that, which God will impute to him for righteouſneſs. All the other acts of aſſent to other truths, taught by our Saviour, and his apoſtles, are not what make a man a chriſtian; but are neceſſary acts of obedience to be performed by one, who is a chriſtian; and therefore, being a chriſtian, ought to live by the laws of Chriſt's kingdom.

Nor are we without ſome glimpſe of light, why it hath pleaſed God of his grace, that the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, ſhould be that faith which he would impute to men for righteouſneſs. 'Tis evident from ſcripture, that our Saviour deſpiſed the ſhame and endured the croſs for the joy ſet before him; which joy, 'tis alſo plain, was a kingdom. But, in this kingdom, which his Father had appointed to him, he could have none but voluntary ſubjects; ſuch as leaving the kingdom of darkneſs, and of the prince of this world, with all the pleaſures, pomps and vanities thereof, would put themſelves under his dominion, and tranſlate themſelves into his kingdom: which they did, by believing and owning him to be the Meſſiah their King, and thereby taking him to rule over them. For the faith for which God juſtifieth, is not an empty ſpeculation, but a faith joined with repentance, and working by love. And for this, which was in effect, to turn to God himſelf, and to their natural allegiance due to him, and to advance, as much as lay in them, the glory of the kingdom, which he had promiſed his Son; God was pleaſed to declare, he would accept them, receive them to grace, and blot out all their former tranſgreſſions.

THIS is evidently the covenant of grace, as delivered in the ſcriptures: and if this be not, I deſire any one to tell me what it is, and what are the terms of it. 'Tis a law of faith, whereby God has promiſed to forgive all our ſins, upon our repentance, and believing ſomething; and to impute that faith to us for righteouſneſs. Now I aſk, what 'tis by the law of faith, we are required to believe? For 'till that be known, the law of faith is not diſtinctly known; nor the terms of the covenant, upon which the All-merciful God graciouſly offers us ſalvation. And, if any one will ſay, this is not known, nay, is not eaſily, and certainly to be known under the goſpel, I deſire him to tell me, what the greateſt enemies of Chriſtianity can ſay worſe againſt it? For a way propoſed to ſalvation, that does not certainly lead thither, or is propoſed, ſo as not to be known, are very little different as to their conſequence; and mankind would be left to wander in darkneſs and uncertainty, with the one as well as the other.

I DO not write this for controverſy's ſake; for had I minded victory, I would not have given the unmaſker this new matter of exception. I know whatever is ſaid, he muſt be bawling for his faſhionable and profitable orthodoxy, and cry out againſt this too, which I have here added, as ſocinianiſm, and caſt that name upon all that differs from what is held by thoſe, he would recommend his zeal to in writing. I call it bawling, for whether what he has ſaid be reaſoning, I ſhall refer to thoſe of his own brotherhood, if he be of any brotherhood, and there be any that will join with him in his ſet of fundamentals, when his creed is made.

HAD I minded nothing but how to deal with him, I had tied him up ſhort to his liſt of fundamentals, without affording him topicks of declaiming, againſt what I have here ſaid. But I have enlarged on this point, for the ſake of ſuch readers, who, with a love of truth, read books of this kind, and endeavour to inform themſelves in the things of their everlaſting concerment: it being of greater conſideration with me, to give any light and ſatisfaction to one ſingle perſon, who is really concerned to underſtand, and be convinced of the religion he profeſſes, than what a thouſand faſhionable, or titular profeſſors of any ſort of orthodoxy ſhall ſay, or think of me, for not doing as they do; i. e. for not ſaying after others, without underſtanding what is ſaid, or upon what grounds, or caring to underſtand it.

LET us now conſider his argument, to prove the articles he has given us to be fundamentals. In his "thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," pag. 119. he argues from 1 Tim. iii. 16. where, he ſays, "Chriſtianity is called a myſte-"ry; that all things in Chriſtianity are not plain, and exactly level to every "common apprehenſion; that every thing in Chriſtianity is not clear, and in-"telligible and comprehenſible by the weakeſt noddle." Let us take this for proved, as much as he pleaſes; and then let us ſee the force of this ſubtile diſputant's argument, for the neceſſity there is, that every Chriſtian man ſhould believe thoſe, which he has given us for fundamental articles, out of the epiſtles. The reaſon of that obligation, and the neceſſity of every man and woman's believing them, he has laid in this, that they are to be found in the epiſtles, or in the bible. This argument for them we have, over and over again, in his "ſo-

" cinianiſm unmaſk'd," is here. p. 9. thus: " Are they ſet down to no purpoſe, " in theſe inſpired epiſtles? Why did the apoſtles write theſe doctrines, was it " not, that thoſe they writ to, might give their aſſent to them?" p. 22. " They are in our bibles, for that very purpoſe, to be believed." p. 25. Now I aſk, Can any one more directly invalidate all he ſays here, for the neceſſity of believing his articles? Can any one more apparently write booty, than by ſaying, that " theſe his doctrines, theſe his fundamental articles" (which are, after his faſhion, ſet down between the 8th and 20th pages of this his firſt chapter) are of neceſſity to be believed by every one, before he can be a Chriſtian, becauſe they are in the epiſtles and in the bible; and yet affirm, that in Chriſtianity, i. e. in the epiſtles and in the bible; there are myſteries, there are things " not plain, " not clear, not intelligible to common apprehenſions?" If his articles, ſome of which contain myſteries, are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian, becauſe they are in the bible; then, according to this rule, it is neceſſary for many men to believe, what is not intelligible to them; what their noddles cannot apprehend, (as the unmaſker is pleaſed to turn the ſuppoſition of vulgar people's underſtanding the fundamentals of their religion, into ridicule) i. e. it is neceſſary for many men to do, what is impoſſible for them to do, before they can be Chriſtians. But if there be ſeveral things in the bible, and in the epiſtles, that it is not neceſſary for men to believe, to make them Chriſtians; then all the unmaſker's arguments, upon their being in the epiſtles, is no proof, that all his articles are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian, becauſe they are ſet down in the epiſtles: much leſs, becauſe he thinks they may be drawn, according to his ſyſtem, out of what is ſet down in the epiſtles. Let him, therefore, either confeſs theſe and the like queſtions, " Why did the apoſtles write theſe? Was " it not, that thoſe they writ to, might give their aſſent to them? Why ſhould " not every one of theſe evangelical truths, be believed and embraced? They " are, in our bibles, for that very purpoſe;" and the like, to be impertinent and ridiculous. Let him ceaſe to propoſe them with ſo much oſtentation, for they can ſerve only to miſlead unwary readers: or let him unſay what he has ſaid, of things " not plain to common apprehenſions, not clear and intelligible." Let him recant what he has ſaid of myſteries in Chriſtianity. For I aſk, with him, p. 8. " Where can we be informed, but in the ſacred and inſpired writings?" It is ridiculous to urge, that any thing is neceſſary to be explicitly believed, to make a man a Chriſtian, becauſe it is writ in the epiſtles, and in the bible; unleſs he confeſs that there is no myſtery, nothing not plain, nor intelligible to vulgar underſtanding, in the epiſtles, or in the bible.

This is ſo evident, that the unmaſker himſelf, who, p. 119. of his " thoughts " concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," thought it ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that the vulgar ſhould underſtand Chriſtianity, is here of another mind: and p. 30. ſays of his evangelical doctrines and articles, neceſſary to be aſſented to, that they are intelligible and plain; there is no " ambiguity and doubtfulneſs in them; they " ſhine with their own light, and to an unprejudiced eye, are plain, evident " and illuſtrious."

To draw the unmaſker out of the clouds, and prevent his hiding himſelf in the doubtfulneſs of his expreſſions, I ſhall deſire him to ſay directly, whether the articles, which are neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a Chriſtian, and particularly thoſe he has ſet down for ſuch, are all plain and intelligible, and ſuch as may be underſtood and comprehended (I will not ſay in the unmaſker's ridiculous way, by the weakeſt noddles, but) by every illiterate countryman and woman, capable of church-communion?

If he ſays, Yes; then all myſteries are excluded out of his articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian. For that which can be comprehended by every day-labourer, every poor ſpinſter, that is a member of the church, cannot be a myſtery. And, if what ſuch illiterate people cannot underſtand, be required to be believed to make them Chriſtians, the greateſt part of mankind are ſhut out from being Chriſtians.

But the unmaſker has provided an anſwer, in theſe words, p. 31. " There " is," ſays he, " a difficulty in the doctrine of the trinity, and ſeveral truths of

“ the goſpel, as to the exact manner of the things themſelves, which we ſhall
“ never be able to comprehend, at leaſt on this ſide of heaven: but there is no
“ difficulty as to the reality and certainty of them, becauſe we know they are
“ revealed to us by God in the holy ſcriptures.”

WHICH anſwer of “ difficulty in the manner,” and no “ difficulty in the “ reality,” having the appearance of a diſtinction, looks like learning; but when it comes to be applied to the caſe in hand, will ſcarce afford us ſenſe.

THE queſtion is about a propoſition to be believed, which muſt firſt neceſſarily be underſtood. For a man cannot poſſibly give his aſſent to any affirmation or negation, unleſs he underſtand the terms as they are join'd in that propoſition, and has a conception of the thing affirmed or denied, and alſo a conception of the thing, concerning which it is affirmed or denied, as they are there put together. But let the propoſition be what it will, there is no more to be underſtood, than is expreſſed in the terms of that propoſition. If it be a propoſition concerning a matter of fact, 'tis enough to conceive, and believe the matter of fact. If it be a propoſition concerning the manner of the fact, the manner of the fact muſt alſo be believed, as 'tis intelligibly expreſſed in that propoſition; v. g. ſhould this propoſition νεκροὶ ἐγείρονται, be offer'd as an article of faith, to an illiterate countryman of England, he could not believe it: becauſe, though a true propoſition, yet it being propoſed in words, whoſe meaning he underſtood not, he could not give any aſſent to it. Put into Engliſh, he underſtands what is meant by the “ dead ſhall riſe.” For he can conceive, that the ſame man, who was dead and ſenſeleſs, ſhould be alive again; as well as he can, that the ſame man, who is now in a lethargy, ſhould awake again; or the ſame man that is now out of his ſight, and he knows not whether he be alive or dead, ſhould return and be with him again: and ſo he is capable of believing it, though he conceives nothing of the manner, how a man revives, wakes, or moves. But none of theſe manners of thoſe actions being included in thoſe propoſitions, the propoſition concerning the matter of fact (if it imply no contradiction in it) may be believed; and ſo all that is required may be done, whatever difficulty may be, as to the exact manner, how it is brought about.

BUT where the propoſition is about the manner, the belief too muſt be of the manner, v. g. the article is, “ The dead ſhall be raiſed with ſpiritual bo-“ dies:” and then the belief muſt be as well of this manner of the fact, as of the fact itſelf. So that what is ſaid here, by the unmaſker, about the manner, ſignifies nothing at all in the caſe. What is underſtood to be expreſſed in each propoſition, whether it be of the manner, or not of the manner, is (by its being a revelation from God) to be believed, as far as it is underſtood: but no more is required to be believed concerning any article, than is contained in that article.

WHAT the unmaſker, for the removing of difficulties, adds farther, in theſe words, “ But there is no difficulty as to the reality and certainty of the truths of “ the goſpel; becauſe we know, they are revealed to us by God, in the holy “ ſcripture;” is yet farther from ſignifying any thing to the purpoſe, than the former. The queſtion is about underſtanding; and, in what ſenſe they are underſtood, believing ſeveral propoſitions, or articles of faith, which are to be found in the ſcripture. To this, the unmaſker ſays, there can be “ no difficulty at all “ as to their reality and certainty; becauſe they are revealed by God.” Which amounts to no more but this, that there is no difficulty at all in the underſtanding and believing this propoſition, “ that whatever is revealed by God, is really “ and certainly true.” But is the underſtanding and believing this ſingle propoſition, the underſtanding and believing all the articles of faith neceſſary to be believed? Is this all the explicit faith a chriſtian need have? If ſo, then a Chriſtian need explicitly believe no more, but this one propoſition, viz. That all the propoſitions between the two covers of his bible, are certainly true. But I imagine the unmaſker will not think the believing this one propoſition, is a ſufficient belief of all thoſe fundamental articles, which he has given us, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian. For, it that will ſerve the turn, I conclude he may make his ſet of fundamentals as large and expreſs to his ſyſtem as he pleaſes: calviniſts, arminians, anabaptiſts, ſocinians, will all thus own the belief of them, viz. that all that God has revealed in the ſcripture, is really and certainly true.

But if believing this propoſition, that all that is revealed by God in the ſcripture is true, be not all the faith which the unmaſker requires, what he ſays about the reality and certainty of all truths revealed by God, removes nothing of the difficulty. A propoſition of divine authority is found in the ſcripture: 'tis agreed preſently between him and me, that it contains a real, certain truth: but the difficulty is, what is the truth it contains, to which he and I muſt aſſent; v. g. the profeſſion of faith made by the eunuch, in theſe words, "Jeſus Chriſt "is the Son of God," upon which he was admitted into the church, as a chriſtian, I believe, contains a "real and certain truth." Is that enough? No, ſays the unmaſker, p. 87, it "includes in it, that Chriſt was God;" and therefore it is not enough for me to believe, that theſe words contain a real certain truth: but I muſt believe, they contain this truth, that Jeſus Chriſt is God; that the eunuch ſpoke them in that ſenſe, and in that ſenſe I muſt aſſent to them: whereas they appear to me to be ſpoken, and meant here, as well as in ſeveral other places of the "new teſtament," in this ſenſe, viz. "That Jeſus Chriſt is "the Meſſiah," and in that ſenſe, in this place, I aſſent to them. The meaning, then, of theſe words, as ſpoken by the eunuch, is the difficulty: and I deſire the unmaſker, by the application of what he has ſaid here, to remove that difficulty. For granting all revelation from God to be really and certainly true (as certainly it is) how does the believing that general truth remove any difficulty, about the ſenſe and interpretation of any particular propoſition, found in any paſſage of the holy ſcriptures? Or is it poſſible for any man to underſtand it in one ſenſe, and believe it in another; becauſe it is a divine revelation, that has reality and certainty in it? Thus much, as to what the unmaſker ſays, of the fundamentals he has given us, p. 30, viz. That "no true lover of God and "truth, need doubt of any of them: for there is no ambiguity and doubtful"neſs in them." If the diſtinction he has uſed, "of difficulty as to the ex"act manner, and no difficulty, as to the reality and certainty of goſpel-truths," will remove all "ambiguity and undoubtfulneſs from all thoſe texts of ſcripture, from whence he and others deduce fundamental articles, ſo that they will be "plain and intelligible" to every man, in the ſenſe he underſtands them; he has done great ſervice to chriſtianity.

But he ſeems to diſtruſt that himſelf, in the following words: "They ſhine," ſays he, "with their own light, and, to an unprejudiced eye, are plain, evident, "and illuſtrious; and they would always continue ſo, if ſome ill-minded men did "not perplex and entangle them." I ſee the matter would go very ſmooth, if the unmaſker might be the ſole, authentick interpreter of ſcripture. He is wiſely of that judge's mind, who was againſt hearing the counſel on the other ſide, becauſe they always perplexed the cauſe.

But if thoſe who differ from the unmaſker, ſhall in their turns call him the "prejudiced and ill-minded man," who perplexes theſe matters (as they may, with as much authority as he) we are but where we were; each muſt underſtand for himſelf, the beſt he can, 'till the unmaſker be received, as the only unprejudiced man, to whoſe dictates every one, without examination, is with an implicit faith to ſubmit.

Here again, p. 32. the unmaſker puts upon me, what I never ſaid: and therefore I muſt deſire him to ſhew, where it is, that I pretend,

XI. That this "propoſition," that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, "is more intelligible, than any of thoſe he has named."

In his "thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," p. 120. he argues, that this propoſition [Jeſus is the Meſſiah] has more difficulty in it, than the article of the holy trinity. And his proofs are worthy of an unmaſker. "For," ſays he, "here is an Hebrew word firſt to be explained; or (as he has this ſtrong argument again, "ſocinianiſm unmaſked, p. 32.") "Here firſt the name Jeſus, which is of Hebrew extraction, tho' ſince greciz'd, muſt be expounded.

ANSW. Jeſus being a proper name, only denoting a certain perſon, needs not to be expounded, of what extraction ſoever it be. Is this propoſition, Jonathan was the ſon of Saul, king of Iſrael, any thing the harder, becauſe the three proper names in it, Jonathan, Saul and Iſrael, are of Hebrew extraction? And is it not as eaſy, and as "level to the underſtanding of the vulgar," as this, Arthur was the ſon of Henry, king of England, though neither of theſe names be of Hebrew extraction? Or cannot any vulgar capacity underſtand this propoſition, "John Edwards writ a book, intituled," ſocinianiſm unmaſked; 'till the name John, which is of Hebrew extraction, be explained to him? If this be ſo, parents were beſt beware, how hereafter they give their children ſcripture-names, if they cannot underſtand what they ſay to one another about them, 'till theſe names of Hebrew extraction are expounded to them; and every propoſition, that is in writings and contracts, made concerning perſons, that have names of Hebrew extraction, become thereby as hard to be underſtood, as the doctrine of the holy trinity.

HIS next argument is juſt of the ſame ſize. The word Meſſias muſt, he ſays, be explained too. Of what extraction ſoever it be, there needs no more explication of it, than what our Engliſh bible gives of it, where it is plain to any vulgar capacity, that it was uſed to denote that King and Deliverer, whom God had promiſed. So that this propoſition, "Jeſus is the Meſſiah," has no more difficulty in it, than this, Jeſus is the promiſed King and Deliverer; or than this, Cyrus was king and deliverer of Perſia: which, I think, requires not much depth of Hebrew to be underſtood. He that underſtood this propoſition, and took Cyrus for his king, was a ſubject and a member of his kingdom; and he that underſtands the other, and takes Jeſus to be his King, is his ſubject, and a member of his kingdom. But if this be as hard as it is to ſome men, to underſtand the doctrine of the trinity, I fear many of the kings in the world have but few true ſubjects. To believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, is (as he has been told, over and over again) to take him for our King and Ruler, promiſed and ſent by God, This is that, which will make any one from a Jew, or heathen, to be a chriſtian. In this ſenſe it is very intelligible to vulgar capacities. Thoſe who ſo underſtand and believe it, are ſo far from "pronouncing theſe words as "a ſpell," (as the unmaſker ridiculouſly ſuggeſts, p. 33.) that they, thereby, become chriſtians.

BUT what if I tell the unmaſker, that there is one Mr. Edwards, who (when he ſpeaks his mind without conſidering how it will make for, or againſt him) in another place, thinks this propoſition, "Jeſus is the Meſſias," very eaſy and intelligible? To convince him of it, I ſhall deſire him to turn to the 74th page of his "ſocinianiſm unmaſked," where he will find, that Mr. Edwards, without any great ſearch into Hebrew extractions, interprets "Jeſus the Meſſiah," to ſignify this, "That Jeſus of Nazareth was that eminent and extraordinary perſon, "propheſied of long before, and that he was ſent and commiſſioned by God: which, I think, is no very hard propoſition to be underſtood. But it is no ſtrange thing, that that, which was very eaſy to an unmaſker, in one place, ſhould be terrible hard in another; where want of ſomething better requires to have it ſo.

ANOTHER argument, that he uſes, to prove the articles, he has given us to be neceſſary to ſalvation, p. 22. is, becauſe they are doctrines which contain things, that in their nature have an "immediate reſpect to the occaſion, author, "way, end, means, and iſſue of men's redemption and ſalvation." And here I deſire him to prove,

XII. THAT every one of his articles contains things ſo immediately relating to the "occaſion, author, way, means, and iſſue of our redemption and "ſalvation, that nobody can be ſaved, without underſtanding the texts from "whence he draws them, in the very ſame ſenſe that he does; and explicitly believing all theſe propoſitions that he has deduced, and all that he "will deduce from ſcripture, when he ſhall pleaſe to complete his creed."

PAGE 23. He ſays of his fundamentals, "Not without good reaſon, THEREFORE, I called them eſſential and integral parts of our chriſtian and evangelical faith: and why the vindicator fleers at theſe terms, p. 593. I know no "reaſon, but that he cannot confute the application of them."

ANSW. One would think by the word, Therefore, which he uſes here, that in the precedent paragraph, he had produced ſome reaſon to juſtify his ridiculous uſe of thoſe terms, in his "thoughts concerning atheiſm, p. 111. But nothing therein will be found tending to it. Indeed, the foregoing paragraph begins with theſe words, "Thus I have briefly ſet before the reader thoſe evangelical truths, thoſe chriſtian principles, which belong to the very eſſence of "chriſtianity." Amongſt theſe, there is the word Eſſence: but that from thence, or any thing elſe in that paragraph, the uumaſker could, with good ſenſe, or any ſenſe at all, infer, as he does, "not without good reaſon, THEREFORE I called them the ESSENTIAL and INTEGRAL parts of our chriſtian and "evangelical faith;" requires an extraordinary ſort of logick to make out. What, I beſeech you, is your good reaſon too, here, upon which you infer, "Therefore," &c? For it is impoſſible for any one, but an unmaſker, to find one word, juſtifying his uſe of the terms eſſential and integral. But it would be a great reſtraint to the running of the unmaſker's pen, if you ſhould not allow him the free uſe of illative particles, where there are no premiſes to ſupport them: and if you ſhould not take affirmations without proof, for reaſoning, you at once ſtrike off above three quarters of his book, and he will often, for ſeveral pages together, have nothing to ſay. As for example, from p. 28. to p. 35.

BUT to ſhew, that I did not, without reaſon, ſay, his uſe of the terms eſſential and integral, in the place before quoted, was ridiculous; I muſt mind my reader, that p. 109. of his "thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," he having ſaid, that "the epiſtolary writings are fraught with other fundamentals, beſides that one which I mention;" and then having ſet them down, he cloſes his catalogue of them thus: "Theſe are matters of faith contained in "the epiſtles, and they are eſſential and integral parts of the goſpel itſelf," p. 111. Now what could be more ridiculous, than, where the queſtion is about fundamental doctrines, which are the eſſentials of chriſtian religion, without an aſſent to which, a man cannot be a chriſtian; and ſo he himſelf calls them, p. 21. of his "ſocinianiſm unmaſked;" that he ſhould cloſe the liſt he had made of fundamental doctrines, i. e. eſſential points of the chriſtian religion; with telling his reader, "Theſe are eſſential and integral parts of the goſpel itſelf?" i. e. Theſe, which I have given you for fundamental, for eſſential doctrines of the goſpel, are the fundamental and not fundamental, eſſential and not eſſential parts of the goſpel mixed together. For integral parts, in all the writers I have met with, beſides the unmaſker, are contradiſtinguiſhed to eſſential; and ſignify ſuch parts, as the thing can be without, but without them will not be ſo complete and intire, as with them. Juſt ſuch an acuteneſs, as our unmaſker, would any one ſhew, who taking upon him to ſet down the parts eſſential to a man, without the having of which, he could not be a man, ſhould name the ſoul, the head, the heart, lungs, ſtomach, liver, ſpleen, eyes, ears, tongue, arms, legs, hair and nails; and, to make all ſure, ſhould conclude with theſe words; "Theſe are parts contained" in a man, "and are eſſential and integral parts of "a man himſelf;" i. e. They are parts, without ſome of which he cannot be a man; and others, which though they make the man intire, yet he may be a man without them: as a man ceaſes not to be a man, though he wants a nail, a finger, or an arm, which are integral parts of a man. "Riſum teneatis?" If the unmaſker can make any better ſenſe of his "eſſential and integral parts "of the goſpel itſelf," I will aſk his pardon for my laughing: 'till then he muſt not be angry, if the reader and I laugh too. Beſides, I muſt tell him, that thoſe, which he has ſet down, are not the "integral parts of the chriſtian "faith," any more than the head, the trunk, and the arms, hands and thighs are the integral parts of a man: for a man is not intire without the legs and feet too. They are ſome of the integral parts indeed; but cannot be called the integral parts, where any, that go to make up the whole man, are left out: nor thoſe the integral, but ſome of the integral parts of the chriſtian faith, out of which any of the doctrines, propoſed in the "new teſtament," are omitted: for whatever is there propoſed, is propoſed to be believed, and ſo is a part of the chriſtian faith.

BEFORE I leave his catalogue of the "eſſential and integral parts" of the goſpel, which he has given us, inſtead of one, containing the articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, I muſt take notice of what he ſays, whilſt he is making it, p. 9. "Why then is there a treatiſe publiſhed, "to tell the world, that the bare belief of a Meſſiah, is all that is required of a "chriſtian?" As if there were no difference between believing a Meſſiah, and believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah; no difference between "required of a chri-"ſtian," and required to make a man a chriſtian. As if you ſhould ſay, renouncing his former idolatry, and being circumciſed and baptized into Moſes, was all that was required to make a man an Iſraelite; therefore it was all that was required of an Iſraelite. For theſe two falſhoods has he, in this one ſhort ſentence, thought fit ſlily to father upon me, the "humble imitator of the "Jeſuits," as he is pleaſed to call me. And, therefore, I muſt deſire him to ſhew,

XIII. WHERE the "world is told, in the treatiſe that I publiſhed, That "the bare belief of a Meſſiah, is all that is required of a chriſtian?"

THE ſix next pages, i. e. from the twenty-eighth to the end of his ſecond chapter, being taken up with nothing but pulpit oratory, out of its place; and without any reply, applied, or applicable to any thing I have ſaid, in my vindication, I ſhall paſs by, 'till he ſhews any thing in them that is ſo.

IN page 36. this giant in argument, falls on me, and mauls me unmercifully, about the epiſtles. He begins thus: "The gentleman is not without his eva-"ſions, and he ſees it is high time to make uſe of them. This puts him in "ſome diſorder. For when he comes to ſpeak of my mentioning his ill treat-"ment of the epiſtles,——you may obſerve, that he begins to grow warmer "than before, Now this meek man is nettled, and one may perceive he is ſen-"ſible of the ſcandal that he hath given to good people, by his ſlighting the "epiſtolary writings of the holy apoſtles; yet he is ſo cunning as to diſguiſe his "paſſion as well as he can." Let all this impertinent and inconſiſtent ſtuff be ſo. I am angry and cannot diſguiſe it, I am cunning and would diſguiſe it, but yet the quick-ſighted unmaſker has found me out, that I am nettled. What does all this notable prologue of "hictius doctius," of a cunning man, and in effect "no cunning man, in diſorder, warmed, nettled, in a paſſion," tend to? but to ſhew, that theſe following words of mine, p. 593, of my vindication, viz. "I "require you to publiſh to the world thoſe paſſages which ſhew my contempt "of the epiſtles," are ſo full of heat and diſorder, that they need no other anſwer. But what need I, good ſir, do this, when you have done it yourſelf?" A reply, I own, very ſoft; and whether I may not ſay, very ſilly, let the reader judge, The unmaſker having accuſed me of contemning the epiſtles, my reply, in my vindication, ibid. was thus: "Sir, when your angry fit is over, and the "abatement of your paſſion has given way to the return of your ſincerity, I "ſhall beg you to read this paſſage in the 584 page of my book. Theſe holy "writers (viz. the penmen of the epiſtles) inſpired from above, writ nothing "but truth; and in moſt places very weighty truths to us now, for the ex-"pounding, clearing and confirming of the chriſtian doctrine, and eſtabliſhing "thoſe in it, who had embraced it. And again, p. 585. The other parts [i. e. "beſides the goſpels and the Acts] of DIVINE REVELATION are objects of "faith, and are ſo to be received; they are truths, of which none that is once "known to be ſuch, i. e. revealed, may, or ought to be diſbelieved. And if "this does not ſatiſfy you, that I have as high a veneration for the epiſtles as "you, or any one can have, I require you to publiſh to the world thoſe PAS-

" SAGES which ſhew my contempt of them," After ſuch direct words of mine, expreſſing my veneration for that part of divine revelation, which is contained in the epiſtles, any one but an unmaſker, would bluſh to charge me with contempt of them; without alledging, when ſummon'd to it, any word in my book to juſtify that charge.

If hardneſs of forehead were ſtrength of brains, 'twere two to one of his ſide againſt any man I ever yet heard of. I require him to publiſh to the world, thoſe paſſages, that ſhew my contempt of the epiſtles; and he anſwers me, " He need " not do it, for I have done it myſelf." Whoever had common ſenſe, would underſtand, that what I demanded was, that he ſhould ſhew the world where, amongſt all I had publiſhed, there were any paſſages that expreſſed contempt of the epiſtles: for it was not expected he ſhould quote paſſages of mine, that I had never publiſhed, And this acute unmaſker (to this) ſays, I had publiſh'd them myſelf. So that the reaſon why he cannot find them, is, becauſe I had publiſhed them myſelf. But, ſays he, " I appeal to to the reader, whether (after " your tedious collection out of the four evangeliſts) your paſſing by the epiſtles, " and neglecting wholly what the apoſtles ſay in them, be not publiſhing to the " world your contempt of them?" I demand of him to publiſh to the world thoſe paſſages, which ſhew my contempt of the epiſtles: and he anſwers, " He " need not, I have done it myſelf." How does that appear? I have paſſed by the epiſtles, ſays he. My paſſing them by then, are paſſages publiſhed againſt the epiſtles? For " publiſhing of paſſages" is what you ſaid, you " need not " do," and what " I had done." So that the paſſages I have publiſhed, containing a contempt of the epiſtles, are extant in my ſaying nothing of them? Surely this ſame paſſing by has done ſome very ſhrewd diſpleaſure to our poor unmaſker, that he ſo ſtarts whenever it is but named, and cannot think it contains leſs than excluſion, defiance, and contempt. Here, therefore, the propoſition remaining to be proved by you, is,

XIV. " THAT one cannot paſs by any thing, without contempt of it."

And when you have proved it, I ſhall then aſk you, what will become of all thoſe parts of ſcripture, all thoſe chapters and verſes, that you have paſſed by, in your collection of fundamental articles? Thoſe that you have vouchſafed to ſet down, you tell us, " are in the bible, on purpoſe to be believed." What muſt become of all the reſt, which you have omitted? Are they there not to be believed? And muſt the reader underſtand you paſſing them by, to be a publiſhing to the world your contempt of them? If ſo, you have unmaſk'd yourſelf: If not, but you may paſs by ſome parts of ſcripture, nay, whole epiſtles, as you have thoſe of St. James and St. Jude, without contempt; Why may not I, without contempt, paſs by others; but becauſe you have a liberty to do what you will, and I muſt do but what you, in your good pleaſure, will allow me? But if I aſk you, whence you have this privilege above others; you will have nothing to ſay, except it be according to your uſual ſkill in divining, that you know my heart, and the thoughts that are in it, which you find not like yours, right orthodox, and good; but always evil and perverſe, ſuch as I dare not own, but hypocritically either ſay nothing of, or declare againſt: but yet, with all my cunning, I cannot hide them from you; your all-knowing penetration always finds them out: you know them, or you gueſs at them, as is beſt for your turn, and that's as good: and then preſently I am confounded. I doubt, whether the world has ever had any two-eyed man your equal, for penetration and a quick ſight. The telling by the ſpectator's looks, what card he gueſſes, is nothing to what you can do. You take the height of an author's parts, by numbering the pages of his book; you can ſpy an hereſy in him, by his ſaying not a ſyllable of it; diſtinguiſh him from the orthodox, by his underſtanding places of ſcripture, juſt as ſeveral of the orthodox do; you can repeat by heart whole leaves of what is in his mind to ſay, before he ſpeaks a word of it; you can diſcover deſigns before they are hatched, and all the intrigues of carrying them on, by thoſe who never thought of them. All this, and more you can do, by the ſpirit of orthodoxy; or which is as certain, by your own good ſpirit of invention informing you. Is not this to be an errant conjurer?

BUT to your reply. You ſay, "After my TEDIOUS collection out of the "four evangeliſts, my paſſing by the epiſtles, and neglecting wholly what the "apoſtles ſay," &c. I wondered at firſt why you mentioned not the Acts here, as well as the four evangeliſts: for I have not, as you have in other places obſerved, been ſparing of collections out of the Acts too. But there was, it ſeems, a neceſſity here for your omitting it: for that would have ſtood too near what followed, in theſe words; and "neglecting wholly what the apoſtles ſay." For if it appeared to the reader, out of your own confeſſion, that I allowed and built upon the divine authority of what the apoſtles ſay in the Acts, he could not ſo eaſily be miſled into an opinion, that I contemned what they ſay in their epiſtles. But this is but a ſlight touch of your leger-de-main.

AND now I aſk the reader, what he will think of a miniſter of the goſpel, who cannot bear the texts of ſcripture I have produced, nor my quotations out of the four evangeliſts? This, which in his "thoughts of the cauſes of atheiſm," p. 114. was want of "vivacity and elevation of mind," want of "a vein of "ſenſe and reaſon, yea, and of elocution too;" is here, in his "ſocinianiſm "unmaſked, a "tedious collection out of the four evangeliſts." Thoſe places I have quoted, lie heavy, it ſeems, upon his ſtomach, and are too many to be got off. But it was my buſineſs not to omit one of them, that the reader might have a full view of the whole tenor of the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, to the unconverted Jews and Gentiles; and might therein ſee, what faith they were converted to, and upon their aſſent to which, they were pronounced believers, and admitted into the chriſtian church. But the unmaſker complains, there are too many of them: he thinks the goſpel, the good news of ſalvation, tedious from the mouth of our Saviour and his apoſtles: he is of opinion, that before the epiſtles were writ, and without believing preciſely what he thinks fit to cull out of them, there could be no chriſtians; and if we had nothing but the four evangeliſts, we could not be ſaved. And yet 'tis plain, that every ſingle one of the four, contains the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt; and at leaſt, they altogether contain all that is neceſſary to ſalvation. If any one doubt of this, I refer him to Mr. Chillingworth for ſatisfaction, who hath abundantly proved it.

HIS following words (were he not the ſame unmaſker all through) would be beyond parallel. "But let us hear why the vindicator did not attempt to "collect any articles out of theſe writings; he aſſigns this as one reaſon: "The "epiſtles being writ to thoſe who were already believers, it could not be ſup- "poſed that they were writ to them, to teach them fundamentals," p. 592. Vindic. "Certainly no man would have conjectured, that he would have uſed "ſuch an evaſion as this. I will ſay that for him, he goes beyond all ſurmiſes, "he is above all conjectures, he hath a faculty which no creature on earth can "ever fathom." Thus far the unmaſker, in his oratorical ſtrain. In what follows, he comes to his cloſer reaſoning, againſt what I had ſaid. His words are, "Do we not know, that the four goſpels were writ to, and for believers, as well "as unbelievers?" Anſw. I grant it. Now let us ſee your inference; therefore, what theſe holy hiſtorians recorded, that our Saviour and his apoſtles ſaid and preached to unbelievers, was ſaid and preached to believers. The diſcourſe which our Saviour had with the woman of Samaria, and her townſmen, was addreſſed to believers; becauſe St. John writ his goſpel (wherein it is recorded as a part of our Saviour's hiſtory) for believers, as well as unbelievers. St. Peter's preaching to Cornelius, and St. Paul's preaching at Antioch, at Theſſalonica, at Corinth, &c. was not to unbelievers, for their converſion; becauſe St. Luke dedicates his hiſtory of the Acts of the apoſtles to Theophilus, who was a chriſtian, as the unmaſker ſtrenuouſly proves in this paragraph. Juſt as if he ſhould ſay, that the diſcourſes which Cæſar records, he had upon ſeveral occaſions with the Gauls, were not addreſſed to the Gauls alone, but to the Romans alſo; becauſe his commentaries were writ for the Romans, as well as others: or that the ſayings of the ancient Greeks and Romans in Plutarch, were not ſpoke by them to their contemporaries only, becauſe they are recorded by him for the benefit of poſterity.

I PERUSED the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles to the unconverted world, to ſee what they taught and required to be believed, to make men chriſtians: and all theſe I ſet down, and leave the world to judge what they contained. The epiſtles, which were all written to thoſe who had embraced the faith, and were all chriſtians already, I thought would not ſo diſtinctly ſhew, what were thoſe doctrines which were abſolutely neceſſary to make men chriſtians; they being not writ to convert unbelievers, but to build up thoſe who were already believers, in their moſt holy faith. This is plainly expreſſed in the epiſtle to the Hebrews, chap. v. 11, &c. “Of whom (i. e. Chriſt) we “ have many things to ſay, and hard to be uttered, ſeeing ye are all dull of hear- “ ing. For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one “ teach you again, which be the firſt principles of the oracles of God; and are “ become ſuch as have need of milk, and not of ſtrong meat. For every one “ that uſeth milk, is unſkilful in the word of righteouſneſs; for he is a babe: “ but ſtrong meat belongeth to him that is of full age, even thoſe, who by rea- “ ſon of uſe have their ſenſes exerciſed, to diſcern both good and bad. Therefore, “ leaving the principles of the doctrine of Chriſt, let us go on unto perfection, “ not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith “ towards God, and of the doctrine of baptiſm, and of laying on of hands, “ and of the reſurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment.” Here the apoſtle ſhews, what was his deſign in writing this epiſtle, not to teach them the fundamental doctrines of the chriſtian religion, but to lead them on to more perfection; that is, to greater degrees of knowledge, of the wiſe deſign, and wonderful contrivance and carrying on of the goſpel, and the evidence of it; which he makes out in this epiſtle, by ſhewing its correſpondence with the old teſtament, and particularly with the œconomy of the Moſaical conſtitution. Here I might aſk the unmaſker, Whether thoſe many things which St. Paul tells the Hebrews, he had to ſay of Chriſt, (hard to be uttered to them, becauſe they were dull of hearing) had not an “ immediate reſpect to the occaſion, author, “ way, means, or iſſue of their redemption and ſalvation?” And therefore, “ whether they were ſuch things, without the knowledge of which they could “ not be ſaved?” as the unmaſker ſays of ſuch things, p. 23. And the like I might aſk him, concerning thoſe things which the apoſtle tells the Corinthians, 1 epiſt. chap. iii. 2. that they “ were not able to bear.” For much to the ſame purpoſe he ſpeaks to the Corinthians, epiſt. 1. chap. iii. as in the above-cited places he did to the Hebrews; “ That he, as a wiſe maſter-builder had laid “ the foundation:” and that foundation he himſelf tells us, is, “ Jeſus the Meſ- “ ſiah;” and that there is no other foundation to be laid. And that in this he laid the foundation of chriſtianity at Corinth, St. Luke records, Acts xviii. 4. in theſe words, Paul, at Corinth, “ reaſoned in the ſynagogue every ſabbath- “ day, and teſtified to the Jews, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah.” Upon which foundation, he tells them, there might be a ſuperſtructure. But that, what is built on the foundation, is not the foundation, I think I need not prove. He further tells them, that he had deſired to build upon this foundation; but withal ſays, he had fed them ’till then “ with milk, and not with meat; becauſe they “ were babes, and had not been able to bear it, neither were they yet able.” And therefore this epiſtle, we ſee, is almoſt wholly ſpent in reproofs of their miſcarriages, and in exhortations and inſtructions relating to practice; and very little ſaid in it, for the explaining any part of the great myſtery of ſalvation, contained in the goſpel.

BY theſe paſſages we may ſee, (were it not evident to common ſenſe itſelf, from the nature of things) that the deſign of theſe epiſtles was not to lay the foundations, or teach the principles of the chriſtian religion; they being writ to thoſe who had received them, and were chriſtians already. The ſame holds in all the other epiſtles; and therefore the epiſtles ſeemed not to me the propereſt parts of ſcripture to give us that foundation, diſtinct from all the ſuperſtructures built on it; becauſe in the epiſtles, the latter was the thing propoſed, rather than the former. For the main intention of the apoſtles, in writing their epiſtles, could not be to do what was done already; to lay down barely the foundations of chriſtianity, to thoſe who were chriſtians already; but to build upon it ſome farther explication of it, which either their particular circumſtances, or a general evidencing of the truth, wiſdom, excellencies, and privileges, &c. of the goſpel required. This was the reaſon that perſuaded me to take the articles of faith, abſolutely neceſſary to be received to make a man a chriſtian, only from the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles to the unconverted world, as laid down in the hiſtorical part of the new teſtament: and I thought it a good reaſon, it being paſt doubt, that they in their preachings propoſed to the unconverted, all that was neceſſary to be believed, to make them chriſtians; and alſo, that that faith, upon a profeſſion whereof any one was admitted into the church, as a believer, had all that was neceſſary in it to make him a chriſtian; becauſe, if it wanted any thing neceſſary, he had neceſſarily not been admitted: unleſs we can ſuppoſe, that any one was admitted into the chriſtian church by our Saviour and his apoſtles, who was not yet a chriſtian; or pronounced a believer, who yet wanted ſomething neceſſary to make him a believer, i. e. was a believer and not a believer, at the ſame time. But what thoſe articles were, which had been preached to thoſe, to whom the epiſtles were writ, and upon the belief whereof they had been admitted into the chriſtian church, and became, as they are called, "believers, ſaints, faithful, elect," &c. could not be collected out of the epiſtles. This, though it were my reaſon, and muſt be a reaſon to every one, who would make this inquiry; and the unmaſker quotes the place where I told him it was my reaſon; yet he, according to his never-erring illumination, flatly tells me, p. 38. that it was not; and adds, "Here then is "want of ſincerity," &c. I muſt deſire him, therefore, to prove what he ſays, pag. 38. viz.

XV. **That**, "by the ſame argument, that I would perſuade, that the fun-"damentals are not to be ſought for in the epiſtles, he can prove that they "are not to be ſought for in the goſpels and in the Acts; becauſe even theſe "were writ to thoſe that believed."

And next I deſire him to prove, what he alſo ſays in the ſame page, viz.

XVI. **That** the epiſtles being writ to thoſe that believed, was not an argu-"ment that I did make uſe of."

He tells us, p. 38. That it is the argument whereby I would perſuade: and in the very ſame page, a few lines lower, ſays, "That it is not the argument I "did make uſe of." Who, but an errant unmaſker, would contradict himſelf ſo flatly in the ſame breath? And yet, upon that, he raiſes a complaint of my "want of ſincerity."

For "want of ſincerity" in one of us, we need not go far for an inſtance. The next paragraph, p. 38,--40. affords us a groſs one of it: wherein the unmaſker argues ſtrongly, not againſt any thing I had ſaid, but againſt an untruth of his own ſetting up. Towards the latter end of the paragraph, p. 40. he has theſe words: "It is manifeſt, that the apoſtles, in their epiſtles, taught funda-"mentals; which is contrary to what this gentleman ſays, that ſuch a thing "could not be ſuppoſed." And therefore the unmaſker has taken a great deal of pains to ſhew, that there are fundamental doctrines to be found in the epiſtles; as if I had denied it. And, to lead the reader into an opinion that I had ſaid ſo, he ſets down theſe words, "could not be ſuppoſed;" as if they were my words. And ſo they are, but not to that purpoſe. And therefore he did well not to quote the page, leſt the reader, by barely turning to the place, ſhould have a clear ſight of falſhood, inſtead of that ſincerity, which he would make the reader believe, is wanting in me. My words, p. 584. "of the reaſonableneſs "of chriſtianity," are, "NOR CAN IT BE SUPPOSED, that the ſending of

" ſuch fundamentals was the reaſon of the apoſtles writing to any of them." And a little lower: " The epiſtles therefore being all written to thoſe who were " already believers and chriſtians, the occaſion and end of writing them could " not be, to inſtruct them in that which was neceſſary to make them chri-" ſtians." The thing then, that I denied, was not, that there were any fundamentals in the epiſtles. For, ibid. I have theſe expreſs words: " I do not deny, " but the great doctrines of the chriſtian faith are dropt here and there, and " ſcattered up and down in moſt of them." And therefore he might have ſpared his endeavours, in the next paragraph, to prove, that there may be fundamentals found in the epiſtles, 'till he finds ſomebody that denies it. And here again, I muſt repeat my uſual queſtion, that with this ſincere writer is ſo often neceſſary, viz.

XVII. Where it is that I ſay, " that it cannot be ſuppoſed, that there are " fundamental articles in the epiſtles?"

If he hopes to ſhift it off by the word Taught, which ſeems fallaciouſly put in; as if he meant, that there were ſome fundamental articles taught, neceſſary to be believed to make them chriſtians, in the epiſtles, which thoſe whom they were writ to, knew not before: in this ſenſe I do deny it: and then this will be the

XVIIth Proposition remaining upon him to prove, viz.

" That there are fundamental articles neceſſary to be believed to make a " man a chriſtian, taught in the epiſtles, which thoſe, whom they were " writ to, knew not before."

The former part of his next paragraph, p. 40. runs thus: " Hear another feigned ground of his omitting the epiſtles, viz. becauſe the fundamental articles are here promiſcuouſly, and without diſtinction, mixed with other truths." p. 41. " But who ſees not, that this is a mere eluſion? For on the ſame account " he might have forborn to ſearch for fundamental articles in the goſpels; for " they do not lie there together, but are diſperſed up and down. The doctri-" nal and hiſtorical parts are mixed with one another, but he pretends to ſever " them. Why then did he not make a ſeparation between the doctrines in the " epiſtles, and thoſe other matters that are treated of there? He has nothing to " reply to this, and therefore we muſt again look upon what he has ſuggeſted, " as a caſt of his ſhuffling faculty.

The argument contained in theſe words is this: A man cannot well diſtinguiſh fundamental from non-fundamental doctrines in the epiſtles, where they are promiſcuouſly mixed with non-fundamental doctrines: therefore he cannot well diſtinguiſh fundamental doctrines from others in the goſpels, and the Acts, where they are mixed with matters of fact. As if he ſhould ſay, one cannot well diſtinguiſh a batchelor of divinity from other divines, where ſeveral of them ſtand together promiſcuouſly in the ſame habit; therefore one cannot diſtinguiſh a batchelor of divinity from a Billingſgate orator, where they ſtand together in their diſtinct habits: or that it is as eaſy to diſtinguiſh fine gold, from that of a little lower allay, where ſeveral pieces of each are mixed together; as it is to diſtinguiſh pieces of fine gold from pieces of ſilver, which they are mixed among.

But it ſeems, the unmaſker thinks it is as eaſy to diſtinguiſh between fundamental and not fundamental doctrines, in a writing of the ſame author, where they are promiſcuouſly mixed together, as it is to diſtinguiſh between a fundamental doctrine of faith, and a relation of matter of fact, where they are intermixedly reported in the ſame hiſtory. When he has proved this, the unmaſker will have more reaſon to tax me with eluſion, ſhuffling and feigning, in the reaſon I gave for not collecting fundamentals out of the epiſtles. 'Till then, all that noiſe muſt ſtand amongſt thoſe ridiculous airs of triumph and victory,

tory, which he ſo often gives himſelf, without the leaſt advantage to his cauſe, or edification of his reader, though he ſhould a thouſand times ſay, "That I have "nothing to reply."

In the latter part of his paragraph, he ſays, "That neceſſary truths, funda-"mental principles, may be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe that are not ſuch, in the "epiſtolary writings, by the nature and importance of them, by their immediate "reſpect to the author and means of our ſalvation." Anſw. If this be ſo, I deſire him to give me a definitive collection of fundamentals out of the epiſtles, as I have given one out of the Goſpels and the Acts. If he cannot do that, 'tis plain, he hath here given a diſtinguiſhing mark of fundamentals, by which he himſelf cannot diſtinguiſh them. But yet I am the ſhuffler,

The argument in the next paragraph, p. 41. is this:

"Necessary doctrines of faith, ſuch as God abſolutely demands to be be-"lieved for juſtification, may be diſtinguiſhed from rules of holy living, with "which they are mixed in the epiſtles; therefore doctrines of faith neceſſary, "and not neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian, may be diſtin-"guiſhed, as they ſtand mixed in the epiſtles." Which is as good ſenſe as to ſay, lambs and kids may be eaſily diſtinguiſhed in the ſame penn, where they are together, by their different natures: therefore the lambs I abſolutely demand of you, as neceſſary to ſatisfy me, may be diſtinguiſhed from others in the ſame penn, where they are mixed, without any diſtinction. Doctrines of faith, and precepts of practiſe, are as diſtinguiſhable as doing and believing; and thoſe as eaſily diſcernible one from another, as thinking and walking: but doctrinal propoſitions, all of them of divine revelation, are of the ſame authority, and of the ſame ſpecies, in reſpect of the neceſſity of believing them; and will be eternally undiſtinguiſhable into neceſſary, and not neceſſary to be believed, 'till there be ſome other way found to diſtinguiſh them, than that they are in a book, which is all of divine revelation. Though therefore doctrines of faith, and rules of practiſe, are very diſtinguiſhable in the epiſtles, yet it does not follow from thence, that fundamental and not fundamental doctrines, points neceſſary and not neceſſary to be believed to make men Chriſtians, are eaſily diſtinguiſhable in the epiſtles. Which, therefore, remains to be proved: and it remains incumbent upon him,

XVIII. "To ſet down the marks, whereby the doctrines delivered in the "epiſtles, may eaſily and exactly be diſtinguiſhed into fundamental, and "not fundamental articles of faith."

All the reſt of that paragraph, containing nothing againſt me, muſt be bound up with a great deal of the like ſtuff, which the unmaſker has put into his book, to ſhew the world he does not "imitate me in impertinence, inco-"herences, and trifling excurſions," as he boaſts in his firſt paragraph. Only I ſhall deſire the reader to take the whole paſſage concerning this matter, as it ſtands in my "reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity," p. 584, &c. "I do not deny, but "the great doctrines of the chriſtian faith are dropt here and there, and ſcatter-"ed up and down in moſt of them. But 'tis not in the epiſtles we are to learn, "what are the fundamental articles of faith, where they are promiſcuouſly, "and without diſtinction, mixed with other truths and diſcourſes, which were "(though for edification indeed, yet) only occaſional. We ſhall find and diſ-"cern thoſe great and neceſſary points beſt, in the preaching of our Saviour "and his apoſtles, to thoſe who were yet ſtrangers and ignorant of the faith, "to bring them in, and convert them to it." And then let him read theſe words, which the unmaſker has quoted out of them: "It is not in the epiſtles, "that we are to learn what are the fundamental articles of faith, they were "written for the reſolving of doubts, and reforming of miſtakes;" with his introduction of them in theſe words: "he commands the reader not to ſtir a jot fur-"ther than the Acts." If I ſhould aſk him where that command appears, he muſt have recourſe to his old ſhift, that he did not mean as he ſaid, or elſe ſtand convicted of a malicious untruth. An orator is not bound to ſpeak ſtrict truth, though a diſputant be. But this unmaſker's writing againſt me will excuſe him from being of the latter: and then, why may not falſhoods paſs for rhetorical flouriſhes, in one who hath been uſed to popular haranguing; to which men are not generally ſo ſevere as ſtrictly to examine them, and expect that they ſhould always be found to contain nothing but preciſe truth, and ſtrict reaſoning? But yet I muſt not forget to put upon his ſcore, this other propoſition of his, which he has, p. 42. and aſk him to ſhew,

XIX. "WHERE it is that I command my reader not to ſtir a jot farther, than "the Acts?"

IN the next two paragraphs, p. 42,--46. the unmaſker is at his natural play, of declaiming without proving. 'Tis pity the Miſhna, out of which he takes his good breeding, as it told him, that "a well-bred and well-taught man anſwers to the firſt, in the firſt place," had not given him this rule too, about order, viz. That proving ſhould go before condemning; elſe all the fierce exaggerations ill language can heap up, are but empty ſcurrility. But 'tis no wonder that the Jewiſh doctors ſhould not provide rules for a chriſtian divine, turned unmaſker, For where a cauſe is to be maintained, and a book to be writ, and arguments are not at hand, yet ſomething muſt be found to fill it; railing in ſuch caſes is much eaſier than reaſoning, eſpecially where a man's parts lie that way.

THE firſt of theſe paragraphs, p. 42, he begins thus: "But let us hear further what this vindicator ſaith to excuſe his rejection of the doctrines contained in the epiſtles, and his putting us off with one article of faith." And then he quotes theſe following words of mine: "What if the author deſigned his "treatiſe, as the title ſhews, chiefly for thoſe who were not yet thoroughly "and firmly chriſtians: purpoſing to work upon thoſe, who either wholly diſbelieved, or doubted of the truth of the chriſtian religion?"

ANSW. This, as he has put it, is a downright falſhood. For the words he quotes were not uſed by me, "to excuſe my rejection of the doctrines contained in the epiſtles," or to prove there was but one article; but as a reaſon why I omitted the mention of ſatisfaction.

To demonſtrate this, I ſhall ſet down the whole paſſage, as it is, p. 590. of my vindication, where it runs thus:

"BUT what will become of me that I have not mentioned ſatisfaction?"

"POSSIBLY this reverend gentleman would have had charity enough for a "known writer of the brotherhood, to have found it by an innuendo in thoſe "words above quoted, of laying down his life for another. But every thing "is to be ſtrained here the other way, For the author of the "reaſonableneſs "of chriſtianity," &c. is of neceſſity to be repreſented as a ſocinian; or elſe his "book may be read, and the truths in it, which Mr, Edwards likes not, be received; and people put upon examining. Thus one, as full of happy conjectures and ſuſpicions as this gentleman, might be apt to argue. But what "if the author deſigned his treatiſe, as the title ſhews, chiefly for thoſe who "were not yet thoroughly or firmly chriſtians; propoſing to work on thoſe, "who either wholly diſbelieved, or doubted of the truth of the chriſtian religion?"

To this he tells me, p, 43. that my "title ſays nothing for me," i. e. ſhews not that I deſigned my book for thoſe that diſbelieved, or doubted of the chriſtian religion.

ANSW. I thought that a title that profeſſed the reaſonableneſs of any doctrine, ſhewed it was intended for thoſe that were not fully ſatiſfied of the reaſonableneſs of it; unleſs books are to be writ to convince thoſe of any thing, who are convinced already. But poſſibly, this may be the unmaſker's way: and if one ſhould judge by his manner of treating this ſubject, with declamation inſtead of argument, one would think, that he meant it for no body but thoſe who where of his mind already. I thought therefore, "the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, "as delivered in the ſcripture," a proper title to ſignify whom it was chiefly meant for: and, I thank God, I can with ſatisfaction ſay, it has not wanted its effect upon ſome of them. But the unmaſker proves for all that, that I could not deſign it chiefly for diſbelievers or doubters of the chriſtian religion. "For, " ſays he, p. 43. how thoſe that wholly diſregard and diſbelieve the ſcriptures of " the new teſtament, as Gentiles, Jews, Mahometans, and Atheiſts do," (I crave leave to put in theiſts, inſtead of atheiſts, for a reaſon preſently to be mentioned) " are like to attend to the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, as delivered " in the ſcripture, is not to be conceived: and therefore, we look upon this as " mere ſham and ſophiſtry," Anſw. Though the unmaſker teaches good breeding out of the Miſhna, yet I thought he had been a miniſter of the goſpel, and had taught chriſtianity out of the ſcripture. Why! good ſir, would you teach Jews and Mahometans chriſtianity out of the talmud and alcoran; becauſe they are the books, that at preſent, they attend to and believe? Or would you, laying by the authority of all books, preach religion to infidels, in your own name, and by your own authority, laying aſide the ſcripture? "Is it not to be con- " ceived," no not by a chriſtian divine, that the way to make unbelievers chriſtians, is to ſhew them the reaſonableneſs of the religion contained in the ſcriptures? But it ſeems the unmaſker has a peculiar way of preaching and propagating chriſtianity without the ſcripture; as ſome men have a peculiar way of diſputing without reaſon.

IN the beginning of this paragraph, p. 45, the unmaſker, that is always a fair interpreter of my meaning, and never fails to know it better than I do, tells me, That by thoſe that wholly diſbelieve, "I muſt mean atheiſts, Turks, " Jews, and pagans, and by thoſe that are not firmly chriſtians, a few weak " chriſtians." But did our unmaſker never hear of unbelievers, under a denomination diſtinct from that of atheiſts, Turks, Jews and pagans? Whilſt the pulpit and the preſs have ſo often had up the name of theiſts or deiſts, has that name wholly eſcaped him? 'Twas theſe I chiefly deſigned, and I believe, nobody of all that read my vindication, but the unmaſker, miſtook me, if he did. But there at leaſt, p. 591. he might have found the name, as of a ſort of unbelievers not unknown amongſt us. But, whatever he thought, it was convenient, and a ſort of prudence in him (when he would perſuade others, that I had not a deſign, which I ſay I had) to leſſen as much as he could, and cover the need of any ſuch deſign; and ſo make it, that I could not intend my book to work upon thoſe that diſbelieved, or did not firmly believe; by inſinuating, there were few or none ſuch amongſt us. Hence he ſays, that by thoſe that are not thoroughly and firmly chriſtians, "I mean a FEW weak chriſtians;" as well as under thoſe, who wholly diſbelieve, he left the theiſts out of my meaning. I am very glad to hear from the unmasker, that there are but few weak chriſtians, few that have doubts about the truth of chriſtianity amongſt us. But if there be not a great number of deiſts, and that the preventing their increaſe be not worth every true chriſtian's care and endeavours, thoſe who have been ſo loud againſt them, have been much to blame; and I wiſh to God, there were no reaſon for their complaints. For theſe therefore, I take the liberty to ſay, as I did before, that I chiefly deſigned my book; and ſhall not be aſhamed of this ſophiſtry, as you call it, if it can be ſophiſtry, to alledge a matter of fact that I know; 'till you have arguments to convince me, that you know my intention in publiſhing it, better than I do myſelf. And I ſhall think it ſtill no blameable prudence, however you exclaim againſt prudence, (as perhaps you have ſome reaſon) that "I mentioned only thoſe advantages, that all chriſtians are agreed in; " and that I obſerved that command of the apoſtle, Rom. xiv. 1. "Him that " is weak in the faith, receive ye, but not to doubtful diſputations;" without " being a ſocinian. I think I did not amiſs, that I offered to the belief of thoſe " that ſtood off, that, and only that, which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached " for the reducing the unconverted world. And would any one think, he in " earneſt went about to perſuade men to be chriſtians, who ſhould uſe that as an " argument to recommend the goſpel, which he has obſerved men to lay hold " on as an objection againſt it? To urge ſuch points of controverſy as neceſſary " articles of faith, when we ſee our Saviour and the apoſtles urged them not as

" neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians, is (by our own authority) " to add prejudices to prejudices, and to block up our own way to thoſe men, " whom we would have acceſs to, and prevail upon."

I HAVE repeated this again out of the 590th page of my vindication, where there is more to the ſame purpoſe; that the reader may ſee how fully the unmaſker has anſwered it.

BECAUSE, I ſaid, " Would any one blame my prudence, if I mentioned " only thoſe advantages, which all chriſtians are agreed in?" the unmaſker adds, p. 44. ſocinian chriſtians: and then, as if the naming of that had gained him his point, he goes on victoriouſly thus: " He has bethought himſelf better, ſince " he firſt publiſhed his notions, and (as the reſult of that) he now begins to " reſolve, what he writ, into prudence. I know whence he had this method, " (and 'tis likely he has taken more than this from the ſame hands) viz. from " the miſſionary Jeſuits, that went to preach the goſpel to the people of China. " We are told, that they inſtructed them in ſome matters relating to our Savi- " our; they let them know that Jeſus was the Meſſias, the perſon promiſed to " be ſent into the world: but they concealed his ſufferings and death, and they " would not let them know any thing of his paſſion and crucifixion. So our " author (their humble imitator) undertakes to inſtruct the world in chriſtianity, " with an omiſſion of its principal articles; and more eſpecially that of the ad- " vantage we have by Chriſt's death, which was the prime thing deſigned in " his coming into the world. This he calls prudence: ſo that to hide from the " people the main articles of the chriſtian religion, to diſguiſe the faith of the " goſpel, to betray chriſtianity itſelf, is, according to this excellent writer, the " cardinal virtue of prudence. May we be delivered then, ſay I, from a pru- " dential Racovian." And there ends the rattling for this time; not to be outdone by any piece of clock-work in the town. When he is once ſet a going, he runs on like an alarum, always in the ſame ſtrain of noiſy, empty declamation, (wherein every thing is ſuppoſed, and nothing proved) till his own weight has brought him to the ground: and then, being wound up with ſome new topick, takes another run, whether it makes for or againſt him, it matters not; he has laid about him with ill language, let it light where it will, and the vindicator is paid off.

THAT I may keep the due diſtance in our different ways of writing, I ſhall ſhew the reader, that I ſay not this at random; but that the place affords me occaſion to ſay ſo. He begins this paragraph with theſe words, p. 42. " Let " us hear farther, what this vindicator ſays to excuſe his rejection of the doc- " trines contained in the epiſtles." This rejection of the doctrines contained in the epiſtles, was the not mentioning the ſatisfaction of Chriſt, amongſt thoſe advantages I ſhewed that the world received by his coming. This appears by the words he here quotes, as my excuſe for that omiſſion. In which place, I alſo produced ſome paſſages in my book, which ſounded like it, ſome words of ſcripture that are uſed to prove it; but this will not content him: I am, for all that, a " betrayer of chriſtianity, and contemner of the epiſtles." Why? Becauſe I did not, out of them, name ſatisfaction, If you will have the truth of it, ſir, there is not any ſuch word in any one of the epiſtles, or other books of the new teſtament, in my bible, as ſatisfying, or ſatisfaction made by our Saviour; and ſo I could not put it into my " chriſtianity as delivered in the ſcripture." If mine be not a true bible, I deſire you to furniſh me with one that is more orthodox; or if the tranſlators have " hid that main article of the chriſtian reli- " gion," they are the " betrayers of chriſtianity, and contemners of the epiſtles," who did not put it there; and not I, who did not take a word from thence, which they did not put there. For truly, I am not a maker of creeds; nor dare add either to the ſcripture, or to the fundamental articles of the chriſtian religion.

BUT you will ſay, ſatisfaction, though not named in the epiſtles, yet may plainly be collected out of them. Anſw. And ſo it may out of ſeveral places in my " reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," ſome whereof, which I took out of the goſpels, I mentioned in my vindication, p. 590, and others of them, which I took out of the epiſtles, I ſhall point out to you now: as p. *529*. I ſay, the deſign of our Saviour's coming was to be OFFERED up; and p. *550*. I ſpeak of the work of our REDEMPTION; words which, in the epiſtles, are taken to imply ſatisfaction. And therefore if that be enough, I ſee not, but I may be free from betraying chriſtianity; but if it be neceſſary to name the word Satisfaction, and he that does not ſo, is a betrayer of chriſtianity, you will do well to conſider, how you will acquit the holy apoſtles from that bold imputation; which if it be extended as far as it will go, will ſcarce come ſhort of blaſphemy: for I do not remember, that our Saviour has any where named ſatisfaction, or implied it plainer in any words, than thoſe I have quoted from him; and he, I hope, will eſcape the intemperance of your tongue.

You tell me, I had my "prudence from the miſſionary Jeſuits in China, "who concealed our Saviour's ſufferings and death, becauſe I undertake to inſtruct the world in chriſtianity, with an omiſſion of its principal articles." And I pray, ſir, from whom did you learn your prudence, when, taking upon you to teach the fundamental doctrines of chriſtianity, in your "thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm," you left out ſeveral, that you have been pleaſed ſince to add in your "Socinianiſm unmaſked?" Or if I, as you ſay here, betray chriſtianity by this omiſſion of this principal article; what do you, who are a profeſſed teacher of it, if you omit any principal article, which your prudence is ſo wary in, that you will not ſay you have given us all that are neceſſary to ſalvation, in that liſt you have laſt publiſhed? I pray, who acts beſt the Jeſuit, (whoſe humble imitator, you ſay, I am) you or I? when, pretending to give a catalogue of fundamentals, you have not reduced them to direct propoſitions; but have left ſome of them indefinite, to be collected as every one pleaſes: and inſtead of telling us it is a perfect catalogue of fundamentals, plainly ſhuffle it off, and tell me, p. 22. "If that will not content me, you are ſure you can "do nothing that will: if I require more, it is folly in you to comply with "me?" One part of what you here ſay, I own to you, ſavours not much of the ſkill of a Jeſuit. You confeſs your inability, and I believe it to be perfectly true: that if what you have done already (which is nothing at all) "will "not content me, you are ſure, you can do nothing that will content me," or any reaſonable man, that ſhall demand of you a complete catalogue of fundamentals. But you make it up pretty well, with a confidence becoming one of that order. For he muſt have rubbed his forehead hard, who in the ſame treatiſe, where he ſo ſeverely condemns the imperfection of my liſt of fundamentals, confeſſes that he cannot give a complete catalogue of his own.

You publiſh to the world in this 44th, and the next page, that "I hide "from the people, the main articles of the chriſtian religion; I diſguiſe the faith "of the goſpel, betray chriſtianity itſelf, and imitate the Jeſuits that went to "preach the goſpel to the people of China, by my omiſſion of its principal or "main articles."

ANSW. I know not how I diſguiſe the faith of the goſpel, &c. in imitation of the Jeſuits in China; unleſs taking men off from the inventions of men, and recommending to them the reading and ſtudy of the holy ſcripture, to find what the goſpel is, and requires, be "a diſguiſing the faith of the goſpel, a betraying of chriſtianity, and an imitating the Jeſuits." Beſides, ſir, if one may aſk you, In what ſchool did you learn that prudent warineſs and reſerve, which ſo eminently appears, p. 24. of you ſocinianiſm unmaſked, in theſe words: "The articles," (meaning thoſe which you had before enumerated as fundamental articles) of faith, "are ſuch as muſt IN SOME MEASURE be known "and aſſented to by a chriſtian, ſuch as muſt GENERALLY be received, and "embraced by him?" You will do well the next time, to ſet down, how far your fundamentals muſt be known, aſſented to, and received; to avoid the ſuſpicion, that there is a little more of Jeſuitiſm in theſe expreſſions, "in ſome "meaſure known and aſſented to, and generally received and embraced," than what becomes a ſincere proteſtant preacher of the goſpel. For your ſpeaking ſo doubtfully of knowing and aſſenting to thoſe, which you give us for fundamental doctrines, which belong (as you ſay) to the very eſſence of chriſtianity, will hardly ly eſcape being imputed to your want of knowledge, or want of ſincerity. And indeed, the word, General, is in familiar uſe with you, and ſtands you in good ſtead, when you would ſay ſomething, you know not what; as I ſhall have occaſion to remark to you, when I come to your 91ſt page.

FURTHER, I do not remember where it was, that I mentioned or undertook to ſet down all the “principal or main articles of chriſtianity.” To change the terms of the queſtion, from articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, into principal or main articles, looks a little Jeſuitical. But to paſs by that: the apoſtles, when they “went to preach the goſpel to people,” as much ſtrangers to it as the Chineſes were, when the Europeans came firſt amongſt them, “Did they hide from the people the main articles of the chrſtian religion, diſguiſe the faith of the goſpel, and betray chriſtianity itſelf?” If they did not I am ſure I have not: for I have not omitted any of the main articles, which they preached to the unbelieving world. Thoſe I have ſet down, with ſo much care, not to omit any of them, that you blame me for it more than once, and call it tedious. However you are pleaſed to acquit or condemn the apoſtles, in the caſe of your ſupreme determination, I am very indifferent. If you think fit to condemn them for “diſguiſing or betraying the chriſtian religion,” becauſe they ſaid no more of ſatisfaction, than I have done, in their preaching at firſt, to their unbelieving auditors, Jews or heathens, to make them, as I think, chriſtians, (for that I am now ſpeaking of) I ſhall not be ſorry to be found in their company, under what cenſure ſoever. If you are pleaſed graciouſly to take off your cenſure from them, for this omiſſion, I ſhall claim a ſhare in the ſame indulgence.

BUT to come to what, perhaps, you will think yourſelf a little more concerned not to cenſure, than what the apoſtles did ſo long ſince; for you have given inſtances of being very apt to make bold with the dead: Pray tell me, does the church of England admit people into the church of Chriſt at hap-hazard? Or without propoſing, and requiring a profeſſion of all that is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian? If ſhe does not, I deſire you to turn to the baptiſm of thoſe of riper years in our liturgy: where the prieſt, aſking the convert particularly, whether he believes the apoſtles creed, which he repeats to him; upon his profeſſion that he does, and that he deſires to be baptized into that faith, without one word of any other articles, baptizes him; and then declares him a chriſtian, in theſe words: “We receive this perſon into the congregation of Chriſt's flock, and ſign him with the ſign of the croſs, in token that he ſhall not be aſhamed,—to CONTINUE Chriſt's faithful ſoldier and ſervant.” In all this there is not one word of ſatisfaction, no more than in my book, nor ſo much neither. And here I aſk you, Whether for this omiſſion, you will pronounce that the church of “England diſguiſes the faith of the goſpel?” However you think fit to treat me, yet methinks you ſhould not let yourſelf looſe ſo freely againſt our firſt reformers, and the fathers of our church ever ſince, as to call them “Betrayers of chriſtianity itſelf;” becauſe they think not ſo much neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, as you are pleaſed to put down in your articles; but omit, as well as I, your “main article of ſatisfaction.”

HAVING thus notably harangued upon the occaſion of my ſaying, “Would any one blame my prudence?” and thereby made me a “Socinian, a Jeſuit, and a betrayer of chriſtianity itſelf,” he has in that anſwered all that ſuch a miſcreant as I do, or can ſay; and ſo paſſes by all the reaſons I gave, for what I did; without any other notice or anſwer, but only denying a matter of fact, which I only can know, and he cannot, viz. my deſign in printing my “reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity.”

IN the next paragraph, p. 45. in anſwer to theſe words of St. Paul, Rom. xiv. 1. “Him that is weak in the faith, receive ye, but not to doubtful diſputations;” which I brought as a reaſon, why I mentioned not ſatisfaction amongſt the benefits received by the coming of our Saviour; becauſe, as I tell him in my vindication, p. 590. “my reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity,” as the title ſhews, was “deſigned chiefly for thoſe who were not yet thoroughly or firmly chriſtians.” He replies, and I deſire him to prove it,

XX. THAT I pretend a deſign of my book, which was never ſo much as " thought of, 'till I was ſollicited by my brethren to vindicate it."

ALL the reſt in this paragraph, bring either nothing to this place of the Romans, or what I have anſwered elſewhere, needs no farther anſwer.

THE next two paragraphs, p. 46,--49. are meant for an anſwer to ſomething I had ſaid concerning the apoſtles creed, upon the occaſion of his charging my book with ſocinianiſm. They begin thus:

THIS " author of the new chriſtianity" [Anſw. This new chriſtianity is as old as the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, and a little older than the unmaſker's ſyſtem] " wiſely objects, that the apoſtles creed hath none of thoſe " articles which I mention," p. 591, &c. Anſw. If that author wiſely objects, the unmaſker would have done well to have replied wiſely. But for a man wiſely to reply, it is in the firſt place requſite, that the objection be truly and fairly ſet down in its full force, and not repreſented ſhort, and as will beſt ſerve the anſwerer's turn to reply to. This is neither wiſe nor honeſt: and this firſt part of a wiſe reply, the unmaſker has failed in. This will appear from my words, and the occaſion of them. The unmaſker had accuſed my book of ſocinianiſm, for omitting ſome points, which he urged as neceſſary articles of faith. To which I anſwered. That he had done ſo only " to give it an ill " name, not becauſe it was ſocinian; for he had no more reaſon to charge it " with ſocinianiſm, for the omiſſions he mentions, than the apoſtles creed." Theſe are my words, which he ſhould have either ſet down out of p. 592. which he quotes, or at leaſt given the objection, as I put it, if he had meant to have cleared it by a fair anſwer. But he, inſtead thereof, contents himſelf that " I object, that the apoſtles creed hath none of thoſe articles and doctrines " which the unmaſker mentioned." Anſw. This at beſt is but a part of my objection, and not to the purpoſe which I there meant, without the reſt joined to it; which it has pleaſed the unmaſker, according to his laudable way, to conceal. My objection, therefore, ſtands thus:

> THAT the ſame articles, for the omiſſion whereof the unmaſker charges my book with ſocinianiſm, being alſo omitted in the apoſtles creed, he has no more reaſon to charge my book with ſocinianiſm, for the omiſſions mentioned, than he hath to charge the apoſtles creed with ſocinianiſm.

To this objection of mine, let us now ſee how he anſwers, p. 47.

" NOR does any conſiderate man wonder at it," [i. e. that the apoſtles creed hath none of thoſe articles and doctrines which he had mentioned] " for the " creed is a form of outward profeſſion, which is chiefly to be made in the pub- " lick aſſemblies, when prayers are put up in the church, and the holy ſcrip- " tures are read: then this abridgment of faith is properly uſed, or when there " is not time or opportunity to make any enlargement. But we are not to think " it expreſsly contains in it all the neceſſary and weighty points, all the important " doctrines of belief; it being only deſigned to be an abſtract."

ANW. Another indiſpenſible requiſite in a wiſe reply is, that it ſhould be pertinent. Now what can there be more impertinent, than to confeſs the matter of fact upon which the objection is grounded; but inſtead of deſtroying the inference drawn from that matter of fact, only amuſe the reader with wrong reaſons, why that matter of fact was ſo?

No conſiderate man, he ſays, doth wonder, that the articles and doctrines he mentioned, are omitted in the apoſtles creed: becauſe " that creed is a form of outward profeſſion." Anſw. A profeſſion! of what I beſeech you? Is it a form to be uſed for form's ſake? I thought it had been a profeſſion of ſomething, even of the chriſtian faith: and if it be ſo, any conſiderate man may wonder neceſſary articles of the chriſtian faith ſhould be left out of it. For how it can be an outward profeſſion of the chriſtian faith, without containing the chriſtian faith, I do not ſee; unleſs a man can outwardly profeſs the chriſtian faith in words, that do not contain or expreſs it, i. e. profeſs the chriſtian faith, when he does not profeſs it, But he ſays, “ 'Tis a profeſſion chiefly to be made uſe of in aſſemblies.” Anſw. Do thoſe ſolemn aſſemblies privilege it from containing the neceſſary articles of the chriſtian religion? This proves not that it does not, or was not deſigned to contain all the articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; unleſs the unmaſker can prove that a “ form of outward profeſſion” of the chriſtian faith, that contains all ſuch neceſſary articles, cannot be made uſe of, in the publick aſſemblies. “ In the publick aſſemblies,” ſays he, “ when prayers are put up by the church, and the holy ſcriptures are read, then this abridgment of faith is properly uſed; or when there is not generally time or opportunity to make an enlargement.” Anſw. But that which contains not what is abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, can no where be properly uſed as a form of outward profeſſion of the chriſtian faith, and leaſt of all, in the ſolemn publick aſſemblies. All the ſenſe I can make of this is, that this abridgment of the chriſtian faith, i. e. imperfect collection (as the unmaſker will have it) of ſome of the fundamental articles of chriſtianity in the apoſtles creed, which omits the greateſt part of them, is made uſe of as a form of outward profeſſion, of but part of the chriſtian faith in the publick aſſemblies; when by reaſon of reading of the ſcripture and prayers, there is not time or opportunity for a full and perfect profeſſion of it.

'Tis ſtrange the chriſtian church ſhould not find time nor opportunity in ſixteen hundred years, to make, in any of her publick aſſemblies, a profeſſion of ſo much of her faith, as is neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian. But pray tell me, has the church any ſuch full and complete form of faith, that hath in it all thoſe propoſitions, you have given us for neceſſary articles, (not to ſay any thing of thoſe which you have reſerved to yourſelf, in your own breaſt, and will not communicate) of which the apoſtles creed is only a ſcanty form, a brief imperfect abſtract, uſed only to ſave time in the croud of other preſſing occaſions, that are always in haſte to be diſpatched? If ſhe has, the unmaſker will do well to produce it. If the church has no ſuch complete form, beſides the apoſtles creed, any where, of fundamental articles; he will do well to leave talking idly of this abſtract, as he goes on to do in the following words:

“ But,” ſays he, “ we are not to think that it expreſly contains in it all the neceſſary and weighty points, all the important doctrines of our belief; it being only deſigned to be an abſtract.” Anſw. Of what, I beſeech you, is it an abſtract? For here the unmaſker ſtops ſhort, and, as one that knows not well what to ſay, ſpeaks not out what it is an abſtract of; but provides himſelf a ſubterfuge in the generality of the preceding terms, of “ neceſſary and weighty points, and important doctrines” jumbled together; which can be there of no other uſe, but to cover his ignorance or ſophiſtry. But the queſtion being only about neceſſary points, to what purpoſe are weighty and important doctrines joined to them; unleſs he will ſay, that there is no difference between neceſſary and weighty points, fundamental and important doctrines; And if ſo, then the diſtinction of points into neceſſary and not neceſſary, will be fooliſh and impertinent; and all the doctrines contained in the bible, will be abſolutely neceſſary to be explicitly believed by every man to make him a chriſtian. But taking it for granted, that the diſtinction of truths contained in the goſpel, into points abſolutely neceſſary, and not abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, is good; I deſire the unmaſker to tell us, what the apoſtles creed is an abſtract of? He will, perhaps, anſwer, that he has told us already in this very page, where he ſays, it is an abridgment of faith; and he has ſaid true in words, but ſaying thoſe words by rote, after others, without underſtanding them, he has ſaid ſo in a ſenſe that is not true. For he ſuppoſes it an abridgement of faith, by containing only a few of the neceſſary articles of faith, and leaving out the far greater part of them; and ſo takes a part of a thing for an abridgment of it; whereas an abridgment or abſtract of any thing, is the whole in little; and if it be of a ſcience or doctrine, the abridgment conſiſts in the eſſential or neceſſary parts of it contracted into a narrower compaſs than where it lies diffuſed in the ordinary way of delivery, amongſt a great number of tranſitions,

tions, explanations, illuſtrations, proofs, reaſonings, corollaries, &c. All which, though they make a part of the diſcourſe, wherein that doctrine is delivered, are left out in the abridgment of it, wherein all the neceſſary parts of it are drawn together into a leſs room. But though an abridgment need to contain none but the eſſential and neceſſary parts, yet all thoſe it ought to contain; or elſe it will not be an abridgment or abſtract of that thing, but an abridgment only of a part of it. I think it could not be ſaid to be an abridgment of the law contained in an act of parliament, wherein any of the things required by that act were omitted; which yet commonly may be reduced into a very narrow compaſs, when ſtripped of all the motives, ends, enacting forms, &c. expreſſed in the act itſelf. If this does not ſatisfy the unmaſker what is properly an abridgment, I ſhall refer him to Mr. Chillingworth, who, I think, will be allowed to underſtand ſenſe, and to ſpeak it properly, at leaſt as well as the unmaſker. And what he ſays, happens to be in the very ſame queſtion, between Knot the Jeſuit, and him, that is here between the unmaſker and me: 'tis but putting the unmaſker in the Jeſuit's place, and myſelf (if it may be allowed me, without vanity) in Mr. Chillingworth, the proteſtants; and Mr. Chillingworth's very words, chap. iv. §. 65. will exactly ſerve for my anſwer: "You trifle affectedly, "confounding the apoſtles belief of the whole religion of Chriſt, as it comprehends both what we are to do, and what we are to believe, with that part "of it, which contains not duties of obedience, but only the neceſſary articles "of ſimple faith. Now, though the apoſtles belief be, in the former ſenſe, a "larger thing than that which we call the apoſtles creed; yet, in the latter ſenſe of the word, the creed (I ſay) is a full comprehenſion of their belief, which you yourſelf have formerly confeſſed, though ſomewhat fearfully "and inconſtantly. And here again, unwillingneſs to ſpeak the truth, makes "you ſpeak that which is hardly ſenſe, and call it "an abridgment of ſome articles of faith." For I demand, thoſe ſome articles, which you ſpeak of, "which are they? Thoſe that are out of the creed, or thoſe that are in it? "Thoſe that are in it, it comprehends at large, and therefore it is not an abridgment of them. Thoſe that are out of it, it comprehends not at all, and therefore it is not an abridgment of them. If you would call it now an abridgment of faith, this would be ſenſe; and ſignify thus much, that all the neceſſary articles of the Chriſtian faith are comprized in it. For this is the proper "duty of abridgments, to leave out nothing neceſſary." So that, in Mr. Chillingworth's judgment of an abridgment, it is not ſenſe to ſay, as you do, p. 47. That "we are not to think, that the apoſtles creed expreſly contains in it all the "neceſſary points of our belief, it being only deſigned to be an abſtract, or an "abridgment of faith:" but on the contrary, we muſt conclude, it contains in it all the neceſſary articles of faith, for that very reaſon; becauſe it is an abridgment of faith, as the unmaſker calls it. But whether this that Mr. Chillingworth has given us here, be the nature of an abridgment or no; this is certain, that the apoſtles creed cannot be a form of profeſſion of the Chriſtian faith, if any part of the faith neceſſary to make a man a Chriſtian, be left out of it: and yet ſuch a profeſſion of faith would the unmaſker have this abridgment of faith to be. For a little lower, in the 47th page, he ſays in expreſs terms, That "if a man believe no more than is, in expreſs terms, in the apoſtles creed, his faith will not "be the faith of a Chriſtian." Wherein he does great honour to the primitive church, and particularly to the church of England. The primitive church admitted converted heathens to baptiſm, upon the faith contained in the apoſtles creed: a bare profeſſion of that faith, and no more, was required of them to be received into the church, and made members of Chriſt's body. How little different the faith of the antient church was, from the faith I have mentioned, may be ſeen in theſe words of Tertullian: "Regula fidei una omnino eſt, ſola, immobilis, "irreformabilis, credendi, ſcilicet, in unicum Deum, omnipotentem, mundi "conditorem, & filium ejus Jeſum Chriſtum, natum ex virgine Maria, crucifixum ſub Pontio Pilato, tertia die reſuſcitatum a mortuis, receptum in cœlis, ſedentem nunc ad dextram Patris, venturum judicare vives & mortuos, "per carnis etiam reſurrectionem. Hic lege fidei manente, cætera jam diſci-

"plinæ & converſationis admittunt novitatem correctionis:" Tert. de virg. velan. in principio. This was the faith, that in Tertullian's time ſufficed to make a Chriſtian. And the church of England, as I have remarked already, only propoſes the articles of the creed to the convert to be baptized; and upon his profeſſing a belief of them, aſks, Whether he will be baptized in THIS FAITH? Which (if we will believe the unmaſker) "is not the faith of a Chriſtian." However, the church, without any more ado, upon the profeſſion of THIS FAITH, and no other, baptizes him into it. So that the antient church, if the unmaſker may be believed, baptized converts into that faith, which "is not the "faith of a Chriſtian." And the church of England, when ſhe baptizes any one, makes him not a Chriſtian. For he that is baptized only into a faith, that "is not the faith of a Chriſtian," I would fain know how he can thereby be made a Chriſtian? So that if the omiſſions, which he ſo much blames in my book, make me a Socinian, I ſee not how the church of England will eſcape that cenſure; ſince thoſe omiſſions are in that very confeſſion of faith which ſhe propoſes, and upon a profeſſion whereof, ſhe baptizes thoſe whom ſhe deſigns to make Chriſtians. But it ſeems that the unmaſker (who has made bold to unmaſk her too) reaſons right, that the church of England is miſtaken, and makes none but Socinian Chriſtians; or (as he is pleaſed now to declare) no Chriſtians at all. Which, if true, the unmaſker had beſt look to it, whether he himſelf be a Chriſtian, or no; for 'tis to be feared, he was baptized only into that faith, which he himſelf confeſſes "is not the faith of a Chriſtian."

BUT he brings himſelf off, in theſe following words: "All matters of faith, "in ſome manner, may be reduced to this brief platform of belief." Anſw. If that be enough to make him a true and an orthodox Chriſtian, he does not conſider whom, in this way, he brings off with him; for I think he cannot deny, that all matters of faith, in ſome manner, may be reduced to that abſtract of faith which I have given, as well as to that brief platform in the apoſtles creed. So that, for aught I ſee, by this rule, we are Chriſtians or not Chriſtians, orthodox or not orthodox, equally together.

BUT yet he ſays, in the next words: "When he calls it an abſtract, or ab-"breviature, it is implied, that there are more truths to be known and aſſented "to, by a Chriſtian, in order to making him really ſo, than what we meet with "here." The quite contrary whereof (as has been ſhewn) is implied, by its being called an abſtract. But what is that to the purpoſe? 'Tis not fit abſtracts and abbreviatures ſhould ſtand in an unmaſker's way. They are ſounds men have uſed for what they pleaſed; and why may not the unmaſker do ſo too, and uſe them in a ſenſe, that may make the apoſtles creed be only a broken ſcrap of the Chriſtian faith? However, in great condeſcenſion, being willing to do the apoſtles creed what honour he could, he ſays, That "all matters of faith, in "ſome manner, may be reduced to this brief platform of belief." But yet, when it is ſet in competition with the creed, which he himſelf is making, (for it is not yet finiſhed) it is by no means to be allowed as ſufficient to make a man a Chriſtian. "There are more truths to be known and aſſented to, in order to "make a man really a Chriſtian." Which, what they are, the church of England ſhall know, when this new reformer thinks fit; and then ſhe may be able to propoſe to thoſe who are not yet ſo, a collection of articles of belief, and baptize them a-new into a faith, which will really make them Chriſtians: but hitherto, if the unmaſker may be credited, ſhe has failed in it.

"YET he craves leave to tell me," in the following words, p. 48. "That "the apoſtles creed hath more in it than I, or my brethren, will ſubſcribe to." Were it not the undoubted privilege of the unmaſker to know me better than I do myſelf, (for he is always telling me ſomething of myſelf, which I did not know) I would, in my turn, crave leave to tell him, that this is the faith I was baptized into, no one tittle whereof I have renounced, that I know; and that I heretofore thought, that gave me title to be a Chriſtian. But the unmaſker hath otherwiſe determined: and I know not now where to find a Chriſtian. For the belief of the apoſtles creed will not, it ſeems, make a man one: and what other belief will, it does not yet pleaſe the unmaſker to tell us. But yet, as to the ſubſcribing to the apoſtles creed, I muſt take leave to ſay, however the unmaſker may be right in the faith, he is out in the morals of a chriſtian; it being againſt the charity of one, that is really ſo, to pronounce, as he does, peremptorily in a thing that he cannot know; and to affirm poſitively what I know to be a down-right falſhood. But what others will do, it is not my talent to determine; that belongs to the unmaſker: though, as to all that are my brethren in the chriſtian faith, I may anſwer for them too, that they will alſo, with me, do that, without which, in that ſenſe, they cannot be my brethren.

PAGE 49. The unmaſker ſmartly convinces me of no ſmall blunder, in theſe words: "But was it not judiciouſly ſaid by this writer, that, "it is well for the "compilers of the creed, that they lived not in my days?" p. 12. "I tell you, "friend, it was impoſſible they ſhould; for the learned Uſher and Voſſius, and "others have proved, that that ſymbol was drawn up, not at once, but that "ſome articles of it were adjoined many years after, far beyond the extent of "any man's life; and therefore the compilers of the creed could not live in my "days, nor could I live in theirs." Anſw. But it ſeems, that had they lived together, you could have lived in their days. "But," ſays he, "I let this paſs, as "one of the blunders of our thoughtful and muſing author." Anſw. And I tell you, friend, that unleſs it were to ſhew your reading in Uſher and Voſſius, you had better have let this blunder of mine alone. Does not the unmaſker give here a clear proof, that he is no changeling? Whatever argument he takes in hand, weighty or trivial, material or not material to the thing in queſtion, he brings it to the ſame ſort of ſenſe and force. He would ſhew me guilty of an abſurdity, in ſaying, "It was well for the compilers of the creed, that they lived "not in his days." This he proves to be a blunder, becauſe they all lived not in one another's days; therefore it was an abſurdity to ſuppoſe, they might all live in his days. As if there were any greater abſurdity to bring the compilers, who lived, poſſibly, within a few centuries of one another, by a ſuppoſition, into one time; than it is to bring the unmaſker, and any one of them who lived a thouſand years diſtant one from another, by a ſuppoſition, to be contemporaries: for 'tis by reaſon of the compilers living at a diſtance one from another, that he proves it impoſſible for him to be their contemporary. As if it were not as impoſſible in fact, for him who was not born 'till above a thouſand years after, to live in any of their days, as it is for any one of them to live in either of thoſe compilers, days, that died before him. The ſuppoſition of their living together, is as eaſy of one as the other, at what diſtance ſoever they lived, and how many ſoever there were of them. This being ſo, I think it had been better for the unmaſker to have let alone the blunder, and ſhewed (which was his buſineſs) that he does not accuſe the compilers of the creed of being all over ſocinianized, as well as he does me, ſince they were as guilty as I, of the omiſſion of thoſe articles, (viz. "That Chriſt is the word of God: That Chriſt was God incarnate: The "eternal and ineffable generation of the Son of God; That the Son is in the "Father, and the Father in the Son, which expreſſes their unity;)" for the omiſſion whereof, the unmaſker laid ſocinianiſm to my charge. So that it remains ſtill upon his ſcore to ſhew,

XXI. "WHY theſe omiſſions in the apoſtles creed do not as well make that "abſtract, as my abridgment of faith, to be ſocinian?"

PAGE 57. The unmaſker "deſires the reader to obſerve, that this lank faith "of mine, is in a manner no other than the faith of a Turk." And I deſire the reader to obſerve, that this faith of mine was all that our Saviour and his apoſtles preached to the unbelieving world. And this our unmaſker cannot deny, as I think, will appear to any one, who obſerves what he ſays, p. 76, 77. of his ſocinianiſm unmaſked. And that they preached nothing but a "faith, that was in "a manner no other than the faith of a Turk," I think none amongſt chriſtians, but this bold unmaſker, will have the irreverence profanely to ſay.

HE tells us, p. 54. That the Muſſelmen (or, as he has, for the information of his reader, very pertinently proved, ſhould be writ Moſlemim; without which, perhaps, we ſhould not have known his ſkill in Arabick) or, in plain Engliſh, "the mahometans, believe that Chriſt is a good man, and not above the nature of a man, and ſent of God to give inſtruction to the world: and my faith," he ſays, "is of the very ſame ſcantling." This I ſhall deſire him to prove; or, which in other words he inſinuates in this, and the neighbouring pages, viz.

XXII. THAT that faith, which I have affirmed to be the faith, which is required to make a man a chriſtian, is no other than what Turks believe, and is contained in the alcoran.

OR, as he expreſſes it himſelf, p. 55.

"THAT a Turk, according to me, is a chriſtian; for I make the ſame faith ſerve them both."

AND particularly to ſhew where it is, I ſay,

XXIII. THAT "Chriſt is not above the nature of a man," or have made that a neceſſary article of the chriſtian faith.

AND next, where it is,

XXIV. "THAT I ſpeak as meanly of Chriſt's ſuffering on the croſs, and death, as if there were no ſuch thing."

FOR thus he ſays of me, p. 54. "I ſeem to have conſulted the mahometan bible, which did ſay, Chriſt did not ſuffer on the croſs, did not die. For I, and my allies, ſpeak as meanly of theſe articles, as if there were no ſuch thing."

TO ſhew our unmaſker's veracity in this caſe, I ſhall trouble my reader with ſome paſſages out of my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," p. 526, &c. "When we conſider, that he was to fill out the time foretold of his miniſtry, and after a life illuſtrious in miracles and good works, attended with humility, meekneſs, patience and SUFFERING, and every way conformable to the prophecies of him, ſhould be led as a ſheep to the ſlaughter, and, with all quiet and ſubmiſſion, be brought to the CROSS, though there were no guilt or fault found in him." And p. 529. "Contrary to the deſign of his coming, which was to be OFFERED up a lamb, blameleſs and void of offence." And, p. 540. "Laying down his life, both for Jews and Gentiles." P. 555, &c. "Given up to contempt, torment and death." But, ſay what I will, when the unmaſker thinks fit to have it ſo, it is ſpeaking out of the mahometan bible, That "Chriſt did not ſuffer on the croſs, did not die; or at leaſt, is ſpeaking as meanly of theſe articles, as if no ſuch thing had been."

HIS next ſlander is p. 55. in theſe words: "This gentleman preſents the world with a very ill notion of faith; for the very devils are capable of all that faith, which, he ſays, makes a chriſtian." It is not ſtrange, that the unmaſker ſhould miſrepreſent the faith, which I ſay, makes a chriſtian; when it ſeems to be his whole deſign to miſrepreſent my meaning every where. The frequency of his doing it, I have ſhewed in abundance of inſtances, to which I ſhall add an eminent one here; which ſhews what a fair champion he is for truth and religion.

PAGE 560. of my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," I give this account of the faith which makes a chriſtian; that it is "men's entering themſelves in the kingdom of God; owning and profeſſing themſelves the ſubjects of Jeſus, whom they believe to be the Meſſiah, and receive for their Lord and King: for that was to be baptized in his name." This ſenſe of believing Chriſt to be the Meſſiah, that is, to take him for our King and Lord, who is to be obeyed, I have expreſſed over and over again; as p. 563, 564. my words are, "That as

“ many of them as would believe Jeſus the ſon of God (whom he ſent into “ the world) to be the Meſſiah, the promiſed Deliverer, and would receive “ him for their King and Ruler, ſhould have all their paſt ſins, diſobedience “ and rebellion, forgiven them. And if, for the future, they lived in ſincere “ obedience to his law, to the utmoſt of their power, the ſins of human frailty “ for the time to come, as well as thoſe of their paſt lives, ſhould for his ſon's “ ſake, becauſe they gave themſelves up to him to be his ſubjects, be forgiven “ them, and ſo their faith, which made them to be baptized into his name, “ (i. e. inroll themſelves in the kingdom of Jeſus, the Meſſiah, and profeſs “ themſelves his ſubjects; and conſequently live by the laws of his kingdom) “ ſhould be accounted to them for righteouſneſs.” Which account of what is neceſſary, I cloſe with theſe words: “ This is the FAITH, for which God of “ his free grace juſtifies ſinful man.” And is this the faith of devils?

To the ſame purpoſe, p. 564. are theſe words: “ The chief end of his coming was to be a King; and, as ſuch, to be received by thoſe, who would be “ his ſubjects in the kingdom which he came to erect.” And again, p. 563. “ Only thoſe who have believed Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and taken him for “ their King, with a ſincere endeavour after righteouſneſs in obeying his law, “ ſhall have their paſt ſins not imputed to them.” And ſo again, p. 564, and 567, and in ſeveral other places; of which I ſhall add but this one more, p. 567. “ 'Tis not enough to believe him to be the Meſſiah, unleſs we obey his laws, “ and take him to be our King, to reign over us.” Can the devils thus believe him to be the Meſſiah? Yet this is that, which, by theſe and abundance of other places, I have ſhewed to be the meaning of believing him to be the Meſſiah.

Besides, I have expreſly diſtinguiſhed the faith which makes a chriſtian, from that which the devils have; by proving, that, to the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, muſt be joined repentance, or elſe it will not make them true chriſtians: and what this repentance is, may be ſeen at large in p. 559, &c. ſome expreſſions whereof I ſhall here ſet down: as, p. 560. “ Repentance does not “ conſiſt in one ſingle act of ſorrow, (though that being firſt, and leading, gives “ denomination to the whole) but in doing works meet for repentance; in a “ ſincere obedience to the law of Chriſt, the remainder of our lives.” Again: to diſtinguiſh the faith of a chriſtian from that of devils, I ſay expreſly, out of St. Paul's epiſtle to the Galatians, “ That which availeth is faith, but faith working by love; and that faith, without works, i. e. the works of ſincere obedience to the law and will of Chriſt, is not ſufficient for our juſtification.” And, p. 567. “ That to inherit eternal life, we muſt love the Lord our God, “ with all our heart, with all our ſoul, with all our ſtrength, and with all our “ mind. And, p. 568. “ Love Chriſt, in keeping his commandments.”

This, and a great deal more to this purpoſe, may be ſeen in my “ reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity; particularly, where I anſwer that objection about the faith of devils, which I handle in p. 559, &c. and therein at large ſhew, wherein the faith of devils comes ſhort of the juſtifying faith which makes a chriſtian. And yet the good, the ſincere, the candid unmaſker, with his becoming confidence, tells his readers here, p. 55. “ That I preſent the world “ with a very ill notion of faith: for the very devils are capable of all that “ faith, which, I ſay, makes a chriſtian man.”

To prevent this calumny, I, in more places than one, diſtinguiſhed between faith, in a ſtrict ſenſe, as it is a bare aſſent to any propoſition, and that which is called evangelical faith, in a larger ſenſe of the word; which comprehends under it ſomething more, than a bare ſimple aſſent; as, p. 521. “ I mean, this “ is all is required to be believed by thoſe who acknowledge but one eternal, “ inviſible God, the maker of heaven and earth: for that there is ſomething “ more required to ſalvation, beſides believing, we ſhall ſee hereafter.” P. 522. “ All, I ſay, that was to be believed for juſtification. For, that this was not all “ that was required to be done for juſtification, we ſhall ſee hereafter.” P. 534. “ Obeying the law of the Meſſiah, their King, being no leſs required, than “ their believing that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, the King and Deliverer, that was

“ promiſed them.” P. 559. “ As far as mere believing could make them “ members of Chriſt's body.” By theſe, and more the like paſſages in my book, my meaning is ſo evident, that nothing but an unmaſker, would have ſaid, that when I ſpoke of believing, as a bare, ſpeculative aſſent to any propoſition, as true, I affirmed that was all that was required of a chriſtian for juſtification: though that, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, is all that is done in believing. And therefore, I ſay, As far as mere believing could make them members of Chriſt's body; plainly ſignifying, as much as words can, that the faith, for which they were juſtified, included ſomething more than a bare aſſent. This appears not only from theſe words of mine, p. 560. “ St. Paul often, in “ his epiſtles, puts faith for the whole duty of a chriſtian;” but from my ſo often, and almoſt every where, interpreting “ believing him to be the Meſſiah, “ by taking him to be our King;” whereby is meant not a bare idle ſpeculation, a bare notional perſuaſion of any truth whatſoever, floating in our brains; but an active principle of life, a faith working by love and obedience. “ To “ take him to be our King,” carries with it a right diſpoſition of the will to honour and obey him, joined to that aſſent wherewith believers embrace this fundamental truth, that Jeſus was the perſon who was by God ſent to be their King; he that was promiſed to be their Prince and Saviour.

But for all this, the unmaſker, p. 56, confidently tells his reader, that I ſay no ſuch thing. His words are: “ But, beſides this hiſtorical faith, (as it “ is generally called by divines) which is giving credit to evangelical truths, as “ barely revealed, there muſt be ſomething elſe added to make up the true ſub- “ ſtantial faith of a chriſtian. With the aſſent of the underſtanding, muſt be “ joined the conſent or approbation of the will. All thoſe divine truths which “ the intellect aſſents to, muſt be allowed of, by this elective power of the ſoul. “ True evangelical faith is a hearty acceptation of the Meſſias, as he offered “ in the goſpel. It is a ſincere and impartial ſubmiſſion to all things required “ by the evangelical law, which is contained in the epiſtles, as well as the other “ writings. And to this practical aſſent and choice, there muſt be added, like- “ wiſe, a firm truſt and reliance in the bleſſed author of our ſalvation. But this “ late undertaker, who attempted to give us a more perfect account, than ever “ was before of chriſtianity, as it is delivered in the ſcriptures, brings us no ti- “ dings of any ſuch faith belonging to chriſtianity, or diſcovered to us in the “ ſcriptures. Which gives us to underſtand, that he verily believes there is no ſuch chriſtian faith; for in ſome of his numerous pages, (eſpecially p. 559, “ &c.) where he ſpeaks ſo much of belief and faith, he might have taken oc- “ caſion to inſert one word about his complete faith of the goſpel.”

Though the place above quoted, out of my “ reaſonableneſs of chriſtian- “ ity,” and the whole tenor of the latter part of it, ſhew the falſhood of what the unmaſker here ſays; yet I will ſet down one paſſage more out of it; and then aſk our unmaſker, when he hath read them, Whether he hath the brow to ſay again, that “ I bring no tidings of any ſuch faith?” My words are, “ reaſon- “ ableneſs of chriſtianity,” p. 572. “ Faith in the promiſes of God, relying “ and acquieſcing in his word and faithfulneſs, the Almighty takes well at our “ hands, as a great mark of homage paid by us, poor frail creatures, to his “ goodneſs and truth, as well as to his power and wiſdom; and accepts it as “ an acknowledgment of his peculiar providence and benignity to us. And, “ therefore, our Saviour tells us, John xii. 44. “ He that believes on me, be- “ lieves not on me, but on him that ſent me.” The works of nature ſhew “ his wiſdom and power: but 'tis his peculiar care of mankind, moſt eminent- “ ly diſcovered in his promiſes to them, that ſhews his bounty and goodneſs; “ and conſequently engages their hearts in love and affection to him. This ob- “ lation of an heart fixed with dependance and affection on him, is the moſt “ acceptable tribute we can pay him, the foundation of true devotion, and life “ of all religion. What a value he puts on this depending on his word, and “ reſting ſatisfied on his promiſes, we have an example in Abraham; whoſe “ faith was counted to him for righteouſneſs, as we have before remarked out “ of Rom. iv. And his relying firmly on the promiſe of God, without any

" doubt of its performance, gave him the name of the father of the faithful; " and gained him ſo much favour with the Almighty, that he was called, the " friend of God, the higheſt and moſt glorious title can be beſtowed on a crea- " ture!

THE great out-cry he makes againſt me in his two next ſections, p. 57,---50. as if I intended to introduce ignorance and popery, is to be entertained rather as the noiſe of a petulant ſcold, ſaying the worſt things ſhe could think of, than as the arguing of a man of ſenſe or ſincerity. All this mighty accuſation is grounded upon theſe falſhoods: That " I make it my great buſineſs to beat men " off from divine truths; that I cry down all articles of the chriſtian faith, but " one; that I will not ſuffer men to look into chriſtianity; that I blaſt the epi- " ſtolary writings." I ſhall add no more to what I have already ſaid, about the epiſtles, but thoſe few words out of my " reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, page 584. " The epiſtles, reſolving doubts, and reforming miſtakes, are of great ad- " vantage to our knowledge and practice." And, p. 585. " An explicit belief of " what God requires of thoſe, who will enter into, and receive the benefits of " the new covenant, is abſolutely required. The other parts of divine revela- " tion are objects of faith, and are ſo to be received. They are truths, where- " of none, that is once known to be ſuch, [i. e. of divine revelation] may, or " ought to be diſbelieved,'

AND as for that other ſaying of his, " That I will not ſuffer men to look into " Chriſtianity:" I deſire to know where that Chriſtianity is locked up, which " I will not ſuffer men to look into." My Chriſtianity, I confeſs, is contained in the written word of God: and that I am ſo far from hindering any one to look into, that I every-where appeal to it, and have quoted ſo much of it, that the unmaſker complains of being overlaid with it, and tells me 'tis tedious. " All " divine revelation, I ſay, p. 585. requires the obedience of faith; and that " every one is to receive all the parts of it, with a docility and diſpoſition pre- " pared to embrace and aſſent to all truths coming from God; and ſubmit his " mind to whatever ſhall appear to him to bear that character." I ſpeak, in the ſame page, of men's endeavouring to underſtand it, and of their interpreting one place by another. This, and the whole deſign of my book, ſhews, that I think it every chriſtian's duty to read, ſearch, and ſtudy the holy ſcriptures; and make this their great buſineſs: and yet the good unmaſker, in a fit of zeal, diſplays his throat, and cries out, p. 59. " Hear, O ye heavens, and give ear, " O earth; judge whether this be not the way to introduce darkneſs and igno- " rance into chriſtendom; whether this be not blinding mens eyes, &c." For this mighty pathos ends not there. And, all things conſidered, I know not whether he had not reaſon, in his want of arguments, this way to pour out his concern. For neither the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, nor the apoſtles creed, nor any thing elſe, being with him the faith of a chriſtian, i. e. ſufficient to make a chriſtian, but juſt his ſet of fundamental articles (when he himſelf knows what they be); in fine, nothing being chriſtianity but juſt his ſyſtem, 'tis time to cry out, Help, neighbours! hold faſt, friends! Knowledge, religion, chriſtianity is gone, if this be once permitted, that the people ſhould read and underſtand the ſcripture for themſelves, as God ſhall enlighten their underſtandings in the uſe of the means; and not be forced to depend upon me, and upon my chuſing, and my interpretation, for the neceſſary points they are to believe to make them chriſtians: if I, the great unmaſker, have not the ſole power to decree what is, or is not fundamental, and people be not bound to receive it for ſuch, faith and the goſpel are given up; darkneſs and barbariſm will be brought in upon us by this writer's contrivance. For " he is an underhand fac- " tor for that communion, which cries up ignorance for the mother of devotion " and religion;" i. e. in plain Engliſh, for popery, For to this, and nothing elſe, tends all that ſputter he makes in the ſection before-mention'd.

I DO not think there was ever a more thorough-pac'd declaimer, than our unmaſker. He leaves out nothing that he thinks will make an affrighting noiſe in the ears of his orthodox hearers, though all the blame and cenſure he pours out upon others, light only on himſelf. For let me aſk this zealous upholder of light and knowledge; Does he think it reaſonable, that any one, who is not a chriſtian, ſhould be ſuffered to be undiſturbed in his pariſh? Nay, does he think fit that any ſuch ſhould live free from the laſh of the magiſtrate, or from the perſecution of the eccleſiaſtical power? He ſeems to talk with another air, pag. 65. In the next place I aſk, Whether any one is a chriſtian, who has not the faith of a chriſtian? Thirdly, I aſk, Whether he has the faith of a chriſtian, who does not explicitly believe all the fundamental articles of chriſtianity? And, to conclude, I aſk him, Whether all thoſe, that he has ſet down, are not fundamental neceſſary articles? When the unmaſker has fairly anſwered theſe queſtions, it will be ſeen who is for popery, and the ignorance and tyranny that accompanies it.

THE unmaſker is for making and impoſing articles of faith; but he is for this power in himſelf. He likes not popery (which is nothing but the tyranny and impoſing upon mens underſtandings, faith and conſciences) in the hands of the old gentleman at Rome: but it would, he thinks, do admirably well in his own hands. And who can blame him for it? Would not that be an excellent way to propagate light and knowledge, by tying up all men to a bundle of articles of his own culling? Or rather, to the authority of Chriſt and his apoſtles reſiding in him? For he does not, nor ever will, give us a full view of fundamentals of his chriſtianity: but, like the church of Rome, to ſecure our dependance, reſerves to himſelf a power of declaring others, and defining what is matter of faith, as he ſhall ſee occaſion.

Now, therefore, veil your bonnets to the unmaſker, all you that have a mind to be chriſtians: break not your heads about the ſcriptures, to examine what they require of you: ſubmit your faith implicitly to the unmaſker; he will underſtand and find out the neceſſary points for you to believe. Take them, juſt ſo many as he thinks fit to deliver them to you; this is the way to be knowing chriſtians. But be ſure, aſk not, Whether thoſe he is pleaſed to deliver, be every one of them fundamental, and all the fundamental articles, neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian? Such a capricious queſtion ſpoils all, overturns chriſtianity, which is intruſted to the unmaſker's ſole keeping, to be diſpenſed out as he thinks fit. If you refuſe an implicit faith to him, he will preſently find you have it for the whore of Babylon; he will ſmell out popery in it immediately: for he has a very ſhrewd ſcent, and you will be diſcovered to be an underhand factor for the church of Rome.

BUT if the unmaſker were ſuch an enemy, as he pretends, to thoſe factors, I wonder he ſhould, in what he has ſaid concerning the apoſtles creed, ſo exactly jump with Knot the jeſuit. If any one doubt of this, I deſire him to look into the fourth chapter of "Knot's charity maintained," and there he will ſee how well our unmaſker and that jeſuit agree in argument; nay, and expreſſions too. But yet I do not think him ſo far guilty, as to be employed as an underhand factor for popery. Every body will, I ſuppoſe, be ready to pronounce him ſo far an innocent, as to clear him from that. The cunning of his deſign goes not beyond the laying out of his preaching oratory, for the ſetting up his own ſyſtem, and making that the ſole chriſtianity. To that end, he would be glad to have the power of interpreting ſcripture, of defining and declaring articles of faith, and impoſing them. This, which makes the abſolute power of the pope, he would not, I think, eſtabliſh at Rome; but 'tis plain he would have it himſelf, if he could get it, for the ſupport of the chriſtianity of his ſyſtem. An implicit faith, if he might have the management of it, and the taking fundamentals upon truſt from his authority, would be of excellent uſe. Such a power, in his hands, would ſpread truth and knowledge in the world, i. e. his own orthodoxy and ſet of opinions. But if a man differs, nay, queſtions any thing of that, whether it be abſolutely neceſſary to make one a chriſtian, 'tis immediately a contrivance to let in popery, and to bring "darkneſs and barbariſm into the chriſtian world." But I muſt tell the innocent unmaſker, whether he deſigns it or no, that if his calling his ſyſtem the only Chriſtianity, can bring the world to receive from him articles of faith of his own chuſing, as fundamentals neceſſary to be believed by all men to make them chriſtians, which Chriſt and his apoſtles did not propoſe to all men to make them Chriſtians; he does only ſet up popery in another guiſe, and lay the foundations of ignorance, darkneſs and barbariſm in the chriſtian world: for all the ignorance and blindneſs, that popery introduced, was only upon this foundation. And if he does not ſee this, (as there is reaſon to excuſe his innocence) 'twould be no hard matter to demonſtrate it, if that were at preſent the queſtion between us. But there are a great many other propoſitions to be proved by him, before we come to that new matter of debate.

BUT before I quit theſe paragraphs, I muſt go on with our unmaſker's account, and deſire him to ſhew, where it is,

XXV. "THAT I make it my buſineſs to beat men off from taking notice of "any divine truths?

NEXT, where it is,

XXVI. THAT, "I cry down all articles of chriſtian faith but one?"

NEXT, how it appears,

XXVII. THAT "I will not ſuffer mankind to look into chriſtianity?"

AGAIN, where it is,

XXVIII. THAT "I labour induſtriouſly to keep people in ignorance;" or tell them, that "there is no neceſſity of knowing any other doctrines of the bible?"

THESE, and ſeveral others of the like ſtrain, particularly concerning one article, and the epiſtles, (which are his common-places) are to be found in his 59th and 60th pages. And all this out of a preſumption, that his ſyſtem is the only chriſtianity; and that if men were not preſſed and perſuaded to receive that, juſt every article of it, upon pain of damnation, chriſtianity would be loſt: and not to do this, is to promote ignorance, and contemn the bible. But he fears where no fear is. If his orthodoxy be the truth, and conformable to the ſcriptures, the laying the foundation only where our Saviour and his apoſtles have laid it, will not overturn it. And to ſhew him, that it is ſo, I deſire him again to conſider what I ſaid in my vindication, p. 591. which, becauſe I do not remember, he any where takes notice of, in his reply, I will here offer again to his conſideration: "Convince but men of the miſſion of Jeſus Chriſt; make them "but ſee the truth, ſimplicity, and reaſonableneſs of what he himſelf hath "taught, and required to be believed by his followers; and you need not doubt, "but being once fully perſuaded of his doctrine, and the advantages which, all "chriſtians agree, are received by him, ſuch converts will not lay by the ſcriptures; but, by a conſtant reading and ſtudy of them, will get all the light "they can from this divine revelation, and nouriſh himſelf up in the words of "faith and good doctrine, as St. Paul ſpeaks to Timothy."

IF the reading and ſtudy of the ſcripture were more preſſed than it is, and men were fairly ſent to the bible to find their religion; and not the bible put into their hands, only to find the opinions of their peculiar ſect or party, chriſtendom would have more chriſtians, and thoſe that are, would be more knowing, and more in the right, than they now are. That which hinders this, is that ſelect bundle of doctrines, which it has pleaſed every ſect to draw out of the ſcriptures, or their own inventions, with an omiſſion (and as our unmaſker would ſay, a contempt) of all the reſt. Theſe choice truths (as the unmaſker calls his) are to be the ſtanding orthodoxy of that party, from which none of that church muſt recede, without the forfeiture of their chriſtianity, and the loſs of eternal life. But, whilſt people keep firm to theſe, they are in the church, and the way to ſalvation: which, in effect, what is it but to encourage ignorance, lazineſs, and neglect of the ſcriptures? For what need they be at the pains of conſtantly reading the bible, or perplex their heads with conſidering and weighing what is there delivered; when believing as the church believes, or ſaying after, or not contradicting their domine, or teacher, ſerves the turn?

Further, I deſired it may be conſidered, what name that mere mock-ſhew, of recommending to men the ſtudy of the ſcripture, deſerves; if, when they read it, they muſt underſtand it juſt as he (that would be, and they are too apt, contrary to the command of Chriſt, to call, their maſter) tells them. If they find any thing in the word of God, that leads them into opinions he does not allow; if any thing they meet with in holy writ, ſeems to them to thwart, or ſhake the received doctrines, the very propoſing of their doubts renders them ſuſpected. Reaſoning about them, and not acquieſcing in whatever is ſaid to them, is interpreted want of due reſpect and deference to the authority of their ſpiritual guides; diſrepute and cenſures follow: and if, in purſuance of their own light, they perſiſt in what they think the ſcripture teaches them, they are turned out of the church, delivered to Satan, and no longer allowed to be chriſtians. And is thus a ſincere and rightly directed ſtudy of the ſcriptures, that men may underſtand and profit thereby, encouraged? This is the conſequence of men's aſſuming to themſelves a power of declaring fundamentals, i. e. of ſetting up a chriſtianity of their own making. For how elſe can they turn men, of as unblameable lives as others of their members, out of the church of Chriſt (for ſo they count their communion) for opinions, unleſs thoſe opinions were concluded inconſiſtent with chriſtianity? Thus ſyſtems, the inventions of men, are turned into ſo many oppoſite goſpels; and nothing is truth in each ſect, but what juſt ſuits with them. So that the ſcripture ſerves but, like a noſe of wax, to be turned and bent, juſt as may fit the contrary orthodoxies of different ſocieties. For 'tis theſe ſeveral ſyſtems, that to each party are the juſt ſtandards of truth, and the meaning of the ſcripture is to be meaſured only by them. Whoever relinquiſhes any of thoſe diſtinguiſhing points, immediately ceaſes to be a chriſtian.

This is the way that the unmaſker would have truth and religion preſerved, light and knowledge propagated. But here too, the different ſects giving equal authority to their own orthodoxies, will be quits with him. For, as far as I can obſerve, the ſame genius ſeems to influence them all, even thoſe who pretend moſt to freedom, the ſocinians themſelves. For when 'tis obſerved, how poſitive and eager they are in their diſputes; how forward to have their interpretations of ſcripture received for authentick, though to others, in ſeveral places, they ſeem very much ſtrained; how impatient they are of contradiction; and with what diſreſpect and roughneſs they often treat their oppoſers: may it not be ſuſpected, that this ſo viſible a warmth in their preſent circumſtances, and zeal for their orthodoxy, would (had they the power) work in them, as it does in others? They, in their turns, would, I fear, be ready with their ſet of fundamentals; which they would be as forward to impoſe on others, as others have been to impoſe contrary fundamentals on them.

This is, and always will be, the unavoidable effect of intruding on our Saviour's authority, and requiring more now, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, than was at firſt required by our Saviour and his apoſtles. What elſe can be expected among chriſtians, but their tearing, and being torn in pieces by, one another; whilſt every ſect aſſumes to itſelf a power of declaring fundamentals, and ſeverally thus narrow chriſtianity to their diſtinct ſyſtems? He that has a mind to ſee how fundamentals come to be framed and faſhioned, and upon what motives and conſiderations they are often taken up, or laid down, according to the humours, intereſts, or deſigns of the heads of parties, as if they were things depending on men's pleaſure, and to be ſuited to their convenience, may find an example worth his notice, in the life of Mr. Baxter, part II. p. 197,--205.

Whenever men take upon them to go beyond thoſe fundamental articles of chriſtianity, which are to be found in the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, where will they ſtop? Whenever any ſet of men will require more, as neceſſary to be believed, to make men of their church, i. e. in their ſenſe, chriſtians, than what our Saviour and his apoſtles propoſed to thoſe whom they made chriſtians, and admitted into the church of Chriſt; however they may pretend to recommend the ſcripture to their people, in effect, no more of it is recommended to them, than juſt comports with what the leaders of that ſect have reſolved chriſtianity ſhall conſiſt in.

'TIS no wonder, therefore, there is ſo much ignorance amongſt chriſtians, and ſo much vain outcry againſt it; whilſt almoſt every diſtinct ſociety of chriſtians magiſterially aſcribes orthodoxy to a ſelect ſet of fundamentals, diſtinct from thoſe propoſed in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles; which, in no one point, muſt be queſtioned by any of its communion. By this means their people are never ſent to the holy ſcriptures, that true fountain of light, but hood-winked: a veil is caſt over their eyes, and then they are bid read their bible. They muſt make it all chime to their church's fundamentals, or elſe they were better let it alone. For if they find any thing there againſt the received doctrines, though they hold it and expreſs it in the very terms the Holy Ghoſt has delivered it in, that will not excuſe them. Hereſy will be their lot, and they ſhall be treated accordingly. And thus we ſee how, amongſt other good effects, creed-making always has, and always will neceſſarily produce and propagate ignorance in the world, however each party blame others for it. And therefore I have often wondered to hear men of ſeveral churches ſo heartily exclaim againſt the implicit faith of the church of Rome; when the ſame implicit faith is as much practiſed and required in their own, though not ſo openly profeſſed, and ingenuouſly owned there.

IN the next ſection, the unmaſker queſtions the ſincerity of mine, and profeſſes the greatneſs of his concern "for the ſalvation of men's ſouls." And tells me of my reflection on him, upon that account, in my vindication, page 591. Anſw. I wiſh he would, for the right information of the reader, every-where ſet down, what he has any thing to ſay to, in my book, or my defence of it, and ſave me the labour of repeating it. My words, in that place, are, "Some men "will not bear, that any one ſhould ſpeak of religion, but according to the mo"del that they themſelves have made of it. Nay, though he propoſes it upon "the very terms, and in the very words, which our Saviour and his apoſtles "preached it in; yet he ſhall not eſcape cenſures, and the ſevereſt inſinuations. "To deviate in the leaſt, or to omit any thing contained in their articles, is he"reſy, under the moſt invidious names in faſhion; and 'tis well if he eſcapes "being a downright atheiſt. Whether this be the way for teachers to make "themſelves hearkened to, as men in earneſt in religion, and really concerned "for the ſalvation of men's ſouls, I leave them to conſider. What ſucceſs it "has had, towards perſuading men of the truth of chriſtianity, their own com"plaints of the prevalency of atheiſm, on the one hand, and the number of "deiſts on the other, ſufficiently ſhew."

I HAVE ſet down this paſſage at large, both as a confirmation of what I ſaid but juſt now; and alſo to ſhew, that the reflection I there made, needed ſome other anſwer, than a bare profeſſion of his "regard to the ſalvation of men's "ſouls." The aſſuming an undue authority to his own opinions, and uſing manifeſt untruths in the defence of them, I am ſure, is no mark, that the directing men right in the way to ſalvation, is his chief aim. And I wiſh, that the greater liberties of that ſort, which he has again taken in his Socinianiſm unmaſked, and which I have ſo often laid open, had not confirmed that reflection. I ſhould have been glad, that any thing in my book had been fairly controverted, and brought to the touch, whether it had, or had not been confuted. The matter of it would have deſerved a ſerious debate (if any had been neceſſary) in the words of ſobriety, and the charitable temper of the goſpel, as I deſired in my preface: and that would not have miſbecome the unmaſker's function. But it did not conſiſt, it ſeems, with his deſign. Chriſtian charity would not have allowed thoſe ill-meant conjectures, and groundleſs cenſures, which were neceſſary to his purpoſe: and therefore he took a ſhorter courſe, than to confute my book, and thereby convince me and others. He makes it his buſineſs to rail at it, and the author of it, that that might be taken for a confutation. For by what he has hitherto done, arguing ſeems not to be his talent. And thus far, who can but allow his wiſdom? But whether it be that "wiſdom that is from "above; firſt pure, then peaceable, gentle, eaſy to be intreated, full of mercy, "and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocriſy;" I ſhall leave to other readers to judge.

His ſaying nothing to that other reflection, which his manner of expreſſing himſelf drew from me, would make one ſuſpect, it ſavoured not altogether of the wiſdom of the goſpel; nor ſhewed an over-great care of the ſalvation of ſouls. My words, vindic. p. 595. are; "I know not how better to ſhew my "care of his credit, than by intreating him, that when he takes next in hand "ſuch a ſubject as this, wherein the ſalvation of ſouls is concerned, he would "treat it a little more ſeriouſly, and with a little more candour, leſt men ſhould "find in his writings another cauſe of atheiſm, which in this treatiſe he has not "thought fit to mention. Oſtentation of wit in general, he has made a cauſe "of atheiſm, p. 28. But the world will tell him, that frothy, light diſcourſes, "concerning the ſerious matters of religion, and oſtentation of trifling, miſbe-"coming wit, in thoſe who come as ambaſſadors from God, under the title of "ſucceſſors of the apoſtles, in the great commiſſion of the goſpel, is none of "the leaſt cauſes of atheiſm." But this advice, I am now ſatisfied, (by his ſecond part of the ſame ſtrain) was very improper for him; and no more reaſonable, than if one ſhould adviſe a buffoon to talk gravely, who has nothing left to draw attention, if he ſhould lay by his ſcurrility.

The remainder of this fourth chapter, p. 61,—67, being ſpent in ſhewing, why the Socinians are for a few articles of faith, being a matter that I am not concerned in; I leave to that forward gentleman to examine, who examined Mr. Edwards's exceptions againſt the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity;" and who, as the unmaſker informs me, page 64. was choſen to vindicate my attempt, &c.

If the unmaſker knows that he was ſo choſen, it is well. If I had known of ſuch a choice, I ſhould have deſired that ſome-body ſhould have been choſen to vindicate my attempt, who underſtood it better. The unmaſker and examiner are each of them ſo full of themſelves, and their own ſyſtems, that I think they may be a fit match one for another: and ſo I leave theſe cocks of the game to try it out in an endleſs battle of wrangling ('till death them part) which of them has made the true and exact collection of fundamentals; and whoſe ſyſtem of the two ought to be the prevailing orthodoxy, and be received for ſcripture. Only I warn the examiner to look to himſelf: for the unmaſker has the whip-hand of him, and gives him to underſtand, p. 65. that if he cannot do it himſelf by the ſtrength of his lungs, the vehemency of his oratory, and endleſs attacks of his repetitions; the eccleſiaſtical power, and the civil magiſtrate's laſh, have, in ſtore, demonſtrative arguments to convince him, that his [the unmaſker's] ſyſtem is the only true chriſtianity.

By the way, I muſt not forget to mind the unmaſker here again, that he hath a very unlucky hand at gueſſing. For whereas he names Socinus, as one from whom I received my platform, and ſays, that "Crellius gave me my cue;" it ſo falls out, that they are two authors of whom I never read a page. I ſay not this, as if I thought it a fault if I had; for I think I ſhould have much better ſpent my time in them, than in the writings of our learned unmaſker.

I was ſure there was no offending the unmaſker, without the guilt of atheiſm; only he here, p. 69. very mercifully lays it upon my book, and not upon my deſign. The "tendency of it to irreligion and atheiſm," he has proved in an eloquent harangue, (for he is ſuch an orator he cannot ſtir a foot without a ſpeech) made, as he bids us ſuppoſe, by the atheiſtical rabble. And who can deny, but he has choſe a fit employment for himſelf? Where could there be found a better ſpeech-maker for the atheiſtical rabble? But let us hear him: for though he would give the atheiſtical rabble the credit of it, yet 'tis the unmaſker ſpeaks. And becauſe 'tis pity ſuch a pattern of rhetorick and reaſon ſhould be loſt, I have, for my reader's edification, ſet it all down verbatim.

“ We are beholden to this worthy adventurer for ridding the world of ſo “ great an incumbrance, viz. that huge maſs and unwieldy body of chriſtianity, “ which took up ſo much room. Now we ſee that it was this bulk, and not “ that of mankind, which he had an eye to, when he ſo often mentioned this “ latter. This is a phyſician for our turn, indeed! We like this chymical o- “ perator, that doth not trouble us with a parcel of heavy drugs of no value, “ but contracts it all into a few ſpirits, nay, doth his buſineſs with a ſingle drop. “ We have been in bondage a long time to creeds and catechiſms, ſyſtems and “ confeſſions; we have been plagued with a tedious bead-roll of articles, “ which our reverend divines have told us, we muſt make the matter of our “ faith. Yea, ſo it is, both conformiſts and nonconformiſts (though diſagree- “ ing in ſome other things) have agreed in this, to moleſt and crucify us. But “ this noble writer (we thank him) hath ſet us free, and eaſed us, by bringing “ down all the chriſtian faith into one point. We have heard ſome men talk of “ epiſtolary compoſures of the new teſtament, as if great matters were contained “ in them, as if the great myſteries of chriſtianity (as they call them) were “ unfolded there: But we could never make any thing of them; and now we “ find that this writer is partly of our opinion. He tells us, that theſe are let- “ ters ſent upon occaſion; but we are not to look for our religion (for now, for “ this gentleman's ſake, we begin to talk of religion) in theſe places. We be- “ lieve it, and we believe that there is no religion but in thoſe very chap- “ ters and verſes, which he has ſet down in his treatiſe. What need we have “ any other part of the new teſtament? That is bible enough, if not too “ much. Happy, thrice happy ſhall this author be perpetually eſteemed by us; “ we will chronicle him as our friend and benefactor. It is not our way to “ ſaint people, otherwiſe we would certainly canonize this gentleman; and “ when our hand is in, his pair of bookſellers, for their being ſo beneficial to “ the world, in publiſhing ſo rich a treaſure. It was a bleſſed day, when “ this hopeful birth ſaw the light; for hereby all the orthodox creed-makers “ and ſyſtematick men are ruined for ever. In brief, if we be for any chriſtia- “ nity, it ſhall be this author's; for that agrees with us ſingularly well, it being “ ſo ſhort, all couched in four words, neither more nor leſs. It is a very fine “ compendium, and we are infinitely obliged to this great reformer for it. We “ are glad at heart, that chriſtianity is brought ſo low by this worthy pen-man; “ for this is a good preſage, that it will dwindle into nothing. What! but one “ article, and that ſo brief too! We like ſuch a faith, and ſuch a religion, be- “ cauſe it is ſo near to none.”

HE hath no ſooner done, but, as it deſerved, he cries out, “ Euge, ſophos! “ And is not the reader,” quoth he, “ ſatisfied that ſuch language as this hath “ real truth in it? Does not he perceive, that the diſcarding all the articles but “ ONE, makes way for the caſting off that too?” Anſw. 'Tis but ſuppoſing that the reader is a civil gentleman, and anſwers, Yes, to theſe two queſtions; and then 'tis demonſtration, that by this ſpeech, he has irrefragably proved the tendency of my book to irreligion and atheiſm.

I REMEMBER Chillingworth ſomewhere puts up this requeſt to his adverſary Knot: “ Sir, I beſeech you, when you write again, do us the favour to “ write nothing but ſyllogiſms. For I find it ſtill an extreme trouble to find out “ the concealed propoſitions, which are to connect the parts of your enthy- “ mems. As now, for example, I profeſs to you I have done my beſt endea- “ vour to find ſome glue, or ſodder, or cement, or thread, or any thing to tie “ the antecedent and this conſequent together.” The unmaſker agrees ſo much in a great part of his opinion with that Jeſuit, (as I have ſhewed already) and does ſo infinitely out-do him in ſpinning ropes of ſand, and a coarſe thread of inconſiſtencies, which runs quite through his book; that 'tis with great juſtice I put him here in the Jeſuit's place, and addreſs the ſame requeſt to him.

HIS very next words give me a freſh reaſon to do it: for thus he argues, p. 72. “ May we not expect, that thoſe who deal thus with the creed, i. e. diſ- “ card all the articles of it but one, will uſe the ſame method in reducing the “ ten commandments and the Lord's prayer, abbreviate the former into one

“ precept, and the latter into one petition?” Anſw. If he will tell me where this creed he ſpeaks of is, it will be much more eaſy to anſwer his demand. Whilſt his creed, which he here ſpeaks of, is yet no where, it is ridiculous for him to aſk queſtions about it. The ten commandments, and the Lord's prayer, I know where to find in expreſs words, ſet down by themſelves, with peculiar marks of diſtinction. Which is the Lord's prayer, we are plainly taught by this command of our Saviour, Luke xi. 2. “ when ye pray, SAY, Our Father,” &c. In the ſame manner and words, we are taught what we ſhould believe, to make us his diſciples, by his command to the apoſtles what they ſhould preach, Matth. x. 7. “ As ye go, preach, SAYING,” (What were they to ſay? Only this) “ The kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Or, as St. Luke expreſſes it, chap. ix. 2. They were ſent “ to preach the kingdom of God, and to heal the ſick:” which, what it was, we have ſufficiently explained. But this creed of the unmaſker, which he talks of, where is it? Let him ſhew it us diſtinctly ſet out from the reſt of the ſcripture. If he knows where it is, let him produce it, or leave talking of it, 'till he can. 'Tis not the apoſtles creed, that's evident: for that creed he has diſcarded from being the ſtandard of chriſtian faith, and has told the world in words at length, That, “ if a man believes no more than is in expreſs terms in the apoſtles creed, his faith will not be the faith of a chriſtian.” Nay, 'tis plain, that creed has, in the unmaſker's opinion, the ſame tendency to atheiſm and irreligion, that my ſummary has. For the apoſtles creed, reducing the forty, or perhaps, the four hundred fundamental articles of his chriſtian creed, to twelve; and leaving out the greateſt part of thoſe neceſſary ones, which he has already, and will hereafter, in good time, give us; does as much diſpoſe men to ſerve the decalogue, and the Lord's prayer, juſt ſo, as my reducing thoſe twelve to two. For ſo many, at leaſt, he has granted to be in my ſummary, viz. the article of one God, maker of heaven and earth, and the other, of Jeſus the Meſſiah; though he every where calls them but ONE: which, whether it be to ſhew, with what love and regard to truth he continues, and conſequently began, this controverſy; or whether it be to beguile and ſtartle unwary, or confirm prejudiced readers, I ſhall leave others to judge. 'Tis evident, he thinks his cauſe would be mightily maimed, if he were forced to leave out the charge of ONE article; and he would not know what to do for wit or argument, if he ſhould call them two: for then the whole weight and edge of his ſtrong and ſharp reaſoning, in his “ thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm,” p. 122. would be loſt. There you have it in theſe words: “ When the catholick faith is thus brought down to one ſingle article, it will ſoon be reduced to none; the unit will dwindle into a cypher.” And here again, it makes the whole argument of his atheiſtical ſpeech, which he winds up with theſe convincing words: “ We are glad to hear that chriſtianity is brought ſo low by this worthy pen-man; for this is a good preſage, that it will dwindle into nothing. What! ONE article, and that ſo brief too! We like ſuch a faith, and ſuch a religion, becauſe it is ſo near NONE.” But I muſt tell this writer, of equal wit, ſenſe, and modeſty, that this religion, which he thus makes a dull farce of, and calls, “ near none,” is that very religion which our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt and his apoſtles preached, for the converſion and ſalvation of mankind; no one article whereof, which they propoſed as neceſſary to be received by unbelievers, to make them chriſtians, is omitted. And I aſk him, Whether it be his errand, as one of our Saviour's ambaſſadors, to turn it thus into ridicule? For 'till he has ſhewn, that they preached otherwiſe, and more than what the Spirit of truth has recorded of their preaching in their hiſtories, which I have faithfully collected, and ſet down, all that he ſhall ſay, reflecting upon the plainneſs and ſimplicity of their doctrine, however directed againſt me, will by his atheiſtical rabble of all kinds, now they are ſo well entered and inſtructed in it by him, be all turned upon our Saviour and his apoſtles.

WHAT tendency this, and all his other trifling, in ſo ſerious a cauſe, as this is, has to the propagating of atheiſm and irreligion in this age, he were beſt to conſider. This I am ſure, the doctrine of but one article (if the author and finiſher of our faith, and thoſe he guided by his Spirit, had preached but one article)

article) has no more tendency to atheiſm, than their doctrine of one God. But the unmaſker every where talks, as if the ſtrength of our religion lay in the number of its articles; and would be preſently routed, if it had but a few; and therefore he has muſtered up a pretty full band of them, and has a reſerve, of, the Lord knows how many more, which ſhall be forth-coming upon occaſion. But I ſhall deſire to mind this learned divine, who is ſo afraid what will become of his religion, if it ſhould propoſe but one or a few articles, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, that the ſtrength and ſecurity of our religion lies in the divine authority of thoſe who firſt promulgated the terms of admittance into the church, and not in the multitude of articles, ſuppoſed by ſome neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian: and I would have him remember, when he goes next to make uſe of this ſtrong argument of, "ONE "dwindling into a cypher," that one is as remote as a million from none. And if this be not ſo, I deſire to know whether his way of arguing will not prove pagan polytheiſm to be more remote from atheiſm than chriſtianity. He will do well to try the force of his ſpeech in the mouth of an heathen, complaining of the tendency of chriſtianity to atheiſm, by reducing his great number of Gods to but one, which was ſo near none, and would, therefore, ſoon be reduced to none.

THE unmaſker ſeems to be upon the ſame topick, where he ſo pathetically complains of the Socinians, p. 66. in theſe words: "Is it not enough to rob "us of our God, by denying Chriſt to be ſo; but muſt they ſpoil us of all the "other articles of chriſtian faith but one?" Have a better heart, good ſir, for I aſſure you no body can rob you of your God, but by your own conſent, nor ſpoil you of any of the articles of your faith. If you look for them, where God has placed them, in the holy ſcripture, and take them as he has framed and faſhioned them there; there you will always find them ſafe and ſound. But if they come out of an artificer's ſhop, and be of human invention, I cannot anſwer for them: they may, for aught I know, be nothing, but an idol of your own ſetting up, which may be pulled down, ſhould you cry out never ſo much, "Great is the Diana of the Epheſians!"

HE, who conſiders this argument of one and none, as managed by the unmaſker, and obſerves his pathetical way of reaſoning all through his book, muſt confeſs, that he has got the very philoſopher's ſtone in diſputing. That which would be worthleſs lead in others, he turns into pure gold; his oratory changes its nature, and gives it the noble tincture: ſo that what, in plain reaſoning, would be nonſenſe, let him but put it into a ſpeech, or an exclamation, and there it becomes ſtrong argument. Whether this be not ſo, I deſire mode and figure may decide. And to thoſe I ſhall deſire he would reduce the proofs, which, p. 73. he ſays he has given of theſe following propoſitions, viz.

XXIX. "THAT I have corrupted men's minds.

XXX. "THAT I have depraved the goſpel."

XXXI. "THAT I have abuſed chriſtianity."

FOR all theſe three, p. 73. he affirms of me without proof, and without honeſty.

WHETHER it be from confuſion of thought, or unfairneſs of deſign; either becauſe he has not clear diſtinct notions of what he would ſay, or finds it not to his purpoſe to ſpeak them clearly out, or both together; ſo it is, that the unmaſker very ſeldom, but when he rails, delivers himſelf ſo that one can certainly tell what he would have.

THE queſtion is, What is abſolutely neceſſary to be believed by every one, to make him a chriſtian? It has been clearly made out, from an exact ſurvey of the hiſtory of our Saviour and his apoſtles, that the whole aim of all their preaching every-where was, to convince the unbelieving world of theſe two great truths; firſt, That there was one, eternal, inviſible God, maker of heaven and earth: and next, that Jeſus of Nazareth was the Meſſiah, the promiſed King and Saviour: and that, upon men's believing theſe two articles, they were baptized and admitted into the church, i. e. received as ſubjects of Chriſt's kingdom, and pronounced believers. From whence it unavoidably follows, that theſe two are the only truths neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian.

This matter of fact is ſo evident from the whole tenor of the four Goſpels, and the Acts; and preſſes ſo hard, that the unmaſker, who contends for a great number of other points neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, thinks himſelf concerned to give ſome anſwer to it; but, in his uſual way of uncertainty and confuſion. To clear this matter, he lays down four particulars, the firſt is, p. 74. "That the believing Jeſus to be the promiſed Meſſiah, was the firſt ſtep "to chriſtianity."

The ſecond, p. 76. "That though this one propoſition, (viz. of Jeſus the "Meſſiah) be mentioned alone in ſome places, yet there is reaſon to think, and "be perſuaded, that at the ſame time other matters of faith were propoſed."

The third, p. 76. "That though there are ſeveral parts and members of the "chriſtian faith, yet they do not all occur in any one place of ſcripture."

The fourth, p. 78. "That chriſtianity was erected by degrees."

These particulars he tells us, p. 74. "he offers to clear an objection." To ſee, therefore, whether they are pertinent or no, we muſt examine what the objection is, as he puts it. I think it might have been put in few words: this I am ſure, it ought to have been put very clear and diſtinct. But the unmaſker has been pleaſed to give it us, p. 73. as followeth; "Becauſe I deſigned theſe "papers for the ſatisfying of the reader's doubts, about any thing occurring, "concerning the matter before us, and for the eſtabliſhing of his wavering "mind; I will here (before I paſs to the ſecond general head of my diſcourſe) "anſwer a query, or objection, which ſome, and not without ſome ſhew of "ground, may be apt to ſtart. How comes it to paſs, they will ſay, that this "article of faith, viz. that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, or Chriſt, is ſo often repeated "in the new teſtament? Why is this ſometimes urged, without the mentioning of any other article of belief? Doth not this plainly ſhew, that this is all "that is required to be believed, as neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian? May "we not infer, from the frequent and ſole repetition of this article in ſeveral "places of the Evangeliſts and the Acts, that there is no other point of faith of "abſolute neceſſity; but that this alone is ſufficient to conſtitute a man a true "member of Chriſt?"

By which he ſhews, that he is uncertain which way to put the objection, ſo as may be eaſieſt to get rid of it: and therefore he has turned it ſeveral ways, and put ſeveral queſtions about it. As firſt,

"Why this article of faith," viz. that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, "is ſo often "repeated in the new teſtament?"

His next queſtion is, "Why is this ſometimes urged without the mentioning any other article of belief?" which ſuppoſes, that ſometimes other articles of belief are mentioned with it.

The third queſtion is, "May we not infer, from the frequent and ſole repetition of this article, in ſeveral places of the Evangeliſts and Acts?"

Which laſt queſtion is in effect, Why is this ſo frequently and alone repeated in the Evangeliſts and the Acts? i. e. in the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles to unbelievers. For of that he muſt give an account, if he will remove the difficulty. Which three, though put as one, yet are three as diſtinct queſtions, and demand a reaſon for three as diſtinct matters of fact, as theſe three are, viz. frequently propoſed; ſometimes propoſed alone; and always propoſed alone, in the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles: for ſo in truth it was, all through the Goſpels and the Acts, to the unconverted believers of one God alone.

These three queſtions being thus jumbled together in one objection, let us ſee how the four particulars, he mentions, will account for them.

THE firſt of them is this: "The believing Jeſus to be the promiſed Meſſias," was, ſays he, "the firſt ſtep to chriſtianity." Let it be ſo: What do you infer from thence? The next words ſhew: "Therefore this, rather than any "other article, was propounded to be believed by all thoſe, whom either our "Saviour or his apoſtles invited to embrace chriſtianity." Let your premiſes be never ſo true, and your deduction of this propoſition be never ſo regular from them, it is all loſt labour. This concluſion is not the propoſition you were to prove. Your queſtions were, "Why this article is ſo often propoſed?" And in thoſe frequent repetitions, "Why ſometimes urged alone, and why always "propoſed alone, viz. to thoſe whom either our Saviour or his apoſtles invited "to embrace chriſtianity?" And your anſwer is, Becauſe the believing "Jeſus "to be the Meſſias, was the firſt ſtep to chriſtianity." This therefore remains upon you to be proved,

XXXII. "THAT becauſe the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſias, is the firſt "ſtep to chriſtianity; therefore this article is frequently propoſed in the "new teſtament, is ſometimes propoſed without the mentioning any other "article, and always alone to unbelievers."

AND when you have proved this, I ſhall deſire you to apply it to our preſent controverſy.

HIS next anſwer to thoſe queſtions, is in theſe words, p. 76. "That though "this one propoſition, or article, be mentioned alone in ſome places, yet there "is reaſon to think, and be perſuaded, that at the ſame time other matters of "faith were propoſed." From whence it lies upon him to make out this reaſoning, viz.

XXXIII, "THAT becauſe there is reaſon to think, and be perſuaded, that "at the ſame time that this one article was mentioned alone, (as it was "ſometimes) other matters of faith were propoſed: therefore this article "was often propoſed in the new teſtament; ſometimes propoſed alone; "and always propoſed alone, in the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, to unbelievers."

THIS I ſet down to ſhew the force of his anſwer to queſtions: ſuppoſing it to be true, not that I grant it to be true, that where "this one article is "mentioned alone, we have reaſon to think, and be perſuaded, that at the "ſame time other matters of faith [i. e. articles of faith neceſſary to be believed "to make a man a chriſtian] were propoſed:" and I doubt not but to ſhew the contrary.

HIS third particular, in anſwer to the queſtion propoſed in his objection, ſtands thus, p. 76. "That though there are ſeveral parts and members of the chriſtian faith, yet they do not all occur in any one place of the ſcripture;" which anſwer lays it upon him to prove,

XXXIV. THAT becauſe "the ſeveral parts of the members of the chriſtian "faith do not all occur in any one place of ſcripture;" therefore this article, that Jeſus was the "Meſſias, was often propoſed in the new teſta-"ment, ſometimes propoſed alone, and always propoſed alone," in the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, through the hiſtory of the evangeliſts and the Acts.

THE fourth and laſt particular, which he tells us, is the main anſwer to the objection, is in theſe words, page 78.

"THAT chriſtianity was erected by degrees."

WHICH requires him to make out this argument, viz.

XXXV. "That becauſe chriſtianity was erected by degrees, therefore this "article," that Jeſus was the Meſſias, was often propoſed in the new teſ- "tament, ſometimes propoſed alone, and always propoſed alone in the "preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles to unbelievers, recorded in the "hiſtory of the evangeliſts and Acts."

For, as I ſaid before, in theſe three queſtions he has put his objection; to which, he tells us, this is the main anſwer.

Of theſe four particulars it is, that he ſays, p. 74. "To clear this objection, "and to give a full and ſatisfactory anſwer to all doubts in this affair, I offer "theſe enſuing particulars, which will lead the reader to the right underſtand- "ing of the whole caſe."

How well they have cleared the objection, may be ſeen by barely ſetting them down as anſwers to theſe queſtions, wherein he puts the objection.

This is all I have hitherto done; whereby is very viſible, how well (ſuppoſing them true) they clear the objection; and how pertinently they are brought to anſwer thoſe queſtions wherein his objection is contained. Perhaps it will be ſaid, that neither theſe, nor any thing elſe, can be an appoſite anſwer to thoſe queſtions put ſo together. I anſwer, I am of the ſame mind. But if the unmaſker, through ignorance or ſhuffling, will talk thus confuſedly, he muſt anſwer for it. He calls all his three queſtions, one objection, over and over again: and therefore, which of thoſe queſtions it does or does not lie in, I ſhall not trouble myſelf to divine; ſince I think he himſelf cannot tell: for which ever he takes of them, it will involve him in equal difficulties. I now proceed to examine his particulars themſelves, and the truth contained in them. The firſt, p. 74. ſtands thus:

1. "The believing of Jeſus to be the promiſed Meſſias, was the firſt ſtep "to chriſtianity. It was that which made way for the embracing of all the "other articles, a paſſage to all the reſt." Anſw. If this be, as he would have it, only the leading article, amongſt a great many other, equally neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian; this is a reaſon, why it ſhould be conſtantly preached in the firſt place: but this is no reaſon why this alone ſhould be ſo often repeated, and the other neceſſary points not be once mentioned. For I deſire to know what thoſe other articles are, that in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, are repeated or urged beſides this?

In the next place, if it be true, that this article, viz. that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, was only the firſt in order amongſt a great many articles, as neceſſary to be believed; how comes it to paſs, that barely upon the propoſal and believing of this, men were admitted into the church as believers? The hiſtory of the new teſtament is full of inſtances of this, as Acts viii. 5, 12, 13. ix. and in other places.

Though it be true, what the unmaſker ſays here, "That if they did not "give credit to this in the firſt place, that Jeſus of Nazareth was that eminent "and extraordinary perſon propheſied of long before, and that he was ſent and "commiſſioned by God, there could be no hope that they would attend to any "other propoſals, relating to the chriſtian religion;" yet what he ſubjoins, that "this is the true reaſon, why that article was conſtantly propounded to be "believed by all that looked towards chriſtianity, and why it is mentioned ſo "often in the evangelical writings," is not true. For, firſt, this ſuppoſes that there were other articles joined with it. This he ſhould have firſt proved, and then given the reaſon of it; and not, as he does here, ſuppoſe what is in queſtion, and then give a reaſon why it is ſo; and ſuch a reaſon that is inconſiſtent with the matter of fact, that is every where recorded in holy writ. For, if the true reaſon why the preaching of this article, that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah," as it is recorded in the hiſtory of the new teſtament, were only to make way for the other articles, one muſt needs think, that either our Saviour and his apoſtles (with reverence be it ſpoken) were very ſtrange preachers; or, that the evangeliſts, and author of the Acts, were very ſtrange hiſtorians. The firſt were to inſtruct the world in a new religion, conſiſting of a great number of articles, ſays the unmaſker, neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, i. e. a great number of propoſitions, making a large ſyſtem, every one whereof is ſo neceſſary for a man to underſtand and believe, that if any one be omitted, he cannot be of that religion. What now did our Saviour and his apoſtles do? Why, if the unmaſker may be believed, they went up and down with danger of their lives, and preached to the world. What did they preach? Event his ſingle propoſition to make way for the reſt, viz. "This is the eminent man ſent "from God," to teach you other things: which amounts to no more but this, that Jeſus was the perſon which was to teach them the true religion, but that true religion itſelf is not to be found in all their preaching; nay, ſcarce a word of it. Can there be any thing more ridiculous than this? And yet this was all they preached, if it be true, that this was all which they meant by the preaching every where, Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and if it were only an introduction, and a making way for the doctrines of the goſpel. But it is plain, it was called the goſpel itſelf. Let the unmaſker, as a true ſucceſſor of the apoſtles, go and preach the goſpel, as the apoſtles did, to ſome part of the heathen world, where the name of Chriſt is not known: would not he himſelf, and every body think, he was very fooliſhly employed, if he ſhould tell them nothing but this, that Jeſus was the perſon promiſed and ſent from God to reveal the true religion; but ſhould teach them nothing of that true religion, but this preliminary article? Such the unmaſker makes all the preaching, recorded in the new teſtament, for the converſion of the unbelieving world. He makes the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles to be no more but this; that the great prophet promiſed to the world was come and that Jeſus was he: but what his doctrine was, that they were ſilent in, and taught not one article of it. But the unmaſker miſrepreſents it: for as to his accuſing the hiſtorians, the evangeliſts, and writers of the Acts of the apoſtles, for their ſhameful omiſſion of the whole doctrine of the chriſtian religion, to ſave his hypotheſis, as he does under his next head, in theſe words; "That though this one propoſition be mentioned "alone in ſome places, yet there is reaſon to think, and be perſuaded, that at "the ſame time other matters of faith were propoſed;" I ſhall ſhew how bold he makes with thoſe inſpired hiſtorians, when I come to conſider that particular.

How ridiculous, how ſenſeleſs, this bold unmaſker, and reformer of the hiſtory of the new teſtament, makes the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, as it ſtands recorded of them by infallible writers, is viſible. But taking it, as in truth it is there, we ſhall have a quite other view of it. Our Saviour preached every-where the kingdom of God; and, by his miracles, declared himſelf to be the king of that kingdom. The apoſtles preached the ſame, and after his aſcenſion, openly avowed him to be the Prince and Saviour promiſed: but preached not this as a bare ſpeculative article of ſimple belief; but that men might receive him for their King, and become his ſubjects. When they told the world, that he was the Chriſt, it was not as the unmaſker will have it; Believe this man to be a prophet, and then he will teach you his new religion; which, when you have received and embraced all and every article thereof, which are a great number, you will then be chriſtians, if you be not ignorant or incredulous of any of them. But it was, Believe this man to be your King ſent from God; take him for ſuch, with a reſolution to obſerve the laws he has given you; and you are his ſubjects, you are chriſtians. For thoſe that truly did ſo, made themſelves his ſubjects: and to continue ſo, there was no more required, than a ſincere endeavour to know his will in all things, and to obey it. Such a preaching as this, of Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, the King and Deliverer, that God Almighty had promiſed to mankind, and now had effectually ſent, to be their Prince and Ruler, was not a ſimple preparation to the goſpel: but, when received with the obedience of faith, was the very receiving of the goſpel; and had all that was requiſite to make men chriſtians. And, without it be ſo underſtood, no body can clear the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles from that incredible imperfection, or their hiſtorians from that unpardonable negligence, and not doing either what they ought, or what they undertook, which our unmaſker hath ſo impiouſly charged upon them: as will appear yet plainer, in what I have to ſay to the unmaſker's next particular. For, as to the remainder of this paragraph, it contains nothing but his cenſure and contempt of me, for not being of his mind, for not ſeeing as he ſees; i. e. in effect, not laying that blame, which he does, either on the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, or on the inſpired writings of their hiſtorians, to make them comply with his ſyſtem, and the chriſtianity he would make.

THE unmaſker's ſecond particular, p. 76. tells us, "That though this one "propoſition or article be mentioned alone in ſome places, yet there is reaſon "to think, and be perſuaded, that at the ſame time other matters of faith were "propoſed. For it is confeſſed by all intelligent and obſerving men, that the "hiſtory of the ſcripture is conciſe; and that in relating of matter of fact, ma-"ny paſſages are omitted by the ſacred penmen. Wherefore, though but this "one article of belief (becauſe it is a leading one, and makes way for the reſt) "be expreſly mentioned in ſome of the goſpels, yet we muſt not conclude "thence, that no other matter of faith was required to be admitted of. For "things are briefly ſet down in the evangelical records, and we muſt ſuppoſe "many things which are not in direct terms related."

ANSW. The unmaſker here keeps to his uſual cuſtom of ſpeaking in doubtful terms. He ſays, that where this one article, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, is alone recorded in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles; "We have "reaſon to be perſuaded, that at the ſame time other matters of faith were pro-"poſed." If this be to his purpoſe, by matters of faith, muſt be meant fundamental articles of faith, abſolutely neceſſary to be believed by every man to make him a chriſtian. That ſuch matters of faith are omitted, in the hiſtory of the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, by the ſacred hiſtorians; this, he ſays, "we have reaſon to be perſuaded of."

ANSW. They need be good reaſons to perſuade a rational man, that the evangeliſts, in their hiſtory of our Saviour and his apoſtles, (if they were but ordinarily fair and prudent men) did, in an hiſtory publiſhed to inſtruct the world in a new religion, leave out the neceſſary and fundamental parts of that religion. But, let them be conſidered as inſpired writers, under the conduct of the infallible ſpirit of God, putting them upon, and directing them in, the writing of this hiſtory of the goſpel; and then it is impoſſible, for any chriſtian but the unmaſker, to think, that they made any ſuch groſs omiſſions, contrary to the deſign of their writing, without a demonſtration to convince him of it. Now all the reaſon that the unmaſker gives, is this: "That it is confeſſed by "all intelligent and obſerving men, that the hiſtory of the ſcripture is conciſe; "and that in relating matters of fact, many paſſages are omitted by the ſacred "pen-men."

ANSW. The unmaſker might have ſpared the confeſſion of intelligent and obſerving men, after ſo plain a declaration of St. John himſelf, chap. xx. 30. "Many other things did Jeſus in the preſence of his diſciples, which are not "written in this book." And again, chap. xxi. 25. "There are alſo many o-"ther things that Jeſus did, the which if they ſhould be written every one, I "ſuppoſe the world could not contain the books that ſhould be written." There needs, therefore, no opinion of intelligent and obſerving men to convince us, that the hiſtory of the goſpel is ſo far conciſe, that a great many matters of fact are omitted, and a great many leſs material circumſtances, even of thoſe that are ſet down. But will any intelligent or obſerving man, any one that bears the name of a chriſtian, have the impudence to ſay, that the inſpired writers, in the relation they give us, of what Chriſt and his apoſtles preached to unbelievers to convert them to the faith, omitted the fundamental articles, which thoſe preachers propoſed to make them chriſtians; and without a belief of which, they could not be chriſtians?

THE unmaſker talks after his wonted faſhion; i. e. ſeems to ſay ſomething, which when examined, proves nothing to his purpoſe. He tells us, "That in "ſome places," where the article of "Jeſus the Meſſiah is mentioned alone, at "the ſame time other matters of faith were propoſed." I aſk, were theſe other matters of faith all the unmaſker's neceſſary articles? If not, what are thoſe other matters of faith to the unmaſker's purpoſe? As for example, in St. Peter's ſermon, Acts ii. "Other matters of faith were propoſed with the article of Je-"ſus the Meſſiah." But what does this make for his fundamental articles: Were they all propoſed with the article of Jeſus the Meſſiah? If not, unbelievers were converted, and brought into the church, without the unmaſker's neceſſary articles. Three thouſand were added to the church by this one ſermon. I paſs by, now, St. Luke's not mentioning a ſyllable of the greateſt part of the unmaſker's neceſſary articles; and ſhall conſider only, how long that ſermon may have been. 'Tis plain from ver. 15. that it began not 'till about nine in the morning; and from ver. 41. that before night three thouſand were converted and baptized. Now I aſk the unmaſker, Whether ſo ſmall a number of hours, as St. Peter muſt neceſſarily employ in preaching to them, were ſufficient to inſtruct ſuch a mixed multitude ſo fully in all thoſe articles, which he has propoſed as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; as that every one of thoſe three thouſand, that were that day baptized, did underſtand, and explicitly believe every one of thoſe his articles, juſt in the ſenſe of our unmaſker's ſyſtem? Not to mention thoſe remaining articles, which the unmaſker will not be able, in twice as many months, to find and declare to us.

He ſays, "That in ſome places," where the article of "Jeſus the Meſſiah is "mentioned alone, at the ſame time other matters of faith were propoſed." Let us take this for ſo at preſent, yet this helps not the unmaſker's caſe. The fundamental articles, that were propoſed by our Saviour and his apoſtles, neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians, are not ſet down; but only this ſingle one, of "Jeſus the Meſſiah:" therefore, will any one dare to ſay they are omitted every-where by the evangeliſts? Did the hiſtorians of the goſpel make their relation ſo conciſe and ſhort, that giving an account in ſo many places, of the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, for the converſion of the unbelieving world, they did not in any one place, nor in all of them together, ſet down the neceſſary points of that faith, which their unbelieving hearers were converted to? If they did not, how can their hiſtories be called the Goſpels of Jeſus Chriſt? Or how can they ſerve to the end for which they were written? Which was to publiſh to the world the doctrine of Jeſus Chriſt, that men might be brought into his religion. Now I challenge the unmaſker to ſhew me, not out of any one place, but out of all the preachings of our Saviour and his apoſtles, recorded in the four Goſpels, and the Acts, all thoſe propoſitions which he has reckoned up as fundamental articles of faith. If they are not to be found there, 'tis plain, that either they are not articles of faith, neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; or elſe, that thoſe inſpired writers have given us an account of the goſpel, or chriſtian religion, wherein the greateſt part of the doctrines neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, are wholly omitted. Which in ſhort is to ſay, that the chriſtianity, which is recorded in the Goſpels and the Acts, is not that chriſtianity which is ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian. This (as abſurd and impious as it is) is what our unmaſker charges upon the conciſeneſs (as he is pleaſed to call it) of the evangelical hiſtory. And this we muſt take upon his word, though theſe inſpired writers tell us the direct contrary: for St. Luke, in his preface to his goſpel, tells Theophilus, That having a perfect knowledge OF ALL THINGS, the deſign of his writing was to ſet them in order, that he might know the certainty of thoſe things that were believed amongſt chriſtians. And his hiſtory of the Acts begins thus: "The "former treatiſe [i. e. his goſpel] have I made, O Theophilus, of ALL that "Jeſus began to do and to teach." So that how conciſe ſoever the unmaſker will have his hiſtory to be, he profeſſes it to contain ALL that Jeſus taught. Which ALL muſt, in the narroweſt ſenſe that can be given it, contain at leaſt all things neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian. 'Twould elſe be a very lame and imperfect hiſtory of ALL that Jeſus taught, if the faith contained in it were not ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian. This indeed, as the unmaſker hath been pleaſed to term it, would be a very lank faith, a very lank goſpel.

St. John alſo ſays thus, of his hiſtory of the goſpel, chap. xx. 30, 31. "Many other ſigns, truly did Jeſus, in the preſence of his diſciples, which "are not written in this book:" ſo far his hiſtory is, by his own confeſſion, conciſe. "But theſe," ſays he, "are written that ye might believe, that Jeſus "is the Meſſiah, the Son of God; and that, believing, ye might have life "through his name." As conciſe as it was, there was yet (if the apoſtle's word may be taken for it againſt the unmaſker's) enough contained in his goſpel, for the procuring of eternal life, to thoſe who believed it. And, whether it was that one article that he there ſets down, viz. That Jeſus was the Meſſiah, or that ſet of articles which the unmaſker gives us, I ſhall leave to this modern divine to reſolve. And, if he thinks ſtill, that all the articles he has ſet down in his roll, are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, I muſt deſire him to ſhew them to me in St. John's goſpel, or elſe to convince the world, that St. John was miſtaken, when he ſaid, that he had written his goſpel, that men might believe that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah, the Son of God; and that, believing, "they might have life through his name."

So that, granting the hiſtory of the ſcripture to be ſo conciſe, as the unmaſker would have it, viz. that in ſome places the infallible writers, recording the diſcourſes of our Saviour and his apoſtles, omitted all the other fundamental articles propoſed by them to be believed to make men chriſtians, but this one, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah; yet this will not remove the objection, that lies againſt his other fundamentals, which are not to be found in the hiſtories of the four evangeliſts; nay, not to be found in every one of them. If every one of them contains the goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt, and conſequently, all things neceſſary to ſalvation, whether this will not be a new ground of accuſation againſt me, and give the unmaſker a right to charge me with laying by three of the goſpels with contempt, as well as he did before charge me with a contempt of the epiſtles, muſt be left to his ſovereign authority to determine.

Having ſhewed, that allowing all he ſays here to be as he would have it, yet it clears not the objection that lies againſt his fundamentals; I ſhall now examine what truth there is in what he here pretends, viz. that though the one article, That Jeſus is the Meſſiah, be mentioned "alone in ſome places, yet we "have reaſon to be perſuaded, from the conciſeneſs of the" ſcripture hiſtory, that there were, at the ſame time, joined with it other neceſſary articles of faith, in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles.

It is to be obſerved, that the unmaſker builds upon this falſe ſuppoſition, that in ſome places, other neceſſary articles of faith, joined with that of Jeſus the Meſſiah, are by the evangeliſts mentioned to be propoſed by our Saviour and his apoſtles, as neceſſary to be believed to make thoſe, they preached to, chriſtians. For his ſaying, that in ſome places, that "one neceſſary article is "mentioned alone," implies, that in other places it is not mentioned alone, but joined with other neceſſary articles. But then it will remain upon him to ſhew,

XXXVI, "In what place either of the Goſpels, or of the Acts, other articles of faith are joined with this, and propoſed as neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians."

The unmaſker, 'tis probable, will tell us, that the article of Chriſt's reſurrection is ſometimes joined with this of the Meſſiah, as particularly in that firſt ſermon of St. Peter, Acts ii. by which there were three thouſand added to the church at one time. Anſw. This ſermon, well conſidered, will explain to us both the preaching of the apoſtles; what it was that they propoſed to their unbelieving auditors, to make them chriſtians; and alſo the manner of St. Luke's recording their ſermons. 'Tis true, that here are delivered by St. Peter many other matters of faith, beſides that of Jeſus being the Meſſiah: for all that he ſaid, being of divine authority, is matter of faith, and may not be diſbelieved. The firſt part of his diſcourſe is, to prove to the Jews, that what they had obſerved of extraordinary at that time, amongſt the diſciples, who ſpake variety of tongues, did not proceed from wine, but from the Holy Ghoſt; and that this was the pouring out of the Spirit, propheſied of by the prophet Joel. This is all matter of faith, and is written, that it might be believed: but yet I think, neither the unmaſker, nor any body elſe will ſay, that this is ſuch a neceſſary article of faith, that no man could, without an explicit belief of it, be a chriſtian; though being a declaration of the Holy Ghoſt by St. Peter, it is ſo much a matter of faith, that nobody to whom it is now propoſed, can deny it, and be a chriſtian. And thus all the ſcripture of the new teſtament, given by divine inſpiration, is matter of faith, and neceſſary to be believed by all chriſtians, to whom it is propoſed. But yet I do not think any one ſo unreaſonable as to ſay, that every propoſition in the new teſtament is a fundamental article of faith, which is required explicitly to be believed to make a man a chriſtian.

HERE now is a matter of faith joined, in the ſame ſermon, with this fundamental article, that "Jeſus is the Meſſiah; and reported by the ſacred hiſtorian ſo at large, that it takes up a third part of St. Peter's ſermon, recorded by St. Luke: and yet it is ſuch a matter of faith, as is not contained in the unmaſker's catalogue of neceſſary articles. I muſt aſk him then, whether St. Luke were ſo conciſe an hiſtorian, that he would ſo at large ſet down a matter of faith, propoſed by St. Peter, that was not neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and wholly leave out the very mention of all the unmaſker's additional neceſſary articles, if indeed they were neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians? I know not how any one could charge the hiſtorian with greater unfaithfulneſs, or greater folly. But this the unmaſker ſticks not at, to preſerve to himſelf the power of appointing what ſhall, and what ſhall not, be neceſſary articles; and of making his ſyſtem the chriſtianity neceſſary, and only neceſſary to be received.

THE next thing that St. Peter proceeds to, in this his ſermon, is, to declare to the unbelieving Jews, that Jeſus of Nazareth, who had done miracles amongſt them, whom they had crucified, and put to death, and whom God had raiſed again from the dead, was the Meſſiah.

HERE indeed our Saviour's crucifixion, death, and reſurrection, are mentioned: and if they were no where elſe recorded, are matters of faith; which, with all the reſt of the new teſtament, ought to be believed by every chriſtian, to whom it is thus propoſed, as a part of divine revelation. But that theſe were not here propoſed to the unbelieving Jews, as the fundamental articles, which St. Peter principally aimed at, and endeavoured to convince them of, is evident from hence; that they are made uſe of, as arguments to perſuade them of this fundamental truth, viz. that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, whom they ought to take for their Lord and Ruler. For whatſoever is brought as an argument, to prove another truth, cannot be thought to be the principal thing aimed at, in that argumentation; though it may have ſo ſtrong and immediate a connection with the concluſion, that you cannot deny it, without denying even what is inferred from it, and is therefore the fitter to be an argument to prove it. But that our Saviour's crucifixion, death, and reſurrection, were uſed here as arguments to perſuade them into a belief of this fundamental article, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, and not as propoſitions of a new faith they were to receive, is evident from hence, that St. Peter preached here to thoſe who knew the death and crucifixion of Jeſus as well as he: and therefore theſe could not be propoſed to them, as new articles of faith to be believed; but theſe matters of fact being what the Jews knew already, were a good argument, joined with his reſurrection, to convince them of that truth, which he endeavoured to give them a belief of. And therefore he rightly inferred, from theſe facts joined together, this concluſion, the believing whereof would make them chriſtians: "Therefore "let all the houſe of Iſrael know aſſuredly, that God hath made that ſame "Jeſus, whom ye have crucified, Lord and Chriſt." To the making good this ſole propoſition, his whole diſcourſe tended: this was the ſole truth he laboured to convince them of; this the faith he endeavoured to bring them into; which as ſoon as they had received with repentance, they were by baptiſm admitted into the church, and three thouſand at once made chriſtians.

HERE St. Luke's own confeſſion, without that "of intelligent and obſerv"ing men," which the unmaſker has recourſe to, might have ſatiſfied him again, "that in relating matters of fact, many paſſages are omitted by the ſacred "pen-men." For, ſays St. Luke here, ver. 40. "And with many other words," which are not ſet down.

One would, at firſt ſight, wonder why the unmaſker neglects theſe demonſtrative authorities of the holy pen-men themſelves, where they own their omiſſions, to tell us, that it is "confeſſed by all intelligent and obſerving men, that "in relating matters of fact, many paſſages are omitted by the ſacred pen-men." S. John, in what he ſays of his goſpel, directly profeſſes large omiſſions, and ſo does St. Luke here. But theſe omiſſions would not ſerve the unmaſker's turn; for they are directly againſt him, and what he would have: and therefore he had reaſon to paſs them by. For St. John, in that paſſage above cited, chap. xx. 30, 31. tells us, that how much ſoever he had left out of his hiſtory, he had inſerted that, which was enough to be believed to eternal life: "But "theſe are written, that ye might believe, and, believing, ye might have life." But this is not all he aſſures us of, viz. that he had recorded all that was neceſſary, to be be believed to eternal life: but he, in expreſs words, tells us what is that ALL, that is neceſſary to be believed to eternal life; and for the proof of which propoſition alone, he writ all the reſt of his goſpel, viz. that we might believe, What? Even this; "That Jeſus is the Chriſt, the Son of God," and that, believing this, we "might have life through his name."

THIS may ſerve for a key to us, in reading the hiſtory of the new teſtament; and ſhew us why this article, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, is no where omitted, though a great part of the arguments uſed to convince men of it, nay, very often the whole diſcourſe, made to lead men into the belief it, be intirely omitted, The Spirit of God directed them every where, to ſet down the article, which was abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians; ſo that that could no ways be doubted of, nor miſtaken: but the arguments and evidences, which were to lead men into this faith, would be ſufficient, if they were once found any where, though ſcattered here and there, in thoſe writings, whereof that infallible Spirit was the author. This preſerved the decorum uſed in all hiſtories, and avoided thoſe continual, large, and unneceſſary repetitions, which our critical unmaſker might have called tedious, with juſter reaſon than he does the repetition of this ſhort propoſition, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah; which I ſet down no oftner in my book, than the Holy Ghoſt thought fit to inſert it in the hiſtory of the new teſtament, as conciſe as it is. But this, it ſeems to our nice unmaſker, is tedious, tedious and offenſive. And if a chriſtian, and a ſucceſſor of the apoſtles, cannot bear the being ſo often told, what it was that our Saviour and his apoſtles every where preached to the believers of one God, though it be contained in one ſhort propoſition; what cauſe of exception and diſguſt would it have been to heathen readers, ſome whereof might, perhaps, have been as critical as the unmaſker, if this ſacred hiſtory had, in every page, been filled with the repeated diſcourſes of the apoſtles, all of them every where to the ſame purpoſe, viz. to perſuade men to believe, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah? It was neceſſary, even by the laws of hiſtory, as often as their preaching any where was mentioned, to tell to what purpoſe they ſpoke; which being always to convince men of this one fundamental truth, 'tis no wonder we find it ſo often repeated. But the arguments and reaſonings with which this one point is urged, are, as they ought to be, in moſt places, left out. A conſtant repetition of them had been ſuperfluous, and conſequently might juſtly have been blamed as tedious. But there is enough recorded abundantly to convince any rational man, any one not wilfully blind, that he is that promiſed Saviour. And, in this, we have a reaſon of the omiſſions in the hiſtory of the new teſtament; which were no other than ſuch as became prudent, as well as faithful writers. Much leſs did that conciſeneſs (with which the unmaſker would cover his bold cenſure of the goſpels and the Acts, and, as it ſeems, lay them by with contempt) make the holy writers omit any thing, in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, abſolutely neceſſary to be known and believed to make men chriſtians.

CONFORMABLE hereunto, we ſhall find St. Luke writes his hiſtory of the Acts of the apoſtles. In the beginning of it, he ſets down at large, ſome of the diſcourſes made to the unbelieving Jews. But in moſt other places, unleſs it be where there was ſomething particular in the circumſtances of the matter, he contents himſelf to tell to what purpoſe they ſpoke; which was every where only this, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah. Nay, St. Luke, in the firſt ſpeech of St. Peter, Acts ii. which he thought fit to give us great part of, yet owns the omiſſion of ſeveral things that the apoſtle ſaid. For, having expreſſed this fundamental doctrine, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, and recorded ſeveral of the arguments wherewith St. Peter urged it, for the converſion of the unbelieving Jews, his auditors, he adds, ver. 40. “ And with many other words, did he teſtify and “ exhort, ſaying, Save yourſelves from this untoward generation.” Here he confeſſes, that he omitted a great deal which St. Peter had ſaid to perſuade them, To what? To that which, in other words, he had juſt ſaid before, ver. 38. “ Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jeſus Chriſt,” i. e. Believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, take him as ſuch for your Lord and King, and reform your lives by a ſincere reſolution of obedience to his laws.

THUS we have an account of the omiſſions in the records of matters of fact in the new teſtament. But will the unmaſker ſay, The preaching of thoſe articles that he has given us, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian, was part of thoſe matters of fact, which have been omitted in the hiſtory of the new teſtament? Can any one think, that “ the corruption and degene- “ racy of human nature, with the true original of it, (the defection of our firſt “ parents) the propagation of ſin and mortality, our reſtoration and reconciliation “ by Chriſt's blood, the eminency and excellency of his prieſthood, the efficacy “ of his death, the full ſatisfaction thereby made to divine juſtice, and his being “ made an all-ſufficient ſacrifice for ſin, our juſtification by Chriſt's righteouſ- “ neſs, election, adoption,” &c. were all propoſed, and that too, in the ſenſe of our author's ſyſtem, by our Saviour and his apoſtles, as fundamental articles of faith, neceſſary to be explicitly believed by every man, to make him a Chriſtian, in all their diſcourſes to unbelievers; and yet that the inſpired pen-men of thoſe hiſtories every where left the mention of theſe fundamental articles wholly out? This would have been to have writ, not a conciſe, but an imperfect hiſtory of all that Jeſus and his apoſtles taught.

WHAT an account would it have been of the goſpel, as it was firſt preached and propagated, if the greateſt part of the neceſſary doctrines of it were wholly left out, and a man could not find from one end to the other of this whole hiſtory, that religion which is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a Chriſtian? And yet this is that, which, under the notion of their being conciſe, the unmaſker would perſuade us to have been done by St. Luke and the other evangeliſts, in their hiſtories. And it is no leſs than what he plainly ſays, in his “ thoughts concerning the cauſes of atheiſm,” p. 109. where, to aggravate my fault, in paſſing by the epiſtles, and to ſhew the neceſſity of ſearching in them for fundamentals, he in words blames me; but in effect, condemns the ſacred hiſtory contained in the Goſpels and the Acts. “ It is moſt evident, “ ſays he, “ to any thinking man,” that the author of the reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, “ purpoſely omits the epiſtolary writings of the apoſtles, becauſe they are fraught “ with other fundamental doctrines, beſides that one which he mentions. There “ we are inſtructed concerning theſe grand heads of Chriſtian divinity. Here, i. e. in the epiſtles, ſays he, “ there are diſcoveries concerning ſatisfaction,” &c. And, in the cloſe of his liſt of grand heads, as he calls them, ſome whereof I have above ſet down out of him, he adds, “ Theſe are the matters of faith “ contained in the epiſtles.” By all which expreſſions he plainly ſignifies, that theſe, which he calls fundamental doctrines, are none of thoſe we are inſtructed in, in the Goſpels and the Acts; that they are not diſcovered nor contained in the hiſtorical writings of the evangeliſts: whereby he confeſſes, that either our Saviour and his apoſtles did not propoſe them in their preachings to their unbelieving hearers; or elſe, that the ſeveral faithful writers of their hiſtory, wilfully, i. e. unfaithfully, every-where omitted them in the account they have left us of thoſe preachings; which could ſcarce poſſibly be done by them all, and every where, without an actual combination amongſt them, to ſmother the greateſt and moſt material parts of our Saviour's and his apoſtles diſcourſes. For what elſe did they, if all that the unmaſker has ſet down in his liſt be fundamental doctrines; every one of them abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, which our Saviour and his apoſtles every where preached, to make men chriſtians; but yet St. Luke, and the other evangeliſts, by a very guilty and unpardonable conciſeneſs, every where omitted them, and, throughout their whole hiſtory, never once tell us, they were ſo much as propoſed, much leſs, that they were thoſe articles which the apoſtles laboured to eſtabliſh and convince men of every where, before they admitted them to baptiſm? Nay, the far greateſt part of them, the hiſtory they writ does not any where ſo much as once mention? How, after ſuch an imputation as this, the unmaſker will clear himſelf from laying by the four Goſpels and the Acts, with contempt, let him look; if my not collecting fundamentals out of the epiſtles had that guilt in it. For I never denied all the fundamental doctrines to be there, but only ſaid, that there they were not eaſy to be found out, and diſtinguiſhed from doctrines not fundamental. Whereas our good unmaſker charges the hiſtorical books of the new teſtament, with a total omiſſion of the far greateſt part of thoſe fundamental doctrines of chriſtianity, which, he ſays, are abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian.

To convince the reader what was abſolutely required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and thereby clear the holy writers from the unmaſker's ſlander, any one need but look a little farther into the hiſtory of the Acts, and obſerve St. Luke's method in the writing of it. In the beginning, (as we obſerved before) and in ſome few other places, he ſets down at large the diſcourſes made by the preachers of chriſtianity, to their unbelieving auditors. But in the proceſs of his hiſtory, he generally contents himſelf to relate, what it was their diſcourſes drive at; what was the doctrine they endeavoured to convince their unbelieving hearers of, to make them believers. This, we may obſerve, is never omitted. This is every where ſet down. Thus, Acts v. 42. he tells us, that "daily in the temple, and in every houſe, the apoſtles ceaſed not to teach, and "to preach JESUS THE MESSIAH." The particulars of their diſcourſes he omits, and the arguments they uſed to induce men to believe, he omits; but never fails to inform us carefully, what it was the apoſtles taught and preached, and would have men believe. The account he gives us of St. Paul's preaching at Theſſalonica, is this: That "three ſabbath days he REASONED with the "Jews out of the ſcriptures, OPENING and ALLEDGING, that the Meſſiah "muſt needs have ſuffered, and riſen again from the dead; and that Jeſus was "the Meſſiah;" Acts xvii. 2, 3. At Corinth, that "he REASONED in the "ſynagogue every ſabbath, and PERSUADED the Jews and the Greeks, and "TESTIFIED that Jeſus was the Meſſiah;" xviii. 4, 5. That "Apollos "mightily convinced the Jews, SHEWING BY THE SCRIPTURES, that Jeſus "was the Meſſiah;" xviii. 28.

BY theſe, and the like places, we may be ſatisfied what it was, that the apoſtles taught and preached, even this one propoſition, That Jeſus was the Meſſiah: for this was the ſole propoſition they reaſoned about; this alone they teſtified, and they ſhewed out of the ſcriptures; and of this alone they endeavoured to convince the Jews and the Greeks, that believed one God. So that it is plain from hence, that St. Luke omitted nothing, that the apoſtles taught and preached; none of thoſe doctrines that it was neceſſary to convince unbelievers of, to make them chriſtians; though he, in moſt places, omitted, as was fit, the paſſages of ſcripture which they alledged, and the arguments thoſe inſpired preachers uſed to perſuade men to believe and embrace that doctrine.

ANOTHER convincing argument, to ſhew that St. Luke omitted none of thoſe fundamental doctrines, which the apoſtles any where propoſed, as neceſſary to be believed, is from that different account he gives us of their preaching in other places, and to auditors otherwiſe diſpoſed. Where the apoſtles had to do with idolatrous heathens, who were not yet come to the knowledge of the only true God, there, he tells us, they propoſed alſo the article of the one inviſible God, maker of heaven and earth: and this we find recorded in him out of their preaching to the Lyſtrians, Acts xiv. and to the Athenians, Acts xvii.

in the latter of which, St. Luke, to convince his reader, that he, out of conciſeneſs, omits none of thoſe fundamental articles, that were any where propoſed by the preachers of the goſpel, as neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians, ſets down not only the article of Jeſus the Meſſiah, but that alſo of the one inviſible God, creator of all things, which (if any neceſſary one might, this, of all other fundamental articles) might, by an author that affected brevity, with the faireſt excuſe, have been omitted, as being implied in that other, of the Meſſiah ordained by God. Indeed in the ſtory of what Paul and Barnabas ſaid at Lyſtra, the article of the Meſſiah is not mentioned. Not that St. Luke omitted that fundamental article, where the apoſtles taught it: but they having here begun their preaching with that of the one living God, they had not as appears, time to proceed farther, and propoſe to them what yet remained to make them chriſtians: all that they could do, at that time, was, to hinder the people from ſacrificing to them. And, before we hear any more of their preaching, they were, by the inſtigation of the Jews, fallen upon, and Paul ſtoned.

THIS, by the way, ſhews the unmaſker's miſtake, in his firſt particular, p. 74. where he ſays, (as he does here again, in the ſecond particular, which we are now examining) that "believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, is the firſt "ſtep to chriſtianity; and therefore this, rather than any other, was propounded to be believed by all thoſe, whom either our Saviour, or the apoſtles, invited to embrace chriſtianity." The contrary whereof appears here; where the article of one God is propoſed in the firſt place, to thoſe whoſe unbelief made ſuch a propoſal neceſſary. And therefore, if his reaſon (which he uſes again here, p. 76.) were good, viz. That the article of the Meſſiah is expreſly mentioned alone, "becauſe it is a leading article, and makes way for the reſt," this reaſon would rather conclude for the article of one God; and that alone ſhould be expreſly mentioned, inſtead of the other, Since, as he argues for the other, p. 74. "If they did not believe this, in the firſt place, viz." that there was one God, "there could be no hopes that they would attend unto any other "propoſal, relating to the chriſtian religion," The vanity and falſhood of which reaſoning, viz, that the article of Jeſus the Meſſiah was every where "propounded, rather than any other, becauſe it was the leading article," we ſee in the hiſtory of St. Paul's preaching to the Athenians. St. Luke mentions more than one article, where more than one was propoſed by St. Paul; though the firſt of them was that leading article of one God, which if not received, "in "the firſt place, there could be no hope they would attend to the reſt."

SOMETHING the unmaſker would make of this argument, of a leading article, for want of a better, though he knows not what. In his firſt particular, p. 74. he makes uſe of it to ſhew, why there was but that one article propoſed by the firſt preachers of the goſpel; and how well that ſucceeds with him, we have ſeen. For this is demonſtration, that if there were but that one propoſed by our Saviour and the apoſtles, there was but that one neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians; unleſs he will impiouſly ſay, that our Saviour and the apoſtles went about preaching to no purpoſe: for if they propoſed not all that was neceſſary to make men chriſtians, 'twas in vain for them to preach, and others to hear; if when they heard and believed all that was propoſed to them, they were not yet chriſtians: for if any article was omitted in the propoſal, which was neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian, though they believed all that was propoſed to them, they could not yet be chriſtians; unleſs a man can, from an infidel, become a chriſtian, without doing what is neceſſary to make him a chriſtian.

FURTHER, if his argument, of its being a leading article, proves, that that alone was propoſed, it is a contradiction to give it as a reaſon, why it was ſet down alone by the hiſtorian, where it was not propoſed alone by the preacher, but other neceſſary "matters of faith were propoſed with it;" unleſs it can be true, that this article, of "Jeſus is the Meſſiah," was propoſed alone by our Saviour and his apoſtles, becauſe it was a leading article, and was mentioned alone in the hiſtory of what they preached, becauſe it was a leading article, tho it were not propoſed alone, but jointly with other neceſſary matters of faith. For this is the uſe he makes here again, page 76. of his leading article, under his ſecond particular, viz. to ſhew why the hiſtorians mentioned this neceſſary article of Jeſus the Meſſiah, alone, in places where the preachers of the goſpel propoſed it not alone, but with other neceſſary articles. But in this latter caſe, it has no ſhew of a reaſon at all. It may be granted as reaſonable for the teachers of any religion not to go any farther, where they ſee the firſt article, which they propoſe, is rejected; where the leading truth, on which all the reſt depends, is not received. But it can be no reaſon at all, for an hiſtorian, who writes the hiſtory of theſe firſt preachers, to ſet down only the firſt and leading article, and omit all the reſt, in inſtances where more were not only propoſed, but believed and embraced, and upon that the hearers and believers admitted into the church. 'Tis not for hiſtorians to put any diſtinction between leading, or not leading articles; but, if they will give a true and uſeful account of the religion, whoſe original they are writing, and of the converts made to it, they muſt tell, not one, but all thoſe neceſſary articles, upon aſſent to which, converts were baptized into that religion, and admitted into the church. Whoever ſays otherwiſe, accuſes them of falſifying the ſtory, miſleading the readers, and giving a wrong account of the religion which they pretend to teach the world, and to preſerve and propagate to future ages. This (if it were ſo) no pretence of conciſeneſs could excuſe or palliate.

There is yet remaining one conſideration, which were ſufficient of itſelf to convince us, that it was the ſole article of faith which was preached; and that if there had been other articles neceſſary to be know and believed by converts, they could not, upon any pretence of conciſeneſs, be ſuppoſed to be omitted: and that is the commiſſions of thoſe, that were ſent to preach the goſpel. Which ſince the ſacred hiſtorians mention, they cannot be ſuppoſed to leave out any material and main heads of thoſe commiſſions.

St. Luke records it, chap. iv. 34. that our Saviour ſays of himſelf, "I " muſt go into the other towns to tell the good news of the kingdom; for (εἰς " τȣ̃το) upon this errand am I SENT." This St. Mark calls ſimply preaching. This preaching, what it contained, St. Matthew tells us, chap. iv. 23. "And " Jeſus went about all Galilee, teaching in their ſynagogues, and preaching the " good news of the kingdom, and healing all manner of ſickneſs, and all manner " of diſeaſes amongſt the people." Here we have his commiſſion, or end of his being ſent, and the execution of it; both terminating in this, that he declared the good news, that the kingdom of the Meſſiah was come; and gave them to underſtand, by the miracles he did, that he himſelf was he. Nor does St. Matthew ſeem to affect ſuch conciſeneſs, that he would have left it out, if the goſpel had contained any other fundamental parts neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians. For he here ſays, "All manner of ſickneſs, and all man- " ner of diſeaſes," when either of them might have been better left out, than any neceſſary article of the goſpel, to make his hiſtory conciſe.

We ſee what our Saviour was ſent for. In the next place, let us look into the commiſſion he gave the apoſtles, when he ſent them to preach the goſpel. We have it in the tenth of St. Matthew, in theſe words: "Go not into the " way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not. But " go rather to the loſt ſheep of the houſe of Iſrael. And as ye go, PREACH, " SAYING, THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS AT HAND. Heal the ſick, cleanſe " the lepers, raiſe the dead, caſt out devils: freely have ye received, free- " ly give. Provide neither gold, nor ſilver, nor braſs in your purſes, nor " ſcrip in your journey; neither two coats, neither ſhoes, nor yet ſtaves (for " the workman is worthy of his meat.) And into whatſoever city, or town, " ye ſhall enter, inquire who in it is worthy, and there abide 'till ye go thence. " And when ye come into any houſe, ſalute it. And if the houſe be worthy, " let your peace come upon it; but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to " you. And whoſoever ſhall not receive you, nor hear your words; when ye de- " part out of that houſe, or city, ſhake off the duſt of your feet, Verily I ſay " unto you, it ſhall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha, “in the day of judgment, than for that city. Behold, I ſend you forth as ſheep, in the midſt of wolves: be ye therefore wiſe as ſerpents, and harmleſs as doves. But beware of men; for they will deliver you up to the councils, and they will ſcourge you in their ſynagogues. And ye ſhall be brought before governors and kings for my ſake, for a teſtimony againſt them and the Gentiles. But when they deliver you up, take no thought, how or what ye ſhall ſpeak; for it ſhall be given you in that ſame hour, what ye ſhall ſpeak. For it is not ye that ſpeak, but the Spirit of your Father, which ſpeaketh in you. And the brother ſhall deliver up the brother to death, and the father the child, and the children ſhall riſe up againſt the parents, and cauſe them to be put to death. And ye ſhall be hated of all men, for my names ſake: but he that endureth to the end ſhall be ſaved. But when they perſecute you in this city, flee ye into another: for verily I ſay unto you, ye ſhall not have gone over the cities of Iſrael, 'till the Son of man be come. The diſciple is not above his maſter, nor the ſervant above his lord. It is enough for the diſciple, that he be as his maſter, and the ſervant as his lord. If they have called the maſter of the houſe Beelzebub, how much more ſhall they call them of his houſhold? Fear them not therefore; for there is nothing covered, which ſhall not be revealed; and hid, that ſhall not be known. What I tell you in darkneſs, that ſpeak ye in light: and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the houſe-tops. And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the ſoul: but rather fear him, which is able to deſtroy both ſoul and body in hell. Are not two ſparrows ſold for a farthing? And one of them ſhall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not therefore; ye are of more value than many ſparrows. Whoſoever therefore ſhall confeſs me before men, him will I confeſs alſo before my Father, which is in heaven. But whoſoever ſhall deny me before men, him will I alſo deny before my Father, which is in heaven. Think not that I am come to ſend peace on earth: I came not to ſend peace, but a ſword. For I am come to ſet a man at variance againſt his father, and the daughter againſt her mother, and the daughter-in-law againſt her mother-in-law. And a man's foes ſhall be they of his own houſhold. He that loveth father and mother more than me, is not worthy of me: and he that loveth ſon or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me. And he that taketh not his croſs, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me. He that findeth his life, ſhall loſe it: and he that loſeth his life for my ſake, ſhall find it. He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that ſent me. He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet, ſhall receive a prophet's reward; and he that receiveth a righteous man in the name of a righteous man, ſhall receive a righteous man's reward. And whoſoever ſhall give to drink unto one of theſe little ones, a cup of cold water only, in the name of a diſciple, verily I ſay unto you, he ſhall in no wiſe loſe his reward. And it came to paſs, when Jeſus had made an end of commanding his twelve diſciples,”——

THIS is the commiſſion our Saviour gave the apoſtles, when he ſent them abroad to recover and ſave the loſt “ſheep of the houſe of Iſrael.” And will any of the unmaſker's intelligent and obſerving men ſay, that the hiſtory of the “ſcripture is ſo conciſe, that any paſſages,” any eſſential, any material, nay, any parts at all of the apoſtles commiſſion, “are here omitted by the ſacred penman?” This commiſſion is ſet down ſo at full, and ſo particularly, that St. Matthew, who was one of them to whom it was given, ſeems not to have left out one word, of all that our Saviour gave him in charge. And it is ſo large, even to every particular article of their inſtructions, that I doubt not, but my citing ſo much, “verbatim,” out of the ſacred text, will here again be troubleſome to the unmaſker. But whether he will venture again to call it tedious, muſt be as nature or caution happen to have the better on it. Can any one, who reads this commiſſion, unleſs he hath the brains, as well as the brow of an unmaſker, alledge, that the conciſeneſs of the hiſtory of the ſcripture has concealed from us thoſe fundamental doctrines, which our Saviour and his apoſtles preached; but the ſacred hiſtorians thought fit by conſent, for unconceivable reaſons, to leave out in the narrative they give us of thoſe preachings? This paſſage here, wholly confuteth that. They could preach nothing but what they were ſent to preach: and that we ſee is contained in theſe few words, “ Preach, “ ſaying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the ſick, cleanſe the le- “ pers, raiſe the dead, caſt out devils; i. e. acquaint them, that the kingdom of the Meſſiah is come, and let them know, by the miracles that you do in my name, that I am that King and Deliverer they expect. If there were any other neceſſary articles that were to be believed, for the ſaving of the loſt ſheep they were ſent to, can one think that St. Matthew, who ſets down ſo minutely every circumſtance of their commiſſion, would have omitted the moſt important and material of it? He was an ear-witneſs, and one that was ſent: and ſo (without ſuppoſing him inſpired) could not be miſled by the ſhort account he might receive from others, who by their own, or others forgetfulneſs, might have dropped thoſe other fundamental articles, that the apoſtles were ordered to preach.

THE very like account St. Luke gives us of our Saviour's commiſſion to the ſeventy, chap. x. 1,--16. “ After theſe things the Lord appointed other ſeventy “ alſo, and ſent them two and two before his face, into every city and place, “ whither he himſelf would come. Therefore ſaid he unto them, The har- “ veſt truly is great, but the labourers are few: pray ye therefore the Lord of “ the harveſt, that he would ſend forth labourers into his harveſt. Go your “ ways: behold, I ſend you forth as lambs among wolves. Carry neither purſe, “ nor ſcrip, nor ſhoes: and ſalute no man by the way. And into whatſoever “ houſe ye enter, firſt ſay, Peace be to this houſe. And if the Son of peace “ be there, your peace ſhall reſt upon it; if not, it ſhall return to you again. “ And in the ſame houſe remain, eating and drinking ſuch things as they give: “ for the labourer is worthy of his hire. Go not from houſe to houſe. And “ into whatſoever city ye enter, and they receive you, eat ſuch things as are ſet “ before you. And heal the ſick that are therein, and SAY UNTO THEM, “ THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS COME NIGH UNTO YOU.” But into whatſo- “ ever city ye enter, and they receive you not, go your ways out into the “ ſtreets of the ſame, and ſay, Even the very duſt of your city, which cleav- “ eth on us, we do wipe off againſt you: notwithſtanding, be ye ſure of this, “ that the kingdom of God is come nigh unto you. But I ſay unto you, that “ it ſhall be more tolerable, in that day, for Sodom, than for that city. Wo “ unto thee, Chorazin! Wo unto thee, Bethſaida! For if the mighty works “ had been done in Tyre and Sidon, which have been done in you, they had “ a great while ago repented, ſitting in ſackcloth and aſhes. But it ſhall be “ more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, at the day of judgment, than for you. “ And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, ſhalt be thruſt down to “ hell. He that heareth you, heareth me: and he that deſpiſeth you, deſpiſeth “ me: and he that deſpiſeth me, deſpiſeth him that ſent me.”

OUR Saviour's commiſſion here to the ſeventy, whom he ſent to preach, is ſo exactly conformable to that which he had before given to the twelve apoſtles, that there needs but this one thing more to be obſerved, to convince any one, that they were ſent to convert their hearers to this ſole belief, That the kingdom of the Meſſiah was come, and that Jeſus was the Meſſiah: and that the hiſtorians of the new teſtament are not ſo conciſe in their account of this matter, that they would have omitted any other neceſſary articles of belief, that had been given to the ſeventy in commiſſion. That which I mean is, the kingdom of the Meſſiah is twice mentioned in it to be come, verſe 9. and 11. If there were other articles given them by our Saviour, to propoſe to their hearers, St. Luke muſt be very fond of this one article, when for conciſeneſs ſake, leaving out the other fundamental articles, that our Saviour gave them in charge to preach, he repeats this more than once.

THE unmaſker's third particular, p. 76. begins thus: “ This alſo muſt be “ thought of, that though there are ſeveral parts and members of the chriſtian

“ faith, yet they do not all occur in any one place of ſcripture.” Something is in it, (whether owing to his will, or underſtanding, I ſhall not inquire) that the unmaſker always delivers himſelf in doubtful and ambiguous terms. It had been as eaſy for him to have ſaid, “ There are ſeveral articles of the chriſtian “ faith neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, ” as to ſay, (as he does here) “ There are ſeveral parts and members of the chriſtian faith.” But as an evidence of the clearneſs of his notions, or the fairneſs of his arguing, he always reſts in generals. “ There are, I grant, ſeveral parts and members of “ the chriſtian faith, which do no more occur in any one place of ſcripture,” than the whole new teſtament can be ſaid to occur in any one place of ſcripture. For every propoſition delivered in the new teſtament for divine revelation, is “ a “ part and member of the chriſtian faith.” But ’tis not thoſe “ parts and mem-“ bers of the chriſtian faith,” we are ſpeaking of; but only ſuch “ parts and “ members of the chriſtian faith,” as are abſolutely neceſſary to be believed by every man, before he can be a chriſtian. And in that ſenſe, I deny his aſſertion to be true, viz. that they do not occur in any one place of ſcripture: for they do all occur in that firſt ſermon of St. Peter, Acts ii. 14. by which three thouſand were at that time brought into the church, and that in theſe words: “ Therefore let all the houſe of Iſrael know aſſuredly, that God hath made that “ ſame Jeſus, whom you have crucified, Lord and Chriſt. Repent, and be “ baptized every one of you in the name of Jeſus Chriſt.” Here is the doctrine of Jeſus the Meſſiah, the Lord, and of repentance, propoſed to thoſe, who already believe one God: which, I ſay, are all the parts of the chriſtian faith neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian. To ſuppoſe, as the unmaſker does here, that more is required, is to beg, not prove, the queſtion.

If he diſputes this collection of mine out of that ſermon of St. Peter, I will give him a more authentick collection of the neceſſary parts of the chriſtian faith, from an author that he will not queſtion. Let him look into Acts xx. 20, &c. and there he will find St. Paul ſaying thus to the elders of Epheſus, whom he was taking his laſt leave of, with an aſſurance that he ſhould never ſee them again: “ I have kept back nothing that was profitable unto you; but “ have ſhewed you, and have taught you publickly, and from houſe to houſe, “ teſtifying both to the Jews, and alſo to the Greeks, repentance towards God, “ and faith towards our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.” If St. Paul knew what was neceſſary to make a chriſtian, here it is: here he (if he knew how to do it, for ’tis plain from his words he deſigned to do it) has put it together. But there is a greater yet than St. Paul, who has brought all the parts of faith neceſſary to ſalvation into one place; I mean our Saviour himſelf, John xvii. 3. in theſe words: “ This “ is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jeſus Chriſt, “ whom thou haſt ſent.”

But the unmaſker goes on: “ Therefore, when, in ſome places, only one “ ſingle part of the chriſtian faith is made mention of, as neceſſarily to be em-“ braced in order to ſalvation, we muſt be careful not to take it alone, but to “ ſupply it from ſeveral other places, which make mention of other neceſſary “ and indiſpenſable points of belief. I will give the reader a plain inſtance of this, “ Rom. x. 9. If thou ſhalt believe in thy heart, that God hath raiſed him (i. e. “ the Lord Jeſus) from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved.” “ Here one article of “ faith, viz. the belief of Chriſt’s reſurrection, (becauſe it is of ſo great im-“ portance in chriſtianity,) is only mentioned: but all the reſt muſt be ſuppoſed, “ becauſe they are mentioned in other places.”

Answ. One would wonder that any one converſant in holy writ, with ever ſo little attention, much more that an expounder of the ſcriptures, ſhould ſo miſtake the ſenſe and ſtyle of the ſcripture. Believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, with a lively faith, i. e. as I have ſhewed, taking him to be our King, with a ſincere ſubmiſſion to the laws of his kingdom, is all that is required to make a man a chriſtian; for this includes repentance too. The believing him therefore to be the Meſſiah, is very often, and with great reaſon, put both for faith and repentance too; which are ſometimes ſet down ſingly, where one is put for both, as implying the other; and ſometimes they are both mentioned; and then faith, as contradiſtinguiſhed to repentance, is taken for a ſimple aſſent of the mind to this truth, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah. Now this faith is variouſly expreſſed in ſcripture.

There are ſome particulars in the hiſtory of our Saviour, allowed to be ſo peculiarly appropriated to the Meſſiah, ſuch incommunicable marks of him, that to believe them of Jeſus of Nazareth, was in effect the ſame, as to believe him to be the Meſſiah, and ſo are put to expreſs it. The principal of theſe is his reſurrection from the dead; which being the great and demonſtrative proof of his being the Meſſiah, 'tis not at all ſtrange, that the believing his reſurrection ſhould be put, for believing him to be the Meſſiah; ſince the declaring his reſurrection, was a declaring him to be the Meſſiah. For thus St. Paul argues Acts xiii. 32, 33. "We declare unto you good tidings, or, we preach the goſ-"pel to you, [for ſo the word ſignifies] how that the promiſe that was made "unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the ſame unto us their children, in that "he hath raiſed up Jeſus again." The force of which argument lies in this, that if Jeſus was raiſed from the dead, then he was certainly the Meſſiah: and thus the promiſe of the Meſſiah was fulfilled, in raiſing Jeſus from the dead. The like argument St. Paul uſeth, 1 Cor. xv. 17. "If Chriſt be not raiſed, your "faith is vain, you are yet in your ſins;" i. e. if Jeſus be not riſen from the dead, he is not the Meſſiah, your believing it is in vain, and you will receive no benefit by that faith. And ſo, likewiſe, from the ſame argument of his reſurrection, he at Theſſalonica proves him to be the Meſſiah, Acts xvii. 2, 3. "And "Paul, as his manner was, went into the ſynagogue, and three ſabbath-days "reaſoned with the Jews out of the ſcriptures, opening and alledging, that the "Meſſiah muſt needs have ſuffered, and riſen again from the dead; and that "this Jeſus, whom I preach unto you, is the Meſſiah."

The neceſſary connection of theſe two, that if he roſe from the dead, he was the Meſſiah; and if he roſe not from the dead, he was not the Meſſiah; the chief prieſt and phariſees, that had proſecuted him to death, underſtood very well: who therefore, "came together unto Pilate, ſaying, Sir, we remember that that "deceiver ſaid, whilſt he was yet alive, After three days I will riſe again. Com-"mand therefore, that the ſepulchre be made ſure unto the third day, leſt his "diſciples come by night, and ſteal him away, and ſay unto the people, "He "is riſen from the dead:" "ſo the laſt error ſhall be worſe than the firſt." The error they here ſpeak of, 'tis plain, was the opinion, that he was the Meſſiah. To ſtop that belief, which his miracles had procured him amongſt the people, they had got him put to death: but if, after that, it ſhould be believed, that he roſe again from the dead, this demonſtration, that he was the Meſſiah, would but eſtabliſh what they had laboured to deſtroy by his death; ſince no one, who believed his reſurrection, could doubt of his being the Meſſiah.

'Tis not at all therefore to be wondered, that his reſurrection, his aſcenſion, his rule and dominion, and his coming to judge the quick and the dead, which are the characteriſtical marks of the Meſſiah, and belong peculiarly to him, ſhould ſometimes in ſcripture be put alone, as ſufficient deſcriptions of the Meſſiah; and the believing them of him, put for believing him to be the Meſſiah. Thus Acts x. our Saviour, in Peter's diſcourſe to Cornelius, when he brought him the goſpel, is deſcribed to be the Meſſiah, by his miracles, death, reſurrection, dominion, and coming to judge the quick and the dead.

These, (which, in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," I have upon this ground taken the liberty to call concomitant articles) where they are ſet alone for the faith to which ſalvation is promiſed, plainly ſignify the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, that fundamental article, which has the promiſe of life; and ſo give no foundation at all for what the unmaſker ſays, in theſe words: "Here "one article of faith, viz. the belief of Chriſt's reſurrection, (becauſe it is of ſo "great importance in chriſtianity) is only mentioned; but all the reſt muſt be "ſuppoſed, becauſe they are mentioned in other places."

Answ. If all the reſt be of abſolute and indiſpenſable neceſſity to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, all the reſt are, every one of them, of equal importance. For things of equal neceſſity, to any end, are of equal importance to that end. But here the truth forced its way, unawares, from the unmaſker, Our Saviour's reſurrection, for the reaſon I have given, is truly of great importance in chriſtianity; ſo great, that his being, or not being the Meſſiah, ſtands or falls with it: ſo that theſe two important articles are inſeparable, and in effect make but one. For ſince that time, believe one, and you believe both; deny one of them, and you can believe neither. If the unmaſker can ſhew me any one of the articles in his liſt, which is not of this great importance, mentioned alone, with a promiſe of ſalvation for believing it, I will grant him to have ſome colour for what he ſays here. But where is to be found in the ſcripture, any ſuch expreſſion as this; If thou ſhalt believe with thy heart "the corruption and degeneracy of human nature," thou ſhalt be ſaved? Or the like. This place, therefore, out of the Romans, makes not for, but againſt his liſt of neceſſary articles. One of them, alone, he cannot ſhew me any where ſet down, with a ſuppoſition of the reſt, as having ſalvation promiſed to it: though it be true, that that one, which alone is abſolutely neceſſary to be ſuperadded to the belief of one God, is, in divers places, differently expreſſed.

THAT which he ſubjoins, as a conſequence of what he had ſaid, is a farther proof of this: "And conſequently, ſays he, if we would give an impartial account of our belief, we muſt conſult thoſe places: and they are not all together, but diſperſed here and there. Wherefore we muſt look them out, and acquaint ourſelves with the ſeveral particulars, which make up our belief, and render it intire and conſummate."

ANSW. Never was a man conſtanter to a looſe way of talking. The queſtion is only about articles neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian: and here he talks of the "ſeveral particulars which make up our belief, and render it intire and conſummate;" confounding, as he did before, eſſential and integral parts, which, it ſeems, he cannot diſtinguiſh. Our faith is true and ſaving, when it is ſuch as God, by the new covenant, requires it to be: but it is not intire and conſummate, 'till we explicitly believe all the truths contained in the word of God. For the whole revelation of truth in the ſcripture being the proper and intire object of faith, our faith cannot be intire and conſummate, 'till it be adequate to its proper object, which is the whole divine revelation contained in the ſcripture: and ſo, to make our faith intire and conſummate, we muſt not look out thoſe places, which he ſays, are not all together. To talk of looking out, and culling of places, is nonſenſe, where the whole ſcripture alone can "make up our belief, and render it intire and conſummate:" which no one, I think, can hope for, in this frail ſtate of ignorance and error. To make the unmaſker ſpeak ſenſe and to the purpoſe here, we muſt underſtand him thus: "That if we will give an impartial account" of the articles, that are neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, "we muſt conſult thoſe places where they are; for they are not all together, but diſperſed here and there; wherefore we muſt look them out," and acquaint ourſelves with the ſeveral particulars, which make up the fundamental articles of our belief, and will render a catalogue of them intire and conſummate. If his ſuppoſition be true, I grant his method to be reaſonable, and upon that I join iſſue with him. Let him thus "give us an impartial account of our belief; let him acquaint us with the ſeveral particulars which make up a chriſtian's belief, and render it intire and conſummate." 'Till he has done this, let him not talk thus in the air of a method, that will not do: let him not reproach me, as he does, for not taking a courſe, by which he himſelf cannot do, what he reviles me for failing in. "But our haſty author," ſays he, "took another courſe, and thereby deceived himſelf, and unhappily deceived others." If it be ſo, I deſire the unmaſker to take the courſe he propoſes, and thereby undeceive me and others; and "acquaint us with the ſeveral particulars which make up a chriſtian's belief, and render it intire and conſummate;" for I am willing to be undeceived: but 'till he has done that, and ſhewn us by the ſucceſs of it, that his courſe is better. he cannot blame us for following that courſe we have done.

I COME now to his fourth and laſt particular, p. 78. which he ſays, "is the main anſwer to the objection;" and therefore I ſhall ſet it down in his own words, intire, as it ſtands together. "This, ſays he, "muſt be borne in our minds, that chriſtianity was erected by degrees, according to that prediction and promiſe of our Saviour, that "the Spirit ſhould teach them all things," John xiv. 26. and that he ſhould guide them into all truth," John xvi. 13. viz, "after his departure and aſcenſion, when the Holy Ghoſt was to be ſent in a ſpecial manner, to enlighten men's minds, and to diſcover to them the great myſteries of chriſtianity. This is to be noted by us, as that which gives great light in the preſent caſe. The diſcovery of the doctrines of the goſpel was gradual. It was by certain ſteps, that chriſtianity climbed to its height. We are not to think then, that all the neceſſary doctrines of the chriſtian religion were clearly publiſhed to the world in our Saviour's time. Not but that all that were neceſſary for that time, were publiſhed: but ſome, which were neceſſary for the ſucceeding one, were not then diſcovered, or, at leaſt, not fully. They had ordinarily no belief, before Chriſt's death and reſurrection, of thoſe ſubſtantial articles, i. e. that he ſhould die and riſe again: but we read in the Acts, and in the epiſtles, that theſe were formal articles of faith afterwards, and are ever ſince neceſſary to complete the chriſtian belief. So as to other great verities, the goſpel increaſed by degrees, and was not perfect at once. Which furniſhes us with a reaſon why moſt of the choiceſt and ſublimeſt truths of chriſtianity are to be met with in the epiſtles of the apoſtles, they being ſuch doctrines as were clearly diſcovered and opened in the goſpels and the Acts." Thus far the unmaſker.

I THOUGHT hitherto, that the covenant of grace in Chriſt Jeſus had been but one, immutably the ſame: but our unmaſker here makes two, or I know not how many. For I cannot tell how to conceive, that the conditions of any covenant ſhould be changed, and the covenant remain the ſame; every change of conditions, in my apprehenſion, makes a new and another covenant. We are not to think, ſays the unmaſker, "That all the neceſſary doctrines of the chriſtian religion were clearly publiſhed to the world in our Saviour's time; not but that all that were neceſſary for that time were publiſhed: but ſome, which were neceſſary for the ſucceeding one, were not then diſcovered, or, at leaſt, not fully." Anſw. The unmaſker, conſtant to himſelf, ſpeaks here doubtfully, and cannot tell whether he ſhould ſay, that the articles neceſſary to ſucceeding times, were diſcovered in our Saviour's time, or no: and therefore, that he may provide himſelf a retreat, in the doubt he is in, he ſays, "They were not clearly publiſhed; they were not then diſcovered, or, at leaſt, not fully." But we muſt deſire him to pull off his maſk, and to that purpoſe,

1. I aſk him how he can tell, that all the neceſſary doctrines were obſcurely publiſhed, or, in part diſcovered? For an obſcure publiſhing, a diſcovery in part, is oppoſed to, and intimated in, "not clearly publiſhed, not fully diſcovered." And if a clear and full diſcovery be all that he denies to them, I aſk,

XXXVII. "WHICH thoſe fundamental articles are, which were obſcurely publiſhed," but not fully diſcovered, in our Saviour's time?

AND next, I ſhall deſire him to tell me,

XXXVIII. "WHETHER there are any articles neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian, that were not diſcovered at all in our Saviour's time; and which they are?"

IF he cannot ſhew theſe diſtinctly, it is plain he talks at random about them; but has no clear and diſtinct conception of thoſe that were publiſhed, or not publiſhed, clearly or obſcurely diſcovered in our Saviour's time. It was neceſſary for him to ſay ſomething, for thoſe his pretended neceſſary articles, which are not to be ſound any where propoſed in the preaching of our Saviour and his apoſtles, to their yet unbelieving auditors; and therefore, he ſays, "We are not to think "all the neceſſary doctrines of the Chriſtian religion were clearly publiſhed to "the world in our Saviour's time." But he barely ſays it, without giving any reaſon, why "we are not to think ſo." It is enough that it is neceſſary to his hypotheſis. He ſays, "we are not to think ſo," and we are preſently bound not to think ſo. Elſe, from another man, that did not uſurp an authority over our thoughts, it would have required ſome reaſon to make them think, that ſomething more was required to make a man a Chriſtian after, than in our Saviour's time. For, as I take it, it is not a very probable, much leſs a ſelf-evident propoſition, to be received without proof, that there was ſomething neceſſary for that time, to make a man a Chriſtian, and ſomething more, that was neceſſary to make a Chriſtian, in the ſucceeding time.

HOWEVER, ſince this great maſter ſays, "we ought to think ſo," let us in obedience think ſo as well as we can; 'till he vouchſafes to gives us ſome reaſon to think, that there was more required to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, in the ſucceeding time, than in our Saviour's. This, inſtead of removing, does but increaſe the difficulty: for if more were neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian after our Saviour's time, than was during his life; how comes it, that no more was propoſed by the apoſtles, in their preaching to unbelievers, for the making them chriſtians, after our Saviour's death, than there was before; even this one article, "that he was the Meſſiah?" For I deſire the unmaſker to ſhew me any of thoſe articles mentioned in his liſt, (except the reſurrection and aſcenſion of our Saviour, which were intervening matters of fact, evidencing him to be the Meſſiah) that were propoſed by the apoſtles, after our Saviour's time, to their unbelieving hearers, to make them chriſtians. This one doctrine, "that "Jeſus was the Meſſiah," was that which was propoſed in our Saviour's time to be believed, as neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian: the ſame doctrine was, likewiſe, what was propoſed afterwards, in the preaching of the apoſtles to unbelievers, to make them chriſtians.

I GRANT, this was more clearly propoſed after, than in our Saviour's time: but in both of them it was all that was propoſed to the believers of one God, to make them chriſtians. Let him ſhew, that there were any other propoſed in, or after our Saviour's time, to be believed, to make unbelievers chriſtians. If he means, by "neceſſary articles publiſhed to the world," the other doctrines contained in the epiſtles; I grant, they are all of them neceſſary articles, to be believed by every chriſtian, as far as he underſtands them. But I deny, that they were propoſed to thoſe they were writ to, as neceſſary to make them chriſtians, for this demonſtrative reaſon; becauſe they were chriſtians already. For example, Many doctrines proving, and explaining, and giving a farther light into the goſpel, are publiſhed in the epiſtles to the Corinthians and Theſſalonians. Theſe are all of divine authority, and none of them may be diſbelieved by any one who is a chriſtian: but yet, what was propoſed or publiſhed to both the Corinthians and Theſſalonians, to make them chriſtians, was only this doctrine, "That Jeſus was the Meſſiah;" as may be ſeen, Acts xvii. xviii. This, then, was the doctrine neceſſary to make men chriſtians, in our Saviour's time; and this the only doctrine neceſſary to make unbelievers chriſtians, after our Saviour's time. The only difference was, that it was more clearly propoſed after, than before his aſcenſion: the reaſon whereof has been ſufficiently explained. But any other doctrine but this, propoſed clearly or obſcurely, in or after our Saviour's time, as neceſſary to be believed to make unbelievers chriſtians, that remains yet to be ſhewn.

WHEN the unmaſker ſpeaks of the doctrines that were neceſſary for the ſucceeding time after our Saviour, he is in doubt, whether he ſhould ſay they were, or were not diſcovered in our Saviour's time; and how far they were then diſcovered: and therefore he ſays, "Some of them were not then diſcovered, or at "leaſt, not fully." We muſt here excuſe the doubtfulneſs of his talking, concerning the diſcovery of his other neceſſary articles. For how could he ſay, they were diſcovered, or not diſcovered, clearly or obſcurely, fully or not fully; when he does not yet know them all, nor can tell us, what thoſe neceſſary articles are? If he does know them, let him give us a liſt of them, and then we ſhall ſee eaſily, whether they were at all publiſhed [illegible] diſcovered in our Saviour's time. If there are ſome of them that were not at all diſcovered in our Saviour's time, let him ſpeak it out, and leave ſhifting: and if ſome of thoſe that were "not neceſſary "for our Saviour's time, but for the ſucceeding one only," were yet diſcovered in our Saviour's time, why were they not neceſſary to be believed in that time? But the truth is, he knows not what theſe doctrines, neceſſary for ſucceeding times, are: and therefore can ſay nothing poſitively about their diſcovery. And for thoſe that he has ſet down, as ſoon as he ſhall name any one of them, to be of the number of thoſe, "not neceſſary for our Saviour's time, but neceſſary for the "ſucceeding one," it will preſently appear, either that it was diſcovered in our Saviour's time; and then it was as neceſſary for his time as the ſucceeding: or elſe, that it was not diſcovered in his time, nor to ſeveral converts after his time, before they were made chriſtians; and therefore it was no more neceſſary to be believed, to make a man a chriſtian in the ſucceeding, than it was in our Saviour's time. However, general poſitions and diſtinctions without a foundation, ſerve for ſhew, and to beguile unwary and inattentive readers.

2. Having thus minded him, that the queſtion is about articles of faith, neceſſary to be explicitly and diſtinctly believed to make a man a chriſtian; I then, in the next place, demand of him to tell me.

XXXIX. "Whether or no all the articles, neceſſary now to be diſtinctly "and explicitly believed, to make any man a chriſtian, were diſtinctly and "explicitly publiſhed or diſcovered in our Saviour's time?"

And then I ſhall deſire to know of him,

XL. "A reason why they were not."

Those that he inſtances in, of Chriſt's death and reſurrection, will not help him one jot: for they are not new doctrines revealed, new myſteries diſcovered; but matters of fact, which happened to our Saviour in their due time, to complete in him the character and predictions of the Meſſiah, and demonſtrate him to be the Deliverer promiſed. Theſe are recorded of him by the Spirit of God in holy writ, but are no more neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, than any other part of divine revelation, but as far as they have an immediate connection with his being the Meſſiah, and cannot be denied without denying him to be the Meſſiah: and therefore this article of his reſurrection, (which ſuppoſes his death) and ſuch other propoſitions as are convertible with his being the Meſſiah, are, as they very well may be, put for his being the Meſſiah; and, as I have ſhewed, propoſed to be believed in the place of it.

All that is revealed in ſcripture has a conſequential neceſſity of being believed by all thoſe, to whom it is propoſed; becauſe it is of divine authority, one part as much as another. And in this ſenſe, all the divine truths in the inſpired writings are fundamental, and neceſſary to be believed. But then this will deſtroy our unmaſker's ſelect number of fundamental articles; and "the choiceſt "and ſublimeſt truths of chriſtianity," which he tells us, "are to be met with in "the Epiſtles," will not be more neceſſary to be believed than any, which he may think the commoneſt or meaneſt truths in any of the Epiſtles or the Goſpels. Whatſoever part of divine revelation, whether revealed before, or in, or after our Saviour's time; whether it contain (according to the diſtinction of our unmaſker's nice palate) choice or common, ſublime or not ſublime truths, is neceſſary to be believed by every one, to whom it is propoſed, as far as he underſtands what is propoſed. But God, by Jeſus Chriſt, has entered into a covenant of grace with mankind; a covenant of faith, inſtead of that of works, wherein ſome truths are abſolutely neceſſary to be explicitly believed by them to make men chriſtians; and therefore thoſe truths are neceſſary to be known, and conſequently neceſſary to be propoſed to them to make them chriſtians. This is peculiar to them to make men chriſtians. For all men, as men, are under a neceſſary obligation to believe what God propoſes to them to be believed: but there being certain diſtinguiſhing truths, which belong to the covenant of the goſpel, which if men know not, they cannot be chriſtians; and they being, ſome of them, ſuch as cannot be known without being propoſed; thoſe, and thoſe only, are the neceſſary doctrines of chriſtianity I ſpeak of; without a knowledge of, and aſſent to which, no man can be a chriſtian.

TO come therefore to a clear deciſion of this controverſy, I deſire the unmaſker to tell me,

XLI. " WHAT thoſe doctrines are, which are abſolutely neceſſary to be pro-
" poſed to every man to make him a chriſtian?"

XLII. 1. " WHETHER they are all the truths of divine revelation contained
" in the Bible?"

FOR I grant his argument, (which in another place he uſes for ſome of them, and truly belongs to them all) viz. that they were revealed and written there, on purpoſe to be believed, and that it is indiſpenſably neceſſary for chriſtians to believe them.

XLIII. 2. " OR, whether it be only that one article, of Jeſus being the Meſ-
" ſiah, which the hiſtory of our Saviour and his apoſtles preaching, has,
" with ſuch a peculiar diſtinction, every where propoſed?"

XLIV. 3. " OR, whether the doctrines neceſſary to be propoſed to every one
" to make him a chriſtian, be any ſet of truths between theſe two?"

AND if he ſays this latter, then I muſt aſk him,

XLV. " WHAT they are? that we may ſee, why thoſe, rather than any
" other, contained in the new teſtament, are neceſſary to be propoſed to
" every man to make him a chriſtian; and, if they are not every one pro-
" poſed to him, and aſſented to by him, he cannot be a chriſtian."

THE unmaſker makes a great noiſe, and hopes to give his unwary, though well-meaning readers, odd thoughts, and ſtrong impreſſions againſt my book, by declaiming againſt my lank faith, and my narrowing of chriſtianity to one article; which, as he ſays, is the next way to reduce it to none. But when it is conſider'd, it will be found, that 'tis he that narrows chriſtianity. The unmaſker, as if he were arbiter and diſpenſer of the oracles of God, takes upon him to ſingle out ſome texts of ſcripture; and, where the words of ſcripture will not ſerve his turn, to impoſe on us his interpretations and deductions, as neceſſary articles of faith; which is, in effect, to make them of equal authority with the unqueſtionable word of God. And thus, partly in the words of ſcripture, and partly in words of his own, he makes a ſet of fundamentals, with an excluſion of all the other truths delivered by the ſpirit of God, in the Bible; though all the reſt be of the ſame divine authority and original, and ought therefore all equally, as far as they are underſtood by every chriſtian, to be believed. I tell him, and I deſire him to take notice of it, God has no where given him an authority thus to garble the inſpired writings of the holy ſcriptures. Every part of it is his word, and ought, every part of it, to be believed by every chriſtian man, according as God ſhall enable him to underſtand it. It ought not to be narrowed to the cut of the unmaſker's peculiar ſyſtem; 'tis a preſumption of the higheſt nature, for him thus to pretend, according to his own fancy, to eſtabliſh a ſet of fundamental articles. This is to diminiſh the authority of the word of God, to ſet up his own; and create a reverence to his ſyſtem, from which the ſeveral parts of divine revelations are to receive their weight, dignity, and authority. Thoſe paſſages of holy writ which ſuit with that, are fundamental, choice, ſublime,

lime, and neceſſary: the reſt of the ſcripture (as of no great moment) is not fundamental, is not neceſſary to be believed, may be neglected, or muſt be tortured, to comply with an analogy of faith of his own making. But tho' he pretends to a certain ſet of fundamentals, yet to ſhew the vanity and impudence of that pretence, he cannot tell us which they are; and therefore in vain contends for a creed he knows not, and is yet no where. He neither does, and, which is more, I tell him, he never can, give us a collection of his fundamentals gathered upon his principles, out of the ſcripture, with the rejection of all the reſt, as not fundamental. He does not obſerve the difference there is between what is neceſſary to be believed by every man to make him a chriſtian, and what is required to be believed by every chriſtian. The firſt of theſe is what, by the covenant of the goſpel, is neceſſary to be known, and conſequently, to be propoſed to every man, to make him a chriſtian: the latter is no leſs than the whole revelation of God, all the divine truths contained in holy ſcripture; which every chriſtian man is under a neceſſity to believe, ſo far as it ſhall pleaſe God, upon his ſerious and conſtant endeavours, to enlighten his mind to underſtand them.

The preaching of our Saviour, and his apoſtles, has ſufficiently taught us what is neceſſary to be propoſed to every man, to make him a chriſtian. He that believes him to be the promiſed Meſſiah, takes Jeſus for his King, and repenting of his former ſins, ſincerely reſolves to live, for the future, in obedience to his laws, is a ſubject of this kingdom, is a chriſtian. If he be not, I deſire the unmaſker to tell me, what more is requiſite to make him ſo. 'Till he does that, I reſt ſatisfied, that this is all that was at firſt, and is ſtill neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian.

This, though it be contained in a few words, and thoſe not hard to be underſtood; though it be in one voluntary act of the mind, relinquiſhing all irregular courſes, and ſubmitting itſelf to the rule of him, whom God had ſent to be our King, and promiſed to be our Saviour: yet it having relation to the race of mankind, from the firſt man Adam, to the end of the world; it being a contrivance, wherein God has diſplayed ſo much of his wiſdom and goodneſs to the corrupt and loſt ſons of men; and it being a deſign, to which the Almighty had a peculiar regard in the whole conſtitution and œconomy of the Jews, as well as in the prophecies and hiſtory of the old teſtament: this was a foundation capable of large ſuperſtructures: 1. In explaining the occaſion, neceſſity, uſe, and end of his coming. 2. Next, in proving him to be the perſon promiſed, by a correſpondence of his birth, life, ſufferings, death, and reſurrection, to all thoſe prophecies and types of him, which had given the expectation of ſuch a Deliverer, and to thoſe deſcriptions of him, whereby he might be known, when he did come. 3. In the diſcovery of the ſort, conſtitution, extent, and management of his kingdom. 4. In ſhewing from what we are delivered by him, and how that deliverance is wrought out, and what are the conſequences of it.

These, and a great many more the like, afford great numbers of truths delivered both in the hiſtorical, epiſtolary, and prophetical writings of the new teſtament, wherein the myſteries of the goſpel, hidden from former ages, were diſcovered; and that more fully, I grant, after the pouring out of the Holy Ghoſt upon the apoſtles. But could no body take Chriſt for their promiſed King, and reſolve to obey him, unleſs he underſtood all the truths that concerned his kingdom, or, as I may ſay, myſteries of ſtate of it? The truth of the contrary is manifeſt, out of the plain and uniform preaching of the apoſtles, after they had received the Holy Ghoſt, that was to guide them in all truth. Nay, after the writing of thoſe epiſtles, wherein were contained the unmaſker's ſublimeſt truths; they every where propoſed to unbelieve, Jeſus the Meſſiah, to be their King, ordained of God; and to this joined repentance: and this alone they preached, for the converſion of their unbelieving hearers. As ſoon as any one aſſented to this, he was pronounced a believer; and theſe inſpired rulers of the church, theſe infallible preachers of the goſpel, admitted him into Chriſt's kingdom by baptiſm. And this after, long " after our Saviour's aſcenſion, when (as our unmaſker expreſſes it) " the Holy Ghoſt was to be ſent in a ſpecial

" manner to enlighten men's minds, and to diſcover to them the great myſteries " of chriſtianity," even as long as the apoſtles lived: and what others were to do, who afterwards were to preach the goſpel, St. Paul tells us, 1 Cor. iii. 11. " Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, even Jeſus the Meſſiah." Though upon this foundation men might build variouſly, things that would, or would not hold the touch; yet however, as long as they kept firm to this foundation, they ſhould be ſaved, as appears in the following verſes.

AND indeed, if all the doctrines of the goſpel, which are contained in the writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts, were neceſſary to be underſtood, and explicitly believed, in the true ſenſe of thoſe that delivered them, to make a man a chriſtian; I doubt, whether ever any one, even to this day, was a true chriſtian; though I believe the unmaſker will not deny, but that, 'ere this, chriſtianity (as he expreſſes it) " is by certain ſteps climbed to its height."

BUT for this, the unmaſker has found a convenient and wiſe remedy. 'Tis but for him to have the power to declare, which of the doctrines delivered in holy writ are, and which are not neceſſary to be believed, with an additional power to add others of his own, that he cannot find there; and the buſineſs is done. For unleſs this be allowed him, his ſyſtem cannot ſtand: unleſs his interpretations be received for authentick revelation, we cannot have all the doctrines neceſſary for our time; in truth, we cannot be chriſtians. For to this only, what he ſays, concerning the " gradual diſcovery of the doctrines of the " goſpel," tends. " We are not to think," ſays he, " that all the neceſſary " doctrines of the chriſtian religion were clearly publiſhed to the world in our " Saviour's time: not but that all that were neceſſary for that time were pub- " liſhed; but ſome that were neceſſary for the ſucceeding one, were not then " diſcovered, or, at leaſt, not fully."

I MUST ask the unmaſker a ſhort queſtion or two; as, firſt,

XLVI. " ARE not all the doctrines neceſſary for our time, contained in his " ſyſtem?"

NEXT,

XLVII. " Can all the doctrines neceſſary for our time, be propoſed in the " expreſs words of the ſcripture?"

WHEN he has anſwered theſe two plain queſtions, (and an anſwer to them I ſhall expect) the world will then ſee, what he deſigns by " doctrines neceſſary " for our Saviour's time, and doctrines neceſſary for ſucceeding times;" whether he means any thing elſe by it, but the ſetting up his new ſyſtem, as the exact ſtandard of the goſpel, and the true and unalterable meaſure of chriſtianity, in which " it has climbed to its height."

LET not good and ſincere chriſtians be deceived, nor perplexed, by this maker of another chriſtianity, than what the infallible Spirit of God has left us in the ſcriptures. 'Tis evident from thence, that whoever takes Jeſus the Meſſiah for his King, with a reſolution to live by his laws, and does ſincerely repent, as often as he tranſgreſſes any of them, is his ſubject; all ſuch are chriſtians. What they are to know, or believe more, concerning him and his kingdom, when they are his ſubjects, he has left upon record in the great and ſacred code and conſtitutions of his kingdom; I mean, in the holy ſcriptures. All that is contained therein, as coming from the God of truth, they are to receive as truth, and embrace as ſuch. But ſince it is impoſſible explicitly to believe any propoſition of the chriſtian doctrine, but what we underſtand, or in any other ſenſe, than we underſtand it to have been delivered in; an explicit belief is, or can be required in no man, of more than what he underſtands of that doctrine. And thus, whatſoever upon fair endeavours he underſtands to be contained in that doctrine, is neceſſary to him to be believed: nor can he continue a ſubject of Chriſt upon other terms.

What he is perſuaded is the meaning of Chriſt his King, in any expreſſion he finds in the ſacred code; that, by his allegiance, he is bound to ſubmit his mind to receive for true, or elſe he denies the authority of Chriſt, and refuſes to believe him; nor can be excuſed, by calling any one on earth maſter. And hence it is evidently impoſſible for a chriſtian to underſtand any text, in one ſenſe, and believe it in another, by whomſoever dictated.

All that is contained in the inſpired writings, is all of divine authority, muſt all be allowed for ſuch, and received for divine and infallible truth, by every ſubject of Chriſt's kingdom, i. e. every chriſtian. How comes then the unmaſker to diſtinguiſh theſe dictates of the Holy Spirit, into neceſſary, and not neceſſary truths? I deſire him to produce his commiſſion, whereby he hath the power given him to tell, which of the divine truths, contained in the holy ſcripture, are of neceſſity to be believed, and which not. Who made him a judge or divider between them? Who gave him this power over the oracles of God, to ſet up one, and debaſe another, at his pleaſure? Some, as he thinks fit, are the choiceſt truths: and what, I beſeech him, are the other? Who made him a chuſer, where nobody can pick and chuſe? Every propoſition there, as far as any chriſtian can underſtand it, is indiſpenſably neceſſary to be believed: and farther than he does underſtand it, it is impoſſible for him to believe it. The laws of Chriſt's kingdom do not require impoſſibilities; for they are all reaſonable, juſt, and good.

Some of the truths delivered in holy writ are very plain: 'tis impoſſible, I think, to miſtake their meaning; and thoſe certainly are all neceſſary to be explicitly believed. Others have more difficulty in them, and are not eaſy to be underſtood. Is the unmaſker appointed Chriſt's vicegerent here, or the Holy Ghoſt's interpreter, with authority to pronounce which of theſe are neceſſary to be believed, and in what ſenſe, and which not? The obſcurity, that is to be found in ſeveral paſſages of the ſcripture, the difficulties that cover and perplex the meaning of ſeveral texts, demand of every chriſtian, ſtudy, diligence, and attention, in reading and hearing the ſcriptures; in comparing and examining them; and receiving what light he can from all manner of helps, to underſtand theſe books, wherein are contained the words of life. This the unmaſker, and every one is to do for himſelf; and thereby find out what is neceſſary for him to believe. But I do not know that the unmaſker is to underſtand and interpret for me, more than I for him. If he has ſuch a power, I deſire him to produce it. 'Till then, I can acknowledge no other infallible, but that guide, which he directs me to himſelf, here in theſe words: "according to our Saviour's promiſe, the Holy Ghoſt was to be ſent in a ſpecial manner to enlighten men's minds, and to diſcover to them the great myſteries of chriſtianity." For whether by men, he here means thoſe, on whom the Holy Ghoſt was ſo eminently poured out, Acts ii. or whether he means by theſe words, that ſpecial aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt, whereby particular men, to the end of the world, are to be led into the truth, by opening their underſtandings, that they may underſtand the ſcriptures, (for he always loves to ſpeak doubtfully and indefinitely) I know no other infallible guide, but the Spirit of God in the ſcriptures. Nor has God left it in my choice, to take any man for ſuch. If he had, I ſhould think the unmaſker the unlikelieſt to be he, and the laſt man in the world to be choſen for that guide: and herein I appeal to any ſober chriſtian, who hath read what the unmaſker has, with ſo little truth and decency, (for 'tis not always men's fault, if they have not ſenſe) writ upon this queſtion, "Whether he would "not be of the ſame mind?"

But yet, as very an unmaſker as he is, he will be extremely apt to call you names, nay, to declare you no chriſtian; and boldly affirm, you have no chriſtianity, if you will not ſwallow it juſt as it is of his cooking. You muſt take it juſt as he has been pleaſed to doſe it; no more, nor no leſs, than what is in his ſyſtem. He hath put himſelf into the throne of Chriſt, and pretends to tell you which are, and which are not the indiſpenſable laws of his kingdom: which parts of his divine revelation you muſt neceſſarily know, underſtand, and believe, and in what ſenſe; and which you need not trouble your head about, but may paſs by, as not neceſſary to be believed. He will tell you, that ſome of his neceſſary articles are myſteries, and yet (as he does, p. 115. of his "thoughts "concerning the cauſes of atheiſm") that they are eaſy to be underſtood by any man, when explained to him. In anſwer to that, I demanded of him, "Who "was to explain them? The papiſts, I told him, would explain ſome of them "one way, and the reformed another; the remonſtrants and anti-remonſtrants "give them different ſenſes; and probably the trinitarians and unitarians will "profeſs, that they underſtand not each other's explications." But to this, in his reply, he has not vouchſafed to give me any anſwer; which yet I expect, and I will tell him why: becauſe as there are different explainers, there will be different fundamentals. And therefore, unleſs he can ſhew his authority to be the ſole explainer of fundamentals, he will in vain make ſuch a pother about his fundamentals. Another explainer, of as good authority as he, will ſet up others againſt them. And what then ſhall we be the better for all this ſtir and noiſe of fundamentals? All the effect of it will be juſt the ſame it has been theſe thouſand years and upwards; ſchiſms, ſeparations, contentions, animoſities, quarrels, blood and butchery, and all that train of miſchiefs, which have ſo long harraſſed and defamed chriſtianity, and are ſo contrary to the doctrine, ſpirit, and end of the goſpel; and which muſt ſtill continue as long as any ſuch unmaſker ſhall take upon him to be the diſpenſer and dictator, to others, of fundamentals; and peremptorily to define which parts of divine revelation are neceſſary to be believed, and which chriſtians may with ſafety diſpenſe with, and not believe.

To conclude, what was ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian in our Saviour's time, is ſufficient ſtill, viz. the taking him for our King and Lord, ordained ſo by God. What was neceſſary to be believed by all chriſtians in our Saviour's time, as an indiſpenſable duty, which they owed to their lord and maſter, was the believing all divine revelation, as far as every one could underſtand it: and juſt ſo it is ſtill, neither more nor leſs. This being ſo, the unmaſker may make what uſe he pleaſes of his notion, "that chriſtianity was erected by degrees," it will no way (in that ſenſe, in which it is true) turn to the advantage of his ſelect, fundamental, neceſſary doctrines.

THE next chapter has nothing in it but his great bug-bear, whereby he hopes to fright people from reading my book, by crying out Socinianiſm, Socinianiſm! Whereas I challenge him again, to ſhew one word of Socinianiſm in it. But however, it is worth while to write a book to prove me a Socinian. Truly, I did not think myſelf ſo conſiderable, that the world need be troubled about me, whether I were a follower of Socinus, Arminius, Calvin, or any other leader of a ſect among chriſtians. A chriſtian I am ſure I am, becauſe I believe "Jeſus to be the Meſſiah," the King and Saviour promiſed, and ſent by God: and as a ſubject of his kingdom, I take the rule of my faith and life from his will, declared and left upon record in the inſpired writings of the apoſtles and evangeliſts in the new teſtament; which I endeavour, to the utmoſt of my power, as is my duty, to underſtand in their true ſenſe and meaning. To lead me into their true meaning, I know (as I have above declared) no infallible guide, but the ſame Holy Spirit, from whom theſe writings at firſt came. If the unmaſker knows any other infallible interpreter of ſcripture, I deſire him to direct me to him: 'till then, I ſhall think it according to my maſter's rule, not to be called, nor to call any man on earth, Maſter. No man, I think, has a right to preſcribe to me my faith, or magiſterially to impoſe his interpretations or opinions on me: nor is it material to any one what mine are, any farther than they carry their own evidence with them. If this, which I think makes me of no ſect, entitles me to the name of a papiſt, or a Socinian, becauſe the unmaſker thinks theſe the worſt and moſt invidious he can give me: and labours to fix them on me for no other reaſon, but becauſe I will not take him for my maſter on earth, and his ſyſtem for my goſpel: I ſhall leave him to recommend himſelf to the world by this ſkill, who, no doubt, will have reaſon to thank him for the rareneſs and ſubtilty of his diſcovery. For I think, I am the firſt man that ever was found out to be at the ſame time a Socinian, and a factor for

Rome. But what is too hard for ſuch an unmaſker? I muſt be what he thinks fit; when he pleaſes, a papiſt; and when he pleaſes, a Socinian; and when he pleaſes, a Mahometan: and probably, when he has conſider'd a little better, an atheiſt; for I hardly eſcaped it, when he writ laſt. My book, he ſays, had a tendency to it; and if he can but go on, as he has done hitherto, from ſurmiſes to certainties, by that time he writes next, his diſcovery will be advanced, and he will certainly find me an atheiſt. Only one thing I dare aſſure him of, that he ſhall never find, that I treat the things of God or religion ſo, as if I made only a trade or a jeſt of them. But let us now ſee, how at preſent he proves me a Socinian.

His firſt argument is, my not anſwering for my leaving out Matth. xxviii. 19. and John i. 1. pag. 82. of his ſocinianiſm unmaſk'd. This he takes to be a confeſſion, that I am a Socinian. I hope he means fairly, and that if it be ſo on my ſide, it muſt be taken for a ſtanding rule between us, that where any thing is not anſwered, it muſt be taken for granted. And upon that ſcore I muſt deſire him to remember ſome paſſages of my vindication, which I have already, and others, which I ſhall mind him of hereafter, which he paſſed over in ſilence, and had nothing to ſay to; which therefore, by his own rule, I ſhall deſire the reader to obſerve, that he has granted.

This being premiſed, I muſt tell the unmaſker, that I perceive he reads my book with the ſame underſtanding that he writes his own. If he had done otherwiſe, he might have ſeen, that I had given him a reaſon for my omiſſion of thoſe two, and other "plain and obvious paſſages, and famous teſtimonies "in the evangeliſts," as he calls them; where I ſay, p. 591. "That if I have "left out none of thoſe paſſages or teſtimonies, which contain what our Sa-"viour and his apoſtles preached and required aſſent to, to make men believers, "I ſhall think my omiſſions (let them be what they will) no faults in the pre-"ſent caſe. Whatever doctrines Mr. Edwards would have to be believed, to "make a man a chriſtian, he will be ſure to find them in thoſe preachings, and "famous teſtimonies, of our Saviour and his apoſtles, I have quoted. And "if they are not there, he may reſt ſatisfied, that they were not propoſed, by "our Saviour and his apoſtles, as neceſſary to be believed to make men Chriſt's "diſciples." From which words, any one, but an unmaſker, would have underſtood my anſwer to be, that all that was neceſſary to be believed to make men chriſtians, might be found in what our Saviour and his apoſtles propoſed to unbelievers for their converſion: but the two paſſages above-mentioned, as well as a great many others in the evangeliſts, being none of thoſe, I had no reaſon to take notice of them. But the unmaſker having, out of his good pleaſure, put it once upon me, as he does in his "thoughts of the cauſes of "atheiſm," p. 107. that I was an "epitomizer of the evangelical writings," though every one may ſee I make not that my buſineſs, yet 'tis no matter for that, I muſt be always accountable to that fancy of his. But when he has proved,

XLVIII. "That this is not as juſt a reaſon for my omitting them, as ſeve-"ral other obvious paſſages and famous teſtimonies in the evangeliſts, "which I there mention, for whoſe omiſſion he does not blame me;"

I will undertake to give him another reaſon, which I know not whether he were not better let alone.

The next proof of my being a Socinian, is, that I take the Son of God to be an expreſſion uſed to ſignify the Meſſiah. Slichtingius and Socinus underſtood it ſo; and therefore I am, the unmaſker ſays, a Socinian. Juſt as good an argument, as that I believe Jeſus to be a prophet, and ſo do the Mahometans; therefore I am a Mahometan; or thus, the unmaſker holds, that the apoſtles creed does not contain all things neceſſary to ſalvation; and ſo ſays Knot the Jeſuit; therefore the unmaſker is a Papiſt. Let me turn the tables, and by the ſame argument I am orthodox again. For two orthodox, pious, and very eminent prelates of our church, whom, when I follow authorities, I ſhall

prefer

prefer to Slichtingius and Socinus, underſtand it as I do; and therefore I am orthodox. Nay, it ſo falls out, that if it were of force either way, the argument would weigh moſt on this ſide; ſince I am not wholly a ſtranger to the writings of thoſe two orthodox biſhops; but I never read a page in either of thoſe Socinians. The never ſufficiently admired and valued archbiſhop Tillotſon's words, which I quoted, the unmaſker ſays, "do not neceſſarily import any "ſuch thing." I know no words that neceſſarily import any thing to a caviller. But he was known to have ſuch clear thoughts, and ſo clear a ſtyle, ſo far from having any thing doubtful or fallacious in what he ſaid, that I ſhall only ſet down his words as they are in his ſermon of ſincerity, p. 2. to ſhew his meaning: "Nathanael," ſays he, "being ſatisfied, that he [our Saviour,] was the "Meſſiah, he preſently owned him for ſuch, calling him THE SON OF GOD," "and the King of Iſrael."

THE words of the other eminent prelate, the biſhop of Ely, whom our church is ſtill happy in, are theſe: "To be the Son of God, and to be Chriſt, "being but different expreſſions of the ſame thing:" witneſs, p. 14. And p. 10. "It is the very ſame thing to believe, "that Jeſus is the Chriſt," and "to believe, "that Jeſus is the Son of God," expreſs it how you pleaſe. "This ALONE is the faith which can regenerate a man, and put a divine Spirit "into him, that it makes him a conqueror over the world, as Jeſus was." Of this the unmaſker ſays, that this reverend author, "ſpeaking only in a general "way, repreſents theſe two as the ſame thing," viz. that Jeſus is the Chriſt, and that Jeſus is the Son of God, becauſe theſe expreſſions are applied to the ſame perſon, and becauſe they are both comprehended in one general name, viz. Jeſus. Anſw. The queſtion is, Whether theſe two expreſſions, "the Son of "God," and the "Meſſiah," in the learned biſhop's opinion, ſignify the ſame thing? If his opinion had been aſked in the point, I know not how he could have declared it more clearly. For he ſays, they are "Expreſſions of the "ſame thing, and that it is the very ſame thing to believe "that Jeſus is the "Meſſiah," and to believe, "that he is the Son of God;" which cannot be ſo, if Meſſiah and Son of God have different ſignifications: for then they will make two diſtinct propoſitions in different ſenſes, which it can be no more the ſame thing to believe, than it is the ſame thing to believe, that Mr. Edwards is a notable preacher, and a notable railer; or than it is to believe one truth, and all truths. For by the ſame reaſon, that it is the ſame thing to believe two diſtinct truths, it will be the ſame thing to believe two thouſand diſtinct truths, and conſequently all truths. The unmaſker, that he might ſeem to ſay ſomething, ſays, that the "Reverend author repreſents theſe as the ſame thing." Anſw. The unmaſker never fails, like Midas, to turn every thing he touches into his own metal. The learned biſhop ſays, very directly and plainly, that "to be the Son of God, and to be the Meſſiah, are expreſſions of the ſame "thing:" and the unmaſker ſays, he "repreſents theſe expreſſions as one "thing;" for 'tis of expreſſions, that both the biſhop and he ſpeak. Now, expreſſions can be one thing, but one of theſe two ways: either in ſound, and ſo theſe two expreſſions are not one; or in ſignification, and ſo they are. And then the unmaſker ſays, but in other words, what the biſhop had ſaid before, viz. That theſe two, "to be the Son of God, and to be the Meſſiah, are ex"preſſions of the ſame thing." Only the unmaſker has put in the word, repreſents, to amuſe his reader, as if he had ſaid ſomething; and ſo indeed he does, after his faſhion, i. e. obſcurely and fallaciouſly; which, when it comes to be examined, is but the ſame thing under ſhew of a difference; or elſe, if it has a different meaning, it is demonſtratively falſe. But ſo it be obſcure enough to deceive a willing reader, who will not be at the pains to examine what he ſays, it ſerves his turn.

BUT yet, as if he had ſaid ſomething of weight, he gives reaſons for putting "repreſents theſe two expreſſions as one thing," inſtead of ſaying, theſe two are "but different expreſſions of the ſame thing."

THE firſt of his reaſons is, Becauſe the reverend author is here "ſpeaking "only in a general way." Anſw. What does the unmaſker mean by a general way? The learned biſhop ſpeaks of two particular expreſſions applied to our Saviour. But was his diſcourſe ever ſo general, how could that alter the plain ſignification of his words, viz. that thoſe two are but "different expreſſions of the "ſame thing?"

Secondly, "Becauſe theſe expreſſions are applied to the ſame perſon." Anſw. A very demonſtrative reaſon, is it not? that therefore they cannot be different expreſſions of the ſame thing!

Thirdly, "And becauſe they are both comprehended in one general name, "viz. Jeſus." Anſw. It requires ſome ſkill to put ſo many falſhoods in ſo few words; for neither both, nor either of theſe expreſſions are comprehended in the name Jeſus; and that Jeſus, the name of a particular perſon, ſhould be a general name is a diſcovery reſerved to be found out by this new logician. However, general, is a learned word, which when a man of learning has uſed twice, as a reaſon of the ſame thing, he is covered with generals. He need not trouble himſelf any farther about ſenſe; he may ſafely talk what ſtuff he pleaſes, without the leaſt ſuſpicion of his reader.

Having thus ſtrongly proved juſt nothing, he proceeds and tells us, p. 91. "Yet it does not follow thence, but that if we will ſpeak ſtrictly and cloſely, we "muſt be forced to confeſs, they are of different ſignifications." By which words (if his words have any ſignification) he plainly allows, that the biſhop meant as he ſays, that theſe two are but "different expreſſions of the ſame "thing: but withal, tells him, that if he will "ſpeak cloſely and ſtrictly," he muſt ſay, "they are of different ſignifications." My concernment in the caſe being only, that in the paſſage alledged, the reverend author ſaid, that the Son of God, and the Meſſiah, were "different expreſſions of the ſame thing," I have no more to demand after theſe words of the unmaſker; he has in them granted all I would have: and I ſhall not meddle with his "ſpeaking cloſely "and ſtrictly," but ſhall leave it to the deciſive authority of this ſuperlative critick to determine, whether this learned biſhop, or any one living, beſides himſelf, can underſtand the phraſes of the new teſtament, and "ſpeak ſtrictly and "cloſely" concerning them. Perhaps, his being yet alive, may preſerve this eminent prelate from the malicious driveling of this unmaſker's pen, which has beſpattered the aſhes of two of the ſame order, who were no mean ornaments of the Engliſh church; and if they had been now alive, no body will doubt but the unmaſker would have treated them after another faſhion.

But let me aſk the unmaſker, whether (if either of theſe pious prelates, whoſe words I have above quoted, did underſtand that phraſe of the Son of God, to ſtand for the Meſſiah; which they might do without holding any one Socinian tenet) he will dare to pronounce him a Socinian. This is ſo ridiculous an inference, that I could not but laugh at it. But withal, tell him, vindic. p. 594. "That if the ſenſe, wherein I underſtand thoſe texts, be a miſtake, I ſhall be "beholden to him to ſet me right: but they are not popular authorities, or "frightful names, whereby I judge of truth or falſhood." To which I ſubjoin theſe words: "You will now, no doubt, applaud your conjectures; the point "is gained, and I am openly a Socinian; ſince I will not diſown, that I think "the Son of God was a phraſe, that, among the Jews, in our Saviour's time, "was uſed for the Meſſiah, though the Socinians underſtand it in the ſame "ſenſe. And therefore, I muſt certainly be of their perſuaſion in every thing "elſe. I admire the acuteneſs, force, and fairneſs of your reaſoning; and ſo I "leave you to triumph in your conjectures." Nor has he failed my expectation: "for here, p. 91. of his Socinianiſm unmaſked, he, upon this, erects his comb, "and crows moſt mightily. "We may," ſays he, "from hence, as well as "other reaſons, pronounce him the ſame with thoſe gentlemen (i. e. as he is "pleaſed to call them, my good patrons and friends, the Racovians); which "you may perceive he is very apprehenſive of, and thinks, that this will be "reckoned a good evidence of his being, what he denied himſelf to be before. "The point is gained, and I am openly a Socinian." He never uttered truer "words in his life, and they are the confutation of all his pretences to the contrary. This truth, which unwarily dropped from his pen, confirms what I "have laid to his charge." Now you have ſung your ſong of triumph, 'tis fit you ſhould gain your victory, by ſhewing,

XLIX. "How my underſtanding the Son of God, to be a phraſe uſed amongſt the Jews, in our Saviour's time, to ſignify the Meſſiah, proves me to be a ſocinian?

Or, if you think you have proved it already, I deſire you to put your proof into a ſyllogiſm: for I confeſs myſelf ſo dull, as not ſee any ſuch concluſion deducible from my underſtanding that phraſe as I do, even when you have proved that I am miſtaken in it.

The places, which in the new teſtament ſhew, that the Son of God ſtands for the Meſſiah, are ſo many and ſo clear, that I imagine nobody that ever conſidered and compared them together, could doubt of their meaning, unleſs he were an unmaſker. Several of them I have collected and ſet down in my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," 513, 518, 520, 522, 531, 533.

First, John the Baptiſt, John i. 20. when the Jews ſent to know who he was, confeſſed he himſelf was not the Meſſiah. But of Jeſus he ſays, ver. 34. after having ſeveral ways, in the foregoing verſes, declared him to be the Meſſiah; "And I ſaw and bare record, that this is the Son of God." And again, chap. iii. 26,--36. he declaring Jeſus to be, and himſelf not to be the Meſſiah, he does it in theſe ſynonymous terms, of the Meſſiah, and the Son of God; as appears by comparing ver. 28, 35, 36.

Nathanael owns him to be the Meſſiah, in theſe words, John i. 50. "Thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Iſrael:" which our Saviour, in the next verſe, calls believing; a term, all through the hiſtory of our Saviour, uſed for owning Jeſus to be the Meſſiah. And for confirming that faith of his, that he was the Meſſiah, our Saviour further adds, that he ſhould ſee greater things, i. e. ſhould ſee him do greater miracles, to evidence that he was the Meſſiah.

Luke iv. 41. "And devils alſo came out of many, crying, Thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of God; and he rebuking them, ſuffered them not to ſpeak." And ſo again, St. Mark tells us, chap. iii. 11, 12. "That unclean ſpirits, when they ſaw him, fell down before him, and cried, ſaying, Thou art the Son of God. And he ſtrictly charged them, that they ſhould not make him known." In both theſe places, which relate to different times, and different occaſions, the devils declare Jeſus to be the Son of God. 'Tis certain, whatever they meant by it, they uſed a phraſe of a known ſignification in that country: and what may we reaſonably think they deſigned to make known to the people by it? Can we imagine theſe unclean ſpirits were promoters of the goſpel, and had a mind to acknowledge and publiſh to the people, the deity of our Saviour, which the unmaſker would have to be the ſignification of the Son of God? Who can entertain ſuch a thought? No, they were no friends to our Saviour: and therefore deſired to ſpread a belief of him, that he was the Meſſiah, that ſo he might, by the envy of the ſcribes and Phariſees, be diſturbed in his miniſtry, and be cut off before he had compleated it. And therefore, we ſee, our Saviour in both places forbids them to make him known; as he did his diſciples themſelves, for the ſame reaſon. For when St. Peter, Matt. xvi. 16. had owned Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, in theſe words; "Thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of the living God;" it follows, ver. 20. "Then charged he his diſciples, that they ſhould tell no man, that he was Jeſus the Meſſiah:" juſt as he had forbid the devils to make him known, i. e. to be the Meſſiah. Beſides, theſe words here of St. Peter, can be taken in no other ſenſe, but barely to ſignify, that Jeſus was the Meſſiah, to make them a proper anſwer to our Saviour's queſtion. His firſt queſtion here to his diſciples, ver. 13. is, "Whom do men ſay, that I, the Son of man, am? The queſtion is not, Of what original do you think the Meſſiah, when he comes, will be? For then this queſtion would have been as it is, Matt. xxii. 42. "What think ye of the Meſſiah, whoſe Son is he?" if he had inquired about the common opinion, concerning the nature and deſcent of the Meſſiah.

ſiah. But his queſtion is concerning himſelf; Whom, of all the extraordinary perſons known to the Jews, or mentioned in their ſacred writings, the people thought him to be? That this was the meaning of his queſtion, is evident from the anſwer the apoſtles gave to it; and his further demand, ver. 14, 15. "They "ſaid, Some ſay thou art John the Baptiſt, ſome Elias, and others Jeremias, or "one of the prophets. He ſaith unto them, But WHOM ſay ye that I am?" The people take me, ſome for one of the prophets, or extraordinary meſſengers from God, and ſome for another: But which of them do you take me to be? "Simon Peter anſwered and ſaid, Thou art the Meſſiah, the Son of the living "God." In all which diſcourſe, 'tis evident there was not the leaſt inquiry made by our Saviour concerning the perſon, nature, or qualifications of the Meſſiah; but whether the people or his apoſtles thought him, i. e. *Jeſus of Nazareth*, to be the Meſſiah. To which St. Peter gave him a direct and plain anſwer in the foregoing words, declaring their belief of him to be the Meſſiah: which is all that, with any manner of congruity, could be made the ſenſe of St. Peter's anſwer. This alone of itſelf were enough to juſtify my interpretation of St. Peter's words, without the authority of St. Mark and St. Luke, both whoſe words confirm it. For St. Mark, chap. viii. 29. renders it, "Thou art the Meſſiah;" and St. Luke, chap. ix. 20, "the Meſſiah of God." To the like queſtion, "Who art thou?" John the Baptiſt gives a like anſwer, John i. 19, 20. "I "am not the Chriſt." By which anſwer, as well as by the foregoing verſes, it is plain, nothing was underſtood to be meant by that queſtion, but, Which of the extraordinary perſons, promiſed to, or expected by, the Jews, art thou?

JOHN xi. 27. The phraſe of the Son of God is made uſe of, by St. Martha; and that it was uſed by her to ſignify the Meſſiah, and nothing elſe, is evident out of the context. Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been there, before her brother died, he, by that divine power which he had manifeſted in ſo many miracles, which he had done, could have ſaved his life; and that now, if our Saviour would aſk it of God, he might obtain the reſtoration of his life. Jeſus tells her, he ſhall riſe again: which words, Martha taking to mean, at the general reſurrection, at the laſt day; Jeſus thereupon takes occaſion to intimate to her, that he was the Meſſiah, by telling her, that he was "the reſurrection and "the life;" i. e. that the life, which mankind ſhould receive at the general reſurrection, was by and through him. This was a deſcription of the Meſſiah, it being a received opinion amongſt the Jews, that when the Meſſiah came, the juſt ſhould riſe, and live with him for ever. And having made this declaration of himſelf to be the Meſſiah, he aſks Martha, "Believeſt thou this?" What? Not whoſe ſon the Meſſiah ſhould be; but whether he himſelf was the Meſſiah, by whom believers ſhould have eternal life at the laſt day. And to this ſhe gives this direct and appoſite anſwer; "Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Chriſt, "the Son of God, which ſhould come into the world." The queſtion was only, Whether ſhe was perſuaded that thoſe, who believed in him, ſhould be raiſed to eternal life; that was in effect, "Whether he was the Meſſiah?" And to this ſhe anſwers, Yea, Lord, I believe this of thee: and then ſhe explains what was contained in that faith of hers; even this, that he was the Meſſiah, that was promiſed to come, by whom alone men were to receive eternal life.

WHAT the Jews alſo underſtood by the Son of God, is likewiſe clear from that paſſage at the latter end of Luke xxii. They having taken our Saviour, and being very deſirous to get a confeſſion from his own mouth, that he was the Meſſiah, that they might from thence be able to raiſe a formal and prevalent accuſation againſt him before Pilate; the only thing the council aſked him, was, Whether he was the Meſſiah? v. 67. To which he anſwers ſo, in the following words, that he lets them ſee he underſtood, that the deſign of their queſtion was to entrap him, and not to believe in him, whatever he ſhould declare of himſelf. But yet he tells them, "Hereafter ſhall the Son of man ſit on the "right hand of the power of God:" Words that, to the Jews, plainly enough owned him to be the Meſſiah; but yet ſuch as could not have any force againſt him with Pilate. He having confeſſed ſo much, they hope to draw yet a clearer confeſſion from him. "Then ſaid they all, Art thou then the Son of God?

" And he ſaid unto them, Ye ſay that I am. And they ſaid, What need we " any further witneſs? For we ourſelves have heard of his own mouth." Can any one think, that the doctrine of his deity (which is that which the unmaſker accuſes me for waving) was that which the Jews deſigned to accuſe our Saviour of, before Pilate; or that they needed witneſſes for? Common ſenſe, as well as the current of the whole hiſtory, ſhews the contrary. No, it was to accuſe him, that he owned himſelf to be the Meſſiah, and thereby clamed a title to be King of the Jews. The Son of God was ſo known a name amongſt the Jews, to ſtand for the Meſſiah; that having got that from his mouth, they thought they had proof enough of treaſon againſt him. This carries with it a clear and eaſy meaning. But if the Son of God be to be taken, as the unmaſker would have it, for a declaration of his deity, I deſire him to make common and coherent ſenſe of it.

I SHALL add one conſideration more, to ſhew that the Son of God was a form of ſpeech then uſed amongſt the Jews, to ſignify the Meſſiah, from the perſons that uſed it, viz. John the Baptiſt, Nathanael, St. Peter, St. Martha, the Sanhedrim, and the Centurion, Matt. xxvii. 54. Here are Jews, heathens, friends, enemies, men, women, believers, and unbelievers; all indifferently uſe this phraſe of the Son of God, and apply it to Jeſus. The queſtion between the unmaſker and me, is, Whether it was uſed by theſe ſeveral perſons, as an appellation of the Meſſiah, or (as the unmaſker would have it) in a quite different ſenſe; as ſuch an application of divinity to our Saviour, that he that ſhall deny that to be the meaning of it in the minds of theſe ſpeakers, denies the divinity of Jeſus Chriſt. For if they did ſpeak it without that meaning, it is plain it was a phraſe known to have another meaning; or elſe they had talked unintelligible jargon. Now I will aſk the unmaſker, " Whether he thinks, that the eternal " generation, or, as the unmaſker calls it, filiation of Jeſus the Son of God, was " a doctrine that had entered into the thoughts of all the perſons above-menti- " oned, even of the Roman centurion, and the ſoldiers that were with him " watching Jeſus?" If he ſay he does, I ſuppoſe he thinks ſo only for this time, and for this occaſion: and then it will lie upon him to give the world convincing reaſons for his opinion, that they may think ſo too; or if he does not think ſo, he muſt give up this argument, and allow that this phraſe, in theſe places, does not neceſſarily import the deity of our Saviour, and the doctrine of his eternal generation: and ſo a man may take it to be an expreſſion ſtanding for the Meſſiah, without being a Socinian, any more than he himſelf is one.

" THERE is one place the unmaſker tells us, p. 87. that confutes all the " ſurmiſes about the identity of theſe terms. It is, ſays he, that famous confeſ- " ſion of faith which the Ethiopian eunuch made, when Philip told him, he " might be baptized, if he believed, This, without doubt, was ſaid, according " to that apprehenſion, which he had of Chriſt, from Philip's inſtructing him; " for it is ſaid, he preached unto him Jeſus, ver, 35. He had acquainted him, " that Jeſus was the Chriſt, the anointed of God, and alſo, that he was the " Son of God; which includes in it, that he was God. And accordingly, this " noble proſelyte gives this account of his faith, in order to his being baptized, " in order to his being admitted a member of Chriſt's church;" " I believe that " Jeſus is the Son of God: or you may read it according to the Greek, I be- " lieve the Son of God to be Jeſus Chriſt. Where there are theſe two diſtinct " propoſitions:

" 1ſt, THAT Jeſus is the Chriſt, the Meſſiah.

" 2dly, THAT he is not only the Meſſiah, but the Son of God."

THE unmaſker is every where ſteadily the ſame ſubtle arguer. Whether he has proved, that the ſon of God, in this confeſſion of the eunuch, ſignifies what he would have, we ſhall examine by and by. This, at leaſt, is demonſtration, that this paſſage of his overturns his principles; and reduces his long liſt of fundamentals to two propoſitions, the belief whereof is ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian. " This noble proſelyte, ſays the unmaſker gives this account of his " faith, in order to his being baptized, in order to his being admitted a member " of Chriſt's church." And what is that faith, according to the unmaſker? " He tells you, there are in it theſe two diſtinct propoſitions, viz. I believe, "1ſt, That Jeſus is the Chriſt, the Meſſiah: 2dly, That he is not only the "Meſſiah, but the Son of God." If this famous confeſſion, containing but theſe two articles, were enough to his being baptized; if this faith were ſufficient to make this noble proſelyte a chriſtian, what is become of all thoſe other articles of the unmaſker's ſyſtem, without the belief whereof, he, in other places, tells us, a man cannot be a chriſtian? If he had here told us, that "Philip had not time nor opportunity," during his ſhort ſtay with the eunuch, to explain to him all the unmaſker's ſyſtem, and make him underſtand all his fundamentals; he had had reaſon on his ſide: and he might have urged it as a reaſon why Philip taught him no more. But nevertheleſs he had, by allowing the eunuch's confeſſion of faith ſufficicient for his admittance as a member of Chriſt's church, given up his other fundamentals, as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; even that of the Holy Trinity: and he has at laſt reduced his neceſſary articles to theſe two, viz. "That Jeſus is the Meſſiah;" and that "Jeſus is the Son of God." So that after his ridiculous calling mine a lank faith, I deſire him to conſider what he will now call his own. Mine is next to none, becauſe, as he ſays, it is but one article. If that reaſoning be good, his is not far from none: it conſiſts but in two articles, which is next to one, and very little more remote from none than one is. If any one had but as much wit as the unmaſker, and could be but as ſmart upon the number two, as he has been upon an unit, here were a brave opportunity for him to lay out his parts; and he might make vehement complaints againſt one, that has thus "cramped our faith, corrupted men's minds, depraved the goſpel, and abuſed "chriſtianity." But if it ſhould fall out, as I think it will, that the unmaſker's two articles ſhould prove to be but one; he has ſaved another that labour, and he ſtands painted to himſelf with his own charcoal.

The unmaſker would have the Son of God, in the confeſſion of the eunuch, to ſignify ſomething different from the Meſſiah: and his reaſon is, becauſe elſe it would be an abſurd tautology. Anſ. There are many exegetical expreſſions put together in ſcripture, which, though they ſignify the ſame thing, yet are not abſurd tautologies. The unmaſker here inverts the propoſition, and would have it to ſignify thus, "The Son of God is Jeſus the Meſſiah;" which is a propoſition ſo different from what the apoſtles propoſed, every where elſe, that he ought to have given a reaſon why, when, every where elſe, they made the propoſition to be, of ſomething affirmed of Jeſus of Nazareth, the eunuch ſhould make the affirmation to be of ſomething concerning the Son of God: as if the eunuch knew very well, what the Son of God ſignified, viz. as the unmaſker tells us here, that it included or ſignified God; and that Philip, (who, we read, at Samaria preached τὸν Χριςὸι, the Meſſiah, i. e. inſtructed them who the Meſſiah was) had here taken pains only to inſtruct him, that this God was Jeſus the Meſſiah, and to bring him to aſſent to that propoſition. Whether this be natural to conceive, I leave to the reader.

The tautology, on which the unmaſker builds his whole objection, will be quite removed, if we take Chriſt here for a proper name, in which way it is uſed by the evangeliſts and apoſtles in other places, and particularly by St. Luke; as Acts ii. 38. iii. 6, 20. iv. 10. xxiv. 24, &c. In two of theſe places it cannot, with any good ſenſe, be taken otherwiſe; for if it be not in Acts iii. 6. and iv. 10. uſed as a proper name, we muſt read thoſe places thus, "Jeſus the "Meſſiah of Nazareth." And I think it is plain in thoſe others cited, as well as in ſeveral other places of the new teſtament, that the word Chriſt is uſed as a proper name. We may eaſily conceive, that long before the Acts were writ, the name of Chriſt was grown, by a familiar uſe, to denote the perſon of our Saviour, as much as Jeſus. This is ſo manifeſt, that it gave a name to his followers; who, as St. Luke tells us. xi. 26. were called chriſtians; and that, if chronologiſts miſtake not, twenty years before St. Luke writ his hiſtory of the apoſtles: and this ſo generally, that Agrippa, a Jew, uſes it, Acts xxvi. 28. And that Chriſt, as the proper name of our Saviour, was got as far as Rome, before St. Luke writ the Acts, appears out of Suetonius, l. 5. and by that name he is called in Tacitus, Ann. l. 15. 'Tis no wonder then, that St. Luke, in writing this hiſtory, ſhould ſometimes ſet it down alone, ſometimes joined with that of Jeſus, as a proper name; which is much eaſier to conceive he did here, than that Philip propoſed more to the eunuch to be believed to make him a chriſtian, than what, in other places, was propoſed for the converſion of others, or than what he himſelf propoſed at Samaria.

HIS 7th chapter is to prove, that I am a ſocinian, becauſe I omitted Chriſt's ſatisfaction. That matter having been anſwered, p. 642. where it came properly under conſideration, I ſhall only obſerve here, that the great ſtreſs of his argument lies as it did before; not upon my total omiſſion of it out of my book, but on this, that, "I have no ſuch thing in the place where the advantages of "Chriſt's coming are purpoſely treated of;" from whence he will have this to be an unavoidable inference, viz. "That I was of opinion, that Chriſt came "not to ſatisfy for us." The reaſon of my omiſſion of it in that place, I told him, was becauſe my book was chiefly deſigned for deiſts; and therefore I mentioned only thoſe advantages, which all chriſtians muſt agree in: and in omitting of that, complied with the apoſtle's rule, Rom. xiv. To this he tells me flatly, that was not the deſign of my book. Whether the unmaſker knows with what deſign I publiſhed it, better than myſelf, muſt be left to the reader to judge: for as for his veracity in what he knows, or knows not, he has given ſo many inſtances of it, that I may ſafely refer that to any body. One inſtance more of it may be found in this very chapter, where he ſays, "I pretend in- "deed, pag. 590. that in another place of my book, I mention Chriſt's reſtor- "ing all mankind from the ſtate of death, and reſtoring them to life; and his "laying down his life for another, as our Saviour profeſſes he did. "Theſe "few words this vindicator has picked up in his book ſince he wrote it. "This is all, through his whole treatiſe, that he hath dropped concerning that "advantage of Chriſt's incarnation; i. e. Chriſt's ſatisfaction." Anſw. But that this is not all that I dropped through my whole treatiſe, concerning that advantage, may appear by thoſe places above-mentioned, p. 643. where I ſay, that the deſign of Chriſt's coming was to be offered up, and ſpeak of the work of redemption; which are expreſſions taken to imply our Saviour's ſatisfaction. But the unmaſker thinking I ſhould have quoted them, if there had been any more, beſides thoſe mentioned in my vindication, upon that preſumption ſticks not boldly to affirm, that there were no more; and ſo goes on with the veracity of an unmaſker. If affirming would do it, nothing could be wanting in his cauſe, that might be for his purpoſe. Whether he be as good at proving, this conſequence (amongſt other propoſitions, which remain upon him to be proved) will try, viz.

L. "THAT if the ſatisfaction of Chriſt be not mentioned in the place where "the advantages of Chriſt's coming are purpoſely treated of, then I am of "opinion, that Chriſt came not to ſatisfy for us:"

Which is all the argument of the 7th chapter.

HIS laſt chapter, as his firſt, begins with a commendation of himſelf; particularly, it boaſts his freedom from bigotiſm, dogmatizing, cenſoriouſneſs, and uncharitableneſs. I think he hath drawn himſelf ſo well with his own pen, that I ſhall need refer the reader only to what he himſelf has wrote in this controverſy, for his character.

IN the next paragraph, p. 104. he tells me, "I laugh at orthodoxy." Anſw. There is nothing that I think deſerves a more ſerious eſteem than right opinion, (as the word ſignifies) if taken up with the ſenſe and love of truth. But this way of becoming orthodox, has always modeſty accompanying it, and a fair acknowledgment of fallibility in ourſelves, as well as a ſuppoſition of error in others. On the other ſide, there is nothing more ridiculous, than for a man, or company of men, to aſſume the title of orthodoxy to their own ſet of opinions, as if infallibility were annexed to their ſyſtems, and thoſe were to be the ſtanding meaſure of truth to all the world; from whence they erect to themſelves a power to cenſure and condemn others, for differing at all from the tenets they have pitched upon. The conſideration of human frailty ought to check this vanity: but ſince it does not, but that, with a ſort of allowance, it ſhews itſelf in almoſt all religious ſocieties, the playing the trick round ſufficiently turns it into ridicule. For each ſociety having an equal right to a good opinion of themſelves, a man by paſſing but a river, or a hill, loſes that orthodoxy in one company, which puffed him up with ſuch aſſurance and inſolence in another; and is there, with equal juſtice, himſelf expoſed to the like cenſures of error and hereſy, which he was ſo forward to lay on others at home. When it ſhall appear, that infallibility is intailed upon one ſet of men of any denomination, or truth confined to any ſpot of ground, the name and uſe of orthodoxy, as now it is in faſhion every where, will in that one place, be reaſonable. 'Till then, this ridiculous cant will be a foundation too weak to ſuſtain that uſurpation that is raiſed upon it. 'Tis not that I do not think every one ſhould be perſuaded of the truth of thoſe opinions he profeſſes. 'Tis that I contend for; and 'tis that which I fear the great ſticklers for orthodoxy often fail in. For we ſee generally that numbers of them exactly jump in a whole large collection of doctrines, conſiſting of abundance of particulars; as if their notions were, by one common, ſtamp, printed on their minds, even to the leaſt lineament. This is very hard, if not impoſſible, to be conceived of thoſe who take up their opinions only from conviction. But how fully ſoever I am perſuaded of the truth of what I hold, I am in common juſtice to allow the ſame ſincerity to him that differs from me; and ſo we are upon equal terms. This perſuaſion of truth on each ſide, inveſts neither of us with a right to cenſure or condemn the other. I have no more reaſon to treat him ill for differing from me, than he has to treat me ill for the ſame cauſe. Pity him, I may; inform him fairly, I ought: but contemn, malign, revile, or any otherwiſe prejudice him for not thinking juſt as I do, that I ought not. My orthodoxy gives me no more authority over him, than his (for every one is orthodox to himſelf) gives him over me. When the word orthodoxy (which in effect ſignifies no more but the opinions of my party) is made uſe of as a pretence to domineer, (as ordinarily it is) it is, and always will be, ridiculous.

He ſays, "I hate, even with a deadly hatred, all catechiſms and confeſſions, "all ſyſtems and models." I do not remember, that I have once mentioned the word catechiſm, either in my reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, or vindication; but he knows "I hate them deadly," and I know I do not. And as for ſyſtems and models, all that I ſay of them, in the pages he quotes to prove my hatred of them, is only this, viz. in my vindication, p. 590. "Some men had rather "you ſhould write booty, and croſs your own deſign, of removing men's pre"judices to chriſtianity, than leave out one tittle of what they put into their "ſyſtems——Some men will not bear it, that any one ſhould ſpeak of reli"gion, but according to the model that they themſelves have made of it." In neither of which places do I ſpeak againſt ſyſtems or models, but the ill uſe that ſome men make of them.

He tells me alſo in the ſame place, p. 104. that I deride myſteries. But for this he hath quoted neither words nor place: and where he does not do that, I have reaſon, from the frequent liberties he takes, to impute to me what no where appears in my books, to deſire the reader to take what he ſays, not to be true. For did he mean fairly, he might, by quoting my words, put all ſuch matters of fact out of doubt; and not force me, ſo often as he does, to demand where it is: as I do now here again,

LI. "Where it is that I deride myſteries?"

His next words. p. 104. are very remarkable: they are, "O how he [the "vindicator] grins at the ſpirit of creed-making! p. 593. vind. The very "thoughts of which do ſo haunt him, ſo plague and torment him, that he can"not reſt 'till it be conjured down. And here, by the way, ſeeing I have men"tioned his rancour againſt ſyſtematick books and writings, I might repreſent "the miſery that is coming upon all bookſellers, if this gentleman and his correſpondents

"reſpondents go on ſucceſsfully. Here is an effectual plot to undermine Stationers-hall; for all ſyſtems and bodies of divinity, philoſophy, &c. muſt be caſhiered: whatſoever looks like ſyſtem muſt not be bought or ſold. This will fall heavy on the gentlemen of St. Paul's church-yard, and other places." Here the politick unmaſker ſeems to threaten me with the poſſe of Paul's church-yard, becauſe my book might leſſen their gain in the ſale of theological ſyſtems. I remember that, "Demetrius the ſhrine-maker, which brought no ſmall gain to the craftſmen, whom he called together, with the workmen of like occupation, and ſaid to this purpoſe: Sirs, ye know, that by this craft we have our wealth: moreover ye ſee and hear, that this Paul hath perſuaded, and turned away much people, ſaying, that they be no Gods that are made with hands; ſo that this our craft is in danger to be ſet at nought." And when they heard theſe ſayings, they were full of wrath, and cried out, ſaying, "Great is Diana of the Epheſians." Have you, ſir, who are ſo good at ſpeech-making, as a worthy ſucceſſor of the ſilver-ſmith, regulating your zeal for the truth, and your writing divinity by the profit it will bring, made a ſpeech to this purpoſe to the craftſmen, and told them, that I ſay, articles of faith, and creeds, and ſyſtems in religion, cannot be made by men's hands or fancies; but muſt be juſt ſuch, and no other than what God hath given us in the ſcriptures? And are they ready to cry out to your content, "Great is Diana of the Epheſians?" If you have well warmed them with your oratory, 'tis to be hoped they will heartily join with you, and beſtir themſelves, and chuſe you for their champion, to prevent the miſery, you tell them, is coming upon them, in the loſs of the ſale of ſyſtems and bodies of divinity: for, as for philoſophy, which you name too, I think you went a little too far; nothing of that kind, as I remember, hath been ſo much as mentioned. But, however, ſome ſort of orators, when their hands are in, omit nothing, true or falſe, that may move thoſe they would work upon. Is not this a worthy employment, and becoming a preacher of the goſpel, to be a ſolicitor for Stationers-hall? And make the gain of the gentlemen of Paul's church-yard, a conſideration for or againſt any book writ concerning religion? This, if it were ever thought on before, no body but an unmaſker, who lays all open, was ever ſo fooliſh as to publiſh. But here you have an account of his zeal: the views of gain are to meaſure the truths of divinity. Had his zeal, as he pretends in the next paragraph, no other aims, but the "defence of the goſpel;" 'tis probable this controverſy would have been managed after another faſhion.

WHETHER what he ſays in the next, pag, 105. to excuſe his ſo often pretending to "know my heart and thoughts," will ſatiſfy the reader; I ſhall not trouble myſelf. By his ſo often doing it again, in his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, I ſee he cannot write without it. And ſo I leave it to the judgment of the readers, whether he can be allowed to know other men's thoughts, who, in many occaſions, ſeems not well to know his own. The railing in the remainder of this chapter, I ſhall paſs by, as I have done a great deal of the ſame ſtrain in his book: only to ſhew how well he underſtands or repreſents my ſenſe, I ſhall ſet down my words, as they are in the pages he quotes, and his inferences from them.

Vindication, p. 594.	Socinianiſm Unmaſk'd, p. 108.
I KNOW not but it may be true, that the Anti-trinitarians and Racovians underſtand thoſe places as I do: but 'tis more than I know, that they do ſo. I took not my ſenſe of thoſe texts from thoſe writers, but from the ſcripture itſelf, giving light to its own meaning, by one place compared with another. What, in this way, appears to me its true meaning, I ſhall not decline; becauſe I am told, that	"THE profeſſed divines of England, you muſt know, are but a pitiful ſort of folks with this great Racovian rabbi. He tells us plainly, that he is not mindful of what the generality of divines declare for, p. 594. He labours ſo concernedly to ingratiate himſelf with the mob, the multitude, (which he ſo often talks of) that he has no regard to theſe. The generality of

Vindication, p. 594.

it is ſo underſtood by the Racovians, whom I never yet read; nor embrace the contrary, though the generality of divines I more converſe with, ſhould declare for it. If the ſenſe wherein I underſtand thoſe texts be a miſtake, I ſhall be beholden to you, if you will ſet me right. But they are not popular authorities, or frightful names, whereby I judge of truth and falſhood.

Socinianiſm Unmaſk'd, p. 108.

“ the rabble are more conſiderable with “ him, than the generality of divines.”

He tells me here of the generality of divines. If he had ſaid, of the church of England, I could have underſtood him: but he ſays, “ The profeſſed divines “ of England;” and there being ſeveral ſorts of divines in England, who, I think, do not every where agree in their interpretations of ſcripture; which of them is it I muſt have regard to, where they differ? If he cannot tell me that, he complains here of me for a fault, which he himſelf knows not how to mend.

Vindication, p. 593.

The liſt of materials for his creed, (for the articles are not yet formed) Mr. Edwards cloſes, p. 111. with theſe words: “ Theſe are the matters of “ faith contained in the epiſtles; and “ they are eſſential and integral parts of the goſpel itſelf.” What! juſt theſe, neither more nor leſs? If you are ſure of it, pray let us have them ſpeedily, for the reconciling of differences in the chriſtian church, which has been ſo cruelly torn about the articles of the chriſtian faith, to the great reproach of chriſtian charity, and ſcandal of our true religion.

Socinianiſm Unmaſk'd, p. 109.

“ This author, as demure and grave “ as he would ſometimes ſeem to be, “ can ſcoff at the matters of faith con-“ tained in the apoſtles epiſtles, p. 593.”

Does the vindicator here “ ſcoff at the matters of faith contained in the “ epiſtles?” or ſhew the vain pretences of the unmaſker: who undertakes to give us, out of the epiſtles, a collection of fundamentals, without being able to ſay, whether thoſe he ſets down be all or no?

Vindication, p. 596.

I hope you do not think, how contemptibly ſoever you ſpeak of the venerable mob, as you are pleaſed to dignify them, p. 117. that the bulk of mankind, or in your phraſe, the rabble, are not concerned in religion, or ought not to underſtand it, in order to their ſalvation. I remember the Phariſees treated the common people with contempt; and ſaid, “ Have any of the rulers, or of the Phariſees, believed in him? But “ this people who know not the law, are curſed.” But yet theſe, who, in the cenſure of the Phariſees, were curſed, were ſome of the poor, or, if you pleaſe to have it ſo, the mob, to whom the goſpel was preached by our Saviour, as he tells John's diſciples, Matt. xi. 5.

Socinianiſm Unmaſk'd, p. 110.

“ To coax the mob, he profanely “ brings in that place of ſcripture;” Have any of the rulers believed in him?

Where the profaneneſs of this is, I do not ſee; unleſs ſome unknown ſacredneſs of the unmaſker's perſon make it profaneneſs to ſhew, that he, like the Phariſees of old, has a great contempt for the common people, i. e. the far greater part of mankind; as if they and their ſalvation were below the regard of this elevated rabbi. But this, of profaneneſs, may be well borne from him, ſince in the next words, my mentioning another part of his carriage is no leſs than irreligion.

Vindication, p. 595.

He prefers what I ſay to him myſelf, to what is offered to him, from

Socinianiſm Unmaſk'd, p. 110.

“ Ridiculously and irreligiouſly “ he pretends,” that I prefer what he

Vindication, p. 595.	Socinianiſm Unmaſked, p. 110.
the word of God, and makes me this compliment, that I begin to mend about the cloſe, i. e. when I leave off quoting of ſcripture, and the dull work was done, of "going through the hiſtory of the Evangeliſts and the Acts," which he computes, p. 105. to take up three quarters of my book.	ſaith to me, to what is offered to me from the word of God, p. 595.

The matter of fact is as I relate it, and ſo is beyond pretence; and for this I refer the reader to the 105th and 114th pages of his "thoughts concerning the "cauſes of atheiſm." But had I miſtaken, I know not how he could have called it, irreligiouſly. Make the worſt of it that can be, how comes it to be irreligious? What is there divine in an unmaſker; that one cannot pretend, (true or falſe) that he prefers what I ſay, to what is offered him from the word of God, without doing it irreligiouſly? Does the very aſſuming the power to define articles, and determine who are, and who are not chriſtians, by a creed not yet made, erect an unmaſker preſently into God's throne, and beſtow on him the title of Dominus Deuſque noſter," whereby offences againſt him come to be irreligious acts? I have miſrepreſented his meaning; let it be ſo: Where is the irreligion of it? Thus it is: the power of making a religion for others, (and thoſe that make creeds do that) being once got into any one's fancy, muſt at laſt make all oppoſitions to thoſe creeds and creed-makers, irreligion. Thus we ſee, in proceſs of time, it did in the church of Rome: but it was in length of time, and by gentle degrees. The unmaſker, it ſeems, cannot ſtay, is in haſte, and at one jump leaps into the chair. He has given us yet but a piece of his creed, and yet that is enough to ſet him above the ſtate of human miſtakes or frailties; and to mention any ſuch thing in him, is to do irreligiouſly.

"We may further ſee," ſays the unmaſker, p. 110. "how counterfeit the "vindicator's gravity is, whilſt he condemns frothy and light diſcourſes," p. 595. vindic. And "yet, in many pages together, moſt irreverently treats a great part "of the apoſtolical writings, and throws aſide the main articles of religion, as "unneceſſary." Anſw. In my vindic. p. 593. you may remember theſe words; "I require you to publiſh to the world thoſe paſſages, which ſhew my con"tempt of the epiſtles." Why do you not (eſpecially having been ſo called upon to do it) ſet down thoſe words, wherein "I moſt irreverently treat a great part "of the apoſtolical writings?" At leaſt, why do you not quote thoſe many pages wherein I do it? This looks a little ſuſpiciouſly, that you cannot: and the more, becauſe you have, in this very page, not been ſparing to quote places which you thought to your purpoſe. I muſt take leave, therefore, (if it may be done without irreligion) to aſſure the reader, that this is another of your many miſtakes in matters of fact, for which you have not ſo much as the excuſe of inadvertency: for, as he ſees, you have been minded of it before. But an unmaſker, ſay what you will to him, will be an unmaſker ſtill.

He cloſes what he has to ſay to me, in his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, as if he were in the pulpit, with an uſe of exhortation. The falſe inſinuations it is filled with, make the concluſion of a piece with the introduction. As he ſets out, ſo he ends, and therein ſhews wherein he places his ſtrength. A cuſtom of making bold with truth is ſo ſeldom curable in a grown man, and the unmaſker ſhews ſo little ſenſe of ſhame, where it is charged upon him, beyond a poſſibility of clearing himſelf; that no body is to trouble themſelves any farther about that part of his eſtabliſhed character. Letting, therefore, that alone to nature and cuſtom, two ſure guides, I ſhall only intreat him, to prevent his taking railing for argument, (which, I fear, he too often does) that upon his entrance, every where, upon any new argument, he would ſet it down in ſyllogiſm; and when he has done that (that I may know what is to be anſwered) let him then give vent, as he pleaſes, to his noble vein of wit and oratory.

The lifting a man's ſelf up in his own opinion, has had the credit, in former ages, to be thought the loweſt degradation that human nature could well ſink itſelf to. Hence, ſays the wiſe man, Prov. xxvi. 5. "Anſwer a fool according “to his folly, leſt he be wiſe in his own conceit:” hereby ſhewing, that ſelf-conceitedneſs is a degree beneath ordinary folly. And therefore he there provides a fence againſt it, to keep even fools from ſinking yet lower, by falling into it. Whether what was not ſo in Solomon's days, be now, by length of time, in ours, grown into a mark of wiſdom and parts, and an evidence of great performances, I ſhall not inquire. Mr. Edwards, who goes beyond all that ever I yet met with, in the commendation of his own, beſt knows why he ſo extols what he has done in this controverſy. For fear the praiſes he has not been ſparing of in his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, ſhould not ſufficiently trumpet out his worth, or might be forgotten; he, in a new piece, entitled, “the ſocinian creed,” proclaims again his mighty deeds, and the victory he has eſtabliſhed to himſelf by them, in theſe words: “But he and his friends (the one-article men) ſeem to “have made ſatisfaction, by their profound ſilence lately, whereby they acknowledge to the world, that they have nothing to ſay in reply to what I laid to their “charge, and fully proved againſt them,” ſocinian creed, p. 128. This freſh teſtimony of no ordinary conceit, which Mr. Edwards hath, of the excellency and ſtrength of his reaſoning, in his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, I leave with him and his friends, to be conſidered of at their leiſure: and, if they think I have miſapplied the term of conceitedneſs, to ſo wiſe, underſtanding, and every way accompliſhed a diſputant, (if we may believe himſelf) I will teach them a way how he, or any body elſe, may fully convince me of it. There remains on his ſcore, marked in this reply of mine, ſeveral propoſitions to be proved by him. If he can but find arguments to prove them, that will bear the ſetting down in form, and will ſo publiſh them, I will allow myſelf to be miſtaken. Nay, which is more, if he, or any body in the 112 pages of his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, can find but ten arguments that will bear the teſt of ſyllogiſm, the true touchſtone of right arguing; I will grant, that that treatiſe deſerves all thoſe commendations he has beſtowed upon it, though it be made up more of his own panegyrick, than a confutation of me.

In his ſocinian creed, (for a creed-maker he will be; and whether he has been as lucky for the Socinians as for the Orthodox, I know not) p. 120. he begins with me, and that with the ſame conquering hand and ſkill, which can never fail of victory; if a man has but wit enough to know what propoſition he is able to confute, and then make that his adverſary's tenet. But the repetitions of his old ſong concerning one article, the epiſtles, &c. which occur here again, I ſhall only ſet down; that none of theſe excellent things may be loſt, whereby this acute and unanſwerable writer has ſo well deſerved his own commendations: viz. “That I ſay, there is but one ſingle article of the chriſtian truth neceſſary “to be believed and aſſented to by us, p. 121. That I ſlight the chriſtian prin-“ciples, curtail the articles of our faith, and raviſh chriſtianity itſelf from him, “p. 123. And that I turn the epiſtles of the apoſtles into waſte paper,” p. 127, &c.

These, and the like ſlanders, I have already given an anſwer to, in my reply to his former book. Only one new one here I cannot paſs over in ſilence, becauſe of the remarkable profaneneſs which ſeems to me to be in it; which, I think, deſerves publick notice. In my “reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity,” I have laid together thoſe paſſages of our Saviour's life, which ſeemed to me moſt eminently to ſhew his wiſdom, in that conduct of himſelf, with that reſerve and caution which was neceſſary to preſerve him, and carry him through the appointed time of his miniſtry. Some have thought I had herein done conſiderable ſervice to the chriſtian religion, by removing thoſe objections which ſome were apt to make from our Saviour's carriage, not rightly underſtood. This creed-maker tells me, p. 127. “That I make our Saviour a coward:” a word not to be applied to the Saviour of the world by a pious or diſcreet chriſtian, upon any pretence, without great neceſſity, and ſure grounds! If he had ſet down my words, and quoted the page, (which was the leaſt could have been done to excuſe ſuch a phraſe) we ſhould then have ſeen which of us two, this impious and irreligious epithet, given to the holy Jeſus, has for its author. In the mean time, I leave it with him, to be accounted for, by his piety, to thoſe, who by his example ſhall be encouraged to entertain ſo vile a thought, or uſe ſo profane an expreſſion of the Captain of our ſalvation, who freely gave himſelf up to death for us.

HE alſo ſays, in the ſame page, 127. "That I every where ſtrike at ſyſtems, "the deſign of which is to eſtabliſh one of my own, or to foſter ſcepticiſm, by "beating down all others."

FOR clear reaſon, or good ſenſe, I do not think our creed-maker ever had his fellow. In the immediate preceding words of the ſame ſentence, he charges me with "a great antipathy againſt ſyſtems;" and before he comes to the end of it, finds out my deſign to be the "eſtabliſhing one of my own." So that this, "my antipathy againſt ſyſtems" makes me in love with one. "My de-"ſign, he ſays, is to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of my own, or to foſter ſcepticiſm, in "beating down all others." Let my book, if he pleaſes, be my ſyſtem of chriſtianity. Now is it in me any more foſtering ſcepticiſm, to ſay my ſyſtem is true, and others not, than it is in the creed-maker to ſay ſo of all other ſyſtems but his own? For, I hope he does not allow any ſyſtem of chriſtianity to be true, that differs from his, any more than I do.

BUT I have ſpoke againſt all ſyſtems. Anſw. And always ſhall, ſo far as they are ſet up by particular men, or parties, as the juſt meaſure of every man's faith; wherein every thing that is contained, is required and impoſed to be believed to make a man a chriſtian: ſuch an opinion and uſe of ſyſtems I ſhall always be againſt, 'till the creed-maker ſhall tell me, amongſt the variety of them, which alone is to be received and reſted in, in the abſence of his creed; which is not yet finiſhed, and, I fear, will not, as long as I live. That every man ſhould receive from others, or make to himſelf, ſuch a ſyſtem of chriſtianity, as he found moſt conformable to the word of God, according to the beſt of his underſtanding, is what I never ſpoke againſt; but think it every one's duty to labour for, and to take all opportunities, as long as he lives, by ſtudying the ſcriptures every day, to perfect.

BUT this, I fear, will not go eaſily down with our author; for then he cannot be a creed-maker for others: a thing he ſhews himſelf very forward to; how able to perform it, we ſhall ſee when his creed is made. In the mean time, talking loudly, and at random, about fundamentals, without knowing what is ſo, may ſtand him in ſome ſtead.

THIS being all that is new, which I think myſelf concerned in, in this ſocinian creed, I paſs on to his poſtſcript. In the firſt page whereof, I find theſe words: "I found that the manager of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity had "prevailed with a gentleman to make a ſermon upon my refutation of that trea-"tiſe, and the vindication of it." Such a piece of impertinency, as this, might have been borne from a fair adverſary: but the ſample Mr. Edwards has given of himſelf, in his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, perſuades me this ought to be bound up with what he ſays of me in his introduction of that book, in theſe words: "Among others, they thought and made choice of a gentleman, who, they "knew, would be extraordinary uſeful to them. And he, it is probable, was "as forward to be made uſe of by them, and preſently accepted of the office "that was aſſigned him:" and more there to the ſame purpoſe. All which I know to be utterly falſe.

'TIS pity that one who relies ſo intirely upon it, ſhould have no better an invention. The ſocinians ſet the author of the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," &c. on work to write that book; by which diſcovery the world being (as Mr. Edwards ſays) let into the project, that book is confounded, baffled, blown off, and by this ſkilful artifice there is an end of it. Mr. Bold preaches and publiſhes a ſermon without this irrefragable gentleman's good leave and liking. What now muſt be done to diſcredit it, and keep it from being read? Why, Mr. Bold too was ſet on work, by "the manager of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," &c. In your whole ſtorehouſe of ſtratagems, you that are ſo great a conqueror, have you but this one way to deſtroy a book, which you ſet your mightineſs againſt, but to tell the world it was a job of journey-work for ſomebody you do not like? Some other would have done better in this new caſe, had your happy invention been ready with it: for you are not ſo baſhful and reſerved, but that you may be allowed to be as great a wit as he who profeſſed himſelf "ready "at any time, to ſay a good or a new thing, if he could but think of it." But in good earneſt, ſir, if one ſhould aſk you, Do you think no books contain truths in them, which were undertaken by the procuration of a bookſeller? I deſire you to be a little tender in the point, not knowing how far it may reach. Ay, but ſuch bookſellers live not at the lower end of Pater-noſter-row, but in Paul's church-yard, and are the managers of other-gueſs books, than "the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity." And therefore you very rightly ſubjoin, "In- "deed it was a great maſter-piece of procuration, and we can't but think that "man muſt ſpeak truth, and defend it very impartially and ſubſtantially, who "is thus brought on to undertake the cauſe." And ſo Mr. Bold's ſermon is found to have neither truth nor ſenſe in it, becauſe it was printed by a bookſeller at the lower end of Pater-noſter-row; for that, I dare ſay, is all you know of the matter. But that is hint enough for a happy diviner, to be ſure of the reſt, and with confidence to report that for certain matter of fact, which had never any being but in the fore-caſting ſide of his politick brain.

But whatever were the reaſons that moved Mr. B—— to preach that ſermon, of which I know nothing; this I am ſure, it ſhews only the weakneſs and malice (I will not ſay, and ill breeding, for that concerns not one of Mr. Edwards's pitch) of any one who excepts againſt it, to take notice of any thing more than what the author has publiſhed. Therein alone conſiſts the error, if there be any; and that alone thoſe meddle with, who write for the ſake of truth. But poor cavillers have other purpoſes, and therefore muſt uſe other ſhifts, and make a buſtle about ſomething beſides the argument, to prejudice and beguile unwary readers.

The only exception the creed-maker makes to Mr. Bold's ſermon, is the contradiction he imputes to him, in ſaying; "That there is but one point or article "neceſſary to be believed for the making a man a chriſtian: and that there are "many points beſides this, which Jeſus Chriſt hath taught and revealed, which "every ſincere chriſtian is indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand;" and, "that there are particular points and articles, which being known to be "revealed by Chriſt, chriſtians muſt indiſpenſably aſſent to." And where, now, is there any thing like a contradiction in this? Let it be granted, for example, that the creed-maker's ſet of articles (let their number be what they will, when he has found them all out) are neceſſary to be believed, for the making a man a chriſtian. Is there any contradiction in it to ſay, there are many points beſides theſe, which Jeſus Chriſt hath taught and revealed, which every ſincere chriſtian is indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand? If this be not ſo, it is but for any one to be perfect in Mr. Edwards's creed, and then he may lay by the bible, and from thenceforth he is abſolutely diſpenſed with, from ſtudying or underſtanding any thing more of the ſcripture.

But Mr. Edwards's ſupremacy is not yet ſo far eſtabliſhed, that he will dare to ſay, that chriſtians are not obliged to endeavour to underſtand any other points revealed in the ſcripture, but what are contained in his creed. He cannot yet well diſcard all the reſt of the ſcripture, becauſe he has yet need of it for the compleating of his creed, which is like to ſecure the bible to us for ſome time yet. For I will be anſwerable for it, he will not be quickly able to reſolve what texts of the ſcripture do, and what do not, contain points neceſſary to be believed. So that I am apt to imagine, that the creed-maker, upon ſecond thoughts, will allow that ſaying, that there is but one, or there are but twelve, or there are but as many as he ſhall ſet down, (when he has reſolved which they ſhall be) neceſſary to the making a man a chriſtian; and the ſaying, there are other points beſides, contained in the ſcripture, which every ſincere chriſtian is indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand, and muſt believe, when he knows them to be revealed by Jeſus Chriſt, are two propoſitions that may conſiſt together without a contradiction.

Every chriſtian is to partake of that bread, and that cup, which is the communion of the body and blood of Chriſt. And is not every ſincere chriſtian indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand theſe words of our Saviour's inſtitution, "This is my body, and this is my blood?" And if, upon his ſerious endeavour to do it, he underſtands them in a literal ſenſe, that Chriſt meant, that that was really his body and blood, and nothing elſe; muſt he not neceſſarily believe, that the bread and wine, in the Lord's ſupper, is changed really into his body and blood, though he doth not know how? Or, if having his mind ſet otherwiſe, he underſtands the bread and wine to be really the body and blood of Chriſt, without ceaſing to be true bread and wine; or elſe, if he underſtands them, that the body and blood of Chriſt are verily and indeed given and received, in the ſacrament, in a ſpiritual manner: or, laſtly, if he underſtands our Saviour to mean, by thoſe words, only the bread and wine to be a repreſentation of his body and blood; in which way ſoever of theſe four, a chriſtian underſtands theſe words of our Saviour to be meant by him, is he not obliged in that ſenſe to believe them to be true, and aſſent to them? Or can he be a chriſtian, and underſtand theſe words to be meant by our Saviour, in one ſenſe, and deny his aſſent to them as true, in that ſenſe? Would not this be to deny our Saviour's veracity, and conſequently his being the Meſſiah, ſent from God? And yet this is put upon a chriſtian, where he underſtands the ſcripture in one ſenſe, and is required to believe it in another. From all which 'tis evident, that to ſay there is one, or any number of articles neceſſary to be known and believed to make a man a chriſtian, and that there are others contained in the ſcripture, which a man is obliged to endeavour to underſtand, and obliged alſo to aſſent to, as he does underſtand them, is no contradiction.

To believe Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, and to take him to be his Lord and King, let us ſuppoſe to be that only which is neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian: may it not yet be neceſſary for him, being a chriſtian, to ſtudy the doctrine and law of this his Lord and King, and believe that all that he delivered is true? Is there any contradiction in holding of this? But this creed-maker, to make ſure work, and not to fail of a contradiction in Mr. Bold's words, miſrepeats them, p. 241. and quite contrary, both to what they are in the ſermon, and what they are, as ſet down by the creed-maker himſelf, in the immediately preceding page. Mr. Bold ſays, "There are other points, that Jeſus Chriſt "hath taught and revealed, which every ſince chriſtian is indiſpenſably obliged "to underſtand; and which being known to be revealed by Chriſt, he muſt in"diſpenſably aſſent to." From which the creed-maker argues thus, p. 240. "Now if there be other points, and particular articles, and thoſe many, which "a ſincere chriſtian is obliged, and that neceſſarily and indiſpenſably, to under"ſtand, believe and aſſent to; then this writer hath, in effect, yielded to that "propoſition I maintained, viz. that the belief of one article is not ſufficient to "make a man a chriſtian; and conſequently he runs counter to the propoſition "he had laid down."

Is there no difference, I beſeech you, between being "indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand, and being indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand any point?" 'Tis the firſt of theſe Mr. Bold ſays, and 'tis the latter of theſe you argue from, and ſo conclude nothing againſt him; nor can you to your purpoſe. For 'till Mr. Bold ſays (which he is far from ſaying) that every ſincere chriſtian is neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand all thoſe texts of ſcripture, from whence you ſhould have drawn your neceſſary articles, (when you have perfected your creed) in the ſame ſenſe that you do; you can conclude nothing againſt what he had ſaid, concerning that one article, or any thing that looks like running counter to it. For it may be enough to conſtitute a man a chriſtian, and one of Chriſt's ſubjects' to take Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, his appointed King, and yet without a contradiction; ſo that it may be his indiſpenſable duty, as a ſubject of that kingdom, to endeavour to underſtand all the dictates of his ſovereign, and to aſſent to the truth of them, as far as he underſtands them.

But that which the good creed-maker aims at, without which all his neceſſary articles fall, is, that it ſhould be granted him, that every ſincere chriſtian was neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand all thoſe parts of divine revelation, from whence he pretends to draw his articles, in their true meaning, i. e. juſt as he does. But his infallibility is not yet ſo eſtabliſhed, but that there will need ſome proof of that propoſition. And when he has proved, that every ſincere chriſtian is neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand thoſe texts in their true meaning; and that his interpretation of them is that true meaning; I ſhall then aſk him, Whether "every ſincere chriſtian is not as neceſſarily and "indiſpenſably obliged" to underſtand other texts of ſcripture in their true meaning, though they have no place in his ſyſtem?

For example, To make uſe of the inſtance above-mentioned, is not every ſincere chriſtian neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand theſe words of our Saviour, "This is my body, and this is my blood," that he may know what he receives in the ſacrament? Does he ceaſe to be a chriſtian, who happens not to underſtand them juſt as the creed-maker does? Or may not the old gentleman at Rome (who has ſomewhat the antienter title to infallibility) make tranſubſtantiation a fundamental article neceſſary to be believed there, as well as the creed-maker here, make his ſenſe of any diſputed text of ſcripture, a fundamental article neceſſary to be believed?

Let us ſuppoſe Mr. Bold had ſaid, that inſtead of one point, the right knowledge of the creed-maker's one hundred points (when he has reſolved on them) doth conſtitute and make a perſon a chriſtian; yet there are many other points Jeſus Chriſt hath taught and revealed, which every ſincere chriſtian is indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand, and to make a due uſe of; for this, I think, the creed-maker will not deny. From whence, in the creed-maker's words, I will thus argue: "Now if there be other points, and particular articles, and thoſe many, which a ſincere chriſtian is obliged, and that neceſſarily and indiſpenſably, to underſtand, and believe, and aſſent to; then this "writer doth, in effect, yield to that propoſition which I maintained, viz. "That the belief of thoſe one hundred articles is not ſufficient to make a man "a chriſtian:" for this is that which I maintain; that upon this ground the belief of the articles, which he has ſet down in his liſt, are not ſufficient to make a man a chriſtian; and that upon Mr. Bold's reaſon, which the creed-maker inſiſts on againſt one article, viz. becauſe there are many other points Jeſus Chriſt hath taught and revealed, which every ſincere chriſtian is as neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to endeavour to underſtand, and make a due uſe of.

But this creed-maker is cautious, beyond any of his predeceſſors: He will not be ſo caught by his own argument; and therefore is very ſhy to give you the preciſe articles, that every ſincere chriſtian is neceſſarily and indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand and give his aſſent to. Something he is ſure there is, that he is indiſpenſably obliged to underſtand and aſſent to, to make him a chriſtian; but what that is, he cannot yet tell. So that whether he be a chriſtian or no, he does not know; and what other people will think of him, from his treating of the ſerious things of chriſtianity, in ſo trifling and ſcandalous a way, muſt be left to them.

In the next paragraph, p. 242. the creed-maker tells us, Mr. Bold goes on to confute himſelf, in ſaying, "A true chriſtian muſt aſſent unto this, that "Chriſt Jeſus is God." But this is juſt ſuch another confutation of himſelf as the before-mentioned, i. e. as much as a falſhood, ſubſtituted by another man, can be a confutation of a man's ſelf, who has ſpoken truth all of a-piece. For the creed-maker, according to his ſure way of baffling his opponents, ſo as to leave them nothing to anſwer, hath here, as he did before, changed Mr. Bold's word's, which in the 35th page, quoted by the creed-maker, ſtands thus: "When "a true chriſtian underſtands, that Chriſt Jeſus hath taught, that he is a God, "he muſt aſſent unto it:" which is true, and conformable to what he had ſaid before, that every ſincere chriſtian muſt endeavour to underſtand the points taught and revealed by Jeſus Chriſt; which being known to be revealed by him, he muſt aſſent unto.

The like piece of honeſty the creed-maker ſhews in the next paragraph, p. 243. where he charges Mr. Bold with ſaying, "That a true chriſtian is as "much obliged to believe, that the Holy Spirit is God, as to believe that Jeſus

" is the Chriſt," p. 40. In which place, Mr. Bold's words are; "When a " true chriſtian underſtands, that Chriſt Jeſus hath given this account of the " Holy Spirit, viz. that he is God; he is as much obliged to believe it, as he " is to believe, that Jeſus is the Chriſt: which is an uncconteſtable truth, but ſuch an one as the creed-maker himſelf ſaw, would do him no ſervice; and therefore he mangles it, and leaves out half to ſerve his turn. But he that ſhould give a teſtimony in the ſlight affairs of men, and their temporal concerns, before a court of judicature, as the creed-maker does here, and almoſt every where, in the great affairs of religion, and the everlaſting concern of ſouls, before all mankind, would loſe his ears for it. What, therefore, this worthy gentleman alledges out of Mr. Bold, as a contradiction to himſelf, being only the creed-maker's contradiction to truth, and clear matter of fact, needs no other anſwer.

THE reſt of what he calls " reflections on Mr. Bold's ſermon," being nothing but either rude and miſbecoming language of him; or pitiful childiſh application to him, to change his perſuaſion at the creed-maker's entreaty, and give up the truth he hath owned, in courteſy to this doughty combatant; ſhews the ability of the man. Leave off begging the queſtion, and ſuperciliouſly preſuming, that you are in the right; and, inſtead of that, ſhew it by argument: and I dare anſwer for Mr. Bold, you will have him, and I promiſe you, with him, one convert more. But arguing is not, it ſeems, this notable diſputant's way. If boaſting of himſelf, and contemning others, falſe quotations, and feigned matters of fact, which the reader neither can know, nor is the queſtion concerned in it, if he did know, will not do; there is an end of him: he has ſhewn his excellency in ſcurrilous declamation; and there you have the whole of this unanſwerable writer. And for this, I appeal to his own writings in this controverſy, if any judicious reader can have the patience to look them over.

IN the beginning of his " reflections on Mr. Bold's ſermon," he confidently tells the world, " that he had found, that the manager of the reaſonableneſs of " chriſtianity had prevailed on Mr. Bold to preach a ſermon upon his reflec- " tions, &c." And adds, " And we cannot but think, that that man muſt " ſpeak the truth, and defend it very impartially and ſubſtantially, who is thus " brought on to undertake the cauſe." And at the latter end, he addreſſes himſelf to Mr. Bold, as one that is drawn off, to be an under journeyman-worker in ſocinianiſm. In his gracious allowance, " Mr. Bold is, ſeemingly, a man of " ſome reliſh of religion and piety," p. 244. He is forced alſo to own him to be a man of ſobriety and temper, p. 245. A very good riſe, to give him out to the world, in the very next words, as a man of a profligate conſcience: for ſo he muſt be, who can be drawn off to preach, or write for ſocinianiſm, when he thinks it a moſt dangerous error; who can " diſſemble with himſelf, and " choak his inward perſuaſions," (as the creed-maker inſinuates that Mr. Bold does, in the ſame addreſs to him, p. 248.) and write contrary to his light. Had the creed-maker had reaſon to think in earneſt, that Mr. Bold was going off to ſocinianiſm, he might have reaſoned with him fairly, as with a man running into dangerous error: or if he had certainly known, that he was by any by-ends prevailed on to undertake a cauſe contrary to his conſcience, he might have ſome reaſon to tell the world, as he does, p. 239, " That we cannot think he " ſhould ſpeak truth, who is thus brought to undertake the cauſe." If he does not certainly know, that " Mr. Bold was THUS brought to undertake the " cauſe," he could not have ſhewn a more villainous and unchriſtian mind, than in publiſhing ſuch a character of a miniſter of the goſpel, and a worthy man, upon no other grounds, but becauſe it might be ſubſervient to his ends. He is engaged in a controverſy, that by argument he cannot maintain; nor knew any other way, from the beginning, to attack the book he pretends to write againſt, but by crying out ſocinianiſm; a name he knows in great diſgrace with all other ſects of chriſtians, and therefore ſufficient to deter all thoſe who approve and condemn books by hear-ſay, without examining their truth themſelves, from peruſing a treatiſe, to which he could affix that imputation. Mr. Bold's name, (who is publickly known to be no ſocinian) he foreſees, will wipe off that falſe imputation, with a great many of thoſe who are led by names more than things. This ſeems exceedingly to trouble him, and he labours might and main, to get Mr. Bold to quit a book as ſocinian, which Mr. Bold knows is not ſocinian, becauſe he has read and conſidered it.

But, though our creed-maker be mightily concerned that Mr. B——d ſhould not appear in the defence of it; yet this concern cannot raiſe him one jot above that honeſty, ſkill, and good breeding, which appears towards others. He manages this matter with Mr. B——d, as he has done the reſt of the controverſy; juſt in the ſame ſtrain of invention, civility, wit, and good ſenſe. He tells him, beſides what I have above ſet down, " That he is drawn off to debaſe himſelf, " and the poſt, i. e. the miniſtry he is in, p. 245. That he hath ſaid very ill " things, to the leſſening and impairing, yea, to the defaming of that knowledge " and belief of our Saviour, and of the articles of chriſtianity, which are neceſ" ſarily required of us, p. 245. That the devout and pious," (whereby he means himſelf: for one, and none, is his own beloved wit and argument) " obſerving " that Mr. Bold is come to the neceſſity of but ONE article of faith, they ex" pect that he may in time hold that NONE is neceſſary, p. 248. That if he writes " again in the ſame ſtrain, he will write rather like a Turkiſh ſpy, than a chri" ſtian preacher; that he is a backſlider, and ſailing to Racovia with a ſide" wind:" than which, what can there be more ſcurrilous, or more malicious? And yet at the ſame time that he outrages him thus, beyond not only what chriſtian charity, but common civility, would allow in an ingenuous adverſary, he makes ſome awkward attempts to ſooth him with ſome ill-timed commendations; and would have his undervaluing Mr. Bold's animadverſions paſs for a compliment to him; becauſe he, for that reaſon, pretends not to believe ſo crude and ſhallow a thing (as he is pleaſed to call it) to be his. A notable contrivance to gain the greater liberty of railing at him under another name, when Mr. B——d's, it ſeems, is too well known to ſerve him ſo well to that purpoſe. Beſides, it is of good uſe to fill up three or four pages of his reflections; a great convenience to a writer, who knows all the ways of baffling his opponents, but argument; and who always makes a great deal of ſtir about matters foreign to his ſubject; which, whether they are granted or denied, make nothing at all to the truth of the queſtion on either ſide. For what is it to the ſhallowneſs or depth of the animadverſions, who writ them? Or to the truth or falſhood of Mr. B---d's defence of the " reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," whether a layman, or a churchman, a ſocinian, or one of the church of England, anſwered the creed-maker as well as he? Yet this is urged as a matter of great weight: but yet, in reality, it amounts to no more but this, that a man of any denomination, who wiſhes well to the peace of chriſtianity, and has obſerved the horrible effects the chriſtian religion has felt from the impoſitions of men, in matters of faith, may have reaſon to defend a book, wherein the ſimplicity of the goſpel, and the doctrine propoſed by our Saviour and his apoſtles, for the converſion of unbelievers, is made out, though there be not one word of the diſtinguiſhing tenets of his ſect in it. But that all thoſe, who, under any name, are for impoſing their own orthodoxy, as neceſſary to be believed, and perſecuting thoſe who diſſent from them, ſhould be all againſt it, is not perhaps very ſtrange.

One thing more I muſt obſerve of the creed-maker on this occaſion: in his ſocinian creed, chap. vi. the author of the " reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity," &c. and his book, muſt be judged of, by the characters and writings of thoſe, who entertain or commend his notions. " A profeſſed unitarian has defended it;" therefore he is a ſocinian. The author of a letter to the deiſts ſpeaks well of it; therefore he is a deiſt. Another, as an abetter of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, he mentions, p. 125. whoſe letters I have never ſeen: and his opinions too are, I ſuppoſe, ſet down there as belonging to me. Whatever is bad in the tenets or writings of theſe men, infects me. But the miſchief is, Mr. Bold's orthodoxy will do me no good: but becauſe he has defended my book againſt Mr. Edwards, all my faults are become his, and he has a mighty load of accuſations laid upon him. Thus contrary cauſes ſerve ſo good a natured, ſo charitable, and candid a writer as the creed-maker, to the ſame purpoſe of cenſure and railing. But I ſhall deſire him to figure to himſelf the lovelineſs of that creature, which turns every thing into venom. What others are, or hold, who have expreſſed favourable thoughts of my book, I think myſelf not concerned in. What opinions others have publiſhed, make thoſe in my book neither true nor falſe; and he that, for the ſake of truths, would confute the errors in it, ſhould ſhew their falſhood and weakneſs, as they are there: but they who write for other ends than truth, are always buſy with other matters; and where they can do nothing by reaſon and argument, hope to prevail with ſome by borrowed prejudices and party.

TAKING therefore the animadverſions, as well as the ſermon, to be his whoſe name they bear, I ſhall leave to Mr. B—d himſelf to take what notice he thinks fit of the little ſenſe, as well as great impudence, of putting his name in print to what is not his, or taking it away from what he hath ſet it to, whether it belongs to his bookſeller or anſwerer. Only I cannot paſs by the palpable falſifying of Mr. B—d's words, in the beginning of his epiſtle to the reader, without mention. Mr. B—d's words are; "whereby I came to be furniſhed with a truer "and more juſt notion of the main deſign of that TREATISE.". And the good creed-maker ſets them down thus; "The main deſign of MY OWN TREATISE "OR SERMON:" a ſure way for ſuch a champion for truth to ſecure to himſelf the laurel or the whetſtone!

THIS irreſiſtible diſputant, (who ſilences all that come in his way, ſo that thoſe that would, cannot anſwer him) to make good the mighty encomiums he has given himſelf, ought (one would think) to clear all as he goes, and leave nothing by the way unanſwered, for fear he ſhould fall into the number of thoſe poor baffled wretches, whom he with ſo much ſcorn reproaches, that they would anſwer, if they could.

MR. B—D begins his animadverſions with this remark, that our creed-maker had ſaid, That "I give it over and over again in theſe formal words, viz. That "nothing is required to be believed by any chriſtian man but this, That Jeſus is "the Meſſiah." To which Mr. B—d replies, p. 4. in theſe words; "Though "I have read over the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. with ſome attention, I "have not obſerved thoſe formal words in any part of that book, nor any words "that are capable of that conſtruction; provided they be conſidered with the relation they have to, and the manifeſt dependence they have on, what goes be-"fore, or what follows after them."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

WHETHER it was becauſe he would not, or becauſe he could not, let the reader judge. But this is down upon his ſcore already, and it is expected he ſhould anſwer to it, or elſe confeſs that he cannot. And that there may be a fair deciſion of this diſpute, I expect the ſame uſage from him, that he ſhould ſet down any propoſition of his, I have not anſwered to, and call on me for an anſwer, if I can; and if I cannot, I promiſe him to own it in print.

THE creed-maker had ſaid, "That it is moſt evident to any thinking and con-"ſiderate perſon, that I purpoſely omit the epiſtolary writings of the apoſtles, "becauſe they are fraught with fundamental doctrines, beſides that which "I mention."

To this Mr. B—d anſwers, p. 5. That if by "fundamental articles, Mr. Ed-"wards means here, all the propoſitions delivered in the epiſtles, concerning "juſt thoſe particular heads, he [Mr. Edwards] had there mentioned; it lies "upon him to prove, that Jeſus Chriſt hath made it neceſſary, that every per-"ſon muſt have an explicit knowledge and belief of all thoſe, before he can be "a chriſtian."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

AND yet, without an anſwer to it, all his talk about fundamentals, and thoſe which he pretended to ſet down in that place, under the name of fundamentals, will ſignify nothing in the preſent caſe; wherein, by fundamentals, were meant ſuch propoſitions which every perſon muſt neceſſarily have an explicit knowledge and belief of, before he can be a chriſtian.

Mr. B—d, in the ſame place, p. 6, 7. very truly and pertinently adds, “ That it did not pertain to [my] undertaking to inquire what doctrines, either in the Epiſtles, or the Evangeliſts and the Acts, were of greateſt moment to be underſtood by them who are chriſtians; but what was neceſſary to be known and believed to a perſon's being a chriſtian. For there are many important doctrines, both in the goſpels, and in the Acts, beſides this, “ That Jeſus is the Meſſiah.” But how many ſoever the doctrines be, which are taught in the epiſtles, if there be no doctrine beſides this, “ That Jeſus is the Meſſiah,” taught there as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; all the doctrines taught there, will not make any thing againſt what this author has aſſerted, nor againſt the method he hath obſerved: eſpecially, conſidering we have an account, in the acts of the apoſtles, of what thoſe perſons, by whom the epiſtles were writ, did teach, as neceſſary to be believed to people's being chriſtians.”

This, and what Mr. B--d ſubjoins, “ That it was not my deſign to give an abſtract of any of the inſpired books,” is ſo true, and has ſo clear reaſon in it, that any but this writer, would have thought himſelf concerned to have anſwered ſomething to it.

But to this Mr. Edwards answers not.

It not being, it ſeems, a creed-maker's buſineſs to convince men's underſtanding by reaſon; but to impoſe on their belief by authority; or, where that is wanting, by falſhood and bawling, And to ſuch Mr. Bold obſerves well, p. 8. “ That if I had given the like account of the epiſtles, that would have been as little ſatisfactory as what I have done already, to thoſe who are reſolved not to diſtinguiſh “ betwixt what is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, and thoſe articles which are to be believed by thoſe who are chriſtians,” as they can attain to know that Chriſt hath taught them.”

This diſtinction the creed-maker, no where that I remember, takes any notice of; p. unleſs it be p. 255. where he has ſomething relating hereunto, which we ſhall conſider, when we come to that place. I ſhall now go on to ſhew what Mr. Bold has ſaid, to which he anſwers not.

Mr Bold farther tells him, p. 10. that if he will prove any thing in oppoſition to the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. it muſt be this; “ That Jeſus Chriſt and his apoſtles have taught, that the belief of ſome one article, or certain number of articles diſtinct from this, “ That Jeſus is the Meſſiah,” either as excluſive of, or in conjunction with, the belief of this article, doth conſtitute and make a perſon a chriſtian: but that the belief of this, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah, alone, doth not make a man a chriſtian.”

But to this Mr. Edwards irrefragably answers nothing.

Mr Bold alſo, p. 10. charges him with his falſly accuſing me in theſe words: “ He pretends to contend for one ſingle article, with the excluſion of all the reſt, for this reaſon; becauſe all men ought to underſtand their religion.” And again, where he ſays, I aim at this, viz. “ That we muſt not have any point of doctrine in our religion, that the mob doth not, at the very firſt naming it, perfectly underſtand and agree to;” Mr. Bold has quoted my expreſs words to the contrary.

But to this, this unanſwerable gentleman answers nothing.

But if he be ſuch a mighty diſputant, that nothing can ſtand in his way; I ſhall expect his direct anſwer to it among thoſe other propoſitions which I have ſet down to his ſcore, and I require him to prove, if he can.

The creed-maker ſpends above four pages of his reflections, in a great ſtir who is the author of thoſe animadverſions he is reflecting on. To which I tell him, it matters not to a lover of truth, or a confuter of errors, who was the author; but what they contain. He who makes ſuch a deal of do about that which is nothing to the queſtion, ſhews he has but little mind to the argument; that his hopes are more in the recommendation of names, and prejudice of parties, than in the ſtrength of his reaſons, and the goodneſs of his cauſe. A lover of truth follows that, whoever be for or againſt it; and can ſuffer himſelf to paſs by no argument of his adverſary, without taking notice of it, either in allowing its force, or giving it a fair anſwer. Were the creed-maker capable of giving ſuch an evidence as this, of his love of truth, he would not have paſſed over the twenty-firſt page of Mr. Bold's animadverſions in ſilence. The falſhoods that are therein charged upon him, would have required an anſwer of him, if he could have given any: and I tell him, he muſt give an anſwer, or confeſs the falſhoods.

IN his 255th page, he comes to take notice of theſe words of Mr. Bold, in the 21ſt page of his animadverſions, viz. "That a convert to chriſtianity, or a "chriſtian, muſt neceſſarily believe as many articles as he ſhall attain to know, "that Jeſus Chriſt hath taught." "Which, ſays the creed-maker, wholly in-"validates what he had ſaid before, in theſe words," viz. "That Jeſus Chriſt, "and his apoſtles, did not teach any thing as neceſſary to be believed to make a "man a chriſtian, but only this one propoſition, "That Jeſus of Nazareth was "the Meſſiah." The reaſon he gives to ſhew, that the former of theſe propoſitions (in Mr. Bold) invalidates the latter, and that the animadverter contradicts himſelf, ſtands thus: "For, ſays he, if a chriſtian muſt give aſſent to all the articles "taught by our Saviour in the goſpel, and that neceſſarily; then all thoſe pro-"poſitions reckoned up in my late diſcourſe, being taught by Chriſt, or his "apoſtles, are neceſſary to be believed." Anſw. And what, I beſeech you, becomes of the reſt of the propoſitions taught by Chriſt, or his apoſtles, which you have not reckoned up in your late diſcourſe? Are not they neceſſary to be believed, "if a chriſtian muſt give an aſſent to ALL the articles taught by our Sa-"viour, and his apoſtles?"

SIR, if you will argue right from that antecedent, it muſt ſtand thus: "If "a chriſtian muſt give an aſſent to ALL the articles taught by our Saviour and his "apoſtles, and that neceſſarily;" then all the propoſitions in the new teſtament, taught by Chriſt, or his apoſtles, are neceſſarily to be believed. This conſequence I grant to be true, and neceſſarily to follow from that antecedent, and pray make your beſt of it: but withal remember, that it puts an utter end to your ſelect number of fundamentals, and makes all the truths delivered in the new teſtament, neceſſary to be explicitly believed by every chriſtian.

BUT, Sir, I muſt take notice to you, that if it be uncertain, whether he that writ the animadverſions, be the ſame perſon that preached the ſermon, yet it is very viſible, that 'tis the very ſame perſon that reflects on both; becauſe he here again uſes the ſame trick, in anſwering in the animadverſions, the ſame thing that had been ſaid in the ſermon, viz. by pretending to argue from words as Mr. Bold's, when Mr. Bold has ſaid no ſuch thing. The propoſition you argue from here is this: "If a chriſtian muſt give aſſent to all the articles taught by our "Saviour, and that neceſſarily." But Mr. Bold ſays no ſuch thing. His words, as ſet down by yourſelf, are: "A chriſtian muſt neceſſarily believe as many ar-"ticles as he ſhall attain to know, that Chriſt Jeſus hath taught." And is there no difference between "ALL that Chriſt Jeſus hath taught; and AS "MANY as any one ſhall attain to know that Chriſt Jeſus hath taught?" There is ſo great a difference between theſe two, that one can ſcarce think even ſuch a creed-maker could miſtake it. For one of them admits all thoſe to be chriſtians, who, taking Jeſus for the Meſſiah, their Lord and King, ſincerely apply themſelves to underſtand and obey his doctrine and law, and do believe all that they underſtand to be taught by him: the other ſhuts out, if not all mankind, yet nine hundred ninety-nine of a thouſand, of thoſe who profeſs themſelves chriſtians, from being really ſo. For he ſpeaks within compaſs, who ſays there is not one of a thouſand, if there be any one man at all, who explicitly knows and believes all that our Saviour and his apoſtles taught, i. e. all that is delivered in the new teſtament, in the true ſenſe that it is there intended. For if giving aſſent to it, in any ſenſe, will ſerve the turn, our creed-maker can have no exceptions againſt ſocinians, papiſts, lutherans, or any other, who, acknowledging the ſcripture to be the word of God, do yet oppoſe his ſyſtem.

BUT the creed-maker goes on, p. 255. and endeavours to prove, that what is neceſſary to be believed by every chriſtian, is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, in theſe words: "But he will ſay, the belief of thoſe propo-"ſitions makes not a man a chriſtian. Then, I ſay, they are not neceſſary and

" indiſpenſable; for what is abſolutely neceſſary in chriſtianity, is abſolutely re-" quiſite to make a man a chriſtian."

IGNORANCE, or ſomething worſe, makes our creed-maker always ſpeak doubtfully or obſcurely, whenever he pretends to argue; for here "abſolutely "neceſſary in chriſtianity" either ſignifies nothing, but abſolutely neceſſary to make a man a chriſtian; and then it is proving the ſame propoſition, by the ſame propoſition: or elſe has a very obſcure and doubtful ſignification. For, if I aſk him, Whether it be abſolutely neceſſary in chriſtianity, to obey every one of our Saviour's commands, What will he anſwer me? If he anſwers, NO; I aſk him, Which of our Saviour's commands is it not, in chriſtianity, abſolutely neceſſary to obey? If he anſwers, YES; then I tell him, by his rule, there are no chriſtians; becauſe there is no one that does in all things obey all our Saviour's commands, and therein fails to perform what is abſolutely neceſſary in chriſtianity; and ſo, by his rule, is no chriſtian. If he anſwers, Sincere endeavour to obey, is all that is abſolutely neceſſary; I reply, And ſo ſincere endeavour to underſtand, is all that is abſolutely neceſſary: neither perfect obedience, nor perfect underſtanding, is abſolutely neceſſary in chriſtianity.

BUT his propoſition, being put in terms clear, and not looſe and fallacious, ſhould ſtand thus, viz. "What is abſolutely neceſſary to every chriſtian, is abſolutely requiſite to make a man a chriſtian." But then I deny, that he can infer from Mr. Bold's words, that thoſe propoſitions (i. e. which he has ſet down as fundamental, or neceſſary to be believed) are abſolutely neceſſary to be believed by every chriſtian. For that indiſpenſable neceſſity Mr. Bold ſpeaks of, is not abſolute, but conditional. His words are, "A chriſtian muſt believe as "many articles, as he ſhall attain to know that Jeſus Chriſt hath taught." So that he places the indiſpenſable neceſſity of believing, upon the condition of attaining to know that Chriſt taught ſo. An endeavour to know what Jeſus Chriſt taught, Mr. B——d ſays truly, is abſolutely neceſſary to every one who is a chriſtian; and to believe what he has attained to know that Jeſus Chriſt taught, that alſo, he ſays, is abſolutely neceſſary to every chriſtian. But, all this granted, (as true it is) it ſtill remains (and eternally will remain) to be proved from this, (which is all that Mr. Bold ſays) that ſomething elſe is abſolutely required to make a man a chriſtian, beſides the unfeigned taking Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, his King and Lord; and accordingly, a ſincere reſolution to obey and believe all that he commanded and taught.

The gaoler, Acts xvi. 30. in anſwer to this queſtion, "What he ſhould "do to be ſaved?" was anſwered, "That he ſhould believe in the Lord Jeſus "Chriſt." And the text ſays, that the gaoler, "took them the ſame hour of "the night, and waſhed their ſtripes, and was baptized, he and all his, ſtraightway." Now, I will aſk our creed-maker, whether St. Paul, in ſpeaking to him the word of the Lord, propoſed and explained to him all thoſe propoſitions and fundamental heads of doctrine, which our creed-maker has ſet down as neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian? Let it be conſidered the gaoler was a heathen, and one that ſeems to have no more ſenſe of religion or humanity, than thoſe of that calling uſe to have: for he had let them alone under the pain of their ſtripes, without any remedy, or ſo much as the eaſe of waſhing them, from the day before, 'till after his converſion; which was not 'till after midnight. And can any one think, that between his aſking what he ſhould do to be ſaved, and his being baptized, which, the text ſays, was the ſame hour, and ſtraightway; there was time enough for St. Paul and Silas, to explain to him all the creed-maker's articles, and make ſuch a man as that, and all his houſe, underſtand the creed-maker's whole ſyſtem; eſpecially, ſince we hear nothing of it in the converſion of theſe, or any others, who were brought into the faith, in the whole hiſtory of the preaching of our Saviour and the apoſtles? Now let me aſk our creed-maker, whether the gaoler was not a chriſtian, when he was baptized; and whether, if he had then immediately died, he had not been ſaved, without the belief of any one article more, than what Paul and Silas had then taught him? Whence it follows, that what was then propoſed to him to be believed, (which appears to be nothing, but that Jeſus was the Meſſiah) was all that was abſolutely neceſſary to be believed to make him a chriſtian; though this hinders not, but that afterwards it might be neceſſary for him, indiſpenſably neceſſary, to believe other articles, when he attained to the knowledge that Chriſt had taught them. And the reaſon of it is plain: becauſe the knowing that Chriſt hath taught any thing, and the not receiving it for true (which is believing it) is inconſiſtent with the believing him to be the Meſſiah, ſent from God to enlighten and ſave the world. Every word of divine revelation is abſolutely and indiſpenſably neceſſary to be believed by every chriſtian, as ſoon as he comes to know it to be taught by our Saviour, or his apoſtles, or to be of divine revelation. But yet this is far enough from making it abſolutely neceſſary to every chriſtian, to know every text in the ſcripture, much leſs to underſtand every text in the ſcripture; and leaſt of all, to underſtand it as the creed-maker is pleaſed to put his ſenſe upon it.

THIS the good creed-maker either will not, or cannot underſtand: but gives us a liſt of articles cull'd out of the ſcripture by his own authority, and tells us, thoſe are abſolutely neceſſary to be believed by every one, to make him a chriſtian. For what is of abſolute neceſſity in chriſtianity, as thoſe, he ſays, are, he tells us, is abſolutely requiſite to make a man a chriſtian. But when he is aſked, Whether theſe are all the articles of abſolute neceſſity to be believed to make a man a chriſtian? this worthy divine, that takes upon himſelf to be a ſucceſſor of the apoſtles, cannot tell. And yet, having taken upon himſelf alſo to be a creed-maker, he muſt ſuffer himſelf to be called upon for it again and again, 'till he tells us what is of abſolute neceſſity to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, or confeſs that he cannot.

IN the mean time, I take the liberty to ſay, that every propoſition delivered in the new teſtament by our Saviour, or his apoſtles, and ſo received by any chriſtian as of divine revelation, is of as abſolute neceſſity to be aſſented to by him, in the ſenſe he underſtands it to be taught by them, as any one of thoſe propoſitions enumerated by the creed-maker: and if he thinks otherwiſe, I ſhall deſire him to prove it. The reaſon whereof is this, that in divine revelation, the ground of faith being only the authority of the propoſer; where that is the ſame, there is no difference in the obligation or meaſure of believing. Whatever the Meſſiah, that came from God, taught, is equally to be believed by every one who receives him as the Meſſiah, as ſoon as he underſtands what it was he taught. There is no ſuch thing as garbling his doctrine, and making one part of it more neceſſary to be believed than another, when it is underſtood. His ſaying is, and muſt be, of unqueſtionable authority to all that receive him as their heavenly King; and carries with it an equal obligation of aſſent to all that he ſays as true. But ſince no body can explicitly aſſent to any propoſition of our Saviour's as true, but in the ſenſe he underſtands our Saviour to have ſpoken it in; the ſame authority of the Meſſiah, his King, obliges every one abſolutely and indiſpenſably to believe every part of the new teſtament in that ſenſe he underſtands it: for elſe he rejects the authority of the deliverer, if he refuſes his aſſent to it in that ſenſe which he is perſuaded it was delivered in. But the taking him for the Meſſiah, his King and Lord, laying upon every one who is his ſubject, an obligation to endeavour to know his will in all things; every true chriſtian is under an abſolute and indiſpenſable neceſſity, by being his ſubject, to ſtudy the ſcriptures with an unprejudiced mind, according to that meaſure of time, opportunity, and helps which he has; that in theſe ſacred writings, he may find what his Lord and Maſter hath, by himſelf, or by the mouths of his apoſtles, required of him, either to be believed or done.

THE creed-maker, in the following page, 256. hath theſe words: "It is "worth the reader's obſerving, that notwithſtanding I had in twelve pages together (viz. from the eighth to the twentieth) proved, that ſeveral propoſitions are neceſſary to be believed by us, in order to our being chriſtians; yet "this ſham-animadverter attends not to any one of the particulars which I had "mentioned, nor offers any thing againſt them; but only, in a lumping way, "dooms them all in thoſe magiſterial words; "I do not ſee any proof he produces," p. 21. "This is his wonderful way of confuting me, by pretending "that he cannot ſee any proof in what I alledge; and all the world muſt be led by his eyes."

Answ. "It is worth the reader's obſerving," that the creed-maker does not reply to what Mr. Bold has ſaid to him, as we have already ſeen, and ſhall ſee more as we go on; and therefore he has little reaſon to complain of him, for not having anſwered enough. Mr. Bold did well to leave that which was an inſignificant lump, ſo as it was, together: for 'tis no wonderful thing not to ſee any proof, where there is no proof. There is indeed, in thoſe pages the creed-maker mentions, much confidence, much aſſertion, a great many queſtions aſked, and a great deal ſaid after his faſhion: but for a proof, I deny there is any one. And if what I have ſaid in another place already, does not convince him of it, I challenge him, with all his eyes, and thoſe of the world to boot, to find out, in thoſe twelve renowned pages, one proof. Let him ſet down the propoſition, and his proof of its being abſolutely and indiſpenſably neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian; and I too will join with him in his teſtimonial of himſelf, and that he is irrefragable. But I muſt tell him before-hand, talking a great deal looſly will not do it.

Mr. Bold and I ſay we cannot ſee any proof in thoſe twelve pages: the way to make us ſee, or to convince the world that we are blind, is to ſingle out one proof out of that wood of words there, which you ſeem to take for arguments, and ſet it down in a ſyllogiſm, which is the fair trial of a proof or no proof. You have, indeed, a ſyllogiſm in the 23d page; but that is not in thoſe twelve pages you mention. Beſides, I have ſhewed in another place, what that proves; to which I refer you.

In anſwer to the creed-maker's queſtion, about his other fundamentals found in the epiſtles; "Why did the apoſtles write theſe doctrines? Was it not, that thoſe they writ to, might give their aſſent to them?" Mr. Bold, p. 22. replies; "But then it may be aſked again, Were not thoſe perſons chriſtians, to whom the apoſtles writ theſe doctrines, and whom they required to aſſent to them? Yes, verily. And if ſo, What was it that made them chriſtians before their aſſent to theſe doctrines was required? If it were any thing beſides their believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah," it ought to be inſtanced in, and made out.

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

The next thing in controverſy between Mr. Bold and the creed-maker, (for I follow Mr. B——d's order) is about a matter of fact, viz. Whether the creed-maker has proved, "that Jeſus Chriſt and his apoſtles have taught, that no man can be a chriſtian, or ſhall be ſaved, unleſs he have an explicit knowledge of all thoſe things, which have an immediate reſpect to the occaſion, author, way, means and iſſue of our ſalvation, and which are neceſſary for the knowing the true nature and deſign of it?" This, Mr. Bold, p. 24. tells him, "he has not done." To this the creed-maker replies, p. 258.

"And yet the reader may ſatisfy himſelf, that this is the very thing that I had been proving juſt before, and indeed, all along in the foregoing chapter. Anſw. There have been thoſe who have been ſeven years proving a thing, which at laſt they could not do; and I give you ſeven years to prove this propoſition, which you ſhould there have proved; and I muſt add to your ſcore here, viz.

LII. "That Jeſus Chriſt, or his apoſtles, have taught, that no man can be a chriſtian, or can be ſaved, unleſs he hath an explicit knowledge of all thoſe things which have an immediate reſpect to the occaſion, author, way, means and iſſue of our ſalvation, and which are neceſſary for our knowing the true nature and deſign of it.

Nor muſt the poor excuſe, of ſaying, It was not neceſſary "to add any farther medium, and proceed to another ſyllogiſm, becauſe you had ſecured that propoſition before;" go for payment. If you had ſecured it, as you ſay, it had been quite as eaſy, and much more for your credit, to have produced the proof whereby you had ſecured it, than to ſay you had done it; and thereupon to reproach Mr. Bold with heedleſsneſs; and to tell the world, that "he cares not what he ſaith." The rule of fair diſpute is, indiſpenſably to prove, where any thing is denied. To evade this, is ſhuffling: and he that, inſtead of it, anſwers with ill language, in my country, is called a foul-mouthed wrangler.

To the creed-maker's exception to my demand, about the actual belief of all his fundamentals in his new creed, Mr. Bold aſks, p. 24. "Whether a man "can believe particular propoſitions, and not actually believe them?"

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

MR. BOLD, p. 25. farther acknowledges the creed-maker's fundamental propoſitions to "be in the bible; and that they are for this purpoſe there, that "they might be believed:" and ſo, he ſaith, "is every other propoſition which "is taught in our bibles." But aſks, "How will it thence follow, that no "man can be a chriſtian, 'till he particularly know, and actually aſſent to, every "propoſition in our bibles?"

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

FROM p. 26. to 30. Mr. Bold ſhews, that the creed-maker's reply concerning my not gathering of fundamentals out of the epiſtles, is nothing to the purpoſe; and this he demonſtratively proves.

AND TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

THE creed-maker had falſly ſaid, That, "I bring no tidings of an evange-"lical faith:" and thence very readily and chartitably infers; "Which gives us "to underſtand, that he verily believes there is no ſuch chriſtian faith." To this Mr. Bold thus ſoftly replies, p. 31. "I think Mr. Edwards is much miſ-"taken, both in his aſſertion and inference:" and to ſhew that he could not ſo infer, adds; "If the author of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. had not "brought any tidings of ſuch a faith, I think it could not be hence juſtly in-"ferred, that "he verily believes there is no ſuch chriſtian faith:" becauſe "his inquiry and ſearch was not concerning chriſtian faith, conſidered ſubjec-"tively, but objectively; what the articles be, which muſt be believed to make "a man a chriſtian; and not, with what ſort of faith theſe articles are to be "believed."

To this the creed-maker anſwers indeed; but it is ſomething as much worſe than nothing, as falſhood is worſe than ſilence. His words are, p. 258. "It "may be queſtioned, from what he [the animadverter] hath the confidence to "ſay, p. 31. viz. There is no inquiry in the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, con-"cerning faith ſubjectively conſidered, but only objectively," &c. And thus having ſet down Mr. B—d's words, otherwiſe than they are; for Mr. Bold does not ſay, there is no inquiry, i. e. no mention, (for ſo the creed-maker explains inquiries here. For to convince Mr. Bold that there is an inquiry, i. e. mention, of ſubjective faith, he alledges, that ſubjective faith is ſpoken of in the 191ſt and 192d pages of my book.) But Mr. Bold ſays not, that faith, conſidered ſubjectively, is not ſpoken of any where in the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. but "that the author's inquiry and ſearch "i. e. the author's "ſearch, or deſign of his ſearch) was not concerning chriſtian faith conſidered "ſubjectively." And thus the creed-maker, impoſing on his reader, by perverting Mr. Bold's ſenſe, from what was the intention of my inquiry and ſearch, to what I had ſaid in it, he goes on, after his ſcurrilous faſhion, to inſult, in theſe words, which follow; "I ſay, it may be gueſſed from this, what a li-"berty this writer takes, to aſſert what he pleaſes." Anſw. "To aſſert what "one pleaſes," without truth, and without certainty, is the worſt character can be given a writer; and with falſhood to charge it on another, is no mean ſlander and injury to a man's neighbour. And yet to theſe ſhameful arts muſt he be driven, who finding his ſtrength of managing a cauſe to lie only in fiction and falſhood, has no other but the dull Billingſgate way of covering it, by endeavouring to divert the reader's obſervation and cenſure from himſelf, by a confident repeated imputation of that to his adverſary, which he himſelf is ſo frequent in the commiſſion of. And of this the inſtances I have given, are a ſufficient proof; in which I have been at the pains to ſet down the words on both ſides, and the pages where they are to be found, for the reader's full ſatiſfaction.

THE cauſe in debate between us is of great weight, and concerns every chriſtian. That any evidence in the propoſal, or defence of it, can be ſufficient to conquer all men's prejudices, is vanity to imagine. But this, I think, I may juſtly demand of every reader, that ſince there are great and viſible falſhoods on one ſide or the other (for the accuſations of this kind are poſitive and frequent) he would examine on which ſide they are: and upon that I will venture the cauſe in any reader's judgment, who will be but at the pains of turning to the pages marked out to him; and as for him that will not do that, I care not much what he ſays.

THE creed-maker's following words, p. 258. have the natural mark of their author. They are theſe: "How can this animadverter come off with peremptory declaring, that ſubjective faith is not inquired into, in the treatiſe of the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. when in another place, p. 35. and 36. he "avers, That chriſtian faith and chriſtianity, conſidered ſubj ctively, are the "ſame?" Anſw. In which words there are two manifeſt untruths: the one is, "That Mr. Bold peremptorily declares, that ſubjective faith is not enquired "into, i. e. ſpoken of, in the reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity," &c. Whereas Mr. Bold ſays in that place, p. 31. "If he [i. e. the author] had not ſaid one "word concerning faith ſubjectively conſidered." The creed-maker's other untruth is his ſaying, "That the animadverter avers, p. 35, 36. that chriſtian "faith and chriſtianity, conſidered ſubjectively are the ſame." Whereas 'tis evident, that Mr. Bold, arguing againſt theſe words of the creed-maker, "The "belief of Jeſus being the Meſſiah, was one of the firſt and leading acts of "chriſtian faith)" ſpeaks in that place of an act of faith, as theſe words of his demonſtrate; "Now, I apprehend that chriſtian faith and chriſtianity, conſi"dered ſubjectively, (and an ACT of chriſtian faith, I think, cannot be under"ſtood in any other ſenſe) are the very ſame." I muſt therefore deſire him to ſet down the words, wherein the animadverter peremptorily declares,

LIII. "THAT ſubjective faith is not inquired into, or ſpoken of, in the treatiſe of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c.

AND next to produce the words wherein the animadverter avers,

LIV. "THAT chriſtian faith and chriſtianity, conſidered ſubjectively, are "the ſame."

To the creed-maker's ſaying, "That the author of the reaſonableneſs of chri"ſtianity, &c. brings us no tidings of evangelical faith belonging to chriſtianity." Mr. Bold replies; That I have done it in all thoſe pages where I ſpeak of taking and accepting Jeſus to be our King and Ruler; and particularly he ſets down my words out of page 301.

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

THE creed-maker ſays, p. 59. of his ſocinianiſm unmaſked, that the author of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity "tells men again and again, that a chriſtian "man, or member of Chriſt, needs not know or believe any more than that one "individual point." To which Mr. Bold thus replies, p. 33. "If any man will "ſhew me thoſe words in any part of the reaſonableneſs, &c. I ſhall ſuſpect I "was not awake all the time I was reading that book: and I am as certain as one "awake can be, that there are ſeveral paſſages in that book directly contrary to "theſe words. And there are ſome expreſſions in the vindication of the rea"ſonableneſs, &c. one would think, if Mr. Edwards had obſerved them, they "would have prevented that miſtake."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

MR. BOLD, p. 34. takes notice, that the creed-maker had not put the query, or objections, right, which he ſays, "Some, and not without ſome ſhew of ground,

" may be apt to ſtart:" and therefore Mr. Bold puts the query right, viz. " Why " did Jeſus Chriſt, and his apoſtles, require aſſent to, and belief of, this one article alone, viz. That Jeſus is the Meſſiah, to conſtitute and make a man a " chriſtian, or true member of Chriſt, (as it is abundantly evident they did, from " the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity) if the belief of more articles is abſolutely " neceſſary to make and conſtitute a man a chriſtian?"

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

AND therefore I put the objection, or query to him again, in Mr. Bold's words, and expect an anſwer to it, viz.

LV. " WHY, did Jeſus Chriſt, and his apoſtles, require aſſent to and belief " of, this one article alone, viz. That Jeſus is the Meſſiah, to make a man " a chriſtian, (as it is abundantly evident they did, from all their preaching, " recorded throughout all the whole hiſtory of the Evangeliſts and the Acts) " if the belief of more articles be abſolutely neceſſary to make a man a " chriſtian?"

THE creed-maker having made believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, only one of the firſt and leading acts of chriſtian faith; Mr. Bold, p. 35. rightly tells him, That " chriſtian faith muſt be the belief of ſomething or other: and if it be the " belief of any thing beſides this, that Jeſus is the Chriſt, or Meſſiah, that other " thing ſhould be ſpecified; and it ſhould be made appear, that the belief that " Jeſus is the Meſſiah, without the belief of that other propoſition, is not chriſtian faith."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

MR. B--D, in the following pages, 36,--39. has excellently explained the difference between that faith which conſtitutes a man a chriſtian, and that faith whereby one that is a chriſtian, believes the doctrine taught by our Saviour; and the ground of that difference: and therein has fully overturned this propoſition, " That believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, is but a ſtep, or the firſt ſtep, to " chriſtianity."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

To the creed-maker's ſuppoſing that other matters of faith were propoſed with this, that Jeſus is the Meſſiah; Mr. Bold replies, That this ſhould be proved, viz. that other articles were propoſed, as requiſite to be believed to make men chriſtians. And, p. 40. he gives a reaſon why he is of another mind, viz. " Becauſe there is nothing but this recorded, which was inſiſted on for that " purpoſe."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

MR. BOLD. p. 42. ſhews that Rom. x. 9. which the creed-maker brought againſt it, confirms the aſſertion of the author of the reaſonableneſs, &c. concerning the faith that makes a man a chriſtian.

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

THE creed-maker ſays, p. 78. " This is the main anſwer to the objection, (or query above propoſed) viz. That chriſtianity was erected by degrees." This Mr. Bold, p. 43. proves to be nothing to the purpoſe, by this reaſon, viz. " Becauſe what makes one man a chriſtian, or ever did make any man a chriſtian, " will at any time, to the end of the world, make any man a chriſtian:" and aſks, " Will not that make a chriſtian now, which made the apoſtles themſelves " chriſtians?"

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

IN anſwer to his ſixth chapter, Mr. Bold, p. 45. tells him, " It was not my " buſineſs to diſcourſe of the Trinity, or any other particular doctrines, propoſed to be believed by them who are chriſtians; and that it is no fair and juſt " ground to accuſe a man, for rejecting the doctrines of the Trinity, and that " Jeſus is God, becauſe he does not interpret ſome particular texts to the ſame " purpoſe others do."

BUT TO THIS Mr. Edwards ANSWERS NOT.

INDEED he takes notice of theſe words of Mr. Bold, in this paragraph, viz. "Hence Mr. Edwards takes occaſion to write many pages about theſe terms [viz. Meſſiah, and Son of God]; but I do not perceive that he pretends to offer any proof, that theſe were not ſynonymous terms amongſt the Jews at that time, which is the point he ſhould have proved, if he deſigned to invalidate what this author ſays about that matter." To this the creed-maker replies, p. 257. "The animadverter doth not ſo much as offer one ſyllable to diſprove what I delivered, and cloſely urged on that head." Anſw. What need any anſwer to diſprove, where there is no proof brought, that reaches the propoſition in queſtion? If there had been any ſuch proof, the producing of it, in ſhort, had been a more convincing argument to the reader, than ſo much bragging of what has been done. For here are more words ſpent, (for I have not ſet them all down) than would have ſerved to have expreſſed the proof of this propoſition, viz. that the terms above-mentioned were not ſynonymous amongſt the Jews, if there had been any proof of it. But having already examined what the creed-maker brags he has cloſely urged, I ſhall ſay no more of it here.

To the creed-maker's making me a Socinian, in his eighth chapter, for not naming Chriſt's ſatisfaction among the advantages and benefits of Chriſt's coming into the world; Mr. Bold replies, "1. That it is no proof, becauſe I promiſed not to name every one of them. And the mention of ſome is no denial of others." 2. He replies, That "ſatisfaction is not ſo ſtrictly to be termed an advantage, as the effects and fruits of it are; and that the doctrine of ſatisfaction inſtructs us in the way how Chriſt did, by divine appointment, obtain thoſe advantages for us." And this was an anſwer that deſerved ſome reply from the creed-maker.

BUT TO THIS HE ANSWERS NOT.

MR. BOLD ſays right, that this is a doctrine that is of mighty importance for a chriſtian to be well acquainted with. And I will add to it, that it is very hard for a chriſtian, who reads the ſcripture with attention, and an unprejudiced mind, to deny the ſatisfaction of Chriſt: but it being a term not uſed by the Holy Ghoſt in the ſcripture, and very variouſly explained by thoſe that do uſe it, and very much ſtumbled at by thoſe I was there ſpeaking to, who were ſuch, as I there ſay, "Who will not take a bleſſing, unleſs they be inſtructed what need they had of it, and why it was beſtowed upon them;" I left it, with the other diſputed doctrines of chriſtianity, to be looked into, (to ſee what it was Chriſt had taught concerning it) by thoſe who were chriſtians, and believed Jeſus to be the Saviour promiſed, and ſent from God. And to thoſe who yet doubted that he was ſo, and made this objection, "What need was there of a Saviour?" I thought it moſt reaſonable to offer ſuch particulars only as were agreed on by all chriſtians, and were capable of no diſpute, but muſt be acknowledged by every body to be needful. This, though the words above-quoted out of the reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c. p. 572. ſhew to be my deſign; yet the creed-maker plainly gives me the lye, and tells me it was not my deſign. "All the world are faithleſs, falſe, treacherous, hypocritical, ſtrainers upon their reaſon and conſcience, diſſemblers, journeymen, mercenary hirelings, except Mr. Edwards: I mean, all the world that oppoſes him. And muſt not one think, he is mightily beholden to the excellency and readineſs of his own nature, who is no ſooner engaged in controverſy, but he immediately finds out in his adverſaries, theſe arts of equivocation, lying, and effrontery, in managing of it? Reaſon, and learning, and acquired improvements, might elſe have let him gone on with others, in the dull and ordinary way of fair arguing; wherein, poſſibly, he might have done no great feats. Muſt not a rich and fertile ſoil within, and a prompt genius, wherein a man may readily ſpy the propenſities of baſe and corrupt nature, be acknowledged to be an excellent qualification for a diſputant, to help him to the quick diſcovery and laying open of the faults of his opponents; which a mind otherwiſe diſpoſed would not ſo much as ſuſpect? But Mr. Bold, without this, could not have been ſo ſoon found out to be a journeyman, a diſſembler, an hired mercenary, and ſtored with all thoſe good qualities, wherein he hath his full ſhare with me. But why would he then venture upon Mr. Edwards, who is ſo very quick-ſighted in theſe matters, and knows ſo well what villainous man is capable of?

I SHOULD not here, in this my vindication, have given the reader ſo much of Mr. Bold's reaſoning, which, though clear and ſtrong, yet has more beauty and force, as it ſtands in the whole piece in his book; nor ſhould I have ſo often repeated this remark upon each paſſage, viz. "To this Mr. Edwards anſwers "not;" had it not been the ſhorteſt and propereſt comment could be made on that triumphant paragraph of his, which begins in the 128th page of his ſocinian creed; wherein, among a great deal of no ſmall ſtrutting, are theſe words: "By their profound ſilence they acknowledge they have nothing to reply." He that deſires to ſee more of the ſame noble ſtrain, may have recourſe to that eminent place. Beſide, it was fit the reader ſhould have this one taſte more of the creed-maker's genius, who, paſſing by in ſilence all theſe clear and appoſite replies of Mr. Bold, loudly complains of him, p. 259. "That where he [Mr. Bold] "finds ſomething that he dares not object againſt, he ſhifts it off." And again, p. 260. "That he doth not make any offer at reaſon; there is not the leaſt "ſhadow of an argument.—As if he were only hired to ſay ſomething againſt "me, [the creed-maker] though not at all to the purpoſe: and truly, any man "may diſcern a MERCENARY ſtroke all along;" with a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe. For ſuch language as this, mixed with ſcurrility, neither fit to be ſpoken by, nor of, a miniſter of the goſpel, make up the remainder of his poſtſcript. But to prevent this for the future; I demand of him, that if in either of his treatiſes, there be any thing againſt what I have ſaid, in my reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, which he thinks not fully anſwered, he will ſet down the propoſition in direct words, and note the page of his book, where it is to be found; and I promiſe him an anſwer to it. For as for his railing, and other ſtuff beſides the matter, I ſhall hereafter no more trouble myſelf to take notice of it. And ſo much for Mr. Edwards.

THERE is another gentleman, and of another ſort of make, parts, and breeding, who (as it ſeems, aſhamed of Mr. Edwards's way of handling controverſies in religion) has had ſomething to ſay of my "reaſonableneſs of "chriſtianity, &c." and ſo has made it neceſſary for me to ſay a word to him, before I let theſe papers go out of my hand. It is the author of "the occaſi"onal paper," numb. 1. The ſecond, third, and fourth pages of that paper, gave me great hopes to meet with a man, who would examine all the miſtakes which come abroad in print, with that temper and indifferency, that might ſet an exact pattern for controverſy, to thoſe who would approve themſelves to be ſincere contenders for truth and knowledge, and nothing elſe, in the diſputes they engaged in. Making him allowance for the miſtakes that ſelf-indulgence is apt to impoſe upon human frailty, I am apt to believe he thought his performance had been ſuch: but I crave leave to obſerve, that good and candid men are often miſled, from a fair unbiaſſed purſuit of truth, by an over-great zeal for ſomething, that they, upon wrong grounds, take to be ſo; and that it is not ſo eaſy to be a fair and unprejudiced champion for truth, as ſome, who profeſs it, think it to be. To acquaint him with the occaſion of this remark, I muſt deſire him to read and conſider his nineteenth page; and then to tell me,

1. WHETHER he knows, that the doctrine propoſed in the "reaſonableneſs "of chriſtianity, &c." was borrowed, as he ſays, from Hobbes's Leviathan? For I tell him, I borrowed it only from the writers of the four goſpels, and the Acts; and did not know that thoſe words, he quoted out of the Leviathan, were there, or any thing like them. Nor do I know yet, any farther than as I believe them to be there, from his quotation.

2. WHETHER affirming, as he does poſitively, this, which he could not know to be true, and is in itſelf perfectly falſe, were meant to increaſe or leſſen the credit of the author of the "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c." in the opinion of the world? Or is it conſonant with his own rule, p. 3. "of putting can"did conſtructions on what adverſaries ſay?" Or with what follows, in theſe

words? “ The more divine the cauſe is, ſtill the greater ſhould be the caution. “ The very diſcourſing about Almighty God, or our holy religion, ſhould com- “ poſe our paſſions, and inſpire us with candor and love. It is very indecent “ to handle ſuch ſubjects, in a manner that betrays rancor and ſpite. Theſe are “ fiends that ought to vaniſh, and ſhould never mix, either with a ſearch after “ truth, or the defence of religion.”

3. Whether the propoſitions which he has, out of my book, inſerted into his nineteenth page, and ſays, “ are conſonant to the words of the Leviathan,” were thoſe, of all my book, which were likelieſt to give the reader a true and fair notion of the doctrine contained in it? If they were not, I muſt deſire him to remember and beware of his fiends. Not but that he will find thoſe propoſitions there to be true. But that neither he nor others may miſtake my book, this is that, in ſhort, which it ſays:

1. That there is a faith that makes men chriſtians.

2. That this faith is the believing “ Jeſus of Nazareth to be the Meſſiah.”

3. That the believing Jeſus to be the Meſſiah, includes in it a receiving him for our Lord and King, promiſed and ſent from God: and ſo lays upon all his ſubjects, and abſolute and diſpenſable neceſſity of aſſenting to all that they can attain the knowledge that he taught; and of a ſincere obedience to all that he commanded.

This, whether it be the doctrine of the Leviathan, I know not. This appears to me out of the new teſtament, from whence (as I told him in the preface) I took it to be the doctrine of our Saviour and his apoſtles; and I would not willingly be miſtaken in it. If therefore there be any other faith beſides this, abſolutely requiſite to make a man a chriſtian, I ſhall here again deſire this gentleman to inform me what it is; i. e. to ſet down all thoſe propotions which are ſo indiſpenſably to be believed, (for 'tis of ſimple believing, I perceive, the controverſy runs) that no man can be a believer, i. e. a chriſtian, without an actual knowledge of, and an explicit aſſent to, them. If he ſhould do this with that candor and fairneſs he declares to be neceſſary in ſuch matters, I ſhall own myſelf obliged to him: for I am in earneſt, and I would not be miſtaken in it.

If he ſhall decline it, I, and the world too, muſt conclude, that upon a review of my doctrine, he is convinced of the truth of it, and is ſatisfied, that I am in the right. For it is impoſſible to think, that a man of that fairneſs and candor, which he ſolemnly prefaces his diſcourſe with, ſhould continue to condemn the account I have given, of the faith which I am perſuaded makes a chriſtian; and yet he himſelf will not tell me, (when I earneſtly demand it of him, as deſirous to be rid of my error, if it be one) what is that more, which is abſolutely required to be believed by every one, before he can be a believer, i. e. what is indiſpenſably neceſſary to be known, and explicitly believed, to make a man a chriſtian.

Another thing which I muſt deſire this author to examine, by thoſe his own rules, is, what he ſays of me, p. 30. where he makes me to have a prejudice againſt the miniſtry of the goſpel, and their office, from what I have ſaid in my reaſonableneſs, &c. p. 575, 576. concerning the prieſts of the world, in our Saviour's time; which he calls bitter reflections.

If he will tell me what is ſo bitter, in any one of thoſe paſſages which he has ſet down, that is not true, or ought not to be ſaid there, and give me the reaſon why he is offended at it; I promiſe him to make what reparation he ſhall think fit, to the memory of thoſe prieſts, whom he, with ſo much good nature, patronizes, near ſeventeen hundred years after they have been out of the world; and is ſo tenderly concerned for their reputation, that he excepts againſt that, as ſaid againſt them, which was not. For one of the three places he ſets down, was not ſpoken of prieſts. But his making my mentioning the faults of the prieſts of old, in our Saviour's time, to be an “ expoſing the office of the “ miniſters of the goſpel now, and a vilifying thoſe who are employed in it;” I muſt deſire him to examine, by his own rules of love and candor; and to tell me, "Whether I have not reaſon here again, to mind him of his FIENDS, "and to adviſe him to beware of them?" And to ſhew him why I think I have, I crave leave to aſk him theſe queſtions:

1. WHETHER I do not all along plainly, and in expreſs words, ſpeak of the prieſts of the world, preceding, and in our Saviour's time? Nor can my argument bear any other ſenſe.

2. WHETHER all I have ſaid of them be not true?

3. WHETHER the repreſenting truly the carriage of the Jewiſh, and more eſpecially of the heathen prieſts, in our Saviour's time, as my argument required. can expoſe the office of the miniſters of the goſpel now? Or ought to have ſuch an interpretation put upon it?

4. WHETHER what he ſays of the "air and language I uſe, reaching farther," carry any thing elſe in it, but a declaration, that he thinks ſome men's carriage now, hath ſome affinity with that I have truly ſaid, of the prieſts of the world, before chriſtianity; and that therefore the faults of thoſe ſhould have been let alone, or touched more gently, for fear ſome ſhould think theſe now concerned in it?

5. WHETHER, in truth, this be not to accuſe them with a deſign to draw the envy of it on me? Whether out of good will to them, or to me, or both, let him look. This I am ſure, I have ſpoke of none but the prieſts before chriſtianity, both Jewiſh and heathen. And for thoſe of the Jews, what our Saviour has pronounced of them, juſtifies my reflections from being bitter; and that the idolatrous heathen prieſts were better than they, I believe our author will not ſay: and if he were preaching againſt them, as oppoſing the miniſters of the goſpel, I ſuppoſe he would give us as ill a character of them. But if any one extends my words farther, than to thoſe they were ſpoke of, I aſk whether that agrees with his rules of love and candor.

I SHALL impatiently expect, from this author of the occaſional paper, an anſwer to theſe queſtions; and hope to find them ſuch as becomes that temper, and love of truth, which he profeſſes. I long to meet with a man, who laying aſide party, and intereſt, and prejudice, appears in controverſy ſo as to make good the character of a champion of truth for truth's ſake; a character not ſo hard to be known whom it belongs to, as to be deſerved. Whoever is truly ſuch an one, his oppoſition to me will be an obligation. For he that propoſes to himſelf the convincing me of an error, only for truth's ſake, cannot, I know, mix any rancour, or ſpite, or ill-will, with it. He will keep himſelf at a diſtance from thoſe fiends, and be as ready to hear, as offer reaſon. And two ſo diſpoſed can hardly miſs truth between them, in a fair inquiry after it; at leaſt, they will not loſe good-breeding, and eſpecially charity, a virtue much more neceſſary than the attaining of the knowledge of obſcure truths, that are not eaſy to be found; and probably, therefore, not neceſſary to be known.

THE unbiaſſed deſign of the writer, purely to defend and propagate truth, ſeems to me to be that alone which legitimates controverſies. I am ſure, it plainly diſtinguiſhes ſuch from all others, in their ſucceſs and uſefulneſs. If a man, as a ſincere friend to the perſon, and to the truth, labours to bring another out of error, there can be nothing more beautiful, nor more beneficial. If party, paſſion, or vanity direct his pen, and have a hand in the controverſy; there can be nothing more unbecoming, more prejudicial, nor more odious. What thoughts I ſhall have of a man that ſhall, as a chriſtian, go about to inform me what is neceſſary to be believed to make a man a chriſtian, I have declared, in the preface to my "reaſonableneſs of chriſtianity, &c." nor do I find myſelf yet altered, He that, in print, finds fault with my imperfect diſcovery of that, wherein the faith, which makes a man a chriſtian, conſiſts, and will not tell me what more is required, will do well to ſatisfy the world what they ought to think of him.

FINIS.

THE
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